1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
15 use chain::{Confirm, Listen, Watch};
16 use chain::channelmonitor;
17 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
18 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
19 use chain::keysinterface::BaseSign;
20 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
21 use ln::channel::{commitment_tx_base_weight, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT};
22 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS };
23 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
24 use ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
25 use ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
26 use routing::network_graph::RoutingFees;
27 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteHint, RouteHintHop, RouteParameters, find_route, get_route};
28 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures, NodeFeatures};
30 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
31 use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
32 use util::{byte_utils, test_utils};
33 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason};
34 use util::errors::APIError;
35 use util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
36 use util::config::UserConfig;
38 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
39 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
40 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
41 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
42 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
43 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
45 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
46 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
52 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
53 use core::default::Default;
54 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
56 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
57 use ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
60 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
61 // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
62 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
63 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
64 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
65 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
67 // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
69 let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
70 let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat);
71 let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
73 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
74 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
76 // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
77 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
79 // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
80 // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
81 let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
82 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
83 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
84 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
85 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
86 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
88 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
89 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), expected_regex, 1);
91 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
93 } else { assert!(false); }
96 use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
97 use ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
99 // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
100 insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than {}. It was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS; msg });
102 insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
104 insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than funding value \d+", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
106 insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
108 insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
110 insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
112 insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
114 insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
117 fn do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(send_from_initiator: bool) {
118 // A peer providing a channel_reserve_satoshis of 0 (or less than our dust limit) is insecure,
119 // but only for them. Because some LSPs do it with some level of trust of the clients (for a
120 // substantial UX improvement), we explicitly allow it. Because it's unlikely to happen often
121 // in normal testing, we test it explicitly here.
122 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
123 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
124 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
125 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
127 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
128 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
129 let feerate_per_kw = 253;
130 let opt_anchors = false;
131 push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
132 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
134 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None).unwrap();
135 let mut open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
136 if !send_from_initiator {
137 open_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
138 open_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
140 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_message);
142 // Extract the channel accept message from node1 to node0
143 let mut accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
144 if send_from_initiator {
145 accept_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
146 accept_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
148 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel_message);
151 let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(if send_from_initiator { &nodes[1] } else { &nodes[0] }, lock, temp_channel_id);
152 chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
153 chan.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
156 let funding_tx = sign_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100_000, temp_channel_id);
157 let funding_msgs = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_tx);
158 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_msgs.0);
160 // nodes[0] should now be able to send the full balance to nodes[1], violating nodes[1]'s
161 // security model if it ever tries to send funds back to nodes[0] (but that's not our problem).
162 if send_from_initiator {
163 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000_000
164 // Note that for outbound channels we have to consider the commitment tx fee and the
165 // "fee spike buffer", which is currently a multiple of the total commitment tx fee as
166 // well as an additional HTLC.
167 - FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, 2, opt_anchors));
169 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], push_amt);
174 fn test_counterparty_no_reserve() {
175 do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(true);
176 do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(false);
180 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
181 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
182 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
183 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
184 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
185 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
188 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
192 // send (1) commitment_signed -.
193 // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
194 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
195 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
196 // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
197 // (2) RAA is delivered ->
198 // .- send (4) commitment_signed
199 // <- (3) RAA is delivered
200 // send (5) commitment_signed -.
201 // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
203 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
205 // (6) RAA is delivered ->
207 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
209 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
212 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
213 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
215 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
216 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
217 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
218 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
219 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
221 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
224 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
226 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
227 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
228 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
229 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
231 let payment_event = {
232 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
233 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
234 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
236 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
237 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
239 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
240 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
241 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
242 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
243 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
244 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
246 // deliver(1), generate (3):
247 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
248 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
249 // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
250 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
252 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
253 let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
254 assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
255 assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
256 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
257 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
258 assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
259 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
261 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
262 let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
263 assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
264 assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
265 assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
266 assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
267 assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
268 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
270 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
271 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
272 // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
273 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
275 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
276 let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
277 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
279 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
280 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
282 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
283 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
285 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
286 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
289 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
290 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
294 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
295 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
296 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
297 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
298 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
299 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
300 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
301 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
304 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
306 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
308 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
311 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
312 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
314 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
315 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
316 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
317 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
320 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
323 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
325 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
326 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
327 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
328 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
330 let payment_event = {
331 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
332 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
333 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
335 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
336 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
338 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
339 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
340 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
341 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
342 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
343 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
345 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
346 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
348 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
352 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
353 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
354 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
355 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
356 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
357 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
360 // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
361 // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
362 // update_fee (never committed) ->
364 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
365 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
366 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
367 // <- (1) RAA delivered
368 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
369 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
370 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
371 // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
373 // B should send no response here
374 // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
375 // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
378 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
381 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
382 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
383 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
385 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
386 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
388 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
389 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
390 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
391 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
392 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
394 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
397 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
398 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
399 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
400 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
401 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
403 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
406 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
407 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
409 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
410 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
411 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
413 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
414 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
415 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
416 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
419 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
421 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
423 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
425 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
426 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
427 let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
428 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
429 assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
430 assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
431 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
432 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
433 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
434 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
435 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
437 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
438 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
439 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
440 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
441 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
443 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
444 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
445 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
448 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
449 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
450 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
452 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
453 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
454 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
456 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
457 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
458 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
459 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
461 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
462 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
463 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
466 fn do_test_1_conf_open(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
467 // Previously, if the minium_depth config was set to 1, we'd never send a funding_locked. This
468 // tests that we properly send one in that case.
469 let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
470 alice_config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
471 alice_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
472 alice_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
473 let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
474 bob_config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
475 bob_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
476 bob_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
477 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
478 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
479 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)]);
480 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
481 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
483 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
484 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
485 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
487 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
488 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
489 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
492 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
493 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
494 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
498 fn test_1_conf_open() {
499 do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst);
500 do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirst);
501 do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
504 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
505 // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
506 // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
507 // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
510 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
511 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
512 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
513 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
515 if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
517 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
520 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
521 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
524 if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
525 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
526 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
528 if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
529 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
530 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
532 if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
533 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
535 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
537 if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
538 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
539 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
540 let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
542 if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
543 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
545 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
546 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
547 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
548 added_monitors.clear();
550 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
552 if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
553 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
555 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
556 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
557 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
558 added_monitors.clear();
561 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
562 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
564 if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
565 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
567 if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
568 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
569 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
570 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
574 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
575 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
576 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
577 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
578 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
579 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
580 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
581 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
582 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
583 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
584 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
585 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
586 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
587 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
588 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
589 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
590 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
591 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
592 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
596 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
597 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
598 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
599 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
600 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
601 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
604 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
607 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
608 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
610 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
611 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
612 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
613 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
614 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
616 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
618 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
620 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
621 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
622 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
624 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
625 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
626 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
628 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
629 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
630 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
631 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
633 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
634 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
635 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
639 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
640 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
641 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
642 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
643 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
644 let channel_value = 5000;
646 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
647 let channel_id = chan.2;
648 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
649 let bs_channel_reserve_sats = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value);
651 let opt_anchors = false;
653 // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
654 // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
655 // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
657 let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
658 let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors)) as u32;
660 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
661 *feerate_lock = feerate;
663 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
664 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
665 let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
667 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
669 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
671 // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
673 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
675 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
676 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
677 let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000;
678 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
679 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
680 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
684 // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
685 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
688 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
689 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
690 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
692 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
694 // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
695 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
696 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
697 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
698 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
699 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
700 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
701 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
702 pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
704 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
705 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
706 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
707 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
708 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
709 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
710 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
711 pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
714 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
715 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
716 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
719 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
720 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
721 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
722 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
723 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
724 INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
726 channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000,
727 opt_anchors, local_funding, remote_funding,
728 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
729 non_buffer_feerate + 4,
731 &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
733 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
736 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
739 htlc_signatures: res.1
742 let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
744 feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
747 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
749 //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
750 //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
751 //Should produce and error.
752 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
753 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
754 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
755 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
756 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") });
760 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
761 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
762 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
763 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
764 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
765 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
768 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
771 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
774 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
775 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
777 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
778 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
779 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
780 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
781 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
783 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
785 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
786 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
787 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
788 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
790 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
792 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
793 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
795 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
796 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
797 added_monitors.clear();
799 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
800 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
801 // node[1] has nothing to do
803 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
804 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
805 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
807 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
808 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
809 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
810 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
811 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
812 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
813 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
815 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
816 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
817 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
818 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
819 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
820 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
822 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
823 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
824 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
825 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
827 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
828 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
829 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
831 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
832 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
833 let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
834 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
836 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
837 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
838 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
840 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
842 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
843 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
845 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
846 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
849 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
851 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
852 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
853 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
854 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
855 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
859 fn test_update_fee() {
860 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
861 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
862 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
863 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
864 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
865 let channel_id = chan.2;
868 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
869 // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
870 // .- send (3) commitment_signed
871 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
872 // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
873 // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
874 // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
875 // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
876 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
877 // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
878 // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
881 // Create and deliver (1)...
884 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
885 feerate = *feerate_lock;
886 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
888 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
889 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
891 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
892 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
893 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
894 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
895 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
897 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
899 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
901 // Generate (2) and (3):
902 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
903 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
904 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
907 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
908 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
909 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
911 // Create and deliver (4)...
913 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
914 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
916 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
917 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
918 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
919 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
920 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
921 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
922 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
924 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
927 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
928 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
929 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
931 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
932 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
934 // Handle (3), creating (6):
935 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
936 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
937 let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
938 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
941 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
942 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
943 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
945 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
946 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
947 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
948 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
949 assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
950 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
951 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
952 assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
953 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
956 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
957 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
958 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
959 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
961 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
962 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
963 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
965 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
966 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
967 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
968 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
969 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
973 fn fake_network_test() {
974 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
975 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
976 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
977 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
978 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
979 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
981 // Create some initial channels
982 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
983 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
984 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
986 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
987 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
988 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
989 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
990 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
992 // Send some more payments
993 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
994 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
995 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
997 // Test failure packets
998 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
999 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
1001 // Add a new channel that skips 3
1002 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1004 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1005 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1006 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1007 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1008 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1009 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1010 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1012 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
1013 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1014 hops.push(RouteHop {
1015 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1016 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1017 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1018 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1020 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1022 hops.push(RouteHop {
1023 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1024 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1025 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1026 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1028 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1030 hops.push(RouteHop {
1031 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1032 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1033 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1034 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1036 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1038 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1039 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1040 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
1042 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1043 hops.push(RouteHop {
1044 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1045 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1046 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1047 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1049 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1051 hops.push(RouteHop {
1052 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1053 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1054 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1055 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1057 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1059 hops.push(RouteHop {
1060 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1061 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1062 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1063 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1065 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1067 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1068 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1069 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1071 // Claim the rebalances...
1072 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1073 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1075 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
1076 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1078 // Send some payments across both channels
1079 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1080 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1081 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1084 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
1085 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1086 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1087 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap(), 1);
1089 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
1091 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
1092 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
1093 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
1095 // Close down the channels...
1096 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1097 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1098 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1099 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1100 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1101 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1102 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1103 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1104 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1105 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1106 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1107 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1108 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
1109 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1110 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1114 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1115 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1116 // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1117 // commitment dance rounds.
1118 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1119 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1120 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1121 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1122 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1123 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1125 let mut payments = Vec::new();
1126 for _ in 0..::ln::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
1127 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1128 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
1129 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1131 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1133 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1134 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1135 let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1136 assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1138 // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1139 // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1141 let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1143 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1144 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1145 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1146 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
1149 // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1150 let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1152 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
1153 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1156 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1157 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1158 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1159 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1161 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1162 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1163 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1164 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1165 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1166 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1167 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1169 let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1170 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1171 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1173 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1175 // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1176 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1177 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1178 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1180 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1181 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1182 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1183 let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1185 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1186 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1187 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1189 for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1190 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1192 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1193 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1194 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1195 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1196 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1198 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1199 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1200 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1201 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1202 let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1204 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1205 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1207 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1209 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1210 assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1211 for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1213 &Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1214 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1216 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1220 for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1221 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1224 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1228 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1229 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1230 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1231 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1232 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1233 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1234 let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1236 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1237 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1238 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1239 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1240 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1241 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1243 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1245 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1246 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1248 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1249 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1251 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1252 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1253 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1257 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1258 // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1259 // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1260 // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1261 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1262 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1263 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1264 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1266 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1269 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1271 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1273 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1274 let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
1275 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1277 // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1278 nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1279 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1281 // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1282 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1284 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1285 let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1286 for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1287 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1288 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1289 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1290 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1293 assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1295 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1296 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1297 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1298 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1300 // Check we only broadcast 1 timeout tx
1301 let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1302 assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 8);
1303 assert_eq!(claim_txn[1], claim_txn[4]);
1304 assert_eq!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[5]);
1305 check_spends!(claim_txn[1], chan_1.3);
1306 check_spends!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[1]);
1307 check_spends!(claim_txn[7], claim_txn[1]);
1309 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1310 assert_eq!(claim_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
1311 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, claim_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
1313 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1314 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1315 check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
1316 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1317 assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
1318 assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1319 check_spends!(claim_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
1320 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1322 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1323 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1326 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1327 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
1328 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1329 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1331 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1332 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1333 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1334 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1335 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1336 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1338 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1344 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1345 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1346 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1347 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1348 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1349 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1351 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1352 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1354 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1355 let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2), 1 + 1, get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2));
1356 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1357 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send + 1);
1358 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).err().unwrap();
1360 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(ref fails) => {
1362 &APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ref err} =>
1363 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)),
1364 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1367 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1369 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1370 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1372 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1376 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1377 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1378 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1379 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1380 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1381 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1383 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460001);
1384 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1385 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1386 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1388 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1390 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1391 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3460001, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1392 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1393 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1396 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1397 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1398 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1399 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1402 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1404 // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1405 // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1406 // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1408 let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1410 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1412 // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1413 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1414 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1415 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1416 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1417 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1418 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1419 chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1421 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1422 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1423 chan_signer.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1424 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1425 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1427 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1428 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1429 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1430 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1431 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1432 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1433 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1434 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1437 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1438 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1439 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
1441 // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1442 // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1443 let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1445 let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1447 amount_msat: 3460001,
1448 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1450 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1453 let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1456 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1457 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1458 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1459 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1463 local_chan.opt_anchors(), local_funding, remote_funding,
1464 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1466 &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1467 &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1469 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1472 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1475 htlc_signatures: res.1
1478 // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1479 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1480 let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1482 // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1483 let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1485 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1486 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point
1488 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1490 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1491 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1492 // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1494 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1495 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1496 update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1498 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1500 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1501 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", ::hex::encode(raa_msg.channel_id)), 1);
1503 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1507 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1508 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1509 // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1510 // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1511 // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1513 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1514 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1515 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1516 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1518 let opt_anchors = false;
1520 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1521 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1522 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1524 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1526 // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1527 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1528 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1531 // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1532 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1533 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1534 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1535 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1536 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1540 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1541 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1542 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1543 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1544 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1545 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1547 let opt_anchors = false;
1549 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1550 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1551 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1552 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1553 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1554 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1555 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1557 // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1558 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1559 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1562 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 700_000);
1563 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1564 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1565 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1566 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1567 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1568 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 700_000, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1569 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1570 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1572 htlc_id: MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64,
1573 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1574 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1575 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1576 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1579 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1580 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1581 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1582 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1583 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1584 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1585 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1586 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() });
1590 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1591 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1592 // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1593 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1594 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1596 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1597 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1598 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1600 let opt_anchors = false;
1602 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1603 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1604 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1605 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1606 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1607 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1608 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1610 let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1611 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1612 // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1613 // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1614 // commitment transaction fee.
1615 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1617 // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1618 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1619 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1622 // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1623 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt + 1);
1624 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1625 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1629 fn test_chan_init_feerate_unaffordability() {
1630 // Test that we will reject channel opens which do not leave enough to pay for any HTLCs due to
1631 // channel reserve and feerate requirements.
1632 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1633 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1634 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1635 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1636 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1638 let opt_anchors = false;
1640 // Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
1642 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1643 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1644 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None).unwrap_err(),
1645 APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
1647 // During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
1648 // requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
1649 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1650 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None).unwrap();
1651 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1652 open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
1653 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg);
1655 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1656 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
1657 match msg_events[0] {
1658 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
1659 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve");
1661 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1666 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1667 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1668 // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1669 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1670 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1671 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1672 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1673 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1675 let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1676 // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1677 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1678 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1679 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1680 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1682 // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1683 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1684 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1685 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1686 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1687 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1689 // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1690 // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1691 // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1692 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1696 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1697 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1698 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1699 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1700 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1701 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1702 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1705 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1706 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1707 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1708 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1710 // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1711 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1712 let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1713 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1715 // Add a pending HTLC.
1716 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1717 let payment_event_1 = {
1718 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1719 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1721 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1722 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1723 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1725 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1727 // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1728 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2, opt_anchors);
1729 let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1730 let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1731 let (route_2, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_2);
1733 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1734 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1735 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1736 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1737 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1738 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, &None, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1739 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1);
1740 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1743 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1744 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1745 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1746 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1749 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1750 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1751 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1752 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1753 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1754 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1755 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1756 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() });
1760 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1761 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1762 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1763 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1764 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1765 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1766 let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1767 let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1768 assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1769 assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1771 let reserve = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100000);
1772 assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1773 assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1775 assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1776 assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1779 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
1780 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1784 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1785 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1786 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1787 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1788 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1789 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1790 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1791 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1792 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1793 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1794 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1796 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1797 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1799 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1800 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1802 macro_rules! expect_forward {
1804 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1805 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1806 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1807 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1812 let feemsat = 239; // set above
1813 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1814 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1815 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1817 let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1819 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1821 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_0);
1822 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1823 assert!(route.paths[0].iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1824 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1825 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1826 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1827 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
1830 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1831 // nodes[0]'s wealth
1833 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1834 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1835 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1836 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1837 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1838 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1839 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1842 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
1844 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1845 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1846 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1847 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1848 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1851 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1852 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1853 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1854 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1855 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1858 // adding pending output.
1859 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1860 // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1861 // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1862 // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1863 // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1864 // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1865 // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1866 // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1867 // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1869 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1870 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1871 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1873 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1874 let payment_event_1 = {
1875 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1876 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1878 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1879 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1880 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1882 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1884 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1885 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1887 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_2 + 1);
1888 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1889 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1890 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1893 // split the rest to test holding cell
1894 let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1895 let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1896 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1897 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1899 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1900 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1903 // now see if they go through on both sides
1904 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1905 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1906 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21, &Some(our_payment_secret_21)).unwrap();
1907 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1908 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1909 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1911 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1913 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22+1);
1914 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1915 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1916 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1917 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 2);
1920 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1921 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1922 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22, &Some(our_payment_secret_22)).unwrap();
1923 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1924 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1925 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1927 // flush the pending htlc
1928 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1929 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1930 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1932 // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1933 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1934 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1935 let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1937 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
1938 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1939 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1940 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1942 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1943 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1944 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1946 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1948 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1949 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
1950 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
1952 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1953 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
1955 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
1956 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
1957 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
1958 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
1959 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
1960 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1962 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1963 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
1964 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
1965 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
1967 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
1968 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1970 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1971 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1973 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
1974 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
1975 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
1977 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1978 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1979 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
1981 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1984 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1987 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
1988 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
1989 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
1991 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1992 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1993 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
1995 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1998 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2001 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
2002 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
2003 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
2005 let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1, opt_anchors);
2006 let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
2007 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
2009 let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
2010 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
2011 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2012 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
2013 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
2015 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2016 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
2020 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
2021 // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
2022 // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
2023 // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
2024 // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
2025 // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
2026 // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
2027 // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
2029 // * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
2030 // you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
2031 // you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
2032 // * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
2033 // * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
2034 // the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
2035 // * deliver the first fulfill from B
2036 // * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
2038 // * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
2039 // This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
2040 // removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
2041 // * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
2042 // of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
2043 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2044 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2045 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2046 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2047 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2049 let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2050 // Route the first two HTLCs.
2051 let (payment_preimage_1, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000);
2052 let (payment_preimage_2, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20000);
2054 // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
2055 let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
2057 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_3, &Some(payment_secret_3)).unwrap();
2058 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2059 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2060 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2061 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2064 // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
2065 // initial fulfill/CS.
2066 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
2067 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2068 let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2070 // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
2071 // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
2072 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2));
2073 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2074 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2076 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2077 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
2078 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2079 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2080 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
2082 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
2083 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
2084 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2085 // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
2086 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2088 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2089 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2090 let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2092 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2093 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2094 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2096 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2097 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2098 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2100 // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
2101 // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2102 // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
2103 // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
2104 // on-chain as necessary).
2105 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2106 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
2107 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2108 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2109 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
2111 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2112 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2113 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2115 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2116 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2118 // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2119 // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2120 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2121 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2122 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2123 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2125 // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2126 // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2127 let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2129 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_4, &Some(payment_secret_4)).unwrap();
2130 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2131 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2132 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2133 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2136 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2137 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2138 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2139 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2141 // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2143 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2144 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2145 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2147 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2148 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2150 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2151 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2152 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2153 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2155 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2156 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2157 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2159 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2160 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2162 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2163 expect_payment_received!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2165 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2166 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2170 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2171 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2172 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2173 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2174 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2175 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2176 let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2178 // Create some initial channels
2179 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2180 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2181 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2182 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2184 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2185 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2186 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2187 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2188 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2189 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2191 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2192 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2193 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2194 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2195 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2197 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2198 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2199 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2200 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
2202 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2203 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2204 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2205 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2206 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2208 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2209 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2210 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2211 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2212 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2214 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2215 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2217 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2218 // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2219 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2220 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
2221 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2223 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2224 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2225 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2226 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2227 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2228 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2230 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2231 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2232 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2233 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2234 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2236 macro_rules! claim_funds {
2237 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
2239 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
2240 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2242 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2243 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2245 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2246 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2247 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2248 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2250 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2256 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2257 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2258 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2259 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2260 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], false);
2261 let node2_commitment_txid;
2263 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2264 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2265 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2266 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2268 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2269 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
2270 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2271 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2272 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2274 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2275 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2276 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2277 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2278 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2280 // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2281 // confusing us in the following tests.
2282 let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2284 // One pending HTLC to time out:
2285 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
2286 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2289 let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2290 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2291 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2292 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2293 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2294 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2297 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2300 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2301 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2303 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2305 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2307 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2309 let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2310 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2311 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2317 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2319 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2320 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
2322 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2323 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2324 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2325 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2326 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2329 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2332 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2333 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2335 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2337 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2338 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2340 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2341 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2342 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2344 nodes[3].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2345 nodes[4].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2346 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2347 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2349 nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon).unwrap();
2350 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2351 check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2355 fn test_justice_tx() {
2356 // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2357 let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2358 alice_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
2359 alice_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2360 alice_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2361 let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2362 bob_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
2363 bob_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2364 bob_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2365 let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2366 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2367 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2368 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2369 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2370 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2371 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2372 // Create some new channels:
2373 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2375 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2376 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2377 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2378 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2379 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2380 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2381 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2382 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2383 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2384 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2385 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2386 // Revoke the old state
2387 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2390 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2392 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2393 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2394 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2396 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2397 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2398 node_txn.truncate(1);
2400 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2401 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2402 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2404 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2405 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2406 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2407 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2408 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2409 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2410 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2411 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2412 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2414 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2416 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2417 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2419 // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
2420 // Create some new channels:
2421 let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2423 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2427 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2428 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2429 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2430 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2431 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2432 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2433 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2434 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2435 // Revoke the old state
2436 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2438 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2440 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2441 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); //ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2442 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2444 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2445 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2447 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2448 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2450 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2451 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2452 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2453 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2454 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2455 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2456 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2458 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2459 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2460 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2464 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2465 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2466 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2467 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2468 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2469 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2470 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2471 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2472 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2473 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2474 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2475 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2476 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2477 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2478 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2480 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2481 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2482 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2483 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2484 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2485 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2487 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2488 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
2490 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2491 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2492 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2493 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2494 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2498 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2499 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2500 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2501 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2502 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2503 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2504 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2506 // Create some new channel:
2507 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2509 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2510 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2511 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2512 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2513 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2515 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2516 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2517 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2518 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2519 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2520 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2521 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2522 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2523 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2525 //Revoke the old state
2526 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2529 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2530 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2531 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2532 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2533 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2534 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2535 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2536 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2538 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2539 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment
2541 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2542 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2544 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2545 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2546 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2547 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2548 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2549 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2550 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2551 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2553 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
2554 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2555 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
2557 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2558 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2559 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2563 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2564 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2565 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2566 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2567 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2568 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2569 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2571 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2573 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2574 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2575 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2576 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2577 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2578 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2580 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2581 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2583 //Revoke the old state
2584 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2587 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2588 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2589 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2590 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2591 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2592 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2593 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2595 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2596 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2599 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2600 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2602 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2603 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 9);
2604 // ChannelMonitor: justice tx revoked offered htlc, justice tx revoked received htlc, justice tx revoked to_local (3)
2605 // ChannelManager: local commmitment + local HTLC-timeout (2)
2606 // ChannelMonitor: bumped justice tx, after one increase, bumps on HTLC aren't generated not being substantial anymore, bump on revoked to_local isn't generated due to more room for expiration (2)
2607 // ChannelMonitor: local commitment + local HTLC-timeout (2)
2609 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2610 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2611 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2612 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2613 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2614 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2615 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2617 // Justice transactions are indices 1-2-4
2618 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2619 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
2620 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
2622 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2623 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2624 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2626 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2627 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2628 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2629 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2630 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2631 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2632 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2633 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2635 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2636 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2637 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2641 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2642 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2643 // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2644 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2645 // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2646 // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2647 // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2648 // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2649 // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2651 // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2652 // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2653 // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2654 // PaymentSent event).
2656 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2657 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2658 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2659 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2661 // Create some initial channels
2662 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2663 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2665 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2666 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2667 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2668 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2669 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2671 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2672 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2673 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2675 let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2676 let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2678 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2679 // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2680 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2681 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2682 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2683 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2684 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2685 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2686 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2687 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2688 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2689 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2690 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2692 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2693 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2694 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2695 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2696 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx, 2*htlc-success tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2697 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5);
2698 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2699 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2700 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2701 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2702 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2703 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2704 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2705 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2706 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2707 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
2708 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2710 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2711 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2712 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: node_txn});
2713 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2715 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2716 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2717 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2718 added_monitors.clear();
2720 let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2721 assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2722 match forwarded_events[0] {
2723 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2724 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2726 if let Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat: Some(1000), claim_from_onchain_tx: true } = forwarded_events[1] {
2727 } else { panic!(); }
2728 if let Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat: Some(1000), claim_from_onchain_tx: true } = forwarded_events[2] {
2729 } else { panic!(); }
2730 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2732 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2733 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2734 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2735 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2736 added_monitors.clear();
2738 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2740 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2741 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2744 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2745 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2749 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2750 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2751 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2752 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2753 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2754 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2756 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2758 macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2759 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $chan_tx: expr) => { {
2760 let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2761 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
2762 // Node[1]: ChannelManager: 3 (commitment tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (timeout tx)
2763 // Node[0]: ChannelManager: 3 (commtiemtn tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 HTLC-timeout
2764 check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2765 check_spends!(node_txn[2], $commitment_tx);
2766 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2767 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time, 0);
2769 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2770 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2771 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2772 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2774 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2775 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2776 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2777 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2779 check_spends!(node_txn[0], $chan_tx);
2780 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2784 // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own local state as a fallback, suggesting an alternate
2785 // commitment transaction with a corresponding HTLC-Timeout transactions, as well as a
2786 // timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2787 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2789 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2790 // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx on A's chain
2791 let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2792 check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2793 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2794 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2795 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2796 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2797 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2798 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 6); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx + HTLC-Sucess * 2), ChannelMonitor : 3 (HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn)
2799 let commitment_spend =
2800 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2801 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2802 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2803 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2806 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2807 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2808 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2812 check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2813 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2814 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2815 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2816 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time, 0);
2817 assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2818 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3);
2819 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2820 check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[3]);
2821 check_spends!(node_txn[5], node_txn[3]);
2822 // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
2823 // we already checked the same situation with A.
2825 // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
2826 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2827 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()] });
2828 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2829 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2830 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2831 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2832 assert_eq!(events.len(), 5);
2833 let mut first_claimed = false;
2834 for event in events {
2836 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
2837 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
2838 assert!(!first_claimed);
2839 first_claimed = true;
2841 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
2842 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
2845 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
2846 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
2847 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2850 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2853 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
2854 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
2855 // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2856 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2857 // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
2858 // B's commitment tx C's commitment tx
2860 // B's HTLC timeout tx B's timeout tx
2862 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2863 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2864 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2865 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2866 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2867 *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2868 *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2870 // Create some intial channels
2871 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2872 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2874 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
2875 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2876 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2878 let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2880 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2881 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2882 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2883 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
2884 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
2885 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2886 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2888 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2889 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2891 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2892 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2893 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2894 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2895 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2896 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2898 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2900 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2901 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2902 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2903 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2904 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx)
2905 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2906 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2907 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2909 // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2910 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
2911 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2912 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
2913 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2916 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2917 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-timeout), 1 timeout tx
2918 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2919 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2921 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2922 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2924 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2925 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2926 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2927 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2929 timeout_tx = node_txn[2].clone();
2933 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
2934 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2935 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2937 // B will rebroadcast a fee-bumped timeout transaction here.
2938 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2939 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2940 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2943 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2945 // B may rebroadcast its own holder commitment transaction here, as a safeguard against
2946 // some incredibly unlikely partial-eclipse-attack scenarios. That said, because the
2947 // original commitment_tx[0] (also spending chan_2.3) has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY B really
2948 // shouldn't broadcast anything here, and in some connect style scenarios we do not.
2949 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2950 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
2951 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2953 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
2957 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2958 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2959 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2960 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2962 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2963 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2964 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2965 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2966 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2967 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2969 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2972 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
2973 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2974 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2976 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
2977 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2979 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2980 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2981 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2982 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 commitment tx, ChannelMonitor : 1 timeout tx
2983 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2984 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2985 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2986 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2987 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2991 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
2992 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
2993 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
2994 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
2998 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
2999 // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
3000 // and fail backward accordingly.
3002 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3003 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3004 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3005 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3007 // Create some initial channels
3008 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3009 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3011 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3012 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3013 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3014 // Revoke the old state
3015 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3017 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3019 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3020 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3021 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3022 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3023 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3025 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3026 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3027 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3028 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3030 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3031 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3032 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3033 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3034 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3035 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3037 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3038 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3039 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
3041 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3045 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
3046 // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
3047 // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
3048 // commitment transaction anymore.
3049 // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
3050 // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
3051 // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
3052 // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
3053 // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
3054 // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
3056 // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
3057 // commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
3058 // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
3059 // and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
3060 // commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
3061 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3062 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3063 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3064 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3066 // Create some initial channels
3067 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3068 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3070 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
3071 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3072 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3073 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
3074 // Revoke the old state
3075 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3077 let value = if use_dust {
3078 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
3079 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
3080 nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
3083 let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3084 let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3085 let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3087 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash));
3088 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3089 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3090 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3091 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3092 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3093 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3094 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3095 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3096 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3097 let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
3098 // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
3100 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash));
3101 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3102 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3103 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3104 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3105 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3106 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3107 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3108 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3109 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3110 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3111 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3112 // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3113 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3114 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3115 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3117 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash));
3118 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3119 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3120 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3121 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3122 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3123 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3124 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3125 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3126 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3127 // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3128 // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3129 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3130 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3131 // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3132 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3133 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3134 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3136 // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3137 // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3138 let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3139 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, fourth_payment_hash, &Some(fourth_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3140 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3141 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3142 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3145 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3146 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3147 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3148 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3149 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3150 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3152 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3153 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3155 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3156 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3159 let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
3160 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3162 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3163 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3164 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3165 assert!(ANTI_REORG_DELAY > PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS); // We assume payments will also expire
3167 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3168 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 4 });
3170 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
3171 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
3174 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3175 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3177 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3179 if !deliver_bs_raa {
3181 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3182 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3184 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3187 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3188 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3191 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3192 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3194 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3195 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3196 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 1 } else { 0 }] {
3197 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3198 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3200 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 1 }] {
3201 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
3202 assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3203 assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3205 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3209 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3210 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3211 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3212 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3213 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3214 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3216 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3219 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 3 } else { 2 }] {
3220 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3221 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3222 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3223 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3224 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3225 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3227 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3228 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3229 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3231 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3233 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3234 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3236 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3237 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3238 // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3239 // that we should update our routing table for.
3240 if !deliver_bs_raa {
3241 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3244 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3247 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3248 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3249 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3251 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3254 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3255 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3256 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3258 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3261 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3264 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3265 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3266 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3270 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3271 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3272 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3273 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3274 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3278 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3279 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3280 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3281 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3282 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3286 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3287 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3288 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3289 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3290 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3291 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3293 // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3295 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3296 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
3297 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3299 let payment_event = {
3300 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3301 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3302 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3304 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3305 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3308 // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3309 let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3311 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, failed_payment_hash, &Some(failed_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3312 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3314 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3317 // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3319 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3321 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3322 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3323 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3324 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 50_000, &Some(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3325 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3326 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
3328 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3329 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3335 onion_routing_packet,
3337 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3339 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3340 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3341 // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3343 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3344 assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3346 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3349 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3350 assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3352 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3354 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3355 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3359 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3360 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3361 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3362 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3363 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3364 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3365 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3366 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3368 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3369 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id).unwrap();
3370 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3371 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3372 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3373 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3375 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3376 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3377 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
3379 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3380 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
3381 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3382 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3383 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3385 // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3386 // registering new transactions
3387 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
3388 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
3392 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3393 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3394 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3395 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3396 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3397 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3398 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3399 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3401 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3403 let mut payment_event = {
3404 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3405 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3407 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3408 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3409 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3412 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3413 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3415 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3417 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3418 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3419 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3420 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3422 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3423 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3424 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3425 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3426 let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3428 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3429 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3430 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3432 nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id).unwrap();
3433 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3434 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3435 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3437 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3438 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3439 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3440 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3441 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3445 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3447 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3448 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3449 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3450 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3452 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3454 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3455 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator, &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3457 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3458 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3459 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3460 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3461 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3462 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3463 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3465 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3469 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3470 // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3471 // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3472 // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3473 // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3475 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3476 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3477 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3478 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3479 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3481 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3483 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
3484 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3485 let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3486 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3487 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
3489 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3490 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3492 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3493 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3497 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3498 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3499 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3500 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3501 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3502 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3503 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3504 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3506 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3507 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3508 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3510 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3511 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3512 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3513 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3515 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3516 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3517 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3519 let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3520 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3521 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3522 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3524 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3525 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3527 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3528 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3530 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
3532 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3533 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3535 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3536 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3537 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3539 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3542 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
3543 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3544 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
3546 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3549 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3550 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3554 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3555 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3558 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3559 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3560 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3561 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3562 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3563 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3565 let mut as_funding_locked = None;
3566 if messages_delivered == 0 {
3567 let (funding_locked, _, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3568 as_funding_locked = Some(funding_locked);
3569 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3570 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3571 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3573 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3576 let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3578 let payment_event = {
3579 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
3580 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3582 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3583 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3584 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3586 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3588 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3589 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3591 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3592 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3593 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3594 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3595 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3597 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3598 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3599 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3600 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3602 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3603 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3604 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3605 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3606 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3608 if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3609 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3610 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3611 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3618 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3619 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3620 if messages_delivered < 3 {
3621 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3622 // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a funding_locked prior to a
3623 // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to funding_locked time.
3625 // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a funding_locked immediately on
3626 // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate funding_locked sent
3627 // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3629 // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3630 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3632 // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3633 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3634 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3635 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3636 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3637 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3638 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3639 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3640 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3641 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3642 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3643 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3644 } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3645 // Everything was delivered...
3646 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3649 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3650 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3652 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3653 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3656 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3657 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3658 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3660 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3662 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3663 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3665 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
3666 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3667 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
3669 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3670 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3671 assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3673 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3676 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3679 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3680 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3682 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3683 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3684 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3685 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3686 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3687 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3688 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3689 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3690 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3691 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3692 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3694 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3697 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3698 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3700 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3701 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3703 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3704 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3705 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3707 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3710 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3711 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3712 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3713 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3715 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3716 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3717 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3718 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3720 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3721 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3722 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3723 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3724 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3726 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3727 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3728 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3729 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3736 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3737 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3738 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3739 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3740 if messages_delivered < 1 {
3741 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
3743 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3745 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
3746 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3747 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3748 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3749 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3750 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3751 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3752 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3753 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3754 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3755 // Everything was delivered...
3756 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3759 if messages_delivered == 1 || messages_delivered == 2 {
3760 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3763 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3764 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3765 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3767 if messages_delivered > 2 {
3768 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3771 // Channel should still work fine...
3772 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3773 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3774 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3778 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
3779 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
3780 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
3781 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
3782 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
3786 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
3787 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
3788 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
3789 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
3790 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
3794 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
3795 // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
3796 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3797 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3798 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3799 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
3800 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
3801 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
3802 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3803 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3805 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3806 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3808 confirm_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
3809 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3811 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3813 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3814 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3815 chan_id = msg.channel_id;
3817 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3820 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3822 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3823 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3825 confirm_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3826 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3827 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 2);
3828 let funding_locked = match events_2[0] {
3829 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3830 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3833 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3835 let bs_announcement_sigs = match events_2[1] {
3836 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3837 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3840 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3843 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3845 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_locked);
3846 nodes[0].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs);
3847 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3848 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 2);
3849 let as_announcement_sigs = match events_3[0] {
3850 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3851 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3854 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3856 let (as_announcement, as_update) = match events_3[1] {
3857 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3858 (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
3860 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3863 nodes[1].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs);
3864 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3865 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3866 let (_, bs_update) = match events_4[0] {
3867 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3868 (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
3870 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3873 nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&as_announcement).unwrap();
3874 nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
3875 nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
3877 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3878 let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3879 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
3881 // Check that after deserialization and reconnection we can still generate an identical
3882 // channel_announcement from the cached signatures.
3883 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3885 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
3886 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
3887 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
3889 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
3890 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
3891 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[0].logger, node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
3892 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
3893 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
3894 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
3895 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
3896 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
3898 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
3899 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
3900 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
3901 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
3902 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
3903 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
3905 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator,
3906 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
3907 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
3908 logger: nodes[0].logger,
3912 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
3913 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
3915 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
3916 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
3917 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3919 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3921 // as_announcement should be re-generated exactly by broadcast_node_announcement.
3922 nodes[0].node.broadcast_node_announcement([0, 0, 0], [0; 32], Vec::new());
3923 let msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3924 let mut found_announcement = false;
3925 for event in msgs.iter() {
3927 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, .. } => {
3928 if *msg == as_announcement { found_announcement = true; }
3930 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => {},
3931 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3934 assert!(found_announcement);
3938 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
3939 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
3940 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
3941 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3942 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3943 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3944 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3945 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3947 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
3949 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
3950 let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3951 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
3952 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3954 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3955 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3957 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
3958 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3961 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
3962 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3964 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3965 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3967 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3968 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3969 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3970 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3971 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3972 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3973 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3975 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3976 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3977 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3979 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3980 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
3981 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
3983 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3986 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
3987 let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3988 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3989 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3991 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3994 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3995 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3997 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
3998 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
3999 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
4000 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4001 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4002 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
4004 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4005 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4006 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4007 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4009 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
4010 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
4012 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
4013 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
4015 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
4017 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4018 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4019 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4020 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4021 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
4022 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
4023 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
4024 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4025 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4026 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4028 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
4029 let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4030 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4031 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4032 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4033 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4034 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4035 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4037 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
4038 let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4039 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4040 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4041 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4042 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4043 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4044 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4046 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4047 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4048 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4049 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4051 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4052 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4053 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4054 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4056 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
4057 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4058 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4060 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4062 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4063 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
4065 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
4066 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
4068 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
4069 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
4070 assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
4072 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
4075 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4078 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
4079 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4080 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4082 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4083 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4086 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
4087 // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
4088 // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
4089 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4090 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4091 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4092 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4094 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4096 let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
4097 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
4098 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
4099 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
4100 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
4101 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
4102 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
4103 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4104 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4105 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4106 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
4107 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentReceived event(s).
4108 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
4111 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
4114 let mut block = Block {
4115 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
4118 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4119 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4120 let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4121 for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
4122 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
4123 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4124 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4127 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4129 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4130 let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4131 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4132 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4133 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4134 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4136 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4137 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4138 // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4139 let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(100_000).to_vec();
4140 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(block_count - 1));
4141 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4145 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4146 do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4147 do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4150 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4151 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4152 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4153 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4154 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4155 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4156 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4157 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4159 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4160 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4161 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4162 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4164 // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4165 let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4167 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, first_payment_hash, &Some(first_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4169 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4170 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4172 // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4173 let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4174 let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4175 sending_node.node.send_payment(&route, second_payment_hash, &Some(second_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4177 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4178 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4179 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4180 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4181 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4183 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4185 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4186 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4187 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4188 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4191 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4192 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4193 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4194 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4195 match fail_commit[0] {
4196 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4197 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4198 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4200 _ => unreachable!(),
4202 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4204 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4205 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4206 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[0] {
4207 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
4208 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
4209 if let Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[1] {
4210 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
4211 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
4216 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4217 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4218 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4222 fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4223 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4224 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4225 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4226 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4227 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4228 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4229 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4230 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4231 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4233 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4235 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4237 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4238 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4239 get_monitor!(nodes[0], OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id())
4240 .write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4242 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4243 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4244 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4245 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4246 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4247 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4248 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4249 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4250 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4251 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4253 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4254 let config = UserConfig::default();
4255 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4256 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4257 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4258 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4259 default_config: config,
4261 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4262 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4263 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4268 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4269 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4271 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4272 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4273 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4274 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4276 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4277 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4278 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4279 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4281 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4282 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4283 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4284 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4286 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4287 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
4288 for node in nodes.iter() {
4289 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4290 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4291 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4294 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4298 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_events() {
4299 // This test makes sure the events field in ChannelManager survives de/serialization
4300 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4301 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4302 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4303 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4304 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4305 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4306 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4307 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4308 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4310 // Start creating a channel, but stop right before broadcasting the funding transaction
4311 let channel_value = 100000;
4312 let push_msat = 10001;
4313 let a_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4314 let b_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4315 let node_a = nodes.remove(0);
4316 let node_b = nodes.remove(0);
4317 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
4318 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), a_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4319 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), b_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id()));
4321 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&node_a, channel_value, 42);
4323 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
4324 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
4326 node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4328 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4329 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4330 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4331 added_monitors.clear();
4334 let bs_funding_signed = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
4335 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_funding_signed);
4337 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4338 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4339 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4340 added_monitors.clear();
4342 // Normally, this is where node_a would broadcast the funding transaction, but the test de/serializes first instead
4347 // Start the de/seriailization process mid-channel creation to check that the channel manager will hold onto events that are serialized
4348 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4349 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4350 get_monitor!(nodes[0], bs_funding_signed.channel_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4352 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4353 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4354 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4355 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4356 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4357 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4358 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4359 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4360 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4361 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4363 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4364 let config = UserConfig::default();
4365 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4366 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4367 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4368 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4369 default_config: config,
4371 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4372 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4373 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4378 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4379 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4381 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4383 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4384 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4386 // After deserializing, make sure the funding_transaction is still held by the channel manager
4387 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4388 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
4389 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4390 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
4392 // Make sure the channel is functioning as though the de/serialization never happened
4393 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4394 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4396 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4397 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4398 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4399 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4401 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4402 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4403 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4404 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4406 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4407 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
4408 for node in nodes.iter() {
4409 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4410 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4411 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4414 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4418 fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4419 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4420 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4421 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4422 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4423 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4424 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4425 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4426 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4427 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4428 let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4430 let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4431 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4433 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4435 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4436 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4437 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4439 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4440 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4441 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4442 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4443 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4444 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4445 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4446 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4447 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4448 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4450 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4451 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4452 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4453 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4454 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4455 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4457 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4458 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4459 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4464 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4465 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4467 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4468 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4469 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4471 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4473 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
4474 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4478 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
4479 // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with an out-of-date ChannelMonitor
4480 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4481 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4482 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
4483 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4484 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4485 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4486 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4487 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4488 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4489 let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4490 let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4491 let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4493 let mut node_0_stale_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4494 for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4495 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4496 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4497 node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4500 let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
4502 // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
4503 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4505 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
4506 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4507 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4508 nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4510 // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
4512 let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4513 for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4514 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4515 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4516 node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4519 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4520 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4521 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4522 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4523 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4524 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4527 let mut node_0_stale_monitors = Vec::new();
4528 for serialized in node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4529 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4530 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4531 assert!(read.is_empty());
4532 node_0_stale_monitors.push(monitor);
4535 let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
4536 for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4537 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4538 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4539 assert!(read.is_empty());
4540 node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
4543 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4544 if let Err(msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue) =
4545 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4546 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4548 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4549 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4550 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4552 channel_monitors: node_0_stale_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4554 panic!("If the monitor(s) are stale, this indicates a bug and we should get an Err return");
4557 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4558 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) =
4559 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4560 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4562 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4563 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4564 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4566 channel_monitors: node_0_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4568 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4569 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4571 { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx
4572 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4573 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
4574 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
4575 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
4578 for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
4579 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor).is_ok());
4580 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4582 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4583 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
4585 // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
4586 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4587 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4588 //... and we can even still claim the payment!
4589 claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4591 nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4592 let reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[3], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4593 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4594 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish);
4595 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4596 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
4597 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
4599 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
4600 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
4602 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
4607 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4608 ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4610 let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4611 let mut txn = Vec::new();
4612 let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4613 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4614 for event in events.drain(..) {
4616 Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs } => {
4617 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4618 txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4619 all_outputs.push(outp);
4622 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4625 if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4626 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx) {
4636 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4637 // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4638 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4639 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4640 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4641 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4643 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4644 nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2).unwrap();
4645 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4646 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4647 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4648 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4649 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4650 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4651 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4653 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4654 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4656 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4657 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4658 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4659 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4660 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4664 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4665 // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4666 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4667 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4668 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4669 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4670 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4672 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4673 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2).unwrap();
4674 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4675 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4676 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4678 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4679 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4680 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4681 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4683 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4684 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4685 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4686 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4687 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4689 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4690 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4691 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4695 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4696 // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4697 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4699 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4700 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4701 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4702 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4704 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4705 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4706 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4707 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4708 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4710 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4711 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4712 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4713 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4714 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4716 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4717 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4718 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4720 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4721 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4722 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4723 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4724 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4728 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4729 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4730 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4731 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4732 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4734 // Create some initial channels
4735 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4737 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4739 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4740 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4741 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4743 // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4744 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
4745 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4746 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4747 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4748 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4750 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4751 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4754 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4755 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4758 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4759 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-Success), ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4760 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4761 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4762 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4763 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
4764 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
4766 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4767 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4768 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4770 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4771 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4772 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4776 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4777 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4778 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4779 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4780 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4782 // Create some initial channels
4783 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4785 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4786 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4788 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4790 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4791 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4792 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4794 // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4795 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4796 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4797 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4799 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4800 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4802 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4804 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4805 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4806 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelManager : 1 local commitent tx, ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4807 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
4808 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0].clone());
4809 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4811 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4812 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4813 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4814 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, true);
4816 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4817 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4818 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4819 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]);
4820 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4824 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4825 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4826 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4827 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4828 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4830 // Create some initial channels
4831 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4833 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4834 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4835 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4836 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4838 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4840 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4841 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4842 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4843 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4845 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4846 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
4847 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4848 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4850 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4851 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4853 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4854 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4855 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4859 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4860 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4861 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4862 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4863 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4864 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4866 // Create some initial channels
4867 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4869 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4870 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4871 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4872 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4874 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4876 // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
4877 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4878 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4879 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4880 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4881 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4883 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4884 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4885 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], chan_1.3);
4886 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4887 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4888 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4889 assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].lock_time, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
4891 // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4892 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4893 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()] });
4894 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4895 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4896 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4898 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4899 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
4900 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4901 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4902 // transactions next...
4903 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
4904 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
4906 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
4907 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
4908 if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid() {
4909 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4911 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid());
4912 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4915 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4916 check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
4918 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4919 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4921 // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4922 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4923 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4924 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4925 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
4929 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
4930 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4931 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4932 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4933 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4934 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4936 // Create some initial channels
4937 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4939 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4940 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4941 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4942 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4944 // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
4945 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
4947 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4949 // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
4950 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4951 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4952 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4953 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4954 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4956 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4957 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4958 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4959 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4961 // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
4962 let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
4963 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
4965 // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4966 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4967 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
4968 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4969 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4970 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4972 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4973 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
4975 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4976 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4977 // transactions next...
4978 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4979 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4980 if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4981 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4983 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4984 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4987 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4988 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4990 check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
4992 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
4993 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4995 // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
4996 // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
4998 // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4999 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5000 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5001 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5002 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
5003 assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5004 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
5005 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
5009 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
5010 // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
5011 // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
5012 // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
5013 // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
5015 // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
5018 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5019 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5020 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5021 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5023 // Create some initial channels
5024 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5025 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5027 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5028 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5029 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5030 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5031 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5033 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
5034 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
5035 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
5037 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
5038 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5039 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
5040 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5041 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5042 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5043 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5044 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5045 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5046 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5048 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
5049 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5050 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5051 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5053 let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Success tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
5054 assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 3);
5055 assert_eq!(c_txn[0], c_txn[2]);
5056 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0], c_txn[1]);
5057 check_spends!(c_txn[1], chan_2.3);
5058 check_spends!(c_txn[2], c_txn[1]);
5059 assert_eq!(c_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
5060 assert_eq!(c_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5061 assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
5062 assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
5064 // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
5065 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
5066 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![c_txn[1].clone(), c_txn[2].clone()]});
5067 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5068 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5069 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5071 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5072 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5075 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, claim_from_onchain_tx } => {
5076 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
5077 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
5079 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5082 let mut b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5083 // ChannelMonitor: claim tx
5084 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
5085 check_spends!(b_txn[0], chan_2.3); // B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
5088 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5089 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5090 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
5091 match msg_events[0] {
5092 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5093 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5095 match msg_events[1] {
5096 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
5097 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5099 match msg_events[2] {
5100 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
5101 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5102 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5103 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5104 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5105 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
5107 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5109 // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
5110 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5111 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
5112 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5113 let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5114 // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success tx
5115 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 3);
5116 check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_1.3);
5117 check_spends!(b_txn[2], b_txn[1]);
5118 check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
5119 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5120 assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
5121 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
5123 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5124 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5128 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
5129 // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
5130 // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
5131 // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
5132 // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
5133 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
5134 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
5135 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5136 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5137 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5138 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5139 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
5140 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5141 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5143 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5144 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5145 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5147 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5148 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5149 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5150 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5151 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
5153 let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 900000);
5155 let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
5156 // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
5157 // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
5158 // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
5159 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], vec![], 900000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40);
5160 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 900000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
5162 let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5163 assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5164 check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5166 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
5167 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5168 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5169 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5170 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5172 let htlc_timeout_tx;
5173 { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
5174 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5175 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5176 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
5177 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5179 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5180 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5181 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5182 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5183 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
5184 check_spends!(node_txn[3], commitment_txn[0]);
5185 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
5187 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5188 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5189 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5190 htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[1].clone();
5193 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
5194 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
5195 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
5196 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5197 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5199 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5200 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5203 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5204 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5206 let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5207 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs), ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
5208 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
5209 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5210 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5211 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5212 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5213 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5214 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5215 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5216 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[3], htlc_success_txn[0]);
5217 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[4], htlc_success_txn[1]);
5218 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
5220 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
5221 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5222 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5223 let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5224 assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5225 assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5226 let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
5227 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5228 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5229 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5231 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5232 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5234 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5236 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
5238 // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
5239 // Note that the fee paid is effectively double as the HTLC value (including the nodes[1] fee
5240 // and nodes[2] fee) is rounded down and then claimed in full.
5241 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[0]);
5242 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], Some(196*2), true);
5243 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5244 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5245 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5246 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5247 assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
5248 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5249 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5251 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5252 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
5254 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5256 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5257 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
5258 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
5260 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5265 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
5266 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5267 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5268 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5269 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5271 // Create some initial channels
5272 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5274 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
5275 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5276 assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
5277 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5278 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5280 // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
5281 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5282 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5283 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
5284 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5285 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5286 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5288 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5289 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5292 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5293 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5296 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5297 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5298 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
5299 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5300 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5301 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5302 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5306 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
5307 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5309 // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5310 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5311 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5312 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5313 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
5314 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5317 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
5318 // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
5319 // unrevoked commitment transaction.
5320 // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
5321 // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
5322 // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
5323 // use the same payment hashes.
5324 // Thus, we use a six-node network:
5329 // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
5330 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
5331 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
5332 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5333 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5334 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5335 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5336 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
5337 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5338 let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5340 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5341 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5342 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5343 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5344 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5346 // Rebalance and check output sanity...
5347 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
5348 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
5349 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
5351 let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5353 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5355 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5356 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5358 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5360 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5362 let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5364 let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5365 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5367 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200).unwrap());
5369 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200).unwrap());
5372 let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5374 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5375 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5378 let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5380 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5381 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200).unwrap());
5383 // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
5384 // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
5385 // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
5386 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2).len(), 1);
5387 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
5389 // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
5390 // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5391 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1));
5392 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3));
5393 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5));
5394 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6));
5395 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
5396 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[4]);
5397 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
5399 let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5400 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5401 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5402 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5403 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5404 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5406 // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5407 assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
5408 assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4));
5409 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5410 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[5]);
5411 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5413 let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5414 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5415 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5416 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5418 let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5420 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[3]);
5421 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5422 let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5423 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5424 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5425 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5426 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5427 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5428 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5429 if deliver_last_raa {
5430 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5432 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5435 // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5436 // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5437 // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5438 // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5440 // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5441 // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5442 // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5444 // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5445 // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5446 let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5448 if announce_latest {
5449 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5451 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5453 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5454 let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5455 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5458 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5462 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5463 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5466 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5467 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5468 if deliver_last_raa {
5469 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5471 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5473 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5475 let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5476 assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5477 let mut a_done = false;
5478 for msg in cs_msgs {
5480 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5481 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5482 // should be failed-backwards here.
5483 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5484 // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5485 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5486 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5488 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5493 // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5494 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5495 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5497 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5498 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5501 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5502 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5503 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5504 if announce_latest {
5505 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5506 if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5507 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5510 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5512 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5516 let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5517 assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5518 let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5519 let mut as_updates = 0;
5520 for event in as_events.iter() {
5521 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5522 assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5523 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5524 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5526 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5528 if network_update.is_some() {
5531 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5533 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5534 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5535 if announce_latest {
5536 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5537 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5539 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5541 let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5542 assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5543 let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5544 let mut bs_updates = 0;
5545 for event in bs_events.iter() {
5546 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5547 assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5548 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5549 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5551 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5553 if network_update.is_some() {
5556 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5558 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5559 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5560 if announce_latest {
5561 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5563 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5565 // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5566 // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5567 // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5568 // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5569 assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5570 assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5574 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5575 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5579 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5580 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5584 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5585 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5586 // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5587 // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5591 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5592 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5593 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5594 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5595 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5597 // Create some initial channels
5598 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5600 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5601 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5602 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5603 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5605 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5606 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5607 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5608 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5609 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5610 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5612 let htlc_timeout = {
5613 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5614 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
5615 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5616 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5617 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5618 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5622 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5623 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5624 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5626 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5627 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5628 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5629 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5630 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5631 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5632 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5633 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5634 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5635 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5636 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5640 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5641 // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with
5642 // a key manager rotation to test that key_derivation_params returned in DynamicOutputP2WSH
5643 // let us re-derive the channel key set to then derive a delayed_payment_key.
5645 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5647 // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5648 let seed = [42; 32];
5649 let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5650 let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5651 let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph: &chanmon_cfgs[0].network_graph, node_seed: seed, features: InitFeatures::known() };
5652 let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5653 node_cfgs.remove(0);
5654 node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5656 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5657 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5659 // Create some initial channels
5660 // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5662 let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5663 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5664 assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5666 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5667 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5668 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5669 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5670 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5672 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5673 let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5674 let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5675 assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5676 check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5678 // We check funding pubkey are unique
5679 let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness[3][36..69]));
5680 let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness[3][36..69]));
5681 if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5682 || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5683 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5684 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5685 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5688 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5689 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5690 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5691 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5692 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5693 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5695 let htlc_timeout = {
5696 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5697 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5698 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5699 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn_1[0]);
5703 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5704 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5705 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5707 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5708 let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5709 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5710 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5711 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5712 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5713 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5714 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5715 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5716 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5717 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5718 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5722 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5723 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5724 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5725 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5726 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5728 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5730 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5731 let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5733 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5734 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5735 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5737 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5738 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5739 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5741 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5742 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5743 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5745 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5746 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5747 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5750 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5751 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5752 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5753 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5754 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5755 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5757 let (payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5759 // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5760 // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5761 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
5762 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5764 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5765 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5766 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
5768 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5769 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5770 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5771 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5772 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5774 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5775 let mut block = Block {
5776 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5779 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5780 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5781 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5783 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5784 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5785 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5786 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5789 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5790 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5791 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5792 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5793 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5794 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5796 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5797 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5798 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5800 let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5802 // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5803 // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5804 // to "time out" the HTLC.
5806 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5807 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5809 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5810 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: Vec::new()});
5811 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
5813 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5814 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5815 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5816 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5819 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5820 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5821 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5822 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5823 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5824 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5826 // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
5827 // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5828 // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
5829 // actually revoked.
5830 let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
5831 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
5832 assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
5833 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5834 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5836 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5837 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5838 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5839 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5840 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5841 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5842 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5843 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
5844 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5845 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5847 if check_revoke_no_close {
5848 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
5849 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5852 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5853 let mut block = Block {
5854 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5857 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
5858 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5859 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5861 if !check_revoke_no_close {
5862 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5863 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5864 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5865 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5867 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5868 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5869 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[0] {
5870 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
5871 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5872 if let Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[1] {
5873 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
5874 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5878 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
5879 // There are only a few cases to test here:
5880 // * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
5881 // broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
5882 // * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
5883 // * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
5884 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
5886 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
5887 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
5888 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
5890 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
5891 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
5892 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
5894 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
5895 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
5899 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
5900 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
5901 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
5902 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
5903 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
5908 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
5909 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5910 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5911 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5912 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5913 //Force duplicate channel ids
5914 for node in nodes.iter() {
5915 *node.keys_manager.override_channel_id_priv.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
5918 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
5919 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5920 let push_msat=10001;
5921 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5922 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5923 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5925 //Create a second channel with a channel_id collision
5926 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5930 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
5931 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5932 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5933 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5934 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5936 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
5937 let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
5938 let push_msat=10001;
5939 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5941 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
5942 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5943 // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
5944 let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
5945 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5947 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
5948 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5949 let push_msat=10001;
5950 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
5951 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5952 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
5954 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
5955 // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
5956 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
5958 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
5959 assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
5960 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5962 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
5963 let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
5964 assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
5966 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
5967 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
5968 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5969 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5970 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
5971 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5975 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
5976 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5977 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5978 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5979 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5981 let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
5982 let push_msat=10001;
5983 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5984 let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5985 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
5986 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
5988 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5989 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5990 let err_msg = match events[0] {
5991 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
5994 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5996 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
5999 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
6000 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
6001 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
6002 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
6004 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
6005 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6006 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6007 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6008 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6009 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6011 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6012 // pending_update_fee.
6014 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6015 *feerate_lock += 20;
6017 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6018 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6020 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6021 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6022 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6023 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6024 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6026 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6029 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6031 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6032 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6033 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6034 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6036 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6037 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
6038 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6040 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6041 let our_payment_id = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6042 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6043 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6045 // Flush the pending fee update.
6046 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6047 let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6048 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6049 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
6050 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6052 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
6053 // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
6054 // us to surface its failure to the user.
6055 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6056 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6057 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6058 let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6059 hex::encode(our_payment_hash.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6060 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6062 // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
6063 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6064 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6066 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data, .. } => {
6067 assert_eq!(our_payment_id, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6068 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
6069 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
6070 assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6071 assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6072 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
6073 assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
6074 assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
6076 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6080 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
6081 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
6082 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
6084 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
6085 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6086 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6087 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6088 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6089 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6091 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6092 // pending_update_fee.
6094 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6095 *feerate_lock += 200;
6097 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6098 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6100 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6101 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6102 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6103 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6104 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6106 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6109 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6111 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6112 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6113 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6114 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6116 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6118 let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors) - amt_1;
6119 let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
6120 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
6122 // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
6123 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
6124 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6125 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
6126 let payment_id_2 = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
6127 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6128 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
6130 // Flush the pending fee update.
6131 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6132 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6133 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6134 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
6135 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6136 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
6138 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
6139 // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
6140 // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
6141 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6142 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6143 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6144 let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6145 hex::encode(payment_hash_2.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6146 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6148 // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
6149 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6150 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6152 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data, .. } => {
6153 assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6154 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
6155 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
6156 assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6157 assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6158 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
6159 assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
6160 assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
6162 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6165 // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
6166 let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
6167 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6168 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
6169 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
6171 let raa = match send_raa_event {
6172 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
6173 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6175 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6176 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6177 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6178 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6179 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6180 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6182 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6183 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6185 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6186 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6187 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6189 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => {},
6190 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6192 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
6193 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6194 let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6195 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6196 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
6197 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
6200 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
6201 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
6202 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
6205 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
6206 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6207 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6208 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
6209 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
6210 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
6211 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
6212 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
6213 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6214 let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6215 let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6217 // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6218 // pending_update_fee.
6220 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6221 *feerate_lock += 20;
6223 nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6224 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6226 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6227 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6228 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6229 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6230 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6232 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6235 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6237 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6238 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6239 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6240 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6242 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6244 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
6245 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors) - total_routing_fee_msat;
6246 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
6247 let payment_event = {
6248 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6249 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6251 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6252 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6254 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6256 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6257 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6258 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6259 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6261 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1_2.2);
6262 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6264 // Flush the pending fee update.
6265 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6266 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6267 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6268 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6269 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6270 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6272 // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
6273 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6274 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6276 let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
6277 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
6280 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6283 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
6284 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6285 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6287 // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
6288 let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6289 assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 1);
6290 match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
6291 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6292 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6295 // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
6296 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6297 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6299 // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
6300 let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6301 assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
6302 let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
6303 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6304 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
6305 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
6306 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
6307 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6308 (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6310 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6313 // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
6314 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
6315 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6317 // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
6318 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6319 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6320 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6321 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6322 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6323 let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6324 assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
6325 let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
6326 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
6327 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6329 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6330 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
6331 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6334 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
6335 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
6336 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
6339 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
6340 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
6341 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6342 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6343 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6344 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6345 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6347 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6348 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 100;
6350 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6351 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6352 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6353 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value".to_string(), 1);
6357 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
6358 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6359 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6360 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6361 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6362 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6363 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6365 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6366 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 0;
6367 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6368 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
6370 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6371 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6375 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
6376 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6377 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6378 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6379 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6380 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6381 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6383 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6384 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6385 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6386 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6387 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6389 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6390 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6391 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6392 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6393 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() });
6397 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6398 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6399 //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6400 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6401 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6402 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6403 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6404 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6406 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], vec![], 100000000, 500000001);
6407 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::RouteError { ref err },
6408 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6412 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6413 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6414 //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6415 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6416 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6417 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6418 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6419 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6420 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6421 let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6423 for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6424 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6425 let payment_event = {
6426 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6427 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6429 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6430 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6431 if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6432 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6436 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6438 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6439 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6440 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6442 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6443 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6445 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6446 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6447 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6449 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6450 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
6454 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6455 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6456 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6457 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6458 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6459 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6460 let channel_value = 100000;
6461 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6462 let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6464 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6466 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6467 // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6469 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = max_in_flight + 1;
6470 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6471 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6473 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6474 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
6476 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6479 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6481 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6482 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6483 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6484 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6485 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6486 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6487 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6488 let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6490 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6491 let channel = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6492 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6495 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6496 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6497 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6498 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6499 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6500 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6501 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6502 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6503 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6504 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6505 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6509 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6510 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6511 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6512 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6513 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6514 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6515 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6517 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6518 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6519 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6520 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6521 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6522 let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
6524 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6525 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6526 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6527 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6528 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6530 // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6531 // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6532 // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6533 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6534 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6536 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6537 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6538 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6539 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6540 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6544 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6545 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6546 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6547 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6548 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6549 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6550 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6551 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6553 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3999999);
6554 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6555 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6556 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6557 let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3999999, &Some(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6558 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash);
6560 let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6564 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6565 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6566 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6569 for i in 0..super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
6570 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6571 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6573 msg.htlc_id = (super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS) as u64;
6574 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6576 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6577 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6578 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6579 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6580 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6584 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6585 //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6586 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6587 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6588 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6589 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6590 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6592 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6593 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6594 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6595 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6596 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6597 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6599 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6600 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6601 assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6602 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6603 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6607 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6608 //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6609 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6610 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6611 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6612 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6614 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6615 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6616 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6617 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6618 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6619 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6620 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6622 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6623 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6624 assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6625 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6626 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6630 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6631 //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6632 // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6633 // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6634 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6635 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6636 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6637 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6639 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6640 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6641 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6642 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6643 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6644 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6646 //Disconnect and Reconnect
6647 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6648 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6649 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
6650 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6651 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6652 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
6653 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6654 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6655 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6656 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6657 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6658 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6661 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6662 assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6663 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6664 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6665 let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6667 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6669 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6670 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6671 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6672 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6673 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6677 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6678 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6680 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6681 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6682 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6683 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6684 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6685 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6686 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6688 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6689 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6690 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6692 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6695 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6698 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6700 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6701 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6702 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6703 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6704 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6708 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6709 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6711 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6712 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6713 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6714 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6715 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6717 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6718 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6719 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6720 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6721 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6723 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6726 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6729 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6731 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6732 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6733 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6734 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6735 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6739 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6740 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6742 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6743 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6744 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6745 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6746 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6748 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6749 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6750 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6751 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6752 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6753 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6756 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6757 failure_code: 0x8000,
6760 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6762 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6763 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6764 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6765 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6766 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6770 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6771 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6773 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6774 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6775 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6776 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6777 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6779 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
6781 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6782 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6784 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6785 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6786 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6788 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6789 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6790 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6791 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6792 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6793 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6794 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6796 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6800 update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6802 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6804 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6805 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6806 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6807 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6808 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6812 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6813 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6815 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6816 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6817 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6818 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6819 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6821 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
6823 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6824 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6826 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6827 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6828 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6830 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6831 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6832 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6833 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6834 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6835 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6836 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6838 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6842 update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
6844 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6846 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6847 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6848 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6849 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6850 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6854 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
6855 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
6857 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6858 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6859 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6860 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6861 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6863 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6864 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6865 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6867 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6868 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6870 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6871 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6872 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6874 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6876 let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
6878 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6879 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6880 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6881 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6882 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6883 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6884 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
6886 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6889 update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
6890 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6892 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6893 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6894 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
6895 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6896 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6900 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
6901 //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
6902 // * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
6904 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6905 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6906 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6907 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6908 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6909 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6911 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
6914 let mut payment_event = {
6915 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6916 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6917 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6918 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6919 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6921 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6922 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6923 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6924 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6925 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6926 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6927 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6928 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6929 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6932 payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6933 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6934 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6935 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6937 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6938 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6939 let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
6941 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6942 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6943 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6944 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6945 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6946 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6947 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
6949 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6953 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
6955 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6956 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
6957 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6958 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6959 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6961 //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
6963 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6964 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6965 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6966 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6967 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6968 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6970 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6973 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6976 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
6977 // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
6978 // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
6979 // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
6981 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6982 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
6983 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6984 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6985 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6986 let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6988 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6990 // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
6991 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6992 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6993 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6995 // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
6996 let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6998 // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
6999 assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
7000 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7001 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7002 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7004 let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7005 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7006 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
7007 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7009 // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
7010 let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7012 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7014 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
7015 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7017 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7020 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
7021 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7023 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7026 assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
7027 // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
7028 if announce_latest {
7029 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
7031 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
7034 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7035 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7036 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7038 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7039 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7040 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7041 // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
7042 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7043 let mut first_failed = false;
7044 for event in events {
7046 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7047 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
7048 assert!(!first_failed);
7049 first_failed = true;
7051 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
7054 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7060 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
7061 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
7062 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
7065 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
7066 // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7067 // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
7068 // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7069 // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
7070 // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7071 // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
7073 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7074 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7075 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7076 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7077 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7079 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7081 let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7082 let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7084 let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7085 let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7087 // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
7089 let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7090 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
7093 let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
7095 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
7096 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
7097 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7098 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7099 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
7101 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
7102 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7103 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7104 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7105 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7106 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7107 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
7108 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7109 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7110 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7111 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7113 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
7114 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7115 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7116 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7117 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7118 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7119 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7120 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7122 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
7123 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7124 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout tx on remote commitment tx
7125 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7126 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7127 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7128 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7130 // If revoked, both dust & non-dust HTLCs should have been failed after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confs of revoked
7132 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7133 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7136 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7137 if payment_hash == dust_hash { first = true; }
7138 else { first = false; }
7140 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7143 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7144 if first { assert_eq!(payment_hash, non_dust_hash); }
7145 else { assert_eq!(payment_hash, dust_hash); }
7147 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7154 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
7155 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
7156 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
7157 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
7161 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
7162 // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
7164 let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7165 low_our_to_self_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
7166 let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7167 high_their_to_self_config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
7168 let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
7169 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7170 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7171 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
7172 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7174 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
7175 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), 1000000, 1000000, 0, &low_our_to_self_config, 0) {
7177 APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7178 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7180 } else { assert!(false) }
7182 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7183 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7184 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7185 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7186 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0, &low_our_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger) {
7188 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7189 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7191 } else { assert!(false); }
7193 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
7194 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7195 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7196 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7197 accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7198 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7200 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
7202 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7203 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
7204 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
7208 } else { panic!(); }
7209 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg });
7211 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7212 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7213 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7214 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7215 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0, &high_their_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger) {
7217 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7218 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7220 } else { assert!(false); }
7224 fn test_data_loss_protect() {
7225 // We want to be sure that :
7226 // * we don't broadcast our Local Commitment Tx in case of fallen behind
7227 // (but this is not quite true - we broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr)
7228 // * we close channel in case of detecting other being fallen behind
7229 // * we are able to claim our own outputs thanks to to_remote being static
7230 // TODO: this test is incomplete and the data_loss_protect implementation is incomplete - see issue #775
7236 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7237 // We broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr, which would cause a panic
7238 // during signing due to revoked tx
7239 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7240 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
7243 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7244 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7245 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7247 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7249 // Cache node A state before any channel update
7250 let previous_node_state = nodes[0].node.encode();
7251 let mut previous_chain_monitor_state = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7252 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan.2).write(&mut previous_chain_monitor_state).unwrap();
7254 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7255 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7257 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7258 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7260 // Restore node A from previous state
7261 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
7262 let mut chain_monitor = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_chain_monitor_state.0), keys_manager).unwrap().1;
7263 chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
7264 tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
7265 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7266 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7267 monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &tx_broadcaster, &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7269 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7270 channel_monitors.insert(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, &mut chain_monitor);
7271 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_node_state), ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7272 keys_manager: keys_manager,
7273 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
7274 chain_monitor: &monitor,
7276 tx_broadcaster: &tx_broadcaster,
7277 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
7281 nodes[0].node = &node_state_0;
7282 assert!(monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chain_monitor).is_ok());
7283 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &monitor;
7284 nodes[0].chain_source = &chain_source;
7286 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7288 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7289 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7291 let reestablish_0 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7293 // Check we don't broadcast any transactions following learning of per_commitment_point from B
7294 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_0[0]);
7295 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7298 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7299 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7302 let mut reestablish_1 = Vec::with_capacity(1);
7303 for msg in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
7304 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } = msg {
7305 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7306 reestablish_1.push(msg.clone());
7307 } else if let MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } = msg {
7308 } else if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg {
7310 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7311 assert_eq!(msg.data, "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting");
7313 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
7316 panic!("Unexpected event")
7320 // Check we close channel detecting A is fallen-behind
7321 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7322 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_string() });
7323 assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction");
7324 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7326 // Check A is able to claim to_remote output
7327 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7328 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7329 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
7330 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
7331 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
7332 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7333 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can\'t do any automated broadcasting".to_string() });
7334 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
7335 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
7336 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
7340 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
7341 // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
7342 // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
7343 // to B, B should refuse payment.
7345 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7346 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7347 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7348 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7350 // Create some initial channels
7351 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7353 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
7354 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7355 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, nodes[0].network_graph, None, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
7356 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7357 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
7358 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7359 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7361 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7362 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7363 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7364 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7365 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7367 // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
7368 // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
7369 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7370 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7372 // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
7373 // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
7374 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7376 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7377 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7378 let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
7379 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7380 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7381 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7382 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7383 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7384 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7385 (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
7387 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7389 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7391 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
7392 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
7394 // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
7395 let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(10_000).to_vec();
7396 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH));
7397 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
7401 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
7402 // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
7403 // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
7405 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7406 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7407 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7408 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7410 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7411 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7412 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7415 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7416 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7418 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // Enabled -> DisabledStaged
7419 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // DisabledStaged -> Disabled
7420 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7421 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7422 let mut chans_disabled = HashMap::new();
7423 for e in msg_events {
7425 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7426 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7427 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7428 if chans_disabled.insert(msg.contents.short_channel_id, msg.contents.timestamp).is_some() {
7429 panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7432 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7436 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7437 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7438 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7439 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7440 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7441 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7443 // Reestablish chan_1
7444 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7445 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7446 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7447 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7448 // Reestablish chan_2
7449 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7450 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7451 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7452 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7453 // Reestablish chan_3
7454 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7455 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7456 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7457 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7459 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7460 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7461 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7462 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7463 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7464 for e in msg_events {
7466 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7467 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7468 match chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7469 // Each update should have a higher timestamp than the previous one, replacing
7471 Some(prev_timestamp) => assert!(msg.contents.timestamp > prev_timestamp),
7472 None => panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!"),
7475 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7478 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7479 assert!(chans_disabled.is_empty());
7483 fn test_priv_forwarding_rejection() {
7484 // If we have a private channel with outbound liquidity, and
7485 // UserConfig::accept_forwards_to_priv_channels is set to false, we should reject any attempts
7486 // to forward through that channel.
7487 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7488 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7489 let mut no_announce_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
7490 no_announce_cfg.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
7491 no_announce_cfg.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels = false;
7492 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(no_announce_cfg), None]);
7493 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
7494 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
7495 let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
7496 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7498 let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
7500 // Note that the create_*_chan functions in utils requires announcement_signatures, which we do
7501 // not send for private channels.
7502 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7503 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7504 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
7505 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7506 nodes[1].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7508 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[1], 1_000_000, 42);
7509 nodes[1].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
7510 nodes[2].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()));
7511 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
7513 let cs_funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7514 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_funding_signed);
7515 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7517 let conf_height = core::cmp::max(nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1, nodes[2].best_block_info().1 + 1);
7518 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, conf_height);
7519 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH - 1);
7520 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[2], &tx, conf_height);
7521 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH - 1);
7522 let as_funding_locked = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7523 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7524 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7525 nodes[2].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked);
7526 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7528 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].is_public);
7529 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
7530 assert!(!nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels()[0].is_public);
7532 // We should always be able to forward through nodes[1] as long as its out through a public
7534 send_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[0]], 10_000);
7536 // ... however, if we send to nodes[2], we will have to pass the private channel from nodes[1]
7537 // to nodes[2], which should be rejected:
7538 let route_hint = RouteHint(vec![RouteHintHop {
7539 src_node_id: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
7540 short_channel_id: nodes[2].node.list_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap(),
7541 fees: RoutingFees { base_msat: 1000, proportional_millionths: 0 },
7542 cltv_expiry_delta: MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
7543 htlc_minimum_msat: None,
7544 htlc_maximum_msat: None,
7546 let last_hops = vec![route_hint];
7547 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], last_hops, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
7549 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7550 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7551 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
7552 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7553 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
7555 let htlc_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7556 assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7557 assert_eq!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7558 assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7559 assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fee.is_none());
7561 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7562 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_fail_updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7563 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, nodes[2].node.list_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap(), true);
7565 // Now disconnect nodes[1] from its peers and restart with accept_forwards_to_priv_channels set
7566 // to true. Sadly there is currently no way to change it at runtime.
7568 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7569 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7571 let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
7572 let mut monitor_a_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7573 let mut monitor_b_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7574 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_1).write(&mut monitor_a_serialized).unwrap();
7575 get_monitor!(nodes[1], cs_funding_signed.channel_id).write(&mut monitor_b_serialized).unwrap();
7577 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7578 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
7579 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7580 nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
7582 let mut monitor_a_read = &monitor_a_serialized.0[..];
7583 let mut monitor_b_read = &monitor_b_serialized.0[..];
7584 let (_, mut monitor_a) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut monitor_a_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
7585 let (_, mut monitor_b) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut monitor_b_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
7586 assert!(monitor_a_read.is_empty());
7587 assert!(monitor_b_read.is_empty());
7589 no_announce_cfg.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels = true;
7591 let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
7592 let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
7593 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7594 channel_monitors.insert(monitor_a.get_funding_txo().0, &mut monitor_a);
7595 channel_monitors.insert(monitor_b.get_funding_txo().0, &mut monitor_b);
7596 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7597 default_config: no_announce_cfg,
7599 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
7600 chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
7601 tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
7602 logger: nodes[1].logger,
7606 assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
7607 nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
7609 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor_a.get_funding_txo().0, monitor_a).is_ok());
7610 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor_b.get_funding_txo().0, monitor_b).is_ok());
7611 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7612 nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
7614 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7615 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7616 let as_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7617 let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7618 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish);
7619 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
7620 get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7621 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7623 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7624 nodes[2].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7625 let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7626 let cs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7627 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
7628 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_reestablish);
7629 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7630 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7632 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7633 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7634 pass_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], 10_000, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret);
7635 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], our_payment_preimage);
7639 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7640 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7641 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7643 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7644 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7645 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7646 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7648 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7650 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7651 let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], vec![], 3000000, 30);
7652 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7654 let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7655 // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7656 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7657 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7658 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7659 let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7661 let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7662 for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7663 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7664 penalty_sum += outp.value;
7668 // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7669 let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7671 // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7672 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7673 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_114, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7674 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()] });
7675 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7677 // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7681 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7682 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor) + local commitment tx
7683 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7684 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7685 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7686 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7687 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7688 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7692 // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7693 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7694 let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7695 let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7697 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7698 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7699 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7700 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7701 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7702 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7703 penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7704 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7705 assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7706 let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7707 feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7708 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7709 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7713 assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7715 // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7716 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7718 let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7720 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7721 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7722 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7723 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7724 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7725 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7726 penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7727 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7728 assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7729 let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7730 feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7731 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7732 assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7736 assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7738 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7739 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7743 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7744 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7745 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7747 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7748 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7749 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7750 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7751 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7753 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7754 // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7755 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7756 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
7757 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph, None,
7758 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
7759 let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7760 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7761 let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, nodes[1].network_graph, None,
7762 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
7763 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7765 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7766 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7767 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7769 // Revoke local commitment tx
7770 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7772 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7773 // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7774 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7775 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7776 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7777 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7778 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 49); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7780 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7781 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
7782 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], chan.3);
7784 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7785 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7786 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7788 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7789 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7790 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
7791 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7793 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7794 let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7795 let header_11 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: hash_128, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7796 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_11, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7797 let header_129 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_11.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7798 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_129, txdata: vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[2].clone()] });
7799 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7800 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7802 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7803 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7809 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7810 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + A commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7811 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7813 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7814 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7815 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7816 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7818 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7819 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7820 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7821 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7822 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7823 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7825 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7826 // available, which we check here:
7827 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7828 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7829 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7831 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7832 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7834 // node_txn[3] is the local commitment tx broadcast just because (and somewhat in case of
7835 // reorgs, though its not clear its ever worth broadcasting conflicting txn like this when
7836 // a remote commitment tx has already been confirmed).
7837 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan.3);
7839 // node_txn[4] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7840 // output, checked above).
7841 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 2);
7842 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].output.len(), 1);
7843 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7845 first = node_txn[4].txid();
7846 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7847 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[4].output[0].value;
7848 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[4].get_weight() as u64;
7849 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7853 // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7854 let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_129.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7855 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7856 let header_131 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_130.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7857 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_131, txdata: Vec::new() });
7859 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7860 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // 2 bumped penalty txn on revoked commitment tx
7862 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7863 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7864 // Note that these are both bogus - they spend outputs already claimed in block 129:
7865 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output {
7866 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7868 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7869 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7875 // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7876 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7877 assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7878 let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7880 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7881 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7883 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7884 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7885 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7886 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7887 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7888 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7889 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7890 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7894 // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7895 let header_145 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_144, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7896 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_145, txdata: node_txn });
7897 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7899 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7900 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7901 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7902 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7903 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7904 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7905 // up bumped justice generation.
7906 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7909 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7910 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7914 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
7915 // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7916 // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7919 // Provide preimage for one
7920 // Check aggregation
7922 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7923 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7924 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7925 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7927 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7928 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7929 route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
7931 // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7932 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7933 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7934 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7935 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7937 // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
7938 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7939 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
7940 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7941 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7943 // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
7947 let feerate_timeout;
7948 let feerate_preimage;
7950 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7951 // 9 transactions including:
7952 // 1*2 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success
7953 // 1*3 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success + HTLC-Timeout
7954 // 2 * HTLC-Success (one RBF bump we'll check later)
7956 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 8);
7957 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7958 assert_eq!(node_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
7959 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7960 check_spends!(node_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
7961 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
7962 preimage_bump = node_txn[3].clone();
7964 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan.3);
7965 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
7966 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
7967 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[5]);
7969 timeout = node_txn[6].txid();
7970 let index = node_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7971 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[6].output[0].value;
7972 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / node_txn[6].get_weight() as u64;
7974 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
7975 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7976 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7977 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7981 assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
7982 assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
7984 // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
7985 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7987 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7988 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7989 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7990 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
7991 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7992 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7994 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7995 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
7996 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.get_weight() as u64;
7997 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
7998 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
8000 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
8001 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
8002 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
8003 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
8004 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
8009 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8010 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8014 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
8015 // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
8016 // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
8017 // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
8018 // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
8019 // EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
8020 // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
8021 // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
8023 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8024 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8025 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8026 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8027 let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
8029 let mut guard = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
8030 let keys = guard.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
8032 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
8034 // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
8035 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8036 let per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
8038 // Must revoke without gaps
8039 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8040 keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
8042 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8043 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
8044 &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
8046 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
8047 &msgs::RevokeAndACK { channel_id, per_commitment_secret, next_per_commitment_point });
8048 assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
8049 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8050 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() });
8054 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
8055 // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
8056 // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
8058 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8059 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8060 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8061 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8063 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8064 // Lock HTLC in both directions
8065 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8066 route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8068 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
8069 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8070 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
8072 // Revoke local commitment tx
8073 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
8075 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
8076 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
8077 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[0]);
8078 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8080 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
8081 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8082 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8083 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8085 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8086 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
8087 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8088 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8089 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8090 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
8094 let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8095 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
8096 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8098 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
8099 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
8100 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
8105 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
8106 // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
8107 // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
8108 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8109 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8110 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8111 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8113 let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8115 // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
8116 // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
8117 // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
8118 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
8119 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8121 // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
8122 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
8123 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8124 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8126 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
8127 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8128 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
8129 let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8130 assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
8132 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
8133 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8134 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
8136 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8141 fn test_override_channel_config() {
8142 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8143 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8144 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8145 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8147 // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
8148 let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
8149 override_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
8151 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
8153 // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
8154 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8155 assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
8156 assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
8160 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
8161 let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
8162 zero_config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
8163 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8164 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8165 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
8166 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8168 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
8169 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8170 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8172 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8173 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8174 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8178 fn test_simple_mpp() {
8179 // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
8180 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8181 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8182 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8183 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8185 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8186 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8187 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8188 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8190 let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8191 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8192 route.paths.push(path);
8193 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8194 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8195 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8196 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8197 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8198 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8199 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
8200 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
8204 fn test_preimage_storage() {
8205 // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
8206 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8207 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8208 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8209 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8211 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8214 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
8215 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8216 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8217 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8218 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8219 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8220 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8221 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8223 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8224 // values from previous calls.
8225 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8226 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8227 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8229 Event::PaymentReceived { ref purpose, .. } => {
8231 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
8232 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
8234 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
8237 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8242 #[allow(deprecated)]
8243 fn test_secret_timeout() {
8244 // Simple test of payment secret storage time outs. After
8245 // `create_inbound_payment(_for_hash)_legacy` is removed, this test will be removed as well.
8246 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8247 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8248 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8249 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8251 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8253 let (payment_hash, payment_secret_1) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_legacy(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8255 // We should fail to register the same payment hash twice, at least until we've connected a
8256 // block with time 7200 + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1.
8257 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8258 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8259 } else { panic!(); }
8261 let node_1_blocks = nodes[1].blocks.lock().unwrap();
8263 header: BlockHeader {
8265 prev_blockhash: node_1_blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(),
8266 merkle_root: Default::default(),
8267 time: node_1_blocks.len() as u32 + 7200, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8271 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8272 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8273 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8274 } else { panic!(); }
8276 // If we then connect the second block, we should be able to register the same payment hash
8277 // again (this time getting a new payment secret).
8278 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.header.block_hash();
8279 block.header.time += 1;
8280 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8281 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8282 assert_ne!(payment_secret_1, our_payment_secret);
8285 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8286 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8287 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8288 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8289 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8290 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8291 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8293 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8294 // values from previous calls.
8295 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8296 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8297 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8299 Event::PaymentReceived { purpose: PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret }, .. } => {
8300 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
8301 assert_eq!(payment_secret, our_payment_secret);
8302 // We don't actually have the payment preimage with which to claim this payment!
8304 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8309 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8310 // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8311 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8312 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8313 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8314 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8316 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8318 let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8319 let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8320 let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8321 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8323 // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8324 // resulting events.
8325 macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8327 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8328 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8329 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8330 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8331 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8333 // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8334 // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8335 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8336 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8337 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8339 // We should fail the payment back
8340 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8341 match events.pop().unwrap() {
8342 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8343 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8344 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8346 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8351 let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8352 // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8353 let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8355 // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8356 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8357 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8358 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8360 // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8361 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8362 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8363 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8365 // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8366 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8367 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8368 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8372 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8373 // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8374 // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8375 // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateErr.
8377 // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8378 // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8379 // commitment at same time.
8381 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8382 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8383 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8384 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8386 // Create some initial channel
8387 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8388 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8390 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8391 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8393 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8394 let preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8396 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8397 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8398 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8399 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8401 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8402 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8403 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8404 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8405 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8406 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8407 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8408 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8411 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8412 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8413 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8414 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (header, 0));
8415 watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 200);
8417 // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8418 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage));
8419 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8420 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8421 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8422 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8423 if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8424 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8425 if let Err(_) = watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8426 if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8427 } else { assert!(false); }
8428 } else { assert!(false); };
8429 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8430 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8431 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8432 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8436 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8437 // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8438 // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8439 // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8440 // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8442 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8443 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8444 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8445 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8447 // Create some initial channel
8448 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8449 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8451 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8452 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8454 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8455 route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8457 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8458 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8459 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8460 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8461 let watchtower_alice = {
8462 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8463 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8464 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8465 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8466 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8467 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8468 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8469 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8472 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8473 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8474 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8475 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as usize, (header, 0));
8476 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8478 // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8480 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8481 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8485 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8486 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8487 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8488 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8489 let watchtower_bob = {
8490 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8491 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8492 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8493 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8494 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8495 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8496 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8497 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8500 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8501 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8503 // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8504 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8506 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8508 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8510 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8511 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8512 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8513 if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8514 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8515 // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8516 if let Err(_) = watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8517 if let Ok(_) = watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8518 if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8519 } else { assert!(false); }
8520 } else { assert!(false); };
8521 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8522 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8524 //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8525 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8526 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8528 // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8531 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8532 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8533 bob_state_y = txn[0].clone();
8537 // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8538 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8539 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![bob_state_y.clone()] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8541 let htlc_txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8542 // We broadcast twice the transaction, once due to the HTLC-timeout, once due
8543 // the onchain detection of the HTLC output
8544 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
8545 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8546 check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], bob_state_y);
8551 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8552 // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8553 // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8556 // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8557 // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8559 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8560 // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8561 // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8562 // before receiving funding_signed.
8563 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8564 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8565 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8566 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8568 // Create an initial channel
8569 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8570 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8571 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8572 let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8573 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_chan_msg);
8575 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8576 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
8578 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
8579 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8581 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8582 let channel_id = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
8583 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8584 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8585 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Hi".to_string() }, true);
8589 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8590 // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8591 // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8592 // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8593 // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
8594 // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
8595 // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
8597 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8598 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8599 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8600 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8602 // Create some initial channels
8603 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8605 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
8606 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
8607 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
8608 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8609 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
8610 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
8612 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8613 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8614 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] });
8615 // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
8616 // this test before #653 fix.
8617 chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
8618 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8619 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8620 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8621 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
8623 let htlc_timeout = {
8624 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8625 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
8626 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8627 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
8631 let header_201 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8632 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_201, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout.clone()] });
8633 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8634 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8637 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
8638 // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
8639 // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
8640 // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
8642 // Steps of the test:
8643 // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
8644 // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
8645 // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
8646 // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
8647 // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
8648 // but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
8649 // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
8650 // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
8651 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8652 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8653 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8654 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8656 // Create some initial channels
8657 let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8658 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8660 // Steps (1) and (2):
8661 // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
8662 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3_000_000);
8664 // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
8665 let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
8666 check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8667 assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
8668 check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
8669 assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8670 assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
8672 // Steps (3) and (4):
8673 // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
8674 // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
8675 let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
8676 if !broadcast_alice { force_closing_node = 1; } // Bob force-closes
8677 nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_channel(&chan_ab.2).unwrap();
8678 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
8679 check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
8680 check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8681 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8682 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
8683 true => alice_txn.clone(),
8684 false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
8686 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8687 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8688 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8689 if broadcast_alice {
8690 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8691 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8692 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8694 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8695 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8699 // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
8700 // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
8701 assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
8702 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8703 let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8704 assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8705 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8706 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8707 assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
8708 assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8710 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8711 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false);
8712 // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
8713 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
8714 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8715 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8717 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
8718 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8720 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8723 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
8724 // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
8725 // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
8726 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8728 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8729 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8730 let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
8731 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8732 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8735 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8737 let bob_updates = match events[1] {
8738 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
8739 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8742 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8745 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
8746 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8747 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
8748 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8750 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8751 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8752 let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
8753 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8754 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8757 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8759 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
8760 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8762 // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
8763 // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
8764 let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
8765 if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
8766 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8767 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8768 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8769 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
8770 if broadcast_alice {
8771 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8772 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8773 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8775 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8776 if broadcast_alice {
8777 // In `connect_block()`, the ChainMonitor and ChannelManager are separately notified about a
8778 // new block being connected. The ChannelManager being notified triggers a monitor update,
8779 // which triggers broadcasting our commitment tx and an HTLC-claiming tx. The ChainMonitor
8780 // being notified triggers the HTLC-claiming tx redundantly, resulting in 3 total txs being
8782 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 3);
8783 check_spends!(bob_txn[1], chan_ab.3);
8785 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8786 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8791 // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
8792 // broadcasted commitment transaction.
8794 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8795 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8796 // Bob should now have an extra broadcasted tx, for the preimage-claiming transaction.
8797 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8799 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
8800 true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
8801 false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
8803 // If Alice force-closed and Bob didn't receive her commitment transaction until after he
8804 // received Carol's fulfill, he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction first. Else if
8805 // Bob force closed or if he found out about Alice's commitment tx before receiving Carol's
8806 // fulfill, then he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction second.
8807 if broadcast_alice && !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8808 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8809 assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8811 check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8812 assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8818 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
8819 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
8820 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
8821 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
8822 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
8826 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
8827 // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
8828 // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
8830 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
8831 // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
8832 // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
8833 // updating logic for the existing channel.
8834 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8835 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8836 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8837 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8839 // Create an initial channel
8840 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8841 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8842 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8843 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8845 // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
8846 // that it is rejected.
8847 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8849 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8850 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8852 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8853 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
8854 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
8855 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
8856 // move forward with it.
8857 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8858 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8860 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8864 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8865 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
8867 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
8868 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8870 let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8871 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8873 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8874 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8875 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8876 added_monitors.clear();
8878 let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8880 let funding_outpoint = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
8881 let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
8883 // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
8886 // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
8887 // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
8888 // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
8889 open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
8890 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8892 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8893 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8895 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8896 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8897 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8898 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8899 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8901 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8905 // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
8906 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8907 let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8908 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_2_msg);
8909 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8910 create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
8912 let funding_created = {
8913 let mut a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
8914 let mut as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get_mut(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
8915 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8916 as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
8918 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8919 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
8920 // At this point we'll try to add a duplicate channel monitor, which will be rejected, but
8921 // still needs to be cleared here.
8922 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8924 // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
8926 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8927 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8929 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8930 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8931 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8932 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
8933 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8935 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8939 // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
8940 // everything is functional.
8941 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
8943 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8944 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8945 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8946 added_monitors.clear();
8949 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8950 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
8951 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
8952 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
8954 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8955 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
8956 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
8957 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
8961 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
8962 // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
8964 // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
8965 // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
8966 // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
8967 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8968 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8969 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8970 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8972 // Create some initial channels
8973 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8974 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8975 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8977 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8978 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8979 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8981 // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
8982 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8983 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8985 // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
8986 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8987 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8988 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
8989 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
8990 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
8991 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8992 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
8993 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8995 // A null channel ID should close all channels
8996 let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8997 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8998 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
8999 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
9000 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9001 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9003 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9004 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9006 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9009 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9010 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9012 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9014 // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
9015 // peer_disconnected with no_connection_possible set to false, duplicating the
9016 // close-all-channels logic. That's OK, we don't want to end up not force-closing channels for
9017 // users with their own peer handling logic. We duplicate the call here, however.
9018 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9019 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9021 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
9022 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9023 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9027 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
9028 // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
9030 // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
9031 // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
9032 // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
9033 // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
9034 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9035 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9036 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9037 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9039 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9040 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9041 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9043 let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100_000, 42);
9044 for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
9045 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
9046 output.script_pubkey = bitcoin::Script::new();
9049 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
9050 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9051 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9053 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9054 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9056 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9057 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
9059 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9060 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9061 nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
9063 let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
9064 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
9065 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
9066 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9067 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9068 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
9069 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
9070 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9071 if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
9072 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
9073 } else { panic!(); }
9074 } else { panic!(); }
9075 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
9078 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
9079 // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
9080 // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
9081 // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
9082 // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
9083 // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
9084 // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
9085 // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
9086 // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
9087 // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
9088 // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
9089 // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
9090 // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
9091 // until we learned about an additional block.
9093 // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
9094 // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
9095 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9096 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9097 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9098 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9099 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
9101 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9102 let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9103 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
9104 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9105 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9107 nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&channel_id).unwrap();
9108 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9109 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9110 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9111 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9112 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
9114 let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
9115 if !test_height_before_timelock {
9116 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
9118 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9119 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
9120 if test_height_before_timelock {
9121 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
9122 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
9123 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
9124 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9126 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
9127 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9128 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
9129 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
9130 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
9131 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
9133 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
9134 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
9136 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
9137 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
9138 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
9139 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9140 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
9141 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9142 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9144 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9145 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9146 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9147 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9148 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9149 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9150 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9151 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9152 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
9157 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
9158 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
9159 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
9163 fn test_forwardable_regen() {
9164 // Tests that if we reload a ChannelManager while forwards are pending we will regenerate the
9165 // PendingHTLCsForwardable event automatically, ensuring we don't forget to forward/receive
9167 // We test it for both payment receipt and payment forwarding.
9169 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9170 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9171 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9172 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
9173 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
9174 let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
9175 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9176 let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9177 let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9179 // First send a payment to nodes[1]
9180 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
9181 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9182 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9184 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9185 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9186 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9187 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9188 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9190 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9192 // Next send a payment which is forwarded by nodes[1]
9193 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 200_000);
9194 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
9195 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9197 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9198 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9199 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9200 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9201 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9203 // There is already a PendingHTLCsForwardable event "pending" so another one will not be
9205 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9207 // Now restart nodes[1] and make sure it regenerates a single PendingHTLCsForwardable
9208 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9209 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9211 let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
9212 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9213 let mut chan_1_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9214 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_1).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9215 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_2).write(&mut chan_1_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9217 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
9218 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
9219 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
9220 nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
9222 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9223 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9224 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9225 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
9226 let mut chan_1_monitor_read = &chan_1_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9227 let (_, mut chan_1_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9228 &mut chan_1_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9229 assert!(chan_1_monitor_read.is_empty());
9231 let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
9232 let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
9233 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
9234 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
9235 channel_monitors.insert(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_1_monitor);
9236 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
9237 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
9239 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
9240 chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
9241 tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
9242 logger: nodes[1].logger,
9246 nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
9247 assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
9249 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
9250 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_1_monitor).is_ok());
9251 nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
9252 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9254 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9255 // Note that nodes[1] and nodes[2] resend their funding_locked here since they haven't updated
9256 // the commitment state.
9257 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9259 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9261 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9262 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 100_000);
9263 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9265 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9266 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9267 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9268 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9269 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9270 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9271 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 200_000);
9273 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
9274 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage_2);
9278 fn test_keysend_payments_to_public_node() {
9279 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9280 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9281 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9282 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9284 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9285 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9286 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9287 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9288 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9289 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9290 final_value_msat: 10000,
9291 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9293 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
9294 let route = find_route(&payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
9296 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9297 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9298 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9299 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9300 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9301 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9302 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9303 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9304 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9308 fn test_keysend_payments_to_private_node() {
9309 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9310 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9311 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9312 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9314 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9315 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9316 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
9317 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
9319 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9320 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9321 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9322 final_value_msat: 10000,
9323 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9325 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9326 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9327 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
9328 let route = find_route(
9329 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9330 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
9333 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9334 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9335 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9336 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9337 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9338 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9339 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9340 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9341 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9344 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
9345 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
9346 enum ExposureEvent {
9347 /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
9349 /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
9351 /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
9352 AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
9355 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool) {
9356 // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
9359 // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
9360 // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
9361 // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
9362 // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
9363 // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
9364 // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
9365 // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
9366 // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
9368 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9369 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
9370 config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = 5_000_000; // default setting value
9371 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9372 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
9373 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9375 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9376 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9377 open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
9378 open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
9380 open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9382 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
9383 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9384 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
9386 let opt_anchors = false;
9388 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 1_000_000, 42);
9391 if let Some(mut chan) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&temporary_channel_id) {
9392 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9396 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
9397 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9398 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9400 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9401 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9403 let (funding_locked, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9404 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
9405 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9407 let dust_buffer_feerate = {
9408 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
9409 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
9410 chan.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64
9412 let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9413 let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9415 let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9416 let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9418 let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 25;
9419 let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
9422 if dust_outbound_balance {
9423 // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9424 // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9425 // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
9426 for i in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9427 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9428 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9431 // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9432 // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9433 // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
9434 for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9435 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9439 if dust_outbound_balance {
9440 // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9441 // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9442 for i in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9443 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9444 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9447 // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9448 // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9449 for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9450 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9455 let dust_overflow = dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx + 1);
9456 if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
9457 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9458 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9459 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9461 let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9462 let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9463 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9465 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9467 } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
9468 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9469 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9470 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9471 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9472 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9473 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
9474 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9475 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9477 // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
9478 let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9479 let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9480 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9482 // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
9483 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9485 } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
9486 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 2_500_000);
9487 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at update_fee-swallowed HTLC", ); }
9489 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9490 *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
9492 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9493 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9494 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure".to_string(), 1);
9497 let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9498 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9499 added_monitors.clear();
9503 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
9504 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9505 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9506 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9507 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9508 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9509 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9510 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9511 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9512 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9513 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9514 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9515 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);