git.bitcoin.ninja Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
  11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
  12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
  13
  14 use chain;
  15 use chain::{Confirm, Listen, Watch};
  16 use chain::channelmonitor;
  17 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
  18 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  19 use chain::keysinterface::BaseSign;
  20 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
  21 use ln::channel::{COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC};
  22 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA};
  23 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
  24 use ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
  25 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
  26 use routing::network_graph::{NetworkUpdate, RoutingFees};
  27 use routing::router::{Payee, Route, RouteHop, RouteHint, RouteHintHop, RouteParameters, find_route, get_route};
  28 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures, NodeFeatures};
  29 use ln::msgs;
  30 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
  31 use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
  32 use util::{byte_utils, test_utils};
  33 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason};
  34 use util::errors::APIError;
  35 use util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
  36 use util::config::UserConfig;
  37
  38 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
  39 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
  40 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
  41 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  42 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
  43 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
  44
  45 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
  46 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
  47
  48 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
  49 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
  50
  51 use regex;
  52
  53 use io;
  54 use prelude::*;
  55 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
  56 use core::default::Default;
  57 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
  58
  59 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
  60 use ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
  61
  62 #[test]
  63 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
  64         // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
  65         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
  66         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
  67         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
  68         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
  69
  70         // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
  71         // funding satoshis
  72         let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
  73         let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat);
  74         let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
  75
  76         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
  77         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
  78
  79         // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
  80         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
  81
  82         // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
  83         // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
  84         let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
  85                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
  86                 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
  87                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
  88                 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
  89                 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
  90                         match action {
  91                                 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
  92                                         nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), expected_regex, 1);
  93                                 },
  94                                 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
  95                         }
  96                 } else { assert!(false); }
  97         };
  98
  99         use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
 100         use ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
 101
 102         // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
 103         insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than {}. It was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS; msg });
 104
 105         insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
 106
 107         insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than funding value \d+", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
 108
 109         insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
 110
 111         insane_open_helper(r"Bogus; channel reserve \(\d+\) is less than dust limit \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.channel_reserve_satoshis + 1; msg });
 112
 113         insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
 114
 115         insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
 116
 117         insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
 118
 119         insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
 120 }
 121
 122 #[test]
 123 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
 124         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 125         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 126         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 127         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 128         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 129
 130         // balancing
 131         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 132
 133         // A                                        B
 134         // update_fee                            ->
 135         // send (1) commitment_signed            -.
 136         //                                       <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
 137         // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
 138         // (1) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 139         //                                       .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
 140         // (2) RAA is delivered                  ->
 141         //                                       .- send (4) commitment_signed
 142         //                                       <- (3) RAA is delivered
 143         // send (5) commitment_signed            -.
 144         //                                       <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
 145         // send (6) RAA                          -.
 146         // (5) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 147         //                                       <- RAA
 148         // (6) RAA is delivered                  ->
 149
 150         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 151         {
 152                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 153                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 154         }
 155         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 156         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 157
 158         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 159         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 160         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 161                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 162                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 163                 },
 164                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 165         };
 166
 167         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 168
 169         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 170         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 171         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
 172         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 173
 174         let payment_event = {
 175                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 176                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 177                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 178         };
 179         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 180         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 181
 182         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 183         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 184         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 185         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 186         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 187         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 188
 189         // deliver(1), generate (3):
 190         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 191         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 192         // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 193         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 194
 195         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
 196         let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 197         assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 198         assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 199         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 200         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 201         assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
 202         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 203
 204         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
 205         let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 206         assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 207         assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 208         assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 209         assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 210         assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
 211         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 212
 213         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
 214         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 215         // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 216         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 217
 218         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
 219         let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 220         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 221
 222         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 223         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 224
 225         let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 226         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
 227         match events_2[0] {
 228                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
 229                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 230         }
 231
 232         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
 233         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 234 }
 235
 236 #[test]
 237 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
 238         // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
 239         // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
 240         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 241         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 242         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 243         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 244         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 245
 246         // balancing
 247         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 248
 249         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 250         {
 251                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 252                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 253         }
 254         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 255         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 256
 257         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 258         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 259         let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 260                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
 261                         update_fee.as_ref()
 262                 },
 263                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 264         };
 265
 266         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 267
 268         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 269         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 270         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
 271         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 272
 273         let payment_event = {
 274                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 275                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 276                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 277         };
 278         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 279         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 280
 281         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 282         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 283         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 284         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 285         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 286         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 287
 288         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
 289         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 290
 291         // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
 292 }
 293
 294 #[test]
 295 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
 296         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 297         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 298         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 299         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 300         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 301
 302         // A                                        B
 303         // update_fee/commitment_signed          ->
 304         //                                       .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
 305         // update_fee (never committed)          ->
 306         // (3) update_fee                        ->
 307         // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
 308         // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
 309         // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
 310         //                                       <- (1) RAA delivered
 311         // (3) is generated and send (4) CS      -.
 312         // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
 313         // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
 314         //                                       <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
 315         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 316         //                                          B should send no response here
 317         // (4) commitment_signed delivered       ->
 318         //                                       <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
 319         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 320
 321         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 322         let initial_feerate;
 323         {
 324                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 325                 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
 326                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
 327         }
 328         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 329         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 330
 331         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 332         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 333         let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 334                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 335                         (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
 336                 },
 337                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 338         };
 339
 340         // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
 341         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
 342         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
 343         let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 344         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 345
 346         // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
 347         // transaction:
 348         {
 349                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 350                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
 351         }
 352         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 353         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 354         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 355
 356         // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
 357         let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
 358                 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
 359                 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
 360         };
 361
 362         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 363
 364         update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
 365         // Deliver (3)
 366         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 367
 368         // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
 369         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
 370         let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 371         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 372         assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 373         assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 374         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 375         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 376         // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
 377         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
 378         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
 379
 380         // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
 381         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
 382         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 383         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 384         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 385
 386         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
 387         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 388         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 389
 390         // Delever (4)
 391         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
 392         let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 393         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 394
 395         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 396         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 397         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 398
 399         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
 400         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 401         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 402         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 403
 404         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
 405         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 406         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 407 }
 408
 409 fn do_test_1_conf_open(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
 410         // Previously, if the minium_depth config was set to 1, we'd never send a funding_locked. This
 411         // tests that we properly send one in that case.
 412         let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
 413         alice_config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
 414         alice_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
 415         alice_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
 416         let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
 417         bob_config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
 418         bob_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
 419         bob_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
 420         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 421         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 422         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)]);
 423         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 424         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
 425
 426         let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 427         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
 428         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
 429
 430         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
 431         let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
 432         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
 433
 434         for node in nodes {
 435                 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
 436                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
 437                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
 438         }
 439 }
 440 #[test]
 441 fn test_1_conf_open() {
 442         do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst);
 443         do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirst);
 444         do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
 445 }
 446
 447 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
 448         // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
 449         // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
 450         // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
 451         // Node objects.
 452
 453         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 454         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 455         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 456         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 457
 458         if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
 459                 let block = Block {
 460                         header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
 461                         txdata: vec![],
 462                 };
 463                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
 464                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
 465         }
 466
 467         if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
 468         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
 469         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 470
 471         if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
 472         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
 473         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 474
 475         if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
 476         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
 477
 478         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
 479
 480         if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
 481         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
 482         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 483         let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 484
 485         if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
 486         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
 487         {
 488                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 489                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 490                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 491                 added_monitors.clear();
 492         }
 493         let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 494
 495         if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
 496         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
 497         {
 498                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 499                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 500                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 501                 added_monitors.clear();
 502         }
 503
 504         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 505         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
 506
 507         if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
 508         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
 509
 510         if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
 511         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
 512         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
 513         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
 514 }
 515
 516 #[test]
 517 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
 518         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
 519         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
 520         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
 521         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
 522         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
 523         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
 524         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
 525         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
 526         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
 527         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
 528         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
 529         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
 530         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
 531         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
 532         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
 533         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
 534         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
 535         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
 536 }
 537
 538 #[test]
 539 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
 540         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 541         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 542         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 543         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 544         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 545
 546         {
 547                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 548                 *feerate_lock += 25;
 549         }
 550         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 551         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 552
 553         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 554         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 555         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 556                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 557                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 558                 },
 559                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 560         };
 561         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 562
 563         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 564         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 565         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 566
 567         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 568         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 569         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 570
 571         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 572         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 573         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 574         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 575
 576         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 577         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 578         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 579 }
 580
 581 #[test]
 582 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
 583         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 584         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 585         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 586         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 587         let channel_value = 1977;
 588         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 700000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 589         let channel_id = chan.2;
 590         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 591
 592         let feerate = 260;
 593         {
 594                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 595                 *feerate_lock = feerate;
 596         }
 597         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 598         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 599         let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 600
 601         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
 602
 603         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
 604
 605         //Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate of 260 set above.
 606         //This value results in a fee that is exactly what the funder can afford (277 sat + 1000 sat channel reserve)
 607         {
 608                 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
 609
 610                 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit so -2 non-HTLC txns from number of outputs
 611                 let num_htlcs = commitment_tx.output.len() - 2;
 612                 let total_fee: u64 = feerate as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
 613                 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
 614                 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
 615                 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
 616         }
 617
 618         //Add 2 to the previous fee rate to the final fee increases by 1 (with no HTLCs the fee is essentially
 619         //fee_rate*(724/1000) so the increment of 1*0.724 is rounded back down)
 620         {
 621                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 622                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 2;
 623         }
 624         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 625         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 2), 1);
 626         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 627
 628         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
 629
 630         // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
 631         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
 632         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
 633                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 634                 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 635                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 636                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
 637                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 638                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 639         };
 640         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
 641                 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 642                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 643                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
 644                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
 645                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 646                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
 647                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 648         };
 649
 650         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
 651         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
 652                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
 653
 654         let res = {
 655                 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 656                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 657                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 658                 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
 659                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
 660                         INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
 661                         700,
 662                         999,
 663                         false, local_funding, remote_funding,
 664                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
 665                         feerate + 124,
 666                         &mut htlcs,
 667                         &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
 668                 );
 669                 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap()
 670         };
 671
 672         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
 673                 channel_id: chan.2,
 674                 signature: res.0,
 675                 htlc_signatures: res.1
 676         };
 677
 678         let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
 679                 channel_id: chan.2,
 680                 feerate_per_kw: feerate + 124,
 681         };
 682
 683         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
 684
 685         //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
 686         //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
 687         //Should produce and error.
 688         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
 689         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
 690         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 691         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 692         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") });
 693 }
 694
 695 #[test]
 696 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
 697         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 698         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 699         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 700         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 701         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 702
 703         // balancing
 704         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 705
 706         {
 707                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 708                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 709         }
 710         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 711         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 712
 713         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 714         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 715         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 716                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 717                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 718                 },
 719                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 720         };
 721         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 722         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 723         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 724         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 725
 726         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
 727
 728         // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
 729         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
 730         {
 731                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 732                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
 733                 added_monitors.clear();
 734         }
 735         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 736         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 737         // node[1] has nothing to do
 738
 739         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 740         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 741         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 742
 743         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 744         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 745         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 746         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 747         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 748         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 749         // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
 750
 751         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 752         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
 753         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
 754         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
 755         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
 756         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
 757
 758         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
 759         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 760         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 761         let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 762
 763         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 764         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 765         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 766
 767         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 768         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 769         let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 770         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 771
 772         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 773         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 774         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 775
 776         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
 777
 778         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 779         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
 780         match events[0] {
 781                 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
 782                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 783         };
 784
 785         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
 786
 787         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
 788         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
 789         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 790         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 791         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 792 }
 793
 794 #[test]
 795 fn test_update_fee() {
 796         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 797         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 798         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 799         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 800         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 801         let channel_id = chan.2;
 802
 803         // A                                        B
 804         // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 805         //                                       <- (2) revoke_and_ack
 806         //                                       .- send (3) commitment_signed
 807         // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 808         //                                       .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
 809         //                                       <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
 810         // send (6) revoke_and_ack               -.
 811         //                                       <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
 812         // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack            ->
 813         //                                       .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
 814         //                                       <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
 815         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 816
 817         // Create and deliver (1)...
 818         let feerate;
 819         {
 820                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 821                 feerate = *feerate_lock;
 822                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
 823         }
 824         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 825         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 826
 827         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 828         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 829         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 830                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 831                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 832                 },
 833                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 834         };
 835         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 836
 837         // Generate (2) and (3):
 838         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 839         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 840         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 841
 842         // Deliver (2):
 843         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 844         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 845         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 846
 847         // Create and deliver (4)...
 848         {
 849                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 850                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
 851         }
 852         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 853         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 854         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 855         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 856         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 857                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 858                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 859                 },
 860                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 861         };
 862
 863         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 864         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 865         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 866         // ... creating (5)
 867         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 868         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 869
 870         // Handle (3), creating (6):
 871         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
 872         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 873         let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 874         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 875
 876         // Deliver (5):
 877         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 878         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 879         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 880
 881         // Deliver (6), creating (7):
 882         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
 883         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 884         assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 885         assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 886         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 887         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 888         assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
 889         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 890
 891         // Deliver (7)
 892         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 893         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 894         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 895         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 896
 897         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 898         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 899         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 900
 901         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
 902         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
 903         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 904         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 905         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 906 }
 907
 908 #[test]
 909 fn fake_network_test() {
 910         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
 911         // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
 912         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
 913         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
 914         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
 915         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 916
 917         // Create some initial channels
 918         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 919         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 920         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 921
 922         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
 923         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 924         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 925         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 926         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 927
 928         // Send some more payments
 929         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
 930         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
 931         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
 932
 933         // Test failure packets
 934         let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
 935         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
 936
 937         // Add a new channel that skips 3
 938         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 939
 940         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
 941         send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
 942         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 943         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 944         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 945         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 946         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 947
 948         // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
 949         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
 950         hops.push(RouteHop {
 951                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
 952                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
 953                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
 954                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
 955                 fee_msat: 0,
 956                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
 957         });
 958         hops.push(RouteHop {
 959                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
 960                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
 961                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
 962                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
 963                 fee_msat: 0,
 964                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
 965         });
 966         hops.push(RouteHop {
 967                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
 968                 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
 969                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
 970                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
 971                 fee_msat: 1000000,
 972                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
 973         });
 974         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
 975         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
 976         let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payee: None }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
 977
 978         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
 979         hops.push(RouteHop {
 980                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
 981                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
 982                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
 983                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
 984                 fee_msat: 0,
 985                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
 986         });
 987         hops.push(RouteHop {
 988                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
 989                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
 990                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
 991                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
 992                 fee_msat: 0,
 993                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
 994         });
 995         hops.push(RouteHop {
 996                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
 997                 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
 998                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
 999                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1000                 fee_msat: 1000000,
1001                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1002         });
1003         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1004         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1005         let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payee: None }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1006
1007         // Claim the rebalances...
1008         fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1009         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1010
1011         // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
1012         let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1013
1014         // Send some payments across both channels
1015         let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1016         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1017         let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1018
1019
1020         route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
1021         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1022         assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1023         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap(), 1);
1024
1025         //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
1026
1027         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
1028         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
1029         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
1030
1031         // Close down the channels...
1032         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1033         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1034         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1035         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1036         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1037         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1038         close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1039         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1040         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1041         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1042         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1043         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1044         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
1045         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1046         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1047 }
1048
1049 #[test]
1050 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1051         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1052         // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1053         // commitment dance rounds.
1054         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1055         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1056         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1057         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1058         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1059         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1060
1061         let mut payments = Vec::new();
1062         for _ in 0..::ln::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
1063                 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1064                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
1065                 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1066         }
1067         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1068
1069         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1070         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1071         let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1072         assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1073
1074         // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1075         // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1076         // another HTLC.
1077         let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1078         {
1079                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1080                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1081                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1082                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
1083         }
1084
1085         // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1086         let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1087         {
1088                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
1089                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1090         }
1091
1092         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1093         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1094         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1095         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1096
1097         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1098         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1099         // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1100         // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1101         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1102         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1103         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1104
1105         let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1106         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1107         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1108
1109         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1110
1111         // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1112         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1113         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1114         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1115
1116         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1117         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1118         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1119         let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1120
1121         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1122         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1123         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1124
1125         for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1126                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1127         }
1128         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1129         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1130         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1131         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1132         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1133
1134         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1135         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1136         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1137         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1138         let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1139
1140         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1141         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1142
1143         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1144
1145         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1146         assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1147         for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1148                 match event {
1149                         &Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1150                                 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1151                         },
1152                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1153                 };
1154         }
1155
1156         for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1157                 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1158         }
1159
1160         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1161 }
1162
1163 #[test]
1164 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1165         // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1166         // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1167         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1168         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1169         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1170         let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1171
1172         // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1173         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1174         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1175         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1176         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1177         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1178
1179         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1180
1181         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1182         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1183
1184         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1185         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1186
1187         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1188         fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1189         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1190 }
1191
1192 #[test]
1193 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1194         // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1195         // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1196         // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1197         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1198         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1199         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1200         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1201
1202         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1203
1204         // balancing
1205         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1206
1207         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1208
1209         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1210         let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
1211         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1212
1213         // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1214         nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1215         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1216
1217         // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1218         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1219
1220         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1221         let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1222         for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1223                 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1224                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1225                 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1226                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1227                 }
1228         }
1229         assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1230
1231         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1232         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1233         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1234         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1235
1236         // Check we only broadcast 1 timeout tx
1237         let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1238         assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 8);
1239         assert_eq!(claim_txn[1], claim_txn[4]);
1240         assert_eq!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[5]);
1241         check_spends!(claim_txn[1], chan_1.3);
1242         check_spends!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[1]);
1243         check_spends!(claim_txn[7], claim_txn[1]);
1244
1245         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1246         assert_eq!(claim_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
1247         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, claim_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
1248
1249         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1250         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1251         check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
1252         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1253         assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
1254         assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1255         check_spends!(claim_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
1256         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1257
1258         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1259         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1260         for e in events {
1261                 match e {
1262                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1263                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
1264                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1265                                 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1266                         },
1267                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1268                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1269                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1270                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1271                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1272                                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1273                         },
1274                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1275                 }
1276         }
1277 }
1278
1279 #[test]
1280 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1281         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1282         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1283         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1284         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1285         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1286
1287         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1288         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1289
1290         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1291         let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2), 1 + 1);
1292         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1293         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send + 1);
1294         let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).err().unwrap();
1295         match err {
1296                 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(ref fails) => {
1297                         match &fails[0] {
1298                                 &APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ref err} =>
1299                                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)),
1300                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1301                         }
1302                 },
1303                 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1304         }
1305         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1306         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1307
1308         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1309 }
1310
1311 #[test]
1312 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1313         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1314         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1315         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1316         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1317         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1318
1319         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460001);
1320         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1321         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1322         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1323
1324         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1325
1326         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1327         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3460001, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1328         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1329         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1330                 channel_id: chan.2,
1331                 htlc_id: 0,
1332                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1333                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1334                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1335                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1336         };
1337
1338         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1339
1340         // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1341         // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1342         // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1343
1344         let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1345
1346         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1347
1348         // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1349         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1350         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1351                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1352                 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1353                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1354                 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1355                 chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1356
1357                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1358                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1359                  chan_signer.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1360                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1361                  chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1362         };
1363         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1364                 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1365                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1366                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1367                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1368                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1369                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1370                  chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1371         };
1372
1373         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1374         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1375                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
1376
1377         // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1378         // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1379         let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1380
1381         let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1382                 offered: false,
1383                 amount_msat: 3460001,
1384                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1385                 payment_hash,
1386                 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1387         };
1388
1389         let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1390
1391         let res = {
1392                 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1393                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1394                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1395                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1396                         commitment_number,
1397                         95000,
1398                         local_chan_balance,
1399                         false, local_funding, remote_funding,
1400                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1401                         feerate_per_kw,
1402                         &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1403                         &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1404                 );
1405                 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1406         };
1407
1408         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1409                 channel_id: chan.2,
1410                 signature: res.0,
1411                 htlc_signatures: res.1
1412         };
1413
1414         // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1415         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1416         let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1417
1418         // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1419         let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1420                 channel_id: chan.2,
1421                 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1422                 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point
1423         };
1424         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1425
1426         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1427         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1428         // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1429         match events[0] {
1430                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1431                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1432                         update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1433                 },
1434                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1435         };
1436         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1437                 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", ::hex::encode(raa_msg.channel_id)), 1);
1438
1439         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1440 }
1441
1442 #[test]
1443 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1444         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1445         // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1446         // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1447         // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1448         // this situation.
1449         let feerate_per_kw = 253;
1450         chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(feerate_per_kw) };
1451         chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(feerate_per_kw) };
1452         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1453         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1454         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1455
1456         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1457         push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
1458         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1459
1460         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1461
1462         // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1463         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1464
1465         // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1466         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1467         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1468                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1469         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1470         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1471 }
1472
1473 #[test]
1474 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1475         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1476         // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the funder
1477         // receiving 1 update_add_htlc would result in them closing the channel due
1478         // to channel reserve violation. This close could also happen if the fee went
1479         // up a more realistic amount, but many HTLCs were outstanding at the time of
1480         // the update_add_htlc.
1481         chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(6000) };
1482         chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(6000) };
1483         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1484         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1485         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1486         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1487
1488         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1000);
1489         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1490         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1491         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1492         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1493         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1494         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 1000, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1495         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1496         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1497                 channel_id: chan.2,
1498                 htlc_id: 1,
1499                 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1500                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1501                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1502                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1503         };
1504
1505         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1506         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1507         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1508         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1509         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1510         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1511         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1512         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() });
1513 }
1514
1515 #[test]
1516 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1517         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1518         // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1519         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1520         let feerate_per_kw = 253;
1521         chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(feerate_per_kw) };
1522         chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(feerate_per_kw) };
1523
1524         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1525         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1526         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1527
1528         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1529         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1530         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1531         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1532         push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT) / 1000 * 1000;
1533         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1534         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1535
1536         let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1537                 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1538         // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1539         // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1540         // commitment transaction fee.
1541         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1542
1543         // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1544         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt + 1);
1545         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1546                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1547 }
1548
1549 #[test]
1550 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1551         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1552         // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1553         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1554         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1555         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1556         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1557         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1558
1559         let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1560         // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1561         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1562         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1563         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1564         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1565
1566         // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1567         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1568         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1569         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1570         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1571         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1572
1573         // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1574         // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1575         // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1576         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1577 }
1578
1579 #[test]
1580 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1581         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1582         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1583         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1584         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1585         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1586         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1587
1588         let feemsat = 239;
1589         let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1590         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1591         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1592
1593         // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1594         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1);
1595         let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1596         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1597
1598         // Add a pending HTLC.
1599         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1600         let payment_event_1 = {
1601                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1602                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1603
1604                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1605                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1606                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1607         };
1608         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1609
1610         // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1611         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2);
1612         let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1613         let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1614         let (route_2, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_2);
1615
1616         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1617         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1618         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1619         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1620         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1621         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, &None, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1622         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1);
1623         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1624                 channel_id: chan.2,
1625                 htlc_id: 1,
1626                 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1627                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1628                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1629                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1630         };
1631
1632         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1633         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1634         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1635         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1636         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1637         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1638         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1639         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() });
1640 }
1641
1642 #[test]
1643 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1644         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1645         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1646         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1647         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1648         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1649         let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1650         let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1651         assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1652         assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1653
1654         let reserve = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100000);
1655         assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1656         assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1657
1658         assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1659         assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1660 }
1661
1662 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64) -> u64 {
1663         (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1664 }
1665
1666 #[test]
1667 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1668         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1669         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1670         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1671         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1672         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1673         config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1674         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1675         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1676         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1677         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1678
1679         let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1680         let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1681
1682         let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1683         let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1684
1685         macro_rules! expect_forward {
1686                 ($node: expr) => {{
1687                         let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1688                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1689                         check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1690                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1691                         payment_event
1692                 }}
1693         }
1694
1695         let feemsat = 239; // set above
1696         let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1697         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1698
1699         let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1700
1701         // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1702         {
1703                 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_0);
1704                 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1705                 assert!(route.paths[0].iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1706                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1707                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1708                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1709                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
1710         }
1711
1712         // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1713         // nodes[0]'s wealth
1714         loop {
1715                 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1716                 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1717                 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1718                 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1719                 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1);
1720                 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1721                 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1722                         break;
1723                 }
1724                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
1725
1726                 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1727                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1728                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1729                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1730                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1731                 );
1732
1733                 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1734                 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1735                 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1736                 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1737                 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1738         }
1739
1740         // adding pending output.
1741         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1742         // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1743         // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1744         // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1745         // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1746         // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1747         // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1748         // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1749         // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1750         // policy.
1751         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1);
1752         let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1753         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1754
1755         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1756         let payment_event_1 = {
1757                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1758                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1759
1760                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1761                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1762                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1763         };
1764         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1765
1766         // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1767         let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1768         {
1769                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_2 + 1);
1770                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1771                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1772                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1773         }
1774
1775         // split the rest to test holding cell
1776         let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1);
1777         let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1778         let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1779         let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1780         {
1781                 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1782                 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1783         }
1784
1785         // now see if they go through on both sides
1786         let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1787         // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1788         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21, &Some(our_payment_secret_21)).unwrap();
1789         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1790         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1791         assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1792
1793         // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1794         {
1795                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22+1);
1796                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1797                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1798                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1799                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 2);
1800         }
1801
1802         let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1803         // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1804         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22, &Some(our_payment_secret_22)).unwrap();
1805         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1806         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1807         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1808
1809         // flush the pending htlc
1810         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1811         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1812         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1813
1814         // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1815         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1816         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1817         let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1818
1819         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
1820         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1821         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1822         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1823
1824         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1825         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1826         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1827
1828         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1829
1830         let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1831         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
1832         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
1833
1834         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1835         expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
1836
1837         // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
1838         assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
1839         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
1840         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
1841         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
1842         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1843
1844         let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1845         assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
1846         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
1847         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
1848
1849         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
1850         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1851
1852         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1853         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1854         match events[0] {
1855                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
1856                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
1857                         assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
1858                         match &purpose {
1859                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1860                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1861                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
1862                                 },
1863                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1864                         }
1865                 },
1866                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1867         }
1868         match events[1] {
1869                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
1870                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
1871                         assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
1872                         match &purpose {
1873                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1874                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1875                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
1876                                 },
1877                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1878                         }
1879                 },
1880                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1881         }
1882
1883         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
1884         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
1885         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
1886
1887         let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1);
1888         let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
1889         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
1890
1891         let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1);
1892         let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
1893         let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1894         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
1895         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
1896
1897         let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1898         assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
1899 }
1900
1901 #[test]
1902 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
1903         // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
1904         // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
1905         // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
1906         // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
1907         // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
1908         // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
1909         // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
1910         // To test this we:
1911         //  * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
1912         //    you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
1913         //    you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
1914         //  * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
1915         //  * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
1916         //    the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
1917         //  * deliver the first fulfill from B
1918         //  * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
1919         //    claim,
1920         //  * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
1921         //    This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
1922         //    removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
1923         //  * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
1924         //    of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
1925         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1926         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1927         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1928         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1929         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1930
1931         let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1932         // Route the first two HTLCs.
1933         let (payment_preimage_1, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000);
1934         let (payment_preimage_2, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20000);
1935
1936         // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
1937         let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
1938         let send_1 = {
1939                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_3, &Some(payment_secret_3)).unwrap();
1940                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1941                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1942                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1943                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1944         };
1945
1946         // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
1947         // initial fulfill/CS.
1948         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
1949         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1950         let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1951
1952         // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
1953         // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
1954         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2));
1955         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1956         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1957
1958         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
1959         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
1960         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1961         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1962         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
1963
1964         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
1965         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
1966         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1967         // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
1968         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1969
1970         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1971         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1972         let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1973
1974         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
1975         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1976         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1977
1978         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
1979         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1980         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1981
1982         // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
1983         // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
1984         // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
1985         // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
1986         // on-chain as necessary).
1987         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
1988         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
1989         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1990         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1991         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
1992
1993         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1994         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1995         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1996
1997         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1998         expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
1999
2000         // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2001         // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2002         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2003         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2004         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2005         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2006
2007         // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2008         // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2009         let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2010         let send_2 = {
2011                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_4, &Some(payment_secret_4)).unwrap();
2012                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2013                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2014                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2015                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2016         };
2017
2018         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2019         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2020         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2021         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2022
2023         // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2024
2025         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2026         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2027         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2028
2029         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2030         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2031
2032         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2033         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2034         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2035         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2036
2037         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2038         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2039         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2040
2041         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2042         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2043
2044         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2045         expect_payment_received!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2046
2047         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2048         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2049 }
2050
2051 #[test]
2052 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2053         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2054         // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2055         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2056         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2057         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2058         let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2059
2060         // Create some initial channels
2061         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2062         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2063         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2064         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2065
2066         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2067         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2068         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2069         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2070         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2071         connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2072
2073         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2074         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2075         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2076         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2077         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2078
2079         // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2080         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2081         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2082         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
2083         {
2084                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2085                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2086                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2087                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2088                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2089         }
2090         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2091         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2092         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2093         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2094         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2095
2096         // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2097         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2098
2099         // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2100         // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2101         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2102         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
2103         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2104         {
2105                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2106                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2107                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2108                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2109                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2110                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2111         }
2112         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2113         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2114         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2115         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2116         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2117
2118         macro_rules! claim_funds {
2119                 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
2120                         {
2121                                 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
2122                                 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2123
2124                                 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2125                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2126                                 match events[0] {
2127                                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2128                                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2129                                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2130                                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2131                                         },
2132                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2133                                 };
2134                         }
2135                 }
2136         }
2137
2138         // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2139         // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2140         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2141         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2142         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], false);
2143         let node2_commitment_txid;
2144         {
2145                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2146                 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2147                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2148                 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2149
2150                 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2151                 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
2152                 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2153                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2154                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2155         }
2156         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2157         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2158         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2159         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2160         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2161
2162         // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2163         // confusing us in the following tests.
2164         let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2165
2166         // One pending HTLC to time out:
2167         let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
2168         // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2169         // buffer space).
2170
2171         let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2172                 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2173                 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2174                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2175                 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2176                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2177                                 msg.clone()
2178                         },
2179                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2180                 };
2181                 match events[1] {
2182                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2183                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2184                         },
2185                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2186                 }
2187                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2188
2189                 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2190                 {
2191                         let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2192                         node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2193                                 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2194                                         false
2195                                 } else { true }
2196                         });
2197                 }
2198
2199                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2200
2201                 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2202                 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
2203
2204                 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2205                 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2206                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2207                 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2208                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2209                                 msg.clone()
2210                         },
2211                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2212                 };
2213                 match events[1] {
2214                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2215                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2216                         },
2217                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2218                 }
2219                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2220                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2221
2222                 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2223                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2224                 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2225         };
2226         nodes[3].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2227         nodes[4].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2228         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2229         assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2230
2231         nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon).unwrap();
2232         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2233         check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2234 }
2235
2236 #[test]
2237 fn test_justice_tx() {
2238         // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2239         let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2240         alice_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
2241         alice_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2242         alice_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2243         let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2244         bob_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
2245         bob_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2246         bob_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2247         let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2248         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2249         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2250         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2251         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2252         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2253         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2254         // Create some new channels:
2255         let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2256
2257         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2258         let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2259         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2260         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2261         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2262         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2263         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2264         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2265         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2266         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2267         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2268         // Revoke the old state
2269         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2270
2271         {
2272                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2273                 {
2274                         let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2275                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2276                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2277
2278                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2279                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2280                         node_txn.truncate(1);
2281                 }
2282                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2283                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2284                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2285
2286                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2287                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2288                 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2289                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2290                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2291                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2292                 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2293                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2294                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2295         }
2296         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2297
2298         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2299         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2300
2301         // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
2302         // Create some new channels:
2303         let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2304         {
2305                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2306                 node_txn.clear();
2307         }
2308
2309         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2310         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2311         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2312         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2313         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2314         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2315         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2316         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2317         // Revoke the old state
2318         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2319         {
2320                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2321                 {
2322                         let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2323                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); //ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2324                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2325
2326                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2327                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2328                 }
2329                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2330                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2331
2332                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2333                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2334                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2335                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2336                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2337                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2338                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2339         }
2340         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2341         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2342         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2343 }
2344
2345 #[test]
2346 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2347         // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2348         // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2349         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2350         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2351         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2352         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2353         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2354         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2355         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2356         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2357         // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2358         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2359         // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2360         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2361
2362         // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2363         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2364         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2365         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2366         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2367         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2368
2369         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2370         check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
2371
2372         // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2373         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2374         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2375         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2376         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2377 }
2378
2379 #[test]
2380 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2381         // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2382         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2383         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2384         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2385         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2386         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2387
2388         // Create some new channel:
2389         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2390
2391         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2392         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2393         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2394         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2395         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2396
2397         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2398         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2399         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2400         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2401         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2402         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2403         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2404         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2405         check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2406
2407         //Revoke the old state
2408         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2409
2410         {
2411                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2412                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2413                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2414                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2415                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2416                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2417                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2418                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2419
2420                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2421                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment
2422
2423                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2424                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2425
2426                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2427                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2428                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2429                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2430                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2431                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2432                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2433                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2434
2435                 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
2436                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2437                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
2438         }
2439         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2440         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2441         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2442 }
2443
2444 #[test]
2445 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2446         // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2447         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2448         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2449         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2450         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2451         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2452
2453         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2454
2455         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2456         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2457         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2458         // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2459         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2460         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2461
2462         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2463         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2464
2465         //Revoke the old state
2466         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2467
2468         {
2469                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2470                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2471                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2472                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2473                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2474                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2475                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2476                 match events[1] {
2477                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2478                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2479                 }
2480
2481                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2482                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2483
2484                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2485                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 9);
2486                 // ChannelMonitor: justice tx revoked offered htlc, justice tx revoked received htlc, justice tx revoked to_local (3)
2487                 // ChannelManager: local commmitment + local HTLC-timeout (2)
2488                 // ChannelMonitor: bumped justice tx, after one increase, bumps on HTLC aren't generated not being substantial anymore, bump on revoked to_local isn't generated due to more room for expiration (2)
2489                 // ChannelMonitor: local commitment + local HTLC-timeout (2)
2490
2491                 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2492                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2493                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2494                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2495                 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2496                 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2497                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2498
2499                 // Justice transactions are indices 1-2-4
2500                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2501                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
2502                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
2503
2504                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2505                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2506                 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2507
2508                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2509                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2510                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2511                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2512                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2513                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2514                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2515                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2516         }
2517         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2518         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2519         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2520 }
2521
2522 #[test]
2523 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2524         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2525         // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2526         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2527         // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2528         // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2529         // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2530         // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2531         // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2532         // towards B.
2533         // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2534         // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2535         // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2536         // PaymentSent event).
2537
2538         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2539         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2540         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2541         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2542
2543         // Create some initial channels
2544         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2545         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2546
2547         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2548         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2549         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2550         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2551         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2552
2553         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2554         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2555         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2556
2557         let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2558         let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2559
2560         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2561         // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2562         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2563         assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2564         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2565         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2566         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2567         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2568         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2569         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2570         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2571         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2572         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2573
2574         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2575         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2576         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2577         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2578         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx, 2*htlc-success tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2579         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5);
2580         assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2581         assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2582         assert_eq!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2583         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2584         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2585         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2586         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2587         assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2588         assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2589         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
2590         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2591
2592         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2593         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2594         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: node_txn});
2595         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2596         {
2597                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2598                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2599                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2600                 added_monitors.clear();
2601         }
2602         let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2603         assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2604         match forwarded_events[0] {
2605                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2606                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2607         }
2608         if let Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat: Some(1000), claim_from_onchain_tx: true } = forwarded_events[1] {
2609                 } else { panic!(); }
2610         if let Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat: Some(1000), claim_from_onchain_tx: true } = forwarded_events[2] {
2611                 } else { panic!(); }
2612         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2613         {
2614                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2615                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2616                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2617                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2618                 added_monitors.clear();
2619         }
2620         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2621         match events[0] {
2622                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2623                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2624         }
2625         match events[1] {
2626                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2627                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2628         }
2629
2630         match events[2] {
2631                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2632                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2633                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2634                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2635                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2636                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2637                 },
2638                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2639         };
2640         macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2641                 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $chan_tx: expr) => { {
2642                         let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2643                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
2644                         // Node[1]: ChannelManager: 3 (commitment tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (timeout tx)
2645                         // Node[0]: ChannelManager: 3 (commtiemtn tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 HTLC-timeout
2646                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2647                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], $commitment_tx);
2648                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2649                         assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time, 0);
2650                         if $htlc_offered {
2651                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2652                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2653                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2654                                 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2655                         } else {
2656                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2657                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2658                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2659                                 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2660                         }
2661                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], $chan_tx);
2662                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2663                         node_txn.clear();
2664                 } }
2665         }
2666         // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own local state as a fallback, suggesting an alternate
2667         // commitment transaction with a corresponding HTLC-Timeout transactions, as well as a
2668         // timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2669         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2670
2671         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2672         // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx  on A's chain
2673         let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2674         check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2675         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2676         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2677         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2678         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2679         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2680         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 6); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx + HTLC-Sucess * 2), ChannelMonitor : 3 (HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn)
2681         let commitment_spend =
2682                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2683                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2684                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2685                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2686                         &node_txn[0]
2687                 } else {
2688                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2689                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2690                         assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2691                         &node_txn[2]
2692                 };
2693
2694         check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2695         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2696         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2697         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2698         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time, 0);
2699         assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2700         check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3);
2701         assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2702         check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[3]);
2703         check_spends!(node_txn[5], node_txn[3]);
2704         // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
2705         // we already checked the same situation with A.
2706
2707         // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
2708         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2709         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()] });
2710         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2711         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2712         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2713         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2714         assert_eq!(events.len(), 5);
2715         let mut first_claimed = false;
2716         for event in events {
2717                 match event {
2718                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
2719                                 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
2720                                         assert!(!first_claimed);
2721                                         first_claimed = true;
2722                                 } else {
2723                                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
2724                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
2725                                 }
2726                         },
2727                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
2728                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
2729                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2730                 }
2731         }
2732         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2733 }
2734
2735 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
2736         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
2737         // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2738         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2739         // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
2740         //    B's commitment tx                 C's commitment tx
2741         //            \                                  \
2742         //         B's HTLC timeout tx               B's timeout tx
2743
2744         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2745         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2746         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2747         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2748         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2749         *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2750         *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2751
2752         // Create some intial channels
2753         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2754         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2755
2756         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
2757         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2758         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2759
2760         let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2761
2762         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2763         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2764         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2765         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
2766         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
2767         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2768         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2769
2770         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2771         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2772         match events[0] {
2773                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2774                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2775                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2776                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2777                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2778                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2779                 },
2780                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2781         };
2782         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2783         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2784         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2785         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2786         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx)
2787         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2788         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2789         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2790
2791         // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2792         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
2793         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2794         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
2795         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2796         let timeout_tx;
2797         {
2798                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2799                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-timeout), 1 timeout tx
2800                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2801                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2802
2803                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2804                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2805
2806                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2807                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2808                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2809                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2810
2811                 timeout_tx = node_txn[2].clone();
2812                 node_txn.clear();
2813         }
2814
2815         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
2816         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2817         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2818         {
2819                 // B will rebroadcast a fee-bumped timeout transaction here.
2820                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2821                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2822                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2823         }
2824
2825         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2826         {
2827                 // B may rebroadcast its own holder commitment transaction here, as a safeguard against
2828                 // some incredibly unlikely partial-eclipse-attack scenarios. That said, because the
2829                 // original commitment_tx[0] (also spending chan_2.3) has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY B really
2830                 // shouldn't broadcast anything here, and in some connect style scenarios we do not.
2831                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2832                 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
2833                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2834                 } else {
2835                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
2836                 }
2837         }
2838
2839         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2840         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2841         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2842         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2843         match events[0] {
2844                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2845                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2846                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2847                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2848                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2849                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2850                 },
2851                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2852         };
2853
2854         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
2855         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2856         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2857
2858         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
2859         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2860
2861         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2862         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2863         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2864         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 commitment tx, ChannelMonitor : 1 timeout tx
2865         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2866         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2867         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2868         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2869         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2870 }
2871
2872 #[test]
2873 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
2874         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
2875         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
2876         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
2877 }
2878
2879 #[test]
2880 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
2881         // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
2882         // and fail backward accordingly.
2883
2884         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2885         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2886         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2887         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2888
2889         // Create some initial channels
2890         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2891         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2892
2893         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
2894         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
2895         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2896         // Revoke the old state
2897         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
2898
2899         let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
2900
2901         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2902         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2903         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2904         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2905         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2906
2907         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2908         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2909         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2910         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2911         match events[0] {
2912                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
2913                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2914                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
2915                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2916                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2917                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2918
2919                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
2920                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
2921                         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
2922                 },
2923                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2924         }
2925 }
2926
2927 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
2928         // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
2929         // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
2930         // commitment transaction anymore.
2931         // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
2932         // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
2933         // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
2934         // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
2935         // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
2936         // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
2937         // transactions:
2938         // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
2939         //   commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
2940         // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
2941         //   and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
2942         //   commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
2943         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2944         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2945         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2946         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2947
2948         // Create some initial channels
2949         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2950         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2951
2952         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
2953         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
2954         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2955         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
2956         // Revoke the old state
2957         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
2958
2959         let value = if use_dust {
2960                 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
2961                 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
2962                 nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
2963         } else { 3000000 };
2964
2965         let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
2966         let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
2967         let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
2968
2969         assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash));
2970         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2971         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2972         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2973         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2974         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2975         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2976         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
2977         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
2978         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
2979         let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
2980         // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
2981
2982         assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash));
2983         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2984         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2985         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2986         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2987         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2988         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2989         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
2990         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
2991         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
2992         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
2993         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2994         // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
2995         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
2996         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2997         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2998
2999         assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash));
3000         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3001         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3002         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3003         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3004         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3005         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3006         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3007         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3008         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3009         // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3010         // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3011         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3012         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3013         // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3014         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3015         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3016         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3017
3018         // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3019         // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3020         let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3021         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, fourth_payment_hash, &Some(fourth_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3022         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3023         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3024         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3025
3026         if deliver_bs_raa {
3027                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3028                 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3029                 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3030                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3031                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3032                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3033                 match events[0] {
3034                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3035                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3036                 };
3037                 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3038                 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3039         }
3040
3041         let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
3042         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3043
3044         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3045         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3046         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3047
3048         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3049         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 3 });
3050         match events[0] {
3051                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
3052                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
3053         }
3054         match events[1] {
3055                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3056                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3057                 },
3058                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3059         }
3060         if !deliver_bs_raa {
3061                 match events[2] {
3062                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3063                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3064                 };
3065         }
3066         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3067         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3068
3069         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3070         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3071         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 1 } else { 0 }] {
3072                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3073                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3074         }
3075         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 1 }] {
3076                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
3077                         assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3078                         assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3079                 },
3080                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3081         }
3082         if deliver_bs_raa {
3083                 match events[0] {
3084                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3085                                 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3086                                 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3087                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3088                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3089                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3090                         },
3091                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3092                 }
3093         }
3094         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 3 } else { 2 }] {
3095                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3096                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3097                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3098                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3099                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3100                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3101
3102                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3103                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3104                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3105
3106                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3107
3108                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3109                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3110                         match events[0] {
3111                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3112                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3113                                         // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3114                                         // that we should update our routing table for.
3115                                         if !deliver_bs_raa {
3116                                                 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3117                                         }
3118                                 },
3119                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3120                         }
3121                         match events[1] {
3122                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3123                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3124                                         assert!(network_update.is_some());
3125                                 },
3126                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3127                         }
3128                         match events[2] {
3129                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3130                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3131                                         assert!(network_update.is_some());
3132                                 },
3133                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3134                         }
3135                 },
3136                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3137         }
3138
3139         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3140         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3141         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3142 }
3143
3144 #[test]
3145 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3146         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3147         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3148         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3149         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3150 }
3151
3152 #[test]
3153 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3154         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3155         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3156         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3157         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3158 }
3159
3160 #[test]
3161 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3162         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3163         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3164         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3165         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3166         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3167
3168         // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3169         {
3170                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3171                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
3172                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3173
3174                 let payment_event = {
3175                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3176                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3177                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3178                 };
3179                 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3180                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3181         }
3182
3183         // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3184         let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3185         {
3186                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, failed_payment_hash, &Some(failed_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3187                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3188
3189                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3190         }
3191
3192         // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3193         {
3194                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3195
3196                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3197                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3198                 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3199                 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 50_000, &Some(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3200                 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3201                 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
3202
3203                 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3204                 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3205                         channel_id: chan.2,
3206                         htlc_id: 0,
3207                         amount_msat: 0,
3208                         payment_hash,
3209                         cltv_expiry,
3210                         onion_routing_packet,
3211                 };
3212                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3213         }
3214         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3215         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3216         // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3217         match events[0] {
3218                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3219                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3220                 },
3221                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3222         }
3223         match events[1] {
3224                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3225                         assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3226                 },
3227                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3228         }
3229         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3230         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3231 }
3232
3233 #[test]
3234 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3235         // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3236         // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3237         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3238         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3239         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3240         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3241         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3242
3243         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3244         nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id).unwrap();
3245         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3246         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3247         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3248         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3249
3250         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3251         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3252         assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
3253
3254         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3255         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
3256         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3257         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3258         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3259
3260         // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3261         // registering new transactions
3262         header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
3263         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
3264 }
3265
3266 #[test]
3267 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3268         // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3269         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3270         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3271         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3272         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3273         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3274         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3275
3276         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3277
3278         let mut payment_event = {
3279                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3280                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3281
3282                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3283                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3284                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3285         };
3286
3287         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3288         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3289
3290         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3291
3292         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3293         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3294         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3295         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3296
3297         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3298         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3299         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3300         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3301         let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3302
3303         // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3304         // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3305         // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3306
3307         nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id).unwrap();
3308         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3309         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3310         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3311         let tx = {
3312                 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3313                 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3314                 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3315                 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3316                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3317                 node_txn.remove(0)
3318         };
3319
3320         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3321
3322         // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3323         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3324         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3325         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3326
3327         // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3328         {
3329                 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3330                         .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator, &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3331         }
3332         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3333         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3334         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3335         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3336         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3337         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3338         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3339
3340         check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3341 }
3342
3343 #[test]
3344 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3345         // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3346         // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3347         // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3348         // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3349
3350         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3351         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3352         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3353         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3354         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3355
3356         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3357
3358         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
3359         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3360         let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3361         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3362         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
3363
3364         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3365         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3366
3367         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3368         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3369 }
3370
3371 #[test]
3372 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3373         // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3374         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3375         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3376         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3377         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3378         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3379         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3380
3381         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3382         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3383         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3384
3385         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3386         let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3387         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3388         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3389
3390         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3391         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3392         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3393
3394         let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3395         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3396         let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3397         let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3398
3399         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3400         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3401
3402         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3403         fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3404
3405         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
3406         {
3407                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3408                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3409                 match events[0] {
3410                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3411                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3412                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3413                         },
3414                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3415                 }
3416                 match events[1] {
3417                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
3418                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3419                                 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
3420                         },
3421                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3422                 }
3423                 match events[2] {
3424                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3425                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3426                 }
3427         }
3428
3429         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3430         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3431 }
3432
3433 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3434         // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3435         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3436         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3437         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3438         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3439
3440         let mut as_funding_locked = None;
3441         if messages_delivered == 0 {
3442                 let (funding_locked, _, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3443                 as_funding_locked = Some(funding_locked);
3444                 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3445                 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3446                 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3447         } else {
3448                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3449         }
3450
3451         let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3452
3453         let payment_event = {
3454                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
3455                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3456
3457                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3458                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3459                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3460         };
3461         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3462
3463         if messages_delivered < 2 {
3464                 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3465         } else {
3466                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3467                 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3468                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3469                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3470                         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3471
3472                         if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3473                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3474                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3475                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3476
3477                                 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3478                                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3479                                         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3480                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3481                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3482
3483                                         if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3484                                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3485                                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3486                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3487                                         }
3488                                 }
3489                         }
3490                 }
3491         }
3492
3493         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3494         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3495         if messages_delivered < 3 {
3496                 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3497                         // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a funding_locked prior to a
3498                         // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to funding_locked time.
3499                         //
3500                         // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a funding_locked immediately on
3501                         // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate funding_locked sent
3502                         // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3503                         //
3504                         // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3505                         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3506                 }
3507                 // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3508                 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3509                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3510         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3511                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3512                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3513         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3514                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3515                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3516         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3517                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3518                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3519         } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3520                 // Everything was delivered...
3521                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3522         }
3523
3524         let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3525         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3526         match events_1[0] {
3527                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3528                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3529         };
3530
3531         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3532         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3533         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3534
3535         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3536
3537         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3538         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3539         match events_2[0] {
3540                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
3541                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3542                         assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
3543                         match &purpose {
3544                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3545                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3546                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3547                                 },
3548                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3549                         }
3550                 },
3551                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3552         }
3553
3554         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3555         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3556
3557         let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3558         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3559         let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3560                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3561                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3562                         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3563                         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3564                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3565                         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3566                         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3567                         (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3568                 },
3569                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3570         };
3571
3572         if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3573                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3574
3575                 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3576                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3577                 match events_4[0] {
3578                         Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3579                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3580                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3581                         },
3582                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3583                 }
3584
3585                 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3586                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3587                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3588                         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3589
3590                         if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3591                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3592                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3593                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3594
3595                                 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3596                                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3597                                         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3598                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3599                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3600
3601                                         if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3602                                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3603                                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3604                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3605                                         }
3606                                 }
3607                         }
3608                 }
3609         }
3610
3611         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3612         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3613         if messages_delivered < 2 {
3614                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3615                 if messages_delivered < 1 {
3616                         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
3617                 } else {
3618                         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3619                 }
3620         } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
3621                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3622                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3623         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3624                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3625                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3626         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3627                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3628                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3629         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3630                 // Everything was delivered...
3631                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3632         }
3633
3634         if messages_delivered == 1 || messages_delivered == 2 {
3635                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3636         }
3637
3638         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3639         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3640         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3641
3642         if messages_delivered > 2 {
3643                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3644         }
3645
3646         // Channel should still work fine...
3647         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3648         let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3649         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3650 }
3651
3652 #[test]
3653 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
3654         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
3655         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
3656         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
3657         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
3658 }
3659
3660 #[test]
3661 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
3662         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
3663         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
3664         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
3665         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
3666 }
3667
3668 #[test]
3669 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
3670         // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
3671         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3672         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3673         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3674         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
3675         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
3676         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
3677         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3678         let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3679
3680         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3681         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3682
3683         confirm_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
3684         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3685         let chan_id;
3686         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3687         match events_1[0] {
3688                 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3689                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3690                         chan_id = msg.channel_id;
3691                 },
3692                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3693         }
3694
3695         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3696
3697         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3698         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3699
3700         confirm_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3701         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3702         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 2);
3703         let funding_locked = match events_2[0] {
3704                 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3705                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3706                         msg.clone()
3707                 },
3708                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3709         };
3710         let bs_announcement_sigs = match events_2[1] {
3711                 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3712                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3713                         msg.clone()
3714                 },
3715                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3716         };
3717
3718         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3719
3720         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_locked);
3721         nodes[0].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs);
3722         let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3723         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 2);
3724         let as_announcement_sigs = match events_3[0] {
3725                 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3726                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3727                         msg.clone()
3728                 },
3729                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3730         };
3731         let (as_announcement, as_update) = match events_3[1] {
3732                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3733                         (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
3734                 },
3735                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3736         };
3737
3738         nodes[1].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs);
3739         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3740         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3741         let (_, bs_update) = match events_4[0] {
3742                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3743                         (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
3744                 },
3745                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3746         };
3747
3748         nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&as_announcement).unwrap();
3749         nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
3750         nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
3751
3752         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3753         let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3754         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
3755
3756         // Check that after deserialization and reconnection we can still generate an identical
3757         // channel_announcement from the cached signatures.
3758         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3759
3760         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
3761         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
3762         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
3763
3764         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
3765         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
3766         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[0].logger, node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
3767         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
3768         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
3769         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
3770                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
3771         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
3772
3773         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
3774         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
3775                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
3776                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
3777                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
3778                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
3779                         keys_manager,
3780                         fee_estimator: node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator,
3781                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
3782                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
3783                         logger: nodes[0].logger,
3784                         channel_monitors,
3785                 }).unwrap()
3786         };
3787         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
3788         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
3789
3790         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
3791         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
3792         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3793
3794         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3795
3796         // as_announcement should be re-generated exactly by broadcast_node_announcement.
3797         nodes[0].node.broadcast_node_announcement([0, 0, 0], [0; 32], Vec::new());
3798         let msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3799         let mut found_announcement = false;
3800         for event in msgs.iter() {
3801                 match event {
3802                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, .. } => {
3803                                 if *msg == as_announcement { found_announcement = true; }
3804                         },
3805                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => {},
3806                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3807                 }
3808         }
3809         assert!(found_announcement);
3810 }
3811
3812 #[test]
3813 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
3814         // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
3815         // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
3816         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3817         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3818         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3819         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3820         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3821
3822         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
3823
3824         // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
3825         let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3826         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
3827         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3828
3829         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3830         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3831         match events_1[0] {
3832                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
3833                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3834         }
3835
3836         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
3837         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3838
3839         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3840         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3841         match events_2[0] {
3842                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3843                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3844                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3845                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3846                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3847                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3848                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3849
3850                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3851                         let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3852                         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3853                         match events_3[0] {
3854                                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3855                                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
3856                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
3857                                 },
3858                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3859                         }
3860
3861                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
3862                         let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3863                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3864                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3865                 },
3866                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3867         }
3868
3869         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3870         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3871
3872         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
3873         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
3874         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
3875         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
3876         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
3877         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
3878
3879         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
3880         let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
3881         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
3882         let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
3883
3884         assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
3885         assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
3886
3887         assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
3888         assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
3889
3890         assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
3891
3892         assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3893         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3894         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3895         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3896         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
3897         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
3898         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
3899         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3900         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3901         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3902
3903         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
3904         let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3905         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3906         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3907         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3908         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3909         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
3910         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3911
3912         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3913         let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3914         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3915         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3916         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3917         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3918         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
3919         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3920
3921         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
3922         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3923         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3924         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3925
3926         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
3927         let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3928         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3929         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3930
3931         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3932         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3933         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3934
3935         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3936
3937         let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3938         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
3939         match events_5[0] {
3940                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
3941                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
3942                         match &purpose {
3943                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3944                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3945                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
3946                                 },
3947                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3948                         }
3949                 },
3950                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3951         }
3952
3953         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
3954         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3955         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3956
3957         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3958         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3959 }
3960
3961 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
3962         // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
3963         // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
3964         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3965         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3966         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3967         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3968
3969         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3970
3971         let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
3972                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
3973                 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
3974                 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
3975                 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
3976                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
3977                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payee, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
3978                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3979                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3980                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3981                 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
3982                 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentReceived event(s).
3983                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
3984                 our_payment_hash
3985         } else {
3986                 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
3987         };
3988
3989         let mut block = Block {
3990                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
3991                 txdata: vec![],
3992         };
3993         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
3994         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
3995         let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
3996         for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
3997                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
3998                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
3999                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4000         }
4001
4002         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4003
4004         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4005         let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4006         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4007         assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4008         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4009         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4010
4011         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4012         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4013         // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4014         let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(100_000).to_vec();
4015         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(block_count - 1));
4016         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4017 }
4018
4019 #[test]
4020 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4021         do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4022         do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4023 }
4024
4025 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4026         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4027         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4028         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4029         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4030         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4031         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4032         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4033
4034         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4035         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4036         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4037         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4038
4039         // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4040         let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4041         {
4042                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, first_payment_hash, &Some(first_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4043         }
4044         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4045         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4046
4047         // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4048         let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4049         let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4050         sending_node.node.send_payment(&route, second_payment_hash, &Some(second_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4051         if forwarded_htlc {
4052                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4053                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4054                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4055                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4056                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4057         }
4058         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4059
4060         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4061         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4062         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4063         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4064
4065         if forwarded_htlc {
4066                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4067                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4068                 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4069                 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4070                 match fail_commit[0] {
4071                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4072                                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4073                                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4074                         },
4075                         _ => unreachable!(),
4076                 }
4077                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4078         } else {
4079                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], second_payment_hash, true);
4080         }
4081 }
4082
4083 #[test]
4084 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4085         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4086         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4087 }
4088
4089 #[test]
4090 fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4091         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4092         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4093         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4094         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4095         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4096         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4097         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4098         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4099         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4100
4101         let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4102
4103         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4104
4105         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4106         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4107         get_monitor!(nodes[0], OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id())
4108                 .write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4109
4110         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4111         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4112         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4113         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4114         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4115         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4116         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4117         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4118                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4119         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4120
4121         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4122         let config = UserConfig::default();
4123         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4124                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4125                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4126                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4127                         default_config: config,
4128                         keys_manager,
4129                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4130                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4131                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4132                         logger: &logger,
4133                         channel_monitors,
4134                 }).unwrap()
4135         };
4136         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4137         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4138
4139         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4140         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4141         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4142         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4143
4144         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4145         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4146         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4147         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4148
4149         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4150         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4151         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4152         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4153
4154         let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4155         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
4156         for node in nodes.iter() {
4157                 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4158                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4159                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4160         }
4161
4162         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4163 }
4164
4165 #[test]
4166 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_events() {
4167         // This test makes sure the events field in ChannelManager survives de/serialization
4168         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4169         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4170         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4171         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4172         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4173         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4174         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4175         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4176         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4177
4178         // Start creating a channel, but stop right before broadcasting the funding transaction
4179         let channel_value = 100000;
4180         let push_msat = 10001;
4181         let a_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4182         let b_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4183         let node_a = nodes.remove(0);
4184         let node_b = nodes.remove(0);
4185         node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
4186         node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), a_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4187         node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), b_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id()));
4188
4189         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&node_a, channel_value, 42);
4190
4191         node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
4192         check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
4193
4194         node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4195         {
4196                 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4197                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4198                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4199                 added_monitors.clear();
4200         }
4201
4202         let bs_funding_signed = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
4203         node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_funding_signed);
4204         {
4205                 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4206                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4207                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4208                 added_monitors.clear();
4209         }
4210         // Normally, this is where node_a would broadcast the funding transaction, but the test de/serializes first instead
4211
4212         nodes.push(node_a);
4213         nodes.push(node_b);
4214
4215         // Start the de/seriailization process mid-channel creation to check that the channel manager will hold onto events that are serialized
4216         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4217         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4218         get_monitor!(nodes[0], bs_funding_signed.channel_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4219
4220         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4221         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4222         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4223         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4224         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4225         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4226         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4227         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4228                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4229         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4230
4231         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4232         let config = UserConfig::default();
4233         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4234                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4235                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4236                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4237                         default_config: config,
4238                         keys_manager,
4239                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4240                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4241                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4242                         logger: &logger,
4243                         channel_monitors,
4244                 }).unwrap()
4245         };
4246         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4247         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4248
4249         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4250
4251         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4252         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4253
4254         // After deserializing, make sure the funding_transaction is still held by the channel manager
4255         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4256         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
4257         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4258         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
4259
4260         // Make sure the channel is functioning as though the de/serialization never happened
4261         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4262         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4263
4264         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4265         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4266         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4267         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4268
4269         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4270         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4271         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4272         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4273
4274         let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4275         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
4276         for node in nodes.iter() {
4277                 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4278                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4279                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4280         }
4281
4282         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4283 }
4284
4285 #[test]
4286 fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4287         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4288         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4289         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4290         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4291         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4292         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4293         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4294         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4295         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4296         let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4297
4298         let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4299         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4300
4301         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4302
4303         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4304         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4305         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4306
4307         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4308         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4309         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4310         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4311         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4312         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4313         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4314         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4315                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4316         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4317
4318         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4319         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4320                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4321                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4322                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4323                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4324                         keys_manager,
4325                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4326                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4327                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4328                         logger: &logger,
4329                         channel_monitors,
4330                 }).unwrap()
4331         };
4332         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4333         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4334
4335         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4336         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4337         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4338
4339         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4340
4341         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
4342         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4343 }
4344
4345 #[test]
4346 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
4347         // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with an out-of-date ChannelMonitor
4348         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4349         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4350         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
4351         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4352         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4353         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4354         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4355         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4356         let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4357         let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4358         let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4359         let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4360
4361         let mut node_0_stale_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4362         for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4363                 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4364                 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4365                 node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4366         }
4367
4368         let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
4369
4370         // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
4371         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4372
4373         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
4374         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4375         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4376         nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4377
4378         // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
4379         // nodes[3])
4380         let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4381         for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4382                 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4383                 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4384                 node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4385         }
4386
4387         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4388         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4389         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4390         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4391         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4392         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4393
4394
4395         let mut node_0_stale_monitors = Vec::new();
4396         for serialized in node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4397                 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4398                 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4399                 assert!(read.is_empty());
4400                 node_0_stale_monitors.push(monitor);
4401         }
4402
4403         let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
4404         for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4405                 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4406                 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4407                 assert!(read.is_empty());
4408                 node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
4409         }
4410
4411         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4412         if let Err(msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue) =
4413                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4414                 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4415                 keys_manager,
4416                 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4417                 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4418                 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4419                 logger: &logger,
4420                 channel_monitors: node_0_stale_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4421         }) { } else {
4422                 panic!("If the monitor(s) are stale, this indicates a bug and we should get an Err return");
4423         };
4424
4425         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4426         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) =
4427                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4428                 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4429                 keys_manager,
4430                 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4431                 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4432                 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4433                 logger: &logger,
4434                 channel_monitors: node_0_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4435         }).unwrap();
4436         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4437         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4438
4439         { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx
4440                 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4441                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
4442                 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
4443                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
4444         }
4445
4446         for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
4447                 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor).is_ok());
4448                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4449         }
4450         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4451         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
4452
4453         // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
4454         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4455         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4456         //... and we can even still claim the payment!
4457         claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4458
4459         nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4460         let reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[3], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4461         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4462         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish);
4463         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4464         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
4465         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
4466                 match action {
4467                         &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
4468                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
4469                         },
4470                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
4471                 }
4472         }
4473 }
4474
4475 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4476         ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4477                 {
4478                         let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4479                         let mut txn = Vec::new();
4480                         let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4481                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4482                         for event in events.drain(..) {
4483                                 match event {
4484                                         Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs } => {
4485                                                 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4486                                                         txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4487                                                         all_outputs.push(outp);
4488                                                 }
4489                                         },
4490                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4491                                 };
4492                         }
4493                         if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4494                                 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx) {
4495                                         txn.push(tx);
4496                                 }
4497                         }
4498                         txn
4499                 }
4500         }
4501 }
4502
4503 #[test]
4504 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4505         // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4506         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4507         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4508         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4509         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4510
4511         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 99000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4512         nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2).unwrap();
4513         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4514         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4515         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4516         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4517         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4518         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4519         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4520
4521         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4522         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4523
4524         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4525         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4526         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4527         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4528         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4529 }
4530
4531 #[test]
4532 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4533         // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4534         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4535         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4536         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4537         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4538         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4539
4540         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 99000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4541         nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2).unwrap();
4542         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4543         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4544         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4545
4546         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4547         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4548         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4549         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4550
4551         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4552         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4553         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4554         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4555         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4556
4557         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4558         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4559         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4560 }
4561
4562 #[test]
4563 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4564         // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4565         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4566
4567         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4568         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4569         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4570         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4571
4572         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4573         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4574         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4575         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4576         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4577
4578         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4579         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4580         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4581         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4582         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4583
4584         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4585         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4586         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4587
4588         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4589         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4590         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4591         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4592         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4593 }
4594
4595 #[test]
4596 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4597         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4598         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4599         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4600         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4601
4602         // Create some initial channels
4603         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4604
4605         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4606
4607         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4608         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4609         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4610
4611         // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4612         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
4613         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4614         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4615         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4616         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4617         match events[0] {
4618                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4619                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4620         }
4621         match events[1] {
4622                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4623                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4624         }
4625
4626         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4627         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); // ChannelManager : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-Success), ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4628         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4629         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4630         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4631         check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
4632         check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
4633
4634         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4635         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4636         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4637
4638         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4639         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4640         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4641 }
4642
4643 #[test]
4644 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4645         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4646         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4647         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4648         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4649
4650         // Create some initial channels
4651         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4652
4653         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4654         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4655
4656         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4657
4658         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4659         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4660         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4661
4662         // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4663         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4664         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4665         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4666         match events[0] {
4667                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4668                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4669         }
4670         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4671
4672         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4673         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4674         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelManager : 1 local commitent tx, ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4675         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
4676         check_spends!(node_txn[1],  commitment_tx[0].clone());
4677         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4678
4679         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4680         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4681         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4682         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, true);
4683
4684         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4685         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4686         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4687         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]);
4688         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4689 }
4690
4691 #[test]
4692 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4693         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4694         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4695         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4696         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4697
4698         // Create some initial channels
4699         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4700
4701         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4702         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4703         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4704         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4705
4706         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4707
4708         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4709         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4710         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4711         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4712
4713         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4714         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
4715         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4716         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4717
4718         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4719         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4720
4721         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4722         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4723         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4724 }
4725
4726 #[test]
4727 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4728         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4729         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4730         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4731         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4732         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4733
4734         // Create some initial channels
4735         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4736
4737         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4738         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4739         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4740         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4741
4742         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4743
4744         // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
4745         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4746         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4747         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4748         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4749         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4750
4751         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4752         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4753         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], chan_1.3);
4754         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4755         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4756         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4757         assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].lock_time, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
4758
4759         // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4760         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4761         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()] });
4762         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4763         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4764         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4765
4766         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4767         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
4768         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4769         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4770         // transactions next...
4771         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
4772         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
4773
4774         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
4775         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
4776         if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid() {
4777                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4778         } else {
4779                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid());
4780                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4781         }
4782
4783         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4784         check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
4785
4786         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4787         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4788
4789         // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4790         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4791         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4792         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4793         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
4794 }
4795
4796 #[test]
4797 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
4798         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4799         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4800         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4801         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4802         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4803
4804         // Create some initial channels
4805         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4806
4807         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4808         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4809         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4810         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4811
4812         // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
4813         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
4814
4815         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4816
4817         // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
4818         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4819         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4820         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4821         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4822         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4823
4824         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4825         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4826         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4827         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4828
4829         // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
4830         let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
4831         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
4832
4833         // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4834         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4835         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
4836         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4837         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4838         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4839
4840         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4841         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
4842
4843         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4844         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4845         // transactions next...
4846         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4847         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4848         if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4849                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4850         } else {
4851                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4852                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4853         }
4854
4855         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4856         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4857
4858         check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
4859
4860         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
4861         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4862
4863         // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
4864         // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
4865
4866         // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4867         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
4868         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4869         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4870         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
4871         assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4872         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
4873         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
4874 }
4875
4876 #[test]
4877 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
4878         // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
4879         // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
4880         // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
4881         // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
4882         // channel.
4883         // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
4884         // gets broadcast.
4885
4886         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4887         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4888         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4889         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4890
4891         // Create some initial channels
4892         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4893         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4894
4895         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
4896         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4897         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4898         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4899         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4900
4901         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4902         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4903         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4904
4905         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
4906         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4907         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
4908         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4909         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4910         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4911         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4912         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4913         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4914         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4915
4916         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
4917         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
4918         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4919         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4920
4921         let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Success tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
4922         assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 3);
4923         assert_eq!(c_txn[0], c_txn[2]);
4924         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0], c_txn[1]);
4925         check_spends!(c_txn[1], chan_2.3);
4926         check_spends!(c_txn[2], c_txn[1]);
4927         assert_eq!(c_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
4928         assert_eq!(c_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4929         assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
4930         assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
4931
4932         // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
4933         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
4934         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![c_txn[1].clone(), c_txn[2].clone()]});
4935         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4936         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4937         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4938         match events[0] {
4939                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
4940                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4941         }
4942         match events[1] {
4943                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, claim_from_onchain_tx } => {
4944                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
4945                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
4946                 },
4947                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4948         }
4949         {
4950                 let mut b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4951                 // ChannelMonitor: claim tx
4952                 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
4953                 check_spends!(b_txn[0], chan_2.3); // B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
4954                 b_txn.clear();
4955         }
4956         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4957         let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4958         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
4959         match msg_events[0] {
4960                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4961                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4962         }
4963         match msg_events[1] {
4964                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
4965                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4966         }
4967         match msg_events[2] {
4968                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
4969                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4970                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4971                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4972                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4973                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
4974                 },
4975                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4976         };
4977         // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
4978         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4979         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4980         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4981         let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4982         // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success tx
4983         assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 3);
4984         check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_1.3);
4985         check_spends!(b_txn[2], b_txn[1]);
4986         check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4987         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4988         assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
4989         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
4990
4991         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4992         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4993 }
4994
4995 #[test]
4996 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
4997         // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
4998         // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
4999         // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
5000         // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
5001         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
5002         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
5003         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5004         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5005         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5006         config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5007         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
5008                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5009         let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5010
5011         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5012         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5013         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5014
5015         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5016         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5017         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5018         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5019         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
5020
5021         let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 900000);
5022
5023         let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
5024         // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
5025         // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
5026         // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
5027         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], vec![], 900000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40);
5028         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 900000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
5029
5030         let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5031         assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5032         check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5033
5034         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
5035         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5036         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5037         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5038         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5039
5040         let htlc_timeout_tx;
5041         { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
5042                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5043                 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5044                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
5045                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5046
5047                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5048                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5049                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5050                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5051                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
5052                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], commitment_txn[0]);
5053                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
5054
5055                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5056                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5057                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5058                 htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[1].clone();
5059         }
5060
5061         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
5062         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
5063         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
5064         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5065         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5066         match events[0] {
5067                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5068                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5069         }
5070         match events[1] {
5071                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5072                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5073         }
5074         let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5075         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs), ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
5076         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
5077         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5078         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5079         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5080         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5081         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5082         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5083         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5084         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[3], htlc_success_txn[0]);
5085         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[4], htlc_success_txn[1]);
5086         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
5087
5088         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
5089         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5090         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5091         let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5092         assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5093         assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5094         let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
5095         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5096         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5097         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5098
5099         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5100         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5101         {
5102                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5103         }
5104         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
5105
5106         // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
5107         // Note that the fee paid is effectively double as the HTLC value (including the nodes[1] fee
5108         // and nodes[2] fee) is rounded down and then claimed in full.
5109         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[0]);
5110         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], Some(196*2), true);
5111         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5112         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5113         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5114         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5115         assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
5116         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5117         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5118
5119         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5120         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
5121
5122         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5123         match events[0] {
5124                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5125                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
5126                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
5127                 }
5128                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5129         }
5130 }
5131
5132 #[test]
5133 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
5134         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5135         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5136         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5137         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5138
5139         // Create some initial channels
5140         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5141
5142         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
5143         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5144         assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
5145         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5146         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5147
5148         // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
5149         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5150         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5151         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
5152         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5153         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5154         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5155         match events[0] {
5156                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5157                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5158         }
5159         match events[1] {
5160                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5161                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5162         }
5163         let node_tx = {
5164                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5165                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5166                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
5167                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5168                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5169                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5170                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5171                 node_txn[0].clone()
5172         };
5173
5174         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
5175         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5176
5177         // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5178         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5179         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5180         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5181         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
5182         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5183 }
5184
5185 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
5186         // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
5187         // unrevoked commitment transaction.
5188         // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
5189         // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
5190         // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
5191         // use the same payment hashes.
5192         // Thus, we use a six-node network:
5193         //
5194         // A \         / E
5195         //    - C - D -
5196         // B /         \ F
5197         // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
5198         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
5199         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
5200         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5201         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5202         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5203         config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5204         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
5205                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5206         let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5207
5208         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5209         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5210         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5211         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5212         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5213
5214         // Rebalance and check output sanity...
5215         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
5216         send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
5217         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
5218
5219         let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5220         // 0th HTLC:
5221         let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5222         // 1st HTLC:
5223         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5224         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5225         // 2nd HTLC:
5226         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5227         // 3rd HTLC:
5228         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5229         // 4th HTLC:
5230         let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5231         // 5th HTLC:
5232         let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5233         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5234         // 6th HTLC:
5235         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200).unwrap());
5236         // 7th HTLC:
5237         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200).unwrap());
5238
5239         // 8th HTLC:
5240         let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5241         // 9th HTLC:
5242         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5243         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5244
5245         // 10th HTLC:
5246         let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5247         // 11th HTLC:
5248         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5249         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200).unwrap());
5250
5251         // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
5252         // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
5253         // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
5254         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2).len(), 1);
5255         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
5256
5257         // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
5258         // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5259         assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1));
5260         assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3));
5261         assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5));
5262         assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6));
5263         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
5264         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[4]);
5265         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
5266
5267         let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5268         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5269         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5270         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5271         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5272         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5273
5274         // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5275         assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
5276         assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4));
5277         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5278         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[5]);
5279         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5280
5281         let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5282         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5283         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5284         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5285
5286         let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5287
5288         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[3]);
5289         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5290         let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5291         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5292         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5293         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5294         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5295         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5296         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5297         if deliver_last_raa {
5298                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5299         } else {
5300                 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5301         }
5302
5303         // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5304         // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5305         // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5306         // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5307         //
5308         // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5309         // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5310         // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5311         //
5312         // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5313         // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5314         let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5315
5316         if announce_latest {
5317                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5318         } else {
5319                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5320         }
5321         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5322         let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5323                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5324                 events[1].clone()
5325         } else {
5326                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5327                 events[0].clone()
5328         };
5329         match close_event {
5330                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5331                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5332         }
5333
5334         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5335         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5336         if deliver_last_raa {
5337                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5338         } else {
5339                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5340         }
5341         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5342
5343         let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5344         assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5345         let mut a_done = false;
5346         for msg in cs_msgs {
5347                 match msg {
5348                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5349                                 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5350                                 // should be failed-backwards here.
5351                                 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5352                                         // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5353                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5354                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5355                                         }
5356                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5357                                         assert!(!a_done);
5358                                         a_done = true;
5359                                         &nodes[0]
5360                                 } else {
5361                                         // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5362                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5363                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5364                                         }
5365                                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5366                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5367                                         &nodes[1]
5368                                 };
5369                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5370                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5371                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5372                                 if announce_latest {
5373                                         target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5374                                         if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5375                                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5376                                         }
5377                                 }
5378                                 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5379                         },
5380                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5381                 }
5382         }
5383
5384         let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5385         assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5386         let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5387         let mut as_updates = 0;
5388         for event in as_events.iter() {
5389                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5390                         assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5391                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5392                                 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5393                         } else {
5394                                 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5395                         }
5396                         if network_update.is_some() {
5397                                 as_updates += 1;
5398                         }
5399                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5400         }
5401         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5402         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5403         if announce_latest {
5404                 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5405                 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5406         }
5407         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5408
5409         let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5410         assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5411         let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5412         let mut bs_updates = 0;
5413         for event in bs_events.iter() {
5414                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5415                         assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5416                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5417                                 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5418                         } else {
5419                                 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5420                         }
5421                         if network_update.is_some() {
5422                                 bs_updates += 1;
5423                         }
5424                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5425         }
5426         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5427         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5428         if announce_latest {
5429                 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5430         }
5431         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5432
5433         // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5434         // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5435         // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5436         // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5437         assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5438         assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5439 }
5440
5441 #[test]
5442 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5443         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5444 }
5445
5446 #[test]
5447 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5448         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5449 }
5450
5451 #[test]
5452 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5453         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5454         // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5455         // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5456 }
5457
5458 #[test]
5459 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5460         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5461         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5462         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5463         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5464
5465         // Create some initial channels
5466         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5467
5468         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5469         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5470         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5471         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5472
5473         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5474         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5475         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5476         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5477         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5478         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5479
5480         let htlc_timeout = {
5481                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5482                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
5483                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5484                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5485                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5486                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5487                 node_txn[1].clone()
5488         };
5489
5490         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5491         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5492         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5493
5494         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5495         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5496         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5497         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5498         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5499         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5500         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5501         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5502         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5503         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5504                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5505 }
5506
5507 #[test]
5508 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5509         // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with
5510         // a key manager rotation to test that key_derivation_params returned in DynamicOutputP2WSH
5511         // let us re-derive the channel key set to then derive a delayed_payment_key.
5512
5513         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5514
5515         // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5516         let seed = [42; 32];
5517         let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5518         let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5519         let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph: &chanmon_cfgs[0].network_graph, node_seed: seed, features: InitFeatures::known() };
5520         let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5521         node_cfgs.remove(0);
5522         node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5523
5524         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5525         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5526
5527         // Create some initial channels
5528         // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5529         // for node 0
5530         let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5531         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5532         assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5533
5534         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5535         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5536         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5537         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5538         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5539
5540         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5541         let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5542         let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5543         assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5544         check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5545
5546         // We check funding pubkey are unique
5547         let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness[3][36..69]));
5548         let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness[3][36..69]));
5549         if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5550             || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5551             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5552             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5553                 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5554         }
5555
5556         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5557         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5558         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5559         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5560         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5561         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5562
5563         let htlc_timeout = {
5564                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5565                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5566                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5567                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn_1[0]);
5568                 node_txn[1].clone()
5569         };
5570
5571         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5572         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5573         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5574
5575         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5576         let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5577         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5578         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5579         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5580         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5581         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5582         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5583         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5584         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5585         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5586                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5587 }
5588
5589 #[test]
5590 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5591         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5592         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5593         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5594         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5595
5596         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5597
5598         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5599         let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5600
5601         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5602         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5603         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5604
5605         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5606         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5607         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5608
5609         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5610         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5611         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5612
5613         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5614         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5615         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5616 }
5617
5618 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5619         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5620         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5621         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5622         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5623         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5624
5625         let (payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5626
5627         // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5628         // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5629         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
5630         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5631
5632         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5633         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5634         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
5635
5636         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5637         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5638         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5639         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5640         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5641
5642         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5643         let mut block = Block {
5644                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5645                 txdata: vec![],
5646         };
5647         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5648                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5649                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5650         }
5651         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5652         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5653         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5654         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5655 }
5656
5657 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5658         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5659         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5660         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5661         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5662         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5663
5664         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5665         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5666         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5667
5668         let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5669
5670         // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5671         // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5672         // to "time out" the HTLC.
5673
5674         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5675         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5676
5677         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5678                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: Vec::new()});
5679                 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
5680         }
5681         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5682         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5683         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5684         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5685 }
5686
5687 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5688         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5689         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5690         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5691         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5692         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5693
5694         // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
5695         // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5696         // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
5697         // actually revoked.
5698         let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
5699         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
5700         assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
5701         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5702         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5703
5704         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5705         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5706         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5707         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5708         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5709         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5710         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5711         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
5712         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5713         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5714
5715         if check_revoke_no_close {
5716                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
5717                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5718         }
5719
5720         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5721         let mut block = Block {
5722                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5723                 txdata: vec![],
5724         };
5725         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
5726                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5727                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5728         }
5729         if !check_revoke_no_close {
5730                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5731                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5732                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5733                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5734         } else {
5735                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5736         }
5737 }
5738
5739 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
5740 // There are only a few cases to test here:
5741 //  * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
5742 //    broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
5743 //  * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
5744 //  * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
5745 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
5746 // non-dust HTLCs.
5747 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
5748 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
5749 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
5750 #[test]
5751 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
5752         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
5753         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
5754
5755         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
5756         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
5757 }
5758
5759 #[test]
5760 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
5761         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
5762         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
5763         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
5764         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
5765 }
5766
5767 #[test]
5768 #[should_panic]
5769 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
5770         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5771         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5772         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5773         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5774         //Force duplicate channel ids
5775         for node in nodes.iter() {
5776                 *node.keys_manager.override_channel_id_priv.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
5777         }
5778
5779         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
5780         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5781         let push_msat=10001;
5782         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5783         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5784         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5785
5786         //Create a second channel with a channel_id collision
5787         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5788 }
5789
5790 #[test]
5791 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
5792         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5793         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5794         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5795         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5796
5797         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
5798         let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
5799         let push_msat=10001;
5800         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5801
5802         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
5803         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5804         // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
5805         let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
5806         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5807
5808         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
5809         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5810         let push_msat=10001;
5811         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
5812         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5813         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
5814
5815         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
5816         // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
5817         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
5818
5819         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
5820         assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
5821         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5822
5823         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
5824         let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
5825         assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
5826
5827         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
5828         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
5829         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5830         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5831         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
5832         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5833 }
5834
5835 #[test]
5836 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
5837         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5838         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5839         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5840         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5841
5842         let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
5843         let push_msat=10001;
5844         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5845         let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5846         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
5847         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
5848
5849         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5850         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5851         let err_msg = match events[0] {
5852                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
5853                         msg.clone()
5854                 },
5855                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5856         };
5857         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
5858 }
5859
5860 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
5861 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
5862 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
5863 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
5864 #[test]
5865 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
5866         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5867         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5868         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5869         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5870         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5871
5872         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5873         // pending_update_fee.
5874         {
5875                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5876                 *feerate_lock += 20;
5877         }
5878         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5879         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5880
5881         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5882         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5883         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5884                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5885                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5886                 },
5887                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5888         };
5889
5890         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5891
5892         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5893         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5894         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5895
5896         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5897         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1);
5898         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
5899
5900         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
5901         let our_payment_id = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
5902         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5903         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
5904
5905         // Flush the pending fee update.
5906         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5907         let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5908         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5909         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
5910         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5911
5912         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
5913         // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
5914         // us to surface its failure to the user.
5915         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5916         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5917         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
5918         let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
5919                 hex::encode(our_payment_hash.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
5920         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
5921
5922         // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
5923         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5924         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5925         match &events[0] {
5926                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data, .. } => {
5927                         assert_eq!(our_payment_id, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
5928                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
5929                         assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
5930                         assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
5931                         assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
5932                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
5933                         assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
5934                         assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
5935                 },
5936                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5937         }
5938 }
5939
5940 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
5941 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
5942 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
5943 #[test]
5944 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
5945         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5946         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5947         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5948         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5949         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5950
5951         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5952         // pending_update_fee.
5953         {
5954                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5955                 *feerate_lock += 200;
5956         }
5957         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5958         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5959
5960         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5961         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5962         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5963                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5964                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5965                 },
5966                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5967         };
5968
5969         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5970
5971         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5972         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5973         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5974
5975         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5976         let amt_1 = 20000;
5977         let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1) - amt_1;
5978         let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
5979         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
5980
5981         // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
5982         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
5983         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5984         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
5985         let payment_id_2 = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
5986         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5987         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
5988
5989         // Flush the pending fee update.
5990         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5991         let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5992         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5993         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
5994         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5995         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
5996
5997         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
5998         // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
5999         // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
6000         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6001         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6002         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6003         let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6004                 hex::encode(payment_hash_2.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6005         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6006
6007         // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
6008         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6009         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6010         match &events[0] {
6011                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data, .. } => {
6012                         assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6013                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
6014                         assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
6015                         assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6016                         assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6017                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
6018                         assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
6019                         assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
6020                 },
6021                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6022         }
6023
6024         // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
6025         let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
6026                 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6027                 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
6028                 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
6029         };
6030         let raa = match send_raa_event {
6031                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
6032                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6033         };
6034         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6035         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6036         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6037         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6038         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6039         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6040         match events[0] {
6041                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6042                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6043         }
6044         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6045         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6046         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6047         match events[0] {
6048                 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => {},
6049                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6050         }
6051         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
6052         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6053         let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6054         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6055         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
6056         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
6057 }
6058
6059 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
6060 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
6061 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
6062 // once it's freed.
6063 #[test]
6064 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
6065         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6066         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6067         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
6068         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
6069         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
6070         config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
6071         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
6072         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6073         let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6074         let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6075
6076         // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6077         // pending_update_fee.
6078         {
6079                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6080                 *feerate_lock += 20;
6081         }
6082         nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6083         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6084
6085         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6086         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6087         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6088                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6089                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6090                 },
6091                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6092         };
6093
6094         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6095
6096         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6097         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6098         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6099
6100         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6101         let feemsat = 239;
6102         let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
6103         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1) - total_routing_fee_msat;
6104         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
6105         let payment_event = {
6106                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6107                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6108
6109                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6110                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6111
6112                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6113         };
6114         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6115         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6116         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6117         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6118
6119         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1_2.2);
6120         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6121
6122         // Flush the pending fee update.
6123         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6124         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6125         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6126         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6127         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6128         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6129
6130         // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
6131         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6132         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6133
6134         let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
6135                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
6136                         msg.clone()
6137                 },
6138                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6139         };
6140
6141         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
6142         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6143         assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6144
6145         // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
6146         let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6147         assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 1);
6148         match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
6149                 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6150                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6151         }
6152
6153         // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
6154         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6155         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6156
6157         // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
6158         let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6159         assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
6160         let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
6161                 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6162                         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
6163                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
6164                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
6165                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6166                         (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6167                 },
6168                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6169         };
6170
6171         // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
6172         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
6173         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6174
6175         // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
6176         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6177         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6178         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6179         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6180         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6181         let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6182         assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
6183         let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
6184                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
6185                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6186         };
6187         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6188         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
6189         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6190 }
6191
6192 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
6193 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
6194 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
6195
6196 #[test]
6197 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
6198         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
6199         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6200         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6201         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6202         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6203         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6204
6205         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6206         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 100;
6207
6208         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6209                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6210         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6211         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value".to_string(), 1);
6212 }
6213
6214 #[test]
6215 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
6216         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6217         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6218         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6219         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6220         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6221         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6222
6223         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6224         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 0;
6225         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6226                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
6227
6228         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6229         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6230 }
6231
6232 #[test]
6233 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
6234         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6235         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6236         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6237         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6238         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6239         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6240
6241         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6242         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6243         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6244         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6245         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6246
6247         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6248         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6249         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6250         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6251         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() });
6252 }
6253
6254 #[test]
6255 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6256         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6257         //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6258         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6259         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6260         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6261         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6262         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6263
6264         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], vec![], 100000000, 500000001);
6265         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::RouteError { ref err },
6266                 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6267 }
6268
6269 #[test]
6270 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6271         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6272         //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6273         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6274         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6275         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6276         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6277         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6278         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6279         let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6280
6281         for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6282                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6283                 let payment_event = {
6284                         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6285                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6286
6287                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6288                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6289                         if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6290                                 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6291                         } else {
6292                                 assert!(false);
6293                         }
6294                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6295                 };
6296                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6297                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6298                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6299
6300                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6301                 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6302         }
6303         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6304         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6305                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6306
6307         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6308         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
6309 }
6310
6311 #[test]
6312 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6313         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6314         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6315         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6316         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6317         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6318         let channel_value = 100000;
6319         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6320         let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6321
6322         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6323
6324         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6325         // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6326         // limits us to.
6327         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat =  max_in_flight + 1;
6328         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6329                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6330
6331         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6332         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
6333
6334         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6335 }
6336
6337 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6338 #[test]
6339 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6340         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6341         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6342         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6343         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6344         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6345         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6346         let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6347         {
6348                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6349                 let channel = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6350                 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6351         }
6352
6353         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6354         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6355         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6356         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6357         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6358         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6359         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6360         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6361         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6362         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6363         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6364 }
6365
6366 #[test]
6367 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6368         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6369         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6370         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6371         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6372         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6373         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6374
6375         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6376         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6377         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6378         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6379         let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1);
6380
6381         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6382         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6383         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6384         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6385         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6386
6387         // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6388         // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6389         // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6390         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6391         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6392
6393         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6394         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6395         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6396         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6397         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6398 }
6399
6400 #[test]
6401 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6402         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6403         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6404         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6405         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6406         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6407         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6408         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6409
6410         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3999999);
6411         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6412         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6413         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6414         let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3999999, &Some(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6415         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash);
6416
6417         let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6418                 channel_id: chan.2,
6419                 htlc_id: 0,
6420                 amount_msat: 1000,
6421                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6422                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6423                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6424         };
6425
6426         for i in 0..super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
6427                 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6428                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6429         }
6430         msg.htlc_id = (super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS) as u64;
6431         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6432
6433         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6434         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6435         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6436         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6437         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6438 }
6439
6440 #[test]
6441 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6442         //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6443         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6444         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6445         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6446         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6447         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6448
6449         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6450         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6451         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6452         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6453         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6454         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6455
6456         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6457         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6458         assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6459         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6460         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6461 }
6462
6463 #[test]
6464 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6465         //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6466         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6467         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6468         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6469         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6470
6471         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6472         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6473         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6474         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6475         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6476         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6477         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6478
6479         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6480         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6481         assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6482         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6483         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6484 }
6485
6486 #[test]
6487 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6488         //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6489         // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6490         // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6491         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6492         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6493         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6494         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6495
6496         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6497         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6498         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6499         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6500         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6501         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6502
6503         //Disconnect and Reconnect
6504         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6505         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6506         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
6507         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6508         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6509         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
6510         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6511         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6512         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6513         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6514         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6515         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6516
6517         //Resend HTLC
6518         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6519         assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6520         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6521         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6522         let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6523
6524         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6525
6526         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6527         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6528         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6529         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6530         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6531 }
6532
6533 #[test]
6534 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6535         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6536
6537         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6538         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6539         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6540         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6541         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6542         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6543         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6544
6545         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6546         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6547         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6548
6549         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6550                 channel_id: chan.2,
6551                 htlc_id: 0,
6552                 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6553         };
6554
6555         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6556
6557         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6558         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6559         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6560         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6561         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6562 }
6563
6564 #[test]
6565 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6566         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6567
6568         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6569         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6570         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6571         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6572         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6573
6574         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6575         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6576         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6577         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6578         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6579
6580         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6581                 channel_id: chan.2,
6582                 htlc_id: 0,
6583                 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6584         };
6585
6586         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6587
6588         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6589         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6590         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6591         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6592         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6593 }
6594
6595 #[test]
6596 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6597         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6598
6599         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6600         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6601         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6602         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6603         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6604
6605         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6606         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6607         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6608         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6609         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6610         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6611                 channel_id: chan.2,
6612                 htlc_id: 0,
6613                 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6614                 failure_code: 0x8000,
6615         };
6616
6617         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6618
6619         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6620         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6621         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6622         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6623         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6624 }
6625
6626 #[test]
6627 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6628         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6629
6630         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6631         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6632         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6633         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6634         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6635
6636         let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
6637
6638         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6639         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6640
6641         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6642         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6643         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6644                 match events[0] {
6645                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6646                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6647                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6648                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6649                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6650                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6651                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6652                         },
6653                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6654                 }
6655         };
6656
6657         update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6658
6659         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6660
6661         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6662         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6663         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6664         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6665         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6666 }
6667
6668 #[test]
6669 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6670         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6671
6672         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6673         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6674         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6675         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6676         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6677
6678         let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
6679
6680         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6681         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6682
6683         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6684         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6685         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6686                 match events[0] {
6687                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6688                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6689                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6690                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6691                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6692                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6693                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6694                         },
6695                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6696                 }
6697         };
6698
6699         update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
6700
6701         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6702
6703         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6704         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6705         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6706         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6707         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6708 }
6709
6710 #[test]
6711 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
6712         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
6713
6714         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6715         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6716         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6717         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6718         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6719
6720         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6721         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6722         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6723
6724         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6725         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6726
6727         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6728         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6729         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6730
6731         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6732
6733         let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
6734                 match events[0] {
6735                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6736                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6737                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6738                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6739                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6740                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6741                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
6742                         },
6743                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6744                 }
6745         };
6746         update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
6747         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6748
6749         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6750         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6751         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
6752         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6753         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6754 }
6755
6756 #[test]
6757 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
6758         //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
6759         //    * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
6760
6761         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6762         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6763         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6764         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6765         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6766         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6767
6768         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
6769
6770         //First hop
6771         let mut payment_event = {
6772                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6773                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6774                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6775                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6776                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6777         };
6778         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6779         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6780         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6781         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6782         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6783         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6784         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6785         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6786         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6787
6788         //Second Hop
6789         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6790         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6791         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6792         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6793
6794         let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6795         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6796         let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
6797                 match events_3[0] {
6798                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6799                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6800                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6801                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6802                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6803                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6804                                 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
6805                         },
6806                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6807                 }
6808         };
6809
6810         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
6811
6812         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6813         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
6814         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6815         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6816         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6817
6818         //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
6819         match events_4[0] {
6820                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6821                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6822                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6823                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6824                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6825                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6826                 },
6827                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6828         };
6829
6830         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6831 }
6832
6833 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
6834         // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
6835         // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
6836         // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
6837
6838         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6839         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
6840         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6841         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6842         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6843         let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6844
6845         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6846
6847         // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
6848         let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6849         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6850         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6851
6852         // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
6853         let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6854
6855         // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
6856         assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
6857         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6858         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6859         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6860
6861         let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6862         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6863         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
6864         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6865
6866         // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
6867         let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6868
6869         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6870         match events[0] {
6871                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
6872                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6873                 },
6874                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6875         }
6876         match events[1] {
6877                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
6878                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6879                 },
6880                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6881         }
6882
6883         assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
6884         // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
6885         if announce_latest {
6886                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
6887         } else {
6888                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
6889         }
6890
6891         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6892         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6893         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6894
6895         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6896         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6897         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6898         // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
6899         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6900         let mut first_failed = false;
6901         for event in events {
6902                 match event {
6903                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6904                                 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
6905                                         assert!(!first_failed);
6906                                         first_failed = true;
6907                                 } else {
6908                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
6909                                 }
6910                         }
6911                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6912                 }
6913         }
6914 }
6915
6916 #[test]
6917 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
6918         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
6919         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
6920 }
6921
6922 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
6923         // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
6924         // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
6925         // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6926         // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
6927         // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6928         // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
6929
6930         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6931         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6932         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6933         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6934         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6935
6936         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6937
6938         let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6939         let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6940
6941         let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6942         let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
6943
6944         // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
6945         if revoked {
6946                 let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6947                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
6948         }
6949
6950         let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
6951         if local {
6952                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
6953                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
6954                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6955                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6956                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
6957
6958                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
6959                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6960                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6961                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6962                 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
6963                 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6964                 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
6965                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6966                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
6967                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6968                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
6969         } else {
6970                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
6971                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
6972                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6973                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6974                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6975                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6976                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
6977                 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
6978                 if !revoked {
6979                         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
6980                         assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6981                         // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout tx on remote commitment tx
6982                         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
6983                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6984                         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6985                         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
6986                 } else {
6987                         // If revoked, both dust & non-dust HTLCs should have been failed after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confs of revoked
6988                         // commitment tx
6989                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6990                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6991                         let first;
6992                         match events[0] {
6993                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6994                                         if payment_hash == dust_hash { first = true; }
6995                                         else { first = false; }
6996                                 },
6997                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6998                         }
6999                         match events[1] {
7000                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7001                                         if first { assert_eq!(payment_hash, non_dust_hash); }
7002                                         else { assert_eq!(payment_hash, dust_hash); }
7003                                 },
7004                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7005                         }
7006                 }
7007         }
7008 }
7009
7010 #[test]
7011 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
7012         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
7013         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
7014         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
7015 }
7016
7017 #[test]
7018 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
7019         // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
7020
7021         let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7022         low_our_to_self_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
7023         let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7024         high_their_to_self_config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
7025         let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
7026         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7027         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7028         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
7029         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7030
7031         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
7032         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), 1000000, 1000000, 0, &low_our_to_self_config, 0) {
7033                 match error {
7034                         APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7035                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7036                 }
7037         } else { assert!(false) }
7038
7039         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7040         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7041         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7042         open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7043         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0, &low_our_to_self_config, 0) {
7044                 match error {
7045                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str()));  },
7046                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7047                 }
7048         } else { assert!(false); }
7049
7050         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
7051         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7052         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7053         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7054         accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7055         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7056         let reason_msg;
7057         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
7058                 match action {
7059                         &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7060                                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
7061                                 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
7062                         },
7063                         _ => { panic!(); }
7064                 }
7065         } else { panic!(); }
7066         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg });
7067
7068         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7069         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7070         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7071         open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7072         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0, &high_their_to_self_config, 0) {
7073                 match error {
7074                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7075                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7076                 }
7077         } else { assert!(false); }
7078 }
7079
7080 #[test]
7081 fn test_data_loss_protect() {
7082         // We want to be sure that :
7083         // * we don't broadcast our Local Commitment Tx in case of fallen behind
7084         //   (but this is not quite true - we broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr)
7085         // * we close channel in case of detecting other being fallen behind
7086         // * we are able to claim our own outputs thanks to to_remote being static
7087         // TODO: this test is incomplete and the data_loss_protect implementation is incomplete - see issue #775
7088         let persister;
7089         let logger;
7090         let fee_estimator;
7091         let tx_broadcaster;
7092         let chain_source;
7093         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7094         // We broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr, which would cause a panic
7095         // during signing due to revoked tx
7096         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7097         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
7098         let monitor;
7099         let node_state_0;
7100         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7101         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7102         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7103
7104         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7105
7106         // Cache node A state before any channel update
7107         let previous_node_state = nodes[0].node.encode();
7108         let mut previous_chain_monitor_state = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7109         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan.2).write(&mut previous_chain_monitor_state).unwrap();
7110
7111         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7112         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7113
7114         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7115         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7116
7117         // Restore node A from previous state
7118         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
7119         let mut chain_monitor = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_chain_monitor_state.0), keys_manager).unwrap().1;
7120         chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
7121         tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
7122         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7123         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7124         monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &tx_broadcaster, &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7125         node_state_0 = {
7126                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7127                 channel_monitors.insert(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, &mut chain_monitor);
7128                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_node_state), ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7129                         keys_manager: keys_manager,
7130                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
7131                         chain_monitor: &monitor,
7132                         logger: &logger,
7133                         tx_broadcaster: &tx_broadcaster,
7134                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
7135                         channel_monitors,
7136                 }).unwrap().1
7137         };
7138         nodes[0].node = &node_state_0;
7139         assert!(monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chain_monitor).is_ok());
7140         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &monitor;
7141         nodes[0].chain_source = &chain_source;
7142
7143         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7144
7145         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7146         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7147
7148         let reestablish_0 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7149
7150         // Check we don't broadcast any transactions following learning of per_commitment_point from B
7151         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_0[0]);
7152         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7153
7154         {
7155                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7156                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7157         }
7158
7159         let mut reestablish_1 = Vec::with_capacity(1);
7160         for msg in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
7161                 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } = msg {
7162                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7163                         reestablish_1.push(msg.clone());
7164                 } else if let MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } = msg {
7165                 } else if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg {
7166                         match action {
7167                                 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7168                                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting");
7169                                 },
7170                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
7171                         }
7172                 } else {
7173                         panic!("Unexpected event")
7174                 }
7175         }
7176
7177         // Check we close channel detecting A is fallen-behind
7178         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7179         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_string() });
7180         assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction");
7181         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7182
7183         // Check A is able to claim to_remote output
7184         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7185         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7186         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
7187         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
7188         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
7189         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7190         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can\'t do any automated broadcasting".to_string() });
7191         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
7192         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
7193         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
7194 }
7195
7196 #[test]
7197 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
7198         // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
7199         // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
7200         // to B, B should refuse payment.
7201
7202         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7203         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7204         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7205         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7206
7207         // Create some initial channels
7208         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7209
7210         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
7211         let payee = Payee::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7212         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payee, nodes[0].network_graph, None, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
7213         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7214         let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
7215         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7216         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7217
7218         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7219         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7220         let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7221         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7222         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7223
7224         // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
7225         // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
7226         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7227         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7228
7229         // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
7230         // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
7231         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7232
7233         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7234         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7235         let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
7236                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7237                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7238                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7239                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7240                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7241                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7242                         (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
7243                 },
7244                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7245         };
7246         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7247
7248         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
7249         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
7250
7251         // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
7252         let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(10_000).to_vec();
7253         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH));
7254         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
7255 }
7256
7257 #[test]
7258 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
7259         // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
7260         // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
7261
7262         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7263         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7264         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7265         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7266
7267         let short_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7268         let short_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7269         let short_id_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7270
7271         // Disconnect peers
7272         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7273         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7274
7275         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // Enabled -> DisabledStaged
7276         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // DisabledStaged -> Disabled
7277         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7278         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7279         let mut chans_disabled: HashSet<u64> = [short_id_1, short_id_2, short_id_3].iter().map(|a| *a).collect();
7280         for e in msg_events {
7281                 match e {
7282                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7283                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7284                                 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7285                                 if !chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7286                                         panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7287                                 }
7288                         },
7289                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7290                 }
7291         }
7292         // Reconnect peers
7293         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7294         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7295         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7296         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7297         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7298         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7299
7300         // Reestablish chan_1
7301         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7302         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7303         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7304         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7305         // Reestablish chan_2
7306         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7307         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7308         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7309         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7310         // Reestablish chan_3
7311         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7312         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7313         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7314         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7315
7316         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7317         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7318         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7319         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7320         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7321         chans_disabled = [short_id_1, short_id_2, short_id_3].iter().map(|a| *a).collect();
7322         for e in msg_events {
7323                 match e {
7324                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7325                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7326                                 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7327                                 if !chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7328                                         panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7329                                 }
7330                         },
7331                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7332                 }
7333         }
7334 }
7335
7336 #[test]
7337 fn test_priv_forwarding_rejection() {
7338         // If we have a private channel with outbound liquidity, and
7339         // UserConfig::accept_forwards_to_priv_channels is set to false, we should reject any attempts
7340         // to forward through that channel.
7341         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7342         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7343         let mut no_announce_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
7344         no_announce_cfg.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
7345         no_announce_cfg.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels = false;
7346         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(no_announce_cfg), None]);
7347         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
7348         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
7349         let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
7350         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7351
7352         let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
7353
7354         // Note that the create_*_chan functions in utils requires announcement_signatures, which we do
7355         // not send for private channels.
7356         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7357         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7358         nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
7359         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7360         nodes[1].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7361
7362         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[1], 1_000_000, 42);
7363         nodes[1].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
7364         nodes[2].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()));
7365         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
7366
7367         let cs_funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7368         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_funding_signed);
7369         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7370
7371         let conf_height = core::cmp::max(nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1, nodes[2].best_block_info().1 + 1);
7372         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, conf_height);
7373         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH - 1);
7374         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[2], &tx, conf_height);
7375         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH - 1);
7376         let as_funding_locked = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7377         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7378         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7379         nodes[2].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked);
7380         get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7381
7382         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].is_public);
7383         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
7384         assert!(!nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels()[0].is_public);
7385
7386         // We should always be able to forward through nodes[1] as long as its out through a public
7387         // channel:
7388         send_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[0]], 10_000);
7389
7390         // ... however, if we send to nodes[2], we will have to pass the private channel from nodes[1]
7391         // to nodes[2], which should be rejected:
7392         let route_hint = RouteHint(vec![RouteHintHop {
7393                 src_node_id: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
7394                 short_channel_id: nodes[2].node.list_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap(),
7395                 fees: RoutingFees { base_msat: 1000, proportional_millionths: 0 },
7396                 cltv_expiry_delta: MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
7397                 htlc_minimum_msat: None,
7398                 htlc_maximum_msat: None,
7399         }]);
7400         let last_hops = vec![route_hint];
7401         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], last_hops, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
7402
7403         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7404         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7405         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
7406         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7407         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
7408
7409         let htlc_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7410         assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7411         assert_eq!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7412         assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7413         assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fee.is_none());
7414
7415         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7416         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_fail_updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7417         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, nodes[2].node.list_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap(), true);
7418
7419         // Now disconnect nodes[1] from its peers and restart with accept_forwards_to_priv_channels set
7420         // to true. Sadly there is currently no way to change it at runtime.
7421
7422         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7423         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7424
7425         let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
7426         let mut monitor_a_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7427         let mut monitor_b_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7428         get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_1).write(&mut monitor_a_serialized).unwrap();
7429         get_monitor!(nodes[1], cs_funding_signed.channel_id).write(&mut monitor_b_serialized).unwrap();
7430
7431         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7432         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
7433         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7434         nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
7435
7436         let mut monitor_a_read = &monitor_a_serialized.0[..];
7437         let mut monitor_b_read = &monitor_b_serialized.0[..];
7438         let (_, mut monitor_a) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut monitor_a_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
7439         let (_, mut monitor_b) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut monitor_b_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
7440         assert!(monitor_a_read.is_empty());
7441         assert!(monitor_b_read.is_empty());
7442
7443         no_announce_cfg.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels = true;
7444
7445         let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
7446         let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
7447                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7448                 channel_monitors.insert(monitor_a.get_funding_txo().0, &mut monitor_a);
7449                 channel_monitors.insert(monitor_b.get_funding_txo().0, &mut monitor_b);
7450                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7451                         default_config: no_announce_cfg,
7452                         keys_manager,
7453                         fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
7454                         chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
7455                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
7456                         logger: nodes[1].logger,
7457                         channel_monitors,
7458                 }).unwrap()
7459         };
7460         assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
7461         nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
7462
7463         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor_a.get_funding_txo().0, monitor_a).is_ok());
7464         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor_b.get_funding_txo().0, monitor_b).is_ok());
7465         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7466         nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
7467
7468         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7469         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7470         let as_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7471         let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7472         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish);
7473         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
7474         get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7475         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7476
7477         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7478         nodes[2].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7479         let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7480         let cs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7481         nodes[2].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
7482         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_reestablish);
7483         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7484         get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7485
7486         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7487         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7488         pass_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], 10_000, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret);
7489         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], our_payment_preimage);
7490 }
7491
7492 #[test]
7493 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7494         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7495         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7496
7497         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7498         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7499         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7500         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7501
7502         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7503
7504         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7505         let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], vec![], 3000000, 30);
7506         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7507
7508         let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7509         // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7510         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7511         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7512         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7513         let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7514
7515         let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7516         for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7517                 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7518                         penalty_sum += outp.value;
7519                 }
7520         }
7521
7522         // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7523         let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7524
7525         // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7526         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7527         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_114, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7528         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()] });
7529         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7530
7531         // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7532         let penalty_1;
7533         let feerate_1;
7534         {
7535                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7536                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor) + local commitment tx
7537                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7538                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7539                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7540                 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7541                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7542                 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7543                 node_txn.clear();
7544         };
7545
7546         // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7547         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7548         let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7549         let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7550         {
7551                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7552                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7553                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7554                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7555                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7556                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7557                         penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7558                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7559                         assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7560                         let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7561                         feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7562                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7563                         assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7564                         node_txn.clear();
7565                 }
7566         }
7567         assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7568
7569         // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7570         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7571         let penalty_3;
7572         let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7573         {
7574                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7575                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7576                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7577                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7578                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7579                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7580                         penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7581                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7582                         assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7583                         let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7584                         feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7585                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7586                         assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7587                         node_txn.clear();
7588                 }
7589         }
7590         assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7591
7592         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7593         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7594 }
7595
7596 #[test]
7597 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7598         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7599         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7600
7601         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7602         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7603         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7604         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7605         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7606
7607         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7608         // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7609         let payee = Payee::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7610         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
7611         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payee, &nodes[0].network_graph, None,
7612                 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
7613         let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7614         let payee = Payee::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7615         let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payee, nodes[1].network_graph, None,
7616                 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
7617         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7618
7619         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7620         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7621         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7622
7623         // Revoke local commitment tx
7624         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7625
7626         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7627         // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7628         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7629         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7630         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7631         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7632         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 49); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7633
7634         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7635         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
7636         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], chan.3);
7637
7638         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7639         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7640         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7641
7642         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7643         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7644         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
7645         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7646
7647         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7648         let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7649         let header_11 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: hash_128, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7650         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_11, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7651         let header_129 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_11.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7652         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_129, txdata: vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[2].clone()] });
7653         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7654         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7655         match events[1] {
7656                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7657                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7658         }
7659         let first;
7660         let feerate_1;
7661         let penalty_txn;
7662         {
7663                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7664                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + A commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7665                 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7666
7667                 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7668                 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7669                 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7670                 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7671                 // future).
7672                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7673                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7674                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7675                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7676                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7677                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7678
7679                 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7680                 // available, which we check here:
7681                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7682                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7683                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7684
7685                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7686                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7687
7688                 // node_txn[3] is the local commitment tx broadcast just because (and somewhat in case of
7689                 // reorgs, though its not clear its ever worth broadcasting conflicting txn like this when
7690                 // a remote commitment tx has already been confirmed).
7691                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan.3);
7692
7693                 // node_txn[4] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7694                 // output, checked above).
7695                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 2);
7696                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].output.len(), 1);
7697                 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7698
7699                 first = node_txn[4].txid();
7700                 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7701                 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[4].output[0].value;
7702                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[4].get_weight() as u64;
7703                 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7704                 node_txn.clear();
7705         }
7706
7707         // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7708         let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_129.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7709         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7710         let header_131 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_130.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7711         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_131, txdata: Vec::new() });
7712         {
7713                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7714                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // 2 bumped penalty txn on revoked commitment tx
7715
7716                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7717                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7718                 // Note that these are both bogus - they spend outputs already claimed in block 129:
7719                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output  {
7720                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7721                 } else {
7722                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7723                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7724                 }
7725
7726                 node_txn.clear();
7727         };
7728
7729         // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7730         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7731         assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7732         let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7733         let node_txn = {
7734                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7735                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7736
7737                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7738                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7739                 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7740                 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7741                 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7742                 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7743                 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7744                 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7745                 node_txn.clear();
7746                 txn
7747         };
7748         // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7749         let header_145 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_144, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7750         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_145, txdata: node_txn });
7751         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7752         {
7753                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7754                 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7755                 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7756                 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7757                 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7758                 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7759                 // up bumped justice generation.
7760                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7761                 node_txn.clear();
7762         }
7763         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7764         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7765 }
7766
7767 #[test]
7768 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
7769         // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7770         // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7771
7772         // Create 2 HTLCs
7773         // Provide preimage for one
7774         // Check aggregation
7775
7776         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7777         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7778         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7779         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7780
7781         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7782         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7783         route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
7784
7785         // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7786         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7787         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7788         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7789         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7790
7791         // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
7792         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7793         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
7794         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7795         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7796
7797         // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
7798         let timeout;
7799         let preimage;
7800         let preimage_bump;
7801         let feerate_timeout;
7802         let feerate_preimage;
7803         {
7804                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7805                 // 9 transactions including:
7806                 // 1*2 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success
7807                 // 1*3 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success + HTLC-Timeout
7808                 // 2 * HTLC-Success (one RBF bump we'll check later)
7809                 // 1 * HTLC-Timeout
7810                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 8);
7811                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7812                 assert_eq!(node_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
7813                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7814                 check_spends!(node_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
7815                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
7816                 preimage_bump = node_txn[3].clone();
7817
7818                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan.3);
7819                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
7820                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
7821                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[5]);
7822
7823                 timeout = node_txn[6].txid();
7824                 let index = node_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7825                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[6].output[0].value;
7826                 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / node_txn[6].get_weight() as u64;
7827
7828                 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
7829                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7830                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7831                 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7832
7833                 node_txn.clear();
7834         };
7835         assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
7836         assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
7837
7838         // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
7839         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7840         {
7841                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7842                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7843                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7844                 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
7845                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7846                 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7847
7848                 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7849                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
7850                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.get_weight() as u64;
7851                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
7852                 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
7853
7854                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7855                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7856                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7857                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
7858                 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
7859
7860                 node_txn.clear();
7861         }
7862
7863         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7864         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7865 }
7866
7867 #[test]
7868 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
7869         // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
7870         // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
7871         // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
7872         // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
7873         // EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
7874         // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
7875         // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
7876         // implement that).
7877         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7878         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7879         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7880         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7881         let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
7882
7883         let mut guard = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
7884         let keys = guard.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
7885
7886         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
7887
7888         // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
7889         keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7890         let per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
7891
7892         // Must revoke without gaps
7893         keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7894         keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
7895
7896         keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7897         let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
7898                 &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
7899
7900         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
7901                 &msgs::RevokeAndACK { channel_id, per_commitment_secret, next_per_commitment_point });
7902         assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
7903         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7904         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() });
7905 }
7906
7907 #[test]
7908 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
7909         // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
7910         // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7911
7912         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7913         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7914         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7915         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7916
7917         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7918         // Lock HTLC in both directions
7919         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
7920         route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000).0;
7921
7922         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7923         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7924         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7925
7926         // Revoke local commitment tx
7927         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7928
7929         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7930         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
7931         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[0]);
7932         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7933
7934         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
7935         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7936         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7937         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7938         let penalty_txn = {
7939                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7940                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
7941                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7942                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7943                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7944                 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
7945                 node_txn.clear();
7946                 penalty_txn
7947         };
7948         let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7949         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7950         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7951         {
7952                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
7953                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
7954                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
7955         }
7956 }
7957
7958 #[test]
7959 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
7960         // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
7961         // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
7962         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7963         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7964         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7965         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7966
7967         let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7968
7969         // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
7970         // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
7971         // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
7972         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
7973         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7974
7975         // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
7976         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
7977         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7978         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7979
7980         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7981         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7982         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
7983         let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7984         assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
7985         match close_ev[0] {
7986                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
7987                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7988                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
7989                 },
7990                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7991         }
7992 }
7993
7994 #[test]
7995 fn test_override_channel_config() {
7996         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7997         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7998         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7999         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8000
8001         // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
8002         let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
8003         override_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
8004
8005         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
8006
8007         // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
8008         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8009         assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
8010         assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
8011 }
8012
8013 #[test]
8014 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
8015         let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
8016         zero_config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
8017         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8018         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8019         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
8020         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8021
8022         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
8023         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8024         assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8025
8026         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8027         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8028         assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8029 }
8030
8031 #[test]
8032 fn test_simple_mpp() {
8033         // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
8034         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8035         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8036         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8037         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8038
8039         let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8040         let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8041         let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8042         let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8043
8044         let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8045         let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8046         route.paths.push(path);
8047         route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8048         route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8049         route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8050         route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8051         route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8052         route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8053         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
8054         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
8055 }
8056
8057 #[test]
8058 fn test_preimage_storage() {
8059         // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
8060         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8061         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8062         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8063         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8064
8065         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8066
8067         {
8068                 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200);
8069                 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8070                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8071                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8072                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8073                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8074                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8075                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8076         }
8077         // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8078         // values from previous calls.
8079         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8080         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8081         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8082         match events[0] {
8083                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref purpose, .. } => {
8084                         match &purpose {
8085                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
8086                                         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
8087                                 },
8088                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
8089                         }
8090                 },
8091                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8092         }
8093 }
8094
8095 #[test]
8096 fn test_secret_timeout() {
8097         // Simple test of payment secret storage time outs
8098         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8099         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8100         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8101         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8102
8103         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8104
8105         let (payment_hash, payment_secret_1) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2);
8106
8107         // We should fail to register the same payment hash twice, at least until we've connected a
8108         // block with time 7200 + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1.
8109         if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8110                 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8111         } else { panic!(); }
8112         let mut block = {
8113                 let node_1_blocks = nodes[1].blocks.lock().unwrap();
8114                 Block {
8115                         header: BlockHeader {
8116                                 version: 0x2000000,
8117                                 prev_blockhash: node_1_blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(),
8118                                 merkle_root: Default::default(),
8119                                 time: node_1_blocks.len() as u32 + 7200, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8120                         txdata: vec![],
8121                 }
8122         };
8123         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8124         if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8125                 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8126         } else { panic!(); }
8127
8128         // If we then connect the second block, we should be able to register the same payment hash
8129         // again (this time getting a new payment secret).
8130         block.header.prev_blockhash = block.header.block_hash();
8131         block.header.time += 1;
8132         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8133         let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8134         assert_ne!(payment_secret_1, our_payment_secret);
8135
8136         {
8137                 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8138                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8139                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8140                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8141                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8142                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8143                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8144         }
8145         // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8146         // values from previous calls.
8147         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8148         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8149         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8150         match events[0] {
8151                 Event::PaymentReceived { purpose: PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret }, .. } => {
8152                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
8153                         assert_eq!(payment_secret, our_payment_secret);
8154                         // We don't actually have the payment preimage with which to claim this payment!
8155                 },
8156                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8157         }
8158 }
8159
8160 #[test]
8161 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8162         // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8163         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8164         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8165         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8166         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8167
8168         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8169
8170         let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8171         let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8172         let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2);
8173         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8174
8175         // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8176         // resulting events.
8177         macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8178                 () => {
8179                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8180                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8181                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8182                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8183                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8184
8185                         // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8186                         // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8187                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8188                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8189                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8190
8191                         // We should fail the payment back
8192                         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8193                         match events.pop().unwrap() {
8194                                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8195                                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8196                                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8197                                 },
8198                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8199                         }
8200                 }
8201         }
8202
8203         let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8204         // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8205         let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8206
8207         // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8208         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8209         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8210         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8211
8212         // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8213         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8214         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8215         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8216
8217         // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8218         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8219         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8220         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8221 }
8222
8223 #[test]
8224 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8225         // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8226         // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8227         // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateErr.
8228         //
8229         // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8230         // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8231         // commitment at same time.
8232
8233         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8234         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8235         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8236         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8237
8238         // Create some initial channel
8239         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8240         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8241
8242         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8243         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8244
8245         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8246         let preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8247
8248         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8249         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8250         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8251         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8252         let watchtower = {
8253                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8254                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8255                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8256                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8257                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8258                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8259                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8260                 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8261                 watchtower
8262         };
8263         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8264         // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8265         // transaction lock time requirements here.
8266         chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (header, 0));
8267         watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 200);
8268
8269         // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8270         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage));
8271         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8272         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8273         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8274         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8275         if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8276                 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8277                         if let Err(_) =  watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8278                         if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8279                 } else { assert!(false); }
8280         } else { assert!(false); };
8281         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8282         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8283         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8284         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8285 }
8286
8287 #[test]
8288 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8289         // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8290         // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8291         // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8292         // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8293
8294         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8295         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8296         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8297         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8298
8299         // Create some initial channel
8300         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8301         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8302
8303         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8304         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8305
8306         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8307         route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8308
8309         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8310         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8311         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8312         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8313         let watchtower_alice = {
8314                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8315                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8316                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8317                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8318                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8319                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8320                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8321                 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8322                 watchtower
8323         };
8324         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8325         // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8326         // transaction lock time requirements here.
8327         chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as usize, (header, 0));
8328         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8329
8330         // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8331         {
8332                 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8333                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8334                 txn.clear();
8335         }
8336
8337         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8338         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8339         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8340         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8341         let watchtower_bob = {
8342                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8343                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8344                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8345                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8346                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8347                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8348                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8349                 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8350                 watchtower
8351         };
8352         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8353         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8354
8355         // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8356         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8357         {
8358                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8359         }
8360         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8361
8362         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8363         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8364         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8365         if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8366                 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8367                         // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8368                         if let Err(_) =  watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8369                         if let Ok(_) = watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8370                         if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8371                 } else { assert!(false); }
8372         } else { assert!(false); };
8373         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8374         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8375
8376         //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8377         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8378         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8379
8380         // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8381         let bob_state_y;
8382         {
8383                 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8384                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8385                 bob_state_y = txn[0].clone();
8386                 txn.clear();
8387         };
8388
8389         // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8390         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8391         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![bob_state_y.clone()] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8392         {
8393                 let htlc_txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8394                 // We broadcast twice the transaction, once due to the HTLC-timeout, once due
8395                 // the onchain detection of the HTLC output
8396                 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
8397                 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8398                 check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], bob_state_y);
8399         }
8400 }
8401
8402 #[test]
8403 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8404         // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8405         // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8406         // message).
8407         //
8408         // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8409         // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8410         //
8411         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8412         // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8413         // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8414         // before receiving funding_signed.
8415         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8416         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8417         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8418         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8419
8420         // Create an initial channel
8421         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8422         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8423         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8424         let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8425         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_chan_msg);
8426
8427         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8428         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
8429
8430         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
8431         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8432
8433         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8434         let channel_id = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
8435         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8436         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8437         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Hi".to_string() }, true);
8438 }
8439
8440 #[test]
8441 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8442         // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8443         // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8444         // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8445         // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
8446         // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
8447         // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
8448
8449         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8450         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8451         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8452         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8453
8454         // Create some initial channels
8455         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8456
8457         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
8458         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
8459         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
8460         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8461         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
8462         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
8463
8464         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8465         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8466         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] });
8467         // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
8468         // this test before #653 fix.
8469         chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
8470         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8471         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8472         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8473         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
8474
8475         let htlc_timeout = {
8476                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8477                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
8478                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8479                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
8480                 node_txn[1].clone()
8481         };
8482
8483         let header_201 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8484         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_201, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout.clone()] });
8485         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8486         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8487 }
8488
8489 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
8490         // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
8491         // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
8492         // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
8493         //
8494         // Steps of the test:
8495         // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
8496         // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
8497         // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
8498         // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
8499         // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
8500         //    but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
8501         // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
8502         // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
8503         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8504         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8505         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8506         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8507
8508         // Create some initial channels
8509         let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8510         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8511
8512         // Steps (1) and (2):
8513         // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
8514         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3_000_000);
8515
8516         // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
8517         let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
8518         check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8519         assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
8520         check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
8521         assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8522         assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
8523
8524         // Steps (3) and (4):
8525         // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
8526         // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
8527         let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
8528         if !broadcast_alice { force_closing_node = 1; } // Bob force-closes
8529         nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_channel(&chan_ab.2).unwrap();
8530         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
8531         check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
8532         check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8533         if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8534                 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
8535                         true => alice_txn.clone(),
8536                         false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
8537                 };
8538                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8539                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8540                 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8541                 if broadcast_alice {
8542                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8543                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8544                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8545                 }
8546                 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8547                 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8548         }
8549
8550         // Step (5):
8551         // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
8552         // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
8553         assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
8554         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8555         let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8556         assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8557         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8558         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8559         assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
8560         assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8561
8562         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8563         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false);
8564         // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
8565         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
8566                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8567                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8568                 match events[0] {
8569                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
8570                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8571                         },
8572                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8573                 };
8574         }
8575         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
8576         // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
8577         // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
8578         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8579
8580         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8581         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8582         let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
8583                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8584                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8585                         (*msg).clone()
8586                 },
8587                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8588         };
8589         let bob_updates = match events[1] {
8590                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
8591                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8592                         (*updates).clone()
8593                 },
8594                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8595         };
8596
8597         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
8598         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8599         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
8600         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8601
8602         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8603         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8604         let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
8605                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8606                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8607                         (*msg).clone()
8608                 },
8609                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8610         };
8611         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
8612         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8613
8614         // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
8615         // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
8616         let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
8617         if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
8618         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8619                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8620                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8621                 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
8622                 if broadcast_alice {
8623                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8624                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8625                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8626                 }
8627                 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8628                 if broadcast_alice {
8629                         // In `connect_block()`, the ChainMonitor and ChannelManager are separately notified about a
8630                         // new block being connected. The ChannelManager being notified triggers a monitor update,
8631                         // which triggers broadcasting our commitment tx and an HTLC-claiming tx. The ChainMonitor
8632                         // being notified triggers the HTLC-claiming tx redundantly, resulting in 3 total txs being
8633                         // broadcasted.
8634                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 3);
8635                         check_spends!(bob_txn[1], chan_ab.3);
8636                 } else {
8637                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8638                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8639                 }
8640         }
8641
8642         // Step (6):
8643         // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
8644         // broadcasted commitment transaction.
8645         {
8646                 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8647                 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8648                         // Bob should now have an extra broadcasted tx, for the preimage-claiming transaction.
8649                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8650                 }
8651                 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
8652                         true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
8653                         false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
8654                 };
8655                 // If Alice force-closed and Bob didn't receive her commitment transaction until after he
8656                 // received Carol's fulfill, he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction first. Else if
8657                 // Bob force closed or if he found out about Alice's commitment tx before receiving Carol's
8658                 // fulfill, then he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction second.
8659                 if broadcast_alice && !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8660                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8661                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8662                 } else {
8663                         check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8664                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8665                 }
8666         }
8667 }
8668
8669 #[test]
8670 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
8671         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
8672         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
8673         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
8674         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
8675 }
8676
8677 #[test]
8678 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
8679         // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
8680         // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
8681         //
8682         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
8683         // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
8684         // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
8685         // updating logic for the existing channel.
8686         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8687         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8688         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8689         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8690
8691         // Create an initial channel
8692         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8693         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8694         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8695         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8696
8697         // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
8698         // that it is rejected.
8699         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8700         {
8701                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8702                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8703                 match events[0] {
8704                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8705                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
8706                                 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
8707                                 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
8708                                 // move forward with it.
8709                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8710                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8711                         },
8712                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8713                 }
8714         }
8715
8716         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8717         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
8718
8719         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
8720         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8721
8722         let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8723         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8724         {
8725                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8726                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8727                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8728                 added_monitors.clear();
8729         }
8730         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8731
8732         let funding_outpoint = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
8733         let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
8734
8735         // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
8736         // temporary one).
8737
8738         // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
8739         // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
8740         // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
8741         open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
8742         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8743         {
8744                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8745                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8746                 match events[0] {
8747                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8748                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8749                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8750                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8751                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8752                         },
8753                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8754                 }
8755         }
8756
8757         // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
8758         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8759         let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8760         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_2_msg);
8761         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8762         create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
8763
8764         let funding_created = {
8765                 let mut a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
8766                 let mut as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get_mut(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
8767                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8768                 as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
8769         };
8770         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8771         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
8772         // At this point we'll try to add a duplicate channel monitor, which will be rejected, but
8773         // still needs to be cleared here.
8774         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8775
8776         // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
8777         {
8778                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8779                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8780                 match events[0] {
8781                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8782                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8783                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8784                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
8785                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8786                         },
8787                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8788                 }
8789         }
8790
8791         // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
8792         // everything is functional.
8793         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
8794         {
8795                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8796                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8797                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8798                 added_monitors.clear();
8799         }
8800
8801         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8802         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
8803         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
8804         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
8805
8806         let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8807         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
8808         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
8809         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
8810 }
8811
8812 #[test]
8813 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
8814         // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
8815         //
8816         // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
8817         // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
8818         // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
8819         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8820         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8821         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8822         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8823
8824         // Create some initial channels
8825         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8826         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8827         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8828
8829         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8830         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8831         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8832
8833         // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
8834         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8835         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8836
8837         // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
8838         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8839         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8840         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
8841         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
8842         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
8843         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8844         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
8845         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8846
8847         // A null channel ID should close all channels
8848         let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8849         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8850         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
8851         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
8852         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8853         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8854         match events[0] {
8855                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
8856                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
8857                 },
8858                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8859         }
8860         match events[1] {
8861                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
8862                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
8863                 },
8864                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8865         }
8866         // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
8867         // peer_disconnected with no_connection_possible set to false, duplicating the
8868         // close-all-channels logic. That's OK, we don't want to end up not force-closing channels for
8869         // users with their own peer handling logic. We duplicate the call here, however.
8870         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8871         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8872
8873         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
8874         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8875         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8876 }
8877
8878 #[test]
8879 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
8880         // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
8881         //
8882         // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
8883         // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
8884         // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
8885         // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
8886         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8887         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8888         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8889         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8890
8891         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8892         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8893         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8894
8895         let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100_000, 42);
8896         for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
8897                 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
8898                 output.script_pubkey = bitcoin::Script::new();
8899         }
8900
8901         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
8902         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8903         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8904
8905         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8906         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8907
8908         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8909         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
8910
8911         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
8912         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
8913         nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
8914
8915         let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
8916         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
8917         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
8918         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8919         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8920         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
8921         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
8922                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8923                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
8924                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
8925                 } else { panic!(); }
8926         } else { panic!(); }
8927         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
8928 }
8929
8930 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
8931         // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
8932         // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
8933         // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
8934         // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
8935         // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
8936         // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
8937         // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
8938         // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
8939         // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
8940         // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
8941         // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
8942         // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
8943         // until we learned about an additional block.
8944         //
8945         // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
8946         // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
8947         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8948         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8949         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8950         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8951         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
8952
8953         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8954         let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8955         let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
8956         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8957         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8958
8959         nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&channel_id).unwrap();
8960         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8961         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8962         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8963         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
8964         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8965
8966         let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
8967         if !test_height_before_timelock {
8968                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
8969         }
8970         nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
8971                 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
8972         if test_height_before_timelock {
8973                 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
8974                 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
8975                 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8976                 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
8977         } else {
8978                 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
8979                 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
8980                 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
8981                 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
8982                 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
8983                 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
8984                 // timelock is up).
8985                 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
8986                 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
8987
8988                 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
8989                 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
8990                 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
8991                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
8992                         &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
8993                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8994                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8995
8996                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8997                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8998                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8999                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9000                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9001                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9002                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9003                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9004                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
9005         }
9006 }
9007
9008 #[test]
9009 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
9010         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
9011         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
9012 }
9013
9014 #[test]
9015 fn test_forwardable_regen() {
9016         // Tests that if we reload a ChannelManager while forwards are pending we will regenerate the
9017         // PendingHTLCsForwardable event automatically, ensuring we don't forget to forward/receive
9018         // HTLCs.
9019         // We test it for both payment receipt and payment forwarding.
9020
9021         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9022         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9023         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9024         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
9025         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
9026         let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
9027         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9028         let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9029         let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9030
9031         // First send a payment to nodes[1]
9032         let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
9033         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9034         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9035
9036         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9037         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9038         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9039         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9040         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9041
9042         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9043
9044         // Next send a payment which is forwarded by nodes[1]
9045         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 200_000);
9046         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
9047         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9048
9049         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9050         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9051         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9052         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9053         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9054
9055         // There is already a PendingHTLCsForwardable event "pending" so another one will not be
9056         // generated
9057         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9058
9059         // Now restart nodes[1] and make sure it regenerates a single PendingHTLCsForwardable
9060         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9061         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9062
9063         let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
9064         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9065         let mut chan_1_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9066         get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_1).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9067         get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_2).write(&mut chan_1_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9068
9069         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
9070         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
9071         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
9072         nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
9073
9074         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9075         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9076                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9077         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
9078         let mut chan_1_monitor_read = &chan_1_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9079         let (_, mut chan_1_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9080                 &mut chan_1_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9081         assert!(chan_1_monitor_read.is_empty());
9082
9083         let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
9084         let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
9085                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
9086                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
9087                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_1_monitor);
9088                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
9089                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
9090                         keys_manager,
9091                         fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
9092                         chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
9093                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
9094                         logger: nodes[1].logger,
9095                         channel_monitors,
9096                 }).unwrap()
9097         };
9098         nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
9099         assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
9100
9101         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
9102         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_1_monitor).is_ok());
9103         nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
9104         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9105
9106         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9107         // Note that nodes[1] and nodes[2] resend their funding_locked here since they haven't updated
9108         // the commitment state.
9109         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9110
9111         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9112
9113         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9114         expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 100_000);
9115         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9116
9117         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9118         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9119         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9120         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9121         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9122         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9123         expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 200_000);
9124
9125         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
9126         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage_2);
9127 }
9128
9129 #[test]
9130 fn test_keysend_payments_to_public_node() {
9131         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9132         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9133         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9134         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9135
9136         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9137         let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9138         let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9139         let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9140         let params = RouteParameters {
9141                 payee: Payee::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9142                 final_value_msat: 10000,
9143                 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9144         };
9145         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
9146         let route = find_route(&payer_pubkey, &params, network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
9147
9148         let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9149         let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9150         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9151         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9152         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9153         let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9154         let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9155         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9156         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9157 }
9158
9159 #[test]
9160 fn test_keysend_payments_to_private_node() {
9161         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9162         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9163         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9164         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9165
9166         let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9167         let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9168         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
9169         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
9170
9171         let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9172         let params = RouteParameters {
9173                 payee: Payee::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9174                 final_value_msat: 10000,
9175                 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9176         };
9177         let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9178         let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9179         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
9180         let route = find_route(
9181                 &payer_pubkey, &params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9182                 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
9183         ).unwrap();
9184
9185         let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9186         let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9187         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9188         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9189         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9190         let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9191         let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9192         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9193         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9194 }
9195
9196 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
9197 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
9198 enum ExposureEvent {
9199         /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
9200         AtHTLCForward,
9201         /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
9202         AtHTLCReception,
9203         /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
9204         AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
9205 }
9206
9207 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool) {
9208         // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
9209         // policy.
9210         //
9211         // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
9212         // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
9213         // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
9214         // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
9215         // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
9216         // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
9217         // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
9218         // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
9219
9220         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9221         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
9222         config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = 5_000_000; // default setting value
9223         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9224         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
9225         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9226
9227         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9228         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9229         open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
9230         open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
9231         if on_holder_tx {
9232                 open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9233         }
9234         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
9235         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9236         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
9237
9238         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 1_000_000, 42);
9239
9240         if on_holder_tx {
9241                 if let Some(mut chan) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&temporary_channel_id) {
9242                         chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9243                 }
9244         }
9245
9246         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
9247         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9248         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9249
9250         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9251         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9252
9253         let (funding_locked, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9254         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
9255         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9256
9257         let dust_buffer_feerate = {
9258                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
9259                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
9260                 chan.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64
9261         };
9262         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9263         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9264
9265         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9266         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9267
9268         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 25;
9269         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
9270
9271         if on_holder_tx {
9272                 if dust_outbound_balance {
9273                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9274                         // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9275                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
9276                         for i in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9277                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9278                                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9279                         }
9280                 } else {
9281                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9282                         // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9283                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
9284                         for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9285                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9286                         }
9287                 }
9288         } else {
9289                 if dust_outbound_balance {
9290                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9291                         // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9292                         for i in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9293                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9294                                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9295                         }
9296                 } else {
9297                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9298                         // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9299                         for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9300                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9301                         }
9302                 }
9303         }
9304
9305         let dust_overflow = dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx + 1);
9306         if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
9307                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9308                 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9309                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9310                 if on_holder_tx {
9311                         let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9312                         let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9313                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9314                 } else {
9315                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9316                 }
9317         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
9318                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9319                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9320                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9321                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9322                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9323                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
9324                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9325                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9326                 if on_holder_tx {
9327                         // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
9328                         let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9329                         let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9330                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9331                 } else {
9332                         // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
9333                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9334                 }
9335         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
9336                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 2_500_000);
9337                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at update_fee-swallowed HTLC", ); }
9338                 {
9339                         let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9340                         *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
9341                 }
9342                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9343                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9344                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure".to_string(), 1);
9345         }
9346
9347         let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9348         let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9349         added_monitors.clear();
9350 }
9351
9352 #[test]
9353 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
9354         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9355         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9356         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9357         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9358         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9359         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9360         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9361         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9362         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9363         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9364         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9365         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9366 }