_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
  11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
  12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
  13
  14 use chain;
  15 use chain::{Confirm, Listen, Watch};
  16 use chain::channelmonitor;
  17 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
  18 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  19 use chain::keysinterface::{BaseSign, KeysInterface};
  20 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
  21 use ln::channel::{commitment_tx_base_weight, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT};
  22 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS };
  23 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
  24 use ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
  25 use ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
  26 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, find_route, get_route};
  27 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures, NodeFeatures};
  28 use ln::msgs;
  29 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
  30 use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
  31 use util::{byte_utils, test_utils};
  32 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason};
  33 use util::errors::APIError;
  34 use util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
  35 use util::config::UserConfig;
  36
  37 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
  38 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
  39 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
  40 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  41 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
  42 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
  43
  44 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
  45 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
  46
  47 use regex;
  48
  49 use io;
  50 use prelude::*;
  51 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
  52 use core::default::Default;
  53 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
  54
  55 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
  56 use ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
  57
  58 #[test]
  59 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
  60         // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
  61         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
  62         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
  63         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
  64         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
  65
  66         // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
  67         // funding satoshis
  68         let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
  69         let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat);
  70         let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
  71
  72         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
  73         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
  74
  75         // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
  76         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
  77
  78         // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
  79         // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
  80         let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
  81                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
  82                 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
  83                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
  84                 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
  85                 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
  86                         match action {
  87                                 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
  88                                         nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), expected_regex, 1);
  89                                 },
  90                                 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
  91                         }
  92                 } else { assert!(false); }
  93         };
  94
  95         use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
  96         use ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
  97
  98         // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
  99         insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than {}. It was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS; msg });
 100
 101         insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
 102
 103         insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than funding value \d+", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
 104
 105         insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
 106
 107         insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
 108
 109         insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
 110
 111         insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
 112
 113         insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
 114 }
 115
 116 fn do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(send_from_initiator: bool) {
 117         // A peer providing a channel_reserve_satoshis of 0 (or less than our dust limit) is insecure,
 118         // but only for them. Because some LSPs do it with some level of trust of the clients (for a
 119         // substantial UX improvement), we explicitly allow it. Because it's unlikely to happen often
 120         // in normal testing, we test it explicitly here.
 121         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 122         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 123         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 124         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 125
 126         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
 127         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
 128         let feerate_per_kw = 253;
 129         let opt_anchors = false;
 130         push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
 131         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
 132
 133         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None).unwrap();
 134         let mut open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 135         if !send_from_initiator {
 136                 open_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 137                 open_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 138         }
 139         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_message);
 140
 141         // Extract the channel accept message from node1 to node0
 142         let mut accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 143         if send_from_initiator {
 144                 accept_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 145                 accept_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 146         }
 147         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel_message);
 148         {
 149                 let mut lock;
 150                 let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(if send_from_initiator { &nodes[1] } else { &nodes[0] }, lock, temp_channel_id);
 151                 chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 152                 chan.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 153         }
 154
 155         let funding_tx = sign_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100_000, temp_channel_id);
 156         let funding_msgs = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_tx);
 157         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_msgs.0);
 158
 159         // nodes[0] should now be able to send the full balance to nodes[1], violating nodes[1]'s
 160         // security model if it ever tries to send funds back to nodes[0] (but that's not our problem).
 161         if send_from_initiator {
 162                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000_000
 163                         // Note that for outbound channels we have to consider the commitment tx fee and the
 164                         // "fee spike buffer", which is currently a multiple of the total commitment tx fee as
 165                         // well as an additional HTLC.
 166                         - FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, 2, opt_anchors));
 167         } else {
 168                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], push_amt);
 169         }
 170 }
 171
 172 #[test]
 173 fn test_counterparty_no_reserve() {
 174         do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(true);
 175         do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(false);
 176 }
 177
 178 #[test]
 179 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
 180         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 181         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 182         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 183         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 184         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 185
 186         // balancing
 187         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 188
 189         // A                                        B
 190         // update_fee                            ->
 191         // send (1) commitment_signed            -.
 192         //                                       <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
 193         // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
 194         // (1) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 195         //                                       .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
 196         // (2) RAA is delivered                  ->
 197         //                                       .- send (4) commitment_signed
 198         //                                       <- (3) RAA is delivered
 199         // send (5) commitment_signed            -.
 200         //                                       <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
 201         // send (6) RAA                          -.
 202         // (5) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 203         //                                       <- RAA
 204         // (6) RAA is delivered                  ->
 205
 206         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 207         {
 208                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 209                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 210         }
 211         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 212         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 213
 214         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 215         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 216         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 217                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 218                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 219                 },
 220                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 221         };
 222
 223         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 224
 225         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 226         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 227         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
 228         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 229
 230         let payment_event = {
 231                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 232                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 233                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 234         };
 235         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 236         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 237
 238         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 239         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 240         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 241         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 242         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 243         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 244
 245         // deliver(1), generate (3):
 246         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 247         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 248         // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 249         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 250
 251         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
 252         let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 253         assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 254         assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 255         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 256         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 257         assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
 258         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 259
 260         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
 261         let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 262         assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 263         assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 264         assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 265         assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 266         assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
 267         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 268
 269         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
 270         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 271         // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 272         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 273
 274         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
 275         let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 276         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 277
 278         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 279         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 280
 281         let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 282         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
 283         match events_2[0] {
 284                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
 285                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 286         }
 287
 288         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
 289         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 290 }
 291
 292 #[test]
 293 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
 294         // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
 295         // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
 296         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 297         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 298         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 299         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 300         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 301
 302         // balancing
 303         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 304
 305         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 306         {
 307                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 308                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 309         }
 310         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 311         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 312
 313         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 314         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 315         let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 316                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
 317                         update_fee.as_ref()
 318                 },
 319                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 320         };
 321
 322         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 323
 324         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 325         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 326         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
 327         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 328
 329         let payment_event = {
 330                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 331                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 332                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 333         };
 334         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 335         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 336
 337         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 338         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 339         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 340         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 341         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 342         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 343
 344         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
 345         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 346
 347         // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
 348 }
 349
 350 #[test]
 351 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
 352         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 353         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 354         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 355         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 356         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 357
 358         // A                                        B
 359         // update_fee/commitment_signed          ->
 360         //                                       .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
 361         // update_fee (never committed)          ->
 362         // (3) update_fee                        ->
 363         // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
 364         // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
 365         // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
 366         //                                       <- (1) RAA delivered
 367         // (3) is generated and send (4) CS      -.
 368         // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
 369         // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
 370         //                                       <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
 371         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 372         //                                          B should send no response here
 373         // (4) commitment_signed delivered       ->
 374         //                                       <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
 375         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 376
 377         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 378         let initial_feerate;
 379         {
 380                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 381                 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
 382                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
 383         }
 384         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 385         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 386
 387         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 388         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 389         let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 390                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 391                         (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
 392                 },
 393                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 394         };
 395
 396         // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
 397         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
 398         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
 399         let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 400         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 401
 402         // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
 403         // transaction:
 404         {
 405                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 406                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
 407         }
 408         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 409         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 410         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 411
 412         // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
 413         let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
 414                 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
 415                 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
 416         };
 417
 418         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 419
 420         update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
 421         // Deliver (3)
 422         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 423
 424         // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
 425         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
 426         let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 427         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 428         assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 429         assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 430         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 431         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 432         // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
 433         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
 434         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
 435
 436         // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
 437         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
 438         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 439         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 440         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 441
 442         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
 443         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 444         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 445
 446         // Delever (4)
 447         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
 448         let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 449         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 450
 451         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 452         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 453         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 454
 455         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
 456         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 457         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 458         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 459
 460         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
 461         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 462         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 463 }
 464
 465 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
 466         // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
 467         // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
 468         // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
 469         // Node objects.
 470
 471         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 472         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 473         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 474         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 475
 476         if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
 477                 let block = Block {
 478                         header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
 479                         txdata: vec![],
 480                 };
 481                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
 482                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
 483         }
 484
 485         if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
 486         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
 487         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 488
 489         if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
 490         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
 491         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 492
 493         if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
 494         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
 495
 496         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
 497
 498         if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
 499         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
 500         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 501         let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 502
 503         if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
 504         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
 505         {
 506                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 507                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 508                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 509                 added_monitors.clear();
 510         }
 511         let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 512
 513         if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
 514         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
 515         {
 516                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 517                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 518                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 519                 added_monitors.clear();
 520         }
 521
 522         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 523         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
 524
 525         if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
 526         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
 527
 528         if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
 529         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
 530         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
 531         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
 532 }
 533
 534 #[test]
 535 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
 536         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
 537         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
 538         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
 539         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
 540         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
 541         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
 542         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
 543         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
 544         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
 545         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
 546         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
 547         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
 548         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
 549         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
 550         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
 551         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
 552         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
 553         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
 554 }
 555
 556 #[test]
 557 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
 558         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 559         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 560         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 561         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 562         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 563
 564         {
 565                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 566                 *feerate_lock += 25;
 567         }
 568         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 569         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 570
 571         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 572         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 573         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 574                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 575                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 576                 },
 577                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 578         };
 579         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 580
 581         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 582         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 583         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 584
 585         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 586         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 587         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 588
 589         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 590         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 591         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 592         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 593
 594         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 595         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 596         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 597 }
 598
 599 #[test]
 600 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
 601         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 602         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 603         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 604         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 605         let channel_value = 5000;
 606         let push_sats = 700;
 607         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 608         let channel_id = chan.2;
 609         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 610         let bs_channel_reserve_sats = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value);
 611
 612         let opt_anchors = false;
 613
 614         // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
 615         // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
 616         // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
 617         // remote limit.
 618         let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
 619         let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors)) as u32;
 620         {
 621                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 622                 *feerate_lock = feerate;
 623         }
 624         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 625         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 626         let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 627
 628         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
 629
 630         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
 631
 632         // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
 633         {
 634                 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
 635
 636                 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
 637                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
 638                 let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000;
 639                 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
 640                 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
 641                 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
 642         }
 643
 644         {
 645                 // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
 646                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 647                 *feerate_lock += 4;
 648         }
 649         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 650         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
 651         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 652
 653         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
 654
 655         // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
 656         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
 657         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
 658                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 659                 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 660                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 661                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
 662                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 663                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 664         };
 665         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
 666                 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 667                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 668                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
 669                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
 670                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 671                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
 672                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 673         };
 674
 675         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
 676         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
 677                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
 678
 679         let res = {
 680                 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 681                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 682                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 683                 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
 684                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
 685                         INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
 686                         push_sats,
 687                         channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000,
 688                         opt_anchors, local_funding, remote_funding,
 689                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
 690                         non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 691                         &mut htlcs,
 692                         &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
 693                 );
 694                 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
 695         };
 696
 697         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
 698                 channel_id: chan.2,
 699                 signature: res.0,
 700                 htlc_signatures: res.1
 701         };
 702
 703         let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
 704                 channel_id: chan.2,
 705                 feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 706         };
 707
 708         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
 709
 710         //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
 711         //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
 712         //Should produce and error.
 713         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
 714         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
 715         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 716         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 717         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") });
 718 }
 719
 720 #[test]
 721 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
 722         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 723         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 724         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 725         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 726         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 727
 728         // balancing
 729         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 730
 731         {
 732                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 733                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 734         }
 735         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 736         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 737
 738         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 739         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 740         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 741                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 742                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 743                 },
 744                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 745         };
 746         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 747         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 748         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 749         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 750
 751         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
 752
 753         // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
 754         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
 755         {
 756                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 757                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
 758                 added_monitors.clear();
 759         }
 760         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 761         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 762         // node[1] has nothing to do
 763
 764         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 765         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 766         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 767
 768         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 769         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 770         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 771         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 772         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 773         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 774         // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
 775
 776         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 777         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
 778         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
 779         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
 780         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
 781         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
 782
 783         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
 784         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 785         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 786         let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 787
 788         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 789         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 790         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 791
 792         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 793         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 794         let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 795         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 796
 797         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 798         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 799         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 800
 801         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
 802
 803         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 804         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
 805         match events[0] {
 806                 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
 807                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 808         };
 809
 810         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
 811
 812         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
 813         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
 814         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 815         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 816         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 817 }
 818
 819 #[test]
 820 fn test_update_fee() {
 821         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 822         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 823         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 824         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 825         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 826         let channel_id = chan.2;
 827
 828         // A                                        B
 829         // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 830         //                                       <- (2) revoke_and_ack
 831         //                                       .- send (3) commitment_signed
 832         // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 833         //                                       .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
 834         //                                       <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
 835         // send (6) revoke_and_ack               -.
 836         //                                       <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
 837         // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack            ->
 838         //                                       .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
 839         //                                       <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
 840         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 841
 842         // Create and deliver (1)...
 843         let feerate;
 844         {
 845                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 846                 feerate = *feerate_lock;
 847                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
 848         }
 849         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 850         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 851
 852         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 853         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 854         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 855                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 856                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 857                 },
 858                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 859         };
 860         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 861
 862         // Generate (2) and (3):
 863         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 864         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 865         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 866
 867         // Deliver (2):
 868         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 869         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 870         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 871
 872         // Create and deliver (4)...
 873         {
 874                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 875                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
 876         }
 877         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 878         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 879         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 880         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 881         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 882                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 883                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 884                 },
 885                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 886         };
 887
 888         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 889         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 890         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 891         // ... creating (5)
 892         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 893         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 894
 895         // Handle (3), creating (6):
 896         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
 897         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 898         let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 899         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 900
 901         // Deliver (5):
 902         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 903         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 904         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 905
 906         // Deliver (6), creating (7):
 907         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
 908         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 909         assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 910         assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 911         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 912         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 913         assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
 914         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 915
 916         // Deliver (7)
 917         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 918         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 919         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 920         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 921
 922         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 923         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 924         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 925
 926         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
 927         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
 928         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 929         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 930         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 931 }
 932
 933 #[test]
 934 fn fake_network_test() {
 935         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
 936         // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
 937         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
 938         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
 939         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
 940         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 941
 942         // Create some initial channels
 943         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 944         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 945         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 946
 947         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
 948         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 949         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 950         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 951         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 952
 953         // Send some more payments
 954         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
 955         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
 956         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
 957
 958         // Test failure packets
 959         let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
 960         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
 961
 962         // Add a new channel that skips 3
 963         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 964
 965         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
 966         send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
 967         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 968         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 969         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 970         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 971         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 972
 973         // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
 974         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
 975         hops.push(RouteHop {
 976                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
 977                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
 978                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
 979                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
 980                 fee_msat: 0,
 981                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
 982         });
 983         hops.push(RouteHop {
 984                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
 985                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
 986                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
 987                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
 988                 fee_msat: 0,
 989                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
 990         });
 991         hops.push(RouteHop {
 992                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
 993                 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
 994                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
 995                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
 996                 fee_msat: 1000000,
 997                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
 998         });
 999         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1000         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1001         let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
1002
1003         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1004         hops.push(RouteHop {
1005                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1006                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1007                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1008                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1009                 fee_msat: 0,
1010                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1011         });
1012         hops.push(RouteHop {
1013                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1014                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1015                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1016                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1017                 fee_msat: 0,
1018                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1019         });
1020         hops.push(RouteHop {
1021                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1022                 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1023                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1024                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1025                 fee_msat: 1000000,
1026                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1027         });
1028         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1029         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1030         let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1031
1032         // Claim the rebalances...
1033         fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1034         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1035
1036         // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
1037         let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1038
1039         // Send some payments across both channels
1040         let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1041         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1042         let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1043
1044
1045         route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
1046         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1047         assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1048         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap(), 1);
1049
1050         //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
1051
1052         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
1053         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
1054         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
1055
1056         // Close down the channels...
1057         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1058         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1059         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1060         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1061         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1062         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1063         close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1064         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1065         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1066         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1067         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1068         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1069         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
1070         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1071         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1072 }
1073
1074 #[test]
1075 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1076         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1077         // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1078         // commitment dance rounds.
1079         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1080         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1081         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1082         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1083         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1084         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1085
1086         let mut payments = Vec::new();
1087         for _ in 0..::ln::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
1088                 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1089                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
1090                 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1091         }
1092         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1093
1094         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1095         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1096         let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1097         assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1098
1099         // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1100         // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1101         // another HTLC.
1102         let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1103         {
1104                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1105                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1106                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1107                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
1108         }
1109
1110         // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1111         let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1112         {
1113                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
1114                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1115         }
1116
1117         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1118         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1119         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1120         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1121
1122         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1123         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1124         // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1125         // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1126         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1127         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1128         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1129
1130         let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1131         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1132         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1133
1134         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1135
1136         // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1137         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1138         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1139         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1140
1141         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1142         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1143         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1144         let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1145
1146         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1147         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1148         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1149
1150         for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1151                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1152         }
1153         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1154         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1155         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1156         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1157         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1158
1159         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1160         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1161         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1162         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1163         let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1164
1165         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1166         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1167
1168         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1169
1170         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1171         assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1172         for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1173                 match event {
1174                         &Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1175                                 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1176                         },
1177                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1178                 };
1179         }
1180
1181         for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1182                 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1183         }
1184
1185         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1186 }
1187
1188 #[test]
1189 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1190         // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1191         // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1192         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1193         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1194         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1195         let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1196
1197         // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1198         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1199         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1200         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1201         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1202         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1203
1204         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1205
1206         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1207         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1208
1209         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1210         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1211
1212         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1213         fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1214         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1215 }
1216
1217 #[test]
1218 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1219         // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1220         // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1221         // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1222         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1223         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1224         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1225         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1226
1227         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1228
1229         // balancing
1230         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1231
1232         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1233
1234         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1235         let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
1236         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1237
1238         // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1239         nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1240         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1241
1242         // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1243         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1244
1245         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1246         let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1247         for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1248                 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1249                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1250                 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1251                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1252                 }
1253         }
1254         assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1255
1256         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1257         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1258         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1259         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1260
1261         // Check we only broadcast 1 timeout tx
1262         let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1263         assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 8);
1264         assert_eq!(claim_txn[1], claim_txn[4]);
1265         assert_eq!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[5]);
1266         check_spends!(claim_txn[1], chan_1.3);
1267         check_spends!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[1]);
1268         check_spends!(claim_txn[7], claim_txn[1]);
1269
1270         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1271         assert_eq!(claim_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
1272         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, claim_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
1273
1274         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1275         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1276         check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
1277         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1278         assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
1279         assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1280         check_spends!(claim_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
1281         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1282
1283         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1284         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1285         for e in events {
1286                 match e {
1287                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1288                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
1289                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1290                                 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1291                         },
1292                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1293                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1294                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1295                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1296                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1297                                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1298                         },
1299                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1300                 }
1301         }
1302 }
1303
1304 #[test]
1305 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1306         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1307         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1308         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1309         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1310         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1311
1312         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1313         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1314
1315         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1316         let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2), 1 + 1, get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2));
1317         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1318         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send + 1);
1319         let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).err().unwrap();
1320         match err {
1321                 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(ref fails) => {
1322                         match &fails[0] {
1323                                 &APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ref err} =>
1324                                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)),
1325                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1326                         }
1327                 },
1328                 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1329         }
1330         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1331         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1332
1333         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1334 }
1335
1336 #[test]
1337 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1338         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1339         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1340         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1341         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1342         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1343
1344         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460001);
1345         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1346         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1347         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1348
1349         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1350
1351         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1352         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3460001, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1353         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1354         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1355                 channel_id: chan.2,
1356                 htlc_id: 0,
1357                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1358                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1359                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1360                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1361         };
1362
1363         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1364
1365         // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1366         // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1367         // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1368
1369         let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1370
1371         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1372
1373         // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1374         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1375         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1376                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1377                 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1378                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1379                 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1380                 chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1381
1382                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1383                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1384                  chan_signer.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1385                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1386                  chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1387         };
1388         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1389                 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1390                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1391                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1392                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1393                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1394                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1395                  chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1396         };
1397
1398         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1399         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1400                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
1401
1402         // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1403         // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1404         let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1405
1406         let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1407                 offered: false,
1408                 amount_msat: 3460001,
1409                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1410                 payment_hash,
1411                 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1412         };
1413
1414         let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1415
1416         let res = {
1417                 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1418                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1419                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1420                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1421                         commitment_number,
1422                         95000,
1423                         local_chan_balance,
1424                         local_chan.opt_anchors(), local_funding, remote_funding,
1425                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1426                         feerate_per_kw,
1427                         &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1428                         &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1429                 );
1430                 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1431         };
1432
1433         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1434                 channel_id: chan.2,
1435                 signature: res.0,
1436                 htlc_signatures: res.1
1437         };
1438
1439         // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1440         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1441         let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1442
1443         // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1444         let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1445                 channel_id: chan.2,
1446                 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1447                 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point
1448         };
1449         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1450
1451         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1452         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1453         // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1454         match events[0] {
1455                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1456                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1457                         update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1458                 },
1459                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1460         };
1461         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1462                 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", ::hex::encode(raa_msg.channel_id)), 1);
1463
1464         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1465 }
1466
1467 #[test]
1468 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1469         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1470         // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1471         // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1472         // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1473         // this situation.
1474         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1475         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1476         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1477         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1478
1479         let opt_anchors = false;
1480
1481         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1482         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1483         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1484
1485         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1486
1487         // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1488         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1489                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1490         }
1491
1492         // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1493         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1494         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1495                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1496         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1497         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1498 }
1499
1500 #[test]
1501 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1502         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1503         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1504         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1505         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1506         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1507
1508         let opt_anchors = false;
1509
1510         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1511         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1512         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1513         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1514         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1515         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1516         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1517
1518         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1519         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1520                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1521         }
1522
1523         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 700_000);
1524         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1525         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1526         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1527         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1528         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1529         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 700_000, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1530         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1531         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1532                 channel_id: chan.2,
1533                 htlc_id: MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64,
1534                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1535                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1536                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1537                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1538         };
1539
1540         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1541         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1542         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1543         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1544         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1545         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1546         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1547         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() });
1548 }
1549
1550 #[test]
1551 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1552         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1553         // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1554         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1555         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1556
1557         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1558         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1559         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1560
1561         let opt_anchors = false;
1562
1563         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1564         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1565         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1566         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1567         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1568         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1569         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1570
1571         let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1572                 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1573         // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1574         // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1575         // commitment transaction fee.
1576         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1577
1578         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1579         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1580                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1581         }
1582
1583         // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1584         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt + 1);
1585         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1586                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1587 }
1588
1589 #[test]
1590 fn test_chan_init_feerate_unaffordability() {
1591         // Test that we will reject channel opens which do not leave enough to pay for any HTLCs due to
1592         // channel reserve and feerate requirements.
1593         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1594         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1595         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1596         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1597         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1598
1599         let opt_anchors = false;
1600
1601         // Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
1602         // HTLC.
1603         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1604         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1605         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None).unwrap_err(),
1606                 APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
1607
1608         // During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
1609         // requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
1610         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1611         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None).unwrap();
1612         let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1613         open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
1614         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg);
1615
1616         let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1617         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
1618         match msg_events[0] {
1619                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
1620                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve");
1621                 },
1622                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1623         }
1624 }
1625
1626 #[test]
1627 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1628         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1629         // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1630         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1631         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1632         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1633         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1634         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1635
1636         let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1637         // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1638         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1639         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1640         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1641         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1642
1643         // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1644         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1645         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1646         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1647         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1648         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1649
1650         // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1651         // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1652         // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1653         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1654 }
1655
1656 #[test]
1657 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1658         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1659         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1660         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1661         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1662         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1663         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1664
1665         let feemsat = 239;
1666         let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1667         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1668         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1669         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1670
1671         // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1672         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1673         let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1674         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1675
1676         // Add a pending HTLC.
1677         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1678         let payment_event_1 = {
1679                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1680                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1681
1682                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1683                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1684                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1685         };
1686         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1687
1688         // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1689         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2, opt_anchors);
1690         let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1691         let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1692         let (route_2, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_2);
1693
1694         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1695         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1696         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1697         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1698         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1699         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, &None, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1700         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1);
1701         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1702                 channel_id: chan.2,
1703                 htlc_id: 1,
1704                 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1705                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1706                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1707                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1708         };
1709
1710         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1711         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1712         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1713         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1714         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1715         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1716         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1717         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() });
1718 }
1719
1720 #[test]
1721 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1722         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1723         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1724         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1725         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1726         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1727         let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1728         let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1729         assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1730         assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1731
1732         let reserve = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100000);
1733         assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1734         assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1735
1736         assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1737         assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1738 }
1739
1740 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
1741         (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1742 }
1743
1744 #[test]
1745 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1746         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1747         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1748         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1749         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1750         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1751         config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1752         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1753         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1754         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1755         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1756
1757         let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1758         let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1759
1760         let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1761         let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1762
1763         macro_rules! expect_forward {
1764                 ($node: expr) => {{
1765                         let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1766                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1767                         check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1768                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1769                         payment_event
1770                 }}
1771         }
1772
1773         let feemsat = 239; // set above
1774         let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1775         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1776         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1777
1778         let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1779
1780         // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1781         {
1782                 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_0);
1783                 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1784                 assert!(route.paths[0].iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1785                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1786                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1787                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1788                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
1789         }
1790
1791         // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1792         // nodes[0]'s wealth
1793         loop {
1794                 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1795                 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1796                 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1797                 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1798                 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1799                 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1800                 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1801                         break;
1802                 }
1803                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
1804
1805                 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1806                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1807                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1808                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1809                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1810                 );
1811
1812                 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1813                 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1814                 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1815                 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1816                 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1817         }
1818
1819         // adding pending output.
1820         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1821         // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1822         // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1823         // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1824         // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1825         // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1826         // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1827         // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1828         // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1829         // policy.
1830         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1831         let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1832         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1833
1834         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1835         let payment_event_1 = {
1836                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1837                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1838
1839                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1840                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1841                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1842         };
1843         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1844
1845         // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1846         let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1847         {
1848                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_2 + 1);
1849                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1850                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1851                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1852         }
1853
1854         // split the rest to test holding cell
1855         let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1856         let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1857         let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1858         let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1859         {
1860                 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1861                 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1862         }
1863
1864         // now see if they go through on both sides
1865         let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1866         // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1867         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21, &Some(our_payment_secret_21)).unwrap();
1868         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1869         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1870         assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1871
1872         // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1873         {
1874                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22+1);
1875                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1876                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1877                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1878                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 2);
1879         }
1880
1881         let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1882         // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1883         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22, &Some(our_payment_secret_22)).unwrap();
1884         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1885         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1886         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1887
1888         // flush the pending htlc
1889         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1890         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1891         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1892
1893         // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1894         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1895         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1896         let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1897
1898         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
1899         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1900         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1901         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1902
1903         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1904         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1905         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1906
1907         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1908
1909         let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1910         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
1911         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
1912
1913         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1914         expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
1915
1916         // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
1917         assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
1918         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
1919         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
1920         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
1921         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1922
1923         let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1924         assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
1925         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
1926         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
1927
1928         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
1929         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1930
1931         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1932         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1933         match events[0] {
1934                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
1935                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
1936                         assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
1937                         match &purpose {
1938                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1939                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1940                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
1941                                 },
1942                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1943                         }
1944                 },
1945                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1946         }
1947         match events[1] {
1948                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
1949                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
1950                         assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
1951                         match &purpose {
1952                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1953                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1954                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
1955                                 },
1956                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1957                         }
1958                 },
1959                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1960         }
1961
1962         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
1963         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
1964         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
1965
1966         let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1, opt_anchors);
1967         let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
1968         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
1969
1970         let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
1971         let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
1972         let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1973         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
1974         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
1975
1976         let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1977         assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
1978 }
1979
1980 #[test]
1981 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
1982         // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
1983         // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
1984         // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
1985         // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
1986         // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
1987         // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
1988         // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
1989         // To test this we:
1990         //  * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
1991         //    you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
1992         //    you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
1993         //  * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
1994         //  * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
1995         //    the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
1996         //  * deliver the first fulfill from B
1997         //  * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
1998         //    claim,
1999         //  * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
2000         //    This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
2001         //    removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
2002         //  * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
2003         //    of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
2004         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2005         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2006         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2007         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2008         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2009
2010         let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2011         // Route the first two HTLCs.
2012         let (payment_preimage_1, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000);
2013         let (payment_preimage_2, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20000);
2014
2015         // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
2016         let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
2017         let send_1 = {
2018                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_3, &Some(payment_secret_3)).unwrap();
2019                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2020                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2021                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2022                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2023         };
2024
2025         // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
2026         // initial fulfill/CS.
2027         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
2028         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2029         let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2030
2031         // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
2032         // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
2033         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2));
2034         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2035         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2036
2037         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2038         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
2039         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2040         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2041         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
2042
2043         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
2044         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
2045         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2046         // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
2047         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2048
2049         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2050         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2051         let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2052
2053         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2054         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2055         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2056
2057         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2058         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2059         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2060
2061         // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
2062         // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2063         // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
2064         // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
2065         // on-chain as necessary).
2066         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2067         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
2068         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2069         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2070         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
2071
2072         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2073         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2074         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2075
2076         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2077         expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2078
2079         // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2080         // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2081         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2082         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2083         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2084         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2085
2086         // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2087         // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2088         let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2089         let send_2 = {
2090                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_4, &Some(payment_secret_4)).unwrap();
2091                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2092                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2093                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2094                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2095         };
2096
2097         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2098         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2099         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2100         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2101
2102         // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2103
2104         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2105         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2106         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2107
2108         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2109         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2110
2111         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2112         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2113         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2114         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2115
2116         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2117         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2118         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2119
2120         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2121         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2122
2123         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2124         expect_payment_received!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2125
2126         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2127         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2128 }
2129
2130 #[test]
2131 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2132         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2133         // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2134         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2135         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2136         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2137         let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2138
2139         // Create some initial channels
2140         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2141         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2142         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2143         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2144
2145         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2146         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2147         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2148         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2149         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2150         connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2151
2152         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2153         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2154         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2155         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2156         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2157
2158         // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2159         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2160         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2161         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
2162         {
2163                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2164                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2165                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2166                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2167                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2168         }
2169         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2170         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2171         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2172         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2173         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2174
2175         // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2176         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2177
2178         // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2179         // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2180         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2181         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
2182         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2183         {
2184                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2185                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2186                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2187                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2188                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2189                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2190         }
2191         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2192         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2193         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2194         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2195         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2196
2197         macro_rules! claim_funds {
2198                 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
2199                         {
2200                                 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
2201                                 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2202
2203                                 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2204                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2205                                 match events[0] {
2206                                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2207                                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2208                                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2209                                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2210                                         },
2211                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2212                                 };
2213                         }
2214                 }
2215         }
2216
2217         // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2218         // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2219         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2220         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2221         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], false);
2222         let node2_commitment_txid;
2223         {
2224                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2225                 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2226                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2227                 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2228
2229                 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2230                 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
2231                 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2232                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2233                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2234         }
2235         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2236         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2237         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2238         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2239         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2240
2241         // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2242         // confusing us in the following tests.
2243         let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2244
2245         // One pending HTLC to time out:
2246         let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
2247         // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2248         // buffer space).
2249
2250         let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2251                 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2252                 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2253                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2254                 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2255                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2256                                 msg.clone()
2257                         },
2258                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2259                 };
2260                 match events[1] {
2261                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2262                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2263                         },
2264                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2265                 }
2266                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2267
2268                 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2269                 {
2270                         let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2271                         node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2272                                 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2273                                         false
2274                                 } else { true }
2275                         });
2276                 }
2277
2278                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2279
2280                 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2281                 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
2282
2283                 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2284                 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2285                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2286                 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2287                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2288                                 msg.clone()
2289                         },
2290                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2291                 };
2292                 match events[1] {
2293                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2294                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2295                         },
2296                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2297                 }
2298                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2299                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2300
2301                 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2302                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2303                 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2304         };
2305         nodes[3].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2306         nodes[4].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2307         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2308         assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2309
2310         nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon).unwrap();
2311         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2312         check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2313 }
2314
2315 #[test]
2316 fn test_justice_tx() {
2317         // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2318         let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2319         alice_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
2320         alice_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2321         alice_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2322         let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2323         bob_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
2324         bob_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2325         bob_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2326         let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2327         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2328         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2329         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2330         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2331         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2332         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2333         // Create some new channels:
2334         let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2335
2336         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2337         let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2338         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2339         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2340         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2341         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2342         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2343         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2344         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2345         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2346         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2347         // Revoke the old state
2348         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2349
2350         {
2351                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2352                 {
2353                         let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2354                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2355                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2356
2357                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2358                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2359                         node_txn.truncate(1);
2360                 }
2361                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2362                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2363                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2364
2365                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2366                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2367                 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2368                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2369                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2370                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2371                 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2372                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2373                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2374         }
2375         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2376
2377         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2378         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2379
2380         // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
2381         // Create some new channels:
2382         let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2383         {
2384                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2385                 node_txn.clear();
2386         }
2387
2388         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2389         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2390         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2391         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2392         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2393         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2394         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2395         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2396         // Revoke the old state
2397         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2398         {
2399                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2400                 {
2401                         let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2402                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); //ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2403                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2404
2405                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2406                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2407                 }
2408                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2409                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2410
2411                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2412                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2413                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2414                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2415                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2416                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2417                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2418         }
2419         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2420         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2421         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2422 }
2423
2424 #[test]
2425 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2426         // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2427         // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2428         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2429         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2430         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2431         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2432         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2433         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2434         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2435         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2436         // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2437         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2438         // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2439         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2440
2441         // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2442         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2443         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2444         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2445         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2446         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2447
2448         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2449         check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
2450
2451         // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2452         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2453         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2454         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2455         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2456 }
2457
2458 #[test]
2459 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2460         // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2461         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2462         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2463         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2464         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2465         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2466
2467         // Create some new channel:
2468         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2469
2470         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2471         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2472         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2473         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2474         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2475
2476         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2477         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2478         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2479         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2480         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2481         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2482         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2483         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2484         check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2485
2486         //Revoke the old state
2487         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2488
2489         {
2490                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2491                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2492                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2493                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2494                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2495                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2496                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2497                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2498
2499                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2500                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment
2501
2502                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2503                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2504
2505                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2506                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2507                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2508                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2509                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2510                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2511                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2512                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2513
2514                 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
2515                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2516                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
2517         }
2518         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2519         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2520         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2521 }
2522
2523 #[test]
2524 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2525         // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2526         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2527         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2528         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2529         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2530         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2531
2532         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2533
2534         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2535         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2536         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2537         // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2538         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2539         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2540
2541         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2542         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2543
2544         //Revoke the old state
2545         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2546
2547         {
2548                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2549                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2550                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2551                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2552                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2553                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2554                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2555                 match events[1] {
2556                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2557                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2558                 }
2559
2560                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2561                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2562
2563                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2564                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 9);
2565                 // ChannelMonitor: justice tx revoked offered htlc, justice tx revoked received htlc, justice tx revoked to_local (3)
2566                 // ChannelManager: local commmitment + local HTLC-timeout (2)
2567                 // ChannelMonitor: bumped justice tx, after one increase, bumps on HTLC aren't generated not being substantial anymore, bump on revoked to_local isn't generated due to more room for expiration (2)
2568                 // ChannelMonitor: local commitment + local HTLC-timeout (2)
2569
2570                 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2571                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2572                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2573                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2574                 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2575                 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2576                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2577
2578                 // Justice transactions are indices 1-2-4
2579                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2580                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
2581                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
2582
2583                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2584                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2585                 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2586
2587                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2588                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2589                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2590                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2591                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2592                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2593                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2594                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2595         }
2596         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2597         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2598         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2599 }
2600
2601 #[test]
2602 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2603         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2604         // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2605         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2606         // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2607         // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2608         // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2609         // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2610         // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2611         // towards B.
2612         // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2613         // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2614         // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2615         // PaymentSent event).
2616
2617         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2618         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2619         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2620         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2621
2622         // Create some initial channels
2623         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2624         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2625
2626         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2627         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2628         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2629         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2630         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2631
2632         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2633         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2634         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2635
2636         let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2637         let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2638
2639         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2640         // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2641         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2642         assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2643         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2644         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2645         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2646         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2647         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2648         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2649         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2650         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2651         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2652
2653         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2654         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2655         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2656         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2657         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx, 2*htlc-success tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2658         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5);
2659         assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2660         assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2661         assert_eq!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2662         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2663         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2664         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2665         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2666         assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2667         assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2668         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
2669         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2670
2671         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2672         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2673         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: node_txn});
2674         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2675         {
2676                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2677                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2678                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2679                 added_monitors.clear();
2680         }
2681         let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2682         assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2683         match forwarded_events[0] {
2684                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2685                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2686         }
2687         let chan_id = Some(chan_1.2);
2688         match forwarded_events[1] {
2689                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
2690                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2691                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2692                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2693                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2694                 },
2695                 _ => panic!()
2696         }
2697         match forwarded_events[2] {
2698                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
2699                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2700                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2701                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2702                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2703                 },
2704                 _ => panic!()
2705         }
2706         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2707         {
2708                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2709                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2710                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2711                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2712                 added_monitors.clear();
2713         }
2714         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2715         match events[0] {
2716                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2717                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2718         }
2719         match events[1] {
2720                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2721                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2722         }
2723
2724         match events[2] {
2725                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2726                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2727                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2728                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2729                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2730                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2731                 },
2732                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2733         };
2734         macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2735                 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $chan_tx: expr) => { {
2736                         let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2737                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
2738                         // Node[1]: ChannelManager: 3 (commitment tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (timeout tx)
2739                         // Node[0]: ChannelManager: 3 (commtiemtn tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 HTLC-timeout
2740                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2741                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], $commitment_tx);
2742                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2743                         assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time, 0);
2744                         if $htlc_offered {
2745                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2746                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2747                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2748                                 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2749                         } else {
2750                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2751                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2752                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2753                                 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2754                         }
2755                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], $chan_tx);
2756                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2757                         node_txn.clear();
2758                 } }
2759         }
2760         // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own local state as a fallback, suggesting an alternate
2761         // commitment transaction with a corresponding HTLC-Timeout transactions, as well as a
2762         // timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2763         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2764
2765         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2766         // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx  on A's chain
2767         let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2768         check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2769         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2770         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2771         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2772         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2773         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2774         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 6); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx + HTLC-Sucess * 2), ChannelMonitor : 3 (HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn)
2775         let commitment_spend =
2776                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2777                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2778                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2779                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2780                         &node_txn[0]
2781                 } else {
2782                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2783                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2784                         assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2785                         &node_txn[2]
2786                 };
2787
2788         check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2789         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2790         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2791         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2792         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time, 0);
2793         assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2794         check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3);
2795         assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2796         check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[3]);
2797         check_spends!(node_txn[5], node_txn[3]);
2798         // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
2799         // we already checked the same situation with A.
2800
2801         // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
2802         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2803         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()] });
2804         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2805         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2806         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2807         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2808         assert_eq!(events.len(), 5);
2809         let mut first_claimed = false;
2810         for event in events {
2811                 match event {
2812                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
2813                                 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
2814                                         assert!(!first_claimed);
2815                                         first_claimed = true;
2816                                 } else {
2817                                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
2818                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
2819                                 }
2820                         },
2821                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
2822                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
2823                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2824                 }
2825         }
2826         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2827 }
2828
2829 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
2830         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
2831         // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2832         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2833         // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
2834         //    B's commitment tx                 C's commitment tx
2835         //            \                                  \
2836         //         B's HTLC timeout tx               B's timeout tx
2837
2838         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2839         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2840         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2841         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2842         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2843         *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2844         *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2845
2846         // Create some intial channels
2847         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2848         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2849
2850         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
2851         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2852         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2853
2854         let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2855
2856         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2857         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2858         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2859         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
2860         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
2861         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2862         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2863
2864         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2865         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2866         match events[0] {
2867                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2868                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2869                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2870                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2871                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2872                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2873                 },
2874                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2875         };
2876         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2877         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2878         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2879         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2880         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx)
2881         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2882         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2883         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2884
2885         // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2886         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
2887         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2888         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
2889         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2890         let timeout_tx;
2891         {
2892                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2893                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-timeout), 1 timeout tx
2894                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2895                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2896
2897                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2898                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2899
2900                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2901                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2902                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2903                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2904
2905                 timeout_tx = node_txn[2].clone();
2906                 node_txn.clear();
2907         }
2908
2909         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
2910         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2911         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2912         {
2913                 // B will rebroadcast a fee-bumped timeout transaction here.
2914                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2915                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2916                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2917         }
2918
2919         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2920         {
2921                 // B may rebroadcast its own holder commitment transaction here, as a safeguard against
2922                 // some incredibly unlikely partial-eclipse-attack scenarios. That said, because the
2923                 // original commitment_tx[0] (also spending chan_2.3) has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY B really
2924                 // shouldn't broadcast anything here, and in some connect style scenarios we do not.
2925                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2926                 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
2927                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2928                 } else {
2929                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
2930                 }
2931         }
2932
2933         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2934         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2935         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2936         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2937         match events[0] {
2938                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2939                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2940                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2941                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2942                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2943                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2944                 },
2945                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2946         };
2947
2948         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
2949         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2950         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2951
2952         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
2953         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2954
2955         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2956         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2957         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2958         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 commitment tx, ChannelMonitor : 1 timeout tx
2959         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2960         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2961         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2962         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2963         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2964 }
2965
2966 #[test]
2967 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
2968         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
2969         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
2970         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
2971 }
2972
2973 #[test]
2974 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
2975         // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
2976         // and fail backward accordingly.
2977
2978         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2979         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2980         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2981         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2982
2983         // Create some initial channels
2984         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2985         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2986
2987         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
2988         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
2989         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2990         // Revoke the old state
2991         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
2992
2993         let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
2994
2995         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2996         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2997         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2998         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2999         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3000
3001         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3002         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3003         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3004         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3005         match events[0] {
3006                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3007                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3008                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3009                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3010                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3011                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3012
3013                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3014                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3015                         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
3016                 },
3017                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3018         }
3019 }
3020
3021 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
3022         // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
3023         // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
3024         // commitment transaction anymore.
3025         // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
3026         // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
3027         // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
3028         // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
3029         // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
3030         // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
3031         // transactions:
3032         // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
3033         //   commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
3034         // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
3035         //   and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
3036         //   commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
3037         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3038         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3039         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3040         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3041
3042         // Create some initial channels
3043         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3044         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3045
3046         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
3047         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3048         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3049         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
3050         // Revoke the old state
3051         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3052
3053         let value = if use_dust {
3054                 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
3055                 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
3056                 nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
3057         } else { 3000000 };
3058
3059         let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3060         let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3061         let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3062
3063         assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash));
3064         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3065         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3066         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3067         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3068         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3069         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3070         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3071         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3072         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3073         let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
3074         // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
3075
3076         assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash));
3077         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3078         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3079         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3080         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3081         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3082         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3083         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3084         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3085         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3086         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3087         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3088         // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3089         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3090         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3091         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3092
3093         assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash));
3094         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3095         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3096         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3097         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3098         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3099         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3100         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3101         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3102         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3103         // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3104         // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3105         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3106         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3107         // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3108         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3109         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3110         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3111
3112         // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3113         // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3114         let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3115         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, fourth_payment_hash, &Some(fourth_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3116         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3117         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3118         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3119
3120         if deliver_bs_raa {
3121                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3122                 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3123                 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3124                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3125                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3126                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3127                 match events[0] {
3128                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3129                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3130                 };
3131                 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3132                 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3133         }
3134
3135         let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
3136         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3137
3138         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3139         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3140         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3141         assert!(ANTI_REORG_DELAY > PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS); // We assume payments will also expire
3142
3143         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3144         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 4 });
3145         match events[0] {
3146                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
3147                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
3148         }
3149         match events[1] {
3150                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3151                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3152                 },
3153                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3154         }
3155         if !deliver_bs_raa {
3156                 match events[2] {
3157                         Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3158                                 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3159                         },
3160                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3161                 }
3162                 match events[3] {
3163                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3164                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3165                 };
3166         }
3167         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3168         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3169
3170         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3171         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3172         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 1 } else { 0 }] {
3173                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3174                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3175         }
3176         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 1 }] {
3177                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
3178                         assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3179                         assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3180                 },
3181                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3182         }
3183         if deliver_bs_raa {
3184                 match events[0] {
3185                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3186                                 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3187                                 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3188                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3189                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3190                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3191                         },
3192                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3193                 }
3194         }
3195         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 3 } else { 2 }] {
3196                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3197                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3198                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3199                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3200                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3201                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3202
3203                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3204                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3205                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3206
3207                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3208
3209                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3210                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3211                         match events[0] {
3212                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3213                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3214                                         // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3215                                         // that we should update our routing table for.
3216                                         if !deliver_bs_raa {
3217                                                 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3218                                         }
3219                                 },
3220                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3221                         }
3222                         match events[1] {
3223                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3224                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3225                                         assert!(network_update.is_some());
3226                                 },
3227                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3228                         }
3229                         match events[2] {
3230                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3231                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3232                                         assert!(network_update.is_some());
3233                                 },
3234                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3235                         }
3236                 },
3237                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3238         }
3239
3240         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3241         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3242         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3243 }
3244
3245 #[test]
3246 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3247         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3248         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3249         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3250         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3251 }
3252
3253 #[test]
3254 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3255         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3256         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3257         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3258         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3259 }
3260
3261 #[test]
3262 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3263         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3264         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3265         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3266         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3267         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3268
3269         // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3270         {
3271                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3272                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
3273                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3274
3275                 let payment_event = {
3276                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3277                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3278                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3279                 };
3280                 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3281                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3282         }
3283
3284         // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3285         let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3286         {
3287                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, failed_payment_hash, &Some(failed_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3288                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3289
3290                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3291         }
3292
3293         // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3294         {
3295                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3296
3297                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3298                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3299                 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3300                 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 50_000, &Some(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3301                 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3302                 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
3303
3304                 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3305                 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3306                         channel_id: chan.2,
3307                         htlc_id: 0,
3308                         amount_msat: 0,
3309                         payment_hash,
3310                         cltv_expiry,
3311                         onion_routing_packet,
3312                 };
3313                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3314         }
3315         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3316         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3317         // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3318         match events[0] {
3319                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3320                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3321                 },
3322                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3323         }
3324         match events[1] {
3325                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3326                         assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3327                 },
3328                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3329         }
3330         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3331         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3332 }
3333
3334 #[test]
3335 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3336         // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3337         // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3338         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3339         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3340         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3341         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3342         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3343
3344         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3345         nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id).unwrap();
3346         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3347         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3348         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3349         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3350
3351         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3352         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3353         assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
3354
3355         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3356         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
3357         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3358         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3359         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3360
3361         // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3362         // registering new transactions
3363         header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
3364         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
3365 }
3366
3367 #[test]
3368 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3369         // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3370         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3371         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3372         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3373         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3374         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3375         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3376
3377         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3378
3379         let mut payment_event = {
3380                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3381                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3382
3383                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3384                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3385                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3386         };
3387
3388         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3389         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3390
3391         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3392
3393         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3394         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3395         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3396         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3397
3398         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3399         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3400         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3401         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3402         let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3403
3404         // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3405         // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3406         // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3407
3408         nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id).unwrap();
3409         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3410         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3411         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3412         let tx = {
3413                 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3414                 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3415                 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3416                 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3417                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3418                 node_txn.remove(0)
3419         };
3420
3421         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3422
3423         // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3424         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3425         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3426         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3427
3428         // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3429         {
3430                 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3431                         .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator, &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3432         }
3433         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3434         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3435         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3436         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3437         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3438         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3439         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3440
3441         check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3442 }
3443
3444 #[test]
3445 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3446         // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3447         // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3448         // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3449         // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3450
3451         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3452         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3453         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3454         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3455         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3456
3457         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3458
3459         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
3460         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3461         let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3462         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3463         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
3464
3465         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3466         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3467
3468         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3469         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3470 }
3471
3472 #[test]
3473 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3474         // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3475         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3476         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3477         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3478         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3479         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3480         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3481
3482         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3483         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3484         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3485
3486         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3487         let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3488         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3489         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3490
3491         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3492         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3493         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3494
3495         let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3496         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3497         let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3498         let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3499
3500         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3501         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3502
3503         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3504         fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3505
3506         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
3507         {
3508                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3509                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3510                 match events[0] {
3511                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3512                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3513                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3514                         },
3515                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3516                 }
3517                 match events[1] {
3518                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
3519                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3520                                 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
3521                         },
3522                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3523                 }
3524                 match events[2] {
3525                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3526                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3527                 }
3528         }
3529
3530         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3531         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3532 }
3533
3534 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3535         // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3536         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3537         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3538         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3539         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3540
3541         let mut as_funding_locked = None;
3542         if messages_delivered == 0 {
3543                 let (funding_locked, _, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3544                 as_funding_locked = Some(funding_locked);
3545                 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3546                 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3547                 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3548         } else {
3549                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3550         }
3551
3552         let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3553
3554         let payment_event = {
3555                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
3556                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3557
3558                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3559                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3560                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3561         };
3562         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3563
3564         if messages_delivered < 2 {
3565                 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3566         } else {
3567                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3568                 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3569                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3570                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3571                         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3572
3573                         if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3574                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3575                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3576                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3577
3578                                 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3579                                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3580                                         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3581                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3582                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3583
3584                                         if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3585                                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3586                                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3587                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3588                                         }
3589                                 }
3590                         }
3591                 }
3592         }
3593
3594         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3595         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3596         if messages_delivered < 3 {
3597                 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3598                         // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a funding_locked prior to a
3599                         // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to funding_locked time.
3600                         //
3601                         // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a funding_locked immediately on
3602                         // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate funding_locked sent
3603                         // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3604                         //
3605                         // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3606                         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3607                 }
3608                 // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3609                 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3610                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3611         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3612                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3613                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3614         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3615                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3616                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3617         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3618                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3619                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3620         } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3621                 // Everything was delivered...
3622                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3623         }
3624
3625         let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3626         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3627         match events_1[0] {
3628                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3629                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3630         };
3631
3632         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3633         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3634         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3635
3636         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3637
3638         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3639         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3640         match events_2[0] {
3641                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
3642                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3643                         assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
3644                         match &purpose {
3645                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3646                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3647                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3648                                 },
3649                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3650                         }
3651                 },
3652                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3653         }
3654
3655         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3656         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3657
3658         let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3659         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3660         let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3661                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3662                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3663                         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3664                         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3665                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3666                         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3667                         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3668                         (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3669                 },
3670                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3671         };
3672
3673         if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3674                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3675
3676                 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3677                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3678                 match events_4[0] {
3679                         Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3680                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3681                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3682                         },
3683                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3684                 }
3685
3686                 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3687                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3688                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3689                         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3690
3691                         if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3692                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3693                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3694                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3695
3696                                 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3697                                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3698                                         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3699                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3700                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3701
3702                                         if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3703                                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3704                                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3705                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3706                                         }
3707                                 }
3708                         }
3709                 }
3710         }
3711
3712         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3713         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3714         if messages_delivered < 2 {
3715                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3716                 if messages_delivered < 1 {
3717                         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
3718                 } else {
3719                         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3720                 }
3721         } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
3722                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3723                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3724         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3725                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3726                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3727         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3728                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3729                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3730         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3731                 // Everything was delivered...
3732                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3733         }
3734
3735         if messages_delivered == 1 || messages_delivered == 2 {
3736                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3737         }
3738
3739         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3740         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3741         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3742
3743         if messages_delivered > 2 {
3744                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3745         }
3746
3747         // Channel should still work fine...
3748         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3749         let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3750         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3751 }
3752
3753 #[test]
3754 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
3755         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
3756         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
3757         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
3758         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
3759 }
3760
3761 #[test]
3762 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
3763         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
3764         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
3765         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
3766         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
3767 }
3768
3769 #[test]
3770 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
3771         // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
3772         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3773         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3774         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3775         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
3776         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
3777         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
3778         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3779         let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3780
3781         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3782         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3783
3784         confirm_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
3785         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3786         assert!(events_1.is_empty());
3787
3788         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3789
3790         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3791         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3792
3793         confirm_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3794         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3795         assert!(events_2.is_empty());
3796
3797         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
3798         let as_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3799         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
3800         let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3801
3802         // nodes[0] hasn't yet received a funding_locked, so it only sends that on reconnect.
3803         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
3804         let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3805         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3806         let as_funding_locked = match events_3[0] {
3807                 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3808                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3809                         msg.clone()
3810                 },
3811                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_3[0]),
3812         };
3813
3814         // nodes[1] received nodes[0]'s funding_locked on the first reconnect above, so it should send
3815         // announcement_signatures as well as channel_update.
3816         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish);
3817         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3818         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 3);
3819         let chan_id;
3820         let bs_funding_locked = match events_4[0] {
3821                 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3822                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3823                         chan_id = msg.channel_id;
3824                         msg.clone()
3825                 },
3826                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[0]),
3827         };
3828         let bs_announcement_sigs = match events_4[1] {
3829                 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3830                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3831                         msg.clone()
3832                 },
3833                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[1]),
3834         };
3835         match events_4[2] {
3836                 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
3837                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3838                 },
3839                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[2]),
3840         }
3841
3842         // Re-deliver nodes[0]'s funding_locked, which nodes[1] can safely ignore. It currently
3843         // generates a duplicative private channel_update
3844         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked);
3845         let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3846         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
3847         match events_5[0] {
3848                 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
3849                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3850                 },
3851                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_5[0]),
3852         };
3853
3854         // When we deliver nodes[1]'s funding_locked, however, nodes[0] will generate its
3855         // announcement_signatures.
3856         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_funding_locked);
3857         let events_6 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3858         assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
3859         let as_announcement_sigs = match events_6[0] {
3860                 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3861                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3862                         msg.clone()
3863                 },
3864                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_6[0]),
3865         };
3866
3867         // When we deliver nodes[1]'s announcement_signatures to nodes[0], nodes[0] should immediately
3868         // broadcast the channel announcement globally, as well as re-send its (now-public)
3869         // channel_update.
3870         nodes[0].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs);
3871         let events_7 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3872         assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
3873         let (chan_announcement, as_update) = match events_7[0] {
3874                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3875                         (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
3876                 },
3877                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_7[0]),
3878         };
3879
3880         // Finally, deliver nodes[0]'s announcement_signatures to nodes[1] and make sure it creates the
3881         // same channel_announcement.
3882         nodes[1].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs);
3883         let events_8 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3884         assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
3885         let bs_update = match events_8[0] {
3886                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3887                         assert_eq!(*msg, chan_announcement);
3888                         update_msg.clone()
3889                 },
3890                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_8[0]),
3891         };
3892
3893         // Provide the channel announcement and public updates to the network graph
3894         nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap();
3895         nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
3896         nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
3897
3898         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3899         let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3900         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
3901
3902         // Check that after deserialization and reconnection we can still generate an identical
3903         // channel_announcement from the cached signatures.
3904         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3905
3906         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
3907         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
3908         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
3909
3910         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
3911         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
3912         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[0].logger, node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
3913         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
3914         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
3915         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
3916                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
3917         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
3918
3919         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
3920         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
3921                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
3922                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
3923                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
3924                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
3925                         keys_manager,
3926                         fee_estimator: node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator,
3927                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
3928                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
3929                         logger: nodes[0].logger,
3930                         channel_monitors,
3931                 }).unwrap()
3932         };
3933         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
3934         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
3935
3936         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
3937         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
3938         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3939
3940         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3941
3942         // The channel announcement should be re-generated exactly by broadcast_node_announcement.
3943         nodes[0].node.broadcast_node_announcement([0, 0, 0], [0; 32], Vec::new());
3944         let msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3945         let mut found_announcement = false;
3946         for event in msgs.iter() {
3947                 match event {
3948                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, .. } => {
3949                                 if *msg == chan_announcement { found_announcement = true; }
3950                         },
3951                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => {},
3952                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3953                 }
3954         }
3955         assert!(found_announcement);
3956 }
3957
3958 #[test]
3959 fn test_funding_locked_without_best_block_updated() {
3960         // Previously, if we were offline when a funding transaction was locked in, and then we came
3961         // back online, calling best_block_updated once followed by transactions_confirmed, we'd not
3962         // generate a funding_locked until a later best_block_updated. This tests that we generate the
3963         // funding_locked immediately instead.
3964         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3965         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3966         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3967         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3968         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
3969
3970         let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3971
3972         let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
3973         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
3974         let block_txn = [funding_tx];
3975         let conf_txn: Vec<_> = block_txn.iter().enumerate().collect();
3976         let conf_block_header = nodes[0].get_block_header(conf_height);
3977         nodes[0].node.transactions_confirmed(&conf_block_header, &conf_txn[..], conf_height);
3978
3979         // Ensure nodes[0] generates a funding_locked after the transactions_confirmed
3980         let as_funding_locked = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3981         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked);
3982 }
3983
3984 #[test]
3985 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
3986         // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
3987         // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
3988         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3989         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3990         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3991         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3992         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3993
3994         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
3995
3996         // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
3997         let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3998         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
3999         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4000
4001         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4002         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4003         match events_1[0] {
4004                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4005                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4006         }
4007
4008         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
4009         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4010
4011         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4012         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4013         match events_2[0] {
4014                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4015                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4016                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4017                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4018                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4019                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4020                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4021
4022                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4023                         let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4024                         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
4025                         match events_3[0] {
4026                                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
4027                                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
4028                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
4029                                 },
4030                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4031                         }
4032
4033                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
4034                         let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4035                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4036                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4037                 },
4038                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4039         }
4040
4041         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4042         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4043
4044         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4045         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4046         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
4047         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4048         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4049         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
4050
4051         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4052         let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4053         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4054         let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4055
4056         assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
4057         assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
4058
4059         assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
4060         assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
4061
4062         assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
4063
4064         assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4065         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4066         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4067         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4068         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
4069         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
4070         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
4071         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4072         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4073         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4074
4075         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
4076         let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4077         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4078         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4079         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4080         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4081         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4082         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4083
4084         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
4085         let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4086         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4087         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4088         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4089         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4090         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4091         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4092
4093         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4094         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4095         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4096         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4097
4098         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4099         let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4100         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4101         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4102
4103         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
4104         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4105         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4106
4107         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4108
4109         let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4110         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
4111         match events_5[0] {
4112                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
4113                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
4114                         match &purpose {
4115                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
4116                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
4117                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
4118                                 },
4119                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
4120                         }
4121                 },
4122                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4123         }
4124
4125         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
4126         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4127         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4128
4129         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4130         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4131 }
4132
4133 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
4134         // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
4135         // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
4136         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4137         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4138         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4139         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4140
4141         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4142
4143         let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
4144                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
4145                 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
4146                 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
4147                 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
4148                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
4149                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
4150                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4151                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4152                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4153                 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
4154                 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentReceived event(s).
4155                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
4156                 our_payment_hash
4157         } else {
4158                 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
4159         };
4160
4161         let mut block = Block {
4162                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
4163                 txdata: vec![],
4164         };
4165         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4166         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4167         let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4168         for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
4169                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
4170                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4171                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4172         }
4173
4174         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4175
4176         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4177         let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4178         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4179         assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4180         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4181         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4182
4183         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4184         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4185         // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4186         let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(100_000).to_vec();
4187         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(block_count - 1));
4188         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4189 }
4190
4191 #[test]
4192 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4193         do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4194         do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4195 }
4196
4197 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4198         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4199         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4200         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4201         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4202         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4203         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4204         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4205
4206         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4207         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4208         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4209         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4210
4211         // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4212         let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4213         {
4214                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, first_payment_hash, &Some(first_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4215         }
4216         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4217         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4218
4219         // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4220         let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4221         let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4222         sending_node.node.send_payment(&route, second_payment_hash, &Some(second_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4223         if forwarded_htlc {
4224                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4225                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4226                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4227                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4228                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4229         }
4230         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4231
4232         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4233         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4234         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4235         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4236
4237         if forwarded_htlc {
4238                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4239                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4240                 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4241                 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4242                 match fail_commit[0] {
4243                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4244                                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4245                                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4246                         },
4247                         _ => unreachable!(),
4248                 }
4249                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4250         } else {
4251                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4252                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4253                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[0] {
4254                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
4255                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
4256                 if let Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[1] {
4257                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
4258                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
4259         }
4260 }
4261
4262 #[test]
4263 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4264         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4265         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4266 }
4267
4268 #[test]
4269 fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4270         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4271         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4272         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4273         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4274         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4275         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4276         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4277         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4278         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4279
4280         let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4281
4282         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4283
4284         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4285         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4286         get_monitor!(nodes[0], OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id())
4287                 .write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4288
4289         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4290         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4291         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4292         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4293         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4294         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4295         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4296         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4297                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4298         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4299
4300         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4301         let config = UserConfig::default();
4302         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4303                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4304                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4305                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4306                         default_config: config,
4307                         keys_manager,
4308                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4309                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4310                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4311                         logger: &logger,
4312                         channel_monitors,
4313                 }).unwrap()
4314         };
4315         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4316         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4317
4318         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4319         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4320         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4321         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4322
4323         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4324         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4325         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4326         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4327
4328         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4329         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4330         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4331         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4332
4333         let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4334         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
4335         for node in nodes.iter() {
4336                 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4337                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4338                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4339         }
4340
4341         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4342 }
4343
4344 #[test]
4345 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_events() {
4346         // This test makes sure the events field in ChannelManager survives de/serialization
4347         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4348         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4349         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4350         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4351         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4352         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4353         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4354         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4355         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4356
4357         // Start creating a channel, but stop right before broadcasting the funding transaction
4358         let channel_value = 100000;
4359         let push_msat = 10001;
4360         let a_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4361         let b_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4362         let node_a = nodes.remove(0);
4363         let node_b = nodes.remove(0);
4364         node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
4365         node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), a_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4366         node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), b_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id()));
4367
4368         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&node_a, channel_value, 42);
4369
4370         node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
4371         check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
4372
4373         node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4374         {
4375                 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4376                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4377                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4378                 added_monitors.clear();
4379         }
4380
4381         let bs_funding_signed = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
4382         node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_funding_signed);
4383         {
4384                 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4385                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4386                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4387                 added_monitors.clear();
4388         }
4389         // Normally, this is where node_a would broadcast the funding transaction, but the test de/serializes first instead
4390
4391         nodes.push(node_a);
4392         nodes.push(node_b);
4393
4394         // Start the de/seriailization process mid-channel creation to check that the channel manager will hold onto events that are serialized
4395         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4396         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4397         get_monitor!(nodes[0], bs_funding_signed.channel_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4398
4399         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4400         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4401         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4402         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4403         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4404         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4405         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4406         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4407                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4408         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4409
4410         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4411         let config = UserConfig::default();
4412         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4413                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4414                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4415                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4416                         default_config: config,
4417                         keys_manager,
4418                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4419                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4420                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4421                         logger: &logger,
4422                         channel_monitors,
4423                 }).unwrap()
4424         };
4425         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4426         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4427
4428         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4429
4430         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4431         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4432
4433         // After deserializing, make sure the funding_transaction is still held by the channel manager
4434         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4435         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
4436         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4437         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
4438
4439         // Make sure the channel is functioning as though the de/serialization never happened
4440         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4441         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4442
4443         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4444         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4445         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4446         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4447
4448         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4449         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4450         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4451         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4452
4453         let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4454         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
4455         for node in nodes.iter() {
4456                 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4457                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4458                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4459         }
4460
4461         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4462 }
4463
4464 #[test]
4465 fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4466         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4467         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4468         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4469         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4470         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4471         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4472         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4473         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4474         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4475         let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4476
4477         let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4478         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4479
4480         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4481
4482         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4483         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4484         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4485
4486         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4487         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4488         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4489         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4490         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4491         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4492         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4493         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4494                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4495         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4496
4497         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4498         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4499                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4500                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4501                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4502                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4503                         keys_manager,
4504                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4505                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4506                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4507                         logger: &logger,
4508                         channel_monitors,
4509                 }).unwrap()
4510         };
4511         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4512         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4513
4514         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4515         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4516         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4517
4518         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4519
4520         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
4521         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4522 }
4523
4524 #[test]
4525 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
4526         // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with an out-of-date ChannelMonitor
4527         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4528         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4529         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
4530         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4531         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4532         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4533         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4534         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4535         let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4536         let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4537         let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4538         let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4539
4540         let mut node_0_stale_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4541         for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4542                 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4543                 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4544                 node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4545         }
4546
4547         let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
4548
4549         // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
4550         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4551
4552         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
4553         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4554         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4555         nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4556
4557         // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
4558         // nodes[3])
4559         let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4560         for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4561                 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4562                 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4563                 node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4564         }
4565
4566         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4567         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4568         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4569         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4570         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4571         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4572
4573
4574         let mut node_0_stale_monitors = Vec::new();
4575         for serialized in node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4576                 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4577                 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4578                 assert!(read.is_empty());
4579                 node_0_stale_monitors.push(monitor);
4580         }
4581
4582         let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
4583         for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4584                 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4585                 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4586                 assert!(read.is_empty());
4587                 node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
4588         }
4589
4590         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4591         if let Err(msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue) =
4592                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4593                 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4594                 keys_manager,
4595                 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4596                 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4597                 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4598                 logger: &logger,
4599                 channel_monitors: node_0_stale_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4600         }) { } else {
4601                 panic!("If the monitor(s) are stale, this indicates a bug and we should get an Err return");
4602         };
4603
4604         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4605         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) =
4606                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4607                 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4608                 keys_manager,
4609                 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4610                 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4611                 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4612                 logger: &logger,
4613                 channel_monitors: node_0_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4614         }).unwrap();
4615         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4616         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4617
4618         { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx
4619                 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4620                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
4621                 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
4622                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
4623         }
4624
4625         for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
4626                 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor).is_ok());
4627                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4628         }
4629         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4630         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
4631
4632         // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
4633         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4634         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4635         //... and we can even still claim the payment!
4636         claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4637
4638         nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4639         let reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[3], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4640         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4641         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish);
4642         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4643         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
4644         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
4645                 match action {
4646                         &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
4647                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
4648                         },
4649                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
4650                 }
4651         }
4652 }
4653
4654 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4655         ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4656                 {
4657                         let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4658                         let mut txn = Vec::new();
4659                         let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4660                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4661                         for event in events.drain(..) {
4662                                 match event {
4663                                         Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs } => {
4664                                                 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4665                                                         txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4666                                                         all_outputs.push(outp);
4667                                                 }
4668                                         },
4669                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4670                                 };
4671                         }
4672                         if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4673                                 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx) {
4674                                         txn.push(tx);
4675                                 }
4676                         }
4677                         txn
4678                 }
4679         }
4680 }
4681
4682 #[test]
4683 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4684         // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4685         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4686         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4687         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4688         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4689
4690         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4691         nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2).unwrap();
4692         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4693         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4694         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4695         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4696         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4697         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4698         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4699
4700         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4701         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4702
4703         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4704         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4705         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4706         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4707         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4708 }
4709
4710 #[test]
4711 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4712         // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4713         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4714         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4715         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4716         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4717         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4718
4719         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4720         nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2).unwrap();
4721         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4722         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4723         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4724
4725         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4726         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4727         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4728         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4729
4730         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4731         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4732         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4733         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4734         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4735
4736         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4737         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4738         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4739 }
4740
4741 #[test]
4742 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4743         // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4744         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4745
4746         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4747         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4748         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4749         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4750
4751         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4752         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4753         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4754         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4755         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4756
4757         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4758         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4759         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4760         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4761         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4762
4763         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4764         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4765         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4766
4767         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4768         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4769         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4770         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4771         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4772 }
4773
4774 #[test]
4775 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4776         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4777         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4778         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4779         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4780
4781         // Create some initial channels
4782         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4783
4784         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4785
4786         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4787         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4788         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4789
4790         // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4791         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
4792         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4793         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4794         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4795         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4796         match events[0] {
4797                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4798                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4799         }
4800         match events[1] {
4801                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4802                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4803         }
4804
4805         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4806         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-Success), ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4807         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4808         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4809         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4810         check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
4811         check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
4812
4813         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4814         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4815         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4816
4817         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4818         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4819         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4820 }
4821
4822 #[test]
4823 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4824         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4825         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4826         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4827         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4828
4829         // Create some initial channels
4830         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4831
4832         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4833         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4834
4835         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4836
4837         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4838         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4839         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4840
4841         // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4842         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4843         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4844         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4845         match events[0] {
4846                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4847                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4848         }
4849         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4850
4851         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4852         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4853         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelManager : 1 local commitent tx, ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4854         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
4855         check_spends!(node_txn[1],  commitment_tx[0].clone());
4856         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4857
4858         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4859         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4860         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4861         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, true);
4862
4863         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4864         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4865         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4866         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]);
4867         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4868 }
4869
4870 #[test]
4871 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4872         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4873         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4874         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4875         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4876
4877         // Create some initial channels
4878         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4879
4880         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4881         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4882         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4883         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4884
4885         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4886
4887         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4888         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4889         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4890         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4891
4892         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4893         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
4894         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4895         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4896
4897         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4898         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4899
4900         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4901         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4902         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4903 }
4904
4905 #[test]
4906 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4907         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4908         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4909         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4910         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4911         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4912
4913         // Create some initial channels
4914         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4915
4916         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4917         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4918         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4919         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4920
4921         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4922
4923         // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
4924         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4925         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4926         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4927         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4928         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4929
4930         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4931         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4932         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], chan_1.3);
4933         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4934         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4935         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4936         assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].lock_time, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
4937
4938         // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4939         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4940         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()] });
4941         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4942         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4943         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4944
4945         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4946         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
4947         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4948         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4949         // transactions next...
4950         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
4951         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
4952
4953         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
4954         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
4955         if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid() {
4956                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4957         } else {
4958                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid());
4959                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4960         }
4961
4962         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4963         check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
4964
4965         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4966         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4967
4968         // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4969         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4970         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4971         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4972         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
4973 }
4974
4975 #[test]
4976 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
4977         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4978         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4979         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4980         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4981         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4982
4983         // Create some initial channels
4984         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4985
4986         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4987         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4988         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4989         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4990
4991         // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
4992         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
4993
4994         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4995
4996         // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
4997         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4998         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4999         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5000         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5001         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5002
5003         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
5004         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5005         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5006         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
5007
5008         // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
5009         let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
5010         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
5011
5012         // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
5013         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5014         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
5015         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5016         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5017         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5018
5019         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5020         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5021
5022         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
5023         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
5024         // transactions next...
5025         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
5026         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
5027         if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
5028                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5029         } else {
5030                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
5031                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5032         }
5033
5034         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5035         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
5036
5037         check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
5038
5039         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
5040         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5041
5042         // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
5043         // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
5044
5045         // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
5046         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5047         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5048         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5049         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
5050         assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5051         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
5052         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
5053 }
5054
5055 #[test]
5056 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
5057         // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
5058         // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
5059         // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
5060         // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
5061         // channel.
5062         // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
5063         // gets broadcast.
5064
5065         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5066         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5067         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5068         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5069
5070         // Create some initial channels
5071         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5072         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5073
5074         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5075         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5076         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5077         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5078         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5079
5080         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
5081         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
5082         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
5083
5084         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
5085         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5086         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
5087         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5088         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5089         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5090         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5091         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5092         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5093         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5094
5095         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
5096         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5097         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5098         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5099
5100         let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Success tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
5101         assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 3);
5102         assert_eq!(c_txn[0], c_txn[2]);
5103         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0], c_txn[1]);
5104         check_spends!(c_txn[1], chan_2.3);
5105         check_spends!(c_txn[2], c_txn[1]);
5106         assert_eq!(c_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
5107         assert_eq!(c_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5108         assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
5109         assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
5110
5111         // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
5112         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
5113         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![c_txn[1].clone(), c_txn[2].clone()]});
5114         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5115         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5116         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5117         match events[0] {
5118                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5119                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5120         }
5121         match events[1] {
5122                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
5123                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
5124                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, Some(chan_1.2));
5125                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
5126                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
5127                 },
5128                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5129         }
5130         {
5131                 let mut b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5132                 // ChannelMonitor: claim tx
5133                 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
5134                 check_spends!(b_txn[0], chan_2.3); // B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
5135                 b_txn.clear();
5136         }
5137         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5138         let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5139         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
5140         match msg_events[0] {
5141                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5142                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5143         }
5144         match msg_events[1] {
5145                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
5146                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5147         }
5148         match msg_events[2] {
5149                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
5150                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5151                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5152                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5153                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5154                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
5155                 },
5156                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5157         };
5158         // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
5159         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5160         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
5161         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5162         let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5163         // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success tx
5164         assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 3);
5165         check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_1.3);
5166         check_spends!(b_txn[2], b_txn[1]);
5167         check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
5168         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5169         assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
5170         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
5171
5172         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5173         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5174 }
5175
5176 #[test]
5177 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
5178         // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
5179         // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
5180         // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
5181         // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
5182         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
5183         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
5184         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5185         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5186         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5187         config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5188         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
5189                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5190         let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5191
5192         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5193         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5194         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5195
5196         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5197         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5198         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5199         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5200         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
5201
5202         let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 900000);
5203
5204         let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
5205         // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
5206         // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
5207         // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
5208         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id())
5209                 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
5210         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], payment_params, 900000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40);
5211         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 900000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
5212
5213         let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5214         assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5215         check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5216
5217         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
5218         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5219         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5220         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5221         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5222
5223         let htlc_timeout_tx;
5224         { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
5225                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5226                 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5227                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
5228                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5229
5230                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5231                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5232                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5233                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5234                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
5235                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], commitment_txn[0]);
5236                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
5237
5238                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5239                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5240                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5241                 htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[1].clone();
5242         }
5243
5244         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
5245         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
5246         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
5247         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5248         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5249         match events[0] {
5250                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5251                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5252         }
5253         match events[1] {
5254                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5255                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5256         }
5257         let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5258         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs), ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
5259         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
5260         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5261         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5262         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5263         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5264         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5265         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5266         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5267         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[3], htlc_success_txn[0]);
5268         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[4], htlc_success_txn[1]);
5269         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
5270
5271         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
5272         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5273         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5274         let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5275         assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5276         assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5277         let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
5278         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5279         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5280         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5281
5282         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5283         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5284         {
5285                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5286         }
5287         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
5288
5289         // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
5290         // Note that the fee paid is effectively double as the HTLC value (including the nodes[1] fee
5291         // and nodes[2] fee) is rounded down and then claimed in full.
5292         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[0]);
5293         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], Some(196*2), true, true);
5294         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5295         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5296         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5297         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5298         assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
5299         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5300         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5301
5302         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5303         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
5304
5305         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5306         match events[0] {
5307                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5308                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
5309                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
5310                 }
5311                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5312         }
5313 }
5314
5315 #[test]
5316 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
5317         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5318         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5319         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5320         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5321
5322         // Create some initial channels
5323         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5324
5325         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
5326         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5327         assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
5328         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5329         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5330
5331         // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
5332         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5333         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5334         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
5335         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5336         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5337         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5338         match events[0] {
5339                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5340                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5341         }
5342         match events[1] {
5343                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5344                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5345         }
5346         let node_tx = {
5347                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5348                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5349                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
5350                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5351                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5352                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5353                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5354                 node_txn[0].clone()
5355         };
5356
5357         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
5358         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5359
5360         // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5361         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5362         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5363         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5364         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
5365         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5366 }
5367
5368 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
5369         // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
5370         // unrevoked commitment transaction.
5371         // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
5372         // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
5373         // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
5374         // use the same payment hashes.
5375         // Thus, we use a six-node network:
5376         //
5377         // A \         / E
5378         //    - C - D -
5379         // B /         \ F
5380         // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
5381         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
5382         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
5383         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5384         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5385         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5386         config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5387         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
5388                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5389         let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5390
5391         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5392         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5393         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5394         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5395         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5396
5397         // Rebalance and check output sanity...
5398         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
5399         send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
5400         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
5401
5402         let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5403         // 0th HTLC:
5404         let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5405         // 1st HTLC:
5406         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5407         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5408         // 2nd HTLC:
5409         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5410         // 3rd HTLC:
5411         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5412         // 4th HTLC:
5413         let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5414         // 5th HTLC:
5415         let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5416         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5417         // 6th HTLC:
5418         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200).unwrap());
5419         // 7th HTLC:
5420         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200).unwrap());
5421
5422         // 8th HTLC:
5423         let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5424         // 9th HTLC:
5425         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5426         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5427
5428         // 10th HTLC:
5429         let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5430         // 11th HTLC:
5431         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5432         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200).unwrap());
5433
5434         // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
5435         // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
5436         // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
5437         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2).len(), 1);
5438         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
5439
5440         // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
5441         // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5442         assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1));
5443         assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3));
5444         assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5));
5445         assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6));
5446         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
5447         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[4]);
5448         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
5449
5450         let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5451         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5452         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5453         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5454         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5455         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5456
5457         // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5458         assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
5459         assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4));
5460         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5461         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[5]);
5462         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5463
5464         let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5465         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5466         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5467         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5468
5469         let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5470
5471         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[3]);
5472         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5473         let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5474         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5475         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5476         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5477         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5478         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5479         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5480         if deliver_last_raa {
5481                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5482         } else {
5483                 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5484         }
5485
5486         // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5487         // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5488         // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5489         // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5490         //
5491         // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5492         // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5493         // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5494         //
5495         // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5496         // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5497         let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5498
5499         if announce_latest {
5500                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5501         } else {
5502                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5503         }
5504         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5505         let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5506                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5507                 events[1].clone()
5508         } else {
5509                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5510                 events[0].clone()
5511         };
5512         match close_event {
5513                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5514                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5515         }
5516
5517         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5518         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5519         if deliver_last_raa {
5520                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5521         } else {
5522                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5523         }
5524         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5525
5526         let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5527         assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5528         let mut a_done = false;
5529         for msg in cs_msgs {
5530                 match msg {
5531                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5532                                 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5533                                 // should be failed-backwards here.
5534                                 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5535                                         // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5536                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5537                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5538                                         }
5539                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5540                                         assert!(!a_done);
5541                                         a_done = true;
5542                                         &nodes[0]
5543                                 } else {
5544                                         // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5545                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5546                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5547                                         }
5548                                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5549                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5550                                         &nodes[1]
5551                                 };
5552                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5553                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5554                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5555                                 if announce_latest {
5556                                         target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5557                                         if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5558                                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5559                                         }
5560                                 }
5561                                 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5562                         },
5563                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5564                 }
5565         }
5566
5567         let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5568         assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5569         let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5570         let mut as_updates = 0;
5571         for event in as_events.iter() {
5572                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5573                         assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5574                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5575                                 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5576                         } else {
5577                                 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5578                         }
5579                         if network_update.is_some() {
5580                                 as_updates += 1;
5581                         }
5582                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5583         }
5584         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5585         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5586         if announce_latest {
5587                 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5588                 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5589         }
5590         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5591
5592         let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5593         assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5594         let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5595         let mut bs_updates = 0;
5596         for event in bs_events.iter() {
5597                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5598                         assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5599                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5600                                 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5601                         } else {
5602                                 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5603                         }
5604                         if network_update.is_some() {
5605                                 bs_updates += 1;
5606                         }
5607                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5608         }
5609         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5610         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5611         if announce_latest {
5612                 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5613         }
5614         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5615
5616         // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5617         // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5618         // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5619         // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5620         assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5621         assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5622 }
5623
5624 #[test]
5625 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5626         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5627 }
5628
5629 #[test]
5630 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5631         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5632 }
5633
5634 #[test]
5635 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5636         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5637         // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5638         // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5639 }
5640
5641 #[test]
5642 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5643         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5644         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5645         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5646         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5647
5648         // Create some initial channels
5649         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5650
5651         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5652         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5653         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5654         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5655
5656         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5657         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5658         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5659         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5660         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5661         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5662
5663         let htlc_timeout = {
5664                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5665                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
5666                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5667                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5668                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5669                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5670                 node_txn[1].clone()
5671         };
5672
5673         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5674         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5675         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5676
5677         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5678         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5679         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5680         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5681         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5682         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5683         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5684         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5685         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5686         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5687                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5688 }
5689
5690 #[test]
5691 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5692         // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with
5693         // a key manager rotation to test that key_derivation_params returned in DynamicOutputP2WSH
5694         // let us re-derive the channel key set to then derive a delayed_payment_key.
5695
5696         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5697
5698         // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5699         let seed = [42; 32];
5700         let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5701         let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5702         let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph: &chanmon_cfgs[0].network_graph, node_seed: seed, features: InitFeatures::known() };
5703         let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5704         node_cfgs.remove(0);
5705         node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5706
5707         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5708         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5709
5710         // Create some initial channels
5711         // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5712         // for node 0
5713         let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5714         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5715         assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5716
5717         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5718         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5719         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5720         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5721         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5722
5723         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5724         let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5725         let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5726         assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5727         check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5728
5729         // We check funding pubkey are unique
5730         let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness[3][36..69]));
5731         let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness[3][36..69]));
5732         if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5733             || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5734             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5735             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5736                 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5737         }
5738
5739         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5740         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5741         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5742         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5743         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5744         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5745
5746         let htlc_timeout = {
5747                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5748                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5749                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5750                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn_1[0]);
5751                 node_txn[1].clone()
5752         };
5753
5754         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5755         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5756         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5757
5758         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5759         let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5760         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5761         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5762         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5763         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5764         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5765         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5766         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5767         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5768         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5769                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5770 }
5771
5772 #[test]
5773 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5774         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5775         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5776         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5777         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5778
5779         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5780
5781         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5782         let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5783
5784         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5785         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5786         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5787
5788         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5789         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5790         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5791
5792         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5793         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5794         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5795
5796         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5797         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5798         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5799 }
5800
5801 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5802         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5803         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5804         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5805         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5806         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5807
5808         let (payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5809
5810         // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5811         // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5812         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
5813         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5814
5815         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5816         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5817         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
5818
5819         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5820         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5821         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5822         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5823         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5824
5825         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5826         let mut block = Block {
5827                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5828                 txdata: vec![],
5829         };
5830         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5831                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5832                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5833         }
5834         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5835         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5836         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5837         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5838 }
5839
5840 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5841         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5842         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5843         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5844         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5845         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5846
5847         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5848         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5849         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5850
5851         let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5852
5853         // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5854         // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5855         // to "time out" the HTLC.
5856
5857         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5858         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5859
5860         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5861                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: Vec::new()});
5862                 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
5863         }
5864         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5865         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5866         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5867         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5868 }
5869
5870 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5871         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5872         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5873         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5874         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5875         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5876
5877         // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
5878         // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5879         // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
5880         // actually revoked.
5881         let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
5882         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
5883         assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
5884         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5885         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5886
5887         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5888         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5889         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5890         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5891         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5892         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5893         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5894         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
5895         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5896         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5897
5898         if check_revoke_no_close {
5899                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
5900                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5901         }
5902
5903         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5904         let mut block = Block {
5905                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5906                 txdata: vec![],
5907         };
5908         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
5909                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5910                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5911         }
5912         if !check_revoke_no_close {
5913                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5914                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5915                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5916                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5917         } else {
5918                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5919                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5920                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[0] {
5921                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
5922                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5923                 if let Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[1] {
5924                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
5925                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5926         }
5927 }
5928
5929 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
5930 // There are only a few cases to test here:
5931 //  * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
5932 //    broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
5933 //  * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
5934 //  * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
5935 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
5936 // non-dust HTLCs.
5937 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
5938 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
5939 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
5940 #[test]
5941 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
5942         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
5943         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
5944
5945         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
5946         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
5947 }
5948
5949 #[test]
5950 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
5951         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
5952         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
5953         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
5954         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
5955 }
5956
5957 #[test]
5958 #[should_panic]
5959 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
5960         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5961         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5962         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5963         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5964         // Force duplicate randomness for every get-random call
5965         for node in nodes.iter() {
5966                 *node.keys_manager.override_random_bytes.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
5967         }
5968
5969         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
5970         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5971         let push_msat=10001;
5972         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5973         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5974         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5975         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5976
5977         // Create a second channel with the same random values. This used to panic due to a colliding
5978         // channel_id, but now panics due to a colliding outbound SCID alias.
5979         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5980 }
5981
5982 #[test]
5983 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
5984         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5985         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5986         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5987         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5988
5989         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
5990         let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
5991         let push_msat=10001;
5992         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5993
5994         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
5995         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5996         // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
5997         let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
5998         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5999
6000         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
6001         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
6002         let push_msat=10001;
6003         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
6004         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6005         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
6006
6007         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
6008         // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
6009         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
6010
6011         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
6012         assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
6013         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6014
6015         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
6016         let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
6017         assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
6018
6019         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
6020         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
6021         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6022         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6023         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
6024         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6025 }
6026
6027 #[test]
6028 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
6029         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6030         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6031         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6032         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6033
6034         let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
6035         let push_msat=10001;
6036         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
6037         let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6038         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
6039         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
6040
6041         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
6042         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6043         let err_msg = match events[0] {
6044                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
6045                         msg.clone()
6046                 },
6047                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6048         };
6049         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
6050 }
6051
6052 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
6053 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
6054 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
6055 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
6056 #[test]
6057 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
6058         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6059         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6060         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6061         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6062         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6063
6064         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6065         // pending_update_fee.
6066         {
6067                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6068                 *feerate_lock += 20;
6069         }
6070         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6071         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6072
6073         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6074         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6075         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6076                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6077                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6078                 },
6079                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6080         };
6081
6082         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6083
6084         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6085         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6086         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6087         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6088
6089         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6090         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
6091         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6092
6093         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6094         let our_payment_id = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6095         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6096         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6097
6098         // Flush the pending fee update.
6099         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6100         let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6101         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6102         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
6103         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6104
6105         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
6106         // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
6107         // us to surface its failure to the user.
6108         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6109         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6110         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6111         let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6112                 hex::encode(our_payment_hash.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6113         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6114
6115         // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
6116         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6117         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6118         match &events[0] {
6119                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data, .. } => {
6120                         assert_eq!(our_payment_id, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6121                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
6122                         assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
6123                         assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6124                         assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6125                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
6126                         assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
6127                         assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
6128                 },
6129                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6130         }
6131 }
6132
6133 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
6134 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
6135 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
6136 #[test]
6137 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
6138         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6139         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6140         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6141         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6142         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6143
6144         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6145         // pending_update_fee.
6146         {
6147                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6148                 *feerate_lock += 200;
6149         }
6150         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6151         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6152
6153         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6154         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6155         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6156                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6157                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6158                 },
6159                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6160         };
6161
6162         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6163
6164         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6165         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6166         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6167         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6168
6169         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6170         let amt_1 = 20000;
6171         let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors) - amt_1;
6172         let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
6173         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
6174
6175         // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
6176         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
6177         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6178         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
6179         let payment_id_2 = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
6180         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6181         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
6182
6183         // Flush the pending fee update.
6184         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6185         let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6186         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6187         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
6188         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6189         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
6190
6191         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
6192         // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
6193         // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
6194         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6195         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6196         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6197         let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6198                 hex::encode(payment_hash_2.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6199         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6200
6201         // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
6202         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6203         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6204         match &events[0] {
6205                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data, .. } => {
6206                         assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6207                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
6208                         assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
6209                         assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6210                         assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6211                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
6212                         assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
6213                         assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
6214                 },
6215                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6216         }
6217
6218         // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
6219         let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
6220                 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6221                 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
6222                 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
6223         };
6224         let raa = match send_raa_event {
6225                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
6226                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6227         };
6228         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6229         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6230         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6231         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6232         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6233         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6234         match events[0] {
6235                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6236                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6237         }
6238         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6239         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6240         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6241         match events[0] {
6242                 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => {},
6243                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6244         }
6245         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
6246         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6247         let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6248         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6249         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
6250         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
6251 }
6252
6253 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
6254 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
6255 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
6256 // once it's freed.
6257 #[test]
6258 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
6259         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6260         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6261         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
6262         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
6263         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
6264         config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
6265         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
6266         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6267         let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6268         let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6269
6270         // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6271         // pending_update_fee.
6272         {
6273                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6274                 *feerate_lock += 20;
6275         }
6276         nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6277         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6278
6279         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6280         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6281         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6282                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6283                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6284                 },
6285                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6286         };
6287
6288         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6289
6290         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6291         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6292         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6293         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6294
6295         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6296         let feemsat = 239;
6297         let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
6298         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors) - total_routing_fee_msat;
6299         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
6300         let payment_event = {
6301                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6302                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6303
6304                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6305                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6306
6307                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6308         };
6309         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6310         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6311         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6312         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6313
6314         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1_2.2);
6315         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6316
6317         // Flush the pending fee update.
6318         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6319         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6320         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6321         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6322         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6323         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6324
6325         // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
6326         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6327         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6328
6329         let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
6330                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
6331                         msg.clone()
6332                 },
6333                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6334         };
6335
6336         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
6337         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6338         assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6339
6340         // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
6341         let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6342         assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 1);
6343         match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
6344                 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6345                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6346         }
6347
6348         // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
6349         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6350         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6351
6352         // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
6353         let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6354         assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
6355         let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
6356                 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6357                         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
6358                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
6359                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
6360                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6361                         (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6362                 },
6363                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6364         };
6365
6366         // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
6367         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
6368         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6369
6370         // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
6371         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6372         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6373         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6374         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6375         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6376         let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6377         assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
6378         let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
6379                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
6380                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6381         };
6382         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6383         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
6384         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6385 }
6386
6387 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
6388 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
6389 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
6390
6391 #[test]
6392 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
6393         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
6394         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6395         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6396         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6397         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6398         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6399
6400         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6401         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 100;
6402
6403         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6404                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6405         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6406         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value".to_string(), 1);
6407 }
6408
6409 #[test]
6410 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
6411         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6412         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6413         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6414         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6415         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6416         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6417
6418         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6419         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 0;
6420         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6421                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
6422
6423         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6424         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6425 }
6426
6427 #[test]
6428 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
6429         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6430         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6431         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6432         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6433         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6434         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6435
6436         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6437         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6438         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6439         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6440         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6441
6442         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6443         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6444         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6445         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6446         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() });
6447 }
6448
6449 #[test]
6450 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6451         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6452         //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6453         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6454         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6455         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6456         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6457         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6458
6459         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
6460                 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
6461         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], payment_params, 100000000, 0);
6462         route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = 500000001;
6463         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::RouteError { ref err },
6464                 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6465 }
6466
6467 #[test]
6468 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6469         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6470         //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6471         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6472         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6473         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6474         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6475         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6476         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6477         let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6478
6479         for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6480                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6481                 let payment_event = {
6482                         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6483                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6484
6485                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6486                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6487                         if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6488                                 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6489                         } else {
6490                                 assert!(false);
6491                         }
6492                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6493                 };
6494                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6495                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6496                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6497
6498                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6499                 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6500         }
6501         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6502         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6503                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6504
6505         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6506         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
6507 }
6508
6509 #[test]
6510 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6511         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6512         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6513         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6514         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6515         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6516         let channel_value = 100000;
6517         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6518         let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6519
6520         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6521
6522         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6523         // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6524         // limits us to.
6525         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat =  max_in_flight + 1;
6526         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6527                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6528
6529         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6530         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
6531
6532         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6533 }
6534
6535 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6536 #[test]
6537 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6538         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6539         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6540         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6541         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6542         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6543         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6544         let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6545         {
6546                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6547                 let channel = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6548                 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6549         }
6550
6551         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6552         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6553         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6554         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6555         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6556         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6557         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6558         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6559         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6560         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6561         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6562 }
6563
6564 #[test]
6565 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6566         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6567         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6568         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6569         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6570         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6571         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6572
6573         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6574         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6575         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6576         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6577         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6578         let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
6579
6580         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6581         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6582         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6583         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6584         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6585
6586         // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6587         // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6588         // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6589         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6590         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6591
6592         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6593         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6594         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6595         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6596         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6597 }
6598
6599 #[test]
6600 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6601         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6602         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6603         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6604         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6605         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6606         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6607         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6608
6609         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3999999);
6610         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6611         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6612         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6613         let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3999999, &Some(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6614         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash);
6615
6616         let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6617                 channel_id: chan.2,
6618                 htlc_id: 0,
6619                 amount_msat: 1000,
6620                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6621                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6622                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6623         };
6624
6625         for i in 0..super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
6626                 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6627                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6628         }
6629         msg.htlc_id = (super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS) as u64;
6630         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6631
6632         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6633         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6634         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6635         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6636         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6637 }
6638
6639 #[test]
6640 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6641         //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6642         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6643         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6644         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6645         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6646         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6647
6648         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6649         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6650         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6651         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6652         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6653         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6654
6655         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6656         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6657         assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6658         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6659         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6660 }
6661
6662 #[test]
6663 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6664         //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6665         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6666         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6667         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6668         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6669
6670         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6671         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6672         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6673         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6674         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6675         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6676         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6677
6678         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6679         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6680         assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6681         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6682         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6683 }
6684
6685 #[test]
6686 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6687         //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6688         // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6689         // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6690         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6691         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6692         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6693         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6694
6695         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6696         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6697         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6698         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6699         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6700         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6701
6702         //Disconnect and Reconnect
6703         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6704         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6705         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
6706         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6707         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6708         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
6709         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6710         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6711         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6712         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6713         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6714         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6715
6716         //Resend HTLC
6717         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6718         assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6719         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6720         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6721         let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6722
6723         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6724
6725         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6726         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6727         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6728         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6729         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6730 }
6731
6732 #[test]
6733 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6734         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6735
6736         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6737         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6738         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6739         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6740         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6741         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6742         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6743
6744         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6745         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6746         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6747
6748         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6749                 channel_id: chan.2,
6750                 htlc_id: 0,
6751                 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6752         };
6753
6754         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6755
6756         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6757         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6758         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6759         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6760         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6761 }
6762
6763 #[test]
6764 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6765         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6766
6767         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6768         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6769         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6770         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6771         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6772
6773         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6774         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6775         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6776         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6777         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6778
6779         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6780                 channel_id: chan.2,
6781                 htlc_id: 0,
6782                 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6783         };
6784
6785         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6786
6787         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6788         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6789         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6790         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6791         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6792 }
6793
6794 #[test]
6795 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6796         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6797
6798         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6799         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6800         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6801         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6802         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6803
6804         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6805         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6806         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6807         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6808         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6809         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6810                 channel_id: chan.2,
6811                 htlc_id: 0,
6812                 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6813                 failure_code: 0x8000,
6814         };
6815
6816         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6817
6818         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6819         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6820         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6821         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6822         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6823 }
6824
6825 #[test]
6826 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6827         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6828
6829         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6830         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6831         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6832         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6833         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6834
6835         let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
6836
6837         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6838         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6839
6840         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6841         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6842         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6843                 match events[0] {
6844                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6845                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6846                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6847                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6848                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6849                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6850                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6851                         },
6852                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6853                 }
6854         };
6855
6856         update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6857
6858         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6859
6860         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6861         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6862         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6863         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6864         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6865 }
6866
6867 #[test]
6868 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6869         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6870
6871         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6872         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6873         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6874         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6875         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6876
6877         let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
6878
6879         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6880         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6881
6882         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6883         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6884         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6885                 match events[0] {
6886                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6887                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6888                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6889                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6890                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6891                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6892                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6893                         },
6894                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6895                 }
6896         };
6897
6898         update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
6899
6900         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6901
6902         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6903         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6904         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6905         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6906         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6907 }
6908
6909 #[test]
6910 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
6911         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
6912
6913         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6914         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6915         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6916         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6917         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6918
6919         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6920         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6921         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6922
6923         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6924         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6925
6926         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6927         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6928         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6929
6930         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6931
6932         let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
6933                 match events[0] {
6934                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6935                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6936                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6937                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6938                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6939                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6940                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
6941                         },
6942                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6943                 }
6944         };
6945         update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
6946         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6947
6948         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6949         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6950         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
6951         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6952         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6953 }
6954
6955 #[test]
6956 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
6957         //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
6958         //    * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
6959
6960         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6961         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6962         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6963         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6964         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6965         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6966
6967         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
6968
6969         //First hop
6970         let mut payment_event = {
6971                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6972                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6973                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6974                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6975                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6976         };
6977         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6978         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6979         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6980         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6981         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6982         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6983         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6984         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6985         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6986
6987         //Second Hop
6988         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6989         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6990         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6991         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6992
6993         let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6994         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6995         let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
6996                 match events_3[0] {
6997                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6998                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6999                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7000                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7001                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
7002                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7003                                 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
7004                         },
7005                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7006                 }
7007         };
7008
7009         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
7010
7011         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7012         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
7013         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7014         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7015         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
7016
7017         //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
7018         match events_4[0] {
7019                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
7020                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7021                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7022                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7023                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7024                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7025                 },
7026                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7027         };
7028
7029         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7030 }
7031
7032 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
7033         // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
7034         // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
7035         // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
7036
7037         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7038         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7039         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7040         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7041         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7042         let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7043
7044         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7045
7046         // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
7047         let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7048         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7049         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7050
7051         // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
7052         let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7053
7054         // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
7055         assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
7056         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7057         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7058         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7059
7060         let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7061         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7062         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
7063         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7064
7065         // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
7066         let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7067
7068         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7069         match events[0] {
7070                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
7071                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7072                 },
7073                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7074         }
7075         match events[1] {
7076                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
7077                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7078                 },
7079                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7080         }
7081
7082         assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
7083         // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
7084         if announce_latest {
7085                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
7086         } else {
7087                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
7088         }
7089
7090         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7091         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7092         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7093
7094         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7095         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7096         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7097         // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
7098         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7099         let mut first_failed = false;
7100         for event in events {
7101                 match event {
7102                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7103                                 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
7104                                         assert!(!first_failed);
7105                                         first_failed = true;
7106                                 } else {
7107                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
7108                                 }
7109                         }
7110                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7111                 }
7112         }
7113 }
7114
7115 #[test]
7116 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
7117         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
7118         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
7119 }
7120
7121 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
7122         // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7123         // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
7124         // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7125         // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
7126         // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7127         // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
7128
7129         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7130         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7131         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7132         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7133         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7134
7135         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7136
7137         let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7138         let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7139
7140         let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7141         let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7142
7143         // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
7144         if revoked {
7145                 let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7146                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
7147         }
7148
7149         let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
7150         if local {
7151                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
7152                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
7153                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7154                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7155                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
7156
7157                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
7158                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7159                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7160                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7161                 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7162                 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7163                 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
7164                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7165                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7166                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7167                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7168         } else {
7169                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
7170                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7171                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7172                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7173                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7174                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7175                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7176                 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7177                 if !revoked {
7178                         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
7179                         assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7180                         // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout tx on remote commitment tx
7181                         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7182                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7183                         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7184                         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7185                 } else {
7186                         // If revoked, both dust & non-dust HTLCs should have been failed after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confs of revoked
7187                         // commitment tx
7188                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7189                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7190                         let first;
7191                         match events[0] {
7192                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7193                                         if payment_hash == dust_hash { first = true; }
7194                                         else { first = false; }
7195                                 },
7196                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7197                         }
7198                         match events[1] {
7199                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7200                                         if first { assert_eq!(payment_hash, non_dust_hash); }
7201                                         else { assert_eq!(payment_hash, dust_hash); }
7202                                 },
7203                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7204                         }
7205                 }
7206         }
7207 }
7208
7209 #[test]
7210 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
7211         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
7212         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
7213         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
7214 }
7215
7216 #[test]
7217 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
7218         // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
7219
7220         let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7221         low_our_to_self_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
7222         let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7223         high_their_to_self_config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
7224         let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
7225         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7226         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7227         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
7228         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7229
7230         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
7231         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) },
7232                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), 1000000, 1000000, 0,
7233                 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, 42)
7234         {
7235                 match error {
7236                         APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7237                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7238                 }
7239         } else { assert!(false) }
7240
7241         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7242         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7243         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7244         open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7245         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) },
7246                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0,
7247                 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
7248         {
7249                 match error {
7250                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str()));  },
7251                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7252                 }
7253         } else { assert!(false); }
7254
7255         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
7256         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7257         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7258         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7259         accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7260         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7261         let reason_msg;
7262         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
7263                 match action {
7264                         &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7265                                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
7266                                 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
7267                         },
7268                         _ => { panic!(); }
7269                 }
7270         } else { panic!(); }
7271         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg });
7272
7273         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7274         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7275         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7276         open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7277         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) },
7278                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0,
7279                 &high_their_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
7280         {
7281                 match error {
7282                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7283                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7284                 }
7285         } else { assert!(false); }
7286 }
7287
7288 #[test]
7289 fn test_data_loss_protect() {
7290         // We want to be sure that :
7291         // * we don't broadcast our Local Commitment Tx in case of fallen behind
7292         //   (but this is not quite true - we broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr)
7293         // * we close channel in case of detecting other being fallen behind
7294         // * we are able to claim our own outputs thanks to to_remote being static
7295         // TODO: this test is incomplete and the data_loss_protect implementation is incomplete - see issue #775
7296         let persister;
7297         let logger;
7298         let fee_estimator;
7299         let tx_broadcaster;
7300         let chain_source;
7301         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7302         // We broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr, which would cause a panic
7303         // during signing due to revoked tx
7304         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7305         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
7306         let monitor;
7307         let node_state_0;
7308         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7309         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7310         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7311
7312         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7313
7314         // Cache node A state before any channel update
7315         let previous_node_state = nodes[0].node.encode();
7316         let mut previous_chain_monitor_state = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7317         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan.2).write(&mut previous_chain_monitor_state).unwrap();
7318
7319         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7320         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7321
7322         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7323         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7324
7325         // Restore node A from previous state
7326         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
7327         let mut chain_monitor = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_chain_monitor_state.0), keys_manager).unwrap().1;
7328         chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
7329         tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
7330         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7331         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7332         monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &tx_broadcaster, &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7333         node_state_0 = {
7334                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7335                 channel_monitors.insert(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, &mut chain_monitor);
7336                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_node_state), ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7337                         keys_manager: keys_manager,
7338                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
7339                         chain_monitor: &monitor,
7340                         logger: &logger,
7341                         tx_broadcaster: &tx_broadcaster,
7342                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
7343                         channel_monitors,
7344                 }).unwrap().1
7345         };
7346         nodes[0].node = &node_state_0;
7347         assert!(monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chain_monitor).is_ok());
7348         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &monitor;
7349         nodes[0].chain_source = &chain_source;
7350
7351         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7352
7353         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7354         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7355
7356         let reestablish_0 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7357
7358         // Check we don't broadcast any transactions following learning of per_commitment_point from B
7359         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_0[0]);
7360         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7361
7362         {
7363                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7364                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7365         }
7366
7367         let mut reestablish_1 = Vec::with_capacity(1);
7368         for msg in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
7369                 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } = msg {
7370                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7371                         reestablish_1.push(msg.clone());
7372                 } else if let MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } = msg {
7373                 } else if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg {
7374                         match action {
7375                                 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7376                                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting");
7377                                 },
7378                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
7379                         }
7380                 } else {
7381                         panic!("Unexpected event")
7382                 }
7383         }
7384
7385         // Check we close channel detecting A is fallen-behind
7386         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7387         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_string() });
7388         assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction");
7389         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7390
7391         // Check A is able to claim to_remote output
7392         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7393         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7394         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
7395         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
7396         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
7397         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7398         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can\'t do any automated broadcasting".to_string() });
7399         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
7400         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
7401         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
7402 }
7403
7404 #[test]
7405 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
7406         // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
7407         // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
7408         // to B, B should refuse payment.
7409
7410         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7411         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7412         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7413         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7414
7415         // Create some initial channels
7416         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7417
7418         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7419         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7420         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7421         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7422         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7423         let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
7424         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7425         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7426
7427         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7428         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7429         let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7430         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7431         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7432
7433         // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
7434         // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
7435         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7436         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7437
7438         // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
7439         // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
7440         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7441
7442         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7443         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7444         let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
7445                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7446                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7447                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7448                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7449                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7450                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7451                         (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
7452                 },
7453                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7454         };
7455         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7456
7457         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
7458         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
7459
7460         // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
7461         let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(10_000).to_vec();
7462         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH));
7463         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
7464 }
7465
7466 #[test]
7467 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
7468         // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
7469         // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
7470
7471         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7472         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7473         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7474         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7475
7476         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7477         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7478         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7479
7480         // Disconnect peers
7481         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7482         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7483
7484         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // Enabled -> DisabledStaged
7485         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // DisabledStaged -> Disabled
7486         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7487         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7488         let mut chans_disabled = HashMap::new();
7489         for e in msg_events {
7490                 match e {
7491                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7492                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7493                                 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7494                                 if chans_disabled.insert(msg.contents.short_channel_id, msg.contents.timestamp).is_some() {
7495                                         panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7496                                 }
7497                         },
7498                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7499                 }
7500         }
7501         // Reconnect peers
7502         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7503         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7504         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7505         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7506         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7507         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7508
7509         // Reestablish chan_1
7510         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7511         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7512         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7513         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7514         // Reestablish chan_2
7515         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7516         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7517         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7518         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7519         // Reestablish chan_3
7520         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7521         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7522         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7523         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7524
7525         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7526         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7527         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7528         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7529         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7530         for e in msg_events {
7531                 match e {
7532                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7533                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7534                                 match chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7535                                         // Each update should have a higher timestamp than the previous one, replacing
7536                                         // the old one.
7537                                         Some(prev_timestamp) => assert!(msg.contents.timestamp > prev_timestamp),
7538                                         None => panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!"),
7539                                 }
7540                         },
7541                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7542                 }
7543         }
7544         // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7545         assert!(chans_disabled.is_empty());
7546 }
7547
7548 #[test]
7549 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7550         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7551         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7552
7553         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7554         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7555         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7556         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7557
7558         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7559
7560         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7561         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
7562                 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7563         let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_params, 3000000, 30);
7564         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7565
7566         let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7567         // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7568         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7569         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7570         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7571         let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7572
7573         let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7574         for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7575                 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7576                         penalty_sum += outp.value;
7577                 }
7578         }
7579
7580         // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7581         let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7582
7583         // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7584         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7585         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_114, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7586         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()] });
7587         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7588
7589         // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7590         let penalty_1;
7591         let feerate_1;
7592         {
7593                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7594                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor) + local commitment tx
7595                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7596                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7597                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7598                 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7599                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7600                 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7601                 node_txn.clear();
7602         };
7603
7604         // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7605         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7606         let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7607         let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7608         {
7609                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7610                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7611                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7612                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7613                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7614                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7615                         penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7616                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7617                         assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7618                         let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7619                         feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7620                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7621                         assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7622                         node_txn.clear();
7623                 }
7624         }
7625         assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7626
7627         // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7628         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7629         let penalty_3;
7630         let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7631         {
7632                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7633                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7634                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7635                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7636                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7637                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7638                         penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7639                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7640                         assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7641                         let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7642                         feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7643                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7644                         assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7645                         node_txn.clear();
7646                 }
7647         }
7648         assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7649
7650         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7651         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7652 }
7653
7654 #[test]
7655 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7656         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7657         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7658
7659         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7660         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7661         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7662         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7663         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7664
7665         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7666         // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7667         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7668         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7669         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7670         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7671                 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7672         let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7673         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7674         let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[1].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7675                 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7676         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7677
7678         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7679         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7680         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7681
7682         // Revoke local commitment tx
7683         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7684
7685         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7686         // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7687         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7688         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7689         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7690         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7691         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 49); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7692
7693         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7694         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
7695         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], chan.3);
7696
7697         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7698         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7699         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7700
7701         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7702         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7703         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
7704         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7705
7706         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7707         let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7708         let header_11 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: hash_128, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7709         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_11, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7710         let header_129 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_11.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7711         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_129, txdata: vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[2].clone()] });
7712         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7713         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7714         match events[1] {
7715                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7716                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7717         }
7718         let first;
7719         let feerate_1;
7720         let penalty_txn;
7721         {
7722                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7723                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + A commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7724                 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7725
7726                 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7727                 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7728                 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7729                 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7730                 // future).
7731                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7732                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7733                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7734                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7735                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7736                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7737
7738                 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7739                 // available, which we check here:
7740                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7741                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7742                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7743
7744                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7745                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7746
7747                 // node_txn[3] is the local commitment tx broadcast just because (and somewhat in case of
7748                 // reorgs, though its not clear its ever worth broadcasting conflicting txn like this when
7749                 // a remote commitment tx has already been confirmed).
7750                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan.3);
7751
7752                 // node_txn[4] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7753                 // output, checked above).
7754                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 2);
7755                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].output.len(), 1);
7756                 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7757
7758                 first = node_txn[4].txid();
7759                 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7760                 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[4].output[0].value;
7761                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[4].get_weight() as u64;
7762                 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7763                 node_txn.clear();
7764         }
7765
7766         // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7767         let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_129.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7768         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7769         let header_131 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_130.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7770         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_131, txdata: Vec::new() });
7771         {
7772                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7773                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // 2 bumped penalty txn on revoked commitment tx
7774
7775                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7776                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7777                 // Note that these are both bogus - they spend outputs already claimed in block 129:
7778                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output  {
7779                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7780                 } else {
7781                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7782                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7783                 }
7784
7785                 node_txn.clear();
7786         };
7787
7788         // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7789         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7790         assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7791         let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7792         let node_txn = {
7793                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7794                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7795
7796                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7797                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7798                 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7799                 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7800                 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7801                 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7802                 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7803                 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7804                 node_txn.clear();
7805                 txn
7806         };
7807         // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7808         let header_145 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_144, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7809         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_145, txdata: node_txn });
7810         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7811         {
7812                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7813                 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7814                 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7815                 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7816                 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7817                 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7818                 // up bumped justice generation.
7819                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7820                 node_txn.clear();
7821         }
7822         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7823         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7824 }
7825
7826 #[test]
7827 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
7828         // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7829         // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7830
7831         // Create 2 HTLCs
7832         // Provide preimage for one
7833         // Check aggregation
7834
7835         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7836         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7837         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7838         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7839
7840         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7841         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7842         route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
7843
7844         // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7845         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7846         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7847         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7848         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7849
7850         // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
7851         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7852         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
7853         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7854         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7855
7856         // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
7857         let timeout;
7858         let preimage;
7859         let preimage_bump;
7860         let feerate_timeout;
7861         let feerate_preimage;
7862         {
7863                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7864                 // 9 transactions including:
7865                 // 1*2 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success
7866                 // 1*3 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success + HTLC-Timeout
7867                 // 2 * HTLC-Success (one RBF bump we'll check later)
7868                 // 1 * HTLC-Timeout
7869                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 8);
7870                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7871                 assert_eq!(node_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
7872                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7873                 check_spends!(node_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
7874                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
7875                 preimage_bump = node_txn[3].clone();
7876
7877                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan.3);
7878                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
7879                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
7880                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[5]);
7881
7882                 timeout = node_txn[6].txid();
7883                 let index = node_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7884                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[6].output[0].value;
7885                 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / node_txn[6].get_weight() as u64;
7886
7887                 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
7888                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7889                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7890                 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7891
7892                 node_txn.clear();
7893         };
7894         assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
7895         assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
7896
7897         // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
7898         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7899         {
7900                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7901                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7902                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7903                 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
7904                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7905                 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7906
7907                 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7908                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
7909                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.get_weight() as u64;
7910                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
7911                 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
7912
7913                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7914                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7915                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7916                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
7917                 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
7918
7919                 node_txn.clear();
7920         }
7921
7922         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7923         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7924 }
7925
7926 #[test]
7927 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
7928         // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
7929         // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
7930         // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
7931         // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
7932         // EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
7933         // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
7934         // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
7935         // implement that).
7936         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7937         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7938         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7939         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7940         let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
7941
7942         let mut guard = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
7943         let keys = guard.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
7944
7945         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
7946
7947         // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
7948         keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7949         let per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
7950
7951         // Must revoke without gaps
7952         keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7953         keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
7954
7955         keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7956         let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
7957                 &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
7958
7959         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
7960                 &msgs::RevokeAndACK { channel_id, per_commitment_secret, next_per_commitment_point });
7961         assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
7962         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7963         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() });
7964 }
7965
7966 #[test]
7967 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
7968         // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
7969         // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7970
7971         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7972         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7973         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7974         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7975
7976         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7977         // Lock HTLC in both directions
7978         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
7979         route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000).0;
7980
7981         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7982         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7983         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7984
7985         // Revoke local commitment tx
7986         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7987
7988         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7989         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
7990         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[0]);
7991         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7992
7993         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
7994         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7995         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7996         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7997         let penalty_txn = {
7998                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7999                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
8000                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8001                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8002                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8003                 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
8004                 node_txn.clear();
8005                 penalty_txn
8006         };
8007         let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8008         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
8009         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8010         {
8011                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
8012                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
8013                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
8014         }
8015 }
8016
8017 #[test]
8018 fn test_pending_claimed_htlc_no_balance_underflow() {
8019         // Tests that if we have a pending outbound HTLC as well as a claimed-but-not-fully-removed
8020         // HTLC we will not underflow when we call `Channel::get_balance_msat()`.
8021         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8022         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8023         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8024         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8025         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8026
8027         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_010_000).0;
8028         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8029         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8030         let fulfill_ev = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8031
8032         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8033         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
8034         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.commitment_signed);
8035         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8036         let (_raa, _cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8037
8038         // At this point nodes[1] has received 1,010k msat (10k msat more than their reserve) and can
8039         // send an HTLC back (though it will go in the holding cell). Send an HTLC back and check we
8040         // can get our balance.
8041
8042         // Get a route from nodes[1] to nodes[0] by getting a route going the other way and then flip
8043         // the public key of the only hop. This works around ChannelDetails not showing the
8044         // almost-claimed HTLC as available balance.
8045         let (mut route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000);
8046         route.payment_params = None; // This is all wrong, but unnecessary
8047         route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8048         let (_, payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
8049         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
8050
8051         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].balance_msat, 1_000_000);
8052 }
8053
8054 #[test]
8055 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
8056         // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
8057         // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
8058         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8059         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8060         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8061         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8062
8063         let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8064
8065         // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
8066         // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
8067         // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
8068         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
8069         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8070
8071         // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
8072         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
8073         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8074         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8075
8076         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
8077         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8078         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
8079         let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8080         assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
8081         match close_ev[0] {
8082                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
8083                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8084                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
8085                 },
8086                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8087         }
8088 }
8089
8090 #[test]
8091 fn test_override_channel_config() {
8092         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8093         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8094         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8095         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8096
8097         // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
8098         let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
8099         override_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
8100
8101         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
8102
8103         // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
8104         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8105         assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
8106         assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
8107 }
8108
8109 #[test]
8110 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
8111         let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
8112         zero_config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
8113         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8114         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8115         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
8116         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8117
8118         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
8119         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8120         assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8121
8122         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8123         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8124         assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8125 }
8126
8127 #[test]
8128 fn test_manually_accept_inbound_channel_request() {
8129         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8130         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8131         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8132         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8133         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8134         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8135
8136         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8137         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8138
8139         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8140
8141         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8142         // accepting the inbound channel request.
8143         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8144
8145         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8146         match events[0] {
8147                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8148                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, 23).unwrap();
8149                 }
8150                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8151         }
8152
8153         let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8154         assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8155
8156         match accept_msg_ev[0] {
8157                 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
8158                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8159                 }
8160                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8161         }
8162
8163         nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&temp_channel_id).unwrap();
8164
8165         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8166         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8167
8168         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8169         match events[0] {
8170                 Event::ChannelClosed { user_channel_id, .. } => {
8171                         assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 23);
8172                 }
8173                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8174         }
8175 }
8176
8177 #[test]
8178 fn test_manually_reject_inbound_channel_request() {
8179         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8180         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8181         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8182         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8183         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8184         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8185
8186         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8187         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8188
8189         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8190
8191         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8192         // rejecting the inbound channel request.
8193         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8194
8195         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8196         match events[0] {
8197                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8198                         nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
8199                 }
8200                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8201         }
8202
8203         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8204         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8205
8206         match close_msg_ev[0] {
8207                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => {
8208                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8209                 }
8210                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8211         }
8212         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8213 }
8214
8215 #[test]
8216 fn test_reject_funding_before_inbound_channel_accepted() {
8217         // This tests that when `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` is set to true, inbound
8218         // channels must to be manually accepted through `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel` by
8219         // the node operator before the counterparty sends a `FundingCreated` message. If a
8220         // `FundingCreated` message is received before the channel is accepted, it should be rejected
8221         // and the channel should be closed.
8222         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8223         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8224         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8225         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8226         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8227         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8228
8229         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8230         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8231         let temp_channel_id = res.temporary_channel_id;
8232
8233         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8234
8235         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in the `msg_events`.
8236         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8237
8238         // Clear the `Event::OpenChannelRequest` event without responding to the request.
8239         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8240
8241         // Get the `AcceptChannel` message of `nodes[1]` without calling
8242         // `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`, which generates a
8243         // `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` event. The message is passed to `nodes[0]`
8244         // `handle_accept_channel`, which is required in order for `create_funding_transaction` to
8245         // succeed when `nodes[0]` is passed to it.
8246         {
8247                 let mut lock;
8248                 let channel = get_channel_ref!(&nodes[1], lock, temp_channel_id);
8249                 let accept_chan_msg = channel.get_accept_channel_message();
8250                 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_chan_msg);
8251         }
8252
8253         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
8254
8255         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
8256         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8257
8258         // The `funding_created_msg` should be rejected by `nodes[1]` as it hasn't accepted the channel
8259         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8260
8261         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8262         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8263
8264         let expected_err = "FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted";
8265         match close_msg_ev[0] {
8266                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id, } => {
8267                         assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, temp_channel_id);
8268                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8269                         assert_eq!(msg.data, expected_err);
8270                 }
8271                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8272         }
8273
8274         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
8275 }
8276
8277 #[test]
8278 fn test_can_not_accept_inbound_channel_twice() {
8279         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8280         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8281         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8282         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8283         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8284         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8285
8286         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8287         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8288
8289         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8290
8291         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8292         // accepting the inbound channel request.
8293         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8294
8295         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8296         match events[0] {
8297                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8298                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, 0).unwrap();
8299                         let api_res = nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, 0);
8300                         match api_res {
8301                                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8302                                         assert_eq!(err, "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.");
8303                                 },
8304                                 Ok(_) => panic!("Channel shouldn't be possible to be accepted twice"),
8305                                 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8306                         }
8307                 }
8308                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8309         }
8310
8311         // Ensure that the channel wasn't closed after attempting to accept it twice.
8312         let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8313         assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8314
8315         match accept_msg_ev[0] {
8316                 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
8317                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8318                 }
8319                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8320         }
8321 }
8322
8323 #[test]
8324 fn test_can_not_accept_unknown_inbound_channel() {
8325         let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
8326         let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
8327         let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
8328         let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr)[0].node;
8329
8330         let unknown_channel_id = [0; 32];
8331         let api_res = node.accept_inbound_channel(&unknown_channel_id, 0);
8332         match api_res {
8333                 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
8334                         assert_eq!(err, "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist");
8335                 },
8336                 Ok(_) => panic!("It shouldn't be possible to accept an unkown channel"),
8337                 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8338         }
8339 }
8340
8341 #[test]
8342 fn test_simple_mpp() {
8343         // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
8344         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8345         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8346         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8347         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8348
8349         let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8350         let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8351         let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8352         let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8353
8354         let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8355         let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8356         route.paths.push(path);
8357         route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8358         route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8359         route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8360         route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8361         route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8362         route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8363         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
8364         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
8365 }
8366
8367 #[test]
8368 fn test_preimage_storage() {
8369         // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
8370         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8371         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8372         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8373         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8374
8375         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8376
8377         {
8378                 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
8379                 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8380                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8381                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8382                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8383                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8384                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8385                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8386         }
8387         // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8388         // values from previous calls.
8389         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8390         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8391         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8392         match events[0] {
8393                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref purpose, .. } => {
8394                         match &purpose {
8395                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
8396                                         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
8397                                 },
8398                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
8399                         }
8400                 },
8401                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8402         }
8403 }
8404
8405 #[test]
8406 #[allow(deprecated)]
8407 fn test_secret_timeout() {
8408         // Simple test of payment secret storage time outs. After
8409         // `create_inbound_payment(_for_hash)_legacy` is removed, this test will be removed as well.
8410         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8411         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8412         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8413         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8414
8415         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8416
8417         let (payment_hash, payment_secret_1) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_legacy(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8418
8419         // We should fail to register the same payment hash twice, at least until we've connected a
8420         // block with time 7200 + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1.
8421         if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8422                 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8423         } else { panic!(); }
8424         let mut block = {
8425                 let node_1_blocks = nodes[1].blocks.lock().unwrap();
8426                 Block {
8427                         header: BlockHeader {
8428                                 version: 0x2000000,
8429                                 prev_blockhash: node_1_blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(),
8430                                 merkle_root: Default::default(),
8431                                 time: node_1_blocks.len() as u32 + 7200, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8432                         txdata: vec![],
8433                 }
8434         };
8435         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8436         if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8437                 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8438         } else { panic!(); }
8439
8440         // If we then connect the second block, we should be able to register the same payment hash
8441         // again (this time getting a new payment secret).
8442         block.header.prev_blockhash = block.header.block_hash();
8443         block.header.time += 1;
8444         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8445         let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8446         assert_ne!(payment_secret_1, our_payment_secret);
8447
8448         {
8449                 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8450                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8451                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8452                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8453                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8454                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8455                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8456         }
8457         // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8458         // values from previous calls.
8459         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8460         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8461         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8462         match events[0] {
8463                 Event::PaymentReceived { purpose: PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret }, .. } => {
8464                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
8465                         assert_eq!(payment_secret, our_payment_secret);
8466                         // We don't actually have the payment preimage with which to claim this payment!
8467                 },
8468                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8469         }
8470 }
8471
8472 #[test]
8473 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8474         // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8475         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8476         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8477         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8478         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8479
8480         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8481
8482         let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8483         let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8484         let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8485         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8486
8487         // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8488         // resulting events.
8489         macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8490                 () => {
8491                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8492                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8493                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8494                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8495                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8496
8497                         // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8498                         // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8499                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8500                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8501                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8502
8503                         // We should fail the payment back
8504                         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8505                         match events.pop().unwrap() {
8506                                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8507                                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8508                                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8509                                 },
8510                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8511                         }
8512                 }
8513         }
8514
8515         let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8516         // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8517         let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8518
8519         // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8520         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8521         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8522         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8523
8524         // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8525         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8526         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8527         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8528
8529         // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8530         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8531         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8532         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8533 }
8534
8535 #[test]
8536 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8537         // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8538         // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8539         // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateErr.
8540         //
8541         // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8542         // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8543         // commitment at same time.
8544
8545         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8546         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8547         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8548         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8549
8550         // Create some initial channel
8551         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8552         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8553
8554         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8555         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8556
8557         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8558         let preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8559
8560         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8561         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8562         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8563         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8564         let watchtower = {
8565                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8566                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8567                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8568                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8569                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8570                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8571                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8572                 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8573                 watchtower
8574         };
8575         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8576         // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8577         // transaction lock time requirements here.
8578         chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (header, 0));
8579         watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 200);
8580
8581         // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8582         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage));
8583         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8584         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8585         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8586         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8587         if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8588                 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8589                         if let Err(_) =  watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8590                         if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8591                 } else { assert!(false); }
8592         } else { assert!(false); };
8593         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8594         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8595         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8596         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8597 }
8598
8599 #[test]
8600 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8601         // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8602         // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8603         // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8604         // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8605
8606         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8607         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8608         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8609         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8610
8611         // Create some initial channel
8612         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8613         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8614
8615         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8616         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8617
8618         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8619         route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8620
8621         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8622         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8623         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8624         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8625         let watchtower_alice = {
8626                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8627                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8628                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8629                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8630                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8631                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8632                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8633                 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8634                 watchtower
8635         };
8636         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8637         // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8638         // transaction lock time requirements here.
8639         chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as usize, (header, 0));
8640         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8641
8642         // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8643         {
8644                 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8645                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8646                 txn.clear();
8647         }
8648
8649         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8650         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8651         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8652         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8653         let watchtower_bob = {
8654                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8655                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8656                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8657                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8658                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8659                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8660                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8661                 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8662                 watchtower
8663         };
8664         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8665         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8666
8667         // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8668         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8669         {
8670                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8671         }
8672         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8673
8674         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8675         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8676         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8677         if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8678                 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8679                         // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8680                         if let Err(_) =  watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8681                         if let Ok(_) = watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8682                         if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8683                 } else { assert!(false); }
8684         } else { assert!(false); };
8685         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8686         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8687
8688         //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8689         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8690         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8691
8692         // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8693         let bob_state_y;
8694         {
8695                 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8696                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8697                 bob_state_y = txn[0].clone();
8698                 txn.clear();
8699         };
8700
8701         // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8702         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8703         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![bob_state_y.clone()] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8704         {
8705                 let htlc_txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8706                 // We broadcast twice the transaction, once due to the HTLC-timeout, once due
8707                 // the onchain detection of the HTLC output
8708                 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
8709                 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8710                 check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], bob_state_y);
8711         }
8712 }
8713
8714 #[test]
8715 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8716         // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8717         // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8718         // message).
8719         //
8720         // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8721         // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8722         //
8723         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8724         // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8725         // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8726         // before receiving funding_signed.
8727         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8728         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8729         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8730         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8731
8732         // Create an initial channel
8733         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8734         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8735         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8736         let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8737         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_chan_msg);
8738
8739         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8740         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
8741
8742         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
8743         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8744
8745         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8746         let channel_id = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
8747         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8748         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8749         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Hi".to_string() }, true);
8750 }
8751
8752 #[test]
8753 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8754         // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8755         // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8756         // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8757         // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
8758         // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
8759         // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
8760
8761         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8762         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8763         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8764         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8765
8766         // Create some initial channels
8767         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8768
8769         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
8770         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
8771         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
8772         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8773         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
8774         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
8775
8776         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8777         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8778         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] });
8779         // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
8780         // this test before #653 fix.
8781         chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
8782         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8783         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8784         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8785         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
8786
8787         let htlc_timeout = {
8788                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8789                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
8790                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8791                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
8792                 node_txn[1].clone()
8793         };
8794
8795         let header_201 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8796         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_201, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout.clone()] });
8797         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8798         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8799 }
8800
8801 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
8802         // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
8803         // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
8804         // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
8805         //
8806         // Steps of the test:
8807         // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
8808         // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
8809         // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
8810         // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
8811         // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
8812         //    but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
8813         // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
8814         // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
8815         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8816         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8817         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8818         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8819
8820         // Create some initial channels
8821         let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8822         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8823
8824         // Steps (1) and (2):
8825         // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
8826         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3_000_000);
8827
8828         // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
8829         let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
8830         check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8831         assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
8832         check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
8833         assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8834         assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
8835
8836         // Steps (3) and (4):
8837         // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
8838         // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
8839         let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
8840         if !broadcast_alice { force_closing_node = 1; } // Bob force-closes
8841         nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_channel(&chan_ab.2).unwrap();
8842         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
8843         check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
8844         check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8845         if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8846                 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
8847                         true => alice_txn.clone(),
8848                         false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
8849                 };
8850                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8851                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8852                 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8853                 if broadcast_alice {
8854                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8855                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8856                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8857                 }
8858                 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8859                 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8860         }
8861
8862         // Step (5):
8863         // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
8864         // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
8865         assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
8866         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8867         let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8868         assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8869         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8870         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8871         assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
8872         assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8873
8874         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8875         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false, false);
8876         // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
8877         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
8878                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8879                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8880                 match events[0] {
8881                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
8882                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8883                         },
8884                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8885                 };
8886         }
8887         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
8888         // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
8889         // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
8890         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8891
8892         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8893         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8894         let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
8895                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8896                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8897                         (*msg).clone()
8898                 },
8899                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8900         };
8901         let bob_updates = match events[1] {
8902                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
8903                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8904                         (*updates).clone()
8905                 },
8906                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8907         };
8908
8909         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
8910         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8911         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
8912         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8913
8914         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8915         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8916         let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
8917                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8918                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8919                         (*msg).clone()
8920                 },
8921                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8922         };
8923         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
8924         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8925
8926         // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
8927         // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
8928         let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
8929         if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
8930         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8931                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8932                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8933                 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
8934                 if broadcast_alice {
8935                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8936                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8937                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8938                 }
8939                 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8940                 if broadcast_alice {
8941                         // In `connect_block()`, the ChainMonitor and ChannelManager are separately notified about a
8942                         // new block being connected. The ChannelManager being notified triggers a monitor update,
8943                         // which triggers broadcasting our commitment tx and an HTLC-claiming tx. The ChainMonitor
8944                         // being notified triggers the HTLC-claiming tx redundantly, resulting in 3 total txs being
8945                         // broadcasted.
8946                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 3);
8947                         check_spends!(bob_txn[1], chan_ab.3);
8948                 } else {
8949                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8950                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8951                 }
8952         }
8953
8954         // Step (6):
8955         // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
8956         // broadcasted commitment transaction.
8957         {
8958                 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8959                 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8960                         // Bob should now have an extra broadcasted tx, for the preimage-claiming transaction.
8961                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8962                 }
8963                 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
8964                         true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
8965                         false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
8966                 };
8967                 // If Alice force-closed and Bob didn't receive her commitment transaction until after he
8968                 // received Carol's fulfill, he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction first. Else if
8969                 // Bob force closed or if he found out about Alice's commitment tx before receiving Carol's
8970                 // fulfill, then he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction second.
8971                 if broadcast_alice && !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8972                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8973                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8974                 } else {
8975                         check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8976                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8977                 }
8978         }
8979 }
8980
8981 #[test]
8982 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
8983         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
8984         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
8985         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
8986         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
8987 }
8988
8989 #[test]
8990 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
8991         // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
8992         // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
8993         //
8994         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
8995         // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
8996         // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
8997         // updating logic for the existing channel.
8998         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8999         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9000         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9001         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9002
9003         // Create an initial channel
9004         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
9005         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9006         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
9007         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9008
9009         // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
9010         // that it is rejected.
9011         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
9012         {
9013                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9014                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9015                 match events[0] {
9016                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9017                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
9018                                 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
9019                                 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
9020                                 // move forward with it.
9021                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9022                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9023                         },
9024                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9025                 }
9026         }
9027
9028         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
9029         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
9030
9031         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
9032         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9033
9034         let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9035         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9036         {
9037                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9038                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
9039                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
9040                 added_monitors.clear();
9041         }
9042         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9043
9044         let funding_outpoint = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
9045         let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
9046
9047         // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
9048         // temporary one).
9049
9050         // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
9051         // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
9052         // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
9053         open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
9054         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
9055         {
9056                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9057                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9058                 match events[0] {
9059                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9060                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
9061                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
9062                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9063                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9064                         },
9065                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9066                 }
9067         }
9068
9069         // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
9070         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
9071         let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9072         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_2_msg);
9073         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9074         create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
9075
9076         let funding_created = {
9077                 let mut a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
9078                 let mut as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get_mut(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
9079                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9080                 as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
9081         };
9082         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9083         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
9084         // At this point we'll try to add a duplicate channel monitor, which will be rejected, but
9085         // still needs to be cleared here.
9086         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9087
9088         // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
9089         {
9090                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9091                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9092                 match events[0] {
9093                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9094                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
9095                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
9096                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
9097                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9098                         },
9099                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9100                 }
9101         }
9102
9103         // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
9104         // everything is functional.
9105         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
9106         {
9107                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9108                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
9109                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
9110                 added_monitors.clear();
9111         }
9112
9113         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9114         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
9115         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9116         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
9117
9118         let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9119         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
9120         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9121         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
9122 }
9123
9124 #[test]
9125 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
9126         // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
9127         //
9128         // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
9129         // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
9130         // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
9131         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9132         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9133         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9134         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9135
9136         // Create some initial channels
9137         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9138         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9139         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9140
9141         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9142         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9143         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9144
9145         // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
9146         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9147         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9148
9149         // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
9150         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9151         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9152         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
9153         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
9154         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
9155         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9156         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
9157         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9158
9159         // A null channel ID should close all channels
9160         let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9161         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9162         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9163         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
9164         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9165         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9166         match events[0] {
9167                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9168                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9169                 },
9170                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9171         }
9172         match events[1] {
9173                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9174                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9175                 },
9176                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9177         }
9178         // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
9179         // peer_disconnected with no_connection_possible set to false, duplicating the
9180         // close-all-channels logic. That's OK, we don't want to end up not force-closing channels for
9181         // users with their own peer handling logic. We duplicate the call here, however.
9182         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9183         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9184
9185         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
9186         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9187         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9188 }
9189
9190 #[test]
9191 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
9192         // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
9193         //
9194         // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
9195         // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
9196         // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
9197         // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
9198         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9199         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9200         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9201         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9202
9203         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9204         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9205         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9206
9207         let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100_000, 42);
9208         for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
9209                 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
9210                 output.script_pubkey = bitcoin::Script::new();
9211         }
9212
9213         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
9214         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9215         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9216
9217         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9218         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9219
9220         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9221         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
9222
9223         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9224         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9225         nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
9226
9227         let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
9228         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
9229         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
9230         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9231         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9232         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
9233         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
9234                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9235                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
9236                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
9237                 } else { panic!(); }
9238         } else { panic!(); }
9239         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
9240 }
9241
9242 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
9243         // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
9244         // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
9245         // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
9246         // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
9247         // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
9248         // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
9249         // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
9250         // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
9251         // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
9252         // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
9253         // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
9254         // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
9255         // until we learned about an additional block.
9256         //
9257         // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
9258         // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
9259         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9260         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9261         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9262         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9263         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
9264
9265         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9266         let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9267         let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
9268         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9269         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9270
9271         nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&channel_id).unwrap();
9272         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9273         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9274         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9275         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9276         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
9277
9278         let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
9279         if !test_height_before_timelock {
9280                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
9281         }
9282         nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9283                 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
9284         if test_height_before_timelock {
9285                 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
9286                 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
9287                 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
9288                 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9289         } else {
9290                 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
9291                 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9292                 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
9293                 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
9294                 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
9295                 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
9296                 // timelock is up).
9297                 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
9298                 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
9299
9300                 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
9301                 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
9302                 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
9303                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9304                         &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
9305                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9306                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9307
9308                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9309                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9310                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9311                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9312                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9313                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9314                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9315                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9316                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
9317         }
9318 }
9319
9320 #[test]
9321 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
9322         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
9323         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
9324 }
9325
9326 #[test]
9327 fn test_forwardable_regen() {
9328         // Tests that if we reload a ChannelManager while forwards are pending we will regenerate the
9329         // PendingHTLCsForwardable event automatically, ensuring we don't forget to forward/receive
9330         // HTLCs.
9331         // We test it for both payment receipt and payment forwarding.
9332
9333         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9334         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9335         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9336         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
9337         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
9338         let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
9339         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9340         let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9341         let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9342
9343         // First send a payment to nodes[1]
9344         let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
9345         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9346         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9347
9348         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9349         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9350         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9351         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9352         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9353
9354         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9355
9356         // Next send a payment which is forwarded by nodes[1]
9357         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 200_000);
9358         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
9359         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9360
9361         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9362         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9363         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9364         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9365         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9366
9367         // There is already a PendingHTLCsForwardable event "pending" so another one will not be
9368         // generated
9369         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9370
9371         // Now restart nodes[1] and make sure it regenerates a single PendingHTLCsForwardable
9372         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9373         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9374
9375         let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
9376         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9377         let mut chan_1_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9378         get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_1).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9379         get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_2).write(&mut chan_1_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9380
9381         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
9382         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
9383         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
9384         nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
9385
9386         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9387         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9388                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9389         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
9390         let mut chan_1_monitor_read = &chan_1_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9391         let (_, mut chan_1_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9392                 &mut chan_1_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9393         assert!(chan_1_monitor_read.is_empty());
9394
9395         let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
9396         let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
9397                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
9398                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
9399                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_1_monitor);
9400                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
9401                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
9402                         keys_manager,
9403                         fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
9404                         chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
9405                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
9406                         logger: nodes[1].logger,
9407                         channel_monitors,
9408                 }).unwrap()
9409         };
9410         nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
9411         assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
9412
9413         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
9414         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_1_monitor).is_ok());
9415         nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
9416         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9417
9418         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9419         // Note that nodes[1] and nodes[2] resend their funding_locked here since they haven't updated
9420         // the commitment state.
9421         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9422
9423         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9424
9425         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9426         expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 100_000);
9427         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9428
9429         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9430         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9431         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9432         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9433         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9434         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9435         expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 200_000);
9436
9437         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
9438         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage_2);
9439 }
9440
9441 #[test]
9442 fn test_dup_htlc_second_fail_panic() {
9443         // Previously, if we received two HTLCs back-to-back, where the second overran the expected
9444         // value for the payment, we'd fail back both HTLCs after generating a `PaymentReceived` event.
9445         // Then, if the user failed the second payment, they'd hit a "tried to fail an already failed
9446         // HTLC" debug panic. This tests for this behavior, checking that only one HTLC is auto-failed.
9447         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9448         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9449         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9450         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9451
9452         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9453
9454         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
9455                 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
9456         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
9457         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9458         let route = get_route(
9459                 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(),
9460                 Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9461                 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
9462
9463         let (_, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
9464
9465         {
9466                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
9467                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9468                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9469                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9470                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9471                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9472                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9473         }
9474         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9475         expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 10_000);
9476
9477         {
9478                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
9479                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9480                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9481                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9482                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9483                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9484                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9485                 // At this point, nodes[1] would notice it has too much value for the payment. It will
9486                 // assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9487                 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC. Previously, it'd also have failed back
9488                 // the first HTLC delivered above.
9489         }
9490
9491         // Now we go fail back the first HTLC from the user end.
9492         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9493         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9494         nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
9495
9496         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9497         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9498
9499         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9500         let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9501         assert_eq!(fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 2);
9502
9503         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9504         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
9505         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9506
9507         let failure_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9508         assert_eq!(failure_events.len(), 2);
9509         if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
9510         if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[1] {} else { panic!(); }
9511 }
9512
9513 #[test]
9514 fn test_keysend_payments_to_public_node() {
9515         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9516         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9517         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9518         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9519
9520         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9521         let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9522         let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9523         let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9524         let route_params = RouteParameters {
9525                 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9526                 final_value_msat: 10000,
9527                 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9528         };
9529         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
9530         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9531         let route = find_route(&payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
9532
9533         let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9534         let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9535         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9536         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9537         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9538         let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9539         let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9540         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9541         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9542 }
9543
9544 #[test]
9545 fn test_keysend_payments_to_private_node() {
9546         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9547         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9548         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9549         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9550
9551         let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9552         let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9553         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
9554         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
9555
9556         let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9557         let route_params = RouteParameters {
9558                 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9559                 final_value_msat: 10000,
9560                 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9561         };
9562         let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9563         let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9564         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
9565         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9566         let route = find_route(
9567                 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9568                 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
9569         ).unwrap();
9570
9571         let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9572         let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9573         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9574         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9575         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9576         let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9577         let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9578         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9579         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9580 }
9581
9582 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
9583 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
9584 enum ExposureEvent {
9585         /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
9586         AtHTLCForward,
9587         /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
9588         AtHTLCReception,
9589         /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
9590         AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
9591 }
9592
9593 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool) {
9594         // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
9595         // policy.
9596         //
9597         // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
9598         // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
9599         // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
9600         // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
9601         // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
9602         // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
9603         // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
9604         // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
9605
9606         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9607         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
9608         config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = 5_000_000; // default setting value
9609         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9610         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
9611         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9612
9613         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9614         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9615         open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
9616         open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
9617         if on_holder_tx {
9618                 open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9619         }
9620         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
9621         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9622         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
9623
9624         let opt_anchors = false;
9625
9626         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 1_000_000, 42);
9627
9628         if on_holder_tx {
9629                 if let Some(mut chan) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&temporary_channel_id) {
9630                         chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9631                 }
9632         }
9633
9634         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
9635         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9636         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9637
9638         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9639         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9640
9641         let (funding_locked, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9642         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
9643         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9644
9645         let dust_buffer_feerate = {
9646                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
9647                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
9648                 chan.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64
9649         };
9650         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9651         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9652
9653         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9654         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9655
9656         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 25;
9657         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
9658
9659         if on_holder_tx {
9660                 if dust_outbound_balance {
9661                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9662                         // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9663                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
9664                         for i in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9665                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9666                                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9667                         }
9668                 } else {
9669                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9670                         // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9671                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
9672                         for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9673                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9674                         }
9675                 }
9676         } else {
9677                 if dust_outbound_balance {
9678                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9679                         // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9680                         for i in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9681                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9682                                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9683                         }
9684                 } else {
9685                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9686                         // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9687                         for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9688                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9689                         }
9690                 }
9691         }
9692
9693         let dust_overflow = dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx + 1);
9694         if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
9695                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9696                 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9697                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9698                 if on_holder_tx {
9699                         let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9700                         let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9701                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9702                 } else {
9703                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9704                 }
9705         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
9706                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9707                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9708                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9709                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9710                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9711                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
9712                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9713                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9714                 if on_holder_tx {
9715                         // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
9716                         let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9717                         let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9718                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9719                 } else {
9720                         // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
9721                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9722                 }
9723         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
9724                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 2_500_000);
9725                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at update_fee-swallowed HTLC", ); }
9726                 {
9727                         let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9728                         *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
9729                 }
9730                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9731                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9732                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure".to_string(), 1);
9733         }
9734
9735         let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9736         let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9737         added_monitors.clear();
9738 }
9739
9740 #[test]
9741 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
9742         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9743         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9744         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9745         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9746         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9747         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9748         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9749         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9750         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9751         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9752         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9753         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9754 }