1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
15 use chain::{Confirm, Listen, Watch};
16 use chain::channelmonitor;
17 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
18 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
19 use chain::keysinterface::BaseSign;
20 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
21 use ln::channel::{COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC};
22 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA};
23 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
24 use ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
25 use ln::chan_utils::HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT;
26 use routing::network_graph::{NetworkUpdate, RoutingFees};
27 use routing::router::{Route, RouteHop, RouteHint, RouteHintHop, get_route, get_keysend_route};
28 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures, NodeFeatures};
30 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
31 use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
32 use util::{byte_utils, test_utils};
33 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason};
34 use util::errors::APIError;
35 use util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
36 use util::config::UserConfig;
38 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
39 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
40 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
41 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
42 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
43 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
45 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
46 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
48 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
49 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
55 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
56 use core::default::Default;
57 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
59 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
60 use ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
63 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
64 // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
65 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
66 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
67 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
68 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
70 // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
72 let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
73 let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat);
74 let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
76 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
77 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
79 // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
80 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
82 // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
83 // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
84 let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
85 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
86 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
87 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
88 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
89 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
91 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
92 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), expected_regex, 1);
94 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
96 } else { assert!(false); }
99 use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
100 use ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
102 // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
103 insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than {}. It was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS; msg });
105 insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
107 insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than funding value \d+", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
109 insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
111 insane_open_helper(r"Bogus; channel reserve \(\d+\) is less than dust limit \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.channel_reserve_satoshis + 1; msg });
113 insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
115 insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
117 insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
119 insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
123 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
124 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
125 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
126 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
127 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
128 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
131 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
135 // send (1) commitment_signed -.
136 // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
137 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
138 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
139 // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
140 // (2) RAA is delivered ->
141 // .- send (4) commitment_signed
142 // <- (3) RAA is delivered
143 // send (5) commitment_signed -.
144 // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
146 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
148 // (6) RAA is delivered ->
150 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
152 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
155 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
156 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
158 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
159 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
160 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
161 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
162 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
164 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
167 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
169 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
170 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
171 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
172 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
174 let payment_event = {
175 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
176 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
177 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
179 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
180 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
182 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
183 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
184 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
185 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
186 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
187 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
189 // deliver(1), generate (3):
190 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
191 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
192 // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
193 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
195 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
196 let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
197 assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
198 assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
199 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
200 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
201 assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
202 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
204 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
205 let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
206 assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
207 assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
208 assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
209 assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
210 assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
211 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
213 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
214 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
215 // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
216 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
218 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
219 let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
220 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
222 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
223 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
225 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
226 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
228 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
229 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
232 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
233 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
237 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
238 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
239 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
240 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
241 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
242 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
243 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
244 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
247 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
249 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
251 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
254 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
255 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
257 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
258 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
259 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
260 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
263 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
266 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
268 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
269 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
270 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
271 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
273 let payment_event = {
274 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
275 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
276 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
278 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
279 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
281 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
282 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
283 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
284 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
285 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
286 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
288 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
289 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
291 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
295 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
296 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
297 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
298 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
299 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
300 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
303 // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
304 // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
305 // update_fee (never committed) ->
307 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
308 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
309 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
310 // <- (1) RAA delivered
311 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
312 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
313 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
314 // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
316 // B should send no response here
317 // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
318 // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
321 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
324 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
325 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
326 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
328 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
329 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
331 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
332 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
333 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
334 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
335 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
337 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
340 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
341 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
342 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
343 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
344 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
346 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
349 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
350 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
352 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
353 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
354 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
356 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
357 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
358 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
359 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
362 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
364 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
366 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
368 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
369 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
370 let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
371 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
372 assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
373 assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
374 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
375 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
376 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
377 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
378 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
380 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
381 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
382 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
383 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
384 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
386 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
387 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
388 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
391 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
392 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
393 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
395 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
396 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
397 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
399 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
400 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
401 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
402 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
404 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
405 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
406 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
409 fn do_test_1_conf_open(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
410 // Previously, if the minium_depth config was set to 1, we'd never send a funding_locked. This
411 // tests that we properly send one in that case.
412 let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
413 alice_config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
414 alice_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
415 alice_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
416 let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
417 bob_config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
418 bob_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
419 bob_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
420 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
421 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
422 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)]);
423 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
424 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
426 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
427 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
428 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
430 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
431 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
432 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
435 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
436 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
437 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
441 fn test_1_conf_open() {
442 do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst);
443 do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirst);
444 do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
447 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
448 // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
449 // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
450 // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
453 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
454 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
455 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
456 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
458 if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
460 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
463 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
464 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
467 if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
468 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
469 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
471 if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
472 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
473 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
475 if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
476 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
478 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
480 if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
481 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
482 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
483 let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
485 if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
486 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
488 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
489 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
490 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
491 added_monitors.clear();
493 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
495 if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
496 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
498 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
499 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
500 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
501 added_monitors.clear();
504 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
505 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
507 if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
508 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
510 if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
511 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
512 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
513 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
517 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
518 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
519 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
520 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
521 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
522 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
523 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
524 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
525 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
526 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
527 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
528 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
529 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
530 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
531 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
532 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
533 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
534 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
535 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
539 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
540 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
541 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
542 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
543 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
544 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
547 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
550 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
551 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
553 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
554 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
555 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
556 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
557 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
559 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
561 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
563 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
564 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
565 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
567 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
568 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
569 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
571 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
572 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
573 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
574 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
576 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
577 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
578 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
582 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
583 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
584 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
585 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
586 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
587 let channel_value = 1888;
588 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 700000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
589 let channel_id = chan.2;
593 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
594 *feerate_lock = feerate;
596 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
597 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
598 let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
600 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
602 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
604 //Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate of 260 set above.
605 //This value results in a fee that is exactly what the funder can afford (277 sat + 1000 sat channel reserve)
607 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
609 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit so -2 non-HTLC txns from number of outputs
610 let num_htlcs = commitment_tx.output.len() - 2;
611 let total_fee: u64 = feerate as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
612 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
613 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
614 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
617 //Add 2 to the previous fee rate to the final fee increases by 1 (with no HTLCs the fee is essentially
618 //fee_rate*(724/1000) so the increment of 1*0.724 is rounded back down)
620 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
621 *feerate_lock = feerate + 2;
623 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
624 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
626 let update2_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
628 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update2_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
630 //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
631 //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
632 //Should produce and error.
633 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update2_msg.commitment_signed);
634 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
635 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
636 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
637 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") });
641 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
642 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
643 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
644 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
645 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
646 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
649 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
652 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
655 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
656 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
658 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
659 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
660 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
661 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
662 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
664 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
666 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
667 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
668 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
669 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
671 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
673 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
674 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
676 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
677 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
678 added_monitors.clear();
680 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
681 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
682 // node[1] has nothing to do
684 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
685 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
686 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
688 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
689 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
690 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
691 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
692 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
693 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
694 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
696 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
697 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
698 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
699 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
700 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
701 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
703 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
704 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
705 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
706 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
708 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
709 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
710 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
712 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
713 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
714 let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
715 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
717 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
718 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
719 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
721 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
723 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
724 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
726 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
727 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
730 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
732 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
733 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
734 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
735 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
736 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
740 fn test_update_fee() {
741 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
742 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
743 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
744 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
745 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
746 let channel_id = chan.2;
749 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
750 // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
751 // .- send (3) commitment_signed
752 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
753 // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
754 // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
755 // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
756 // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
757 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
758 // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
759 // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
762 // Create and deliver (1)...
765 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
766 feerate = *feerate_lock;
767 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
769 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
770 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
772 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
773 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
774 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
775 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
776 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
778 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
780 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
782 // Generate (2) and (3):
783 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
784 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
785 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
788 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
789 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
790 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
792 // Create and deliver (4)...
794 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
795 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
797 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
798 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
799 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
800 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
801 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
802 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
803 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
805 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
808 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
809 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
810 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
812 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
813 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
815 // Handle (3), creating (6):
816 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
817 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
818 let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
819 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
822 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
823 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
824 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
826 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
827 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
828 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
829 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
830 assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
831 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
832 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
833 assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
834 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
837 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
838 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
839 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
840 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
842 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
843 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
844 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
846 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
847 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
848 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
849 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
850 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
854 fn fake_network_test() {
855 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
856 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
857 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
858 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
859 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
860 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
862 // Create some initial channels
863 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
864 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
865 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
867 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
868 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
869 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
870 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
871 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
873 // Send some more payments
874 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
875 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
876 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
878 // Test failure packets
879 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
880 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
882 // Add a new channel that skips 3
883 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
885 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
886 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
887 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
888 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
889 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
890 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
891 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
893 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
894 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
896 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
897 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
898 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
899 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
901 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
904 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
905 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
906 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
907 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
909 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
912 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
913 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
914 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
915 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
917 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
919 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
920 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
921 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops] }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
923 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
925 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
926 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
927 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
928 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
930 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
933 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
934 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
935 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
936 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
938 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
941 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
942 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
943 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
944 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
946 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
948 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
949 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
950 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops] }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
952 // Claim the rebalances...
953 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
954 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
956 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
957 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
959 // Send some payments across both channels
960 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
961 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
962 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
965 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
966 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
967 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
968 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap(), 1);
970 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
972 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
973 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
974 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
976 // Close down the channels...
977 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
978 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
979 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
980 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
981 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
982 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
983 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
984 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
985 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
986 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
987 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
988 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
989 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
990 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
991 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
995 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
996 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
997 // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
998 // commitment dance rounds.
999 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1000 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1001 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1002 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1003 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1004 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1006 let mut payments = Vec::new();
1007 for _ in 0..::ln::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
1008 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1009 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
1010 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1012 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1014 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1015 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1016 let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1017 assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1019 // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1020 // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1022 let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1024 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1025 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1026 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1027 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
1030 // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1031 let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1033 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
1034 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1037 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1038 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1039 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1040 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1042 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1043 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1044 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1045 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1046 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1047 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1048 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1050 let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1051 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1052 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1054 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1056 // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1057 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1058 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1059 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1061 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1062 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1063 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1064 let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1066 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1067 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1068 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1070 for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1071 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1073 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1074 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1075 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1076 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1077 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1079 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1080 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1081 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1082 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1083 let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1085 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1086 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1088 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1090 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1091 assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1092 for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1094 &Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1095 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1097 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1101 for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1102 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1105 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1109 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1110 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1111 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1112 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1113 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1114 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1115 let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1117 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1118 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1119 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1120 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1121 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1122 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1124 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1126 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1127 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1129 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1130 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1132 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1133 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1134 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1138 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1139 // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1140 // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1141 // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1142 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1143 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1144 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1145 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1147 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1150 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1152 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1154 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1155 let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, 0).unwrap();
1156 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1158 // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1159 nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1160 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1162 // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1163 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1165 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1166 let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1167 for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1168 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1169 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1170 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1171 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1174 assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1176 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1177 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1178 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1179 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1181 // Check we only broadcast 1 timeout tx
1182 let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1183 assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 8);
1184 assert_eq!(claim_txn[1], claim_txn[4]);
1185 assert_eq!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[5]);
1186 check_spends!(claim_txn[1], chan_1.3);
1187 check_spends!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[1]);
1188 check_spends!(claim_txn[7], claim_txn[1]);
1190 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1191 assert_eq!(claim_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
1192 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, claim_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
1194 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1195 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1196 check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
1197 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1198 assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
1199 assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1200 check_spends!(claim_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
1201 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1203 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1204 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1207 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1208 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
1209 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1210 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1212 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1213 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1214 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1215 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1216 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1217 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1219 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1225 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1226 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1227 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1228 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1229 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1230 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1232 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1233 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1235 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1236 let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2), 1 + 1);
1237 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1238 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send + 1);
1239 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).err().unwrap();
1241 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(ref fails) => {
1243 &APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ref err} =>
1244 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)),
1245 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1248 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1250 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1251 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1253 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1257 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1258 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1259 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1260 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1261 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1262 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1264 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460001);
1265 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1266 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1267 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1269 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1271 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1272 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3460001, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1273 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1274 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1277 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1278 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1279 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1280 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1283 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1285 // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1286 // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1287 // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1289 let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1291 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1293 // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1294 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1295 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1296 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1297 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1298 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1299 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1300 chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1302 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1303 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1304 chan_signer.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1305 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1306 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1308 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1309 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1310 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1311 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1312 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1313 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1314 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1315 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1318 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1319 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1320 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
1322 // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1323 // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1324 let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1326 let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1328 amount_msat: 3460001,
1329 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1331 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1334 let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1337 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1338 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1339 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1340 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1344 false, local_funding, remote_funding,
1345 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1347 &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1348 &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1350 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1353 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1356 htlc_signatures: res.1
1359 // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1360 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1361 let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1363 // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1364 let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1366 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1367 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point
1369 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1371 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1372 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1373 // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1375 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1376 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1377 update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1379 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1381 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1382 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", ::hex::encode(raa_msg.channel_id)), 1);
1384 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1388 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1389 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1390 // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1391 // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1392 // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1394 let feerate_per_kw = 253;
1395 chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(feerate_per_kw) };
1396 chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(feerate_per_kw) };
1397 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1398 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1399 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1401 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1402 push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
1403 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1405 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1407 // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1408 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1410 // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1411 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1412 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1413 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1414 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1415 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1419 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1420 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1421 // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the funder
1422 // receiving 1 update_add_htlc would result in them closing the channel due
1423 // to channel reserve violation. This close could also happen if the fee went
1424 // up a more realistic amount, but many HTLCs were outstanding at the time of
1425 // the update_add_htlc.
1426 chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(6000) };
1427 chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(6000) };
1428 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1429 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1430 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1431 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1433 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1000);
1434 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1435 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1436 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1437 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1438 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1439 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 1000, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1440 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1441 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1444 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1445 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1446 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1447 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1450 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1451 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1452 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1453 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1454 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1455 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1456 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1457 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() });
1461 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1462 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1463 // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1464 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1465 let feerate_per_kw = 253;
1466 chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(feerate_per_kw) };
1467 chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(feerate_per_kw) };
1469 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1470 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1471 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1473 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1474 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1475 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1476 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1477 push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT) / 1000 * 1000;
1478 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1479 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1481 let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1482 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1483 // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1484 // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1485 // commitment transaction fee.
1486 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1488 // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1489 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt + 1);
1490 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1491 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1495 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1496 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1497 // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1498 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1499 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1500 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1501 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1502 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1504 let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1505 // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1506 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1507 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1508 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1509 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1511 // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1512 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1513 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1514 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1515 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1516 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1518 // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1519 // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1520 // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1521 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1525 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1526 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1527 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1528 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1529 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1530 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1531 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1534 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1535 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1536 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1538 // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1539 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1);
1540 let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1541 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1543 // Add a pending HTLC.
1544 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1545 let payment_event_1 = {
1546 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1547 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1549 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1550 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1551 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1553 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1555 // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1556 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2);
1557 let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1558 let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1559 let (route_2, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_2);
1561 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1562 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1563 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1564 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1565 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1566 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, &None, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1567 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1);
1568 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1571 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1572 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1573 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1574 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1577 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1578 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1579 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1580 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1581 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1582 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1583 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1584 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() });
1588 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1589 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1590 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1591 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1592 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1593 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1594 let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1595 let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1596 assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1597 assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1599 let reserve = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100000);
1600 assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1601 assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1603 assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1604 assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1607 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64) -> u64 {
1608 (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1612 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1613 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1614 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1615 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1616 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1617 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1618 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1619 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1620 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1621 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1622 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1624 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1625 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1627 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1628 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1630 macro_rules! expect_forward {
1632 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1633 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1634 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1635 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1640 let feemsat = 239; // set above
1641 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1642 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1644 let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1646 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1648 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_0);
1649 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1650 assert!(route.paths[0].iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1651 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1652 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1653 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1654 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
1657 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1658 // nodes[0]'s wealth
1660 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1661 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1662 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1663 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1664 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1);
1665 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1666 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1669 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
1671 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1672 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1673 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1674 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1675 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1678 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1679 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1680 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1681 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1682 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1685 // adding pending output.
1686 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1687 // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1688 // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1689 // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1690 // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1691 // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1692 // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1693 // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1694 // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1696 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1);
1697 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1698 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1700 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1701 let payment_event_1 = {
1702 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1703 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1705 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1706 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1707 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1709 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1711 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1712 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1714 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_2 + 1);
1715 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1716 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1717 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1720 // split the rest to test holding cell
1721 let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1);
1722 let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1723 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1724 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1726 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1727 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1730 // now see if they go through on both sides
1731 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1732 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1733 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21, &Some(our_payment_secret_21)).unwrap();
1734 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1735 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1736 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1738 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1740 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22+1);
1741 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1742 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1743 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1744 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 2);
1747 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1748 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1749 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22, &Some(our_payment_secret_22)).unwrap();
1750 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1751 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1752 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1754 // flush the pending htlc
1755 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1756 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1757 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1759 // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1760 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1761 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1762 let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1764 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
1765 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1766 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1767 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1769 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1770 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1771 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1773 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1775 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1776 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
1777 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
1779 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1780 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
1782 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
1783 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
1784 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
1785 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
1786 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
1787 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1789 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1790 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
1791 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
1792 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
1794 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
1795 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1797 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1798 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1800 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
1801 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
1802 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
1804 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1805 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1806 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
1808 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1811 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1814 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
1815 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
1816 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
1818 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1819 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1820 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
1822 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1825 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1828 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
1829 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
1830 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
1832 let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1);
1833 let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
1834 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
1836 let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1);
1837 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
1838 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1839 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
1840 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
1842 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1843 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
1847 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
1848 // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
1849 // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
1850 // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
1851 // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
1852 // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
1853 // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
1854 // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
1856 // * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
1857 // you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
1858 // you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
1859 // * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
1860 // * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
1861 // the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
1862 // * deliver the first fulfill from B
1863 // * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
1865 // * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
1866 // This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
1867 // removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
1868 // * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
1869 // of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
1870 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1871 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1872 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1873 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1874 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1876 let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1877 // Route the first two HTLCs.
1878 let (payment_preimage_1, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000);
1879 let (payment_preimage_2, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20000);
1881 // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
1882 let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
1884 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_3, &Some(payment_secret_3)).unwrap();
1885 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1886 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1887 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1888 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1891 // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
1892 // initial fulfill/CS.
1893 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
1894 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1895 let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1897 // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
1898 // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
1899 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2));
1900 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1901 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1903 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
1904 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
1905 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1906 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1907 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
1909 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
1910 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
1911 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1912 // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
1913 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1915 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1916 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1917 let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1919 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
1920 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1921 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1923 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
1924 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1925 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1927 // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
1928 // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
1929 // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
1930 // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
1931 // on-chain as necessary).
1932 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
1933 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
1934 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1935 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1936 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
1938 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1939 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1940 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1942 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1943 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
1945 // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
1946 // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
1947 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
1948 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1949 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1951 // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
1952 // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
1953 let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
1955 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_4, &Some(payment_secret_4)).unwrap();
1956 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1957 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1958 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1959 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1962 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
1963 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
1964 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1965 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1967 // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
1969 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
1970 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1971 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1973 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1974 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1976 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
1977 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1978 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1980 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
1981 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1982 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1984 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
1985 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1987 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
1988 expect_payment_received!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
1990 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
1991 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
1995 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
1996 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
1997 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
1998 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
1999 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2000 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2001 let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2003 // Create some initial channels
2004 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2005 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2006 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2007 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2009 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2010 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2011 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2012 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2013 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2014 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2016 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2017 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2018 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2019 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2020 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2022 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2023 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2024 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2025 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
2027 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2028 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2029 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2030 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2031 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2033 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2034 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2035 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2036 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2037 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2039 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2040 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2042 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2043 // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2044 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2045 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
2046 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2048 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2049 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2050 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2051 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2052 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2053 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2055 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2056 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2057 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2058 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2059 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2061 macro_rules! claim_funds {
2062 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
2064 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
2065 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2067 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2068 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2070 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2071 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2072 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2073 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2075 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2081 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2082 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2083 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2084 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2085 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], false);
2086 let node2_commitment_txid;
2088 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2089 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2090 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2091 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2093 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2094 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
2095 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2096 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2097 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2099 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2100 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2101 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2102 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2103 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2105 // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2106 // confusing us in the following tests.
2107 let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2109 // One pending HTLC to time out:
2110 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
2111 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2114 let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2115 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2116 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2117 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2118 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2119 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2122 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2125 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2126 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2128 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2130 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2132 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2134 let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2135 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2136 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2142 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2144 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2145 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
2147 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2148 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2149 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2150 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2151 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2154 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2157 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2158 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2160 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2162 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2163 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2165 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2166 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2167 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2169 nodes[3].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2170 nodes[4].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2171 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2172 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2174 nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon).unwrap();
2175 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2176 check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2180 fn test_justice_tx() {
2181 // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2182 let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2183 alice_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
2184 alice_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2185 alice_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2186 let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2187 bob_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
2188 bob_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2189 bob_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2190 let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2191 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2192 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2193 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2194 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2195 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2196 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2197 // Create some new channels:
2198 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2200 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2201 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2202 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2203 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2204 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2205 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2206 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2207 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2208 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2209 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2210 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2211 // Revoke the old state
2212 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2215 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2217 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2218 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2219 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2221 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2222 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2223 node_txn.truncate(1);
2225 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2226 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2227 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2229 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2230 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2231 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2232 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2233 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2234 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2235 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2236 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2237 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2239 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2241 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2242 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2244 // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
2245 // Create some new channels:
2246 let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2248 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2252 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2253 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2254 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2255 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2256 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2257 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2258 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2259 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2260 // Revoke the old state
2261 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2263 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2265 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2266 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); //ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2267 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2269 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2270 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2272 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2273 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2275 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2276 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2277 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2278 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2279 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2280 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2281 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2283 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2284 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2285 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2289 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2290 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2291 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2292 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2293 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2294 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2295 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2296 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2297 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2298 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2299 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2300 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2301 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2302 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2303 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2305 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2306 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2307 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2308 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2309 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2310 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2312 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2313 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
2315 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2316 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2317 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2318 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2319 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2323 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2324 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2325 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2326 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2327 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2328 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2329 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2331 // Create some new channel:
2332 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2334 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2335 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2336 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2337 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2338 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2340 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2341 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2342 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2343 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2344 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2345 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2346 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2347 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2348 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2350 //Revoke the old state
2351 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2354 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2355 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2356 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2357 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2358 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2359 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2360 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2361 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2363 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2364 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment
2366 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2367 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2369 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2370 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2371 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2372 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2373 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2374 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2375 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2376 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2378 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
2379 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2380 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
2382 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2383 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2384 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2388 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2389 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2390 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2391 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2392 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2393 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2394 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2396 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2398 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2399 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2400 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2401 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2402 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2403 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2405 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2406 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2408 //Revoke the old state
2409 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2412 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2413 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2414 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2415 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2416 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2417 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2418 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2420 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2421 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2424 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2425 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2427 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2428 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 9);
2429 // ChannelMonitor: justice tx revoked offered htlc, justice tx revoked received htlc, justice tx revoked to_local (3)
2430 // ChannelManager: local commmitment + local HTLC-timeout (2)
2431 // ChannelMonitor: bumped justice tx, after one increase, bumps on HTLC aren't generated not being substantial anymore, bump on revoked to_local isn't generated due to more room for expiration (2)
2432 // ChannelMonitor: local commitment + local HTLC-timeout (2)
2434 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2435 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2436 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2437 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2438 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2439 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2440 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2442 // Justice transactions are indices 1-2-4
2443 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2444 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
2445 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
2447 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2448 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2449 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2451 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2452 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2453 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2454 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2455 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2456 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2457 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2458 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2460 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2461 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2462 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2466 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2467 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2468 // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2469 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2470 // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2471 // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2472 // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2473 // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2474 // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2476 // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2477 // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2478 // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2479 // PaymentSent event).
2481 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2482 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2483 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2484 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2486 // Create some initial channels
2487 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2488 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2490 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2491 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2492 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2493 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2494 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2496 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2497 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2498 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2500 let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2501 let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2503 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2504 // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2505 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2506 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2507 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2508 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2509 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2510 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2511 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2512 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2513 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2514 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2515 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2517 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2518 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2519 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2520 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2521 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx, 2*htlc-success tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2522 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5);
2523 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2524 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2525 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2526 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2527 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2528 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2529 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2530 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2531 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2532 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
2533 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2535 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2536 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2537 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: node_txn});
2538 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2540 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2541 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2542 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2543 added_monitors.clear();
2545 let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2546 assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2547 match forwarded_events[0] {
2548 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2549 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2551 if let Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat: Some(1000), claim_from_onchain_tx: true } = forwarded_events[1] {
2552 } else { panic!(); }
2553 if let Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat: Some(1000), claim_from_onchain_tx: true } = forwarded_events[2] {
2554 } else { panic!(); }
2555 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2557 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2558 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2559 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2560 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2561 added_monitors.clear();
2563 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2565 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2566 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2569 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2570 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2574 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2575 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2576 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2577 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2578 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2579 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2581 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2583 macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2584 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $chan_tx: expr) => { {
2585 let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2586 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
2587 // Node[1]: ChannelManager: 3 (commitment tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (timeout tx)
2588 // Node[0]: ChannelManager: 3 (commtiemtn tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 HTLC-timeout
2589 check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2590 check_spends!(node_txn[2], $commitment_tx);
2591 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2592 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time, 0);
2594 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2595 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2596 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2597 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2599 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2600 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2601 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2602 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2604 check_spends!(node_txn[0], $chan_tx);
2605 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2609 // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own local state as a fallback, suggesting an alternate
2610 // commitment transaction with a corresponding HTLC-Timeout transactions, as well as a
2611 // timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2612 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2614 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2615 // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx on A's chain
2616 let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2617 check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2618 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2619 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2620 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2621 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2622 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2623 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 6); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx + HTLC-Sucess * 2), ChannelMonitor : 3 (HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn)
2624 let commitment_spend =
2625 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2626 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2627 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2628 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2631 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2632 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2633 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2637 check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2638 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2639 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2640 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2641 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time, 0);
2642 assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2643 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3);
2644 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2645 check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[3]);
2646 check_spends!(node_txn[5], node_txn[3]);
2647 // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
2648 // we already checked the same situation with A.
2650 // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
2651 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2652 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()] });
2653 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2654 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2655 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2656 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2657 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2658 let mut first_claimed = false;
2659 for event in events {
2661 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash } => {
2662 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
2663 assert!(!first_claimed);
2664 first_claimed = true;
2666 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
2667 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
2670 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
2671 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2674 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2677 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
2678 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
2679 // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2680 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2681 // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
2682 // B's commitment tx C's commitment tx
2684 // B's HTLC timeout tx B's timeout tx
2686 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2687 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2688 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2689 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2690 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2691 *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2692 *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2694 // Create some intial channels
2695 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2696 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2698 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
2699 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2700 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2702 let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2704 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2705 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2706 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2707 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
2708 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
2709 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2710 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2712 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2713 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2715 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2716 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2717 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2718 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2719 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2720 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2722 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2724 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2725 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2726 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2727 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2728 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx)
2729 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2730 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2731 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2733 // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2734 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
2735 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2736 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
2737 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2740 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2741 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-timeout), 1 timeout tx
2742 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2743 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2745 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2746 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2748 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2749 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2750 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2751 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2753 timeout_tx = node_txn[2].clone();
2757 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
2758 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2759 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2761 // B will rebroadcast a fee-bumped timeout transaction here.
2762 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2763 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2764 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2767 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2769 // B may rebroadcast its own holder commitment transaction here, as a safeguard against
2770 // some incredibly unlikely partial-eclipse-attack scenarios. That said, because the
2771 // original commitment_tx[0] (also spending chan_2.3) has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY B really
2772 // shouldn't broadcast anything here, and in some connect style scenarios we do not.
2773 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2774 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
2775 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2777 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
2781 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2782 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2783 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2784 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2786 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2787 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2788 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2789 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2790 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2791 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2793 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2796 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
2797 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2798 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2800 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
2801 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2803 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2804 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2805 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2806 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 commitment tx, ChannelMonitor : 1 timeout tx
2807 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2808 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2809 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2810 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2811 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2815 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
2816 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
2817 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
2818 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
2822 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
2823 // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
2824 // and fail backward accordingly.
2826 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2827 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2828 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2829 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2831 // Create some initial channels
2832 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2833 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2835 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
2836 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
2837 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2838 // Revoke the old state
2839 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
2841 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
2843 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2844 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2845 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2846 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2847 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2849 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2850 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2851 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2852 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2854 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
2855 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2856 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
2857 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2858 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2859 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2861 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
2862 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
2863 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
2865 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2869 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
2870 // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
2871 // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
2872 // commitment transaction anymore.
2873 // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
2874 // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
2875 // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
2876 // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
2877 // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
2878 // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
2880 // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
2881 // commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
2882 // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
2883 // and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
2884 // commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
2885 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2886 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2887 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2888 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2890 // Create some initial channels
2891 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2892 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2894 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
2895 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
2896 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2897 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
2898 // Revoke the old state
2899 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
2901 let value = if use_dust {
2902 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
2903 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
2904 nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
2907 let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
2908 let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
2909 let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
2911 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash));
2912 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2913 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2914 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2915 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2916 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2917 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2918 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
2919 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
2920 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
2921 let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
2922 // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
2924 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash));
2925 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2926 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2927 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2928 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2929 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2930 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2931 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
2932 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
2933 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
2934 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
2935 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2936 // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
2937 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
2938 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2939 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2941 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash));
2942 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2943 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2944 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2945 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2946 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2947 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2948 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
2949 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
2950 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
2951 // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
2952 // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
2953 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
2954 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2955 // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
2956 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
2957 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2958 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2960 // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
2961 // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
2962 let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
2963 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, fourth_payment_hash, &Some(fourth_payment_secret)).unwrap();
2964 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2965 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2966 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
2969 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2970 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
2971 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
2972 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2973 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2974 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2976 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
2977 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2979 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
2980 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
2983 let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
2984 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2986 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2987 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2988 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2990 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2991 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 3 });
2993 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
2994 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
2997 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
2998 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3000 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3002 if !deliver_bs_raa {
3004 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3005 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3008 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3009 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3011 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3012 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3013 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 1 } else { 0 }] {
3014 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3015 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3017 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 1 }] {
3018 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
3019 assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3020 assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3022 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3026 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3027 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3028 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3029 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3030 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3031 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3033 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3036 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 3 } else { 2 }] {
3037 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3038 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3039 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3040 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3041 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3042 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3044 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3045 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3046 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3048 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3050 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3051 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3053 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3054 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3055 // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3056 // that we should update our routing table for.
3057 if !deliver_bs_raa {
3058 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3061 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3064 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3065 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3066 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3068 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3071 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3072 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3073 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3075 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3078 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3081 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3082 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3083 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3087 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3088 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3089 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3090 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3091 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3095 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3096 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3097 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3098 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3099 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3103 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3104 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3105 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3106 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3107 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3108 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3110 // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3112 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3113 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
3114 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3116 let payment_event = {
3117 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3118 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3119 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3121 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3122 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3125 // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3126 let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3128 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, failed_payment_hash, &Some(failed_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3129 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3131 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3134 // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3136 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3138 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3139 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3140 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3141 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 50_000, &Some(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3142 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3143 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
3145 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3146 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3152 onion_routing_packet,
3154 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3156 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3157 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3158 // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3160 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3161 assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3163 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3166 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3167 assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3169 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3171 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3172 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3176 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3177 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3178 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3179 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3180 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3181 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3182 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3183 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3185 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3186 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id).unwrap();
3187 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3188 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3189 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3190 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3192 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3193 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3194 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
3196 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3197 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
3198 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3199 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3200 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3202 // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3203 // registering new transactions
3204 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
3205 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
3209 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3210 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3211 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3212 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3213 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3214 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3215 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3216 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3218 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3220 let mut payment_event = {
3221 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3222 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3224 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3225 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3226 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3229 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3230 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3232 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3234 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3235 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3236 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3237 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3239 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3240 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3241 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3242 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3243 let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3245 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3246 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3247 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3249 nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id).unwrap();
3250 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3251 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3252 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3254 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3255 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3256 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3257 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3258 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3262 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3264 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3265 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3266 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3267 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3269 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3271 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3272 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator, &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3274 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3275 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3276 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3277 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3278 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3279 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3280 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3282 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3286 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3287 // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3288 // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3289 // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3290 // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3292 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3293 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3294 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3295 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3296 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3298 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3300 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
3301 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3302 let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3303 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3304 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
3306 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3307 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3309 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3310 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3314 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3315 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3316 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3317 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3318 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3319 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3320 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3321 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3323 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3324 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3325 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3327 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3328 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3329 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3330 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3332 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3333 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3334 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3336 let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3337 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3338 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3339 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3341 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3342 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3344 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3345 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3347 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
3349 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3350 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3352 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash } => {
3353 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3354 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3356 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3359 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
3360 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3361 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
3363 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3367 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3368 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3371 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3372 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3373 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3374 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3375 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3376 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3378 let mut as_funding_locked = None;
3379 if messages_delivered == 0 {
3380 let (funding_locked, _, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3381 as_funding_locked = Some(funding_locked);
3382 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3383 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3384 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3386 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3389 let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3391 let payment_event = {
3392 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
3393 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3395 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3396 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3397 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3399 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3401 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3402 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3404 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3405 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3406 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3407 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3408 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3410 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3411 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3412 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3413 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3415 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3416 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3417 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3418 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3419 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3421 if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3422 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3423 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3424 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3431 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3432 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3433 if messages_delivered < 3 {
3434 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3435 // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a funding_locked prior to a
3436 // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to funding_locked time.
3438 // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a funding_locked immediately on
3439 // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate funding_locked sent
3440 // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3442 // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3443 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3445 // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3446 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3447 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3448 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3449 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3450 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3451 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3452 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3453 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3454 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3455 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3456 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3457 } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3458 // Everything was delivered...
3459 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3462 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3463 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3465 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3466 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3469 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3470 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3471 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3473 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3475 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3476 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3478 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
3479 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3480 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
3482 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3483 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3484 assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3486 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3489 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3492 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3493 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3495 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3496 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3497 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3498 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3499 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3500 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3501 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3502 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3503 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3504 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3505 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3507 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3510 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3511 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3513 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3514 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3516 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash } => {
3517 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3518 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3520 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3523 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3524 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3525 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3526 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3528 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3529 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3530 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3531 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3533 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3534 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3535 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3536 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3537 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3539 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3540 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3541 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3542 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3549 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3550 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3551 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3552 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3553 if messages_delivered < 1 {
3554 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3555 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3557 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash } => {
3558 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3559 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3561 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3564 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3566 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
3567 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3568 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3569 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3570 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3571 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3572 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3573 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3574 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3575 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3576 // Everything was delivered...
3577 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3580 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3581 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3582 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3584 // Channel should still work fine...
3585 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3586 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3587 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3591 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
3592 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
3593 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
3594 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
3595 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
3599 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
3600 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
3601 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
3602 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
3603 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
3607 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
3608 // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
3609 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3610 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3611 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3612 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
3613 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
3614 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
3615 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3616 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3618 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3619 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3621 confirm_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
3622 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3624 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3626 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3627 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3628 chan_id = msg.channel_id;
3630 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3633 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3635 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3636 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3638 confirm_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3639 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3640 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 2);
3641 let funding_locked = match events_2[0] {
3642 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3643 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3646 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3648 let bs_announcement_sigs = match events_2[1] {
3649 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3650 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3653 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3656 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3658 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_locked);
3659 nodes[0].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs);
3660 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3661 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 2);
3662 let as_announcement_sigs = match events_3[0] {
3663 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3664 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3667 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3669 let (as_announcement, as_update) = match events_3[1] {
3670 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3671 (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
3673 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3676 nodes[1].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs);
3677 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3678 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3679 let (_, bs_update) = match events_4[0] {
3680 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3681 (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
3683 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3686 nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&as_announcement).unwrap();
3687 nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
3688 nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
3690 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3691 let (payment_preimage, _, _) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
3692 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
3694 // Check that after deserialization and reconnection we can still generate an identical
3695 // channel_announcement from the cached signatures.
3696 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3698 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
3699 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
3700 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
3702 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
3703 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
3704 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[0].logger, node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
3705 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
3706 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
3707 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
3708 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
3709 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
3711 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
3712 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
3713 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
3714 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
3715 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
3716 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
3718 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator,
3719 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
3720 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
3721 logger: nodes[0].logger,
3725 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
3726 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
3728 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
3729 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
3730 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3732 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3734 // as_announcement should be re-generated exactly by broadcast_node_announcement.
3735 nodes[0].node.broadcast_node_announcement([0, 0, 0], [0; 32], Vec::new());
3736 let msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3737 let mut found_announcement = false;
3738 for event in msgs.iter() {
3740 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, .. } => {
3741 if *msg == as_announcement { found_announcement = true; }
3743 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => {},
3744 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3747 assert!(found_announcement);
3751 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
3752 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
3753 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
3754 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3755 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3756 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3757 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3758 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3760 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
3762 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
3763 let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3764 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
3765 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3767 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3768 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3770 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
3771 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3774 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
3775 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3777 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3778 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3780 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3781 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3782 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3783 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3784 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3785 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3786 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3788 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3789 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3790 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3792 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash } => {
3793 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
3794 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
3796 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3799 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
3800 let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3801 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3802 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3804 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3807 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3808 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3810 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
3811 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
3812 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
3813 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
3814 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
3815 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
3817 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
3818 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
3819 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
3820 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
3822 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
3823 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
3825 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
3826 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
3828 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
3830 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3831 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3832 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3833 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3834 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
3835 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
3836 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
3837 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3838 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3839 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3841 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
3842 let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3843 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3844 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3845 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3846 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3847 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
3848 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3850 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3851 let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3852 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3853 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3854 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3855 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3856 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
3857 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3859 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
3860 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3861 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3862 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3864 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
3865 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3866 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3867 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3869 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3870 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3871 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3873 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3875 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3876 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
3878 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
3879 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
3881 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3882 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3883 assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
3885 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3888 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3891 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
3892 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3893 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3895 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3898 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
3899 // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
3900 // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
3901 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3902 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3903 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3904 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3906 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3908 let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
3909 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
3910 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
3911 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
3912 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
3913 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
3914 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
3915 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3916 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3917 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3918 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
3919 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentReceived event(s).
3920 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
3923 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
3926 let mut block = Block {
3927 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
3930 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
3931 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
3932 let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
3933 for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
3934 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
3935 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
3936 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
3939 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3941 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3942 let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3943 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3944 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3945 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3946 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
3948 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3949 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
3950 // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
3951 let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(100_000).to_vec();
3952 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(block_count - 1));
3953 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
3957 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
3958 do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
3959 do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
3962 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
3963 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
3964 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3965 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3966 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3967 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3968 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3969 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3971 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
3972 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
3973 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
3974 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
3976 // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
3977 let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
3979 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, first_payment_hash, &Some(first_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3981 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
3982 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3984 // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
3985 let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
3986 let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
3987 sending_node.node.send_payment(&route, second_payment_hash, &Some(second_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3989 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3990 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
3991 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3992 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3993 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3995 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3997 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
3998 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3999 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4000 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4003 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4004 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4005 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4006 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4007 match fail_commit[0] {
4008 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4009 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4010 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4012 _ => unreachable!(),
4014 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4016 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], second_payment_hash, true);
4021 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4022 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4023 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4027 fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4028 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4029 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4030 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4031 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4032 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4033 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4034 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4035 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4036 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4038 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4040 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4042 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4043 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4044 get_monitor!(nodes[0], OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id())
4045 .write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4047 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4048 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4049 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4050 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4051 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4052 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4053 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4054 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4055 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4056 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4058 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4059 let config = UserConfig::default();
4060 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4061 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4062 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4063 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4064 default_config: config,
4066 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4067 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4068 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4073 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4074 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4076 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4077 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4078 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4079 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4081 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4082 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4083 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4084 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4086 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4087 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4088 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4089 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4091 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4092 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
4093 for node in nodes.iter() {
4094 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4095 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4096 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4099 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4103 fn test_dup_htlc_onchain_fails_on_reload() {
4104 // When a Channel is closed, any outbound HTLCs which were relayed through it are simply
4105 // dropped when the Channel is. From there, the ChannelManager relies on the ChannelMonitor
4106 // having a copy of the relevant fail-/claim-back data and processes the HTLC fail/claim when
4107 // the ChannelMonitor tells it to.
4109 // If, due to an on-chain event, an HTLC is failed/claimed, and then we serialize the
4110 // ChannelManager, we generally expect there not to be a duplicate HTLC fail/claim (eg via a
4111 // PaymentPathFailed event appearing). However, because we may not serialize the relevant
4112 // ChannelMonitor at the same time, this isn't strictly guaranteed. In order to provide this
4113 // consistency, the ChannelManager explicitly tracks pending-onchain-resolution outbound HTLCs
4114 // and de-duplicates ChannelMonitor events.
4116 // This tests that explicit tracking behavior.
4117 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4118 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4119 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4120 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4121 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4122 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4123 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4125 let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4127 // Route a payment, but force-close the channel before the HTLC fulfill message arrives at
4129 let (payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
4130 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id).unwrap();
4131 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4132 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4133 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4135 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4136 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4138 // Connect blocks until the CLTV timeout is up so that we get an HTLC-Timeout transaction
4139 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
4140 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4141 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4142 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
4144 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
4145 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4147 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4148 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
4149 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4150 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4151 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4152 let claim_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4154 header.prev_blockhash = nodes[0].best_block_hash();
4155 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
4157 // Serialize out the ChannelMonitor before connecting the on-chain claim transactions. This is
4158 // fairly normal behavior as ChannelMonitor(s) are often not re-serialized when on-chain events
4159 // happen, unlike ChannelManager which tends to be re-serialized after any relevant event(s).
4160 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4161 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4163 header.prev_blockhash = nodes[0].best_block_hash();
4164 let claim_block = Block { header, txdata: claim_txn};
4165 connect_block(&nodes[0], &claim_block);
4166 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
4168 // ChannelManagers generally get re-serialized after any relevant event(s). Since we just
4169 // connected a highly-relevant block, it likely gets serialized out now.
4170 let mut chan_manager_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4171 nodes[0].node.write(&mut chan_manager_serialized).unwrap();
4173 // Now reload nodes[0]...
4174 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4175 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4176 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[0].logger, node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4177 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4178 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4179 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4180 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4181 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4183 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4184 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4185 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4186 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>
4187 ::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&chan_manager_serialized.0[..]), ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4188 default_config: Default::default(),
4190 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator,
4191 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4192 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4193 logger: nodes[0].logger,
4197 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4199 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4200 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4201 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4203 // Note that if we re-connect the block which exposed nodes[0] to the payment preimage (but
4204 // which the current ChannelMonitor has not seen), the ChannelManager's de-duplication of
4205 // payment events should kick in, leaving us with no pending events here.
4206 let height = nodes[0].blocks.lock().unwrap().len() as u32 - 1;
4207 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.block_connected(&claim_block, height);
4208 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4212 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_events() {
4213 // This test makes sure the events field in ChannelManager survives de/serialization
4214 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4215 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4216 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4217 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4218 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4219 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4220 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4221 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4222 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4224 // Start creating a channel, but stop right before broadcasting the funding transaction
4225 let channel_value = 100000;
4226 let push_msat = 10001;
4227 let a_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4228 let b_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4229 let node_a = nodes.remove(0);
4230 let node_b = nodes.remove(0);
4231 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
4232 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), a_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4233 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), b_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id()));
4235 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&node_a, channel_value, 42);
4237 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
4238 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
4240 node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4242 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4243 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4244 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4245 added_monitors.clear();
4248 let bs_funding_signed = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
4249 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_funding_signed);
4251 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4252 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4253 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4254 added_monitors.clear();
4256 // Normally, this is where node_a would broadcast the funding transaction, but the test de/serializes first instead
4261 // Start the de/seriailization process mid-channel creation to check that the channel manager will hold onto events that are serialized
4262 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4263 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4264 get_monitor!(nodes[0], bs_funding_signed.channel_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4266 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4267 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4268 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4269 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4270 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4271 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4272 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4273 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4274 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4275 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4277 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4278 let config = UserConfig::default();
4279 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4280 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4281 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4282 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4283 default_config: config,
4285 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4286 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4287 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4292 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4293 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4295 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4297 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4298 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4300 // After deserializing, make sure the funding_transaction is still held by the channel manager
4301 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4302 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
4303 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4304 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
4306 // Make sure the channel is functioning as though the de/serialization never happened
4307 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4308 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4310 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4311 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4312 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4313 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4315 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4316 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4317 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4318 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4320 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4321 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
4322 for node in nodes.iter() {
4323 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4324 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4325 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4328 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4332 fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4333 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4334 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4335 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4336 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4337 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4338 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4339 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4340 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4341 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4342 let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4344 let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4345 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4347 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4349 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4350 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4351 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4353 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4354 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4355 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4356 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4357 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4358 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4359 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4360 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4361 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4362 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4364 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4365 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4366 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4367 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4368 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4369 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4371 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4372 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4373 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4378 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4379 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4381 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4382 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4383 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4385 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4387 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
4388 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4392 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
4393 // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with an out-of-date ChannelMonitor
4394 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4395 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4396 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
4397 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4398 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4399 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4400 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4401 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4402 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4403 let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4404 let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4405 let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4407 let mut node_0_stale_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4408 for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4409 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4410 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4411 node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4414 let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
4416 // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
4417 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4419 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
4420 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4421 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4422 nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4424 // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
4426 let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4427 for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4428 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4429 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4430 node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4433 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4434 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4435 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4436 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4437 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4438 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4441 let mut node_0_stale_monitors = Vec::new();
4442 for serialized in node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4443 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4444 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4445 assert!(read.is_empty());
4446 node_0_stale_monitors.push(monitor);
4449 let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
4450 for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4451 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4452 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4453 assert!(read.is_empty());
4454 node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
4457 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4458 if let Err(msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue) =
4459 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4460 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4462 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4463 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4464 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4466 channel_monitors: node_0_stale_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4468 panic!("If the monitor(s) are stale, this indicates a bug and we should get an Err return");
4471 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4472 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) =
4473 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4474 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4476 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4477 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4478 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4480 channel_monitors: node_0_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4482 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4483 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4485 { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx
4486 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4487 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
4488 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
4489 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
4492 for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
4493 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor).is_ok());
4494 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4496 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4497 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
4499 // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
4500 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4501 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4502 //... and we can even still claim the payment!
4503 claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4505 nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4506 let reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[3], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4507 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4508 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish);
4509 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4510 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
4511 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
4513 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
4514 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
4516 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
4521 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4522 ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4524 let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4525 let mut txn = Vec::new();
4526 let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4527 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4528 for event in events.drain(..) {
4530 Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs } => {
4531 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4532 txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4533 all_outputs.push(outp);
4536 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4539 if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4540 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx) {
4550 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4551 // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4552 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4553 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4554 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4555 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4557 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 99000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4558 nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2).unwrap();
4559 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4560 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4561 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4562 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4563 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4564 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4565 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4567 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4568 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4570 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4571 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4572 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4573 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4574 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4578 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4579 // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4580 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4581 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4582 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4583 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4584 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4586 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 99000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4587 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2).unwrap();
4588 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4589 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4590 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4592 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4593 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4594 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4595 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4597 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4598 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4599 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4600 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4601 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4603 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4604 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4605 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4609 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4610 // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4611 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4613 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4614 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4615 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4616 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4618 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4619 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4620 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4621 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4622 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4624 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4625 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4626 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4627 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4628 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4630 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4631 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4632 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4634 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4635 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4636 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4637 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4638 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4642 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4643 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4644 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4645 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4646 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4648 // Create some initial channels
4649 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4651 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4653 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4654 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4655 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4657 // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4658 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
4659 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4660 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4661 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4662 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4664 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4665 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4668 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4669 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4672 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4673 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); // ChannelManager : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-Success), ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4674 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4675 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4676 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4677 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
4678 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
4680 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4681 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4682 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4684 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4685 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4686 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4690 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4691 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4692 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4693 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4694 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4696 // Create some initial channels
4697 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4699 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4700 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4702 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4704 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4705 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4706 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4708 // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4709 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4710 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4711 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4713 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4714 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4716 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4718 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4719 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4720 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelManager : 1 local commitent tx, ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4721 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
4722 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0].clone());
4723 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4725 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4726 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4727 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4728 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, true);
4730 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4731 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4732 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4733 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]);
4734 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4738 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4739 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4740 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4741 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4742 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4744 // Create some initial channels
4745 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4747 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4748 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4749 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4750 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4752 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4754 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4755 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4756 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4757 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4759 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4760 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
4761 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4762 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4764 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4765 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4767 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4768 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4769 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4773 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4774 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4775 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4776 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4777 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4778 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4780 // Create some initial channels
4781 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4783 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4784 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4785 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4786 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4788 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4790 // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
4791 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4792 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4793 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4794 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4795 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4797 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4798 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4799 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], chan_1.3);
4800 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4801 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4802 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4803 assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].lock_time, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
4805 // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4806 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4807 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()] });
4808 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4809 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4810 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4812 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4813 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
4814 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4815 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4816 // transactions next...
4817 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
4818 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
4820 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
4821 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
4822 if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid() {
4823 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4825 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid());
4826 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4829 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4830 check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
4832 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4833 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4835 // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4836 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4837 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4838 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4839 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
4843 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
4844 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4845 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4846 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4847 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4848 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4850 // Create some initial channels
4851 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4853 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4854 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4855 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4856 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4858 // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
4859 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
4861 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4863 // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
4864 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4865 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4866 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4867 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4868 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4870 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4871 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4872 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4873 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4875 // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
4876 let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
4877 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
4879 // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4880 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4881 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
4882 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4883 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4884 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4886 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4887 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
4889 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4890 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4891 // transactions next...
4892 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4893 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4894 if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4895 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4897 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4898 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4901 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4902 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4904 check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
4906 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
4907 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4909 // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
4910 // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
4912 // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4913 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
4914 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4915 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4916 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
4917 assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4918 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
4919 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
4923 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
4924 // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
4925 // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
4926 // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
4927 // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
4929 // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
4932 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4933 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4934 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4935 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4937 // Create some initial channels
4938 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4939 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4941 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
4942 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4943 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4944 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4945 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4947 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4948 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4949 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4951 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
4952 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4953 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
4954 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4955 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4956 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4957 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4958 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4959 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4960 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4962 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
4963 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
4964 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4965 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4967 let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Success tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
4968 assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 3);
4969 assert_eq!(c_txn[0], c_txn[2]);
4970 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0], c_txn[1]);
4971 check_spends!(c_txn[1], chan_2.3);
4972 check_spends!(c_txn[2], c_txn[1]);
4973 assert_eq!(c_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
4974 assert_eq!(c_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4975 assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
4976 assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
4978 // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
4979 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
4980 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![c_txn[1].clone(), c_txn[2].clone()]});
4981 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4982 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4983 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4985 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
4986 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4989 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, claim_from_onchain_tx } => {
4990 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
4991 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
4993 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4996 let mut b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4997 // ChannelMonitor: claim tx
4998 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
4999 check_spends!(b_txn[0], chan_2.3); // B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
5002 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5003 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5004 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
5005 match msg_events[0] {
5006 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5007 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5009 match msg_events[1] {
5010 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
5011 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5013 match msg_events[2] {
5014 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
5015 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5016 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5017 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5018 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5019 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
5021 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5023 // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
5024 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5025 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
5026 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5027 let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5028 // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success tx
5029 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 3);
5030 check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_1.3);
5031 check_spends!(b_txn[2], b_txn[1]);
5032 check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
5033 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5034 assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
5035 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
5037 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5038 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5042 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
5043 // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
5044 // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
5045 // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
5046 // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
5047 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
5048 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
5049 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5050 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5051 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5052 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5053 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
5054 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5055 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5057 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5058 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5059 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5061 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5062 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5063 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5064 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5065 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
5067 let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 900000);
5069 let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200, 0).unwrap();
5070 // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
5071 // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
5072 // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
5073 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], vec![], 900000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40);
5074 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 900000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
5076 let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5077 assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5078 check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5080 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
5081 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5082 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5083 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5084 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5086 let htlc_timeout_tx;
5087 { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
5088 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5089 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5090 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
5091 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5093 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5094 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5095 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5096 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5097 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
5098 check_spends!(node_txn[3], commitment_txn[0]);
5099 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
5101 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5102 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5103 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5104 htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[1].clone();
5107 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
5108 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
5109 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
5110 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5111 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5113 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5114 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5117 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5118 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5120 let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5121 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs), ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
5122 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
5123 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5124 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5125 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5126 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5127 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5128 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5129 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5130 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[3], htlc_success_txn[0]);
5131 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[4], htlc_success_txn[1]);
5132 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
5134 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
5135 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5136 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5137 let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5138 assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5139 assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5140 let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
5141 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5142 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5143 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5145 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5146 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5148 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5150 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
5152 // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
5153 // Note that the fee paid is effectively double as the HTLC value (including the nodes[1] fee
5154 // and nodes[2] fee) is rounded down and then claimed in full.
5155 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[0]);
5156 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], Some(196*2), true);
5157 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5158 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5159 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5160 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5161 assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
5162 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5163 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5165 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5166 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
5168 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5170 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash } => {
5171 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
5172 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
5174 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5179 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
5180 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5181 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5182 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5183 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5185 // Create some initial channels
5186 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5188 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
5189 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5190 assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
5191 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5192 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5194 // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
5195 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5196 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5197 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
5198 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5199 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5200 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5202 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5203 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5206 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5207 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5210 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5211 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5212 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
5213 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5214 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5215 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5216 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5220 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
5221 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5223 // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5224 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5225 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5226 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5227 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
5228 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5231 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
5232 // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
5233 // unrevoked commitment transaction.
5234 // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
5235 // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
5236 // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
5237 // use the same payment hashes.
5238 // Thus, we use a six-node network:
5243 // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
5244 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
5245 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
5246 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5247 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5248 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5249 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5250 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
5251 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5252 let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5254 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5255 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5256 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5257 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5258 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5260 // Rebalance and check output sanity...
5261 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
5262 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
5263 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
5265 let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5267 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5269 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5270 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5272 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200, 0).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5274 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200, 0).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5276 let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5278 let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5279 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5281 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200, 0).unwrap());
5283 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200, 0).unwrap());
5286 let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5288 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5289 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200, 0).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5292 let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5294 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5295 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200, 0).unwrap());
5297 // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
5298 // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
5299 // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
5300 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2).len(), 1);
5301 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
5303 // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
5304 // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5305 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1));
5306 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3));
5307 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5));
5308 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6));
5309 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
5310 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[4]);
5311 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
5313 let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5314 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5315 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5316 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5317 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5318 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5320 // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5321 assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
5322 assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4));
5323 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5324 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[5]);
5325 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5327 let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5328 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5329 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5330 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5332 let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5334 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[3]);
5335 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5336 let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5337 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5338 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5339 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5340 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5341 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5342 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5343 if deliver_last_raa {
5344 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5346 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5349 // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5350 // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5351 // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5352 // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5354 // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5355 // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5356 // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5358 // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5359 // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5360 let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5362 if announce_latest {
5363 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5365 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5367 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5368 let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5369 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5372 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5376 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5377 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5380 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5381 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5382 if deliver_last_raa {
5383 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5385 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5387 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5389 let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5390 assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5391 let mut a_done = false;
5392 for msg in cs_msgs {
5394 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5395 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5396 // should be failed-backwards here.
5397 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5398 // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5399 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5400 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5402 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5407 // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5408 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5409 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5411 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5412 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5415 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5416 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5417 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5418 if announce_latest {
5419 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5420 if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5421 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5424 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5426 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5430 let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5431 assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5432 let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5433 let mut as_updates = 0;
5434 for event in as_events.iter() {
5435 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5436 assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5437 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5438 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5440 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5442 if network_update.is_some() {
5445 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5447 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5448 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5449 if announce_latest {
5450 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5451 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5453 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5455 let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5456 assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5457 let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5458 let mut bs_updates = 0;
5459 for event in bs_events.iter() {
5460 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5461 assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5462 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5463 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5465 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5467 if network_update.is_some() {
5470 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5472 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5473 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5474 if announce_latest {
5475 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5477 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5479 // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5480 // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5481 // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5482 // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5483 assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5484 assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5488 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5489 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5493 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5494 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5498 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5499 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5500 // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5501 // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5505 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5506 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5507 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5508 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5509 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5511 // Create some initial channels
5512 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5514 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5515 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5516 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5517 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5519 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5520 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5521 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5522 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5523 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5524 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5526 let htlc_timeout = {
5527 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5528 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
5529 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5530 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5531 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5532 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5536 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5537 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5538 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5540 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5541 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5542 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5543 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5544 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5545 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5546 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5547 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5548 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5549 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5550 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5554 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5555 // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with
5556 // a key manager rotation to test that key_derivation_params returned in DynamicOutputP2WSH
5557 // let us re-derive the channel key set to then derive a delayed_payment_key.
5559 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5561 // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5562 let seed = [42; 32];
5563 let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5564 let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5565 let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, node_seed: seed, features: InitFeatures::known() };
5566 let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5567 node_cfgs.remove(0);
5568 node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5570 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5571 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5573 // Create some initial channels
5574 // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5576 let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5577 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5578 assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5580 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5581 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5582 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5583 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5584 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5586 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5587 let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5588 let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5589 assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5590 check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5592 // We check funding pubkey are unique
5593 let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness[3][36..69]));
5594 let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness[3][36..69]));
5595 if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5596 || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5597 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5598 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5599 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5602 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5603 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5604 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5605 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5606 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5607 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5609 let htlc_timeout = {
5610 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5611 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5612 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5613 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn_1[0]);
5617 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5618 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5619 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5621 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5622 let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5623 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5624 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5625 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5626 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5627 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5628 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5629 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5630 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5631 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5632 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5636 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5637 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5638 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5639 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5640 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5642 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5644 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5645 let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5647 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5648 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5649 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5651 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5652 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5653 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5655 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5656 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5657 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5659 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5660 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5661 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5664 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5665 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5666 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5667 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5668 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5669 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5671 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5673 // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5674 // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5675 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
5676 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5678 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5679 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5680 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5681 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5683 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash } => {
5684 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
5685 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
5687 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5690 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5691 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5692 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5693 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5694 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5696 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5697 let mut block = Block {
5698 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5701 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5702 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5703 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5705 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5706 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5707 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5708 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5711 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5712 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5713 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5714 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5715 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5716 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5718 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5719 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5720 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5722 let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5724 // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5725 // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5726 // to "time out" the HTLC.
5728 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5729 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5731 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5732 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: Vec::new()});
5733 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
5735 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5736 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5737 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5738 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5741 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5742 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5743 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5744 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5745 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5746 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5748 // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
5749 // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5750 // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
5751 // actually revoked.
5752 let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
5753 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
5754 assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
5755 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5756 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5758 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5759 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5760 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5761 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5762 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5763 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5764 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5765 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
5766 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5767 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5769 if check_revoke_no_close {
5770 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
5771 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5774 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5775 let mut block = Block {
5776 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5779 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
5780 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5781 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5783 if !check_revoke_no_close {
5784 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5785 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5786 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5787 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5789 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5793 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
5794 // There are only a few cases to test here:
5795 // * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
5796 // broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
5797 // * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
5798 // * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
5799 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
5801 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
5802 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
5803 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
5805 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
5806 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
5807 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
5809 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
5810 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
5814 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
5815 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
5816 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
5817 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
5818 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
5823 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
5824 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5825 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5826 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5827 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5828 //Force duplicate channel ids
5829 for node in nodes.iter() {
5830 *node.keys_manager.override_channel_id_priv.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
5833 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
5834 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5835 let push_msat=10001;
5836 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5837 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5838 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5840 //Create a second channel with a channel_id collision
5841 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5845 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
5846 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5847 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5848 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5849 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5851 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
5852 let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
5853 let push_msat=10001;
5854 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5856 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
5857 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5858 // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
5859 let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
5860 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5862 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
5863 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5864 let push_msat=10001;
5865 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
5866 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5867 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
5869 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
5870 // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
5871 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
5873 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
5874 assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
5875 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5877 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
5878 let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
5879 assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
5881 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
5882 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
5883 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5884 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5885 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
5886 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5890 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
5891 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5892 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5893 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5894 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5896 let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
5897 let push_msat=10001;
5898 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5899 let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5900 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
5901 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
5903 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5904 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5905 let err_msg = match events[0] {
5906 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
5909 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5911 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
5914 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
5915 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
5916 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
5917 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
5919 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
5920 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5921 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5922 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5923 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5924 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5926 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5927 // pending_update_fee.
5929 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5930 *feerate_lock += 20;
5932 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5933 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5935 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5936 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5937 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5938 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5939 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5941 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5944 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5946 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5947 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5948 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5950 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5951 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1);
5952 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
5954 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
5955 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
5956 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5957 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
5959 // Flush the pending fee update.
5960 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5961 let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5962 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5963 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
5964 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5966 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
5967 // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
5968 // us to surface its failure to the user.
5969 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5970 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5971 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
5972 let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
5973 hex::encode(our_payment_hash.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
5974 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
5976 // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
5977 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5978 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5980 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, path: _, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data } => {
5981 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
5982 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
5983 assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
5984 assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
5985 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
5986 assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
5987 assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
5989 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5993 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
5994 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
5995 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
5997 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
5998 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5999 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6000 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6001 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6002 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6004 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6005 // pending_update_fee.
6007 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6008 *feerate_lock += 200;
6010 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6011 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6013 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6014 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6015 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6016 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6017 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6019 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6022 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6024 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6025 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6026 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6028 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6030 let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1) - amt_1;
6031 let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
6032 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
6034 // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
6035 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
6036 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6037 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
6038 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
6039 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6040 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
6042 // Flush the pending fee update.
6043 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6044 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6045 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6046 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
6047 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6048 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
6050 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
6051 // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
6052 // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
6053 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6054 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6055 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6056 let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6057 hex::encode(payment_hash_2.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6058 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6060 // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
6061 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6062 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6064 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, path: _, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data } => {
6065 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
6066 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
6067 assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6068 assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6069 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
6070 assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
6071 assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
6073 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6076 // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
6077 let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
6078 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6079 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
6080 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
6082 let raa = match send_raa_event {
6083 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
6084 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6086 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6087 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6088 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6089 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6090 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6091 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6093 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6094 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6096 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6097 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6098 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6100 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => {},
6101 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6103 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
6104 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6105 let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6106 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6107 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
6108 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6109 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6111 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash } => {
6112 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
6113 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
6115 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6119 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
6120 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
6121 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
6124 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
6125 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6126 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6127 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
6128 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
6129 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
6130 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
6131 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
6132 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6133 let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6134 let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6136 // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6137 // pending_update_fee.
6139 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6140 *feerate_lock += 20;
6142 nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6143 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6145 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6146 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6147 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6148 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6149 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6151 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6154 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6156 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6157 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6158 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6160 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6162 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
6163 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1) - total_routing_fee_msat;
6164 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
6165 let payment_event = {
6166 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6167 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6169 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6170 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6172 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6174 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6175 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6176 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6177 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6179 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1_2.2);
6180 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6182 // Flush the pending fee update.
6183 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6184 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6185 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6186 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6187 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6188 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6190 // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
6191 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6192 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6194 let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
6195 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
6198 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6201 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
6202 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6203 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6205 // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
6206 let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6207 assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 1);
6208 match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
6209 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6210 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6213 // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
6214 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6215 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6217 // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
6218 let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6219 assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
6220 let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
6221 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6222 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
6223 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
6224 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
6225 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6226 (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6228 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6231 // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
6232 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
6233 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6235 // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
6236 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6237 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6238 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6239 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6240 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6241 let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6242 assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
6243 let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
6244 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
6245 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6247 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6248 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
6249 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6252 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
6253 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
6254 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
6257 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
6258 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
6259 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6260 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6261 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6262 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6263 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6265 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6266 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 100;
6268 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6269 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6270 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6271 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value".to_string(), 1);
6275 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
6276 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6277 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6278 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6279 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6280 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6281 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6283 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6284 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 0;
6285 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6286 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
6288 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6289 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6293 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
6294 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6295 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6296 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6297 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6298 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6299 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6301 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6302 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6303 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6304 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6305 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6307 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6308 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6309 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6310 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6311 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() });
6315 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6316 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6317 //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6318 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6319 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6320 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6321 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6322 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6324 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], vec![], 100000000, 500000001);
6325 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::RouteError { ref err },
6326 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6330 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6331 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6332 //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6333 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6334 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6335 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6336 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6337 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6338 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6339 let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6341 for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6342 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6343 let payment_event = {
6344 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6345 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6347 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6348 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6349 if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6350 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6354 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6356 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6357 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6358 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6360 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6361 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6363 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6364 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6365 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6367 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6368 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
6372 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6373 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6374 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6375 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6376 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6377 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6378 let channel_value = 100000;
6379 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6380 let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6382 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6384 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6385 // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6387 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = max_in_flight + 1;
6388 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6389 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6391 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6392 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
6394 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6397 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6399 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6400 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6401 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6402 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6403 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6404 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6405 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6406 let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6408 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6409 let channel = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6410 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6413 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6414 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6415 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6416 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6417 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6418 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6419 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6420 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6421 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6422 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6423 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6427 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6428 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6429 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6430 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6431 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6432 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6433 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6435 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6436 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6437 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6438 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6439 let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1);
6441 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6442 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6443 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6444 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6445 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6447 // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6448 // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6449 // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6450 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6451 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6453 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6454 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6455 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6456 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6457 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6461 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6462 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6463 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6464 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6465 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6466 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6467 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6468 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6470 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3999999);
6471 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6472 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6473 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6474 let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3999999, &Some(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6475 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash);
6477 let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6481 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6482 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6483 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6486 for i in 0..super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
6487 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6488 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6490 msg.htlc_id = (super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS) as u64;
6491 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6493 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6494 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6495 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6496 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6497 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6501 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6502 //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6503 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6504 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6505 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6506 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6507 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6509 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6510 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6511 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6512 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6513 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6514 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6516 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6517 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6518 assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6519 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6520 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6524 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6525 //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6526 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6527 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6528 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6529 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6531 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6532 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6533 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6534 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6535 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6536 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6537 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6539 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6540 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6541 assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6542 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6543 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6547 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6548 //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6549 // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6550 // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6551 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6552 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6553 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6554 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6556 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6557 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6558 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6559 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6560 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6561 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6563 //Disconnect and Reconnect
6564 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6565 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6566 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
6567 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6568 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6569 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
6570 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6571 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6572 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6573 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6574 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6575 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6578 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6579 assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6580 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6581 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6582 let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6584 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6586 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6587 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6588 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6589 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6590 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6594 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6595 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6597 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6598 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6599 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6600 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6601 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6602 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6603 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6605 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6606 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6607 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6609 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6612 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6615 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6617 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6618 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6619 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6620 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6621 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6625 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6626 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6628 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6629 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6630 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6631 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6632 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6634 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6635 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6636 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6637 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6638 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6640 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6643 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6646 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6648 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6649 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6650 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6651 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6652 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6656 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6657 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6659 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6660 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6661 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6662 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6663 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6665 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6666 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6667 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6668 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6669 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6670 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6673 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6674 failure_code: 0x8000,
6677 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6679 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6680 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6681 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6682 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6683 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6687 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6688 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6690 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6691 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6692 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6693 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6694 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6696 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
6698 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6699 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6701 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6702 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6703 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6705 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6706 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6707 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6708 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6709 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6710 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6711 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6713 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6717 update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6719 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6721 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6722 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6723 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6724 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6725 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6729 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6730 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6732 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6733 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6734 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6735 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6736 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6738 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
6740 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6741 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6743 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6744 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6745 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6747 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6748 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6749 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6750 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6751 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6752 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6753 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6755 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6759 update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
6761 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6763 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6764 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6765 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6766 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6767 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6771 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
6772 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
6774 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6775 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6776 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6777 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6778 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6780 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6781 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6782 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6784 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6785 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6787 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6788 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6789 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6791 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6793 let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
6795 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6796 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6797 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6798 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6799 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6800 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6801 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
6803 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6806 update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
6807 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6809 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6810 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6811 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
6812 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6813 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6817 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
6818 //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
6819 // * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
6821 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6822 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6823 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6824 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6825 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6826 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6828 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
6831 let mut payment_event = {
6832 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6833 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6834 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6835 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6836 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6838 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6839 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6840 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6841 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6842 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6843 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6844 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6845 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6846 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6849 payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6850 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6851 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6852 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6854 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6855 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6856 let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
6858 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6859 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6860 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6861 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6862 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6863 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6864 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
6866 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6870 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
6872 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6873 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
6874 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6875 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6876 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6878 //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
6880 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6881 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6882 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6883 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6884 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6885 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6887 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6890 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6893 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
6894 // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
6895 // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
6896 // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
6898 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6899 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
6900 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6901 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6902 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6903 let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6905 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6907 // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
6908 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6909 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6910 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6912 // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
6913 let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6915 // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
6916 assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
6917 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6918 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6919 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6921 let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6922 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6923 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
6924 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6926 // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
6927 let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6929 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6931 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
6932 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6934 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6937 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
6938 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6940 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6943 assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
6944 // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
6945 if announce_latest {
6946 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
6948 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
6951 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6952 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6953 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6955 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6956 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6957 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6958 // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
6959 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6960 let mut first_failed = false;
6961 for event in events {
6963 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6964 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
6965 assert!(!first_failed);
6966 first_failed = true;
6968 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
6971 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6977 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
6978 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
6979 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
6982 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
6983 // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
6984 // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
6985 // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6986 // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
6987 // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6988 // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
6990 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6991 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6992 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6993 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6994 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6996 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6998 let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6999 let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7001 let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7002 let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7004 // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
7006 let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7007 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
7010 let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
7012 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
7013 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
7014 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7015 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7016 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
7018 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
7019 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7020 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7021 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7022 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7023 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7024 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
7025 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7026 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7027 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7028 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7030 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
7031 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7032 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7033 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7034 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7035 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7036 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7037 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7039 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
7040 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7041 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout tx on remote commitment tx
7042 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7043 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7044 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7045 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7047 // If revoked, both dust & non-dust HTLCs should have been failed after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confs of revoked
7049 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7050 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7053 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7054 if payment_hash == dust_hash { first = true; }
7055 else { first = false; }
7057 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7060 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7061 if first { assert_eq!(payment_hash, non_dust_hash); }
7062 else { assert_eq!(payment_hash, dust_hash); }
7064 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7071 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
7072 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
7073 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
7074 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
7078 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
7079 // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
7081 let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7082 low_our_to_self_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
7083 let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7084 high_their_to_self_config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
7085 let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
7086 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7087 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7088 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
7089 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7091 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
7092 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), 1000000, 1000000, 0, &low_our_to_self_config) {
7094 APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7095 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7097 } else { assert!(false) }
7099 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7100 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7101 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7102 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7103 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0, &low_our_to_self_config) {
7105 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7106 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7108 } else { assert!(false); }
7110 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
7111 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7112 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7113 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7114 accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7115 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7117 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
7119 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7120 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
7121 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
7125 } else { panic!(); }
7126 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg });
7128 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7129 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7130 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7131 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7132 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0, &high_their_to_self_config) {
7134 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7135 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7137 } else { assert!(false); }
7141 fn test_data_loss_protect() {
7142 // We want to be sure that :
7143 // * we don't broadcast our Local Commitment Tx in case of fallen behind
7144 // (but this is not quite true - we broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr)
7145 // * we close channel in case of detecting other being fallen behind
7146 // * we are able to claim our own outputs thanks to to_remote being static
7147 // TODO: this test is incomplete and the data_loss_protect implementation is incomplete - see issue #775
7153 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7154 // We broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr, which would cause a panic
7155 // during signing due to revoked tx
7156 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7157 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
7160 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7161 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7162 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7164 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7166 // Cache node A state before any channel update
7167 let previous_node_state = nodes[0].node.encode();
7168 let mut previous_chain_monitor_state = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7169 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan.2).write(&mut previous_chain_monitor_state).unwrap();
7171 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7172 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7174 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7175 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7177 // Restore node A from previous state
7178 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
7179 let mut chain_monitor = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_chain_monitor_state.0), keys_manager).unwrap().1;
7180 chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
7181 tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
7182 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7183 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7184 monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &tx_broadcaster, &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7186 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7187 channel_monitors.insert(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, &mut chain_monitor);
7188 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_node_state), ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7189 keys_manager: keys_manager,
7190 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
7191 chain_monitor: &monitor,
7193 tx_broadcaster: &tx_broadcaster,
7194 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
7198 nodes[0].node = &node_state_0;
7199 assert!(monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chain_monitor).is_ok());
7200 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &monitor;
7201 nodes[0].chain_source = &chain_source;
7203 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7205 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7206 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7208 let reestablish_0 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7210 // Check we don't broadcast any transactions following learning of per_commitment_point from B
7211 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_0[0]);
7212 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7215 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7216 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7219 let mut reestablish_1 = Vec::with_capacity(1);
7220 for msg in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
7221 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } = msg {
7222 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7223 reestablish_1.push(msg.clone());
7224 } else if let MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } = msg {
7225 } else if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg {
7227 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7228 assert_eq!(msg.data, "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting");
7230 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
7233 panic!("Unexpected event")
7237 // Check we close channel detecting A is fallen-behind
7238 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7239 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_string() });
7240 assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction");
7241 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7243 // Check A is able to claim to_remote output
7244 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7245 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7246 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
7247 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
7248 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
7249 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7250 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can\'t do any automated broadcasting".to_string() });
7251 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
7252 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
7253 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
7257 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
7258 // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
7259 // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
7260 // to B, B should refuse payment.
7262 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7263 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7264 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7265 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7267 // Create some initial channels
7268 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7270 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger).unwrap();
7271 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7272 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200, 0).unwrap();
7273 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7274 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7276 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7277 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7278 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7279 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7280 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7282 // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
7283 // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
7284 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7285 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7287 // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
7288 // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
7289 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7291 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7292 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7293 let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
7294 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7295 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7296 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7297 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7298 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7299 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7300 (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
7302 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7304 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7306 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
7307 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
7309 // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
7310 let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(10_000).to_vec();
7311 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH));
7312 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
7316 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
7317 // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
7318 // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
7320 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7321 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7322 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7323 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7325 let short_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7326 let short_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7327 let short_id_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7330 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7331 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7333 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // Enabled -> DisabledStaged
7334 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // DisabledStaged -> Disabled
7335 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7336 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7337 let mut chans_disabled: HashSet<u64> = [short_id_1, short_id_2, short_id_3].iter().map(|a| *a).collect();
7338 for e in msg_events {
7340 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7341 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7342 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7343 if !chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7344 panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7347 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7351 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7352 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7353 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7354 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7355 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7356 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7358 // Reestablish chan_1
7359 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7360 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7361 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7362 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7363 // Reestablish chan_2
7364 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7365 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7366 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7367 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7368 // Reestablish chan_3
7369 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7370 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7371 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7372 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7374 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7375 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7376 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7377 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7378 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7379 chans_disabled = [short_id_1, short_id_2, short_id_3].iter().map(|a| *a).collect();
7380 for e in msg_events {
7382 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7383 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7384 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7385 if !chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7386 panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7389 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7395 fn test_priv_forwarding_rejection() {
7396 // If we have a private channel with outbound liquidity, and
7397 // UserConfig::accept_forwards_to_priv_channels is set to false, we should reject any attempts
7398 // to forward through that channel.
7399 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7400 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7401 let mut no_announce_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
7402 no_announce_cfg.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
7403 no_announce_cfg.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels = false;
7404 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(no_announce_cfg), None]);
7405 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
7406 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
7407 let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
7408 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7410 let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
7412 // Note that the create_*_chan functions in utils requires announcement_signatures, which we do
7413 // not send for private channels.
7414 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7415 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7416 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
7417 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7418 nodes[1].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7420 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[1], 1_000_000, 42);
7421 nodes[1].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
7422 nodes[2].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()));
7423 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
7425 let cs_funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7426 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_funding_signed);
7427 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7429 let conf_height = core::cmp::max(nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1, nodes[2].best_block_info().1 + 1);
7430 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, conf_height);
7431 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH - 1);
7432 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[2], &tx, conf_height);
7433 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH - 1);
7434 let as_funding_locked = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7435 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7436 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7437 nodes[2].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked);
7438 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7440 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].is_public);
7441 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
7442 assert!(!nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels()[0].is_public);
7444 // We should always be able to forward through nodes[1] as long as its out through a public
7446 send_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[0]], 10_000);
7448 // ... however, if we send to nodes[2], we will have to pass the private channel from nodes[1]
7449 // to nodes[2], which should be rejected:
7450 let route_hint = RouteHint(vec![RouteHintHop {
7451 src_node_id: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
7452 short_channel_id: nodes[2].node.list_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap(),
7453 fees: RoutingFees { base_msat: 1000, proportional_millionths: 0 },
7454 cltv_expiry_delta: MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
7455 htlc_minimum_msat: None,
7456 htlc_maximum_msat: None,
7458 let last_hops = vec![&route_hint];
7459 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], last_hops, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
7461 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7462 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7463 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
7464 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7465 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
7467 let htlc_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7468 assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7469 assert_eq!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7470 assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7471 assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fee.is_none());
7473 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7474 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_fail_updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7475 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, nodes[2].node.list_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap(), true);
7477 // Now disconnect nodes[1] from its peers and restart with accept_forwards_to_priv_channels set
7478 // to true. Sadly there is currently no way to change it at runtime.
7480 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7481 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7483 let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
7484 let mut monitor_a_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7485 let mut monitor_b_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7486 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_1).write(&mut monitor_a_serialized).unwrap();
7487 get_monitor!(nodes[1], cs_funding_signed.channel_id).write(&mut monitor_b_serialized).unwrap();
7489 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7490 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
7491 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7492 nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
7494 let mut monitor_a_read = &monitor_a_serialized.0[..];
7495 let mut monitor_b_read = &monitor_b_serialized.0[..];
7496 let (_, mut monitor_a) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut monitor_a_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
7497 let (_, mut monitor_b) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut monitor_b_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
7498 assert!(monitor_a_read.is_empty());
7499 assert!(monitor_b_read.is_empty());
7501 no_announce_cfg.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels = true;
7503 let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
7504 let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
7505 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7506 channel_monitors.insert(monitor_a.get_funding_txo().0, &mut monitor_a);
7507 channel_monitors.insert(monitor_b.get_funding_txo().0, &mut monitor_b);
7508 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7509 default_config: no_announce_cfg,
7511 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
7512 chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
7513 tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
7514 logger: nodes[1].logger,
7518 assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
7519 nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
7521 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor_a.get_funding_txo().0, monitor_a).is_ok());
7522 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor_b.get_funding_txo().0, monitor_b).is_ok());
7523 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7524 nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
7526 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7527 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7528 let as_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7529 let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7530 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish);
7531 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
7532 get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7533 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7535 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7536 nodes[2].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7537 let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7538 let cs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7539 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
7540 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_reestablish);
7541 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7542 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7544 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7545 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7546 pass_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], 10_000, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret);
7547 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], our_payment_preimage);
7551 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7552 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7553 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7555 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7556 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7557 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7558 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7560 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7562 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7563 let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], vec![], 3000000, 30);
7564 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7566 let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7567 // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7568 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7569 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7570 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7571 let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7573 let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7574 for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7575 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7576 penalty_sum += outp.value;
7580 // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7581 let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7583 // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7584 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7585 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_114, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7586 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()] });
7587 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7589 // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7593 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7594 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor) + local commitment tx
7595 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7596 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7597 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7598 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7599 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7600 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7604 // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7605 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7606 let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7607 let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7609 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7610 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7611 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7612 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7613 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7614 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7615 penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7616 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7617 assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7618 let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7619 feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7620 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7621 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7625 assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7627 // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7628 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7630 let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7632 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7633 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7634 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7635 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7636 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7637 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7638 penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7639 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7640 assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7641 let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7642 feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7643 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7644 assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7648 assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7650 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7651 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7655 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7656 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7657 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7659 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7660 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7661 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7662 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7663 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7665 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7666 // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7667 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph,
7668 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger).unwrap();
7669 let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7670 let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[1].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph,
7671 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger).unwrap();
7672 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7674 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7675 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7676 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7678 // Revoke local commitment tx
7679 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7681 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7682 // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7683 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7684 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7685 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7686 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7687 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 49); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7689 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7690 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
7691 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], chan.3);
7693 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7694 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7695 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7697 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7698 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7699 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
7700 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7702 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7703 let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7704 let header_11 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: hash_128, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7705 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_11, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7706 let header_129 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_11.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7707 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_129, txdata: vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[2].clone()] });
7708 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7709 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7711 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7712 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7718 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7719 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + A commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7720 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7722 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7723 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7724 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7725 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7727 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7728 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7729 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7730 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7731 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7732 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7734 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7735 // available, which we check here:
7736 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7737 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7738 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7740 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7741 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7743 // node_txn[3] is the local commitment tx broadcast just because (and somewhat in case of
7744 // reorgs, though its not clear its ever worth broadcasting conflicting txn like this when
7745 // a remote commitment tx has already been confirmed).
7746 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan.3);
7748 // node_txn[4] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7749 // output, checked above).
7750 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 2);
7751 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].output.len(), 1);
7752 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7754 first = node_txn[4].txid();
7755 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7756 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[4].output[0].value;
7757 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[4].get_weight() as u64;
7758 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7762 // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7763 let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_129.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7764 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7765 let header_131 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_130.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7766 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_131, txdata: Vec::new() });
7768 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7769 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // 2 bumped penalty txn on revoked commitment tx
7771 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7772 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7773 // Note that these are both bogus - they spend outputs already claimed in block 129:
7774 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output {
7775 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7777 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7778 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7784 // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7785 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7786 assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7787 let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7789 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7790 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7792 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7793 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7794 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7795 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7796 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7797 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7798 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7799 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7803 // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7804 let header_145 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_144, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7805 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_145, txdata: node_txn });
7806 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7808 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7809 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7810 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7811 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7812 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7813 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7814 // up bumped justice generation.
7815 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7818 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7819 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7823 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
7824 // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7825 // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7828 // Provide preimage for one
7829 // Check aggregation
7831 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7832 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7833 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7834 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7836 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7837 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7838 route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
7840 // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7841 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7842 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7843 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7844 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7846 // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
7847 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7848 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
7849 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7850 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7852 // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
7856 let feerate_timeout;
7857 let feerate_preimage;
7859 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7860 // 9 transactions including:
7861 // 1*2 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success
7862 // 1*3 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success + HTLC-Timeout
7863 // 2 * HTLC-Success (one RBF bump we'll check later)
7865 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 8);
7866 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7867 assert_eq!(node_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
7868 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7869 check_spends!(node_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
7870 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
7871 preimage_bump = node_txn[3].clone();
7873 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan.3);
7874 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
7875 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
7876 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[5]);
7878 timeout = node_txn[6].txid();
7879 let index = node_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7880 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[6].output[0].value;
7881 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / node_txn[6].get_weight() as u64;
7883 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
7884 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7885 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7886 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7890 assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
7891 assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
7893 // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
7894 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7896 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7897 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7898 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7899 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
7900 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7901 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7903 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7904 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
7905 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.get_weight() as u64;
7906 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
7907 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
7909 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7910 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7911 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7912 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
7913 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
7918 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7919 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7923 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
7924 // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
7925 // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
7926 // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
7927 // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
7928 // EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
7929 // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
7930 // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
7932 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7933 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7934 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7935 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7936 let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
7938 let mut guard = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
7939 let keys = guard.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
7941 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
7943 // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
7944 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7945 let per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
7947 // Must revoke without gaps
7948 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7949 keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
7951 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7952 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
7953 &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
7955 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
7956 &msgs::RevokeAndACK { channel_id, per_commitment_secret, next_per_commitment_point });
7957 assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
7958 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7959 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() });
7963 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
7964 // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
7965 // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7967 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7968 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7969 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7970 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7972 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7973 // Lock HTLC in both directions
7974 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
7975 route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000).0;
7977 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7978 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7979 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7981 // Revoke local commitment tx
7982 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7984 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7985 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
7986 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[0]);
7987 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7989 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
7990 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7991 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7992 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7994 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7995 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
7996 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7997 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7998 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7999 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
8003 let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8004 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
8005 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8007 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
8008 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
8009 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
8014 fn test_override_channel_config() {
8015 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8016 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8017 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8018 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8020 // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
8021 let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
8022 override_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
8024 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
8026 // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
8027 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8028 assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
8029 assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
8033 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
8034 let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
8035 zero_config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
8036 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8037 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8038 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
8039 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8041 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
8042 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8043 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8045 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8046 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8047 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8051 fn test_simple_mpp() {
8052 // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
8053 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8054 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8055 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8056 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8058 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8059 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8060 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8061 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8063 let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8064 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8065 route.paths.push(path);
8066 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8067 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8068 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8069 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8070 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8071 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8072 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
8073 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
8077 fn test_preimage_storage() {
8078 // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
8079 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8080 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8081 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8082 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8084 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8087 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200, 42);
8088 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8089 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8090 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8091 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8092 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8093 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8094 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8096 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8097 // values from previous calls.
8098 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8099 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8100 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8102 Event::PaymentReceived { ref purpose, .. } => {
8104 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, user_payment_id, .. } => {
8105 assert_eq!(*user_payment_id, 42);
8106 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
8108 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
8111 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8116 fn test_secret_timeout() {
8117 // Simple test of payment secret storage time outs
8118 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8119 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8120 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8121 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8123 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8125 let (payment_hash, payment_secret_1) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2, 0);
8127 // We should fail to register the same payment hash twice, at least until we've connected a
8128 // block with time 7200 + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1.
8129 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2, 0) {
8130 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8131 } else { panic!(); }
8133 let node_1_blocks = nodes[1].blocks.lock().unwrap();
8135 header: BlockHeader {
8137 prev_blockhash: node_1_blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(),
8138 merkle_root: Default::default(),
8139 time: node_1_blocks.len() as u32 + 7200, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8143 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8144 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2, 0) {
8145 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8146 } else { panic!(); }
8148 // If we then connect the second block, we should be able to register the same payment hash
8149 // again with a different user_payment_id (this time getting a new payment secret).
8150 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.header.block_hash();
8151 block.header.time += 1;
8152 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8153 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2, 42).unwrap();
8154 assert_ne!(payment_secret_1, our_payment_secret);
8157 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8158 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8159 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8160 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8161 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8162 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8163 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8165 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8166 // values from previous calls.
8167 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8168 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8169 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8171 Event::PaymentReceived { purpose: PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, user_payment_id }, .. } => {
8172 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
8173 assert_eq!(user_payment_id, 42);
8174 assert_eq!(payment_secret, our_payment_secret);
8175 // We don't actually have the payment preimage with which to claim this payment!
8177 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8182 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8183 // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8184 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8185 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8186 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8187 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8189 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8191 let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8192 let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8193 let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2, 0);
8194 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8196 // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8197 // resulting events.
8198 macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8200 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8201 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8202 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8203 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8204 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8206 // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8207 // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8208 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8209 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8210 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8212 // We should fail the payment back
8213 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8214 match events.pop().unwrap() {
8215 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8216 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8217 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8219 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8224 let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8225 // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8226 let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8228 // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8229 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8230 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8231 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8233 // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8234 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8235 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8236 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8238 // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8239 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8240 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8241 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8245 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8246 // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8247 // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8248 // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateErr.
8250 // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8251 // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8252 // commitment at same time.
8254 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8255 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8256 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8257 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8259 // Create some initial channel
8260 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8261 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8263 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8264 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8266 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8267 let preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8269 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8270 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8271 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8272 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8274 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8275 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8276 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8277 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8278 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8279 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8280 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8281 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8284 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8285 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8286 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8287 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (header, 0));
8288 watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 200);
8290 // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8291 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage));
8292 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8293 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8294 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8295 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8296 if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8297 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8298 if let Err(_) = watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8299 if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8300 } else { assert!(false); }
8301 } else { assert!(false); };
8302 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8303 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8304 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8305 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8309 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8310 // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8311 // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8312 // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8313 // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8315 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8316 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8317 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8318 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8320 // Create some initial channel
8321 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8322 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8324 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8325 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8327 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8328 route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8330 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8331 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8332 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8333 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8334 let watchtower_alice = {
8335 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8336 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8337 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8338 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8339 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8340 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8341 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8342 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8345 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8346 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8347 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8348 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as usize, (header, 0));
8349 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8351 // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8353 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8354 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8358 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8359 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8360 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8361 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8362 let watchtower_bob = {
8363 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8364 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8365 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8366 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8367 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8368 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8369 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8370 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8373 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8374 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8376 // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8377 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8379 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8381 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8383 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8384 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8385 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8386 if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8387 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8388 // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8389 if let Err(_) = watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8390 if let Ok(_) = watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8391 if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8392 } else { assert!(false); }
8393 } else { assert!(false); };
8394 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8395 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8397 //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8398 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8399 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8401 // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8404 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8405 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8406 bob_state_y = txn[0].clone();
8410 // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8411 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8412 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![bob_state_y.clone()] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8414 let htlc_txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8415 // We broadcast twice the transaction, once due to the HTLC-timeout, once due
8416 // the onchain detection of the HTLC output
8417 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
8418 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8419 check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], bob_state_y);
8424 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8425 // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8426 // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8429 // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8430 // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8432 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8433 // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8434 // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8435 // before receiving funding_signed.
8436 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8437 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8438 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8439 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8441 // Create an initial channel
8442 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8443 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8444 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8445 let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8446 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_chan_msg);
8448 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8449 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
8451 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
8452 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8454 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8455 let channel_id = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
8456 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8457 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8458 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Hi".to_string() }, true);
8462 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8463 // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8464 // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8465 // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8466 // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
8467 // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
8468 // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
8470 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8471 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8472 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8473 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8475 // Create some initial channels
8476 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8478 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
8479 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
8480 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
8481 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8482 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
8483 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
8485 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8486 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8487 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] });
8488 // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
8489 // this test before #653 fix.
8490 chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
8491 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8492 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8493 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8494 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
8496 let htlc_timeout = {
8497 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8498 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
8499 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8500 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
8504 let header_201 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8505 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_201, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout.clone()] });
8506 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8507 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8510 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
8511 // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
8512 // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
8513 // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
8515 // Steps of the test:
8516 // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
8517 // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
8518 // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
8519 // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
8520 // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
8521 // but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
8522 // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
8523 // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
8524 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8525 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8526 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8527 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8529 // Create some initial channels
8530 let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8531 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8533 // Steps (1) and (2):
8534 // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
8535 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3_000_000);
8537 // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
8538 let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
8539 check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8540 assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
8541 check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
8542 assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8543 assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
8545 // Steps (3) and (4):
8546 // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
8547 // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
8548 let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
8549 if !broadcast_alice { force_closing_node = 1; } // Bob force-closes
8550 nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_channel(&chan_ab.2).unwrap();
8551 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
8552 check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
8553 check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8554 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8555 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
8556 true => alice_txn.clone(),
8557 false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
8559 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8560 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8561 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8562 if broadcast_alice {
8563 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8564 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8565 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8567 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8568 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8572 // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
8573 // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
8574 assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
8575 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8576 let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8577 assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8578 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8579 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8580 assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
8581 assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8583 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8584 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false);
8585 // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
8586 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
8587 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8588 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8590 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
8591 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8593 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8596 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
8597 // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
8598 // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
8599 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8601 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8602 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8603 let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
8604 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8605 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8608 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8610 let bob_updates = match events[1] {
8611 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
8612 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8615 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8618 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
8619 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8620 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
8621 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8623 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8624 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8625 let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
8626 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8627 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8630 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8632 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
8633 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8635 // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
8636 // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
8637 let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
8638 if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
8639 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8640 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8641 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8642 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
8643 if broadcast_alice {
8644 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8645 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8646 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8648 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8649 if broadcast_alice {
8650 // In `connect_block()`, the ChainMonitor and ChannelManager are separately notified about a
8651 // new block being connected. The ChannelManager being notified triggers a monitor update,
8652 // which triggers broadcasting our commitment tx and an HTLC-claiming tx. The ChainMonitor
8653 // being notified triggers the HTLC-claiming tx redundantly, resulting in 3 total txs being
8655 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 3);
8656 check_spends!(bob_txn[1], chan_ab.3);
8658 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8659 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8664 // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
8665 // broadcasted commitment transaction.
8667 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8668 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8669 // Bob should now have an extra broadcasted tx, for the preimage-claiming transaction.
8670 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8672 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
8673 true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
8674 false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
8676 // If Alice force-closed and Bob didn't receive her commitment transaction until after he
8677 // received Carol's fulfill, he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction first. Else if
8678 // Bob force closed or if he found out about Alice's commitment tx before receiving Carol's
8679 // fulfill, then he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction second.
8680 if broadcast_alice && !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8681 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8682 assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8684 check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8685 assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8691 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
8692 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
8693 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
8694 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
8695 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
8699 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
8700 // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
8701 // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
8703 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
8704 // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
8705 // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
8706 // updating logic for the existing channel.
8707 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8708 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8709 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8710 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8712 // Create an initial channel
8713 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8714 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8715 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8716 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8718 // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
8719 // that it is rejected.
8720 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8722 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8723 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8725 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8726 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
8727 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
8728 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
8729 // move forward with it.
8730 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8731 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8733 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8737 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8738 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
8740 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
8741 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8743 let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8744 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8746 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8747 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8748 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8749 added_monitors.clear();
8751 let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8753 let funding_outpoint = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
8754 let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
8756 // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
8759 // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
8760 // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
8761 // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
8762 open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
8763 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8765 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8766 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8768 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8769 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8770 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8771 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8772 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8774 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8778 // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
8779 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8780 let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8781 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_2_msg);
8782 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8783 create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
8785 let funding_created = {
8786 let mut a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
8787 let mut as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get_mut(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
8788 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8789 as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
8791 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8792 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
8793 // At this point we'll try to add a duplicate channel monitor, which will be rejected, but
8794 // still needs to be cleared here.
8795 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8797 // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
8799 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8800 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8802 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8803 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8804 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8805 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
8806 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8808 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8812 // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
8813 // everything is functional.
8814 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
8816 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8817 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8818 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8819 added_monitors.clear();
8822 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8823 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
8824 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
8825 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
8827 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8828 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
8829 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
8830 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
8834 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
8835 // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
8837 // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
8838 // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
8839 // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
8840 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8841 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8842 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8843 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8845 // Create some initial channels
8846 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8847 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8848 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8850 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8851 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8852 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8854 // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
8855 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8856 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8858 // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
8859 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8860 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8861 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
8862 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
8863 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
8864 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8865 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
8866 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8868 // A null channel ID should close all channels
8869 let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8870 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8871 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
8872 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
8873 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8874 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8876 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
8877 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
8879 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8882 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
8883 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
8885 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8887 // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
8888 // peer_disconnected with no_connection_possible set to false, duplicating the
8889 // close-all-channels logic. That's OK, we don't want to end up not force-closing channels for
8890 // users with their own peer handling logic. We duplicate the call here, however.
8891 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8892 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8894 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
8895 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8896 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8900 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
8901 // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
8903 // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
8904 // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
8905 // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
8906 // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
8907 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8908 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8909 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8910 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8912 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8913 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8914 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8916 let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100_000, 42);
8917 for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
8918 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
8919 output.script_pubkey = bitcoin::Script::new();
8922 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
8923 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8924 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8926 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8927 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8929 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8930 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
8932 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
8933 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
8934 nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
8936 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
8937 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8938 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8939 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8940 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
8941 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
8942 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8943 if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
8944 assert_eq!(msg.data, "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index");
8945 } else { panic!(); }
8946 } else { panic!(); }
8947 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
8950 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
8951 // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
8952 // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
8953 // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
8954 // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
8955 // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
8956 // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
8957 // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
8958 // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
8959 // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
8960 // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
8961 // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
8962 // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
8963 // until we learned about an additional block.
8965 // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
8966 // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
8967 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8968 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8969 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8970 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8971 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
8973 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8974 let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8975 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
8976 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8977 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8979 nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&channel_id).unwrap();
8980 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8981 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8982 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8983 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
8984 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8986 let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
8987 if !test_height_before_timelock {
8988 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
8990 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
8991 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
8992 if test_height_before_timelock {
8993 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
8994 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
8995 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8996 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
8998 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
8999 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9000 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
9001 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
9002 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
9003 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
9005 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
9006 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
9008 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
9009 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
9010 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
9011 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9012 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
9013 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9014 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9016 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9017 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9018 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9019 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9020 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9021 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9022 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9023 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9024 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
9029 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
9030 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
9031 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
9035 fn test_forwardable_regen() {
9036 // Tests that if we reload a ChannelManager while forwards are pending we will regenerate the
9037 // PendingHTLCsForwardable event automatically, ensuring we don't forget to forward/receive
9039 // We test it for both payment receipt and payment forwarding.
9041 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9042 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9043 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9044 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
9045 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
9046 let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
9047 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9048 let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9049 let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9051 // First send a payment to nodes[1]
9052 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
9053 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9054 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9056 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9057 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9058 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9059 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9060 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9062 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9064 // Next send a payment which is forwarded by nodes[1]
9065 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 200_000);
9066 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
9067 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9069 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9070 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9071 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9072 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9073 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9075 // There is already a PendingHTLCsForwardable event "pending" so another one will not be
9077 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9079 // Now restart nodes[1] and make sure it regenerates a single PendingHTLCsForwardable
9080 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9081 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9083 let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
9084 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9085 let mut chan_1_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9086 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_1).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9087 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_2).write(&mut chan_1_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9089 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
9090 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
9091 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
9092 nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
9094 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9095 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9096 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9097 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
9098 let mut chan_1_monitor_read = &chan_1_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9099 let (_, mut chan_1_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9100 &mut chan_1_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9101 assert!(chan_1_monitor_read.is_empty());
9103 let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
9104 let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
9105 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
9106 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
9107 channel_monitors.insert(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_1_monitor);
9108 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
9109 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
9111 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
9112 chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
9113 tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
9114 logger: nodes[1].logger,
9118 nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
9119 assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
9121 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
9122 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_1_monitor).is_ok());
9123 nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
9124 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9126 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9127 // Note that nodes[1] and nodes[2] resend their funding_locked here since they haven't updated
9128 // the commitment state.
9129 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9131 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9133 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9134 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 100_000);
9135 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9137 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9138 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9139 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9140 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9141 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9142 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9143 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 200_000);
9145 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
9146 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage_2);
9150 fn test_keysend_payments_to_public_node() {
9151 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9152 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9153 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9154 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9156 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9157 let network_graph = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph;
9158 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9159 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9160 let route = get_keysend_route(
9161 &payer_pubkey, &network_graph, &payee_pubkey, None, &vec![], 10000, 40, nodes[0].logger
9164 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9165 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9166 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9167 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9168 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9169 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9170 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9171 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9172 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9176 fn test_keysend_payments_to_private_node() {
9177 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9178 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9179 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9180 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9182 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9183 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9184 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
9185 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
9187 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9188 let network_graph = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph;
9189 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9190 let route = get_keysend_route(
9191 &payer_pubkey, &network_graph, &payee_pubkey, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9192 &vec![], 10000, 40, nodes[0].logger
9195 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9196 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9197 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9198 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9199 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9200 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9201 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9202 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9203 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);