_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
  11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
  12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
  13
  14 use chain;
  15 use chain::{Confirm, Listen, Watch};
  16 use chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
  17 use chain::channelmonitor;
  18 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
  19 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  20 use chain::keysinterface::{BaseSign, KeysInterface};
  21 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
  22 use ln::channel::{commitment_tx_base_weight, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT};
  23 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS };
  24 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
  25 use ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
  26 use ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
  27 use routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
  28 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, find_route, get_route};
  29 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures, NodeFeatures};
  30 use ln::msgs;
  31 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
  32 use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
  33 use util::{byte_utils, test_utils};
  34 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
  35 use util::errors::APIError;
  36 use util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
  37 use util::config::UserConfig;
  38
  39 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
  40 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
  41 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
  42 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  43 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
  44 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
  45 use bitcoin::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, Witness};
  46 use bitcoin::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
  47
  48 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
  49 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
  50
  51 use regex;
  52
  53 use io;
  54 use prelude::*;
  55 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
  56 use core::default::Default;
  57 use core::iter::repeat;
  58 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
  59
  60 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
  61 use ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
  62
  63 #[test]
  64 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
  65         // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
  66         use ln::channel::TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS;
  67         let mut cfg = UserConfig::default();
  68         cfg.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1;
  69         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
  70         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
  71         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(cfg)]);
  72         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
  73
  74         // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
  75         // funding satoshis
  76         let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
  77         let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat);
  78         let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
  79
  80         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
  81         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
  82
  83         // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
  84         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
  85
  86         // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
  87         // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
  88         let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
  89                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
  90                 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
  91                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
  92                 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
  93                 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
  94                         match action {
  95                                 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
  96                                         nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), expected_regex, 1);
  97                                 },
  98                                 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
  99                         }
 100                 } else { assert!(false); }
 101         };
 102
 103         use ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
 104
 105         // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
 106         insane_open_helper(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2; msg });
 107         insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS; msg });
 108
 109         insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
 110
 111         insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than channel amount minus reserve \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
 112
 113         insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
 114
 115         insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
 116
 117         insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
 118
 119         insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
 120
 121         insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
 122 }
 123
 124 #[test]
 125 fn test_funding_exceeds_no_wumbo_limit() {
 126         // Test that if a peer does not support wumbo channels, we'll refuse to open a wumbo channel to
 127         // them.
 128         use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO;
 129         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 130         let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 131         node_cfgs[1].features = InitFeatures::known().clear_wumbo();
 132         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 133         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 134
 135         match nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1, 0, 42, None) {
 136                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
 137                         assert_eq!(format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1), err);
 138                 },
 139                 _ => panic!()
 140         }
 141 }
 142
 143 fn do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(send_from_initiator: bool) {
 144         // A peer providing a channel_reserve_satoshis of 0 (or less than our dust limit) is insecure,
 145         // but only for them. Because some LSPs do it with some level of trust of the clients (for a
 146         // substantial UX improvement), we explicitly allow it. Because it's unlikely to happen often
 147         // in normal testing, we test it explicitly here.
 148         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 149         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 150         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 151         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 152
 153         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
 154         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
 155         let feerate_per_kw = 253;
 156         let opt_anchors = false;
 157         push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
 158         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
 159
 160         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None).unwrap();
 161         let mut open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 162         if !send_from_initiator {
 163                 open_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 164                 open_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 165         }
 166         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_message);
 167
 168         // Extract the channel accept message from node1 to node0
 169         let mut accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 170         if send_from_initiator {
 171                 accept_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 172                 accept_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 173         }
 174         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel_message);
 175         {
 176                 let mut lock;
 177                 let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(if send_from_initiator { &nodes[1] } else { &nodes[0] }, lock, temp_channel_id);
 178                 chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 179                 chan.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 180         }
 181
 182         let funding_tx = sign_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100_000, temp_channel_id);
 183         let funding_msgs = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_tx);
 184         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_msgs.0);
 185
 186         // nodes[0] should now be able to send the full balance to nodes[1], violating nodes[1]'s
 187         // security model if it ever tries to send funds back to nodes[0] (but that's not our problem).
 188         if send_from_initiator {
 189                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000_000
 190                         // Note that for outbound channels we have to consider the commitment tx fee and the
 191                         // "fee spike buffer", which is currently a multiple of the total commitment tx fee as
 192                         // well as an additional HTLC.
 193                         - FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, 2, opt_anchors));
 194         } else {
 195                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], push_amt);
 196         }
 197 }
 198
 199 #[test]
 200 fn test_counterparty_no_reserve() {
 201         do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(true);
 202         do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(false);
 203 }
 204
 205 #[test]
 206 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
 207         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 208         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 209         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 210         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 211         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 212
 213         // balancing
 214         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 215
 216         // A                                        B
 217         // update_fee                            ->
 218         // send (1) commitment_signed            -.
 219         //                                       <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
 220         // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
 221         // (1) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 222         //                                       .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
 223         // (2) RAA is delivered                  ->
 224         //                                       .- send (4) commitment_signed
 225         //                                       <- (3) RAA is delivered
 226         // send (5) commitment_signed            -.
 227         //                                       <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
 228         // send (6) RAA                          -.
 229         // (5) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 230         //                                       <- RAA
 231         // (6) RAA is delivered                  ->
 232
 233         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 234         {
 235                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 236                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 237         }
 238         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 239         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 240
 241         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 242         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 243         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 244                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 245                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 246                 },
 247                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 248         };
 249
 250         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 251
 252         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 253         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 254         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
 255         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 256
 257         let payment_event = {
 258                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 259                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 260                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 261         };
 262         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 263         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 264
 265         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 266         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 267         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 268         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 269         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 270         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 271
 272         // deliver(1), generate (3):
 273         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 274         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 275         // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 276         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 277
 278         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
 279         let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 280         assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 281         assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 282         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 283         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 284         assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
 285         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 286
 287         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
 288         let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 289         assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 290         assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 291         assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 292         assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 293         assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
 294         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 295
 296         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
 297         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 298         // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 299         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 300
 301         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
 302         let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 303         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 304
 305         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 306         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 307
 308         let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 309         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
 310         match events_2[0] {
 311                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
 312                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 313         }
 314
 315         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
 316         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 317 }
 318
 319 #[test]
 320 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
 321         // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
 322         // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
 323         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 324         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 325         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 326         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 327         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 328
 329         // balancing
 330         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 331
 332         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 333         {
 334                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 335                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 336         }
 337         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 338         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 339
 340         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 341         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 342         let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 343                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
 344                         update_fee.as_ref()
 345                 },
 346                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 347         };
 348
 349         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 350
 351         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 352         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 353         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
 354         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 355
 356         let payment_event = {
 357                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 358                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 359                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 360         };
 361         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 362         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 363
 364         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 365         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 366         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 367         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 368         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 369         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 370
 371         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
 372         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 373
 374         // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
 375 }
 376
 377 #[test]
 378 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
 379         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 380         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 381         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 382         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 383         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 384
 385         // A                                        B
 386         // update_fee/commitment_signed          ->
 387         //                                       .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
 388         // update_fee (never committed)          ->
 389         // (3) update_fee                        ->
 390         // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
 391         // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
 392         // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
 393         //                                       <- (1) RAA delivered
 394         // (3) is generated and send (4) CS      -.
 395         // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
 396         // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
 397         //                                       <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
 398         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 399         //                                          B should send no response here
 400         // (4) commitment_signed delivered       ->
 401         //                                       <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
 402         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 403
 404         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 405         let initial_feerate;
 406         {
 407                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 408                 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
 409                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
 410         }
 411         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 412         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 413
 414         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 415         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 416         let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 417                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 418                         (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
 419                 },
 420                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 421         };
 422
 423         // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
 424         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
 425         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
 426         let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 427         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 428
 429         // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
 430         // transaction:
 431         {
 432                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 433                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
 434         }
 435         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 436         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 437         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 438
 439         // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
 440         let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
 441                 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
 442                 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
 443         };
 444
 445         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 446
 447         update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
 448         // Deliver (3)
 449         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 450
 451         // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
 452         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
 453         let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 454         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 455         assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 456         assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 457         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 458         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 459         // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
 460         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
 461         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
 462
 463         // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
 464         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
 465         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 466         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 467         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 468
 469         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
 470         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 471         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 472
 473         // Delever (4)
 474         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
 475         let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 476         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 477
 478         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 479         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 480         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 481
 482         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
 483         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 484         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 485         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 486
 487         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
 488         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 489         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 490 }
 491
 492 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
 493         // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
 494         // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
 495         // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
 496         // Node objects.
 497
 498         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 499         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 500         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 501         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 502
 503         if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
 504                 let block = Block {
 505                         header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
 506                         txdata: vec![],
 507                 };
 508                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
 509                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
 510         }
 511
 512         if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
 513         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
 514         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 515
 516         if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
 517         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
 518         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 519
 520         if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
 521         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
 522
 523         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
 524
 525         if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
 526         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
 527         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 528         let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 529
 530         if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
 531         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
 532         {
 533                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 534                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 535                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 536                 added_monitors.clear();
 537         }
 538         let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 539
 540         if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
 541         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
 542         {
 543                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 544                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 545                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 546                 added_monitors.clear();
 547         }
 548
 549         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 550         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
 551
 552         if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
 553         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
 554
 555         if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
 556         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
 557         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
 558         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
 559 }
 560
 561 #[test]
 562 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
 563         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
 564         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
 565         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
 566         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
 567         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
 568         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
 569         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
 570         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
 571         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
 572         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
 573         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
 574         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
 575         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
 576         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
 577         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
 578         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
 579         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
 580         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
 581 }
 582
 583 #[test]
 584 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
 585         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 586         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 587         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 588         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 589         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 590
 591         {
 592                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 593                 *feerate_lock += 25;
 594         }
 595         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 596         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 597
 598         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 599         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 600         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 601                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 602                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 603                 },
 604                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 605         };
 606         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 607
 608         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 609         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 610         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 611
 612         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 613         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 614         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 615
 616         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 617         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 618         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 619         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 620
 621         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 622         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 623         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 624 }
 625
 626 #[test]
 627 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
 628         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 629         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 630         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 631         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 632         let channel_value = 5000;
 633         let push_sats = 700;
 634         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 635         let channel_id = chan.2;
 636         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 637         let bs_channel_reserve_sats = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value);
 638
 639         let opt_anchors = false;
 640
 641         // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
 642         // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
 643         // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
 644         // remote limit.
 645         let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
 646         let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors)) as u32;
 647         {
 648                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 649                 *feerate_lock = feerate;
 650         }
 651         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 652         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 653         let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 654
 655         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
 656
 657         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
 658
 659         // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
 660         {
 661                 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
 662
 663                 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
 664                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
 665                 let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000;
 666                 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
 667                 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
 668                 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
 669         }
 670
 671         {
 672                 // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
 673                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 674                 *feerate_lock += 4;
 675         }
 676         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 677         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
 678         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 679
 680         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
 681
 682         // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
 683         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
 684         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
 685                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 686                 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 687                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 688                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
 689                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 690                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 691         };
 692         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
 693                 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 694                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 695                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
 696                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
 697                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 698                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
 699                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 700         };
 701
 702         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
 703         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
 704                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
 705
 706         let res = {
 707                 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 708                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 709                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 710                 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
 711                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
 712                         INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
 713                         push_sats,
 714                         channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000,
 715                         opt_anchors, local_funding, remote_funding,
 716                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
 717                         non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 718                         &mut htlcs,
 719                         &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
 720                 );
 721                 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
 722         };
 723
 724         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
 725                 channel_id: chan.2,
 726                 signature: res.0,
 727                 htlc_signatures: res.1
 728         };
 729
 730         let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
 731                 channel_id: chan.2,
 732                 feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 733         };
 734
 735         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
 736
 737         //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
 738         //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
 739         //Should produce and error.
 740         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
 741         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
 742         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 743         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 744         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") });
 745 }
 746
 747 #[test]
 748 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
 749         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 750         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 751         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 752         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 753         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 754
 755         // balancing
 756         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 757
 758         {
 759                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 760                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 761         }
 762         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 763         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 764
 765         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 766         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 767         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 768                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 769                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 770                 },
 771                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 772         };
 773         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 774         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 775         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 776         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 777
 778         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
 779
 780         // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
 781         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
 782         {
 783                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 784                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
 785                 added_monitors.clear();
 786         }
 787         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 788         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 789         // node[1] has nothing to do
 790
 791         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 792         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 793         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 794
 795         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 796         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 797         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 798         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 799         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 800         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 801         // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
 802
 803         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 804         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
 805         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
 806         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
 807         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
 808         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
 809
 810         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
 811         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 812         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 813         let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 814
 815         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 816         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 817         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 818
 819         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 820         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 821         let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 822         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 823
 824         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 825         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 826         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 827
 828         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
 829
 830         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 831         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
 832         match events[0] {
 833                 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
 834                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 835         };
 836
 837         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
 838
 839         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
 840         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
 841         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 842         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 843         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 844 }
 845
 846 #[test]
 847 fn test_update_fee() {
 848         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 849         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 850         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 851         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 852         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 853         let channel_id = chan.2;
 854
 855         // A                                        B
 856         // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 857         //                                       <- (2) revoke_and_ack
 858         //                                       .- send (3) commitment_signed
 859         // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 860         //                                       .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
 861         //                                       <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
 862         // send (6) revoke_and_ack               -.
 863         //                                       <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
 864         // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack            ->
 865         //                                       .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
 866         //                                       <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
 867         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 868
 869         // Create and deliver (1)...
 870         let feerate;
 871         {
 872                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 873                 feerate = *feerate_lock;
 874                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
 875         }
 876         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 877         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 878
 879         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 880         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 881         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 882                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 883                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 884                 },
 885                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 886         };
 887         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 888
 889         // Generate (2) and (3):
 890         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 891         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 892         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 893
 894         // Deliver (2):
 895         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 896         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 897         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 898
 899         // Create and deliver (4)...
 900         {
 901                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 902                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
 903         }
 904         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 905         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 906         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 907         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 908         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 909                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 910                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 911                 },
 912                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 913         };
 914
 915         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 916         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 917         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 918         // ... creating (5)
 919         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 920         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 921
 922         // Handle (3), creating (6):
 923         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
 924         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 925         let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 926         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 927
 928         // Deliver (5):
 929         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 930         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 931         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 932
 933         // Deliver (6), creating (7):
 934         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
 935         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 936         assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 937         assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 938         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 939         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 940         assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
 941         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 942
 943         // Deliver (7)
 944         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 945         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 946         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 947         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 948
 949         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 950         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 951         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 952
 953         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
 954         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
 955         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 956         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 957         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 958 }
 959
 960 #[test]
 961 fn fake_network_test() {
 962         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
 963         // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
 964         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
 965         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
 966         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
 967         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 968
 969         // Create some initial channels
 970         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 971         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 972         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 973
 974         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
 975         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 976         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 977         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 978         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 979
 980         // Send some more payments
 981         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
 982         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
 983         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
 984
 985         // Test failure packets
 986         let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
 987         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
 988
 989         // Add a new channel that skips 3
 990         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 991
 992         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
 993         send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
 994         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 995         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 996         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 997         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 998         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 999
1000         // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
1001         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1002         hops.push(RouteHop {
1003                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1004                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1005                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1006                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1007                 fee_msat: 0,
1008                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1009         });
1010         hops.push(RouteHop {
1011                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1012                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1013                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1014                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1015                 fee_msat: 0,
1016                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1017         });
1018         hops.push(RouteHop {
1019                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1020                 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1021                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1022                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1023                 fee_msat: 1000000,
1024                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1025         });
1026         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1027         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1028         let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
1029
1030         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1031         hops.push(RouteHop {
1032                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1033                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1034                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1035                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1036                 fee_msat: 0,
1037                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1038         });
1039         hops.push(RouteHop {
1040                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1041                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1042                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1043                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1044                 fee_msat: 0,
1045                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1046         });
1047         hops.push(RouteHop {
1048                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1049                 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1050                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1051                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1052                 fee_msat: 1000000,
1053                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1054         });
1055         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1056         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1057         let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1058
1059         // Claim the rebalances...
1060         fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1061         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1062
1063         // Close down the channels...
1064         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1065         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1066         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1067         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1068         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1069         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1070         close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1071         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1072         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1073         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1074         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1075         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1076 }
1077
1078 #[test]
1079 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1080         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1081         // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1082         // commitment dance rounds.
1083         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1084         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1085         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1086         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1087         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1088         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1089
1090         let mut payments = Vec::new();
1091         for _ in 0..::ln::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
1092                 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1093                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
1094                 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1095         }
1096         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1097
1098         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1099         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1100         let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1101         assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1102
1103         // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1104         // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1105         // another HTLC.
1106         let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1107         {
1108                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1109                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1110                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1111                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
1112         }
1113
1114         // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1115         let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1116         {
1117                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
1118                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1119         }
1120
1121         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1122         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1123         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1124         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1125
1126         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1127         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1128         // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1129         // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1130         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1131         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
1132         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1133
1134         let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1135         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1136         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1137
1138         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1139
1140         // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1141         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1142         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1143         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1144
1145         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1146         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1147         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1148         let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1149
1150         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1151         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1152         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1153
1154         for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1155                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1156         }
1157         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1158         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1159         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1160         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1161         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1162
1163         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1164         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1165         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1166         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1167         let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1168
1169         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1170         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1171
1172         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1173
1174         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1175         assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1176         for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1177                 match event {
1178                         &Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1179                                 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1180                         },
1181                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1182                 };
1183         }
1184
1185         for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1186                 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1187         }
1188
1189         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1190 }
1191
1192 #[test]
1193 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1194         // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1195         // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1196         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1197         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1198         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1199         let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1200
1201         // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1202         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1203         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1204         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1205         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1206         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1207
1208         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1209
1210         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1211         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1212
1213         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1214         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1215
1216         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1217         fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1218         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1219 }
1220
1221 #[test]
1222 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1223         // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1224         // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1225         // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1226         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1227         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1228         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1229         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1230
1231         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1232
1233         // balancing
1234         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1235
1236         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1237
1238         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1239         let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
1240         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1241
1242         // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1243         nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1244         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, 800_000);
1245         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1246
1247         // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1248         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1249
1250         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1251         let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1252         for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1253                 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1254                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1255                 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1256                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1257                 }
1258         }
1259         assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1260
1261         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1262         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1263         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1264         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1265
1266         let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1267         assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 8);
1268
1269         check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]); // Immediate HTLC claim with preimage
1270
1271         check_spends!(claim_txn[1], chan_1.3); // Alternative commitment tx
1272         check_spends!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[1]); // HTLC spend in alternative commitment tx
1273
1274         let bump_tx = if claim_txn[1] == claim_txn[4] {
1275                 assert_eq!(claim_txn[1], claim_txn[4]);
1276                 assert_eq!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[5]);
1277
1278                 check_spends!(claim_txn[7], claim_txn[1]); // HTLC timeout on alternative commitment tx
1279
1280                 check_spends!(claim_txn[3], remote_txn[0]); // HTLC timeout on broadcasted commitment tx
1281                 &claim_txn[3]
1282         } else {
1283                 assert_eq!(claim_txn[1], claim_txn[3]);
1284                 assert_eq!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[4]);
1285
1286                 check_spends!(claim_txn[5], claim_txn[1]); // HTLC timeout on alternative commitment tx
1287
1288                 check_spends!(claim_txn[7], remote_txn[0]); // HTLC timeout on broadcasted commitment tx
1289
1290                 &claim_txn[7]
1291         };
1292
1293         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1294         assert_eq!(bump_tx.input.len(), 1);
1295         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, bump_tx.input[0].previous_output);
1296
1297         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1298         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1299         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1300
1301         assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
1302         assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1303         check_spends!(claim_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
1304         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1305
1306         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1307         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1308         for e in events {
1309                 match e {
1310                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1311                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
1312                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1313                                 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1314                         },
1315                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1316                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1317                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1318                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1319                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1320                                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1321                         },
1322                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1323                 }
1324         }
1325 }
1326
1327 #[test]
1328 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1329         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1330         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1331         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1332         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1333         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1334
1335         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1336         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1337
1338         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1339         let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2), 1 + 1, get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2));
1340         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1341         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send + 1);
1342         let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).err().unwrap();
1343         match err {
1344                 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(ref fails) => {
1345                         match &fails[0] {
1346                                 &APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ref err} =>
1347                                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)),
1348                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1349                         }
1350                 },
1351                 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1352         }
1353         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1354         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1355
1356         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1357 }
1358
1359 #[test]
1360 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1361         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1362         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1363         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1364         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1365         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1366
1367         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460001);
1368         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1369         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1370         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1371
1372         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1373
1374         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1375         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3460001, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1376         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1377         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1378                 channel_id: chan.2,
1379                 htlc_id: 0,
1380                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1381                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1382                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1383                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1384         };
1385
1386         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1387
1388         // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1389         // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1390         // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1391
1392         let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1393
1394         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1395
1396         // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1397         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1398         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1399                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1400                 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1401                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1402                 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1403                 chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1404
1405                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1406                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1407                  chan_signer.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1408                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1409                  chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1410         };
1411         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1412                 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1413                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1414                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1415                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1416                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1417                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1418                  chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1419         };
1420
1421         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1422         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1423                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
1424
1425         // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1426         // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1427         let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1428
1429         let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1430                 offered: false,
1431                 amount_msat: 3460001,
1432                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1433                 payment_hash,
1434                 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1435         };
1436
1437         let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1438
1439         let res = {
1440                 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1441                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1442                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1443                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1444                         commitment_number,
1445                         95000,
1446                         local_chan_balance,
1447                         local_chan.opt_anchors(), local_funding, remote_funding,
1448                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1449                         feerate_per_kw,
1450                         &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1451                         &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1452                 );
1453                 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1454         };
1455
1456         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1457                 channel_id: chan.2,
1458                 signature: res.0,
1459                 htlc_signatures: res.1
1460         };
1461
1462         // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1463         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1464         let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1465
1466         // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1467         let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1468                 channel_id: chan.2,
1469                 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1470                 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point
1471         };
1472         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1473
1474         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1475         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1476         // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1477         match events[0] {
1478                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1479                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1480                         update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1481                 },
1482                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1483         };
1484         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1485                 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", ::hex::encode(raa_msg.channel_id)), 1);
1486
1487         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1488 }
1489
1490 #[test]
1491 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1492         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1493         // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1494         // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1495         // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1496         // this situation.
1497         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1498         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1499         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1500         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1501
1502         let opt_anchors = false;
1503
1504         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1505         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1506         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1507
1508         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1509
1510         // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1511         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1512                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1513         }
1514
1515         // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1516         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1517         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1518                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1519         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1520         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1521 }
1522
1523 #[test]
1524 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1525         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1526         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1527         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1528         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1529         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1530
1531         let opt_anchors = false;
1532
1533         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1534         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1535         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1536         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1537         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1538         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1539         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1540
1541         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1542         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1543                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1544         }
1545
1546         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 700_000);
1547         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1548         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1549         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1550         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1551         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1552         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 700_000, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1553         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1554         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1555                 channel_id: chan.2,
1556                 htlc_id: MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64,
1557                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1558                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1559                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1560                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1561         };
1562
1563         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1564         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1565         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1566         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1567         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1568         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1569         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1570         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() });
1571 }
1572
1573 #[test]
1574 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1575         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1576         // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1577         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1578         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1579
1580         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1581         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1582         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1583
1584         let opt_anchors = false;
1585
1586         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1587         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1588         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1589         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1590         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1591         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1592         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1593
1594         let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1595                 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1596         // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1597         // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1598         // commitment transaction fee.
1599         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1600
1601         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1602         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1603                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1604         }
1605
1606         // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1607         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt + 1);
1608         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1609                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1610 }
1611
1612 #[test]
1613 fn test_chan_init_feerate_unaffordability() {
1614         // Test that we will reject channel opens which do not leave enough to pay for any HTLCs due to
1615         // channel reserve and feerate requirements.
1616         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1617         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1618         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1619         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1620         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1621
1622         let opt_anchors = false;
1623
1624         // Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
1625         // HTLC.
1626         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1627         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1628         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None).unwrap_err(),
1629                 APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
1630
1631         // During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
1632         // requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
1633         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1634         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None).unwrap();
1635         let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1636         open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
1637         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg);
1638
1639         let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1640         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
1641         match msg_events[0] {
1642                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
1643                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve");
1644                 },
1645                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1646         }
1647 }
1648
1649 #[test]
1650 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1651         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1652         // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1653         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1654         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1655         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1656         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1657         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1658
1659         let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1660         // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1661         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1662         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1663         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1664         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1665
1666         // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1667         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1668         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1669         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1670         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1671         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1672
1673         // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1674         // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1675         // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1676         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1677 }
1678
1679 #[test]
1680 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1681         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1682         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1683         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1684         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1685         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1686         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1687
1688         let feemsat = 239;
1689         let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1690         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1691         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1692         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1693
1694         // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1695         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1696         let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1697         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1698
1699         // Add a pending HTLC.
1700         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1701         let payment_event_1 = {
1702                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1703                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1704
1705                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1706                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1707                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1708         };
1709         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1710
1711         // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1712         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2, opt_anchors);
1713         let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1714         let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1715         let (route_2, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_2);
1716
1717         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1718         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1719         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1720         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1721         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1722         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, &None, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1723         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1);
1724         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1725                 channel_id: chan.2,
1726                 htlc_id: 1,
1727                 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1728                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1729                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1730                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1731         };
1732
1733         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1734         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1735         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1736         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1737         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1738         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1739         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1740         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() });
1741 }
1742
1743 #[test]
1744 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1745         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1746         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1747         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1748         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1749         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1750         let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1751         let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1752         assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1753         assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1754
1755         let reserve = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100000);
1756         assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1757         assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1758
1759         assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1760         assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1761 }
1762
1763 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
1764         (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1765 }
1766
1767 #[test]
1768 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1769         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1770         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1771         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1772         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1773         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1774         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1775         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1776         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1777         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1778         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1779
1780         let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1781         let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1782
1783         let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1784         let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1785
1786         macro_rules! expect_forward {
1787                 ($node: expr) => {{
1788                         let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1789                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1790                         check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1791                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1792                         payment_event
1793                 }}
1794         }
1795
1796         let feemsat = 239; // set above
1797         let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1798         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1799         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1800
1801         let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1802
1803         // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1804         {
1805                 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id())
1806                         .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known()).with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1807                 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], payment_params, recv_value_0, TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
1808                 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1809                 assert!(route.paths[0].iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1810
1811                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1812                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1813                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1814                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
1815         }
1816
1817         // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1818         // nodes[0]'s wealth
1819         loop {
1820                 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1821                 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1822                 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1823                 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1824                 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1825                 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1826                 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1827                         break;
1828                 }
1829
1830                 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id())
1831                         .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known()).with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1832                 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, recv_value_0, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
1833                 let (payment_preimage, ..) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], recv_value_0);
1834                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
1835
1836                 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1837                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1838                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1839                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1840                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1841                 );
1842
1843                 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1844                 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1845                 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1846                 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1847                 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1848         }
1849
1850         // adding pending output.
1851         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1852         // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1853         // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1854         // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1855         // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1856         // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1857         // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1858         // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1859         // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1860         // policy.
1861         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1862         let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1863         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1864
1865         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1866         let payment_event_1 = {
1867                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1868                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1869
1870                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1871                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1872                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1873         };
1874         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1875
1876         // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1877         let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1878         {
1879                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_2 + 1);
1880                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1881                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1882                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1883         }
1884
1885         // split the rest to test holding cell
1886         let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1887         let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1888         let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1889         let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1890         {
1891                 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1892                 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1893         }
1894
1895         // now see if they go through on both sides
1896         let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1897         // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1898         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21, &Some(our_payment_secret_21)).unwrap();
1899         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1900         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1901         assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1902
1903         // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1904         {
1905                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22+1);
1906                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1907                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1908                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1909                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 2);
1910         }
1911
1912         let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1913         // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1914         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22, &Some(our_payment_secret_22)).unwrap();
1915         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1916         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1917         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1918
1919         // flush the pending htlc
1920         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1921         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1922         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1923
1924         // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1925         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1926         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1927         let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1928
1929         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
1930         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1931         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1932         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1933
1934         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1935         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1936         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1937
1938         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1939
1940         let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1941         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
1942         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
1943
1944         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1945         expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
1946
1947         // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
1948         assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
1949         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
1950         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
1951         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
1952         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1953
1954         let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1955         assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
1956         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
1957         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
1958
1959         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
1960         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1961
1962         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1963         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1964         match events[0] {
1965                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat } => {
1966                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
1967                         assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amount_msat);
1968                         match &purpose {
1969                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1970                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1971                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
1972                                 },
1973                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1974                         }
1975                 },
1976                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1977         }
1978         match events[1] {
1979                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat } => {
1980                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
1981                         assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amount_msat);
1982                         match &purpose {
1983                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1984                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1985                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
1986                                 },
1987                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1988                         }
1989                 },
1990                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1991         }
1992
1993         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
1994         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
1995         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
1996
1997         let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1, opt_anchors);
1998         let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
1999         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
2000
2001         let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
2002         let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
2003         let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2004         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
2005         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
2006
2007         let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2008         assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
2009 }
2010
2011 #[test]
2012 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
2013         // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
2014         // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
2015         // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
2016         // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
2017         // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
2018         // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
2019         // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
2020         // To test this we:
2021         //  * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
2022         //    you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
2023         //    you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
2024         //  * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
2025         //  * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
2026         //    the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
2027         //  * deliver the first fulfill from B
2028         //  * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
2029         //    claim,
2030         //  * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
2031         //    This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
2032         //    removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
2033         //  * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
2034         //    of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
2035         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2036         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2037         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2038         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2039         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2040
2041         let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2042         // Route the first two HTLCs.
2043         let payment_value_1 = b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000;
2044         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_value_1);
2045         let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20_000);
2046
2047         // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
2048         let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
2049         let send_1 = {
2050                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_3, &Some(payment_secret_3)).unwrap();
2051                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2052                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2053                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2054                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2055         };
2056
2057         // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
2058         // initial fulfill/CS.
2059         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
2060         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, payment_value_1);
2061         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2062         let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2063
2064         // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
2065         // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
2066         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
2067         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000);
2068         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2069         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2070
2071         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2072         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
2073         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2074         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2075         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
2076
2077         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
2078         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
2079         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2080         // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
2081         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2082
2083         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2084         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2085         let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2086
2087         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2088         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2089         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2090
2091         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2092         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2093         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2094
2095         // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
2096         // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2097         // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
2098         // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
2099         // on-chain as necessary).
2100         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2101         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
2102         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2103         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2104         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
2105
2106         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2107         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2108         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2109
2110         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2111         expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2112
2113         // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2114         // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2115         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2116         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2117         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2118         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2119
2120         // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2121         // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2122         let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2123         let send_2 = {
2124                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_4, &Some(payment_secret_4)).unwrap();
2125                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2126                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2127                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2128                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2129         };
2130
2131         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2132         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2133         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2134         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2135
2136         // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2137
2138         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2139         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2140         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2141
2142         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2143         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2144
2145         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2146         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2147         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2148         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2149
2150         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2151         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2152         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2153
2154         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2155         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2156
2157         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2158         expect_payment_received!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2159
2160         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2161         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2162 }
2163
2164 #[test]
2165 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2166         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2167         // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2168         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2169         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2170         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2171         let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2172
2173         // Create some initial channels
2174         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2175         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2176         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2177         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2178
2179         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2180         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2181         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2182         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2183         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2184         connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2185
2186         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2187         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2188         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2189         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2190         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2191
2192         // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2193         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_1.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2194         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2195         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2196         {
2197                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2198                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2199                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2200                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2201                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2202         }
2203         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2204         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2205         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2206         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2207         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2208
2209         // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2210         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 3_000_000);
2211
2212         // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2213         // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2214         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_2.2, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2215         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2216         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2217         {
2218                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2219                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2220                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2221                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2222                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2223                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2224         }
2225         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2226         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2227         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2228         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2229         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2230
2231         macro_rules! claim_funds {
2232                 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
2233                         {
2234                                 $node.node.claim_funds($preimage);
2235                                 expect_payment_claimed!($node, $payment_hash, 3_000_000);
2236                                 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2237
2238                                 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2239                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2240                                 match events[0] {
2241                                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2242                                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2243                                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2244                                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2245                                         },
2246                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2247                                 };
2248                         }
2249                 }
2250         }
2251
2252         // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2253         // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2254         nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_3.2, &nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2255         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2256         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2257         let node2_commitment_txid;
2258         {
2259                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2260                 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2261                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2262                 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2263
2264                 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2265                 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1);
2266                 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2267                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2268                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2269         }
2270         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2271         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2272         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2273         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2274         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2275
2276         // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2277         // confusing us in the following tests.
2278         let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2279
2280         // One pending HTLC to time out:
2281         let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[3], &[&nodes[4]], 3_000_000);
2282         // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2283         // buffer space).
2284
2285         let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2286                 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2287                 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2288                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2289                 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2290                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2291                                 msg.clone()
2292                         },
2293                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2294                 };
2295                 match events[1] {
2296                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2297                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2298                         },
2299                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2300                 }
2301                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2302
2303                 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2304                 {
2305                         let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2306                         node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2307                                 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2308                                         false
2309                                 } else { true }
2310                         });
2311                 }
2312
2313                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2314
2315                 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2316                 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2);
2317
2318                 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2319                 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2320                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2321                 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2322                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2323                                 msg.clone()
2324                         },
2325                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2326                 };
2327                 match events[1] {
2328                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2329                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2330                         },
2331                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2332                 }
2333                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2334                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2335
2336                 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2337                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2338                 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2339         };
2340         nodes[3].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2341         nodes[4].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2342         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2343         assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2344
2345         nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon).unwrap();
2346         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2347         check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2348 }
2349
2350 #[test]
2351 fn test_justice_tx() {
2352         // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2353         let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2354         alice_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2355         alice_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2356         alice_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2357         let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2358         bob_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2359         bob_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2360         bob_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2361         let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2362         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2363         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2364         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2365         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2366         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2367         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2368         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen;
2369         // Create some new channels:
2370         let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2371
2372         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2373         let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2374         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2375         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2376         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2377         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2378         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2379         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2380         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2381         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2382         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2383         // Revoke the old state
2384         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2385
2386         {
2387                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2388                 {
2389                         let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2390                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2391                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2392
2393                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2394                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2395                         node_txn.truncate(1);
2396                 }
2397                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2398                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2399                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2400
2401                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2402                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2403                 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2404                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2405                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2406                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2407                 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2408                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2409                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2410         }
2411         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2412
2413         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2414         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2415
2416         // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
2417         // Create some new channels:
2418         let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2419         {
2420                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2421                 node_txn.clear();
2422         }
2423
2424         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2425         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2426         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2427         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2428         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2429         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2430         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2431         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2432         // Revoke the old state
2433         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2434         {
2435                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2436                 {
2437                         let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2438                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); //ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2439                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2440
2441                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2442                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2443                 }
2444                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2445                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2446
2447                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2448                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2449                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2450                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2451                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2452                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2453                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2454         }
2455         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2456         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2457         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2458 }
2459
2460 #[test]
2461 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2462         // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2463         // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2464         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2465         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2466         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2467         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2468         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2469         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2470         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2471         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2472         // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2473         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2474         // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2475         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2476
2477         // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2478         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2479         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2480         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2481         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2482         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2483
2484         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2485         check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
2486
2487         // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2488         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2489         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2490         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2491         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2492 }
2493
2494 #[test]
2495 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2496         // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2497         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2498         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2499         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2500         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2501         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2502
2503         // Create some new channel:
2504         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2505
2506         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2507         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2508         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2509         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2510         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2511
2512         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2513         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2514         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2515         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2516         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2517         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2518         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2519         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2520         check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2521
2522         //Revoke the old state
2523         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2524
2525         {
2526                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2527                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2528                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2529                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2530                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2531                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2532                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2533                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2534
2535                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2536                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment
2537
2538                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2539                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2540
2541                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2542                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2543                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2544                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2545                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2546                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2547                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2548                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2549
2550                 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
2551                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2552                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
2553
2554                 // Finally, mine the penalty transaction and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2555                 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2556                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
2557                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2558                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2559         }
2560         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2561         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2562         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2563 }
2564
2565 #[test]
2566 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2567         // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2568         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2569         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2570         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2571         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2572         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2573
2574         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2575
2576         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2577         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2578         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2579         // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2580         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2581         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2582
2583         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2584         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2585
2586         //Revoke the old state
2587         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2588
2589         {
2590                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2591                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2592                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2593                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2594                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2595                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2596                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2597                 match events.last().unwrap() {
2598                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2599                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2600                 }
2601
2602                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2603                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2604
2605                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2606                 assert!(node_txn.len() == 9 || node_txn.len() == 10);
2607
2608                 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2609                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2610                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2611                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2612                 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2613                 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2614                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2615
2616                 // Justice transactions are indices 1-2-4
2617                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2618                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
2619                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
2620
2621                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2622                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2623                 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2624
2625                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2626                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2627                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2628                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2629                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2630                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2631                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2632                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2633
2634                 // Finally, mine the penalty transactions and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2635                 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2636                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[2]);
2637                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[3]);
2638                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[4]);
2639                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2640                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2641         }
2642         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2643         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2644         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2645 }
2646
2647 #[test]
2648 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2649         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2650         // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2651         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2652         // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2653         // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2654         // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2655         // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2656         // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2657         // towards B.
2658         // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2659         // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2660         // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2661         // PaymentSent event).
2662
2663         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2664         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2665         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2666         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2667
2668         // Create some initial channels
2669         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2670         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2671
2672         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2673         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2674         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2675         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2676         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2677
2678         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2679         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2680         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2681
2682         let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2683         let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2684
2685         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2686         // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2687         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2688         assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2689         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2690         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2691         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_1, 3_000_000);
2692         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2693         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, 3_000_000);
2694         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2695         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2696         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2697         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2698         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2699         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2700
2701         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2702         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2703         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2704         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2705         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx, 2*htlc-success tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2706         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5);
2707         assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2708         assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2709         assert_eq!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2710         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2711         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2712         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2713         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2714         assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2715         assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2716         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
2717         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2718
2719         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2720         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2721         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: node_txn});
2722         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2723         {
2724                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2725                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2726                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2727                 added_monitors.clear();
2728         }
2729         let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2730         assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2731         match forwarded_events[0] {
2732                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2733                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2734         }
2735         let chan_id = Some(chan_1.2);
2736         match forwarded_events[1] {
2737                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
2738                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2739                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2740                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2741                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2742                 },
2743                 _ => panic!()
2744         }
2745         match forwarded_events[2] {
2746                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
2747                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2748                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2749                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2750                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2751                 },
2752                 _ => panic!()
2753         }
2754         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2755         {
2756                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2757                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2758                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2759                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2760                 added_monitors.clear();
2761         }
2762         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2763         match events[0] {
2764                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2765                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2766         }
2767         match events[1] {
2768                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2769                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2770         }
2771
2772         match events[2] {
2773                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2774                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2775                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2776                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2777                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2778                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2779                 },
2780                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2781         };
2782         macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2783                 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $chan_tx: expr) => { {
2784                         let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2785                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
2786                         // Node[1]: ChannelManager: 3 (commitment tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (timeout tx)
2787                         // Node[0]: ChannelManager: 3 (commtiemtn tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 HTLC-timeout
2788                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2789                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], $commitment_tx);
2790                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2791                         assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time, 0);
2792                         if $htlc_offered {
2793                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2794                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2795                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2796                                 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2797                         } else {
2798                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2799                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2800                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2801                                 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2802                         }
2803                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], $chan_tx);
2804                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2805                         node_txn.clear();
2806                 } }
2807         }
2808         // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own local state as a fallback, suggesting an alternate
2809         // commitment transaction with a corresponding HTLC-Timeout transactions, as well as a
2810         // timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2811         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2812
2813         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2814         // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx  on A's chain
2815         let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2816         check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2817         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2818         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2819         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2820         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2821         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2822         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 6); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx + HTLC-Sucess * 2), ChannelMonitor : 3 (HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn)
2823         let commitment_spend =
2824                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2825                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2826                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2827                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2828                         &node_txn[0]
2829                 } else {
2830                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2831                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2832                         assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2833                         &node_txn[2]
2834                 };
2835
2836         check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2837         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2838         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2839         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2840         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time, 0);
2841         assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2842         check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3);
2843         assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2844         check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[3]);
2845         check_spends!(node_txn[5], node_txn[3]);
2846         // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
2847         // we already checked the same situation with A.
2848
2849         // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
2850         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2851         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()] });
2852         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2853         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2854         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2855         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2856         assert_eq!(events.len(), 5);
2857         let mut first_claimed = false;
2858         for event in events {
2859                 match event {
2860                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
2861                                 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
2862                                         assert!(!first_claimed);
2863                                         first_claimed = true;
2864                                 } else {
2865                                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
2866                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
2867                                 }
2868                         },
2869                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
2870                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
2871                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2872                 }
2873         }
2874         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2875 }
2876
2877 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
2878         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
2879         // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2880         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2881         // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
2882         //    B's commitment tx                 C's commitment tx
2883         //            \                                  \
2884         //         B's HTLC timeout tx               B's timeout tx
2885
2886         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2887         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2888         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2889         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2890         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2891         *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2892         *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2893
2894         // Create some intial channels
2895         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2896         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2897
2898         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
2899         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2900         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2901
2902         let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2903
2904         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2905         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2906         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2907         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
2908         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
2909         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }]);
2910         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2911
2912         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2913         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2914         match events[0] {
2915                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2916                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2917                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2918                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2919                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2920                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2921                 },
2922                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2923         };
2924         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2925         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2926         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2927         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2928         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx)
2929         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2930         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2931         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2932
2933         // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2934         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
2935         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2936         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
2937         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2938         let timeout_tx;
2939         {
2940                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2941                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-timeout), 1 timeout tx
2942                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2943                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2944
2945                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2946                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2947
2948                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2949                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2950                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2951                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2952
2953                 timeout_tx = node_txn[2].clone();
2954                 node_txn.clear();
2955         }
2956
2957         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
2958         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2959         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2960         {
2961                 // B will rebroadcast a fee-bumped timeout transaction here.
2962                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2963                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2964                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2965         }
2966
2967         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2968         {
2969                 // B may rebroadcast its own holder commitment transaction here, as a safeguard against
2970                 // some incredibly unlikely partial-eclipse-attack scenarios. That said, because the
2971                 // original commitment_tx[0] (also spending chan_2.3) has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY B really
2972                 // shouldn't broadcast anything here, and in some connect style scenarios we do not.
2973                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2974                 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
2975                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2976                 } else {
2977                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
2978                 }
2979         }
2980
2981         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
2982         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2983         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2984         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2985         match events[0] {
2986                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2987                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2988                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2989                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2990                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2991                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2992                 },
2993                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2994         };
2995
2996         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
2997         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2998         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2999
3000         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
3001         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
3002
3003         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3004         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3005         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3006         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 commitment tx, ChannelMonitor : 1 timeout tx
3007         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
3008         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
3009         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
3010         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
3011         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3012 }
3013
3014 #[test]
3015 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
3016         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
3017         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
3018         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
3019 }
3020
3021 #[test]
3022 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
3023         // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
3024         // and fail backward accordingly.
3025
3026         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3027         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3028         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3029         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3030
3031         // Create some initial channels
3032         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3033         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3034
3035         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3036         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3037         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3038         // Revoke the old state
3039         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3040
3041         let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3042
3043         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3044         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3045         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3046         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3047         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3048
3049         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
3050         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3051         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3052         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3053         match events[0] {
3054                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3055                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3056                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3057                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3058                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3059                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3060
3061                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3062                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3063                         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
3064                 },
3065                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3066         }
3067 }
3068
3069 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
3070         // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
3071         // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
3072         // commitment transaction anymore.
3073         // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
3074         // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
3075         // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
3076         // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
3077         // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
3078         // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
3079         // transactions:
3080         // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
3081         //   commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
3082         // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
3083         //   and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
3084         //   commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
3085         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3086         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3087         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3088         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3089
3090         // Create some initial channels
3091         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3092         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3093
3094         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
3095         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3096         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3097         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
3098         // Revoke the old state
3099         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3100
3101         let value = if use_dust {
3102                 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
3103                 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
3104                 nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
3105         } else { 3000000 };
3106
3107         let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3108         let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3109         let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3110
3111         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash);
3112         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: first_payment_hash }]);
3113         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3114         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3115         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3116         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3117         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3118         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3119         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3120         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3121         let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
3122         // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
3123
3124         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash);
3125         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: second_payment_hash }]);
3126         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3127         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3128         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3129         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3130         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3131         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3132         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3133         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3134         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3135         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3136         // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3137         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3138         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3139         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3140
3141         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash);
3142         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: third_payment_hash }]);
3143         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3144         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3145         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3146         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3147         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3148         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3149         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3150         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3151         // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3152         // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3153         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3154         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3155         // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3156         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3157         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3158         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3159
3160         // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3161         // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3162         let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3163         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, fourth_payment_hash, &Some(fourth_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3164         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3165         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3166         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3167
3168         if deliver_bs_raa {
3169                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3170                 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3171                 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3172                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3173                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3174                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3175                 match events[0] {
3176                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3177                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3178                 };
3179                 match events[1] {
3180                         Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { .. } => { },
3181                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3182                 }
3183                 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3184                 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3185         }
3186
3187         let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
3188         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3189
3190         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3191         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3192         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3193         assert!(ANTI_REORG_DELAY > PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS); // We assume payments will also expire
3194
3195         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3196         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 2 + (nodes.len() - 1) } else { 4 + nodes.len() });
3197         match events[0] {
3198                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
3199                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
3200         }
3201         match events[1] {
3202                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3203                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3204                 },
3205                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3206         }
3207         if !deliver_bs_raa {
3208                 match events[2] {
3209                         Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3210                                 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3211                         },
3212                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3213                 }
3214                 match events[3] {
3215                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3216                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3217                 };
3218         }
3219         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3220         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3221
3222         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3223         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3224         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 1 } else { 0 }] {
3225                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3226                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3227         }
3228         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 1 }] {
3229                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
3230                         assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3231                         assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3232                 },
3233                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3234         }
3235         if deliver_bs_raa {
3236                 match events[0] {
3237                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3238                                 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3239                                 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3240                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3241                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3242                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3243                         },
3244                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3245                 }
3246         }
3247         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 3 } else { 2 }] {
3248                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3249                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3250                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3251                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3252                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3253                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3254
3255                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3256                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3257                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3258
3259                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3260
3261                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3262                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3263                         match events[0] {
3264                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3265                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3266                                         // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3267                                         // that we should update our routing table for.
3268                                         if !deliver_bs_raa {
3269                                                 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3270                                         }
3271                                 },
3272                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3273                         }
3274                         match events[1] {
3275                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3276                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3277                                         assert!(network_update.is_some());
3278                                 },
3279                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3280                         }
3281                         match events[2] {
3282                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3283                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3284                                         assert!(network_update.is_some());
3285                                 },
3286                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3287                         }
3288                 },
3289                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3290         }
3291
3292         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3293         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3294         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3295 }
3296
3297 #[test]
3298 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3299         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3300         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3301         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3302         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3303 }
3304
3305 #[test]
3306 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3307         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3308         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3309         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3310         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3311 }
3312
3313 #[test]
3314 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3315         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3316         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3317         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3318         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3319         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3320
3321         // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3322         {
3323                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3324                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
3325                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3326
3327                 let payment_event = {
3328                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3329                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3330                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3331                 };
3332                 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3333                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3334         }
3335
3336         // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3337         let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3338         {
3339                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, failed_payment_hash, &Some(failed_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3340                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3341
3342                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3343         }
3344
3345         // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3346         {
3347                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3348
3349                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3350                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3351                 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3352                 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 50_000, &Some(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3353                 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3354                 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
3355
3356                 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3357                 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3358                         channel_id: chan.2,
3359                         htlc_id: 0,
3360                         amount_msat: 0,
3361                         payment_hash,
3362                         cltv_expiry,
3363                         onion_routing_packet,
3364                 };
3365                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3366         }
3367         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3368         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3369         // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3370         match events[0] {
3371                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3372                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3373                 },
3374                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3375         }
3376         match events[1] {
3377                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3378                         assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3379                 },
3380                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3381         }
3382         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3383         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3384 }
3385
3386 #[test]
3387 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3388         // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3389         // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3390         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3391         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3392         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3393         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3394         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3395
3396         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3397         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3398         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3399         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3400         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3401         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3402
3403         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
3404         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3405         assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
3406
3407         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3408         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
3409         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3410         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3411         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3412
3413         // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3414         // registering new transactions
3415         header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
3416         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
3417 }
3418
3419 #[test]
3420 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3421         // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3422         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3423         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3424         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3425         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3426         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3427         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3428
3429         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3430
3431         let mut payment_event = {
3432                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3433                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3434
3435                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3436                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3437                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3438         };
3439
3440         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3441         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3442
3443         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3444
3445         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3446         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3447         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3448         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3449
3450         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3451         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3452         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3453         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3454         let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3455
3456         // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3457         // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3458         // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3459
3460         nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3461         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3462         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3463         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3464         let tx = {
3465                 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3466                 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3467                 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3468                 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3469                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3470                 node_txn.remove(0)
3471         };
3472
3473         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3474
3475         // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3476         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3477         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3478         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3479
3480         // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3481         {
3482                 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3483                         .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator), &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3484         }
3485         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3486         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3487         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3488         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3489         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3490         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3491         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3492
3493         check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3494 }
3495
3496 #[test]
3497 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3498         // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3499         // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3500         // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3501         // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3502
3503         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3504         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3505         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3506         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3507         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3508
3509         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
3510
3511         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
3512         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_000_000);
3513         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3514         let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3515         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3516         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
3517
3518         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3519         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3520
3521         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3522         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3523 }
3524
3525 #[test]
3526 fn test_peer_disconnected_before_funding_broadcasted() {
3527         // Test that channels are closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` if the peer disconnects
3528         // before the funding transaction has been broadcasted.
3529         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3530         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3531         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3532         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3533
3534         // Open a channel between `nodes[0]` and `nodes[1]`, for which the funding transaction is never
3535         // broadcasted, even though it's created by `nodes[0]`.
3536         let expected_temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
3537         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3538         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
3539         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3540         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
3541
3542         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
3543         assert_eq!(temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3544
3545         assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
3546
3547         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3548         assert_eq!(funding_created_msg.temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3549
3550         // Even though the funding transaction is created by `nodes[0]`, the `FundingCreated` msg is
3551         // never sent to `nodes[1]`, and therefore the tx is never signed by either party nor
3552         // broadcasted.
3553         {
3554                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3555         }
3556
3557         // Ensure that the channel is closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` when the peers are
3558         // disconnected before the funding transaction was broadcasted.
3559         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3560         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3561
3562         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3563         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3564 }
3565
3566 #[test]
3567 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3568         // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3569         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3570         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3571         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3572         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3573         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3574         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3575
3576         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3577         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3578         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3579
3580         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3581         let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3582         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3583         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3584
3585         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3586         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3587         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3588
3589         let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3590         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3591         let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3592         let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3593
3594         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3595         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3596
3597         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3598         fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3599
3600         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
3601         {
3602                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3603                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3604                 match events[0] {
3605                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3606                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3607                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3608                         },
3609                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3610                 }
3611                 match events[1] {
3612                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
3613                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3614                                 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
3615                         },
3616                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3617                 }
3618                 match events[2] {
3619                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3620                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3621                 }
3622         }
3623
3624         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3625         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3626 }
3627
3628 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3629         // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3630         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3631         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3632         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3633         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3634
3635         let mut as_channel_ready = None;
3636         if messages_delivered == 0 {
3637                 let (channel_ready, _, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3638                 as_channel_ready = Some(channel_ready);
3639                 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the channel_ready message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3640                 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3641                 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3642         } else {
3643                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3644         }
3645
3646         let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1_000_000);
3647
3648         let payment_event = {
3649                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
3650                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3651
3652                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3653                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3654                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3655         };
3656         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3657
3658         if messages_delivered < 2 {
3659                 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3660         } else {
3661                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3662                 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3663                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3664                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3665                         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3666
3667                         if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3668                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3669                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3670                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3671
3672                                 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3673                                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3674                                         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3675                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3676                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3677
3678                                         if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3679                                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3680                                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3681                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3682                                         }
3683                                 }
3684                         }
3685                 }
3686         }
3687
3688         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3689         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3690         if messages_delivered < 3 {
3691                 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3692                         // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a channel_ready prior to a
3693                         // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to channel_ready time.
3694                         //
3695                         // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a channel_ready immediately on
3696                         // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate channel_ready sent
3697                         // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3698                         //
3699                         // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3700                         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3701                 }
3702                 // Even if the channel_ready messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3703                 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3704                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3705         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3706                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3707                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3708         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3709                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3710                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3711         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3712                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3713                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3714         } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3715                 // Everything was delivered...
3716                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3717         }
3718
3719         let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3720         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3721         match events_1[0] {
3722                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3723                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3724         };
3725
3726         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3727         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3728         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3729
3730         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3731
3732         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3733         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3734         match events_2[0] {
3735                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat } => {
3736                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3737                         assert_eq!(amount_msat, 1_000_000);
3738                         match &purpose {
3739                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3740                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3741                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3742                                 },
3743                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3744                         }
3745                 },
3746                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3747         }
3748
3749         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3750         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3751         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
3752
3753         let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3754         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3755         let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3756                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3757                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3758                         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3759                         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3760                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3761                         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3762                         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3763                         (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3764                 },
3765                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3766         };
3767
3768         if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3769                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3770
3771                 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3772                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3773                 match events_4[0] {
3774                         Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3775                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3776                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3777                         },
3778                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3779                 }
3780
3781                 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3782                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3783                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3784                         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3785
3786                         if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3787                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3788                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3789                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3790
3791                                 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3792                                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3793                                         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3794                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3795                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3796
3797                                         if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3798                                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3799                                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3800                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3801                                         }
3802                                 }
3803                         }
3804                 }
3805         }
3806
3807         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3808         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3809         if messages_delivered < 2 {
3810                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3811                 if messages_delivered < 1 {
3812                         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
3813                 } else {
3814                         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3815                 }
3816         } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
3817                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3818                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3819         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3820                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3821                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3822         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3823                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3824                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3825         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3826                 // Everything was delivered...
3827                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3828         }
3829
3830         if messages_delivered == 1 || messages_delivered == 2 {
3831                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3832         }
3833
3834         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3835         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3836         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3837
3838         if messages_delivered > 2 {
3839                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3840         }
3841
3842         // Channel should still work fine...
3843         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3844         let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3845         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3846 }
3847
3848 #[test]
3849 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
3850         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
3851         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
3852         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
3853         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
3854 }
3855
3856 #[test]
3857 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
3858         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
3859         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
3860         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
3861         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
3862 }
3863
3864 #[test]
3865 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
3866         // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
3867         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3868         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3869         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3870         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
3871         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
3872         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
3873         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3874         let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3875
3876         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3877         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3878
3879         confirm_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
3880         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3881         assert!(events_1.is_empty());
3882
3883         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3884
3885         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3886         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3887
3888         confirm_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3889         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3890         assert!(events_2.is_empty());
3891
3892         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
3893         let as_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3894         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
3895         let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3896
3897         // nodes[0] hasn't yet received a channel_ready, so it only sends that on reconnect.
3898         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
3899         let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3900         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3901         let as_channel_ready = match events_3[0] {
3902                 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3903                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3904                         msg.clone()
3905                 },
3906                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_3[0]),
3907         };
3908
3909         // nodes[1] received nodes[0]'s channel_ready on the first reconnect above, so it should send
3910         // announcement_signatures as well as channel_update.
3911         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish);
3912         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3913         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 3);
3914         let chan_id;
3915         let bs_channel_ready = match events_4[0] {
3916                 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3917                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3918                         chan_id = msg.channel_id;
3919                         msg.clone()
3920                 },
3921                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[0]),
3922         };
3923         let bs_announcement_sigs = match events_4[1] {
3924                 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3925                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3926                         msg.clone()
3927                 },
3928                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[1]),
3929         };
3930         match events_4[2] {
3931                 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
3932                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3933                 },
3934                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[2]),
3935         }
3936
3937         // Re-deliver nodes[0]'s channel_ready, which nodes[1] can safely ignore. It currently
3938         // generates a duplicative private channel_update
3939         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
3940         let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3941         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
3942         match events_5[0] {
3943                 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
3944                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3945                 },
3946                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_5[0]),
3947         };
3948
3949         // When we deliver nodes[1]'s channel_ready, however, nodes[0] will generate its
3950         // announcement_signatures.
3951         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_channel_ready);
3952         let events_6 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3953         assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
3954         let as_announcement_sigs = match events_6[0] {
3955                 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3956                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3957                         msg.clone()
3958                 },
3959                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_6[0]),
3960         };
3961
3962         // When we deliver nodes[1]'s announcement_signatures to nodes[0], nodes[0] should immediately
3963         // broadcast the channel announcement globally, as well as re-send its (now-public)
3964         // channel_update.
3965         nodes[0].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs);
3966         let events_7 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3967         assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
3968         let (chan_announcement, as_update) = match events_7[0] {
3969                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3970                         (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
3971                 },
3972                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_7[0]),
3973         };
3974
3975         // Finally, deliver nodes[0]'s announcement_signatures to nodes[1] and make sure it creates the
3976         // same channel_announcement.
3977         nodes[1].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs);
3978         let events_8 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3979         assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
3980         let bs_update = match events_8[0] {
3981                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3982                         assert_eq!(*msg, chan_announcement);
3983                         update_msg.clone()
3984                 },
3985                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_8[0]),
3986         };
3987
3988         // Provide the channel announcement and public updates to the network graph
3989         nodes[0].gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap();
3990         nodes[0].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
3991         nodes[0].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
3992
3993         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3994         let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3995         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
3996
3997         // Check that after deserialization and reconnection we can still generate an identical
3998         // channel_announcement from the cached signatures.
3999         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4000
4001         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4002         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4003         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4004
4005         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4006         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4007         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[0].logger, node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4008         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4009         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4010         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4011                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4012         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4013
4014         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4015         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4016                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4017                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4018                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4019                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4020                         keys_manager,
4021                         fee_estimator: node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator,
4022                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4023                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4024                         logger: nodes[0].logger,
4025                         channel_monitors,
4026                 }).unwrap()
4027         };
4028         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4029         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4030
4031         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4032         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4033         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4034
4035         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4036
4037         // The channel announcement should be re-generated exactly by broadcast_node_announcement.
4038         nodes[0].node.broadcast_node_announcement([0, 0, 0], [0; 32], Vec::new());
4039         let msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4040         let mut found_announcement = false;
4041         for event in msgs.iter() {
4042                 match event {
4043                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, .. } => {
4044                                 if *msg == chan_announcement { found_announcement = true; }
4045                         },
4046                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => {},
4047                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4048                 }
4049         }
4050         assert!(found_announcement);
4051 }
4052
4053 #[test]
4054 fn test_channel_ready_without_best_block_updated() {
4055         // Previously, if we were offline when a funding transaction was locked in, and then we came
4056         // back online, calling best_block_updated once followed by transactions_confirmed, we'd not
4057         // generate a channel_ready until a later best_block_updated. This tests that we generate the
4058         // channel_ready immediately instead.
4059         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4060         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4061         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4062         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4063         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
4064
4065         let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4066
4067         let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
4068         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
4069         let block_txn = [funding_tx];
4070         let conf_txn: Vec<_> = block_txn.iter().enumerate().collect();
4071         let conf_block_header = nodes[0].get_block_header(conf_height);
4072         nodes[0].node.transactions_confirmed(&conf_block_header, &conf_txn[..], conf_height);
4073
4074         // Ensure nodes[0] generates a channel_ready after the transactions_confirmed
4075         let as_channel_ready = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4076         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
4077 }
4078
4079 #[test]
4080 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
4081         // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
4082         // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
4083         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4084         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4085         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4086         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4087         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4088
4089         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
4090
4091         // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
4092         let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
4093         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
4094         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4095
4096         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4097         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4098         match events_1[0] {
4099                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4100                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4101         }
4102
4103         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
4104         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
4105         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4106
4107         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4108         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4109         match events_2[0] {
4110                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4111                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4112                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4113                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4114                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4115                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4116                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4117
4118                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4119                         let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4120                         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
4121                         match events_3[0] {
4122                                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
4123                                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
4124                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
4125                                 },
4126                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4127                         }
4128
4129                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
4130                         let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4131                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4132                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4133                 },
4134                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4135         }
4136
4137         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4138         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4139
4140         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4141         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4142         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
4143         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4144         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4145         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
4146
4147         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4148         let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4149         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4150         let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4151
4152         assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
4153         assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
4154
4155         assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
4156         assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
4157
4158         assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
4159
4160         assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4161         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4162         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4163         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4164         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
4165         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
4166         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
4167         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4168         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4169         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4170
4171         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
4172         let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4173         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4174         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4175         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4176         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4177         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4178         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4179
4180         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
4181         let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4182         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4183         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4184         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4185         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4186         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4187         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4188
4189         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4190         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4191         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4192         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4193
4194         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4195         let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4196         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4197         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4198
4199         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
4200         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4201         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4202
4203         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4204
4205         let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4206         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
4207         match events_5[0] {
4208                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
4209                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
4210                         match &purpose {
4211                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
4212                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
4213                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
4214                                 },
4215                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
4216                         }
4217                 },
4218                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4219         }
4220
4221         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
4222         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4223         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4224
4225         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4226         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4227 }
4228
4229 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
4230         // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
4231         // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
4232         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4233         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4234         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4235         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4236
4237         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4238
4239         let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
4240                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
4241                 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
4242                 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
4243                 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
4244                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
4245                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
4246                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4247                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4248                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4249                 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
4250                 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentReceived event(s).
4251                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
4252                 our_payment_hash
4253         } else {
4254                 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
4255         };
4256
4257         let mut block = Block {
4258                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
4259                 txdata: vec![],
4260         };
4261         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4262         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4263         let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4264         for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
4265                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
4266                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4267                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4268         }
4269
4270         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
4271
4272         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4273         let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4274         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4275         assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4276         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4277         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4278
4279         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4280         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4281         // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4282         let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(100_000).to_vec();
4283         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(block_count - 1));
4284         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4285 }
4286
4287 #[test]
4288 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4289         do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4290         do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4291 }
4292
4293 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4294         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4295         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4296         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4297         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4298         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4299         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4300         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4301
4302         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4303         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4304         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4305         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4306
4307         // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4308         let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4309         {
4310                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, first_payment_hash, &Some(first_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4311         }
4312         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4313         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4314
4315         // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4316         let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4317         let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4318         sending_node.node.send_payment(&route, second_payment_hash, &Some(second_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4319         if forwarded_htlc {
4320                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4321                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4322                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4323                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4324                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4325         }
4326         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4327
4328         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4329         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4330         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4331         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4332
4333         if forwarded_htlc {
4334                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
4335                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4336                 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4337                 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4338                 match fail_commit[0] {
4339                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4340                                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4341                                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4342                         },
4343                         _ => unreachable!(),
4344                 }
4345                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4346         } else {
4347                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4348                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4349                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[0] {
4350                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
4351                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
4352                 if let Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[1] {
4353                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
4354                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
4355         }
4356 }
4357
4358 #[test]
4359 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4360         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4361         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4362 }
4363
4364 #[test]
4365 fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4366         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4367         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4368         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4369         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4370         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4371         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4372         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4373         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4374         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4375
4376         let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4377
4378         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4379
4380         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4381         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4382         get_monitor!(nodes[0], OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id())
4383                 .write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4384
4385         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4386         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4387         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4388         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4389         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4390         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4391         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4392         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4393                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4394         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4395
4396         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4397         let config = UserConfig::default();
4398         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4399                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4400                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4401                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4402                         default_config: config,
4403                         keys_manager,
4404                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4405                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4406                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4407                         logger: &logger,
4408                         channel_monitors,
4409                 }).unwrap()
4410         };
4411         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4412         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4413
4414         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4415         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4416         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4417         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4418
4419         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4420         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4421         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4422         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4423
4424         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4425         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4426         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4427         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4428
4429         let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4430         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
4431         for node in nodes.iter() {
4432                 assert!(node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4433                 node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4434                 node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4435         }
4436
4437         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4438 }
4439
4440 #[test]
4441 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_events() {
4442         // This test makes sure the events field in ChannelManager survives de/serialization
4443         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4444         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4445         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4446         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4447         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4448         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4449         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4450         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4451         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4452
4453         // Start creating a channel, but stop right before broadcasting the funding transaction
4454         let channel_value = 100000;
4455         let push_msat = 10001;
4456         let a_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4457         let b_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4458         let node_a = nodes.remove(0);
4459         let node_b = nodes.remove(0);
4460         node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
4461         node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), a_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4462         node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), b_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id()));
4463
4464         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&node_a, &node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, 42);
4465
4466         node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
4467         check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
4468
4469         node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4470         {
4471                 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4472                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4473                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4474                 added_monitors.clear();
4475         }
4476
4477         let bs_funding_signed = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
4478         node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_funding_signed);
4479         {
4480                 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4481                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4482                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4483                 added_monitors.clear();
4484         }
4485         // Normally, this is where node_a would broadcast the funding transaction, but the test de/serializes first instead
4486
4487         nodes.push(node_a);
4488         nodes.push(node_b);
4489
4490         // Start the de/seriailization process mid-channel creation to check that the channel manager will hold onto events that are serialized
4491         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4492         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4493         get_monitor!(nodes[0], bs_funding_signed.channel_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4494
4495         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4496         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4497         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4498         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4499         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4500         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4501         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4502         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4503                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4504         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4505
4506         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4507         let config = UserConfig::default();
4508         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4509                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4510                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4511                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4512                         default_config: config,
4513                         keys_manager,
4514                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4515                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4516                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4517                         logger: &logger,
4518                         channel_monitors,
4519                 }).unwrap()
4520         };
4521         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4522         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4523
4524         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4525
4526         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4527         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4528
4529         // After deserializing, make sure the funding_transaction is still held by the channel manager
4530         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4531         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
4532         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4533         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
4534
4535         // Make sure the channel is functioning as though the de/serialization never happened
4536         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4537         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4538
4539         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4540         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4541         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4542         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4543
4544         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4545         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4546         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4547         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4548
4549         let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4550         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
4551         for node in nodes.iter() {
4552                 assert!(node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4553                 node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4554                 node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4555         }
4556
4557         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4558 }
4559
4560 #[test]
4561 fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4562         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4563         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4564         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4565         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4566         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4567         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4568         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4569         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4570         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4571         let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4572
4573         let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4574         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4575
4576         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4577
4578         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4579         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4580         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4581
4582         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4583         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4584         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4585         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4586         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4587         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4588         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4589         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4590                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4591         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4592
4593         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4594         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4595                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4596                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4597                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4598                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4599                         keys_manager,
4600                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4601                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4602                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4603                         logger: &logger,
4604                         channel_monitors,
4605                 }).unwrap()
4606         };
4607         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4608         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4609
4610         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4611         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4612         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4613
4614         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4615
4616         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
4617         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4618 }
4619
4620 #[test]
4621 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
4622         // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with an out-of-date ChannelMonitor
4623         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4624         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4625         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
4626         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4627         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4628         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4629         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4630         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4631         let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4632         let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4633         let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4634         let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4635
4636         let mut node_0_stale_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4637         for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4638                 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4639                 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4640                 node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4641         }
4642
4643         let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
4644
4645         // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
4646         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4647
4648         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
4649         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4650         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4651         nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4652
4653         // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
4654         // nodes[3])
4655         let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4656         for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4657                 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4658                 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4659                 node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4660         }
4661
4662         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4663         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4664         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4665         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4666         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4667         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4668
4669
4670         let mut node_0_stale_monitors = Vec::new();
4671         for serialized in node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4672                 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4673                 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4674                 assert!(read.is_empty());
4675                 node_0_stale_monitors.push(monitor);
4676         }
4677
4678         let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
4679         for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4680                 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4681                 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4682                 assert!(read.is_empty());
4683                 node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
4684         }
4685
4686         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4687         if let Err(msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue) =
4688                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4689                 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4690                 keys_manager,
4691                 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4692                 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4693                 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4694                 logger: &logger,
4695                 channel_monitors: node_0_stale_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4696         }) { } else {
4697                 panic!("If the monitor(s) are stale, this indicates a bug and we should get an Err return");
4698         };
4699
4700         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4701         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) =
4702                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4703                 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4704                 keys_manager,
4705                 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4706                 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4707                 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4708                 logger: &logger,
4709                 channel_monitors: node_0_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4710         }).unwrap();
4711         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4712         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4713
4714         { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx
4715                 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4716                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
4717                 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
4718                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
4719         }
4720
4721         for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
4722                 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor).is_ok());
4723                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4724         }
4725         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4726         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
4727
4728         // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
4729         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4730         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4731         //... and we can even still claim the payment!
4732         claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4733
4734         nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4735         let reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[3], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4736         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4737         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish);
4738         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4739         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
4740         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
4741                 match action {
4742                         &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
4743                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
4744                         },
4745                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
4746                 }
4747         }
4748 }
4749
4750 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4751         ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4752                 {
4753                         let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4754                         let mut txn = Vec::new();
4755                         let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4756                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4757                         for event in events.drain(..) {
4758                                 match event {
4759                                         Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs } => {
4760                                                 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4761                                                         txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4762                                                         all_outputs.push(outp);
4763                                                 }
4764                                         },
4765                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4766                                 };
4767                         }
4768                         if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4769                                 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx) {
4770                                         txn.push(tx);
4771                                 }
4772                         }
4773                         txn
4774                 }
4775         }
4776 }
4777
4778 #[test]
4779 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4780         // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4781         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4782         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4783         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4784         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4785
4786         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4787         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4788         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4789         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4790         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4791         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4792         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4793         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4794         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4795
4796         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4797         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4798
4799         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4800         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4801         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4802         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4803         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4804 }
4805
4806 #[test]
4807 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4808         // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4809         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4810         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4811         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4812         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4813         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4814
4815         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4816         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4817         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4818         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4819         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4820
4821         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4822         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4823         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4824         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4825
4826         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4827         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4828         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4829         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4830         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4831
4832         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4833         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4834         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4835 }
4836
4837 #[test]
4838 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4839         // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4840         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4841
4842         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4843         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4844         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4845         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4846
4847         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4848         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4849         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4850         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4851         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4852
4853         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4854         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4855         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4856         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4857         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4858
4859         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4860         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4861         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4862
4863         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4864         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4865         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4866         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4867         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4868 }
4869
4870 #[test]
4871 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4872         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4873         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4874         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4875         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4876
4877         // Create some initial channels
4878         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4879
4880         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
4881
4882         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4883         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4884         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4885
4886         // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4887         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4888         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4889         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4890         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4891         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4892         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4893         match events[0] {
4894                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4895                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4896         }
4897         match events[1] {
4898                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4899                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4900         }
4901
4902         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4903         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-Success), ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4904         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4905         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4906         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4907         check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
4908         check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
4909
4910         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4911         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4912         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4913
4914         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4915         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4916         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4917 }
4918
4919 #[test]
4920 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4921         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4922         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4923         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4924         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4925
4926         // Create some initial channels
4927         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4928
4929         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4930         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4931
4932         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4933
4934         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4935         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4936         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4937
4938         // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4939         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4940         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4941         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4942         match events[0] {
4943                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4944                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4945         }
4946         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4947
4948         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4949         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4950         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelManager : 1 local commitent tx, ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4951         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
4952         check_spends!(node_txn[1],  commitment_tx[0].clone());
4953         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4954
4955         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4956         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4957         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4958         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, true);
4959
4960         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4961         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4962         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4963         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]);
4964         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4965 }
4966
4967 #[test]
4968 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4969         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4970         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4971         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4972         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4973
4974         // Create some initial channels
4975         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4976
4977         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4978         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4979         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4980         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4981
4982         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4983
4984         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4985         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4986         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4987         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4988
4989         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4990         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
4991         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4992         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4993
4994         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4995         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4996
4997         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4998         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4999         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
5000 }
5001
5002 #[test]
5003 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5004         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5005         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
5006         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5007         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5008         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5009
5010         // Create some initial channels
5011         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5012
5013         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5014         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5015         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5016         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
5017
5018         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
5019
5020         // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
5021         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
5022         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5023         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5024         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5025         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5026
5027         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
5028         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
5029         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5030         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5031         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5032         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
5033         assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].lock_time, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
5034
5035         // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
5036         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5037         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()] });
5038         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5039         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5040         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5041
5042         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5043         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5044         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
5045         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
5046         // transactions next...
5047         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
5048         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
5049
5050         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
5051         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
5052         if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid() {
5053                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5054         } else {
5055                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid());
5056                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5057         }
5058
5059         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5060         check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
5061
5062         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
5063         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5064
5065         // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
5066         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5067         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5068         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5069         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
5070 }
5071
5072 #[test]
5073 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
5074         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5075         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
5076         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5077         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5078         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5079
5080         // Create some initial channels
5081         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5082
5083         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5084         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5085         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5086         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
5087
5088         // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
5089         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
5090
5091         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
5092
5093         // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
5094         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
5095         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5096         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5097         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5098         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5099
5100         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
5101         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5102         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5103         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
5104
5105         // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
5106         let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
5107         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
5108
5109         // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
5110         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5111         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
5112         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5113         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5114         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5115
5116         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5117         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5118
5119         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
5120         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
5121         // transactions next...
5122         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
5123         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
5124         if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
5125                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5126         } else {
5127                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
5128                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5129         }
5130
5131         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5132         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
5133
5134         check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
5135
5136         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
5137         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5138
5139         // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
5140         // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
5141
5142         // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
5143         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5144         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5145         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5146         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
5147         assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5148         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
5149         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
5150 }
5151
5152 #[test]
5153 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
5154         // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
5155         // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
5156         // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
5157         // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
5158         // channel.
5159         // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
5160         // gets broadcast.
5161
5162         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5163         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5164         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5165         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5166
5167         // Create some initial channels
5168         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5169         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5170
5171         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5172         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5173         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5174         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5175         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5176
5177         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
5178         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
5179         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
5180
5181         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
5182         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5183         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
5184         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5185         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
5186         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5187         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5188         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5189         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5190         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5191         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5192
5193         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
5194         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5195         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5196         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5197
5198         let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Success tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
5199         assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 3);
5200         assert_eq!(c_txn[0], c_txn[2]);
5201         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0], c_txn[1]);
5202         check_spends!(c_txn[1], chan_2.3);
5203         check_spends!(c_txn[2], c_txn[1]);
5204         assert_eq!(c_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
5205         assert_eq!(c_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5206         assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
5207         assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
5208
5209         // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
5210         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
5211         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![c_txn[1].clone(), c_txn[2].clone()]});
5212         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5213         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5214         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5215         match events[0] {
5216                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5217                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5218         }
5219         match events[1] {
5220                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
5221                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
5222                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, Some(chan_1.2));
5223                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
5224                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
5225                 },
5226                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5227         }
5228         {
5229                 let mut b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5230                 // ChannelMonitor: claim tx
5231                 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
5232                 check_spends!(b_txn[0], chan_2.3); // B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
5233                 b_txn.clear();
5234         }
5235         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5236         let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5237         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
5238         match msg_events[0] {
5239                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5240                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5241         }
5242         match msg_events[1] {
5243                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
5244                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5245         }
5246         match msg_events[2] {
5247                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
5248                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5249                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5250                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5251                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5252                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
5253                 },
5254                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5255         };
5256         // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
5257         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5258         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
5259         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5260         let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5261         // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success tx
5262         assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 3);
5263         check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_1.3);
5264         check_spends!(b_txn[2], b_txn[1]);
5265         check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
5266         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5267         assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
5268         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
5269
5270         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5271         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5272 }
5273
5274 #[test]
5275 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
5276         // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
5277         // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
5278         // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
5279         // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
5280         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
5281         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
5282         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5283         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5284         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5285         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5286         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
5287                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5288         let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5289
5290         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5291         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5292         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5293
5294         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5295         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5296         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5297         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5298         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
5299
5300         let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 900_000);
5301
5302         let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
5303         // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
5304         // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
5305         // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
5306         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id())
5307                 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
5308         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], payment_params, 900000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40);
5309         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 900000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
5310
5311         let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5312         assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5313         check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5314
5315         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
5316         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5317         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5318         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5319         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5320
5321         let htlc_timeout_tx;
5322         { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
5323                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5324                 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 2-or-3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5325                 assert!(node_txn.len() == 4 || node_txn.len() == 3);
5326                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5327
5328                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5329                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5330
5331                 if node_txn.len() > 3 {
5332                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5333                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5334                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
5335
5336                         check_spends!(node_txn[3], commitment_txn[0]);
5337                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
5338                 } else {
5339                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5340                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
5341                 }
5342
5343                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5344                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5345                 if node_txn.len() > 3 {
5346                         assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5347                 }
5348                 htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[1].clone();
5349         }
5350
5351         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
5352         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], duplicate_payment_hash, 900_000);
5353
5354         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
5355         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
5356         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5357         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5358         match events[0] {
5359                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5360                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5361         }
5362         match events[1] {
5363                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5364                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5365         }
5366         let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5367         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs), ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
5368         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
5369         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5370         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5371         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5372         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5373         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5374         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5375         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5376         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[3], htlc_success_txn[0]);
5377         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[4], htlc_success_txn[1]);
5378         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
5379
5380         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
5381         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5382         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
5383         let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5384         assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5385         assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5386         let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
5387         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5388         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5389         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5390
5391         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5392         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5393         {
5394                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5395         }
5396         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
5397
5398         // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
5399         // Note that the fee paid is effectively double as the HTLC value (including the nodes[1] fee
5400         // and nodes[2] fee) is rounded down and then claimed in full.
5401         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[0]);
5402         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], Some(196*2), true, true);
5403         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5404         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5405         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5406         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5407         assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
5408         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5409         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5410
5411         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5412         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
5413
5414         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5415         match events[0] {
5416                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5417                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
5418                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
5419                 }
5420                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5421         }
5422 }
5423
5424 #[test]
5425 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
5426         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5427         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5428         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5429         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5430
5431         // Create some initial channels
5432         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5433
5434         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
5435         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5436         assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
5437         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5438         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5439
5440         // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
5441         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5442         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
5443         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5444
5445         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
5446         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5447         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5448         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5449         match events[0] {
5450                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5451                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5452         }
5453         match events[1] {
5454                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5455                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5456         }
5457         let node_tx = {
5458                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5459                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5460                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
5461                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5462                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5463                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5464                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5465                 node_txn[0].clone()
5466         };
5467
5468         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
5469         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5470
5471         // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5472         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5473         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5474         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5475         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
5476         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5477 }
5478
5479 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
5480         // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
5481         // unrevoked commitment transaction.
5482         // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
5483         // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
5484         // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
5485         // use the same payment hashes.
5486         // Thus, we use a six-node network:
5487         //
5488         // A \         / E
5489         //    - C - D -
5490         // B /         \ F
5491         // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
5492         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
5493         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
5494         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5495         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5496         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5497         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5498         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
5499                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5500         let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5501
5502         let _chan_0_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5503         let _chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5504         let chan_2_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5505         let chan_3_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5506         let chan_3_5  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5507
5508         // Rebalance and check output sanity...
5509         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
5510         send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
5511         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
5512
5513         let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2_3.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5514         // 0th HTLC:
5515         let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5516         // 1st HTLC:
5517         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5518         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5519         // 2nd HTLC:
5520         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5521         // 3rd HTLC:
5522         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5523         // 4th HTLC:
5524         let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5525         // 5th HTLC:
5526         let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5527         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5528         // 6th HTLC:
5529         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200).unwrap());
5530         // 7th HTLC:
5531         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200).unwrap());
5532
5533         // 8th HTLC:
5534         let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5535         // 9th HTLC:
5536         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5537         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5538
5539         // 10th HTLC:
5540         let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5541         // 11th HTLC:
5542         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5543         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200).unwrap());
5544
5545         // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
5546         // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
5547         // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
5548         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2).len(), 1);
5549         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
5550
5551         // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
5552         // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5553         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1);
5554         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3);
5555         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5);
5556         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6);
5557         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
5558
5559         let failed_destinations = vec![
5560                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_1 },
5561                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_3 },
5562                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_5 },
5563                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_6 },
5564         ];
5565         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[4], failed_destinations);
5566         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
5567
5568         let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5569         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5570         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5571         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5572         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5573         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5574
5575         // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5576         nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
5577         nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4);
5578         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5579
5580         let failed_destinations_2 = vec![
5581                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 },
5582                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_4 },
5583         ];
5584         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[5], failed_destinations_2);
5585         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5586
5587         let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5588         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5589         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5590         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5591
5592         let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5593
5594         // After 4 and 2 removes respectively above in nodes[4] and nodes[5], nodes[3] should receive 6 PaymentForwardedFailed events
5595         let failed_destinations_3 = vec![
5596                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5597                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5598                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5599                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5600                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5601                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5602         ];
5603         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations_3);
5604         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5605         let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5606         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5607         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5608         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5609         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5610         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5611         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5612         if deliver_last_raa {
5613                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5614         } else {
5615                 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5616         }
5617
5618         // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5619         // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5620         // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5621         // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5622         //
5623         // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5624         // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5625         // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5626         //
5627         // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5628         // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5629         let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5630
5631         if announce_latest {
5632                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5633         } else {
5634                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5635         }
5636         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5637         let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5638                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2 + 6);
5639                 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5640         } else {
5641                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5642                 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5643         };
5644         match close_event {
5645                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5646                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5647         }
5648
5649         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5650         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5651         if deliver_last_raa {
5652                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5653
5654                 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(3).collect();
5655                 expect_htlc_handling_failed_destinations!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(), expected_destinations);
5656         } else {
5657                 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = if announce_latest {
5658                         repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(9).collect()
5659                 } else {
5660                         repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(6).collect()
5661                 };
5662
5663                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], expected_destinations);
5664         }
5665         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5666
5667         let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5668         assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5669         let mut a_done = false;
5670         for msg in cs_msgs {
5671                 match msg {
5672                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5673                                 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5674                                 // should be failed-backwards here.
5675                                 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5676                                         // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5677                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5678                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5679                                         }
5680                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5681                                         assert!(!a_done);
5682                                         a_done = true;
5683                                         &nodes[0]
5684                                 } else {
5685                                         // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5686                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5687                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5688                                         }
5689                                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5690                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5691                                         &nodes[1]
5692                                 };
5693                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5694                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5695                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5696                                 if announce_latest {
5697                                         target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5698                                         if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5699                                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5700                                         }
5701                                 }
5702                                 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5703                         },
5704                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5705                 }
5706         }
5707
5708         let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5709         assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5710         let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5711         let mut as_updates = 0;
5712         for event in as_events.iter() {
5713                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5714                         assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5715                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5716                                 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5717                         } else {
5718                                 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5719                         }
5720                         if network_update.is_some() {
5721                                 as_updates += 1;
5722                         }
5723                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5724         }
5725         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5726         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5727         if announce_latest {
5728                 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5729                 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5730         }
5731         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5732
5733         let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5734         assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5735         let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5736         let mut bs_updates = 0;
5737         for event in bs_events.iter() {
5738                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5739                         assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5740                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5741                                 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5742                         } else {
5743                                 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5744                         }
5745                         if network_update.is_some() {
5746                                 bs_updates += 1;
5747                         }
5748                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5749         }
5750         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5751         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5752         if announce_latest {
5753                 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5754         }
5755         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5756
5757         // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5758         // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5759         // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5760         // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5761         assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5762         assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5763 }
5764
5765 #[test]
5766 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5767         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5768 }
5769
5770 #[test]
5771 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5772         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5773 }
5774
5775 #[test]
5776 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5777         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5778         // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5779         // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5780 }
5781
5782 #[test]
5783 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5784         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5785         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5786         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5787         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5788
5789         // Create some initial channels
5790         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5791
5792         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5793         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5794         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5795         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5796
5797         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5798         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5799         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5800         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5801         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5802         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5803
5804         let htlc_timeout = {
5805                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5806                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
5807                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5808                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5809                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5810                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5811                 node_txn[1].clone()
5812         };
5813
5814         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5815         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5816         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5817
5818         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5819         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5820         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5821         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5822         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5823         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5824         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5825         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5826         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5827         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5828                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5829 }
5830
5831 #[test]
5832 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5833         // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with
5834         // a key manager rotation to test that key_derivation_params returned in DynamicOutputP2WSH
5835         // let us re-derive the channel key set to then derive a delayed_payment_key.
5836
5837         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5838
5839         // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5840         let seed = [42; 32];
5841         let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5842         let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5843         let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source.genesis_hash, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger);
5844         let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph, node_seed: seed, features: InitFeatures::known() };
5845         let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5846         node_cfgs.remove(0);
5847         node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5848
5849         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5850         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5851
5852         // Create some initial channels
5853         // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5854         // for node 0
5855         let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5856         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5857         assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5858
5859         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5860         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5861         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5862         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5863         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5864
5865         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5866         let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5867         let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5868         assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5869         check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5870
5871         // We check funding pubkey are unique
5872         let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5873         let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5874         if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5875             || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5876             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5877             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5878                 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5879         }
5880
5881         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5882         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5883         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5884         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5885         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5886         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5887
5888         let htlc_timeout = {
5889                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5890                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5891                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5892                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn_1[0]);
5893                 node_txn[1].clone()
5894         };
5895
5896         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5897         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5898         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5899
5900         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5901         let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5902         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5903         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5904         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5905         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5906         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5907         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5908         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5909         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5910         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5911                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5912 }
5913
5914 #[test]
5915 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5916         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5917         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5918         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5919         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5920
5921         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5922
5923         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5924         let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5925
5926         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5927         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5928         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5929
5930         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5931         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5932         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5933
5934         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5935         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5936         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5937
5938         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5939         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5940         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5941 }
5942
5943 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5944         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5945         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5946         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5947         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5948         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5949
5950         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5951
5952         // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5953         // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5954         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5955         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5956         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5957
5958         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5959         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5960         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
5961
5962         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5963         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5964         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5965         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5966         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5967
5968         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5969         let mut block = Block {
5970                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5971                 txdata: vec![],
5972         };
5973         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5974                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5975                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5976         }
5977         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5978         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5979         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5980         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5981 }
5982
5983 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5984         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5985         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5986         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5987         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5988         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5989
5990         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5991         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5992         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5993
5994         let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5995
5996         // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5997         // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5998         // to "time out" the HTLC.
5999
6000         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
6001         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6002
6003         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
6004                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: Vec::new()});
6005                 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
6006         }
6007         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
6008         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6009         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6010         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6011 }
6012
6013 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
6014         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6015         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6016         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6017         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6018         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6019
6020         // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
6021         // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
6022         // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
6023         // actually revoked.
6024         let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
6025         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
6026         nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
6027         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
6028         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6029
6030         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6031         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6032         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
6033         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6034         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6035         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
6036         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6037         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
6038         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6039         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6040
6041         if check_revoke_no_close {
6042                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
6043                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6044         }
6045
6046         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
6047         let mut block = Block {
6048                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
6049                 txdata: vec![],
6050         };
6051         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
6052                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
6053                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
6054         }
6055         if !check_revoke_no_close {
6056                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
6057                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6058                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6059                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6060         } else {
6061                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6062                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6063                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[0] {
6064                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
6065                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
6066                 if let Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[1] {
6067                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
6068                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
6069         }
6070 }
6071
6072 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
6073 // There are only a few cases to test here:
6074 //  * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
6075 //    broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
6076 //  * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
6077 //  * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
6078 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
6079 // non-dust HTLCs.
6080 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
6081 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
6082 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
6083 #[test]
6084 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
6085         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
6086         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
6087
6088         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
6089         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
6090 }
6091
6092 #[test]
6093 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
6094         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
6095         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
6096         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
6097         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
6098 }
6099
6100 #[test]
6101 #[should_panic]
6102 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
6103         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6104         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6105         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6106         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6107         // Force duplicate randomness for every get-random call
6108         for node in nodes.iter() {
6109                 *node.keys_manager.override_random_bytes.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
6110         }
6111
6112         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
6113         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
6114         let push_msat=10001;
6115         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
6116         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6117         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
6118         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6119
6120         // Create a second channel with the same random values. This used to panic due to a colliding
6121         // channel_id, but now panics due to a colliding outbound SCID alias.
6122         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
6123 }
6124
6125 #[test]
6126 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
6127         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6128         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6129         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6130         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6131
6132         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
6133         let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
6134         let push_msat=10001;
6135         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
6136
6137         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
6138         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
6139         // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
6140         let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
6141         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
6142
6143         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
6144         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
6145         let push_msat=10001;
6146         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
6147         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6148         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
6149
6150         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
6151         // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
6152         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
6153
6154         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
6155         assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
6156         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6157
6158         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
6159         let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
6160         assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
6161
6162         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
6163         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
6164         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6165         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6166         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
6167         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6168 }
6169
6170 #[test]
6171 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
6172         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6173         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6174         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6175         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6176
6177         let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
6178         let push_msat=10001;
6179         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
6180         let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6181         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
6182         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
6183
6184         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
6185         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6186         let err_msg = match events[0] {
6187                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
6188                         msg.clone()
6189                 },
6190                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6191         };
6192         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
6193 }
6194
6195 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
6196 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
6197 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
6198 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
6199 #[test]
6200 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
6201         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6202         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6203         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6204         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6205         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6206
6207         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6208         // pending_update_fee.
6209         {
6210                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6211                 *feerate_lock += 20;
6212         }
6213         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6214         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6215
6216         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6217         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6218         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6219                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6220                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6221                 },
6222                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6223         };
6224
6225         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6226
6227         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6228         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6229         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6230         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6231
6232         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6233         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
6234         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6235
6236         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6237         let our_payment_id = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6238         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6239         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6240
6241         // Flush the pending fee update.
6242         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6243         let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6244         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6245         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
6246         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6247
6248         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
6249         // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
6250         // us to surface its failure to the user.
6251         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6252         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6253         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6254         let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6255                 hex::encode(our_payment_hash.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6256         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6257
6258         // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
6259         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6260         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6261         match &events[0] {
6262                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data, .. } => {
6263                         assert_eq!(our_payment_id, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6264                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
6265                         assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
6266                         assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6267                         assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6268                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
6269                         assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
6270                         assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
6271                 },
6272                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6273         }
6274 }
6275
6276 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
6277 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
6278 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
6279 #[test]
6280 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
6281         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6282         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6283         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6284         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6285         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6286
6287         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6288         // pending_update_fee.
6289         {
6290                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6291                 *feerate_lock += 200;
6292         }
6293         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6294         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6295
6296         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6297         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6298         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6299                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6300                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6301                 },
6302                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6303         };
6304
6305         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6306
6307         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6308         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6309         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6310         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6311
6312         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6313         let amt_1 = 20000;
6314         let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors) - amt_1;
6315         let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
6316         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
6317
6318         // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
6319         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
6320         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6321         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
6322         let payment_id_2 = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
6323         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6324         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
6325
6326         // Flush the pending fee update.
6327         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6328         let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6329         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6330         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
6331         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6332         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
6333
6334         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
6335         // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
6336         // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
6337         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6338         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6339         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6340         let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6341                 hex::encode(payment_hash_2.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6342         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6343
6344         // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
6345         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6346         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6347         match &events[0] {
6348                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data, .. } => {
6349                         assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6350                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
6351                         assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
6352                         assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6353                         assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6354                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
6355                         assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
6356                         assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
6357                 },
6358                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6359         }
6360
6361         // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
6362         let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
6363                 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6364                 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
6365                 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
6366         };
6367         let raa = match send_raa_event {
6368                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
6369                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6370         };
6371         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6372         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6373         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6374         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6375         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6376         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6377         match events[0] {
6378                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6379                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6380         }
6381         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6382         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6383         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6384         match events[0] {
6385                 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => {},
6386                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6387         }
6388         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
6389         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6390         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, amt_1);
6391
6392         let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6393         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6394         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
6395         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
6396 }
6397
6398 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
6399 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
6400 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
6401 // once it's freed.
6402 #[test]
6403 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
6404         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6405         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6406         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
6407         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
6408         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
6409         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
6410         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
6411         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6412         let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6413         let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6414
6415         // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6416         // pending_update_fee.
6417         {
6418                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6419                 *feerate_lock += 20;
6420         }
6421         nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6422         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6423
6424         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6425         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6426         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6427                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6428                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6429                 },
6430                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6431         };
6432
6433         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6434
6435         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6436         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6437         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6438         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6439
6440         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6441         let feemsat = 239;
6442         let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
6443         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors) - total_routing_fee_msat;
6444         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
6445         let payment_event = {
6446                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6447                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6448
6449                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6450                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6451
6452                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6453         };
6454         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6455         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6456         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6457         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6458
6459         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1_2.2);
6460         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6461
6462         // Flush the pending fee update.
6463         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6464         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6465         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6466         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6467         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6468         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6469
6470         // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
6471         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6472         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6473
6474         let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
6475                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
6476                         msg.clone()
6477                 },
6478                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6479         };
6480
6481         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
6482         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6483         assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6484
6485         // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
6486         let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6487         assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 2);
6488         match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
6489                 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6490                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6491         }
6492
6493         // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
6494         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6495         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6496
6497         // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
6498         let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6499         assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
6500         let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
6501                 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6502                         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
6503                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
6504                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
6505                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6506                         (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6507                 },
6508                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6509         };
6510
6511         // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
6512         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
6513         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6514
6515         // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
6516         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6517         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6518         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6519         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6520         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6521         let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6522         assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
6523         let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
6524                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
6525                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6526         };
6527         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6528         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
6529         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6530 }
6531
6532 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
6533 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
6534 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
6535
6536 #[test]
6537 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
6538         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
6539         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6540         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6541         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6542         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6543         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6544
6545         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6546         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 100;
6547
6548         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6549                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6550         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6551         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value".to_string(), 1);
6552 }
6553
6554 #[test]
6555 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
6556         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6557         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6558         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6559         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6560         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6561         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6562
6563         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6564         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 0;
6565         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6566                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
6567
6568         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6569         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6570 }
6571
6572 #[test]
6573 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
6574         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6575         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6576         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6577         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6578         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6579         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6580
6581         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6582         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6583         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6584         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6585         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6586
6587         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6588         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6589         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6590         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6591         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() });
6592 }
6593
6594 #[test]
6595 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6596         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6597         //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6598         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6599         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6600         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6601         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6602         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6603
6604         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
6605                 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
6606         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], payment_params, 100000000, 0);
6607         route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = 500000001;
6608         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::RouteError { ref err },
6609                 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6610 }
6611
6612 #[test]
6613 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6614         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6615         //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6616         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6617         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6618         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6619         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6620         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6621         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6622         let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6623
6624         for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6625                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6626                 let payment_event = {
6627                         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6628                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6629
6630                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6631                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6632                         if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6633                                 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6634                         } else {
6635                                 assert!(false);
6636                         }
6637                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6638                 };
6639                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6640                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6641                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6642
6643                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6644                 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6645         }
6646         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6647         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6648                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6649
6650         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6651         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
6652 }
6653
6654 #[test]
6655 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6656         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6657         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6658         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6659         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6660         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6661         let channel_value = 100000;
6662         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6663         let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6664
6665         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6666
6667         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6668         // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6669         // limits us to.
6670         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat =  max_in_flight + 1;
6671         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6672                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6673
6674         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6675         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
6676
6677         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6678 }
6679
6680 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6681 #[test]
6682 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6683         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6684         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6685         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6686         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6687         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6688         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6689         let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6690         {
6691                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6692                 let channel = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6693                 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6694         }
6695
6696         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6697         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6698         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6699         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6700         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6701         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6702         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6703         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6704         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6705         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6706         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6707 }
6708
6709 #[test]
6710 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6711         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6712         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6713         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6714         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6715         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6716         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6717
6718         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6719         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6720         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6721         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6722         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6723         let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
6724
6725         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6726         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6727         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6728         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6729         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6730
6731         // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6732         // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6733         // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6734         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6735         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6736
6737         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6738         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6739         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6740         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6741         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6742 }
6743
6744 #[test]
6745 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6746         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6747         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6748         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6749         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6750         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6751         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6752         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6753
6754         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3999999);
6755         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6756         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6757         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6758         let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3999999, &Some(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6759         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash);
6760
6761         let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6762                 channel_id: chan.2,
6763                 htlc_id: 0,
6764                 amount_msat: 1000,
6765                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6766                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6767                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6768         };
6769
6770         for i in 0..super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
6771                 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6772                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6773         }
6774         msg.htlc_id = (super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS) as u64;
6775         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6776
6777         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6778         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6779         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6780         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6781         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6782 }
6783
6784 #[test]
6785 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6786         //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6787         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6788         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6789         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6790         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6791         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6792
6793         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6794         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6795         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6796         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6797         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6798         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6799
6800         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6801         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6802         assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6803         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6804         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6805 }
6806
6807 #[test]
6808 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6809         //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6810         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6811         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6812         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6813         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6814
6815         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6816         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6817         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6818         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6819         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6820         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6821         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6822
6823         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6824         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6825         assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6826         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6827         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6828 }
6829
6830 #[test]
6831 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6832         //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6833         // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6834         // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6835         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6836         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6837         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6838         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6839
6840         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6841         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6842         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6843         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6844         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6845         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6846
6847         //Disconnect and Reconnect
6848         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6849         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6850         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
6851         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6852         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6853         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
6854         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6855         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6856         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6857         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6858         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6859         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6860
6861         //Resend HTLC
6862         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6863         assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6864         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6865         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6866         let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6867
6868         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6869
6870         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6871         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6872         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6873         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6874         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6875 }
6876
6877 #[test]
6878 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6879         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6880
6881         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6882         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6883         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6884         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6885         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6886         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6887         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6888
6889         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6890         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6891         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6892
6893         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6894                 channel_id: chan.2,
6895                 htlc_id: 0,
6896                 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6897         };
6898
6899         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6900
6901         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6902         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6903         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6904         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6905         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6906 }
6907
6908 #[test]
6909 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6910         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6911
6912         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6913         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6914         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6915         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6916         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6917
6918         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6919         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6920         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6921         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6922         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6923
6924         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6925                 channel_id: chan.2,
6926                 htlc_id: 0,
6927                 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6928         };
6929
6930         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6931
6932         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6933         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6934         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6935         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6936         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6937 }
6938
6939 #[test]
6940 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6941         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6942
6943         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6944         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6945         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6946         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6947         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6948
6949         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6950         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6951         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6952         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6953         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6954         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6955                 channel_id: chan.2,
6956                 htlc_id: 0,
6957                 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6958                 failure_code: 0x8000,
6959         };
6960
6961         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6962
6963         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6964         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6965         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6966         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6967         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6968 }
6969
6970 #[test]
6971 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6972         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6973
6974         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6975         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6976         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6977         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6978         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6979
6980         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6981
6982         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6983         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6984         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6985
6986         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6987         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6988         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6989                 match events[0] {
6990                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6991                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6992                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6993                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6994                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6995                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6996                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6997                         },
6998                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6999                 }
7000         };
7001
7002         update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
7003
7004         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
7005
7006         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
7007         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
7008         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
7009         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7010         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
7011 }
7012
7013 #[test]
7014 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
7015         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
7016
7017         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7018         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7019         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7020         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7021         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7022
7023         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
7024
7025         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
7026         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7027         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
7028
7029         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7030         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7031         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
7032                 match events[0] {
7033                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
7034                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7035                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
7036                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7037                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7038                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7039                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
7040                         },
7041                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7042                 }
7043         };
7044
7045         update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
7046
7047         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
7048
7049         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
7050         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
7051         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
7052         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7053         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
7054 }
7055
7056 #[test]
7057 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
7058         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
7059
7060         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7061         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7062         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7063         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7064         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7065
7066         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
7067         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7068         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7069
7070         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7071         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
7072
7073         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7074         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7075         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
7076
7077         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7078
7079         let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
7080                 match events[0] {
7081                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
7082                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7083                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7084                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7085                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
7086                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7087                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
7088                         },
7089                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7090                 }
7091         };
7092         update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
7093         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
7094
7095         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
7096         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
7097         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
7098         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7099         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
7100 }
7101
7102 #[test]
7103 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
7104         //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
7105         //    * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
7106
7107         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7108         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7109         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7110         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7111         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7112         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7113
7114         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
7115
7116         //First hop
7117         let mut payment_event = {
7118                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7119                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7120                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7121                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7122                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
7123         };
7124         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7125         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7126         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7127         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7128         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7129         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
7130         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7131         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
7132         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
7133
7134         //Second Hop
7135         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
7136         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7137         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
7138         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
7139
7140         let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7141         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7142         let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
7143                 match events_3[0] {
7144                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7145                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7146                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7147                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7148                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
7149                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7150                                 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
7151                         },
7152                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7153                 }
7154         };
7155
7156         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
7157
7158         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7159         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
7160         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
7161         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7162         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
7163
7164         //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
7165         match events_4[0] {
7166                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
7167                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7168                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7169                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7170                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7171                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7172                 },
7173                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7174         };
7175
7176         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7177 }
7178
7179 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
7180         // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
7181         // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
7182         // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
7183
7184         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7185         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7186         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7187         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7188         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7189         let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7190
7191         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7192
7193         // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
7194         let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7195         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7196         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7197
7198         // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
7199         let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7200
7201         // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
7202         nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
7203         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7204         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
7205         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7206
7207         let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7208         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7209         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
7210         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7211
7212         // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
7213         let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7214
7215         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7216         match events[0] {
7217                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
7218                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7219                 },
7220                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7221         }
7222         match events[1] {
7223                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
7224                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7225                 },
7226                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7227         }
7228
7229         assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
7230         // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
7231         if announce_latest {
7232                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
7233         } else {
7234                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
7235         }
7236
7237         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7238         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7239         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7240
7241         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7242         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7243         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7244         // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
7245         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7246         let mut first_failed = false;
7247         for event in events {
7248                 match event {
7249                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7250                                 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
7251                                         assert!(!first_failed);
7252                                         first_failed = true;
7253                                 } else {
7254                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
7255                                 }
7256                         }
7257                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7258                 }
7259         }
7260 }
7261
7262 #[test]
7263 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
7264         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
7265         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
7266 }
7267
7268 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
7269         // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7270         // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
7271         // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7272         // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
7273         // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7274         // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
7275
7276         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7277         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7278         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7279         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7280         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7281
7282         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7283
7284         let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7285         let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7286
7287         let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7288         let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7289
7290         // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
7291         if revoked {
7292                 let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7293                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
7294         }
7295
7296         let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
7297         if local {
7298                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
7299                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
7300                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7301                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7302                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
7303
7304                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
7305                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7306                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7307                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7308                 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7309                 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7310                 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
7311                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7312                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7313                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7314                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7315         } else {
7316                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
7317                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7318                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7319                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7320                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7321                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7322
7323                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7324                 timeout_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..)
7325                         .filter(|tx| tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == bs_commitment_tx[0].txid()).collect();
7326                 check_spends!(timeout_tx[0], bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7327                 // For both a revoked or non-revoked commitment transaction, after ANTI_REORG_DELAY the
7328                 // dust HTLC should have been failed.
7329                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
7330
7331                 if !revoked {
7332                         assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7333                 } else {
7334                         assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].lock_time, 0);
7335                 }
7336                 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout/revocation-claim tx
7337                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7338                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7339                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7340                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7341         }
7342 }
7343
7344 #[test]
7345 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
7346         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
7347         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
7348         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
7349 }
7350
7351 #[test]
7352 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
7353         // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
7354
7355         let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7356         low_our_to_self_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
7357         let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7358         high_their_to_self_config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
7359         let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
7360         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7361         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7362         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
7363         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7364
7365         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
7366         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7367                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), 1000000, 1000000, 0,
7368                 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, 42)
7369         {
7370                 match error {
7371                         APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7372                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7373                 }
7374         } else { assert!(false) }
7375
7376         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7377         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7378         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7379         open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7380         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7381                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0,
7382                 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
7383         {
7384                 match error {
7385                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str()));  },
7386                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7387                 }
7388         } else { assert!(false); }
7389
7390         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
7391         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7392         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7393         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7394         accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7395         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7396         let reason_msg;
7397         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
7398                 match action {
7399                         &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7400                                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
7401                                 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
7402                         },
7403                         _ => { panic!(); }
7404                 }
7405         } else { panic!(); }
7406         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg });
7407
7408         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7409         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7410         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7411         open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7412         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7413                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0,
7414                 &high_their_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
7415         {
7416                 match error {
7417                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7418                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7419                 }
7420         } else { assert!(false); }
7421 }
7422
7423 fn do_test_data_loss_protect(reconnect_panicing: bool) {
7424         // When we get a data_loss_protect proving we're behind, we immediately panic as the
7425         // chain::Watch API requirements have been violated (e.g. the user restored from a backup). The
7426         // panic message informs the user they should force-close without broadcasting, which is tested
7427         // if `reconnect_panicing` is not set.
7428         let persister;
7429         let logger;
7430         let fee_estimator;
7431         let tx_broadcaster;
7432         let chain_source;
7433         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7434         // We broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr, which would cause a panic
7435         // during signing due to revoked tx
7436         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7437         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
7438         let monitor;
7439         let node_state_0;
7440         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7441         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7442         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7443
7444         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7445
7446         // Cache node A state before any channel update
7447         let previous_node_state = nodes[0].node.encode();
7448         let mut previous_chain_monitor_state = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7449         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan.2).write(&mut previous_chain_monitor_state).unwrap();
7450
7451         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7452         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7453
7454         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7455         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7456
7457         // Restore node A from previous state
7458         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
7459         let mut chain_monitor = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_chain_monitor_state.0), keys_manager).unwrap().1;
7460         chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
7461         tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster { txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new())) };
7462         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7463         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7464         monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &tx_broadcaster, &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7465         node_state_0 = {
7466                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7467                 channel_monitors.insert(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, &mut chain_monitor);
7468                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_node_state), ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7469                         keys_manager: keys_manager,
7470                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
7471                         chain_monitor: &monitor,
7472                         logger: &logger,
7473                         tx_broadcaster: &tx_broadcaster,
7474                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
7475                         channel_monitors,
7476                 }).unwrap().1
7477         };
7478         nodes[0].node = &node_state_0;
7479         assert!(monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chain_monitor).is_ok());
7480         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &monitor;
7481         nodes[0].chain_source = &chain_source;
7482
7483         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7484
7485         if reconnect_panicing {
7486                 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7487                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7488
7489                 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7490
7491                 // Check we close channel detecting A is fallen-behind
7492                 // Check that we sent the warning message when we detected that A has fallen behind,
7493                 // and give the possibility for A to recover from the warning.
7494                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7495                 let warn_msg = "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned();
7496                 assert!(check_warn_msg!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), chan.2).contains(&warn_msg));
7497
7498                 {
7499                         let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7500                         // The node B should not broadcast the transaction to force close the channel!
7501                         assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
7502                 }
7503
7504                 let reestablish_0 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7505                 // Check A panics upon seeing proof it has fallen behind.
7506                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_0[0]);
7507                 return; // By this point we should have panic'ed!
7508         }
7509
7510         nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
7511         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7512         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
7513         {
7514                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7515                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7516         }
7517
7518         for msg in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
7519                 if let MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } = msg {
7520                 } else if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg {
7521                         match action {
7522                                 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7523                                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel force-closed");
7524                                 },
7525                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
7526                         }
7527                 } else {
7528                         panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", msg)
7529                 }
7530         }
7531
7532         // after the warning message sent by B, we should not able to
7533         // use the channel, or reconnect with success to the channel.
7534         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().is_empty());
7535         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7536         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7537         let retry_reestablish = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7538
7539         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &retry_reestablish[0]);
7540         let mut err_msgs_0 = Vec::with_capacity(1);
7541         for msg in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
7542                 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg {
7543                         match action {
7544                                 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7545                                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Failed to find corresponding channel");
7546                                         err_msgs_0.push(msg.clone());
7547                                 },
7548                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
7549                         }
7550                 } else {
7551                         panic!("Unexpected event!");
7552                 }
7553         }
7554         assert_eq!(err_msgs_0.len(), 1);
7555         nodes[1].node.handle_error(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &err_msgs_0[0]);
7556         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().is_empty());
7557         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7558         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned() });
7559         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
7560 }
7561
7562 #[test]
7563 #[should_panic]
7564 fn test_data_loss_protect_showing_stale_state_panics() {
7565         do_test_data_loss_protect(true);
7566 }
7567
7568 #[test]
7569 fn test_force_close_without_broadcast() {
7570         do_test_data_loss_protect(false);
7571 }
7572
7573 #[test]
7574 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
7575         // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
7576         // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
7577         // to B, B should refuse payment.
7578
7579         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7580         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7581         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7582         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7583
7584         // Create some initial channels
7585         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7586
7587         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7588         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7589         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7590         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7591         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7592         let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
7593         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7594         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7595
7596         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7597         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7598         let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7599         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7600         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7601
7602         // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
7603         // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
7604         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7605         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
7606
7607         // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
7608         // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
7609         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7610
7611         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7612         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7613         let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
7614                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7615                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7616                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7617                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7618                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7619                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7620                         (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
7621                 },
7622                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7623         };
7624         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7625
7626         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
7627         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
7628
7629         // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
7630         let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(10_000).to_vec();
7631         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH));
7632         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
7633 }
7634
7635 #[test]
7636 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
7637         // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
7638         // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
7639
7640         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7641         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7642         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7643         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7644
7645         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7646         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7647         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7648
7649         // Disconnect peers
7650         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7651         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7652
7653         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // Enabled -> DisabledStaged
7654         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // DisabledStaged -> Disabled
7655         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7656         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7657         let mut chans_disabled = HashMap::new();
7658         for e in msg_events {
7659                 match e {
7660                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7661                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7662                                 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7663                                 if chans_disabled.insert(msg.contents.short_channel_id, msg.contents.timestamp).is_some() {
7664                                         panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7665                                 }
7666                         },
7667                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7668                 }
7669         }
7670         // Reconnect peers
7671         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7672         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7673         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7674         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7675         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7676         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7677
7678         // Reestablish chan_1
7679         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7680         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7681         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7682         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7683         // Reestablish chan_2
7684         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7685         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7686         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7687         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7688         // Reestablish chan_3
7689         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7690         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7691         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7692         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7693
7694         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7695         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7696         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7697         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7698         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7699         for e in msg_events {
7700                 match e {
7701                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7702                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7703                                 match chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7704                                         // Each update should have a higher timestamp than the previous one, replacing
7705                                         // the old one.
7706                                         Some(prev_timestamp) => assert!(msg.contents.timestamp > prev_timestamp),
7707                                         None => panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!"),
7708                                 }
7709                         },
7710                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7711                 }
7712         }
7713         // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7714         assert!(chans_disabled.is_empty());
7715 }
7716
7717 #[test]
7718 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7719         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7720         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7721
7722         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7723         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7724         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7725         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7726
7727         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7728
7729         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7730         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
7731                 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7732         let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_params, 3000000, 30);
7733         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7734
7735         let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7736         // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7737         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7738         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7739         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7740         let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7741
7742         let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7743         for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7744                 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7745                         penalty_sum += outp.value;
7746                 }
7747         }
7748
7749         // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7750         let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7751
7752         // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7753         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7754         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_114, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7755         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()] });
7756         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7757
7758         // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7759         let penalty_1;
7760         let feerate_1;
7761         {
7762                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7763                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor) + local commitment tx
7764                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7765                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7766                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7767                 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7768                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7769                 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7770                 node_txn.clear();
7771         };
7772
7773         // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7774         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7775         let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7776         let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7777         {
7778                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7779                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7780                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7781                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7782                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7783                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7784                         penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7785                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7786                         assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7787                         let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7788                         feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7789                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7790                         assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7791                         node_txn.clear();
7792                 }
7793         }
7794         assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7795
7796         // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7797         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7798         let penalty_3;
7799         let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7800         {
7801                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7802                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7803                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7804                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7805                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7806                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7807                         penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7808                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7809                         assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7810                         let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7811                         feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7812                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7813                         assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7814                         node_txn.clear();
7815                 }
7816         }
7817         assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7818
7819         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7820         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7821 }
7822
7823 #[test]
7824 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7825         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7826         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7827
7828         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7829         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7830         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7831         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7832         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7833
7834         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7835         // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7836         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7837         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7838         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7839         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7840                 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7841         let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7842         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7843         let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[1].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7844                 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7845         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7846
7847         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7848         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7849         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7850
7851         // Revoke local commitment tx
7852         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7853
7854         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7855         // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7856         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7857         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7858         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7859         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7860         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 49); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7861
7862         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
7863         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
7864         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], chan.3);
7865
7866         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7867         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7868         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7869
7870         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7871         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7872         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
7873         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7874
7875         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7876         let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7877         let header_11 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: hash_128, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7878         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_11, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7879         let header_129 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_11.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7880         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_129, txdata: vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[2].clone()] });
7881         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7882         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7883         match events.last().unwrap() {
7884                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7885                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7886         }
7887         let first;
7888         let feerate_1;
7889         let penalty_txn;
7890         {
7891                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7892                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + A commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7893                 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7894
7895                 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7896                 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7897                 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7898                 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7899                 // future).
7900                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7901                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7902                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7903                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7904                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7905                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7906
7907                 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7908                 // available, which we check here:
7909                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7910                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7911                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7912
7913                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7914                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7915
7916                 // node_txn[3] is the local commitment tx broadcast just because (and somewhat in case of
7917                 // reorgs, though its not clear its ever worth broadcasting conflicting txn like this when
7918                 // a remote commitment tx has already been confirmed).
7919                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan.3);
7920
7921                 // node_txn[4] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7922                 // output, checked above).
7923                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 2);
7924                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].output.len(), 1);
7925                 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7926
7927                 first = node_txn[4].txid();
7928                 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7929                 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[4].output[0].value;
7930                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[4].weight() as u64;
7931                 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7932                 node_txn.clear();
7933         }
7934
7935         // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7936         let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_129.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7937         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7938         let header_131 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_130.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7939         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_131, txdata: Vec::new() });
7940         {
7941                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7942                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // 2 bumped penalty txn on revoked commitment tx
7943
7944                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7945                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7946                 // Note that these are both bogus - they spend outputs already claimed in block 129:
7947                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output  {
7948                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7949                 } else {
7950                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7951                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7952                 }
7953
7954                 node_txn.clear();
7955         };
7956
7957         // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7958         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7959         assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7960         let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7961         let node_txn = {
7962                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7963                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7964
7965                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7966                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7967                 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7968                 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7969                 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7970                 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7971                 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7972                 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7973                 node_txn.clear();
7974                 txn
7975         };
7976         // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7977         let header_145 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_144, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7978         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_145, txdata: node_txn });
7979         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7980         {
7981                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7982                 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7983                 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7984                 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7985                 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7986                 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7987                 // up bumped justice generation.
7988                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7989                 node_txn.clear();
7990         }
7991         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7992         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7993 }
7994
7995 #[test]
7996 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
7997         // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7998         // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7999
8000         // Create 2 HTLCs
8001         // Provide preimage for one
8002         // Check aggregation
8003
8004         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8005         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8006         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8007         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8008
8009         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8010         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
8011         route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
8012
8013         // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
8014         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
8015         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
8016         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8017         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
8018
8019         // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
8020         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8021         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
8022         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
8023         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8024         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
8025
8026         // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
8027         let timeout;
8028         let preimage;
8029         let preimage_bump;
8030         let feerate_timeout;
8031         let feerate_preimage;
8032         {
8033                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8034                 // 9 transactions including:
8035                 // 1*2 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success
8036                 // 1*3 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success + HTLC-Timeout
8037                 // 2 * HTLC-Success (one RBF bump we'll check later)
8038                 // 1 * HTLC-Timeout
8039                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 8);
8040                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8041                 assert_eq!(node_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
8042                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
8043                 check_spends!(node_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
8044
8045                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan.3);
8046                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
8047
8048                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output == node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output {
8049                         preimage_bump = node_txn[3].clone();
8050                         check_spends!(node_txn[3], remote_txn[0]);
8051
8052                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
8053                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[5]);
8054                 } else {
8055                         preimage_bump = node_txn[7].clone();
8056                         check_spends!(node_txn[7], remote_txn[0]);
8057                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[7].input[0].previous_output);
8058
8059                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[3]);
8060                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[4]);
8061                 }
8062
8063                 timeout = node_txn[6].txid();
8064                 let index = node_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout;
8065                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[6].output[0].value;
8066                 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / node_txn[6].weight() as u64;
8067
8068                 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
8069                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
8070                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
8071                 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
8072
8073                 node_txn.clear();
8074         };
8075         assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
8076         assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
8077
8078         // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
8079         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
8080         {
8081                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8082                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8083                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8084                 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
8085                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
8086                 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
8087
8088                 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
8089                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
8090                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.weight() as u64;
8091                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
8092                 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
8093
8094                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
8095                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
8096                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
8097                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
8098                 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
8099
8100                 node_txn.clear();
8101         }
8102
8103         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8104         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8105 }
8106
8107 #[test]
8108 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
8109         // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
8110         // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
8111         // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
8112         // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
8113         // EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
8114         // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
8115         // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
8116         // implement that).
8117         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8118         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8119         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8120         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8121         let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
8122
8123         let per_commitment_secret;
8124         let next_per_commitment_point;
8125         {
8126                 let mut guard = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
8127                 let keys = guard.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
8128
8129                 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
8130
8131                 // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
8132                 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8133                 per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
8134
8135                 // Must revoke without gaps
8136                 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8137                 keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
8138
8139                 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8140                 next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
8141                         &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
8142         }
8143
8144         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
8145                 &msgs::RevokeAndACK { channel_id, per_commitment_secret, next_per_commitment_point });
8146         assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
8147         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8148         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() });
8149 }
8150
8151 #[test]
8152 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
8153         // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
8154         // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
8155
8156         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8157         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8158         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8159         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8160
8161         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8162         // Lock HTLC in both directions
8163         let (payment_preimage_1, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000);
8164         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000);
8165
8166         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
8167         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8168         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
8169
8170         // Revoke local commitment tx
8171         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
8172
8173         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
8174         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
8175         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[0], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
8176         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8177
8178         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
8179         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8180         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8181         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8182         let penalty_txn = {
8183                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8184                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
8185                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8186                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8187                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8188                 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
8189                 node_txn.clear();
8190                 penalty_txn
8191         };
8192         let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8193         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
8194         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8195         {
8196                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
8197                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
8198                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
8199         }
8200 }
8201
8202 #[test]
8203 fn test_pending_claimed_htlc_no_balance_underflow() {
8204         // Tests that if we have a pending outbound HTLC as well as a claimed-but-not-fully-removed
8205         // HTLC we will not underflow when we call `Channel::get_balance_msat()`.
8206         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8207         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8208         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8209         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8210         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8211
8212         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_010_000);
8213         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8214         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_010_000);
8215         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8216         let fulfill_ev = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8217
8218         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8219         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
8220         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.commitment_signed);
8221         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8222         let (_raa, _cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8223
8224         // At this point nodes[1] has received 1,010k msat (10k msat more than their reserve) and can
8225         // send an HTLC back (though it will go in the holding cell). Send an HTLC back and check we
8226         // can get our balance.
8227
8228         // Get a route from nodes[1] to nodes[0] by getting a route going the other way and then flip
8229         // the public key of the only hop. This works around ChannelDetails not showing the
8230         // almost-claimed HTLC as available balance.
8231         let (mut route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000);
8232         route.payment_params = None; // This is all wrong, but unnecessary
8233         route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8234         let (_, payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
8235         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
8236
8237         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].balance_msat, 1_000_000);
8238 }
8239
8240 #[test]
8241 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
8242         // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
8243         // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
8244         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8245         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8246         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8247         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8248
8249         let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8250
8251         // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
8252         // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
8253         // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
8254         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
8255         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8256
8257         // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
8258         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
8259         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8260         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8261
8262         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
8263         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8264         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
8265         let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8266         assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
8267         match close_ev[0] {
8268                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
8269                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8270                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
8271                 },
8272                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8273         }
8274 }
8275
8276 #[test]
8277 fn test_override_channel_config() {
8278         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8279         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8280         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8281         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8282
8283         // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
8284         let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
8285         override_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
8286
8287         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
8288
8289         // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
8290         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8291         assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
8292         assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
8293 }
8294
8295 #[test]
8296 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
8297         let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
8298         zero_config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
8299         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8300         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8301         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
8302         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8303
8304         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
8305         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8306         assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8307
8308         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8309         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8310         assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8311 }
8312
8313 #[test]
8314 fn test_channel_update_has_correct_htlc_maximum_msat() {
8315         // Tests that the `ChannelUpdate` message has the correct values for `htlc_maximum_msat` set.
8316         // Bolt 7 specifies that if present `htlc_maximum_msat`:
8317         // 1. MUST be set to less than or equal to the channel capacity. In LDK, this is capped to
8318         // 90% of the `channel_value`.
8319         // 2. MUST be set to less than or equal to the `max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` received from the peer.
8320
8321         let mut config_30_percent = UserConfig::default();
8322         config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
8323         config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 30;
8324         let mut config_50_percent = UserConfig::default();
8325         config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
8326         config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 50;
8327         let mut config_95_percent = UserConfig::default();
8328         config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
8329         config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 95;
8330         let mut config_100_percent = UserConfig::default();
8331         config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
8332         config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 100;
8333
8334         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8335         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8336         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config_30_percent), Some(config_50_percent), Some(config_95_percent), Some(config_100_percent)]);
8337         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8338
8339         let channel_value_satoshis = 100000;
8340         let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8341         let channel_value_30_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.3) as u64;
8342         let channel_value_50_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.5) as u64;
8343         let channel_value_90_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.9) as u64;
8344
8345         let (node_0_chan_update, node_1_chan_update, _, _)  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value_satoshis, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8346         let (node_2_chan_update, node_3_chan_update, _, _)  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, channel_value_satoshis, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8347
8348         // Assert that `node[0]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 50 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8349         // that's the value of `node[1]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
8350         assert_eq!(node_0_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_50_percent_msat);
8351         // Assert that `node[1]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 30 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8352         // that's the value of `node[0]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
8353         assert_eq!(node_1_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_30_percent_msat);
8354
8355         // Assert that `node[2]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8356         // the value of `node[3]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (100%), exceeds 90% of the
8357         // `channel_value`.
8358         assert_eq!(node_2_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
8359         // Assert that `node[3]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8360         // the value of `node[2]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (95%), exceeds 90% of the
8361         // `channel_value`.
8362         assert_eq!(node_3_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
8363 }
8364
8365 #[test]
8366 fn test_manually_accept_inbound_channel_request() {
8367         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8368         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8369         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8370         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8371         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8372         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8373
8374         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8375         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8376
8377         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8378
8379         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8380         // accepting the inbound channel request.
8381         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8382
8383         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8384         match events[0] {
8385                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8386                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap();
8387                 }
8388                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8389         }
8390
8391         let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8392         assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8393
8394         match accept_msg_ev[0] {
8395                 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
8396                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8397                 }
8398                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8399         }
8400
8401         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8402
8403         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8404         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8405
8406         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8407         match events[0] {
8408                 Event::ChannelClosed { user_channel_id, .. } => {
8409                         assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 23);
8410                 }
8411                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8412         }
8413 }
8414
8415 #[test]
8416 fn test_manually_reject_inbound_channel_request() {
8417         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8418         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8419         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8420         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8421         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8422         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8423
8424         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8425         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8426
8427         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8428
8429         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8430         // rejecting the inbound channel request.
8431         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8432
8433         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8434         match events[0] {
8435                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8436                         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8437                 }
8438                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8439         }
8440
8441         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8442         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8443
8444         match close_msg_ev[0] {
8445                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => {
8446                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8447                 }
8448                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8449         }
8450         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8451 }
8452
8453 #[test]
8454 fn test_reject_funding_before_inbound_channel_accepted() {
8455         // This tests that when `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` is set to true, inbound
8456         // channels must to be manually accepted through `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel` by
8457         // the node operator before the counterparty sends a `FundingCreated` message. If a
8458         // `FundingCreated` message is received before the channel is accepted, it should be rejected
8459         // and the channel should be closed.
8460         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8461         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8462         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8463         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8464         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8465         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8466
8467         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8468         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8469         let temp_channel_id = res.temporary_channel_id;
8470
8471         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8472
8473         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in the `msg_events`.
8474         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8475
8476         // Clear the `Event::OpenChannelRequest` event without responding to the request.
8477         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8478
8479         // Get the `AcceptChannel` message of `nodes[1]` without calling
8480         // `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`, which generates a
8481         // `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` event. The message is passed to `nodes[0]`
8482         // `handle_accept_channel`, which is required in order for `create_funding_transaction` to
8483         // succeed when `nodes[0]` is passed to it.
8484         let accept_chan_msg = {
8485                 let mut lock;
8486                 let channel = get_channel_ref!(&nodes[1], lock, temp_channel_id);
8487                 channel.get_accept_channel_message()
8488         };
8489         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_chan_msg);
8490
8491         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8492
8493         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8494         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8495
8496         // The `funding_created_msg` should be rejected by `nodes[1]` as it hasn't accepted the channel
8497         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8498
8499         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8500         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8501
8502         let expected_err = "FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted";
8503         match close_msg_ev[0] {
8504                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id, } => {
8505                         assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, temp_channel_id);
8506                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8507                         assert_eq!(msg.data, expected_err);
8508                 }
8509                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8510         }
8511
8512         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
8513 }
8514
8515 #[test]
8516 fn test_can_not_accept_inbound_channel_twice() {
8517         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8518         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8519         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8520         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8521         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8522         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8523
8524         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8525         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8526
8527         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8528
8529         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8530         // accepting the inbound channel request.
8531         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8532
8533         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8534         match events[0] {
8535                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8536                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0).unwrap();
8537                         let api_res = nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
8538                         match api_res {
8539                                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8540                                         assert_eq!(err, "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.");
8541                                 },
8542                                 Ok(_) => panic!("Channel shouldn't be possible to be accepted twice"),
8543                                 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8544                         }
8545                 }
8546                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8547         }
8548
8549         // Ensure that the channel wasn't closed after attempting to accept it twice.
8550         let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8551         assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8552
8553         match accept_msg_ev[0] {
8554                 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
8555                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8556                 }
8557                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8558         }
8559 }
8560
8561 #[test]
8562 fn test_can_not_accept_unknown_inbound_channel() {
8563         let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8564         let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
8565         let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
8566         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
8567
8568         let unknown_channel_id = [0; 32];
8569         let api_res = nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&unknown_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
8570         match api_res {
8571                 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
8572                         assert_eq!(err, "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist");
8573                 },
8574                 Ok(_) => panic!("It shouldn't be possible to accept an unkown channel"),
8575                 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8576         }
8577 }
8578
8579 #[test]
8580 fn test_simple_mpp() {
8581         // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
8582         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8583         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8584         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8585         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8586
8587         let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8588         let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8589         let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8590         let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8591
8592         let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8593         let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8594         route.paths.push(path);
8595         route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8596         route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8597         route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8598         route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8599         route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8600         route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8601         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
8602         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
8603 }
8604
8605 #[test]
8606 fn test_preimage_storage() {
8607         // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
8608         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8609         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8610         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8611         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8612
8613         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8614
8615         {
8616                 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
8617                 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8618                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8619                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8620                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8621                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8622                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8623                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8624         }
8625         // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8626         // values from previous calls.
8627         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8628         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8629         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8630         match events[0] {
8631                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref purpose, .. } => {
8632                         match &purpose {
8633                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
8634                                         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
8635                                 },
8636                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
8637                         }
8638                 },
8639                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8640         }
8641 }
8642
8643 #[test]
8644 #[allow(deprecated)]
8645 fn test_secret_timeout() {
8646         // Simple test of payment secret storage time outs. After
8647         // `create_inbound_payment(_for_hash)_legacy` is removed, this test will be removed as well.
8648         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8649         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8650         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8651         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8652
8653         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8654
8655         let (payment_hash, payment_secret_1) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_legacy(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8656
8657         // We should fail to register the same payment hash twice, at least until we've connected a
8658         // block with time 7200 + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1.
8659         if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8660                 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8661         } else { panic!(); }
8662         let mut block = {
8663                 let node_1_blocks = nodes[1].blocks.lock().unwrap();
8664                 Block {
8665                         header: BlockHeader {
8666                                 version: 0x2000000,
8667                                 prev_blockhash: node_1_blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(),
8668                                 merkle_root: Default::default(),
8669                                 time: node_1_blocks.len() as u32 + 7200, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8670                         txdata: vec![],
8671                 }
8672         };
8673         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8674         if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8675                 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8676         } else { panic!(); }
8677
8678         // If we then connect the second block, we should be able to register the same payment hash
8679         // again (this time getting a new payment secret).
8680         block.header.prev_blockhash = block.header.block_hash();
8681         block.header.time += 1;
8682         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8683         let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8684         assert_ne!(payment_secret_1, our_payment_secret);
8685
8686         {
8687                 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8688                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8689                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8690                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8691                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8692                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8693                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8694         }
8695         // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8696         // values from previous calls.
8697         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8698         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8699         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8700         match events[0] {
8701                 Event::PaymentReceived { purpose: PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret }, .. } => {
8702                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
8703                         assert_eq!(payment_secret, our_payment_secret);
8704                         // We don't actually have the payment preimage with which to claim this payment!
8705                 },
8706                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8707         }
8708 }
8709
8710 #[test]
8711 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8712         // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8713         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8714         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8715         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8716         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8717
8718         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8719
8720         let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8721         let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8722         let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8723         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8724
8725         // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8726         // resulting events.
8727         macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8728                 ($payment_hash: expr) => {
8729                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8730                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8731                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8732                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8733                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8734
8735                         // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8736                         // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8737                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8738                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash: $payment_hash }]);
8739                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8740
8741                         // We should fail the payment back
8742                         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8743                         match events.pop().unwrap() {
8744                                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8745                                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8746                                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8747                                 },
8748                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8749                         }
8750                 }
8751         }
8752
8753         let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8754         // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8755         let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8756
8757         // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8758         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8759         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(our_payment_hash);
8760         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8761
8762         // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8763         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8764         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8765         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8766
8767         // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8768         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8769         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8770         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8771 }
8772
8773 #[test]
8774 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8775         // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8776         // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8777         // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateErr.
8778         //
8779         // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8780         // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8781         // commitment at same time.
8782
8783         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8784         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8785         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8786         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8787
8788         // Create some initial channel
8789         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8790         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8791
8792         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8793         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8794
8795         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8796         let (preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
8797
8798         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8799         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8800         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8801         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8802         let watchtower = {
8803                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8804                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8805                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8806                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8807                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8808                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8809                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8810                 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8811                 watchtower
8812         };
8813         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8814         let block = Block { header, txdata: vec![] };
8815         // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8816         // transaction lock time requirements here.
8817         chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (block.clone(), 0));
8818         watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, 200);
8819
8820         // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8821         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage);
8822         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8823         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
8824
8825         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8826         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8827         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8828         if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8829                 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8830                         if let Err(_) =  watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8831                         if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8832                 } else { assert!(false); }
8833         } else { assert!(false); };
8834         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8835         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8836         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8837         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8838 }
8839
8840 #[test]
8841 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8842         // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8843         // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8844         // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8845         // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8846
8847         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8848         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8849         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8850         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8851
8852         // Create some initial channel
8853         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8854         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8855
8856         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8857         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8858
8859         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8860         route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8861
8862         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8863         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8864         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8865         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8866         let watchtower_alice = {
8867                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8868                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8869                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8870                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8871                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8872                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8873                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8874                 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8875                 watchtower
8876         };
8877         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8878         let block = Block { header, txdata: vec![] };
8879         // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8880         // transaction lock time requirements here.
8881         chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as usize, (block.clone(), 0));
8882         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8883
8884         // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8885         {
8886                 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8887                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8888                 txn.clear();
8889         }
8890
8891         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8892         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8893         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8894         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8895         let watchtower_bob = {
8896                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8897                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8898                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8899                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8900                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8901                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8902                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8903                 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8904                 watchtower
8905         };
8906         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8907         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8908
8909         // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8910         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8911         {
8912                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8913         }
8914         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8915
8916         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8917         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8918         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8919         if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8920                 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8921                         // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8922                         if let Err(_) =  watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8923                         if let Ok(_) = watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8924                         if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8925                 } else { assert!(false); }
8926         } else { assert!(false); };
8927         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8928         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8929
8930         //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8931         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8932         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8933
8934         // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8935         let bob_state_y;
8936         {
8937                 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8938                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8939                 bob_state_y = txn[0].clone();
8940                 txn.clear();
8941         };
8942
8943         // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8944         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8945         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![bob_state_y.clone()] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8946         {
8947                 let htlc_txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8948                 // We broadcast twice the transaction, once due to the HTLC-timeout, once due
8949                 // the onchain detection of the HTLC output
8950                 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
8951                 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8952                 check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], bob_state_y);
8953         }
8954 }
8955
8956 #[test]
8957 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8958         // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8959         // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8960         // message).
8961         //
8962         // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8963         // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8964         //
8965         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8966         // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8967         // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8968         // before receiving funding_signed.
8969         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8970         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8971         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8972         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8973
8974         // Create an initial channel
8975         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8976         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8977         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8978         let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8979         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_chan_msg);
8980
8981         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8982         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8983
8984         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8985         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8986
8987         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8988         let channel_id = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
8989         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8990         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8991         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Hi".to_string() }, true);
8992 }
8993
8994 #[test]
8995 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8996         // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8997         // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8998         // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8999         // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
9000         // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
9001         // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
9002
9003         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9004         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9005         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9006         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9007
9008         // Create some initial channels
9009         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9010
9011         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
9012         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
9013         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
9014         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9015         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
9016         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
9017
9018         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
9019         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9020         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] });
9021         // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
9022         // this test before #653 fix.
9023         chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
9024         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
9025         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9026         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
9027         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
9028
9029         let htlc_timeout = {
9030                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9031                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
9032                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9033                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
9034                 node_txn[1].clone()
9035         };
9036
9037         let header_201 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9038         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_201, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout.clone()] });
9039         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
9040         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
9041 }
9042
9043 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
9044         // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
9045         // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
9046         // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
9047         //
9048         // Steps of the test:
9049         // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
9050         // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
9051         // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
9052         // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
9053         // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
9054         //    but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
9055         // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
9056         // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
9057         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9058         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9059         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9060         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9061
9062         // Create some initial channels
9063         let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9064         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9065
9066         // Steps (1) and (2):
9067         // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
9068         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
9069
9070         // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
9071         let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
9072         check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
9073         assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
9074         check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
9075         assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9076         assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
9077
9078         // Steps (3) and (4):
9079         // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
9080         // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
9081         let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
9082         let mut counterparty_node = 1; // Bob if Alice force-closes
9083
9084         // Bob force-closes
9085         if !broadcast_alice {
9086                 force_closing_node = 1;
9087                 counterparty_node = 0;
9088         }
9089         nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_ab.2, &nodes[counterparty_node].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9090         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
9091         check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
9092         check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9093         if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9094                 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
9095                         true => alice_txn.clone(),
9096                         false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
9097                 };
9098                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
9099                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
9100                 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
9101                 if broadcast_alice {
9102                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9103                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9104                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
9105                 }
9106                 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
9107                 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
9108         }
9109
9110         // Step (5):
9111         // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
9112         // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
9113         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9114         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9115         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
9116
9117         let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9118         assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9119         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9120         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9121         assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
9122         assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
9123
9124         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9125         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false, false);
9126         // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
9127         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
9128                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9129                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9130                 match events[0] {
9131                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
9132                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9133                         },
9134                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9135                 };
9136         }
9137         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
9138         // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
9139         // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
9140         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9141
9142         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9143         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9144         let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
9145                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
9146                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9147                         (*msg).clone()
9148                 },
9149                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9150         };
9151         let bob_updates = match events[1] {
9152                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
9153                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9154                         (*updates).clone()
9155                 },
9156                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9157         };
9158
9159         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
9160         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9161         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
9162         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9163
9164         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9165         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9166         let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
9167                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
9168                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9169                         (*msg).clone()
9170                 },
9171                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9172         };
9173         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
9174         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9175
9176         // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
9177         // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
9178         let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
9179         if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
9180         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9181                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
9182                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
9183                 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
9184                 if broadcast_alice {
9185                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9186                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9187                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
9188                 }
9189                 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9190                 if broadcast_alice {
9191                         // In `connect_block()`, the ChainMonitor and ChannelManager are separately notified about a
9192                         // new block being connected. The ChannelManager being notified triggers a monitor update,
9193                         // which triggers broadcasting our commitment tx and an HTLC-claiming tx. The ChainMonitor
9194                         // being notified triggers the HTLC-claiming tx redundantly, resulting in 3 total txs being
9195                         // broadcasted.
9196                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 3);
9197                         check_spends!(bob_txn[1], chan_ab.3);
9198                 } else {
9199                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
9200                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
9201                 }
9202         }
9203
9204         // Step (6):
9205         // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
9206         // broadcasted commitment transaction.
9207         {
9208                 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
9209                 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9210                         // Bob should now have an extra broadcasted tx, for the preimage-claiming transaction.
9211                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
9212                 }
9213                 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
9214                         true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
9215                         false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
9216                 };
9217                 // If Alice force-closed and Bob didn't receive her commitment transaction until after he
9218                 // received Carol's fulfill, he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction first. Else if
9219                 // Bob force closed or if he found out about Alice's commitment tx before receiving Carol's
9220                 // fulfill, then he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction second.
9221                 if broadcast_alice && !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9222                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
9223                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
9224                 } else {
9225                         check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
9226                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
9227                 }
9228         }
9229 }
9230
9231 #[test]
9232 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
9233         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
9234         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
9235         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
9236         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
9237 }
9238
9239 #[test]
9240 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
9241         // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
9242         // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
9243         //
9244         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
9245         // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
9246         // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
9247         // updating logic for the existing channel.
9248         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9249         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9250         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9251         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9252
9253         // Create an initial channel
9254         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
9255         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9256         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
9257         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9258
9259         // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
9260         // that it is rejected.
9261         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
9262         {
9263                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9264                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9265                 match events[0] {
9266                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9267                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
9268                                 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
9269                                 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
9270                                 // move forward with it.
9271                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9272                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9273                         },
9274                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9275                 }
9276         }
9277
9278         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
9279         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
9280
9281         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9282         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9283
9284         let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9285         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9286         {
9287                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9288                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
9289                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
9290                 added_monitors.clear();
9291         }
9292         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9293
9294         let funding_outpoint = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
9295         let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
9296
9297         // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
9298         // temporary one).
9299
9300         // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
9301         // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
9302         // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
9303         open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
9304         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
9305         {
9306                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9307                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9308                 match events[0] {
9309                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9310                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
9311                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
9312                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9313                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9314                         },
9315                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9316                 }
9317         }
9318
9319         // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
9320         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
9321         let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9322         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_2_msg);
9323         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9324         create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
9325
9326         let funding_created = {
9327                 let mut a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
9328                 // Once we call `get_outbound_funding_created` the channel has a duplicate channel_id as
9329                 // another channel in the ChannelManager - an invalid state. Thus, we'd panic later when we
9330                 // try to create another channel. Instead, we drop the channel entirely here (leaving the
9331                 // channelmanager in a possibly nonsense state instead).
9332                 let mut as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.remove(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
9333                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9334                 as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
9335         };
9336         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9337         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
9338         // At this point we'll try to add a duplicate channel monitor, which will be rejected, but
9339         // still needs to be cleared here.
9340         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9341
9342         // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
9343         {
9344                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9345                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9346                 match events[0] {
9347                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9348                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
9349                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
9350                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
9351                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9352                         },
9353                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9354                 }
9355         }
9356
9357         // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
9358         // everything is functional.
9359         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
9360         {
9361                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9362                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
9363                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
9364                 added_monitors.clear();
9365         }
9366
9367         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9368         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
9369         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9370         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9371
9372         let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9373         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9374         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9375         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
9376 }
9377
9378 #[test]
9379 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
9380         // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
9381         //
9382         // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
9383         // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
9384         // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
9385         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9386         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9387         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9388         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9389
9390         // Create some initial channels
9391         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9392         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9393         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9394
9395         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9396         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9397         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9398
9399         // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
9400         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9401         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9402
9403         // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
9404         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9405         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9406         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
9407         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
9408         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
9409         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9410         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
9411         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9412
9413         // A null channel ID should close all channels
9414         let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9415         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9416         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9417         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
9418         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9419         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9420         match events[0] {
9421                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9422                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9423                 },
9424                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9425         }
9426         match events[1] {
9427                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9428                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9429                 },
9430                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9431         }
9432         // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
9433         // peer_disconnected with no_connection_possible set to false, duplicating the
9434         // close-all-channels logic. That's OK, we don't want to end up not force-closing channels for
9435         // users with their own peer handling logic. We duplicate the call here, however.
9436         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9437         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9438
9439         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
9440         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9441         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9442 }
9443
9444 #[test]
9445 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
9446         // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
9447         //
9448         // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
9449         // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
9450         // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
9451         // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
9452         //
9453         // Further, if the funding transaction is consensus-valid, confirms, and is later spent, we'd
9454         // previously have crashed in `ChannelMonitor` even though we closed the channel as bogus and
9455         // gave up on it. We test this here by generating such a transaction.
9456         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9457         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9458         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9459         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9460
9461         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9462         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9463         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9464
9465         let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
9466
9467         // Create a witness program which can be spent by a 4-empty-stack-elements witness and which is
9468         // 136 bytes long. This matches our "accepted HTLC preimage spend" matching, previously causing
9469         // a panic as we'd try to extract a 32 byte preimage from a witness element without checking
9470         // its length.
9471         let mut wit_program: Vec<u8> = channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program();
9472         assert!(chan_utils::HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(wit_program.len()).unwrap() ==
9473                 chan_utils::HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC);
9474
9475         let wit_program_script: Script = wit_program.clone().into();
9476         for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
9477                 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
9478                 output.script_pubkey = Script::new_v0_p2wsh(&wit_program_script.wscript_hash());
9479         }
9480
9481         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
9482         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9483         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9484
9485         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9486         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9487
9488         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9489         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
9490
9491         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9492         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9493         nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
9494
9495         let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
9496         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
9497         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
9498         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9499         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9500         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
9501         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
9502                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9503                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
9504                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
9505                 } else { panic!(); }
9506         } else { panic!(); }
9507         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
9508
9509         // Now confirm a spend of the (bogus) funding transaction. As long as the witness is 5 elements
9510         // long the ChannelMonitor will try to read 32 bytes from the second-to-last element, panicing
9511         // as its not 32 bytes long.
9512         let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
9513                 version: 2i32, lock_time: 0,
9514                 input: tx.output.iter().enumerate().map(|(idx, _)| TxIn {
9515                         previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
9516                                 txid: tx.txid(),
9517                                 vout: idx as u32,
9518                         },
9519                         script_sig: Script::new(),
9520                         sequence: 0xfffffffd,
9521                         witness: Witness::from_vec(channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness())
9522                 }).collect(),
9523                 output: vec![TxOut {
9524                         value: 1000,
9525                         script_pubkey: Script::new(),
9526                 }]
9527         };
9528         check_spends!(spend_tx, tx);
9529         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &spend_tx);
9530 }
9531
9532 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
9533         // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
9534         // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
9535         // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
9536         // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
9537         // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
9538         // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
9539         // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
9540         // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
9541         // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
9542         // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
9543         // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
9544         // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
9545         // until we learned about an additional block.
9546         //
9547         // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
9548         // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
9549         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9550         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9551         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9552         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9553         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
9554
9555         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9556         let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9557         let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
9558         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9559         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9560
9561         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9562         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9563         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9564         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9565         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9566         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
9567
9568         let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
9569         if !test_height_before_timelock {
9570                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
9571         }
9572         nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9573                 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
9574         if test_height_before_timelock {
9575                 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
9576                 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
9577                 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
9578                 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9579         } else {
9580                 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
9581                 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9582                 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
9583                 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
9584                 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
9585                 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
9586                 // timelock is up).
9587                 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
9588                 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
9589
9590                 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
9591                 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
9592                 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
9593                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9594                         &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
9595                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: channel_id }]);
9596                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9597
9598                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9599                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9600                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9601                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9602                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9603                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9604                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9605                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9606                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
9607         }
9608 }
9609
9610 #[test]
9611 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
9612         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
9613         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
9614 }
9615
9616 #[test]
9617 fn test_forwardable_regen() {
9618         // Tests that if we reload a ChannelManager while forwards are pending we will regenerate the
9619         // PendingHTLCsForwardable event automatically, ensuring we don't forget to forward/receive
9620         // HTLCs.
9621         // We test it for both payment receipt and payment forwarding.
9622
9623         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9624         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9625         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9626         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
9627         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
9628         let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
9629         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9630         let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9631         let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9632
9633         // First send a payment to nodes[1]
9634         let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
9635         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9636         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9637
9638         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9639         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9640         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9641         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9642         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9643
9644         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9645
9646         // Next send a payment which is forwarded by nodes[1]
9647         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 200_000);
9648         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
9649         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9650
9651         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9652         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9653         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9654         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9655         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9656
9657         // There is already a PendingHTLCsForwardable event "pending" so another one will not be
9658         // generated
9659         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9660
9661         // Now restart nodes[1] and make sure it regenerates a single PendingHTLCsForwardable
9662         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9663         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9664
9665         let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
9666         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9667         let mut chan_1_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9668         get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_1).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9669         get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_2).write(&mut chan_1_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9670
9671         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
9672         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
9673         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
9674         nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
9675
9676         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9677         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9678                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9679         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
9680         let mut chan_1_monitor_read = &chan_1_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9681         let (_, mut chan_1_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9682                 &mut chan_1_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9683         assert!(chan_1_monitor_read.is_empty());
9684
9685         let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
9686         let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
9687                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
9688                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
9689                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_1_monitor);
9690                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
9691                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
9692                         keys_manager,
9693                         fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
9694                         chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
9695                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
9696                         logger: nodes[1].logger,
9697                         channel_monitors,
9698                 }).unwrap()
9699         };
9700         nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
9701         assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
9702
9703         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
9704         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_1_monitor).is_ok());
9705         nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
9706         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9707
9708         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9709         // Note that nodes[1] and nodes[2] resend their channel_ready here since they haven't updated
9710         // the commitment state.
9711         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9712
9713         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9714
9715         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9716         expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 100_000);
9717         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9718
9719         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9720         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9721         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9722         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9723         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9724         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9725         expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 200_000);
9726
9727         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
9728         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage_2);
9729 }
9730
9731 fn do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(test_for_second_fail_panic: bool) {
9732         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9733         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9734         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9735         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9736
9737         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9738
9739         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
9740                 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
9741         let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
9742
9743         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
9744
9745         {
9746                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
9747                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9748                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9749                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9750                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9751                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9752                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9753         }
9754         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9755         expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 10_000);
9756
9757         {
9758                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
9759                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9760                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9761                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9762                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9763                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9764                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9765                 // At this point, nodes[1] would notice it has too much value for the payment. It will
9766                 // assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9767                 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC. Previously, it'd also have failed back
9768                 // the first HTLC delivered above.
9769         }
9770
9771         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9772         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9773
9774         if test_for_second_fail_panic {
9775                 // Now we go fail back the first HTLC from the user end.
9776                 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
9777
9778                 let expected_destinations = vec![
9779                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
9780                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
9781                 ];
9782                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1],  expected_destinations);
9783                 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9784
9785                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9786                 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9787                 assert_eq!(fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 2);
9788
9789                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9790                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
9791                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9792
9793                 let failure_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9794                 assert_eq!(failure_events.len(), 2);
9795                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
9796                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[1] {} else { panic!(); }
9797         } else {
9798                 // Let the second HTLC fail and claim the first
9799                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9800                 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9801
9802                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9803                 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9804                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9805                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9806
9807                 expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9808
9809                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
9810         }
9811 }
9812
9813 #[test]
9814 fn test_dup_htlc_second_fail_panic() {
9815         // Previously, if we received two HTLCs back-to-back, where the second overran the expected
9816         // value for the payment, we'd fail back both HTLCs after generating a `PaymentReceived` event.
9817         // Then, if the user failed the second payment, they'd hit a "tried to fail an already failed
9818         // HTLC" debug panic. This tests for this behavior, checking that only one HTLC is auto-failed.
9819         do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(true);
9820 }
9821
9822 #[test]
9823 fn test_dup_htlc_second_rejected() {
9824         // Test that if we receive a second HTLC for an MPP payment that overruns the payment amount we
9825         // simply reject the second HTLC but are still able to claim the first HTLC.
9826         do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(false);
9827 }
9828
9829 #[test]
9830 fn test_inconsistent_mpp_params() {
9831         // Test that if we recieve two HTLCs with different payment parameters we fail back the first
9832         // such HTLC and allow the second to stay.
9833         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9834         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9835         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9836         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9837
9838         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9839         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9840         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9841         let chan_2_3 =create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9842
9843         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id())
9844                 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
9845         let mut route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 15_000_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
9846         assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9847         route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9848                 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9849                 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9850                         core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9851         });
9852         let payment_params_opt = Some(payment_params);
9853
9854         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[3]);
9855
9856         let cur_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
9857         let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
9858         {
9859                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
9860                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9861
9862                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9863                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9864                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), false, None);
9865         }
9866         assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9867
9868         {
9869                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 14_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
9870                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9871
9872                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9873                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9874                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9875
9876                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9877                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9878
9879                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9880                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9881
9882                 let mut events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9883                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9884                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9885
9886                 nodes[3].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9887                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9888                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg, true, true);
9889
9890                 // At this point, nodes[3] should notice the two HTLCs don't contain the same total payment
9891                 // amount. It will assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9892                 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC.
9893         }
9894         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[3]);
9895         nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9896         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[3], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9897         nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9898
9899         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
9900
9901         let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9902         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9903         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9904
9905         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }]);
9906         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9907
9908         let fail_updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9909         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9910         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], fail_updates_2.commitment_signed, false);
9911
9912         expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9913
9914         nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
9915         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9916
9917         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9918         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9919         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), true, None);
9920
9921         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, our_payment_preimage);
9922 }
9923
9924 #[test]
9925 fn test_keysend_payments_to_public_node() {
9926         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9927         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9928         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9929         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9930
9931         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9932         let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9933         let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9934         let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9935         let route_params = RouteParameters {
9936                 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9937                 final_value_msat: 10000,
9938                 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9939         };
9940         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
9941         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9942         let route = find_route(&payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
9943
9944         let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9945         let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9946         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9947         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9948         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9949         let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9950         let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9951         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9952         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9953 }
9954
9955 #[test]
9956 fn test_keysend_payments_to_private_node() {
9957         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9958         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9959         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9960         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9961
9962         let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9963         let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9964         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
9965         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
9966
9967         let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9968         let route_params = RouteParameters {
9969                 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9970                 final_value_msat: 10000,
9971                 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9972         };
9973         let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9974         let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9975         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
9976         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9977         let route = find_route(
9978                 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9979                 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
9980         ).unwrap();
9981
9982         let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9983         let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9984         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9985         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9986         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9987         let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9988         let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9989         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9990         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9991 }
9992
9993 #[test]
9994 fn test_double_partial_claim() {
9995         // Test what happens if a node receives a payment, generates a PaymentReceived event, the HTLCs
9996         // time out, the sender resends only some of the MPP parts, then the user processes the
9997         // PaymentReceived event, ensuring they don't inadvertently claim only part of the full payment
9998         // amount.
9999         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
10000         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
10001         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
10002         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10003
10004         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
10005         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
10006         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
10007         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
10008
10009         let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], 15_000_000);
10010         assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
10011         route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
10012                 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
10013                 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
10014                         core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
10015         });
10016
10017         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
10018         // nodes[3] has now received a PaymentReceived event...which it will take some (exorbitant)
10019         // amount of time to respond to.
10020
10021         // Connect some blocks to time out the payment
10022         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
10023         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // To get the same height for sending later
10024
10025         let failed_destinations = vec![
10026                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
10027                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
10028         ];
10029         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations);
10030
10031         pass_failed_payment_back(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_hash);
10032
10033         // nodes[1] now retries one of the two paths...
10034         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
10035         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
10036
10037         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10038         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
10039         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
10040
10041         // At this point nodes[3] has received one half of the payment, and the user goes to handle
10042         // that PaymentReceived event they got hours ago and never handled...we should refuse to claim.
10043         nodes[3].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
10044         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
10045         assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
10046 }
10047
10048 fn do_test_partial_claim_before_restart(persist_both_monitors: bool) {
10049         // Test what happens if a node receives an MPP payment, claims it, but crashes before
10050         // persisting the ChannelManager. If `persist_both_monitors` is false, also crash after only
10051         // updating one of the two channels' ChannelMonitors. As a result, on startup, we'll (a) still
10052         // have the PaymentReceived event, (b) have one (or two) channel(s) that goes on chain with the
10053         // HTLC preimage in them, and (c) optionally have one channel that is live off-chain but does
10054         // not have the preimage tied to the still-pending HTLC.
10055         //
10056         // To get to the correct state, on startup we should propagate the preimage to the
10057         // still-off-chain channel, claiming the HTLC as soon as the peer connects, with the monitor
10058         // receiving the preimage without a state update.
10059         //
10060         // Further, we should generate a `PaymentClaimed` event to inform the user that the payment was
10061         // definitely claimed.
10062         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
10063         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
10064         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
10065
10066         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
10067         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
10068         let nodes_3_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
10069
10070         let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10071
10072         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
10073         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
10074         let chan_id_persisted = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
10075         let chan_id_not_persisted = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
10076
10077         // Create an MPP route for 15k sats, more than the default htlc-max of 10%
10078         let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], 15_000_000);
10079         assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
10080         route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
10081                 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
10082                 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
10083                         core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
10084         });
10085
10086         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
10087         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
10088
10089         // Send the payment through to nodes[3] *without* clearing the PaymentReceived event
10090         let mut send_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10091         assert_eq!(send_events.len(), 2);
10092         do_pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), send_events[0].clone(), true, false, None);
10093         do_pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), send_events[1].clone(), true, false, None);
10094
10095         // Now that we have an MPP payment pending, get the latest encoded copies of nodes[3]'s
10096         // monitors and ChannelManager, for use later, if we don't want to persist both monitors.
10097         let mut original_monitor = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
10098         if !persist_both_monitors {
10099                 for outpoint in nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.list_monitors() {
10100                         if outpoint.to_channel_id() == chan_id_not_persisted {
10101                                 assert!(original_monitor.0.is_empty());
10102                                 nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap().write(&mut original_monitor).unwrap();
10103                         }
10104                 }
10105         }
10106
10107         let mut original_manager = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
10108         nodes[3].node.write(&mut original_manager).unwrap();
10109
10110         expect_payment_received!(nodes[3], payment_hash, payment_secret, 15_000_000);
10111
10112         nodes[3].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
10113         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 2);
10114         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[3], payment_hash, 15_000_000);
10115
10116         // Now fetch one of the two updated ChannelMonitors from nodes[3], and restart pretending we
10117         // crashed in between the two persistence calls - using one old ChannelMonitor and one new one,
10118         // with the old ChannelManager.
10119         let mut updated_monitor = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
10120         for outpoint in nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.list_monitors() {
10121                 if outpoint.to_channel_id() == chan_id_persisted {
10122                         assert!(updated_monitor.0.is_empty());
10123                         nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap().write(&mut updated_monitor).unwrap();
10124                 }
10125         }
10126         // If `persist_both_monitors` is set, get the second monitor here as well
10127         if persist_both_monitors {
10128                 for outpoint in nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.list_monitors() {
10129                         if outpoint.to_channel_id() == chan_id_not_persisted {
10130                                 assert!(original_monitor.0.is_empty());
10131                                 nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap().write(&mut original_monitor).unwrap();
10132                         }
10133                 }
10134         }
10135
10136         // Now restart nodes[3].
10137         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
10138         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[3].keys_manager;
10139         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[3].chain_source), nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[3].logger, node_cfgs[3].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
10140         nodes[3].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
10141         let mut monitors = Vec::new();
10142         for mut monitor_data in [original_monitor, updated_monitor].iter() {
10143                 let (_, mut deserialized_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut &monitor_data.0[..], keys_manager).unwrap();
10144                 monitors.push(deserialized_monitor);
10145         }
10146
10147         let config = UserConfig::default();
10148         nodes_3_deserialized = {
10149                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
10150                 for monitor in monitors.iter_mut() {
10151                         channel_monitors.insert(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
10152                 }
10153                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut &original_manager.0[..], ChannelManagerReadArgs {
10154                         default_config: config,
10155                         keys_manager,
10156                         fee_estimator: node_cfgs[3].fee_estimator,
10157                         chain_monitor: nodes[3].chain_monitor,
10158                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
10159                         logger: nodes[3].logger,
10160                         channel_monitors,
10161                 }).unwrap().1
10162         };
10163         nodes[3].node = &nodes_3_deserialized;
10164
10165         for monitor in monitors {
10166                 // On startup the preimage should have been copied into the non-persisted monitor:
10167                 assert!(monitor.get_stored_preimages().contains_key(&payment_hash));
10168                 nodes[3].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.clone(), monitor).unwrap();
10169         }
10170         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 2);
10171
10172         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
10173         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
10174
10175         // During deserialization, we should have closed one channel and broadcast its latest
10176         // commitment transaction. We should also still have the original PaymentReceived event we
10177         // never finished processing.
10178         let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10179         assert_eq!(events.len(), if persist_both_monitors { 4 } else { 3 });
10180         if let Event::PaymentReceived { amount_msat: 15_000_000, .. } = events[0] { } else { panic!(); }
10181         if let Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager, .. } = events[1] { } else { panic!(); }
10182         if persist_both_monitors {
10183                 if let Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager, .. } = events[2] { } else { panic!(); }
10184         }
10185
10186         // On restart, we should also get a duplicate PaymentClaimed event as we persisted the
10187         // ChannelManager prior to handling the original one.
10188         if let Event::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: our_payment_hash, amount_msat: 15_000_000, .. } =
10189                 events[if persist_both_monitors { 3 } else { 2 }]
10190         {
10191                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
10192         } else { panic!(); }
10193
10194         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), if persist_both_monitors { 0 } else { 1 });
10195         if !persist_both_monitors {
10196                 // If one of the two channels is still live, reveal the payment preimage over it.
10197
10198                 nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
10199                 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2]);
10200                 nodes[2].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
10201                 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[3]);
10202
10203                 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
10204                 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
10205                 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
10206
10207                 nodes[3].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
10208
10209                 // Once we call `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` the holding cell is cleared and the HTLC
10210                 // claim should fly.
10211                 let ds_msgs = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10212                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
10213                 assert_eq!(ds_msgs.len(), 2);
10214                 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } = ds_msgs[1] {} else { panic!(); }
10215
10216                 let cs_updates = match ds_msgs[0] {
10217                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
10218                                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10219                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
10220                                 let cs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10221                                 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[2], nodes[0], nodes[3], Some(1000), false, false);
10222                                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
10223                                 cs_updates
10224                         }
10225                         _ => panic!(),
10226                 };
10227
10228                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10229                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], cs_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
10230                 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
10231         }
10232 }
10233
10234 #[test]
10235 fn test_partial_claim_before_restart() {
10236         do_test_partial_claim_before_restart(false);
10237         do_test_partial_claim_before_restart(true);
10238 }
10239
10240 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
10241 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
10242 enum ExposureEvent {
10243         /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
10244         AtHTLCForward,
10245         /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
10246         AtHTLCReception,
10247         /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
10248         AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
10249 }
10250
10251 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool) {
10252         // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
10253         // policy.
10254         //
10255         // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
10256         // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
10257         // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
10258         // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
10259         // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
10260         // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
10261         // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
10262         // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
10263
10264         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10265         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
10266         config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = 5_000_000; // default setting value
10267         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10268         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
10269         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10270
10271         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
10272         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10273         open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
10274         open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
10275         if on_holder_tx {
10276                 open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10277         }
10278         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
10279         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10280         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
10281
10282         let opt_anchors = false;
10283
10284         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
10285
10286         if on_holder_tx {
10287                 if let Some(mut chan) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&temporary_channel_id) {
10288                         chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10289                 }
10290         }
10291
10292         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
10293         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
10294         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10295
10296         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
10297         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10298
10299         let (channel_ready, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
10300         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
10301         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
10302
10303         let dust_buffer_feerate = {
10304                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
10305                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
10306                 chan.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64
10307         };
10308         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
10309         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
10310
10311         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
10312         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
10313
10314         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 25;
10315         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
10316
10317         if on_holder_tx {
10318                 if dust_outbound_balance {
10319                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
10320                         // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
10321                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
10322                         for i in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
10323                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
10324                                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
10325                         }
10326                 } else {
10327                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
10328                         // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
10329                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
10330                         for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
10331                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
10332                         }
10333                 }
10334         } else {
10335                 if dust_outbound_balance {
10336                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
10337                         // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
10338                         for i in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
10339                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
10340                                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
10341                         }
10342                 } else {
10343                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
10344                         // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
10345                         for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
10346                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
10347                         }
10348                 }
10349         }
10350
10351         let dust_overflow = dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx + 1);
10352         if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
10353                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
10354                 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
10355                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
10356                 if on_holder_tx {
10357                         let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
10358                         let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
10359                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
10360                 } else {
10361                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
10362                 }
10363         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
10364                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
10365                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
10366                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10367                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10368                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10369                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
10370                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10371                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
10372                 if on_holder_tx {
10373                         // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
10374                         let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
10375                         let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
10376                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
10377                 } else {
10378                         // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
10379                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
10380                 }
10381         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
10382                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 2_500_000);
10383                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at update_fee-swallowed HTLC", ); }
10384                 {
10385                         let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
10386                         *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
10387                 }
10388                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10389                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10390                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure".to_string(), 1);
10391         }
10392
10393         let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10394         let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
10395         added_monitors.clear();
10396 }
10397
10398 #[test]
10399 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
10400         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
10401         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
10402         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
10403         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
10404         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
10405         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
10406         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
10407         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
10408         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
10409         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
10410         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
10411         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
10412 }
10413
10414 #[test]
10415 fn test_non_final_funding_tx() {
10416         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10417         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10418         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10419         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10420
10421         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10422         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10423         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_message);
10424         let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10425         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel_message);
10426
10427         let best_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
10428
10429         let chan_id = *nodes[0].network_chan_count.borrow();
10430         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10431         let input = TxIn { previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint::null(), script_sig: bitcoin::Script::new(), sequence: 0x1, witness: Witness::from_vec(vec!(vec!(1))) };
10432         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10433         let mut tx = match events[0] {
10434                 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } => {
10435                         // Timelock the transaction _beyond_ the best client height + 2.
10436                         Transaction { version: chan_id as i32, lock_time: best_height + 3, input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut {
10437                                 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
10438                         }]}
10439                 },
10440                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10441         };
10442         // Transaction should fail as it's evaluated as non-final for propagation.
10443         match nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()) {
10444                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
10445                         assert_eq!(format!("Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final"), err);
10446                 },
10447                 _ => panic!()
10448         }
10449
10450         // However, transaction should be accepted if it's in a +2 headroom from best block.
10451         tx.lock_time -= 1;
10452         assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
10453         get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10454 }