1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
15 use crate::chain::{ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Confirm, Listen, Watch};
16 use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
17 use crate::chain::channelmonitor;
18 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
19 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
20 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{BaseSign, KeysInterface};
21 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
22 use crate::ln::channel::{commitment_tx_base_weight, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT};
23 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA};
24 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
25 use crate::ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
26 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
27 use crate::routing::gossip::{NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate};
28 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, find_route, get_route};
29 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures};
31 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
32 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
33 use crate::util::{byte_utils, test_utils};
34 use crate::util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
35 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
36 use crate::util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
37 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
39 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
40 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
41 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
42 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
43 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
44 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
45 use bitcoin::{PackedLockTime, Sequence, Transaction, TxIn, TxMerkleNode, TxOut, Witness};
46 use bitcoin::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
48 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
49 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
54 use crate::prelude::*;
55 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
56 use core::default::Default;
57 use core::iter::repeat;
58 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
59 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
61 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
62 use crate::ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
65 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
66 // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
67 use crate::ln::channel::TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS;
68 let mut cfg = UserConfig::default();
69 cfg.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1;
70 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
71 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
72 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(cfg)]);
73 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
75 // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
77 let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
78 let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat, &cfg);
79 let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
81 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
82 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
84 // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
85 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
87 // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
88 // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
89 let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
90 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
91 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
92 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
93 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
94 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
96 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
97 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), expected_regex, 1);
99 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
101 } else { assert!(false); }
104 use crate::ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
106 // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
107 insane_open_helper(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2; msg });
108 insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS; msg });
110 insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
112 insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than channel amount minus reserve \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
114 insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
116 insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
118 insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
120 insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
122 insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
126 fn test_funding_exceeds_no_wumbo_limit() {
127 // Test that if a peer does not support wumbo channels, we'll refuse to open a wumbo channel to
129 use crate::ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO;
130 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
131 let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
132 node_cfgs[1].features = channelmanager::provided_init_features().clear_wumbo();
133 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
134 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
136 match nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1, 0, 42, None) {
137 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
138 assert_eq!(format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1), err);
144 fn do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(send_from_initiator: bool) {
145 // A peer providing a channel_reserve_satoshis of 0 (or less than our dust limit) is insecure,
146 // but only for them. Because some LSPs do it with some level of trust of the clients (for a
147 // substantial UX improvement), we explicitly allow it. Because it's unlikely to happen often
148 // in normal testing, we test it explicitly here.
149 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
150 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
151 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
152 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
153 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
155 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
156 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
157 let feerate_per_kw = 253;
158 let opt_anchors = false;
159 push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
160 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
162 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None).unwrap();
163 let mut open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
164 if !send_from_initiator {
165 open_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
166 open_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
168 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_message);
170 // Extract the channel accept message from node1 to node0
171 let mut accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
172 if send_from_initiator {
173 accept_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
174 accept_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
176 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel_message);
179 let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(if send_from_initiator { &nodes[1] } else { &nodes[0] }, lock, temp_channel_id);
180 chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
181 chan.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
184 let funding_tx = sign_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100_000, temp_channel_id);
185 let funding_msgs = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_tx);
186 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_msgs.0);
188 // nodes[0] should now be able to send the full balance to nodes[1], violating nodes[1]'s
189 // security model if it ever tries to send funds back to nodes[0] (but that's not our problem).
190 if send_from_initiator {
191 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000_000
192 // Note that for outbound channels we have to consider the commitment tx fee and the
193 // "fee spike buffer", which is currently a multiple of the total commitment tx fee as
194 // well as an additional HTLC.
195 - FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, 2, opt_anchors));
197 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], push_amt);
202 fn test_counterparty_no_reserve() {
203 do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(true);
204 do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(false);
208 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
209 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
210 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
211 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
212 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
213 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
216 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
220 // send (1) commitment_signed -.
221 // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
222 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
223 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
224 // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
225 // (2) RAA is delivered ->
226 // .- send (4) commitment_signed
227 // <- (3) RAA is delivered
228 // send (5) commitment_signed -.
229 // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
231 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
233 // (6) RAA is delivered ->
235 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
237 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
240 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
241 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
243 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
244 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
245 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
246 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
247 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
249 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
252 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
254 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
255 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
256 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
257 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
259 let payment_event = {
260 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
261 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
262 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
264 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
265 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
267 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
268 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
269 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
270 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
271 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
272 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
274 // deliver(1), generate (3):
275 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
276 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
277 // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
278 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
280 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
281 let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
282 assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
283 assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
284 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
285 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
286 assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
287 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
289 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
290 let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
291 assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
292 assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
293 assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
294 assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
295 assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
296 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
298 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
299 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
300 // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
301 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
303 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
304 let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
305 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
307 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
308 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
310 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
311 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
313 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
314 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
317 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
318 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
322 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
323 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
324 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
325 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
326 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
327 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
328 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
329 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
332 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
334 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
336 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
339 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
340 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
342 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
343 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
344 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
345 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
348 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
351 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
353 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
354 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
355 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
356 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
358 let payment_event = {
359 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
360 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
361 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
363 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
364 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
366 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
367 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
368 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
369 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
370 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
371 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
373 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
374 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
376 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
380 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
381 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
382 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
383 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
384 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
385 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
388 // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
389 // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
390 // update_fee (never committed) ->
392 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
393 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
394 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
395 // <- (1) RAA delivered
396 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
397 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
398 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
399 // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
401 // B should send no response here
402 // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
403 // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
406 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
409 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
410 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
411 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
413 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
414 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
416 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
417 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
418 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
419 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
420 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
422 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
425 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
426 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
427 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
428 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
429 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
431 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
434 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
435 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
437 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
438 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
439 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
441 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
442 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
443 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
444 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
447 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
449 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
451 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
453 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
454 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
455 let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
456 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
457 assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
458 assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
459 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
460 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
461 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
462 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
463 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
465 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
466 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
467 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
468 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
469 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
471 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
472 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
473 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
476 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
477 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
478 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
480 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
481 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
482 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
484 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
485 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
486 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
487 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
489 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
490 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
491 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
494 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
495 // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
496 // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
497 // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
500 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
501 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
502 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
503 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
505 if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
507 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
510 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
511 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
514 if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
515 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
516 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
518 if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
519 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel);
520 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
522 if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
523 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
525 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
527 if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
528 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
529 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
530 let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
532 if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
533 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
535 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
536 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
537 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
538 added_monitors.clear();
540 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
542 if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
543 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
545 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
546 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
547 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
548 added_monitors.clear();
551 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
552 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
554 if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
555 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
557 if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
558 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
559 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
560 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
561 expect_channel_ready_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
565 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
566 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
567 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
568 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
569 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
570 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
571 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
572 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
573 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
574 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
575 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
576 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
577 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
578 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
579 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
580 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
581 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
582 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
583 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
587 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
588 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
589 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
590 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
591 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
592 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
595 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
598 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
599 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
601 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
602 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
603 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
604 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
605 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
607 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
609 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
611 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
612 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
613 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
615 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
616 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
617 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
619 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
620 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
621 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
622 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
624 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
625 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
626 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
630 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
631 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
632 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
633 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
634 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
635 let channel_value = 5000;
637 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
638 let channel_id = chan.2;
639 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
640 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
641 let bs_channel_reserve_sats = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value, &default_config);
643 let opt_anchors = false;
645 // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
646 // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
647 // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
649 let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
650 let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors)) as u32;
652 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
653 *feerate_lock = feerate;
655 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
656 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
657 let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
659 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
661 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
663 // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
665 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
667 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
668 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
669 let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000;
670 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
671 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
672 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
676 // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
677 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
680 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
681 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
682 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
684 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
686 // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
687 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
688 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
689 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
690 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
691 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
692 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
693 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
694 pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
696 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
697 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
698 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
699 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
700 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
701 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
702 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
703 pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
706 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
707 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
708 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
711 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
712 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
713 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
714 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
715 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
716 INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
718 channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000,
719 opt_anchors, local_funding, remote_funding,
720 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
721 non_buffer_feerate + 4,
723 &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
725 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
728 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
731 htlc_signatures: res.1
734 let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
736 feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
739 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
741 //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
742 //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
743 //Should produce and error.
744 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
745 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
746 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
747 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
748 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") });
752 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
753 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
754 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
755 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
756 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
757 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
760 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
763 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
766 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
767 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
769 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
770 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
771 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
772 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
773 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
775 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
777 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
778 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
779 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
780 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
782 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
784 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
785 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
787 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
788 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
789 added_monitors.clear();
791 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
792 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
793 // node[1] has nothing to do
795 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
796 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
797 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
799 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
800 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
801 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
802 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
803 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
804 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
805 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
807 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
808 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
809 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
810 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
811 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
812 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
814 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
815 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
816 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
817 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
819 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
820 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
821 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
823 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
824 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
825 let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
826 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
828 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
829 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
830 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
832 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
834 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
835 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
837 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
838 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
841 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
843 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
844 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
845 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
846 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
847 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
851 fn test_update_fee() {
852 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
853 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
854 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
855 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
856 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
857 let channel_id = chan.2;
860 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
861 // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
862 // .- send (3) commitment_signed
863 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
864 // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
865 // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
866 // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
867 // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
868 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
869 // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
870 // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
873 // Create and deliver (1)...
876 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
877 feerate = *feerate_lock;
878 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
880 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
881 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
883 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
884 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
885 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
886 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
887 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
889 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
891 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
893 // Generate (2) and (3):
894 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
895 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
896 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
899 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
900 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
901 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
903 // Create and deliver (4)...
905 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
906 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
908 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
909 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
910 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
911 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
912 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
913 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
914 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
916 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
919 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
920 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
921 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
923 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
924 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
926 // Handle (3), creating (6):
927 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
928 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
929 let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
930 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
933 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
934 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
935 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
937 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
938 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
939 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
940 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
941 assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
942 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
943 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
944 assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
945 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
948 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
949 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
950 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
951 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
953 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
954 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
955 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
957 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
958 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
959 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
960 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
961 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
965 fn fake_network_test() {
966 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
967 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
968 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
969 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
970 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
971 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
973 // Create some initial channels
974 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
975 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
976 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
978 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
979 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
980 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
981 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
982 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
984 // Send some more payments
985 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
986 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
987 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
989 // Test failure packets
990 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
991 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
993 // Add a new channel that skips 3
994 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
996 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
997 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
998 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
999 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1000 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1001 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1002 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1004 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
1005 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1006 hops.push(RouteHop {
1007 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1008 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1009 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1010 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1012 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1014 hops.push(RouteHop {
1015 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1016 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1017 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1018 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1020 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1022 hops.push(RouteHop {
1023 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1024 node_features: channelmanager::provided_node_features(),
1025 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1026 channel_features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(),
1028 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1030 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1031 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1032 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
1034 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1035 hops.push(RouteHop {
1036 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1037 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1038 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1039 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1041 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1043 hops.push(RouteHop {
1044 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1045 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1046 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1047 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1049 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1051 hops.push(RouteHop {
1052 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1053 node_features: channelmanager::provided_node_features(),
1054 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1055 channel_features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(),
1057 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1059 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1060 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1061 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1063 // Claim the rebalances...
1064 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1065 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1067 // Close down the channels...
1068 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1069 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1070 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1071 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1072 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1073 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1074 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1075 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1076 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1077 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1078 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1079 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1083 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1084 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1085 // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1086 // commitment dance rounds.
1087 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1088 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1089 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1090 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1091 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1092 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1094 let mut payments = Vec::new();
1095 for _ in 0..crate::ln::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
1096 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1097 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
1098 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1100 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1102 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1103 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1104 let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1105 assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1107 // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1108 // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1110 let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1112 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1113 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1114 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1115 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
1118 // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1119 let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1121 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
1122 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1125 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1126 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1127 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1128 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1130 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1131 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1132 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1133 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1134 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1135 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
1136 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1138 let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1139 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1140 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1142 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1144 // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1145 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1146 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1147 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1149 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1150 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1151 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1152 let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1154 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1155 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1156 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1158 for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1159 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1161 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1162 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1163 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1164 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1165 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1167 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1168 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1169 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1170 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1171 let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1173 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1174 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1176 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1178 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1179 assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1180 for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1182 &Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1183 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1185 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1189 for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1190 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1193 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1197 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1198 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1199 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1200 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1201 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1202 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1203 let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1205 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1206 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1207 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1208 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1209 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1210 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1212 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1214 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1215 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1217 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1218 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1220 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1221 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1222 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1226 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1227 // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1228 // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1229 // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1230 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1231 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1232 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1233 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1235 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1238 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1240 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1242 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1243 let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
1244 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1246 // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1247 nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1248 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, 800_000);
1249 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1251 // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1252 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1254 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1255 let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1256 for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1257 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1258 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1259 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1260 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1263 assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1265 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1266 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1267 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1268 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1270 let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1271 assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 5);
1273 check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]); // Immediate HTLC claim with preimage
1274 check_spends!(claim_txn[1], chan_1.3); // Alternative commitment tx
1275 check_spends!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[1]); // HTLC spend in alternative commitment tx
1277 check_spends!(claim_txn[3], remote_txn[0]);
1278 check_spends!(claim_txn[4], remote_txn[0]);
1279 let preimage_tx = &claim_txn[0];
1280 let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if claim_txn[3].input[0].previous_output == preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output {
1281 (&claim_txn[3], &claim_txn[4])
1283 (&claim_txn[4], &claim_txn[3])
1286 assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1287 assert_eq!(preimage_bump_tx.input.len(), 1);
1289 assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1290 assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1291 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1293 assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input.len(), 1);
1294 assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1295 check_spends!(timeout_tx, remote_txn[0]);
1296 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1298 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1299 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1302 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1303 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
1304 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1305 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1307 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1308 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1309 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1310 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1311 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1312 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1314 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1320 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1321 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1322 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1323 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1324 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1325 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1327 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1328 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1330 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1331 let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2), 1 + 1, get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2));
1332 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1333 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send + 1);
1334 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).err().unwrap();
1336 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(ref fails) => {
1338 &APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ref err} =>
1339 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)),
1340 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1343 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1345 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1346 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1348 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1352 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1353 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1354 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1355 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1356 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1357 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1359 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460001);
1360 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1361 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1362 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1364 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1366 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1367 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3460001, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1368 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1369 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1372 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1373 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1374 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1375 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1378 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1380 // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1381 // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1382 // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1384 let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1386 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1388 // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1389 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1390 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1391 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1392 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1393 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1394 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1395 chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1397 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1398 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1399 chan_signer.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1400 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1401 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1403 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1404 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1405 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1406 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1407 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1408 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1409 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1410 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1413 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1414 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1415 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
1417 // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1418 // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1419 let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1421 let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1423 amount_msat: 3460001,
1424 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1426 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1429 let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1432 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1433 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1434 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1435 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1439 local_chan.opt_anchors(), local_funding, remote_funding,
1440 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1442 &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1443 &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1445 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1448 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1451 htlc_signatures: res.1
1454 // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1455 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1456 let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1458 // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1459 let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1461 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1462 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point
1464 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1466 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1467 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1468 // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1470 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1471 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1472 update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1474 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1476 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1477 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", ::hex::encode(raa_msg.channel_id)), 1);
1479 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1483 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1484 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1485 // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1486 // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1487 // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1489 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1490 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1491 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1492 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1493 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1494 let opt_anchors = false;
1496 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1497 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1499 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1501 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1503 // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1504 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1505 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1508 // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1509 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1510 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1511 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1512 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1513 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1517 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1518 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1519 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1520 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1521 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1522 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1523 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1524 let opt_anchors = false;
1526 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1527 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1528 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1529 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1530 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1531 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1532 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1534 // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1535 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1536 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1539 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 700_000);
1540 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1541 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1542 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1543 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1544 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1545 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 700_000, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1546 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1547 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1549 htlc_id: MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64,
1550 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1551 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1552 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1553 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1556 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1557 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1558 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1559 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1560 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1561 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1562 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1563 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() });
1567 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1568 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1569 // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1570 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1571 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1573 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1574 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1575 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1576 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1577 let opt_anchors = false;
1579 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1580 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1581 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1582 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1583 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1584 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1585 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1587 let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1588 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1589 // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1590 // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1591 // commitment transaction fee.
1592 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1594 // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1595 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1596 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1599 // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1600 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt + 1);
1601 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1602 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1606 fn test_chan_init_feerate_unaffordability() {
1607 // Test that we will reject channel opens which do not leave enough to pay for any HTLCs due to
1608 // channel reserve and feerate requirements.
1609 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1610 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1611 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1612 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1613 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1614 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1615 let opt_anchors = false;
1617 // Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
1619 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1620 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1621 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None).unwrap_err(),
1622 APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
1624 // During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
1625 // requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
1626 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1627 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None).unwrap();
1628 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1629 open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
1630 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_msg);
1632 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1633 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
1634 match msg_events[0] {
1635 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
1636 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve");
1638 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1643 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1644 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1645 // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1646 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1647 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1648 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1649 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1650 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1652 let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1653 // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1654 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1655 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1656 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1657 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1659 // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1660 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1661 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1662 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1663 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1664 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1666 // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1667 // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1668 // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1669 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1673 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1674 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1675 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1676 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1677 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1678 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1679 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1682 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1683 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1684 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1685 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1687 // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1688 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1689 let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1690 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1692 // Add a pending HTLC.
1693 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1694 let payment_event_1 = {
1695 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
1696 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1698 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1699 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1700 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1702 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1704 // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1705 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2, opt_anchors);
1706 let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1707 let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1708 let (route_2, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_2);
1710 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1711 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1712 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1713 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1714 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1715 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, &None, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1716 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1);
1717 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1720 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1721 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1722 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1723 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1726 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1727 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1728 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1729 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1730 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1731 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1732 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1733 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() });
1737 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1738 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1739 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1740 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1741 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1742 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1743 let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1744 let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1745 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1746 assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1747 assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1749 let reserve = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config);
1750 assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1751 assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1753 assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1754 assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1757 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
1758 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1762 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1763 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1764 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1765 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1766 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1767 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1768 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1769 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1770 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1771 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1772 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1774 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1775 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1777 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1778 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1780 macro_rules! expect_forward {
1782 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1783 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1784 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1785 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1790 let feemsat = 239; // set above
1791 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1792 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1793 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1795 let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1797 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1799 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id())
1800 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features()).with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1801 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], payment_params, recv_value_0, TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
1802 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1803 assert!(route.paths[0].iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1805 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1806 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1807 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1808 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
1811 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1812 // nodes[0]'s wealth
1814 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1815 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1816 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1817 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1818 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1819 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1820 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1824 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id())
1825 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features()).with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1826 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, recv_value_0, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
1827 let (payment_preimage, ..) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], recv_value_0);
1828 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
1830 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1831 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1832 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1833 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1834 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1837 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1838 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1839 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1840 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1841 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1844 // adding pending output.
1845 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1846 // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1847 // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1848 // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1849 // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1850 // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1851 // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1852 // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1853 // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1855 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1856 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1857 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1859 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1860 let payment_event_1 = {
1861 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
1862 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1864 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1865 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1866 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1868 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1870 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1871 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1873 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_2 + 1);
1874 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1875 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1876 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1879 // split the rest to test holding cell
1880 let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1881 let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1882 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1883 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1885 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1886 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1889 // now see if they go through on both sides
1890 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1891 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1892 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21, &Some(our_payment_secret_21), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_21.0)).unwrap();
1893 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1894 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1895 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1897 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1899 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22+1);
1900 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1901 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1902 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1903 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 2);
1906 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1907 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1908 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22, &Some(our_payment_secret_22), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_22.0)).unwrap();
1909 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1910 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1911 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1913 // flush the pending htlc
1914 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1915 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1916 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1918 // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1919 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1920 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1921 let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1923 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
1924 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1925 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1926 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1928 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1929 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1930 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1932 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1934 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1935 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
1936 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
1938 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1939 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
1941 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
1942 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
1943 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
1944 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
1945 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
1946 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1948 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1949 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
1950 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
1951 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
1953 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
1954 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1956 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1957 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1959 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat } => {
1960 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
1961 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amount_msat);
1963 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1964 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1965 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
1967 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1970 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1973 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat } => {
1974 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
1975 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amount_msat);
1977 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1978 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1979 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
1981 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1984 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1987 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
1988 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
1989 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
1991 let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1, opt_anchors);
1992 let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
1993 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
1995 let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
1996 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
1997 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1998 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
1999 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
2001 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2002 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
2006 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
2007 // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
2008 // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
2009 // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
2010 // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
2011 // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
2012 // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
2013 // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
2015 // * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
2016 // you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
2017 // you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
2018 // * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
2019 // * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
2020 // the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
2021 // * deliver the first fulfill from B
2022 // * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
2024 // * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
2025 // This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
2026 // removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
2027 // * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
2028 // of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
2029 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2030 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2031 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2032 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2033 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2035 let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2036 // Route the first two HTLCs.
2037 let payment_value_1 = b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000;
2038 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_value_1);
2039 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20_000);
2041 // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
2042 let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
2044 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_3, &Some(payment_secret_3), PaymentId(payment_hash_3.0)).unwrap();
2045 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2046 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2047 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2048 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2051 // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
2052 // initial fulfill/CS.
2053 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
2054 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, payment_value_1);
2055 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2056 let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2058 // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
2059 // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
2060 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
2061 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000);
2062 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2063 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2065 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2066 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
2067 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2068 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2069 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
2071 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
2072 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
2073 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2074 // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
2075 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2077 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2078 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2079 let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2081 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2082 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2083 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2085 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2086 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2087 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2089 // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
2090 // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2091 // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
2092 // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
2093 // on-chain as necessary).
2094 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2095 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
2096 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2097 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2098 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
2100 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2101 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2102 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2104 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2105 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2107 // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2108 // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2109 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2110 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2111 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2112 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2114 // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2115 // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2116 let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2118 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_4, &Some(payment_secret_4), PaymentId(payment_hash_4.0)).unwrap();
2119 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2120 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2121 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2122 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2125 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2126 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2127 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2128 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2130 // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2132 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2133 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2134 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2136 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2137 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2139 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2140 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2141 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2142 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2144 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2145 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2146 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2148 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2149 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2151 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2152 expect_payment_received!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2154 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2155 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2159 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2160 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2161 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2162 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2163 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2164 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2165 let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2167 // Create some initial channels
2168 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2169 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2170 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2171 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2173 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2174 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2175 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2176 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2177 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2178 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2180 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2181 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2182 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2183 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2184 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2186 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2187 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_1.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2188 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2189 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2191 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2192 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2193 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2194 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2195 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2197 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2198 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2199 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2200 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2201 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2203 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2204 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 3_000_000);
2206 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2207 // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2208 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_2.2, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2209 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2210 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2212 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2213 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2214 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2215 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2216 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2217 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2219 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2220 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2221 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2222 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2223 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2225 macro_rules! claim_funds {
2226 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
2228 $node.node.claim_funds($preimage);
2229 expect_payment_claimed!($node, $payment_hash, 3_000_000);
2230 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2232 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2233 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2235 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2236 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2237 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2238 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2240 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2246 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2247 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2248 nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_3.2, &nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2249 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2250 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2251 let node2_commitment_txid;
2253 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2254 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2255 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2256 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2258 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2259 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1);
2260 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2261 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2262 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2264 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2265 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2266 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2267 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2268 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2270 // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2271 // confusing us in the following tests.
2272 let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2274 // One pending HTLC to time out:
2275 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[3], &[&nodes[4]], 3_000_000);
2276 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2279 let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2280 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2281 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2282 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2283 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2284 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2287 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2290 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2291 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2293 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2295 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2297 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2299 let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2300 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2301 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2307 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2309 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2310 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2);
2312 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2313 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2314 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2315 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2316 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2319 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2322 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2323 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2325 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2327 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2328 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2330 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2331 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2332 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2334 nodes[3].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2335 nodes[4].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2336 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2337 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2339 assert_eq!(nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon),
2340 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
2341 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2342 check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2346 fn test_justice_tx() {
2347 // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2348 let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2349 alice_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2350 alice_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2351 alice_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2352 let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2353 bob_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2354 bob_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2355 bob_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2356 let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2357 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2358 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2359 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2360 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2361 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2362 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2363 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen;
2364 // Create some new channels:
2365 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2367 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2368 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2369 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2370 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2371 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2372 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2373 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2374 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2375 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2376 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2377 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2378 // Revoke the old state
2379 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2382 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2384 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2385 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2386 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2388 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2389 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2390 node_txn.truncate(1);
2392 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2393 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2394 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2396 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2397 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2398 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2399 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2400 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2401 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2402 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2403 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2404 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2406 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2408 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2409 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2411 // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
2412 // Create some new channels:
2413 let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2415 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2419 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2420 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2421 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2422 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2423 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2424 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2425 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2426 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2427 // Revoke the old state
2428 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2430 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2432 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2433 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); //ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2434 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2436 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2437 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2439 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2440 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2442 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2443 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2444 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2445 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2446 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2447 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2448 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2450 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2451 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2452 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2456 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2457 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2458 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2459 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2460 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2461 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2462 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2463 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2464 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2465 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2466 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2467 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2468 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2469 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2470 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2472 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2473 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2474 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2475 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2476 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2477 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2479 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2480 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
2482 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2483 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2484 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2485 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2486 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2490 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2491 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2492 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2493 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2494 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2495 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2496 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2498 // Create some new channel:
2499 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2501 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2502 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2503 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2504 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2505 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2507 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2508 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2509 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2510 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2511 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2512 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2513 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2514 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2515 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2517 //Revoke the old state
2518 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2521 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2522 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2523 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2524 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2525 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2526 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2527 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2528 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2530 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2531 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment
2533 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2534 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2536 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2537 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2538 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2539 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2540 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2541 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2542 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2543 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2545 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
2546 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2547 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
2549 // Finally, mine the penalty transaction and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2550 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2551 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
2552 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2553 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2555 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2556 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2557 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2561 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2562 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2563 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2564 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2565 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2566 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2567 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2569 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2571 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2572 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2573 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2574 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2575 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2576 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2578 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2579 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2581 //Revoke the old state
2582 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2585 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2586 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2587 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2588 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2589 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2590 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2591 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2592 match events.last().unwrap() {
2593 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2594 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2597 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2598 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2600 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2601 assert!(node_txn.len() == 9 || node_txn.len() == 10);
2603 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2604 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2605 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2606 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2607 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2608 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2609 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2611 // Justice transactions are indices 1-2-4
2612 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2613 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
2614 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
2616 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2617 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2618 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2620 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2621 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2622 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2623 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2624 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2625 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2626 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2627 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2629 // Finally, mine the penalty transactions and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2630 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2631 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[2]);
2632 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[3]);
2633 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[4]);
2634 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2635 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2637 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2638 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2639 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2643 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2644 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2645 // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2646 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2647 // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2648 // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2649 // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2650 // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2651 // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2653 // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2654 // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2655 // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2656 // PaymentSent event).
2658 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2659 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2660 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2661 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2663 // Create some initial channels
2664 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2665 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2667 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2668 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2669 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2670 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2671 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2673 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2674 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2675 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2677 let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2678 let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2680 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2681 // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2682 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2683 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2684 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2685 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2686 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_1, 3_000_000);
2687 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2688 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, 3_000_000);
2689 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2690 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2691 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2692 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2693 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2694 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2696 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2697 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2698 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2699 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2700 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx, 2*htlc-success tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2701 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5);
2702 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2703 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2704 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2705 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2706 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2707 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2708 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2709 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2710 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2711 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0);
2712 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0);
2714 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2715 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2716 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: node_txn});
2717 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2719 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2720 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2721 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2722 added_monitors.clear();
2724 let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2725 assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2726 match forwarded_events[0] {
2727 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2728 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2730 let chan_id = Some(chan_1.2);
2731 match forwarded_events[1] {
2732 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
2733 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2734 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2735 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2736 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2740 match forwarded_events[2] {
2741 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
2742 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2743 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2744 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2745 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2749 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2751 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2752 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2753 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2754 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2755 added_monitors.clear();
2757 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2759 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2760 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2763 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2764 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2768 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2769 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2770 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2771 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2772 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2773 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2775 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2777 macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2778 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $chan_tx: expr) => { {
2779 let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2780 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
2781 // Node[1]: ChannelManager: 3 (commitment tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (timeout tx)
2782 // Node[0]: ChannelManager: 3 (commtiemtn tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 HTLC-timeout
2783 check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2784 check_spends!(node_txn[2], $commitment_tx);
2785 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0);
2786 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time.0, 0);
2788 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2789 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2790 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2791 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2793 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2794 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2795 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2796 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2798 check_spends!(node_txn[0], $chan_tx);
2799 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2803 // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own local state as a fallback, suggesting an alternate
2804 // commitment transaction with a corresponding HTLC-Timeout transactions, as well as a
2805 // timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2806 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2808 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2809 // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx on A's chain
2810 let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2811 check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2812 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2813 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2814 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2815 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2816 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2817 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 6); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx + HTLC-Sucess * 2), ChannelMonitor : 3 (HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn)
2818 let commitment_spend =
2819 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2820 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2821 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2822 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2825 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2826 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2827 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2831 check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2832 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2833 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2834 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2835 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time.0, 0);
2836 assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2837 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3);
2838 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2839 check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[3]);
2840 check_spends!(node_txn[5], node_txn[3]);
2841 // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
2842 // we already checked the same situation with A.
2844 // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
2845 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2846 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()] });
2847 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2848 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2849 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2850 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2851 assert_eq!(events.len(), 5);
2852 let mut first_claimed = false;
2853 for event in events {
2855 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
2856 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
2857 assert!(!first_claimed);
2858 first_claimed = true;
2860 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
2861 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
2864 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
2865 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
2866 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2869 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2872 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
2873 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
2874 // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2875 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2876 // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
2877 // B's commitment tx C's commitment tx
2879 // B's HTLC timeout tx B's timeout tx
2881 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2882 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2883 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2884 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2885 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2886 *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2887 *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2889 // Create some intial channels
2890 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2891 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2893 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
2894 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2895 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2897 let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2899 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2900 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2901 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2902 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
2903 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
2904 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }]);
2905 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2907 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2908 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2910 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2911 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2912 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2913 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2914 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2915 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2917 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2919 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2920 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2921 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2922 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2923 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx)
2924 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2925 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2926 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2928 // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2929 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
2930 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2931 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
2932 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2935 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2936 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-timeout), 1 timeout tx
2937 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2938 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2940 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2941 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2943 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2944 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2945 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2946 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2948 timeout_tx = node_txn[2].clone();
2952 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
2953 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2954 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2956 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2958 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
2959 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2960 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2961 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2963 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2964 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2965 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2966 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2967 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2968 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2970 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2973 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
2974 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2975 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2977 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
2978 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2980 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2981 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2982 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2983 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 commitment tx, ChannelMonitor : 1 timeout tx
2984 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2985 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2986 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2987 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2988 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2992 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
2993 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
2994 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
2995 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
2999 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
3000 // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
3001 // and fail backward accordingly.
3003 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3004 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3005 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3006 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3008 // Create some initial channels
3009 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3010 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3012 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3013 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3014 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3015 // Revoke the old state
3016 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3018 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3020 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3021 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3022 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3023 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3024 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3026 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
3027 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3028 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3029 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3031 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3032 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3033 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3034 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3035 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3036 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3038 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3039 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3040 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
3042 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3046 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
3047 // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
3048 // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
3049 // commitment transaction anymore.
3050 // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
3051 // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
3052 // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
3053 // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
3054 // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
3055 // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
3057 // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
3058 // commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
3059 // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
3060 // and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
3061 // commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
3062 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3063 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3064 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3065 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3067 // Create some initial channels
3068 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3069 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3071 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
3072 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3073 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3074 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
3075 // Revoke the old state
3076 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3078 let value = if use_dust {
3079 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
3080 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
3081 nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
3084 let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3085 let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3086 let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3088 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash);
3089 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: first_payment_hash }]);
3090 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3091 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3092 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3093 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3094 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3095 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3096 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3097 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3098 let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
3099 // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
3101 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash);
3102 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: second_payment_hash }]);
3103 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3104 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3105 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3106 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3107 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3108 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3109 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3110 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3111 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3112 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3113 // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3114 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3115 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3116 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3118 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash);
3119 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: third_payment_hash }]);
3120 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3121 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3122 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3123 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3124 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3125 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3126 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3127 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3128 // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3129 // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3130 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3131 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3132 // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3133 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3134 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3135 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3137 // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3138 // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3139 let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3140 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, fourth_payment_hash, &Some(fourth_payment_secret), PaymentId(fourth_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3141 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3142 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3143 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3146 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3147 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3148 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3149 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3150 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3151 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3153 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3154 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3157 Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { .. } => { },
3158 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3160 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3161 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3164 let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
3165 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3167 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3168 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3169 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3171 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3172 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 2 + nodes.len() - 1 } else { 3 + nodes.len() });
3174 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
3175 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
3178 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3179 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3181 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3183 if !deliver_bs_raa {
3185 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3186 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3188 nodes[1].node.abandon_payment(PaymentId(fourth_payment_hash.0));
3189 let payment_failed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3190 assert_eq!(payment_failed_events.len(), 1);
3191 match payment_failed_events[0] {
3192 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3193 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3195 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3198 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3199 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3201 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3202 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3203 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 1 } else { 0 }] {
3204 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3205 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3207 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 1 }] {
3208 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
3209 assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3210 assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3212 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3216 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3217 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3218 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3219 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3220 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3221 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3223 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3226 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 3 } else { 2 }] {
3227 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3228 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3229 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3230 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3231 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3232 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3234 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3235 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3236 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3238 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3240 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3241 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3243 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref network_update, .. } => {
3244 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3245 // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3246 // that we should update our routing table for.
3247 if !deliver_bs_raa {
3248 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3251 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3254 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref network_update, .. } => {
3255 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3256 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3258 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3261 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref network_update, .. } => {
3262 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3263 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3265 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3268 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3271 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3272 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3273 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3277 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3278 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3279 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3280 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3281 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3285 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3286 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3287 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3288 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3289 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3293 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3294 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3295 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3296 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3297 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3298 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3300 // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3302 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3303 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3304 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3306 let payment_event = {
3307 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3308 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3309 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3311 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3312 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3315 // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3316 let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3318 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, failed_payment_hash, &Some(failed_payment_secret), PaymentId(failed_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3319 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3321 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3324 // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3326 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3328 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3329 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3330 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3331 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 50_000, &Some(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3332 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3333 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
3335 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3336 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3342 onion_routing_packet,
3344 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3346 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3347 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3348 // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3350 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3351 assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3353 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3356 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3357 assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3359 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3361 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3362 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3366 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3367 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3368 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3369 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3370 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3371 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3372 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3373 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3375 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3376 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3377 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3378 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3379 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3380 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3382 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
3383 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3384 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
3386 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3387 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
3388 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3389 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3390 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3392 // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3393 // registering new transactions
3394 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
3395 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
3399 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3400 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3401 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3402 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3403 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3404 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3405 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3406 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3408 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3410 let mut payment_event = {
3411 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3412 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3414 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3415 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3416 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3419 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3420 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3422 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3424 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3425 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3426 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3427 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3429 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3430 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3431 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3432 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3433 let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3435 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3436 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3437 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3439 nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3440 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3441 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3442 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3444 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3445 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3446 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3447 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3448 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3452 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3454 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3455 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3456 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3457 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3459 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3461 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3462 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator), &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3464 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3465 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3466 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3467 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3468 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3469 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3470 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3472 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3476 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3477 // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3478 // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3479 // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3480 // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3482 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3483 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3484 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3485 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3486 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3488 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
3490 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
3491 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_000_000);
3492 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3493 let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3494 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3495 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
3497 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3498 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3500 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3501 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3505 fn test_peer_disconnected_before_funding_broadcasted() {
3506 // Test that channels are closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` if the peer disconnects
3507 // before the funding transaction has been broadcasted.
3508 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3509 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3510 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3511 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3513 // Open a channel between `nodes[0]` and `nodes[1]`, for which the funding transaction is never
3514 // broadcasted, even though it's created by `nodes[0]`.
3515 let expected_temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
3516 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3517 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel);
3518 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3519 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
3521 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
3522 assert_eq!(temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3524 assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
3526 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3527 assert_eq!(funding_created_msg.temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3529 // Even though the funding transaction is created by `nodes[0]`, the `FundingCreated` msg is
3530 // never sent to `nodes[1]`, and therefore the tx is never signed by either party nor
3533 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3536 // Ensure that the channel is closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` when the peers are
3537 // disconnected before the funding transaction was broadcasted.
3538 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3539 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3541 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3542 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3546 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3547 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3548 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3549 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3550 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3551 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3552 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3553 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3555 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3556 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3557 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3559 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3560 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3561 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3562 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3564 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3565 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3566 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3568 let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3569 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3570 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3571 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3573 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3574 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3576 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3577 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3579 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
3581 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3582 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3584 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3585 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3586 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3588 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3591 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, payment_failed_permanently, .. } => {
3592 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3593 assert!(payment_failed_permanently);
3595 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3598 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3599 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3603 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3604 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3607 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3608 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3609 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3610 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3611 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3612 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3614 let mut as_channel_ready = None;
3615 if messages_delivered == 0 {
3616 let (channel_ready, _, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3617 as_channel_ready = Some(channel_ready);
3618 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the channel_ready message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3619 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3620 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3622 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3625 let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1_000_000);
3627 let payment_event = {
3628 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
3629 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3631 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3632 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3633 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3635 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3637 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3638 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3640 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3641 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3642 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3643 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3644 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3646 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3647 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3648 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3649 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3651 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3652 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3653 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3654 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3655 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3657 if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3658 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3659 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3660 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3667 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3668 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3669 if messages_delivered < 3 {
3670 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3671 // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a channel_ready prior to a
3672 // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to channel_ready time.
3674 // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a channel_ready immediately on
3675 // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate channel_ready sent
3676 // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3678 // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3679 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3681 // Even if the channel_ready messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3682 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3683 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3684 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3685 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3686 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3687 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3688 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3689 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3690 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3691 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3692 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3693 } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3694 // Everything was delivered...
3695 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3698 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3699 if messages_delivered == 0 {
3700 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 2);
3702 Event::ChannelReady { .. } => { },
3703 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3706 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3707 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3710 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3712 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3713 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3717 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3718 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3719 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3721 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3723 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3724 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3726 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat } => {
3727 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3728 assert_eq!(amount_msat, 1_000_000);
3730 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3731 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3732 assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3734 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3737 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3740 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3741 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3742 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
3744 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3745 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3746 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3747 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3748 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3749 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3750 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3751 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3752 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3753 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3754 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3756 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3759 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3760 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3762 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3763 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3765 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3766 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3767 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3769 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3772 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3773 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3774 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3775 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3777 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3778 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3779 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3780 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3782 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3783 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3784 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3785 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3786 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3788 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3789 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3790 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3791 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3798 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3799 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3800 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3801 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3802 if messages_delivered < 1 {
3803 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
3805 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3807 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
3808 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3809 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3810 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3811 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3812 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3813 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3814 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3815 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3816 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3817 // Everything was delivered...
3818 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3821 if messages_delivered == 1 || messages_delivered == 2 {
3822 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3825 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3826 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3827 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3829 if messages_delivered > 2 {
3830 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3833 // Channel should still work fine...
3834 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3835 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3836 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3840 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
3841 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
3842 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
3843 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
3844 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
3848 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
3849 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
3850 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
3851 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
3852 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
3856 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
3857 // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
3858 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3859 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3860 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3861 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
3862 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
3863 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
3864 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3865 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3867 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3868 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3870 confirm_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
3871 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3872 assert!(events_1.is_empty());
3874 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3876 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3877 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3879 confirm_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3880 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3881 assert!(events_2.is_empty());
3883 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
3884 let as_reestablish = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]).pop().unwrap();
3885 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
3886 let bs_reestablish = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]).pop().unwrap();
3888 // nodes[0] hasn't yet received a channel_ready, so it only sends that on reconnect.
3889 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
3890 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3891 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3892 let as_channel_ready = match events_3[0] {
3893 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3894 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3897 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_3[0]),
3900 // nodes[1] received nodes[0]'s channel_ready on the first reconnect above, so it should send
3901 // announcement_signatures as well as channel_update.
3902 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish);
3903 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3904 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 3);
3906 let bs_channel_ready = match events_4[0] {
3907 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3908 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3909 chan_id = msg.channel_id;
3912 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[0]),
3914 let bs_announcement_sigs = match events_4[1] {
3915 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3916 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3919 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[1]),
3922 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
3923 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3925 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[2]),
3928 // Re-deliver nodes[0]'s channel_ready, which nodes[1] can safely ignore. It currently
3929 // generates a duplicative private channel_update
3930 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
3931 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3932 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
3934 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
3935 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3937 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_5[0]),
3940 // When we deliver nodes[1]'s channel_ready, however, nodes[0] will generate its
3941 // announcement_signatures.
3942 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_channel_ready);
3943 let events_6 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3944 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
3945 let as_announcement_sigs = match events_6[0] {
3946 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3947 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3950 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_6[0]),
3952 expect_channel_ready_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3953 expect_channel_ready_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3955 // When we deliver nodes[1]'s announcement_signatures to nodes[0], nodes[0] should immediately
3956 // broadcast the channel announcement globally, as well as re-send its (now-public)
3958 nodes[0].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs);
3959 let events_7 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3960 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
3961 let (chan_announcement, as_update) = match events_7[0] {
3962 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3963 (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
3965 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_7[0]),
3968 // Finally, deliver nodes[0]'s announcement_signatures to nodes[1] and make sure it creates the
3969 // same channel_announcement.
3970 nodes[1].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs);
3971 let events_8 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3972 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
3973 let bs_update = match events_8[0] {
3974 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3975 assert_eq!(*msg, chan_announcement);
3978 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_8[0]),
3981 // Provide the channel announcement and public updates to the network graph
3982 nodes[0].gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap();
3983 nodes[0].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
3984 nodes[0].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
3986 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3987 let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3988 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
3990 // Check that after deserialization and reconnection we can still generate an identical
3991 // channel_announcement from the cached signatures.
3992 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3994 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
3995 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
3996 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
3998 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
3999 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4000 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[0].logger, node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4001 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4002 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4003 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4004 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4005 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4007 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4008 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4009 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4010 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4011 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4012 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4014 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator,
4015 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4016 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4017 logger: nodes[0].logger,
4021 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4022 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4024 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor),
4025 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
4026 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4027 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4029 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4033 fn test_channel_ready_without_best_block_updated() {
4034 // Previously, if we were offline when a funding transaction was locked in, and then we came
4035 // back online, calling best_block_updated once followed by transactions_confirmed, we'd not
4036 // generate a channel_ready until a later best_block_updated. This tests that we generate the
4037 // channel_ready immediately instead.
4038 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4039 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4040 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4041 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4042 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
4044 let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4046 let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
4047 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
4048 let block_txn = [funding_tx];
4049 let conf_txn: Vec<_> = block_txn.iter().enumerate().collect();
4050 let conf_block_header = nodes[0].get_block_header(conf_height);
4051 nodes[0].node.transactions_confirmed(&conf_block_header, &conf_txn[..], conf_height);
4053 // Ensure nodes[0] generates a channel_ready after the transactions_confirmed
4054 let as_channel_ready = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4055 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
4059 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
4060 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
4061 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
4062 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4063 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4064 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4065 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4066 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4068 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
4070 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
4071 let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
4072 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
4073 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4075 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4076 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4078 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4079 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4082 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
4083 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
4084 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4086 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4087 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4089 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4090 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4091 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4092 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4093 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4094 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4095 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4097 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4098 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4099 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
4101 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
4102 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
4103 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
4105 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4108 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
4109 let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4110 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4111 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4113 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4116 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4117 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4119 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
4120 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4121 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
4122 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
4123 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4124 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
4126 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4127 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4128 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4129 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4131 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
4132 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
4134 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
4135 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
4137 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
4139 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4140 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4141 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4142 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4143 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
4144 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
4145 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
4146 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4147 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4148 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4150 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
4151 let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4152 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4153 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4154 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4155 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4156 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4157 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4159 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
4160 let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4161 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4162 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4163 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4164 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4165 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4166 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4168 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4169 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4170 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4171 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4173 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4174 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4175 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4176 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4178 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
4179 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4180 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4182 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4184 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4185 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
4187 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
4188 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
4190 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
4191 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
4192 assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
4194 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
4197 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4200 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
4201 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4202 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4204 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4205 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4208 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
4209 // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
4210 // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
4211 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4212 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4213 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4214 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4216 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4218 let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
4219 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
4220 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
4221 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
4222 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
4223 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
4224 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
4225 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
4226 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4227 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4228 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4229 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
4230 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentReceived event(s).
4231 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
4234 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
4237 let mut block = Block {
4238 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
4241 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4242 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4243 let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4244 for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
4245 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
4246 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4247 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4250 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
4252 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4253 let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4254 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4255 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4256 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4257 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4259 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4260 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4261 // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4262 let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(100_000).to_vec();
4263 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(block_count - 1));
4264 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4268 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4269 do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4270 do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4273 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4274 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4275 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4276 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4277 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4278 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4279 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4280 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4282 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4283 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4284 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4285 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4287 // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4288 let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4290 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, first_payment_hash, &Some(first_payment_secret), PaymentId(first_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
4292 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4293 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4295 // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4296 let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4297 let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4298 sending_node.node.send_payment(&route, second_payment_hash, &Some(second_payment_secret), PaymentId(second_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
4300 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4301 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4302 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4303 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4304 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4306 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4308 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4309 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4310 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4311 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4314 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
4315 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4316 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4317 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4318 match fail_commit[0] {
4319 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4320 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4321 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4323 _ => unreachable!(),
4325 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4327 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], second_payment_hash, false);
4332 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4333 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4334 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4338 fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4339 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4340 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4341 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4342 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4343 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4344 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4345 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4346 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4347 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4349 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4351 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4353 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4354 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4355 get_monitor!(nodes[0], OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id())
4356 .write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4358 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4359 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4360 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4361 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4362 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4363 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4364 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4365 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4366 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4367 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4369 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4370 let config = UserConfig::default();
4371 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4372 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4373 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4374 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4375 default_config: config,
4377 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4378 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4379 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4384 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4385 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4387 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor),
4388 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
4389 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4390 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4391 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4393 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
4394 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4395 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
4396 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4398 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4399 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4400 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4401 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4403 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4404 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
4405 for node in nodes.iter() {
4406 assert!(node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4407 node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4408 node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4411 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4415 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_events() {
4416 // This test makes sure the events field in ChannelManager survives de/serialization
4417 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4418 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4419 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4420 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4421 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4422 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4423 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4424 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4425 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4427 // Start creating a channel, but stop right before broadcasting the funding transaction
4428 let channel_value = 100000;
4429 let push_msat = 10001;
4430 let a_flags = channelmanager::provided_init_features();
4431 let b_flags = channelmanager::provided_init_features();
4432 let node_a = nodes.remove(0);
4433 let node_b = nodes.remove(0);
4434 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
4435 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), a_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4436 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), b_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id()));
4438 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&node_a, &node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, 42);
4440 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
4441 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
4443 node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4445 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4446 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4447 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4448 added_monitors.clear();
4451 let bs_funding_signed = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
4452 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_funding_signed);
4454 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4455 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4456 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4457 added_monitors.clear();
4459 // Normally, this is where node_a would broadcast the funding transaction, but the test de/serializes first instead
4464 // Start the de/seriailization process mid-channel creation to check that the channel manager will hold onto events that are serialized
4465 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4466 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4467 get_monitor!(nodes[0], bs_funding_signed.channel_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4469 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4470 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4471 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4472 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4473 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4474 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4475 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4476 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4477 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4478 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4480 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4481 let config = UserConfig::default();
4482 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4483 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4484 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4485 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4486 default_config: config,
4488 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4489 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4490 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4495 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4496 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4498 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4500 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor),
4501 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
4502 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4504 // After deserializing, make sure the funding_transaction is still held by the channel manager
4505 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4506 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
4507 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4508 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
4510 // Make sure the channel is functioning as though the de/serialization never happened
4511 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4512 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4514 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
4515 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4516 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
4517 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4519 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4520 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4521 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4522 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4524 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4525 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
4526 for node in nodes.iter() {
4527 assert!(node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4528 node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4529 node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4532 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4536 fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4537 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4538 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4539 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4540 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4541 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4542 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4543 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4544 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4545 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4546 let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).2;
4548 let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4549 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4551 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4553 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4554 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4555 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4557 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4558 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4559 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4560 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4561 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4562 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4563 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4564 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4565 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4566 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4568 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4569 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4570 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4571 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4572 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4573 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4575 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4576 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4577 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4582 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4583 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4585 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor),
4586 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
4587 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4588 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4590 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4592 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
4593 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4597 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
4598 // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with an out-of-date ChannelMonitor
4599 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4600 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4601 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
4602 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4603 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4604 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4605 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4606 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4607 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4608 let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).2;
4609 let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).2;
4610 let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4612 let mut node_0_stale_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4613 for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4614 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4615 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4616 node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4619 let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
4621 // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
4622 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4624 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
4625 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4626 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4627 nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4629 // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
4631 let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4632 for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4633 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4634 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4635 node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4638 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4639 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4640 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4641 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4642 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4643 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4646 let mut node_0_stale_monitors = Vec::new();
4647 for serialized in node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4648 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4649 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4650 assert!(read.is_empty());
4651 node_0_stale_monitors.push(monitor);
4654 let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
4655 for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4656 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4657 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4658 assert!(read.is_empty());
4659 node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
4662 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4663 if let Err(msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue) =
4664 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4665 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4667 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4668 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4669 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4671 channel_monitors: node_0_stale_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4673 panic!("If the monitor(s) are stale, this indicates a bug and we should get an Err return");
4676 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4677 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) =
4678 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4679 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4681 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4682 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4683 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4685 channel_monitors: node_0_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4687 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4688 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4690 { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx
4691 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4692 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
4693 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
4694 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
4697 for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
4698 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor),
4699 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
4700 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4702 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4703 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
4705 // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
4706 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4707 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4708 //... and we can even still claim the payment!
4709 claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4711 nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
4712 let reestablish = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[0]).pop().unwrap();
4713 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
4714 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish);
4715 let mut found_err = false;
4716 for msg_event in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
4717 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_event {
4719 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
4720 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
4721 assert!(!found_err);
4724 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
4731 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4732 ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4734 let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4735 let mut txn = Vec::new();
4736 let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4737 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4738 for event in events.drain(..) {
4740 Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs } => {
4741 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4742 txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4743 all_outputs.push(outp);
4746 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4749 if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4750 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx) {
4760 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4761 // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4762 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4763 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4764 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4765 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4767 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4768 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4769 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4770 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4771 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4772 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4773 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4774 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4775 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4777 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4778 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4780 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4781 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4782 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4783 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4784 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4788 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4789 // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4790 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4791 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4792 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4793 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4794 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4796 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4797 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4798 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4799 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4800 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4802 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4803 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4804 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4805 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4807 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4808 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4809 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4810 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4811 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4813 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4814 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4815 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4819 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4820 // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4821 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4823 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4824 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4825 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4826 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4828 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4829 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4830 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4831 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4832 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4834 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4835 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4836 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4837 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4838 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4840 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4841 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4842 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4844 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4845 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4846 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4847 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4848 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4852 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4853 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4854 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4855 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4856 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4858 // Create some initial channels
4859 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4861 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
4863 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4864 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4865 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4867 // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4868 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4869 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4870 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4871 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4872 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4873 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4875 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4876 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4879 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4880 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4883 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4884 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-Success), ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4885 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4886 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4887 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4888 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
4889 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
4891 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4892 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4893 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4895 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4896 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4897 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4901 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4902 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4903 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4904 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4905 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4907 // Create some initial channels
4908 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4910 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4911 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4913 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4915 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4916 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4917 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4919 // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4920 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4921 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4922 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4924 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4925 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4927 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4929 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4930 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4931 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelManager : 1 local commitent tx, ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4932 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
4933 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0].clone());
4934 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4936 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4937 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4938 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4939 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, false);
4941 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4942 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4943 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4944 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]);
4945 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4949 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4950 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4951 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4952 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4953 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4955 // Create some initial channels
4956 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4958 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4959 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4960 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4961 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4963 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4965 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4966 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4967 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4968 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4970 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4971 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
4972 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4973 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4975 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4976 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4978 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4979 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4980 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4984 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4985 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4986 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4987 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4988 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4989 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4991 // Create some initial channels
4992 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4994 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4995 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4996 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4997 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4999 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
5001 // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
5002 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
5003 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5004 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5005 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5006 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5008 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
5009 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
5010 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5011 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5012 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5013 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
5014 assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
5016 // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
5017 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5018 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()] });
5019 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5020 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5021 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5023 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5024 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5025 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
5026 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
5027 // transactions next...
5028 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
5029 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
5031 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
5032 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
5033 if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid() {
5034 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5036 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid());
5037 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5040 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5041 check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
5043 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
5044 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5046 // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
5047 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5048 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5049 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5050 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
5054 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
5055 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5056 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
5057 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5058 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5059 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5061 // Create some initial channels
5062 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5064 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5065 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5066 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5067 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
5069 // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
5070 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
5072 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
5074 // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
5075 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
5076 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5077 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5078 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5079 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5081 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
5082 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5083 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5084 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
5086 // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
5087 let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
5088 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
5090 // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
5091 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5092 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
5093 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5094 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5095 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5097 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5098 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5100 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
5101 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
5102 // transactions next...
5103 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
5104 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
5105 if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
5106 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5108 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
5109 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5112 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5113 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
5115 check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
5117 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
5118 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5120 // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
5121 // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
5123 // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
5124 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5125 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5126 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5127 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
5128 assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5129 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
5130 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
5134 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
5135 // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
5136 // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
5137 // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
5138 // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
5140 // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
5143 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5144 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5145 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5146 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5148 // Create some initial channels
5149 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5150 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5152 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5153 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5154 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5155 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5156 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5158 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
5159 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
5160 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
5162 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
5163 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5164 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
5165 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5166 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
5167 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5168 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5169 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5170 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5171 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5172 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5174 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
5175 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5176 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5177 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5179 let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Success tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
5180 assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 3);
5181 assert_eq!(c_txn[0], c_txn[2]);
5182 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0], c_txn[1]);
5183 check_spends!(c_txn[1], chan_2.3);
5184 check_spends!(c_txn[2], c_txn[1]);
5185 assert_eq!(c_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
5186 assert_eq!(c_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5187 assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
5188 assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Success tx
5190 // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
5191 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
5192 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![c_txn[1].clone(), c_txn[2].clone()]});
5193 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5194 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5195 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5197 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5198 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5201 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
5202 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
5203 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, Some(chan_1.2));
5204 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
5205 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
5207 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5210 let mut b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5211 // ChannelMonitor: claim tx
5212 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
5213 check_spends!(b_txn[0], chan_2.3); // B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
5216 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5217 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5218 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
5219 match msg_events[0] {
5220 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5221 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5223 match msg_events[1] {
5224 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
5225 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5227 match msg_events[2] {
5228 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
5229 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5230 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5231 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5232 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5233 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
5235 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5237 // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
5238 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5239 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
5240 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5241 let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5242 // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success tx
5243 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 3);
5244 check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_1.3);
5245 check_spends!(b_txn[2], b_txn[1]);
5246 check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
5247 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5248 assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
5249 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Success tx
5251 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5252 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5256 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
5257 // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
5258 // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
5259 // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
5260 // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
5261 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
5262 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
5263 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5264 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5265 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5266 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5267 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
5268 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5269 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5271 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5272 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5273 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5275 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5276 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5277 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5278 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5279 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
5281 let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 900_000);
5283 let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
5284 // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
5285 // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
5286 // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
5287 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id())
5288 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
5289 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], payment_params, 900000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40);
5290 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 900000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
5292 let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5293 assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5294 check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5296 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
5297 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5298 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5299 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5300 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5302 let htlc_timeout_tx;
5303 { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
5304 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5305 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 2-or-3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5306 assert!(node_txn.len() == 4 || node_txn.len() == 3);
5307 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5309 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5310 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5312 if node_txn.len() > 3 {
5313 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5314 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5315 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
5317 check_spends!(node_txn[3], commitment_txn[0]);
5318 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
5320 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5321 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
5324 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5325 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5326 if node_txn.len() > 3 {
5327 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5329 htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[1].clone();
5332 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
5333 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], duplicate_payment_hash, 900_000);
5335 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
5336 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
5337 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5338 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5340 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5341 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5344 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5345 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5347 let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5348 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs), ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
5349 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
5350 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5351 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5352 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5353 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5354 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5355 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5356 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5357 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[3], htlc_success_txn[0]);
5358 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[4], htlc_success_txn[1]);
5359 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
5361 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
5362 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5363 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
5364 let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5365 assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5366 assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5367 let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
5368 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5369 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5370 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5372 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5373 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5375 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5377 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
5379 // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
5380 // Note that the fee paid is effectively double as the HTLC value (including the nodes[1] fee
5381 // and nodes[2] fee) is rounded down and then claimed in full.
5382 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[0]);
5383 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], Some(196*2), true, true);
5384 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5385 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5386 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5387 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5388 assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
5389 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5390 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5392 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5393 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
5395 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5397 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5398 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
5399 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
5401 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5406 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
5407 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5408 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5409 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5410 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5412 // Create some initial channels
5413 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5415 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
5416 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5417 assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
5418 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5419 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5421 // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
5422 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5423 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
5424 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5426 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
5427 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5428 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5429 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5431 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5432 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5435 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5436 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5439 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5440 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5441 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
5442 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5443 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5444 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5445 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5449 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
5450 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5452 // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5453 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5454 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5455 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5456 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
5457 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5460 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
5461 // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
5462 // unrevoked commitment transaction.
5463 // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
5464 // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
5465 // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
5466 // use the same payment hashes.
5467 // Thus, we use a six-node network:
5472 // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
5473 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
5474 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
5475 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5476 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5477 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5478 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5479 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
5480 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5481 let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5483 let _chan_0_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5484 let _chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5485 let chan_2_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5486 let chan_3_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5487 let chan_3_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5489 // Rebalance and check output sanity...
5490 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
5491 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
5492 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
5494 let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2_3.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5496 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5498 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5499 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5501 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5503 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5505 let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5507 let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5508 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5510 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200).unwrap());
5512 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200).unwrap());
5515 let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5517 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5518 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5521 let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5523 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5524 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200).unwrap());
5526 // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
5527 // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
5528 // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
5529 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2).len(), 1);
5530 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
5532 // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
5533 // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5534 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1);
5535 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3);
5536 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5);
5537 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6);
5538 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
5540 let failed_destinations = vec![
5541 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_1 },
5542 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_3 },
5543 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_5 },
5544 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_6 },
5546 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[4], failed_destinations);
5547 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
5549 let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5550 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5551 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5552 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5553 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5554 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5556 // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5557 nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
5558 nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4);
5559 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5561 let failed_destinations_2 = vec![
5562 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 },
5563 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_4 },
5565 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[5], failed_destinations_2);
5566 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5568 let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5569 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5570 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5571 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5573 let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5575 // After 4 and 2 removes respectively above in nodes[4] and nodes[5], nodes[3] should receive 6 PaymentForwardedFailed events
5576 let failed_destinations_3 = vec![
5577 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5578 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5579 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5580 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5581 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5582 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5584 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations_3);
5585 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5586 let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5587 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5588 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5589 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5590 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5591 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5592 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5593 if deliver_last_raa {
5594 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5596 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5599 // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5600 // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5601 // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5602 // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5604 // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5605 // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5606 // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5608 // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5609 // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5610 let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5612 if announce_latest {
5613 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5615 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5617 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5618 let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5619 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2 + 6);
5620 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5622 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5623 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5626 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5627 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5630 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5631 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5632 if deliver_last_raa {
5633 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5635 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(3).collect();
5636 expect_htlc_handling_failed_destinations!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(), expected_destinations);
5638 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = if announce_latest {
5639 repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(9).collect()
5641 repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(6).collect()
5644 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], expected_destinations);
5646 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5648 let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5649 assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5650 let mut a_done = false;
5651 for msg in cs_msgs {
5653 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5654 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5655 // should be failed-backwards here.
5656 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5657 // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5658 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5659 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5661 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5666 // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5667 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5668 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5670 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5671 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5674 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5675 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5676 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5677 if announce_latest {
5678 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5679 if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5680 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5683 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5685 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5689 let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5690 assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5691 let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5692 let mut as_updates = 0;
5693 for event in as_events.iter() {
5694 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5695 assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5696 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5697 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5699 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5701 if network_update.is_some() {
5704 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5706 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5707 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5708 if announce_latest {
5709 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5710 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5712 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5714 let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5715 assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5716 let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5717 let mut bs_updates = 0;
5718 for event in bs_events.iter() {
5719 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5720 assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5721 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5722 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5724 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5726 if network_update.is_some() {
5729 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5731 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5732 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5733 if announce_latest {
5734 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5736 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5738 // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5739 // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5740 // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5741 // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5742 assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5743 assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5747 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5748 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5752 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5753 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5757 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5758 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5759 // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5760 // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5764 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5765 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5766 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5767 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5768 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5770 // Create some initial channels
5771 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5773 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5774 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5775 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5776 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5778 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5779 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5780 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5781 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5782 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5783 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5785 let htlc_timeout = {
5786 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5787 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
5788 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5789 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5790 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5791 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5795 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5796 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5797 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5799 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5800 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5801 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5802 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5803 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5804 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5805 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5806 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5807 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5808 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5809 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5813 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5814 // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with
5815 // a key manager rotation to test that key_derivation_params returned in DynamicOutputP2WSH
5816 // let us re-derive the channel key set to then derive a delayed_payment_key.
5818 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5820 // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5821 let seed = [42; 32];
5822 let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5823 let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5824 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source.genesis_hash, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger);
5825 let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph, node_seed: seed, features: channelmanager::provided_init_features() };
5826 let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5827 node_cfgs.remove(0);
5828 node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5830 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5831 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5833 // Create some initial channels
5834 // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5836 let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5837 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5838 assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5840 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5841 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5842 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5843 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5844 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5846 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5847 let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5848 let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5849 assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5850 check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5852 // We check funding pubkey are unique
5853 let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5854 let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5855 if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5856 || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5857 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5858 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5859 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5862 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5863 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5864 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5865 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5866 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5867 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5869 let htlc_timeout = {
5870 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5871 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5872 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5873 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn_1[0]);
5877 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5878 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5879 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5881 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5882 let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5883 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5884 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5885 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5886 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5887 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5888 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5889 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5890 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5891 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5892 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5896 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5897 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5898 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5899 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5900 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5902 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5904 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5905 let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5907 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5908 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5909 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5911 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5912 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5913 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5915 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5916 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5917 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5919 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5920 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5921 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5924 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5925 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5926 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5927 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5928 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5929 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5931 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5933 // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5934 // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5935 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5936 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5937 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5939 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5940 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5941 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
5943 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5944 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5945 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5946 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5947 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5949 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5950 let mut block = Block {
5951 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5954 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5955 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5956 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5958 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5959 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5960 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5961 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5964 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5965 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5966 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5967 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5968 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5969 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5971 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5972 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5973 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5975 let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5977 // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5978 // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5979 // to "time out" the HTLC.
5981 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5982 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5984 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5985 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: Vec::new()});
5986 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
5988 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5989 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5990 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5991 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5994 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5995 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5996 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5997 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5998 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5999 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6001 // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
6002 // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
6003 // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
6004 // actually revoked.
6005 let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
6006 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
6007 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
6008 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
6009 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6011 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6012 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6013 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
6014 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6015 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6016 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
6017 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6018 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
6019 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6020 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6022 if check_revoke_no_close {
6023 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
6024 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6027 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
6028 let mut block = Block {
6029 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
6032 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
6033 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
6034 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
6036 if !check_revoke_no_close {
6037 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
6038 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6039 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6040 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6042 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
6046 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
6047 // There are only a few cases to test here:
6048 // * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
6049 // broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
6050 // * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
6051 // * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
6052 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
6054 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
6055 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
6056 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
6058 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
6059 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
6060 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
6062 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
6063 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
6067 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
6068 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
6069 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
6070 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
6071 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
6076 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
6077 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6078 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6079 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6080 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6081 // Force duplicate randomness for every get-random call
6082 for node in nodes.iter() {
6083 *node.keys_manager.override_random_bytes.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
6086 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
6087 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
6088 let push_msat=10001;
6089 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
6090 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6091 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
6092 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6094 // Create a second channel with the same random values. This used to panic due to a colliding
6095 // channel_id, but now panics due to a colliding outbound SCID alias.
6096 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
6100 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
6101 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6102 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6103 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6104 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6106 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
6107 let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
6108 let push_msat=10001;
6109 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
6111 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
6112 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
6113 // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
6114 let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
6115 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
6117 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
6118 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
6119 let push_msat=10001;
6120 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
6121 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6122 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
6124 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
6125 // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
6126 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
6128 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
6129 assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
6130 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6132 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
6133 let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
6134 assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
6136 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
6137 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
6138 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6139 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6140 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
6141 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6145 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
6146 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6147 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6148 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6149 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6151 let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
6152 let push_msat=10001;
6153 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
6154 let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6155 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
6156 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
6158 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
6159 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6160 let err_msg = match events[0] {
6161 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
6164 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6166 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
6169 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
6170 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
6171 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
6172 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
6174 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
6175 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6176 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6177 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6178 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6179 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6181 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6182 // pending_update_fee.
6184 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6185 *feerate_lock += 20;
6187 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6188 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6190 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6191 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6192 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6193 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6194 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6196 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6199 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6201 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6202 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6203 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6204 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6206 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6207 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
6208 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6210 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6211 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6212 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6213 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6215 // Flush the pending fee update.
6216 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6217 let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6218 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6219 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
6220 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6222 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
6223 // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
6224 // us to surface its failure to the user.
6225 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6226 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6227 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6228 let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6229 hex::encode(our_payment_hash.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6230 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6232 // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
6233 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6234 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6236 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
6237 assert_eq!(PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0), *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6238 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
6239 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
6240 assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6241 assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6242 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id));
6244 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6248 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
6249 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
6250 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
6252 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
6253 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6254 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6255 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6256 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6257 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6259 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6260 // pending_update_fee.
6262 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6263 *feerate_lock += 200;
6265 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6266 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6268 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6269 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6270 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6271 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6272 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6274 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6277 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6279 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6280 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6281 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6282 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6284 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6286 let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors) - amt_1;
6287 let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
6288 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
6290 // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
6291 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
6292 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6293 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
6294 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId(nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6295 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2), payment_id_2).unwrap();
6296 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6297 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
6299 // Flush the pending fee update.
6300 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6301 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6302 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6303 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
6304 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6305 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
6307 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
6308 // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
6309 // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
6310 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6311 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6312 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6313 let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6314 hex::encode(payment_hash_2.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6315 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6317 // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
6318 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6319 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6321 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
6322 assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6323 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
6324 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
6325 assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6326 assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6327 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route_2.paths[0][0].short_channel_id));
6329 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6332 // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
6333 let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
6334 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6335 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
6336 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
6338 let raa = match send_raa_event {
6339 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
6340 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6342 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6343 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6344 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6345 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6346 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6347 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6349 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6350 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6352 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6353 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6354 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6356 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => {},
6357 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6359 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
6360 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6361 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, amt_1);
6363 let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6364 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6365 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
6366 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
6369 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
6370 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
6371 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
6374 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
6375 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6376 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6377 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
6378 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
6379 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
6380 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
6381 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
6382 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6383 let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6384 let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6386 // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6387 // pending_update_fee.
6389 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6390 *feerate_lock += 20;
6392 nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6393 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6395 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6396 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6397 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6398 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6399 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6401 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6404 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6406 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6407 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6408 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6409 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6411 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6413 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
6414 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors) - total_routing_fee_msat;
6415 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
6416 let payment_event = {
6417 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6418 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6420 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6421 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6423 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6425 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6426 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6427 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6428 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6430 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1_2.2);
6431 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6433 // Flush the pending fee update.
6434 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6435 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6436 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6437 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6438 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6439 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6441 // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
6442 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6443 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6445 let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
6446 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
6449 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6452 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
6453 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6454 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6456 // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
6457 let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6458 assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 2);
6459 match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
6460 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6461 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6464 // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
6465 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6466 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6468 // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
6469 let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6470 assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
6471 let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
6472 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6473 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
6474 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
6475 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
6476 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6477 (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6479 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6482 // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
6483 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
6484 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6486 // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
6487 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6488 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6489 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6490 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6491 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6492 let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6493 assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
6494 let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
6495 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
6496 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6498 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6499 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
6500 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6503 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
6504 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
6505 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
6508 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
6509 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
6510 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6511 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6512 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6513 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6514 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6516 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6517 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 100;
6519 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6520 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6521 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6522 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value".to_string(), 1);
6526 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
6527 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6528 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6529 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6530 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6531 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6532 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6534 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6535 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 0;
6536 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6537 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
6539 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6540 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6544 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
6545 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6546 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6547 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6548 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6549 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6550 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6552 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6553 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6554 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6555 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6556 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6558 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6559 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6560 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6561 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6562 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() });
6566 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6567 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6568 //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6569 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6570 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6571 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6572 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6573 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6575 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
6576 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
6577 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], payment_params, 100000000, 0);
6578 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = 500000001;
6579 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::RouteError { ref err },
6580 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6584 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6585 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6586 //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6587 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6588 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6589 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6590 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6591 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6592 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6593 let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6595 for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6596 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6597 let payment_event = {
6598 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6599 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6601 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6602 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6603 if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6604 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6608 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6610 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6611 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6612 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6614 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6615 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6617 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6618 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6619 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6621 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6622 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
6626 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6627 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6628 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6629 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6630 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6631 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6632 let channel_value = 100000;
6633 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6634 let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6636 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6638 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6639 // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6641 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = max_in_flight + 1;
6642 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6643 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6645 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6646 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
6648 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6651 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6653 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6654 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6655 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6656 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6657 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6658 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6659 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6660 let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6662 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6663 let channel = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6664 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6667 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6668 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6669 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6670 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6671 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6672 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6673 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6674 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6675 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6676 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6677 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6681 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6682 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6683 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6684 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6685 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6686 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6687 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6689 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6690 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6691 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6692 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6693 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6694 let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
6696 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6697 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6698 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6699 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6700 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6702 // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6703 // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6704 // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6705 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6706 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6708 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6709 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6710 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6711 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6712 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6716 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6717 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6718 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6719 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6720 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6721 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6722 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6723 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6725 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3999999);
6726 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6727 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6728 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6729 let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3999999, &Some(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6730 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash);
6732 let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6736 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6737 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6738 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6741 for i in 0..super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
6742 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6743 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6745 msg.htlc_id = (super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS) as u64;
6746 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6748 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6749 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6750 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6751 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6752 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6756 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6757 //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6758 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6759 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6760 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6761 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6762 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6764 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6765 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6766 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6767 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6768 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6769 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6771 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6772 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6773 assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6774 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6775 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6779 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6780 //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6781 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6782 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6783 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6784 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6786 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6787 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6788 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6789 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6790 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6791 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6792 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6794 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6795 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6796 assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6797 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6798 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6802 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6803 //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6804 // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6805 // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6806 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6807 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6808 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6809 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6811 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6812 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6813 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6814 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6815 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6816 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6818 //Disconnect and Reconnect
6819 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6820 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6821 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
6822 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6823 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6824 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
6825 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6826 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6827 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6828 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6829 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6830 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6833 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6834 assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6835 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6836 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6837 let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6839 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6841 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6842 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6843 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6844 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6845 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6849 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6850 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6852 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6853 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6854 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6855 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6856 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6857 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6858 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6860 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6861 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6862 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6864 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6867 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6870 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6872 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6873 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6874 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6875 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6876 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6880 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6881 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6883 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6884 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6885 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6886 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6887 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6889 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6890 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6891 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6892 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6893 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6895 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6898 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6901 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6903 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6904 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6905 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6906 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6907 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6911 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6912 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6914 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6915 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6916 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6917 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6918 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6920 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6921 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6922 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6923 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6924 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6925 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6928 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6929 failure_code: 0x8000,
6932 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6934 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6935 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6936 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6937 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6938 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6942 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6943 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6945 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6946 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6947 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6948 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6949 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6951 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6953 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6954 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6955 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6957 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6958 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6959 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6961 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6962 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6963 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6964 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6965 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6966 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6967 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6969 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6973 update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6975 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6977 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6978 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6979 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6980 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6981 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6985 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6986 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6988 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6989 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6990 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6991 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6992 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6994 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6996 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6997 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6998 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
7000 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7001 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7002 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
7004 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
7005 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7006 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
7007 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7008 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7009 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7010 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
7012 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7016 update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
7018 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
7020 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
7021 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
7022 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
7023 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7024 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
7028 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
7029 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
7031 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7032 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7033 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7034 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7035 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7037 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
7038 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
7039 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7041 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7042 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
7044 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7045 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7046 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
7048 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7050 let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
7052 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
7053 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7054 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7055 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7056 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
7057 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7058 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
7060 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7063 update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
7064 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
7066 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
7067 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
7068 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
7069 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7070 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
7074 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
7075 //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
7076 // * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
7078 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7079 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7080 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7081 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7082 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7083 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7085 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
7088 let mut payment_event = {
7089 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
7090 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7091 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7092 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7093 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
7095 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7096 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7097 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7098 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7099 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7100 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
7101 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7102 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
7103 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
7106 payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
7107 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7108 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
7109 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
7111 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7112 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7113 let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
7115 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7116 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7117 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7118 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7119 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
7120 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7121 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
7123 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7127 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
7129 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7130 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
7131 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
7132 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7133 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
7135 //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
7137 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
7138 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7139 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7140 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7141 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7142 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7144 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7147 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7151 fn test_channel_failed_after_message_with_badonion_node_perm_bits_set() {
7152 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7153 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7154 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7155 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7156 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7157 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7159 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100_000);
7162 let mut payment_event = {
7163 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
7164 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7165 SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[0])
7168 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7169 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7170 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7171 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7172 payment_event = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[1]);
7173 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
7176 payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; // Trigger an invalid_onion_version error
7177 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7178 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
7179 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
7181 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7182 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7184 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
7185 let mut update_msg = updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone();
7186 // Set the NODE bit (BADONION and PERM already set in invalid_onion_version error)
7187 update_msg.failure_code |= 0x2000;
7189 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
7190 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
7192 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7195 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1],
7196 vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel {
7197 node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
7198 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7199 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
7200 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7203 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
7204 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7205 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
7207 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7210 let events_5 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7211 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
7213 // Expect a PaymentPathFailed event with a ChannelFailure network update for the channel between
7214 // the node originating the error to its next hop.
7216 Event::PaymentPathFailed { network_update:
7217 Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure { short_channel_id, is_permanent }), error_code, ..
7219 assert_eq!(short_channel_id, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id);
7220 assert!(is_permanent);
7221 assert_eq!(error_code, Some(0x8000|0x4000|0x2000|4));
7223 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7226 // TODO: Test actual removal of channel from NetworkGraph when it's implemented.
7229 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
7230 // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
7231 // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
7232 // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
7234 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7235 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7236 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7237 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7238 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7239 let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7241 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7243 // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
7244 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7245 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7246 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7248 // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
7249 let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7251 // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
7252 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
7253 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7254 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
7255 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7257 let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7258 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7259 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
7260 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7262 // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
7263 let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7265 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7267 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
7268 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7270 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7273 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
7274 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7276 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7279 assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
7280 // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
7281 if announce_latest {
7282 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
7284 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
7287 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7288 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7289 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7291 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7292 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7293 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7294 // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
7295 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7296 let mut first_failed = false;
7297 for event in events {
7299 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7300 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
7301 assert!(!first_failed);
7302 first_failed = true;
7304 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
7307 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7313 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
7314 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
7315 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
7318 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
7319 // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7320 // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
7321 // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7322 // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
7323 // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7324 // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
7326 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7327 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7328 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7329 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7330 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7332 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7334 let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7335 let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7337 let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7338 let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7340 // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
7342 let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7343 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
7346 let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
7348 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
7349 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
7350 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7351 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7352 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
7354 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
7355 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7356 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7357 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7358 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7359 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7360 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
7361 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7362 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7363 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7364 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
7366 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
7367 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7368 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7369 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7370 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7371 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7373 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7374 timeout_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..)
7375 .filter(|tx| tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == bs_commitment_tx[0].txid()).collect();
7376 check_spends!(timeout_tx[0], bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7377 // For both a revoked or non-revoked commitment transaction, after ANTI_REORG_DELAY the
7378 // dust HTLC should have been failed.
7379 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
7382 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7384 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].lock_time.0, 0);
7386 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout/revocation-claim tx
7387 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7388 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7389 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7390 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
7395 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
7396 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
7397 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
7398 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
7402 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
7403 // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
7405 let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7406 low_our_to_self_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
7407 let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7408 high_their_to_self_config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
7409 let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
7410 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7411 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7412 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
7413 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7415 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
7416 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7417 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 1000000, 1000000, 0,
7418 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, 42)
7421 APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7422 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7424 } else { assert!(false) }
7426 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7427 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7428 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7429 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7430 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7431 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
7432 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
7435 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7436 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7438 } else { assert!(false); }
7440 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
7441 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7442 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7443 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7444 accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7445 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
7447 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
7449 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7450 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
7451 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
7455 } else { panic!(); }
7456 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg });
7458 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7459 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7460 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7461 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7462 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7463 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
7464 &high_their_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
7467 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7468 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7470 } else { assert!(false); }
7473 fn do_test_data_loss_protect(reconnect_panicing: bool) {
7474 // When we get a data_loss_protect proving we're behind, we immediately panic as the
7475 // chain::Watch API requirements have been violated (e.g. the user restored from a backup). The
7476 // panic message informs the user they should force-close without broadcasting, which is tested
7477 // if `reconnect_panicing` is not set.
7483 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7484 // We broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr, which would cause a panic
7485 // during signing due to revoked tx
7486 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7487 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
7490 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7491 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7492 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7494 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7496 // Cache node A state before any channel update
7497 let previous_node_state = nodes[0].node.encode();
7498 let mut previous_chain_monitor_state = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7499 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan.2).write(&mut previous_chain_monitor_state).unwrap();
7501 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7502 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7504 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7505 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7507 // Restore node A from previous state
7508 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
7509 let mut chain_monitor = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_chain_monitor_state.0), keys_manager).unwrap().1;
7510 chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
7511 tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster { txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new())) };
7512 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7513 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7514 monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &tx_broadcaster, &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7516 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7517 channel_monitors.insert(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, &mut chain_monitor);
7518 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_node_state), ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7519 keys_manager: keys_manager,
7520 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
7521 chain_monitor: &monitor,
7523 tx_broadcaster: &tx_broadcaster,
7524 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
7528 nodes[0].node = &node_state_0;
7529 assert_eq!(monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chain_monitor),
7530 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
7531 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &monitor;
7532 nodes[0].chain_source = &chain_source;
7534 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7536 if reconnect_panicing {
7537 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7538 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7540 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7542 // Check we close channel detecting A is fallen-behind
7543 // Check that we sent the warning message when we detected that A has fallen behind,
7544 // and give the possibility for A to recover from the warning.
7545 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7546 let warn_msg = "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned();
7547 assert!(check_warn_msg!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), chan.2).contains(&warn_msg));
7550 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7551 // The node B should not broadcast the transaction to force close the channel!
7552 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
7555 let reestablish_0 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7556 // Check A panics upon seeing proof it has fallen behind.
7557 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_0[0]);
7558 return; // By this point we should have panic'ed!
7561 nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
7562 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7563 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
7565 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7566 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7569 for msg in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
7570 if let MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } = msg {
7571 } else if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg {
7573 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7574 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel force-closed");
7576 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
7579 panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", msg)
7583 // after the warning message sent by B, we should not able to
7584 // use the channel, or reconnect with success to the channel.
7585 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().is_empty());
7586 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7587 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7588 let retry_reestablish = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7590 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &retry_reestablish[0]);
7591 let mut err_msgs_0 = Vec::with_capacity(1);
7592 for msg in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
7593 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg {
7595 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7596 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Failed to find corresponding channel");
7597 err_msgs_0.push(msg.clone());
7599 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
7602 panic!("Unexpected event!");
7605 assert_eq!(err_msgs_0.len(), 1);
7606 nodes[1].node.handle_error(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &err_msgs_0[0]);
7607 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().is_empty());
7608 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7609 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned() });
7610 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
7615 fn test_data_loss_protect_showing_stale_state_panics() {
7616 do_test_data_loss_protect(true);
7620 fn test_force_close_without_broadcast() {
7621 do_test_data_loss_protect(false);
7625 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
7626 // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
7627 // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
7628 // to B, B should refuse payment.
7630 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7631 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7632 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7633 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7635 // Create some initial channels
7636 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7638 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7639 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7640 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
7641 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7642 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7643 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
7644 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
7645 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7647 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7648 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7649 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7650 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7651 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7653 // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
7654 // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
7655 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7656 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
7658 // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
7659 // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
7660 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7662 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7663 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7664 let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
7665 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7666 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7667 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7668 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7669 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7670 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7671 (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
7673 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7675 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7677 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
7678 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
7680 // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
7681 let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(10_000).to_vec();
7682 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH));
7683 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
7687 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
7688 // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
7689 // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
7691 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7692 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7693 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7694 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7696 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7697 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7698 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7701 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7702 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7704 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // Enabled -> DisabledStaged
7705 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // DisabledStaged -> Disabled
7706 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7707 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7708 let mut chans_disabled = HashMap::new();
7709 for e in msg_events {
7711 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7712 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7713 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7714 if chans_disabled.insert(msg.contents.short_channel_id, msg.contents.timestamp).is_some() {
7715 panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7718 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7722 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7723 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7724 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7725 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7726 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7727 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7729 // Reestablish chan_1
7730 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7731 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7732 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7733 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7734 // Reestablish chan_2
7735 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7736 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7737 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7738 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7739 // Reestablish chan_3
7740 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7741 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7742 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7743 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7745 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7746 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7747 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7748 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7749 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7750 for e in msg_events {
7752 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7753 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7754 match chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7755 // Each update should have a higher timestamp than the previous one, replacing
7757 Some(prev_timestamp) => assert!(msg.contents.timestamp > prev_timestamp),
7758 None => panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!"),
7761 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7764 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7765 assert!(chans_disabled.is_empty());
7769 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7770 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7771 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7773 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7774 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7775 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7776 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7778 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7780 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7781 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
7782 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
7783 let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_params, 3000000, 30);
7784 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7786 let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7787 // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7788 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7789 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7790 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7791 let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7793 let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7794 for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7795 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7796 penalty_sum += outp.value;
7800 // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7801 let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7803 // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7804 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7805 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_114, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7806 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()] });
7807 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7809 // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7813 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7814 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor) + local commitment tx
7815 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7816 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7817 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7818 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7819 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7820 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7824 // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7825 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7826 let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7827 let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7829 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7830 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7831 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7832 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7833 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7834 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7835 penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7836 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7837 assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7838 let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7839 feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7840 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7841 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7845 assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7847 // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7848 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7850 let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7852 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7853 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7854 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7855 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7856 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7857 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7858 penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7859 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7860 assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7861 let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7862 feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7863 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7864 assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7868 assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7870 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7871 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7875 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7876 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7877 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7879 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7880 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7881 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7882 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7883 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7885 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7886 // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7887 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
7888 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7889 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7890 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7891 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7892 let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7893 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
7894 let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[1].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7895 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7896 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7898 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7899 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7900 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7902 // Revoke local commitment tx
7903 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7905 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7906 // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7907 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7908 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7909 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7910 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7911 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 49); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7913 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
7914 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
7915 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], chan.3);
7917 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7918 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7919 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7921 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7922 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7923 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
7924 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7926 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7927 let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7928 let header_11 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: hash_128, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7929 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_11, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7930 let header_129 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_11.block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7931 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_129, txdata: vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[2].clone()] });
7932 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7933 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7934 match events.last().unwrap() {
7935 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7936 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7942 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7943 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + A commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7944 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7946 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7947 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7948 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7949 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7951 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7952 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7953 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7954 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7955 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7956 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7958 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7959 // available, which we check here:
7960 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7961 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7962 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7964 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7965 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7967 // node_txn[3] is the local commitment tx broadcast just because (and somewhat in case of
7968 // reorgs, though its not clear its ever worth broadcasting conflicting txn like this when
7969 // a remote commitment tx has already been confirmed).
7970 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan.3);
7972 // node_txn[4] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7973 // output, checked above).
7974 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 2);
7975 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].output.len(), 1);
7976 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7978 first = node_txn[4].txid();
7979 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7980 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[4].output[0].value;
7981 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[4].weight() as u64;
7982 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7986 // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7987 let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_129.block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7988 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7989 let header_131 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_130.block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7990 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_131, txdata: Vec::new() });
7992 // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7993 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7994 assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7995 let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7997 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7998 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8000 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
8001 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
8002 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
8003 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
8004 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
8005 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
8006 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
8007 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
8011 // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
8012 let header_145 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_144, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8013 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_145, txdata: node_txn });
8014 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
8016 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8017 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
8018 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
8019 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
8020 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
8021 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
8022 // up bumped justice generation.
8023 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
8026 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8027 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8031 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
8032 // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
8033 // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
8036 // Provide preimage for one
8037 // Check aggregation
8039 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8040 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8041 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8042 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8044 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8045 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
8046 route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
8048 // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
8049 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
8050 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
8051 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8052 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
8054 // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
8055 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8056 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
8057 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
8058 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8059 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
8061 // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
8065 let feerate_timeout;
8066 let feerate_preimage;
8068 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8069 // 5 transactions including:
8070 // local commitment + HTLC-Success
8071 // preimage and timeout sweeps from remote commitment + preimage sweep bump
8072 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5);
8073 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8074 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
8075 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
8076 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
8077 check_spends!(node_txn[3], remote_txn[0]);
8078 check_spends!(node_txn[4], remote_txn[0]);
8080 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan.3); // local commitment
8081 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]); // local HTLC-Success
8083 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
8084 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
8085 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
8086 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
8088 let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output == node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output {
8089 (node_txn[3].clone(), node_txn[4].clone())
8091 (node_txn[4].clone(), node_txn[3].clone())
8094 preimage_bump = preimage_bump_tx;
8095 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
8096 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output);
8098 timeout = timeout_tx.txid();
8099 let index = timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout;
8100 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - timeout_tx.output[0].value;
8101 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / timeout_tx.weight() as u64;
8105 assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
8106 assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
8108 // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
8109 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
8111 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8112 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8113 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8114 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
8115 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
8116 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
8118 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
8119 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
8120 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.weight() as u64;
8121 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
8122 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
8124 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
8125 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
8126 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
8127 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
8128 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
8133 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8134 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8138 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
8139 // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
8140 // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
8141 // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
8142 // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
8143 // EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
8144 // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
8145 // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
8147 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8148 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8149 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8150 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8151 let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).2;
8153 let per_commitment_secret;
8154 let next_per_commitment_point;
8156 let mut guard = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
8157 let keys = guard.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
8159 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
8161 // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
8162 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8163 per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
8165 // Must revoke without gaps
8166 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8167 keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
8169 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8170 next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
8171 &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
8174 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
8175 &msgs::RevokeAndACK { channel_id, per_commitment_secret, next_per_commitment_point });
8176 assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
8177 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8178 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() });
8182 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
8183 // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
8184 // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
8186 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8187 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8188 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8189 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8191 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8192 // Lock HTLC in both directions
8193 let (payment_preimage_1, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000);
8194 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000);
8196 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
8197 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8198 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
8200 // Revoke local commitment tx
8201 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
8203 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
8204 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
8205 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[0], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
8206 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8208 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
8209 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8210 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8211 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8213 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8214 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
8215 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8216 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8217 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8218 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
8222 let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8223 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
8224 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8226 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
8227 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
8228 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
8233 fn test_pending_claimed_htlc_no_balance_underflow() {
8234 // Tests that if we have a pending outbound HTLC as well as a claimed-but-not-fully-removed
8235 // HTLC we will not underflow when we call `Channel::get_balance_msat()`.
8236 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8237 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8238 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8239 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8240 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8242 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_010_000);
8243 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8244 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_010_000);
8245 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8246 let fulfill_ev = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8248 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8249 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
8250 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.commitment_signed);
8251 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8252 let (_raa, _cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8254 // At this point nodes[1] has received 1,010k msat (10k msat more than their reserve) and can
8255 // send an HTLC back (though it will go in the holding cell). Send an HTLC back and check we
8256 // can get our balance.
8258 // Get a route from nodes[1] to nodes[0] by getting a route going the other way and then flip
8259 // the public key of the only hop. This works around ChannelDetails not showing the
8260 // almost-claimed HTLC as available balance.
8261 let (mut route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000);
8262 route.payment_params = None; // This is all wrong, but unnecessary
8263 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8264 let (_, payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
8265 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
8267 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].balance_msat, 1_000_000);
8271 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
8272 // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
8273 // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
8274 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8275 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8276 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8277 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8279 let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8281 // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
8282 // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
8283 // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
8284 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
8285 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8287 // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
8288 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
8289 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8290 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8292 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
8293 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8294 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
8295 let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8296 assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
8298 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
8299 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8300 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
8302 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8307 fn test_override_channel_config() {
8308 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8309 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8310 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8311 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8313 // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
8314 let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
8315 override_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
8317 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
8319 // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
8320 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8321 assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
8322 assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
8326 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
8327 let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
8328 zero_config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
8329 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8330 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8331 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
8332 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8334 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
8335 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8336 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8338 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &res);
8339 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8340 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8344 fn test_channel_update_has_correct_htlc_maximum_msat() {
8345 // Tests that the `ChannelUpdate` message has the correct values for `htlc_maximum_msat` set.
8346 // Bolt 7 specifies that if present `htlc_maximum_msat`:
8347 // 1. MUST be set to less than or equal to the channel capacity. In LDK, this is capped to
8348 // 90% of the `channel_value`.
8349 // 2. MUST be set to less than or equal to the `max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` received from the peer.
8351 let mut config_30_percent = UserConfig::default();
8352 config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
8353 config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 30;
8354 let mut config_50_percent = UserConfig::default();
8355 config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
8356 config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 50;
8357 let mut config_95_percent = UserConfig::default();
8358 config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
8359 config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 95;
8360 let mut config_100_percent = UserConfig::default();
8361 config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
8362 config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 100;
8364 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8365 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8366 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config_30_percent), Some(config_50_percent), Some(config_95_percent), Some(config_100_percent)]);
8367 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8369 let channel_value_satoshis = 100000;
8370 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8371 let channel_value_30_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.3) as u64;
8372 let channel_value_50_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.5) as u64;
8373 let channel_value_90_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.9) as u64;
8375 let (node_0_chan_update, node_1_chan_update, _, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value_satoshis, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8376 let (node_2_chan_update, node_3_chan_update, _, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, channel_value_satoshis, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8378 // Assert that `node[0]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 50 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8379 // that's the value of `node[1]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
8380 assert_eq!(node_0_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_50_percent_msat);
8381 // Assert that `node[1]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 30 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8382 // that's the value of `node[0]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
8383 assert_eq!(node_1_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_30_percent_msat);
8385 // Assert that `node[2]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8386 // the value of `node[3]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (100%), exceeds 90% of the
8388 assert_eq!(node_2_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
8389 // Assert that `node[3]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8390 // the value of `node[2]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (95%), exceeds 90% of the
8392 assert_eq!(node_3_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
8396 fn test_manually_accept_inbound_channel_request() {
8397 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8398 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8399 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8400 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8401 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8402 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8404 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8405 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8407 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &res);
8409 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8410 // accepting the inbound channel request.
8411 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8413 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8415 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8416 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap();
8418 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8421 let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8422 assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8424 match accept_msg_ev[0] {
8425 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
8426 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8428 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8431 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8433 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8434 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8436 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8438 Event::ChannelClosed { user_channel_id, .. } => {
8439 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 23);
8441 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8446 fn test_manually_reject_inbound_channel_request() {
8447 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8448 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8449 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8450 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8451 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8452 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8454 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8455 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8457 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &res);
8459 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8460 // rejecting the inbound channel request.
8461 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8463 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8465 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8466 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8468 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8471 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8472 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8474 match close_msg_ev[0] {
8475 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => {
8476 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8478 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8480 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8484 fn test_reject_funding_before_inbound_channel_accepted() {
8485 // This tests that when `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` is set to true, inbound
8486 // channels must to be manually accepted through `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel` by
8487 // the node operator before the counterparty sends a `FundingCreated` message. If a
8488 // `FundingCreated` message is received before the channel is accepted, it should be rejected
8489 // and the channel should be closed.
8490 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8491 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8492 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8493 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8494 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8495 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8497 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8498 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8499 let temp_channel_id = res.temporary_channel_id;
8501 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &res);
8503 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in the `msg_events`.
8504 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8506 // Clear the `Event::OpenChannelRequest` event without responding to the request.
8507 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8509 // Get the `AcceptChannel` message of `nodes[1]` without calling
8510 // `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`, which generates a
8511 // `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` event. The message is passed to `nodes[0]`
8512 // `handle_accept_channel`, which is required in order for `create_funding_transaction` to
8513 // succeed when `nodes[0]` is passed to it.
8514 let accept_chan_msg = {
8516 let channel = get_channel_ref!(&nodes[1], lock, temp_channel_id);
8517 channel.get_accept_channel_message()
8519 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_chan_msg);
8521 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8523 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8524 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8526 // The `funding_created_msg` should be rejected by `nodes[1]` as it hasn't accepted the channel
8527 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8529 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8530 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8532 let expected_err = "FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted";
8533 match close_msg_ev[0] {
8534 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id, } => {
8535 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, temp_channel_id);
8536 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8537 assert_eq!(msg.data, expected_err);
8539 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8542 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
8546 fn test_can_not_accept_inbound_channel_twice() {
8547 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8548 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8549 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8550 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8551 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8552 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8554 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8555 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8557 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &res);
8559 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8560 // accepting the inbound channel request.
8561 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8563 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8565 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8566 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0).unwrap();
8567 let api_res = nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
8569 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8570 assert_eq!(err, "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.");
8572 Ok(_) => panic!("Channel shouldn't be possible to be accepted twice"),
8573 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8576 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8579 // Ensure that the channel wasn't closed after attempting to accept it twice.
8580 let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8581 assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8583 match accept_msg_ev[0] {
8584 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
8585 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8587 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8592 fn test_can_not_accept_unknown_inbound_channel() {
8593 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8594 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
8595 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
8596 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
8598 let unknown_channel_id = [0; 32];
8599 let api_res = nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&unknown_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
8601 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
8602 assert_eq!(err, "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist");
8604 Ok(_) => panic!("It shouldn't be possible to accept an unkown channel"),
8605 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8610 fn test_simple_mpp() {
8611 // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
8612 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8613 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8614 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8615 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8617 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8618 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8619 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8620 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8622 let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8623 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8624 route.paths.push(path);
8625 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8626 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8627 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8628 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8629 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8630 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8631 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
8632 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
8636 fn test_preimage_storage() {
8637 // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
8638 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8639 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8640 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8641 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8643 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8646 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
8647 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8648 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8649 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8650 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8651 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8652 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8653 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8655 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8656 // values from previous calls.
8657 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8658 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8659 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8661 Event::PaymentReceived { ref purpose, .. } => {
8663 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
8664 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
8666 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
8669 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8674 #[allow(deprecated)]
8675 fn test_secret_timeout() {
8676 // Simple test of payment secret storage time outs. After
8677 // `create_inbound_payment(_for_hash)_legacy` is removed, this test will be removed as well.
8678 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8679 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8680 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8681 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8683 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8685 let (payment_hash, payment_secret_1) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_legacy(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8687 // We should fail to register the same payment hash twice, at least until we've connected a
8688 // block with time 7200 + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1.
8689 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8690 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8691 } else { panic!(); }
8693 let node_1_blocks = nodes[1].blocks.lock().unwrap();
8695 header: BlockHeader {
8697 prev_blockhash: node_1_blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(),
8698 merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(),
8699 time: node_1_blocks.len() as u32 + 7200, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8703 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8704 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8705 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8706 } else { panic!(); }
8708 // If we then connect the second block, we should be able to register the same payment hash
8709 // again (this time getting a new payment secret).
8710 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.header.block_hash();
8711 block.header.time += 1;
8712 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8713 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8714 assert_ne!(payment_secret_1, our_payment_secret);
8717 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8718 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8719 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8720 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8721 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8722 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8723 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8725 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8726 // values from previous calls.
8727 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8728 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8729 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8731 Event::PaymentReceived { purpose: PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret }, .. } => {
8732 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
8733 assert_eq!(payment_secret, our_payment_secret);
8734 // We don't actually have the payment preimage with which to claim this payment!
8736 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8741 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8742 // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8743 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8744 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8745 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8746 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8748 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8750 let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8751 let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8752 let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8753 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8755 // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8756 // resulting events.
8757 macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8758 ($payment_hash: expr) => {
8759 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8760 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8761 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8762 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8763 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8765 // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8766 // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8767 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8768 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash: $payment_hash }]);
8769 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8771 // We should fail the payment back
8772 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8773 match events.pop().unwrap() {
8774 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8775 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8776 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8778 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8783 let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8784 // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8785 let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8787 // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8788 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8789 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(our_payment_hash);
8790 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8792 // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8793 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(random_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8794 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8795 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8797 // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8798 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret), PaymentId(random_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8799 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8800 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8804 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8805 // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8806 // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8807 // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus
8810 // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8811 // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8812 // commitment at same time.
8814 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8815 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8816 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8817 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8819 // Create some initial channel
8820 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8821 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8823 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8824 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8826 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8827 let (preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
8829 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8830 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8831 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8832 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8834 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8835 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8836 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8837 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8838 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8839 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8840 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8841 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8844 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8845 let block = Block { header, txdata: vec![] };
8846 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8847 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8848 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (block.clone(), 0));
8849 watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, 200);
8851 // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8852 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage);
8853 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8854 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
8856 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8857 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8858 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8859 if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8860 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8861 assert_eq!(watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure);
8862 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8863 } else { assert!(false); }
8864 } else { assert!(false); };
8865 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8866 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8867 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8868 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8872 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8873 // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8874 // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8875 // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8876 // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8878 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8879 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8880 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8881 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8883 // Create some initial channel
8884 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8885 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8887 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8888 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8890 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8891 route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8893 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8894 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8895 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8896 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8897 let watchtower_alice = {
8898 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8899 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8900 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8901 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8902 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8903 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8904 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8905 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8908 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8909 let block = Block { header, txdata: vec![] };
8910 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8911 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8912 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as usize, (block.clone(), 0));
8913 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8915 // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8917 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8918 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8922 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8923 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8924 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8925 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8926 let watchtower_bob = {
8927 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8928 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8929 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8930 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8931 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8932 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8933 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8934 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8937 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8938 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8940 // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8941 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8943 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8945 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8947 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8948 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8949 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8950 if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8951 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8952 // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8953 assert_eq!(watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure);
8954 assert_eq!(watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8955 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8956 } else { assert!(false); }
8957 } else { assert!(false); };
8958 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8959 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8961 //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8962 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8963 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8965 // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8968 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8969 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8970 bob_state_y = txn[0].clone();
8974 // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8975 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8976 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![bob_state_y.clone()] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8978 let htlc_txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8979 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 1);
8980 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8985 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8986 // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8987 // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8990 // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8991 // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8993 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8994 // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8995 // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8996 // before receiving funding_signed.
8997 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8998 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8999 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9000 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9002 // Create an initial channel
9003 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
9004 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9005 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_chan_msg);
9006 let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9007 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_chan_msg);
9009 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
9010 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
9012 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9013 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9015 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9016 let channel_id = crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
9017 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
9018 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
9019 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Hi".to_string() }, true);
9023 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
9024 // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
9025 // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
9026 // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
9027 // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
9028 // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
9029 // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
9031 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9032 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9033 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9034 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9036 // Create some initial channels
9037 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9039 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
9040 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
9041 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
9042 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9043 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
9044 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
9046 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
9047 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9048 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] });
9049 // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
9050 // this test before #653 fix.
9051 chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
9052 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
9053 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9054 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
9055 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
9057 let htlc_timeout = {
9058 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9059 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
9060 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9061 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
9065 let header_201 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9066 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_201, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout.clone()] });
9067 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
9068 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
9071 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
9072 // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
9073 // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
9074 // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
9076 // Steps of the test:
9077 // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
9078 // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
9079 // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
9080 // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
9081 // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
9082 // but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
9083 // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
9084 // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
9085 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9086 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9087 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9088 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9090 // Create some initial channels
9091 let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9092 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9094 // Steps (1) and (2):
9095 // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
9096 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
9098 // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
9099 let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
9100 check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
9101 assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
9102 check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
9103 assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9104 assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
9106 // Steps (3) and (4):
9107 // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
9108 // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
9109 let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
9110 let mut counterparty_node = 1; // Bob if Alice force-closes
9113 if !broadcast_alice {
9114 force_closing_node = 1;
9115 counterparty_node = 0;
9117 nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_ab.2, &nodes[counterparty_node].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9118 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
9119 check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
9120 check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9121 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9122 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
9123 true => alice_txn.clone(),
9124 false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
9126 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
9127 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
9128 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
9129 if broadcast_alice {
9130 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9131 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9132 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
9134 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
9135 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
9139 // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
9140 // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
9141 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9142 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9143 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
9145 let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9146 assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9147 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9148 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9149 assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
9150 assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
9152 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9153 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false, false);
9154 // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
9155 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
9156 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9157 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9159 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
9160 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9162 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9165 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
9166 // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
9167 // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
9168 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9170 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9171 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9172 let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
9173 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
9174 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9177 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9179 let bob_updates = match events[1] {
9180 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
9181 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9184 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9187 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
9188 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9189 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
9190 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9192 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9193 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9194 let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
9195 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
9196 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9199 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9201 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
9202 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9204 // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
9205 // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
9206 let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
9207 if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
9208 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9209 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
9210 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
9211 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
9212 if broadcast_alice {
9213 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9214 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9215 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
9217 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9218 if broadcast_alice {
9219 // In `connect_block()`, the ChainMonitor and ChannelManager are separately notified about a
9220 // new block being connected. The ChannelManager being notified triggers a monitor update,
9221 // which triggers broadcasting our commitment tx and an HTLC-claiming tx. The ChainMonitor
9222 // being notified triggers the HTLC-claiming tx redundantly, resulting in 3 total txs being
9224 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 3);
9225 check_spends!(bob_txn[1], chan_ab.3);
9227 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
9228 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
9233 // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
9234 // broadcasted commitment transaction.
9236 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
9237 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9238 // Bob should now have an extra broadcasted tx, for the preimage-claiming transaction.
9239 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
9241 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
9242 true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
9243 false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
9245 // If Alice force-closed and Bob didn't receive her commitment transaction until after he
9246 // received Carol's fulfill, he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction first. Else if
9247 // Bob force closed or if he found out about Alice's commitment tx before receiving Carol's
9248 // fulfill, then he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction second.
9249 if broadcast_alice && !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9250 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
9251 assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
9253 check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
9254 assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
9260 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
9261 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
9262 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
9263 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
9264 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
9268 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
9269 // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
9270 // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
9272 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
9273 // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
9274 // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
9275 // updating logic for the existing channel.
9276 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9277 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9278 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9279 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9281 // Create an initial channel
9282 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
9283 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9284 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_chan_msg);
9285 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9287 // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
9288 // that it is rejected.
9289 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_chan_msg);
9291 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9292 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9294 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9295 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
9296 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
9297 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
9298 // move forward with it.
9299 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9300 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9302 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9306 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
9307 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
9309 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9310 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9312 let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9313 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9315 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9316 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
9317 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
9318 added_monitors.clear();
9320 let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9322 let funding_outpoint = crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
9323 let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
9325 // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
9328 // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
9329 // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
9330 // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
9331 open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
9332 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_chan_msg);
9334 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9335 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9337 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9338 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
9339 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
9340 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9341 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9343 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9347 // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
9348 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
9349 let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9350 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_chan_2_msg);
9351 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9352 create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
9354 let funding_created = {
9355 let mut a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
9356 // Once we call `get_outbound_funding_created` the channel has a duplicate channel_id as
9357 // another channel in the ChannelManager - an invalid state. Thus, we'd panic later when we
9358 // try to create another channel. Instead, we drop the channel entirely here (leaving the
9359 // channelmanager in a possibly nonsense state instead).
9360 let mut as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.remove(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
9361 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9362 as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
9364 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9365 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
9366 // At this point we'll try to add a duplicate channel monitor, which will be rejected, but
9367 // still needs to be cleared here.
9368 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9370 // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
9372 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9373 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9375 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9376 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
9377 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
9378 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
9379 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9381 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9385 // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
9386 // everything is functional.
9387 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
9389 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9390 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
9391 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
9392 added_monitors.clear();
9395 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9396 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
9397 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9398 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9400 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9401 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9402 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9404 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
9408 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
9409 // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
9411 // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
9412 // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
9413 // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
9414 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9415 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9416 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9417 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9419 // Create some initial channels
9420 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9421 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9422 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9424 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9425 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9426 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9428 // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
9429 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9430 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9432 // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
9433 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9434 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9435 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
9436 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
9437 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
9438 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9439 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
9440 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9442 // A null channel ID should close all channels
9443 let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9444 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9445 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9446 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
9447 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9448 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9450 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9451 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9453 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9456 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9457 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9459 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9461 // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
9462 // peer_disconnected with no_connection_possible set to false, duplicating the
9463 // close-all-channels logic. That's OK, we don't want to end up not force-closing channels for
9464 // users with their own peer handling logic. We duplicate the call here, however.
9465 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9466 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9468 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
9469 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9470 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9474 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
9475 // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
9477 // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
9478 // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
9479 // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
9480 // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
9482 // Further, if the funding transaction is consensus-valid, confirms, and is later spent, we'd
9483 // previously have crashed in `ChannelMonitor` even though we closed the channel as bogus and
9484 // gave up on it. We test this here by generating such a transaction.
9485 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9486 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9487 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9488 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9490 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9491 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9492 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9494 let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
9496 // Create a witness program which can be spent by a 4-empty-stack-elements witness and which is
9497 // 136 bytes long. This matches our "accepted HTLC preimage spend" matching, previously causing
9498 // a panic as we'd try to extract a 32 byte preimage from a witness element without checking
9500 let mut wit_program: Vec<u8> = channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program();
9501 let wit_program_script: Script = wit_program.into();
9502 for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
9503 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
9504 output.script_pubkey = Script::new_v0_p2wsh(&wit_program_script.wscript_hash());
9507 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
9508 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9509 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9511 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9512 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9514 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9515 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
9517 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9518 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9519 nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
9521 let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
9522 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
9523 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
9524 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9525 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9526 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
9527 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
9528 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9529 if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
9530 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
9531 } else { panic!(); }
9532 } else { panic!(); }
9533 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
9535 // Now confirm a spend of the (bogus) funding transaction. As long as the witness is 5 elements
9536 // long the ChannelMonitor will try to read 32 bytes from the second-to-last element, panicing
9537 // as its not 32 bytes long.
9538 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
9539 version: 2i32, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
9540 input: tx.output.iter().enumerate().map(|(idx, _)| TxIn {
9541 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
9545 script_sig: Script::new(),
9546 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
9547 witness: Witness::from_vec(channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness())
9549 output: vec![TxOut {
9551 script_pubkey: Script::new(),
9554 check_spends!(spend_tx, tx);
9555 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &spend_tx);
9558 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
9559 // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
9560 // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
9561 // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
9562 // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
9563 // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
9564 // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
9565 // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
9566 // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
9567 // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
9568 // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
9569 // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
9570 // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
9571 // until we learned about an additional block.
9573 // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
9574 // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
9575 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9576 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9577 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9578 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9579 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
9581 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9582 let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9583 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
9584 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9585 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9587 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9588 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9589 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9590 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9591 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9592 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
9594 let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
9595 if !test_height_before_timelock {
9596 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
9598 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9599 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
9600 if test_height_before_timelock {
9601 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
9602 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
9603 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
9604 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9606 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
9607 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9608 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
9609 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
9610 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
9611 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
9613 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
9614 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
9616 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
9617 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
9618 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
9619 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9620 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
9621 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: channel_id }]);
9622 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9624 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9625 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9626 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9627 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9628 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9629 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9630 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9631 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9632 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
9637 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
9638 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
9639 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
9643 fn test_forwardable_regen() {
9644 // Tests that if we reload a ChannelManager while forwards are pending we will regenerate the
9645 // PendingHTLCsForwardable event automatically, ensuring we don't forget to forward/receive
9647 // We test it for both payment receipt and payment forwarding.
9649 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9650 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9651 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9652 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
9653 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
9654 let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
9655 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9656 let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).2;
9657 let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).2;
9659 // First send a payment to nodes[1]
9660 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
9661 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9662 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9664 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9665 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9666 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9667 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9668 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9670 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9672 // Next send a payment which is forwarded by nodes[1]
9673 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 200_000);
9674 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
9675 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9677 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9678 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9679 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9680 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9681 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9683 // There is already a PendingHTLCsForwardable event "pending" so another one will not be
9685 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9687 // Now restart nodes[1] and make sure it regenerates a single PendingHTLCsForwardable
9688 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9689 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9691 let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
9692 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9693 let mut chan_1_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9694 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_1).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9695 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_2).write(&mut chan_1_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9697 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
9698 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
9699 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
9700 nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
9702 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9703 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9704 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9705 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
9706 let mut chan_1_monitor_read = &chan_1_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9707 let (_, mut chan_1_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9708 &mut chan_1_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9709 assert!(chan_1_monitor_read.is_empty());
9711 let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
9712 let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
9713 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
9714 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
9715 channel_monitors.insert(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_1_monitor);
9716 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
9717 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
9719 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
9720 chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
9721 tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
9722 logger: nodes[1].logger,
9726 nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
9727 assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
9729 assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor),
9730 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
9731 assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_1_monitor),
9732 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
9733 nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
9734 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9736 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9737 // Note that nodes[1] and nodes[2] resend their channel_ready here since they haven't updated
9738 // the commitment state.
9739 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9741 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9743 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9744 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 100_000);
9745 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9747 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9748 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9749 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9750 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9751 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9752 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9753 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 200_000);
9755 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
9756 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage_2);
9759 fn do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(test_for_second_fail_panic: bool) {
9760 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9761 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9762 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9763 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9765 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9767 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
9768 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
9769 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
9771 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
9774 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9775 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9776 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9777 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9778 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9779 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9780 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9782 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9783 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 10_000);
9786 // Note that we use a different PaymentId here to allow us to duplicativly pay
9787 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_secret.0)).unwrap();
9788 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9789 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9790 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9791 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9792 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9793 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9794 // At this point, nodes[1] would notice it has too much value for the payment. It will
9795 // assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9796 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC. Previously, it'd also have failed back
9797 // the first HTLC delivered above.
9800 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9801 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9803 if test_for_second_fail_panic {
9804 // Now we go fail back the first HTLC from the user end.
9805 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
9807 let expected_destinations = vec![
9808 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
9809 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
9811 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1], expected_destinations);
9812 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9814 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9815 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9816 assert_eq!(fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 2);
9818 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9819 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
9820 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9822 let failure_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9823 assert_eq!(failure_events.len(), 2);
9824 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
9825 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[1] {} else { panic!(); }
9827 // Let the second HTLC fail and claim the first
9828 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9829 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9831 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9832 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9833 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9834 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9836 expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9838 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
9843 fn test_dup_htlc_second_fail_panic() {
9844 // Previously, if we received two HTLCs back-to-back, where the second overran the expected
9845 // value for the payment, we'd fail back both HTLCs after generating a `PaymentReceived` event.
9846 // Then, if the user failed the second payment, they'd hit a "tried to fail an already failed
9847 // HTLC" debug panic. This tests for this behavior, checking that only one HTLC is auto-failed.
9848 do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(true);
9852 fn test_dup_htlc_second_rejected() {
9853 // Test that if we receive a second HTLC for an MPP payment that overruns the payment amount we
9854 // simply reject the second HTLC but are still able to claim the first HTLC.
9855 do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(false);
9859 fn test_inconsistent_mpp_params() {
9860 // Test that if we recieve two HTLCs with different payment parameters we fail back the first
9861 // such HTLC and allow the second to stay.
9862 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9863 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9864 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9865 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9867 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9868 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9869 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9870 let chan_2_3 =create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9872 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id())
9873 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
9874 let mut route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 15_000_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
9875 assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9876 route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9877 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9878 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9879 core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9881 let payment_params_opt = Some(payment_params);
9883 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[3]);
9885 let cur_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
9886 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
9888 let session_privs = {
9889 // We create a fake route here so that we start with three pending HTLCs, which we'll
9890 // ultimately have, just not right away.
9891 let mut dup_route = route.clone();
9892 dup_route.paths.push(route.paths[1].clone());
9893 nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &dup_route).unwrap()
9896 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
9897 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9899 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9900 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9901 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), false, None);
9903 assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9906 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 14_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
9907 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9909 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9910 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9911 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9913 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9914 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9916 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9917 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9919 let mut events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9920 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9921 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9923 nodes[3].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9924 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9925 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg, true, true);
9927 // At this point, nodes[3] should notice the two HTLCs don't contain the same total payment
9928 // amount. It will assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9929 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC.
9931 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[3]);
9932 nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9933 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[3], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9934 nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9936 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
9938 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9939 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9940 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9942 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }]);
9943 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9945 let fail_updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9946 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9947 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], fail_updates_2.commitment_signed, false);
9949 expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9951 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[2]).unwrap();
9952 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9954 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9955 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9956 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), true, None);
9958 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, our_payment_preimage);
9962 fn test_keysend_payments_to_public_node() {
9963 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9964 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9965 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9966 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9968 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9969 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9970 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9971 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9972 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9973 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9974 final_value_msat: 10000,
9975 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9977 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
9978 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9979 let route = find_route(&payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
9981 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9982 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(test_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9983 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9984 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9985 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9986 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9987 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9988 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9989 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9993 fn test_keysend_payments_to_private_node() {
9994 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9995 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9996 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9997 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9999 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
10000 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
10001 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
10002 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
10004 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
10005 let route_params = RouteParameters {
10006 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
10007 final_value_msat: 10000,
10008 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
10010 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
10011 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
10012 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
10013 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10014 let route = find_route(
10015 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
10016 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
10019 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
10020 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(test_preimage.0)).unwrap();
10021 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10022 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10023 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10024 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
10025 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
10026 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
10027 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
10031 fn test_double_partial_claim() {
10032 // Test what happens if a node receives a payment, generates a PaymentReceived event, the HTLCs
10033 // time out, the sender resends only some of the MPP parts, then the user processes the
10034 // PaymentReceived event, ensuring they don't inadvertently claim only part of the full payment
10036 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
10037 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
10038 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
10039 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10041 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
10042 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
10043 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
10044 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
10046 let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], 15_000_000);
10047 assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
10048 route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
10049 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
10050 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
10051 core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
10054 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
10055 // nodes[3] has now received a PaymentReceived event...which it will take some (exorbitant)
10056 // amount of time to respond to.
10058 // Connect some blocks to time out the payment
10059 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
10060 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // To get the same height for sending later
10062 let failed_destinations = vec![
10063 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
10064 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
10066 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations);
10068 pass_failed_payment_back(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_hash);
10070 // nodes[1] now retries one of the two paths...
10071 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
10072 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
10074 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10075 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
10076 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
10078 // At this point nodes[3] has received one half of the payment, and the user goes to handle
10079 // that PaymentReceived event they got hours ago and never handled...we should refuse to claim.
10080 nodes[3].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
10081 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
10082 assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
10085 fn do_test_partial_claim_before_restart(persist_both_monitors: bool) {
10086 // Test what happens if a node receives an MPP payment, claims it, but crashes before
10087 // persisting the ChannelManager. If `persist_both_monitors` is false, also crash after only
10088 // updating one of the two channels' ChannelMonitors. As a result, on startup, we'll (a) still
10089 // have the PaymentReceived event, (b) have one (or two) channel(s) that goes on chain with the
10090 // HTLC preimage in them, and (c) optionally have one channel that is live off-chain but does
10091 // not have the preimage tied to the still-pending HTLC.
10093 // To get to the correct state, on startup we should propagate the preimage to the
10094 // still-off-chain channel, claiming the HTLC as soon as the peer connects, with the monitor
10095 // receiving the preimage without a state update.
10097 // Further, we should generate a `PaymentClaimed` event to inform the user that the payment was
10098 // definitely claimed.
10099 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
10100 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
10101 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
10103 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
10104 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
10105 let nodes_3_deserialized: ChannelManager<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
10107 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10109 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
10110 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
10111 let chan_id_persisted = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).2;
10112 let chan_id_not_persisted = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).2;
10114 // Create an MPP route for 15k sats, more than the default htlc-max of 10%
10115 let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], 15_000_000);
10116 assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
10117 route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
10118 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
10119 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
10120 core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
10123 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
10124 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
10126 // Send the payment through to nodes[3] *without* clearing the PaymentReceived event
10127 let mut send_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10128 assert_eq!(send_events.len(), 2);
10129 do_pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), send_events[0].clone(), true, false, None);
10130 do_pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), send_events[1].clone(), true, false, None);
10132 // Now that we have an MPP payment pending, get the latest encoded copies of nodes[3]'s
10133 // monitors and ChannelManager, for use later, if we don't want to persist both monitors.
10134 let mut original_monitor = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
10135 if !persist_both_monitors {
10136 for outpoint in nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.list_monitors() {
10137 if outpoint.to_channel_id() == chan_id_not_persisted {
10138 assert!(original_monitor.0.is_empty());
10139 nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap().write(&mut original_monitor).unwrap();
10144 let mut original_manager = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
10145 nodes[3].node.write(&mut original_manager).unwrap();
10147 expect_payment_received!(nodes[3], payment_hash, payment_secret, 15_000_000);
10149 nodes[3].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
10150 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 2);
10151 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[3], payment_hash, 15_000_000);
10153 // Now fetch one of the two updated ChannelMonitors from nodes[3], and restart pretending we
10154 // crashed in between the two persistence calls - using one old ChannelMonitor and one new one,
10155 // with the old ChannelManager.
10156 let mut updated_monitor = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
10157 for outpoint in nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.list_monitors() {
10158 if outpoint.to_channel_id() == chan_id_persisted {
10159 assert!(updated_monitor.0.is_empty());
10160 nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap().write(&mut updated_monitor).unwrap();
10163 // If `persist_both_monitors` is set, get the second monitor here as well
10164 if persist_both_monitors {
10165 for outpoint in nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.list_monitors() {
10166 if outpoint.to_channel_id() == chan_id_not_persisted {
10167 assert!(original_monitor.0.is_empty());
10168 nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap().write(&mut original_monitor).unwrap();
10173 // Now restart nodes[3].
10174 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
10175 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[3].keys_manager;
10176 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[3].chain_source), nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[3].logger, node_cfgs[3].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
10177 nodes[3].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
10178 let mut monitors = Vec::new();
10179 for mut monitor_data in [original_monitor, updated_monitor].iter() {
10180 let (_, mut deserialized_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut &monitor_data.0[..], keys_manager).unwrap();
10181 monitors.push(deserialized_monitor);
10184 let config = UserConfig::default();
10185 nodes_3_deserialized = {
10186 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
10187 for monitor in monitors.iter_mut() {
10188 channel_monitors.insert(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
10190 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut &original_manager.0[..], ChannelManagerReadArgs {
10191 default_config: config,
10193 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[3].fee_estimator,
10194 chain_monitor: nodes[3].chain_monitor,
10195 tx_broadcaster: nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
10196 logger: nodes[3].logger,
10200 nodes[3].node = &nodes_3_deserialized;
10202 for monitor in monitors {
10203 // On startup the preimage should have been copied into the non-persisted monitor:
10204 assert!(monitor.get_stored_preimages().contains_key(&payment_hash));
10205 assert_eq!(nodes[3].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.clone(), monitor),
10206 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
10208 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 2);
10210 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
10211 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
10213 // During deserialization, we should have closed one channel and broadcast its latest
10214 // commitment transaction. We should also still have the original PaymentReceived event we
10215 // never finished processing.
10216 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10217 assert_eq!(events.len(), if persist_both_monitors { 4 } else { 3 });
10218 if let Event::PaymentReceived { amount_msat: 15_000_000, .. } = events[0] { } else { panic!(); }
10219 if let Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager, .. } = events[1] { } else { panic!(); }
10220 if persist_both_monitors {
10221 if let Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager, .. } = events[2] { } else { panic!(); }
10224 // On restart, we should also get a duplicate PaymentClaimed event as we persisted the
10225 // ChannelManager prior to handling the original one.
10226 if let Event::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: our_payment_hash, amount_msat: 15_000_000, .. } =
10227 events[if persist_both_monitors { 3 } else { 2 }]
10229 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
10230 } else { panic!(); }
10232 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), if persist_both_monitors { 0 } else { 1 });
10233 if !persist_both_monitors {
10234 // If one of the two channels is still live, reveal the payment preimage over it.
10236 nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
10237 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2]);
10238 nodes[2].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
10239 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[3]);
10241 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
10242 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
10243 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
10245 nodes[3].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
10247 // Once we call `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` the holding cell is cleared and the HTLC
10248 // claim should fly.
10249 let ds_msgs = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10250 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
10251 assert_eq!(ds_msgs.len(), 2);
10252 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } = ds_msgs[1] {} else { panic!(); }
10254 let cs_updates = match ds_msgs[0] {
10255 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
10256 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10257 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
10258 let cs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10259 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[2], nodes[0], nodes[3], Some(1000), false, false);
10260 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
10266 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10267 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], cs_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
10268 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
10273 fn test_partial_claim_before_restart() {
10274 do_test_partial_claim_before_restart(false);
10275 do_test_partial_claim_before_restart(true);
10278 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
10279 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
10280 enum ExposureEvent {
10281 /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
10283 /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
10285 /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
10286 AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
10289 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool) {
10290 // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
10293 // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
10294 // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
10295 // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
10296 // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
10297 // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
10298 // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
10299 // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
10300 // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
10302 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10303 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
10304 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = 5_000_000; // default setting value
10305 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10306 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
10307 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10309 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
10310 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10311 open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
10312 open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
10314 open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10316 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel);
10317 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10318 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
10320 let opt_anchors = false;
10322 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
10325 if let Some(mut chan) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&temporary_channel_id) {
10326 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10330 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
10331 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
10332 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10334 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
10335 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10337 let (channel_ready, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
10338 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
10339 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
10341 let dust_buffer_feerate = {
10342 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
10343 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
10344 chan.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64
10346 let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
10347 let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
10349 let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
10350 let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
10352 let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 25;
10353 let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
10356 if dust_outbound_balance {
10357 // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
10358 // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
10359 // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
10360 for i in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
10361 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
10362 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
10365 // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
10366 // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
10367 // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
10368 for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
10369 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
10373 if dust_outbound_balance {
10374 // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
10375 // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
10376 for i in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
10377 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
10378 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
10381 // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
10382 // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
10383 for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
10384 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
10389 let dust_overflow = dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx + 1);
10390 if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
10391 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
10392 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
10393 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
10395 let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
10396 let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
10397 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
10399 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
10401 } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
10402 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
10403 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
10404 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10405 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10406 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10407 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
10408 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10409 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
10411 // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
10412 let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
10413 let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
10414 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
10416 // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
10417 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
10419 } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
10420 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 2_500_000);
10421 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)) { panic!("Unexpected event at update_fee-swallowed HTLC", ); }
10423 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
10424 *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
10426 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10427 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10428 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure".to_string(), 1);
10431 let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10432 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
10433 added_monitors.clear();
10437 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
10438 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
10439 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
10440 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
10441 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
10442 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
10443 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
10444 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
10445 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
10446 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
10447 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
10448 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
10449 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
10453 fn test_non_final_funding_tx() {
10454 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10455 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10456 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10457 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10459 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10460 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10461 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_message);
10462 let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10463 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel_message);
10465 let best_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
10467 let chan_id = *nodes[0].network_chan_count.borrow();
10468 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10469 let input = TxIn { previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint::null(), script_sig: bitcoin::Script::new(), sequence: Sequence(1), witness: Witness::from_vec(vec!(vec!(1))) };
10470 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10471 let mut tx = match events[0] {
10472 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } => {
10473 // Timelock the transaction _beyond_ the best client height + 2.
10474 Transaction { version: chan_id as i32, lock_time: PackedLockTime(best_height + 3), input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut {
10475 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
10478 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10480 // Transaction should fail as it's evaluated as non-final for propagation.
10481 match nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()) {
10482 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
10483 assert_eq!(format!("Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final"), err);
10488 // However, transaction should be accepted if it's in a +2 headroom from best block.
10489 tx.lock_time = PackedLockTime(tx.lock_time.0 - 1);
10490 assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
10491 get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());