_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
  11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
  12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
  13
  14 use crate::chain;
  15 use crate::chain::{ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Confirm, Listen, Watch};
  16 use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
  17 use crate::chain::channelmonitor;
  18 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
  19 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  20 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{BaseSign, KeysInterface};
  21 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
  22 use crate::ln::channel::{commitment_tx_base_weight, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT};
  23 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA};
  24 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
  25 use crate::ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
  26 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
  27 use crate::routing::gossip::{NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate};
  28 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, find_route, get_route};
  29 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures};
  30 use crate::ln::msgs;
  31 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
  32 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
  33 use crate::util::{byte_utils, test_utils};
  34 use crate::util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
  35 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
  36 use crate::util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
  37 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
  38
  39 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
  40 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
  41 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
  42 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  43 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
  44 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
  45 use bitcoin::{PackedLockTime, Sequence, Transaction, TxIn, TxMerkleNode, TxOut, Witness};
  46 use bitcoin::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
  47
  48 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
  49 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
  50
  51 use regex;
  52
  53 use crate::io;
  54 use crate::prelude::*;
  55 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
  56 use core::default::Default;
  57 use core::iter::repeat;
  58 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
  59 use crate::sync::Mutex;
  60
  61 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
  62 use crate::ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
  63
  64 #[test]
  65 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
  66         // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
  67         use crate::ln::channel::TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS;
  68         let mut cfg = UserConfig::default();
  69         cfg.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1;
  70         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
  71         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
  72         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(cfg)]);
  73         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
  74
  75         // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
  76         // funding satoshis
  77         let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
  78         let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat, &cfg);
  79         let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
  80
  81         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
  82         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
  83
  84         // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
  85         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
  86
  87         // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
  88         // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
  89         let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
  90                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
  91                 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
  92                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
  93                 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
  94                 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
  95                         match action {
  96                                 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
  97                                         nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), expected_regex, 1);
  98                                 },
  99                                 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
 100                         }
 101                 } else { assert!(false); }
 102         };
 103
 104         use crate::ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
 105
 106         // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
 107         insane_open_helper(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2; msg });
 108         insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS; msg });
 109
 110         insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
 111
 112         insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than channel amount minus reserve \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
 113
 114         insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
 115
 116         insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
 117
 118         insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
 119
 120         insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
 121
 122         insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
 123 }
 124
 125 #[test]
 126 fn test_funding_exceeds_no_wumbo_limit() {
 127         // Test that if a peer does not support wumbo channels, we'll refuse to open a wumbo channel to
 128         // them.
 129         use crate::ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO;
 130         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 131         let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 132         node_cfgs[1].features = channelmanager::provided_init_features().clear_wumbo();
 133         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 134         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 135
 136         match nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1, 0, 42, None) {
 137                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
 138                         assert_eq!(format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1), err);
 139                 },
 140                 _ => panic!()
 141         }
 142 }
 143
 144 fn do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(send_from_initiator: bool) {
 145         // A peer providing a channel_reserve_satoshis of 0 (or less than our dust limit) is insecure,
 146         // but only for them. Because some LSPs do it with some level of trust of the clients (for a
 147         // substantial UX improvement), we explicitly allow it. Because it's unlikely to happen often
 148         // in normal testing, we test it explicitly here.
 149         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 150         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 151         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 152         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 153         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
 154
 155         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
 156         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
 157         let feerate_per_kw = 253;
 158         let opt_anchors = false;
 159         push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
 160         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
 161
 162         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None).unwrap();
 163         let mut open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 164         if !send_from_initiator {
 165                 open_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 166                 open_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 167         }
 168         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_message);
 169
 170         // Extract the channel accept message from node1 to node0
 171         let mut accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 172         if send_from_initiator {
 173                 accept_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 174                 accept_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 175         }
 176         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel_message);
 177         {
 178                 let mut lock;
 179                 let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(if send_from_initiator { &nodes[1] } else { &nodes[0] }, lock, temp_channel_id);
 180                 chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 181                 chan.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 182         }
 183
 184         let funding_tx = sign_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100_000, temp_channel_id);
 185         let funding_msgs = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_tx);
 186         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_msgs.0);
 187
 188         // nodes[0] should now be able to send the full balance to nodes[1], violating nodes[1]'s
 189         // security model if it ever tries to send funds back to nodes[0] (but that's not our problem).
 190         if send_from_initiator {
 191                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000_000
 192                         // Note that for outbound channels we have to consider the commitment tx fee and the
 193                         // "fee spike buffer", which is currently a multiple of the total commitment tx fee as
 194                         // well as an additional HTLC.
 195                         - FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, 2, opt_anchors));
 196         } else {
 197                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], push_amt);
 198         }
 199 }
 200
 201 #[test]
 202 fn test_counterparty_no_reserve() {
 203         do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(true);
 204         do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(false);
 205 }
 206
 207 #[test]
 208 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
 209         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 210         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 211         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 212         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 213         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
 214
 215         // balancing
 216         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 217
 218         // A                                        B
 219         // update_fee                            ->
 220         // send (1) commitment_signed            -.
 221         //                                       <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
 222         // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
 223         // (1) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 224         //                                       .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
 225         // (2) RAA is delivered                  ->
 226         //                                       .- send (4) commitment_signed
 227         //                                       <- (3) RAA is delivered
 228         // send (5) commitment_signed            -.
 229         //                                       <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
 230         // send (6) RAA                          -.
 231         // (5) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 232         //                                       <- RAA
 233         // (6) RAA is delivered                  ->
 234
 235         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 236         {
 237                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 238                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 239         }
 240         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 241         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 242
 243         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 244         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 245         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 246                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 247                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 248                 },
 249                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 250         };
 251
 252         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 253
 254         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 255         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 256         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
 257         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 258
 259         let payment_event = {
 260                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 261                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 262                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 263         };
 264         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 265         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 266
 267         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 268         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 269         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 270         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 271         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 272         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 273
 274         // deliver(1), generate (3):
 275         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 276         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 277         // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 278         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 279
 280         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
 281         let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 282         assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 283         assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 284         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 285         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 286         assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
 287         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 288
 289         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
 290         let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 291         assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 292         assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 293         assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 294         assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 295         assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
 296         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 297
 298         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
 299         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 300         // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 301         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 302
 303         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
 304         let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 305         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 306
 307         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 308         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 309
 310         let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 311         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
 312         match events_2[0] {
 313                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
 314                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 315         }
 316
 317         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
 318         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 319 }
 320
 321 #[test]
 322 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
 323         // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
 324         // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
 325         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 326         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 327         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 328         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 329         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
 330
 331         // balancing
 332         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 333
 334         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 335         {
 336                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 337                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 338         }
 339         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 340         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 341
 342         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 343         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 344         let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 345                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
 346                         update_fee.as_ref()
 347                 },
 348                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 349         };
 350
 351         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 352
 353         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 354         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 355         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
 356         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 357
 358         let payment_event = {
 359                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 360                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 361                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 362         };
 363         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 364         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 365
 366         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 367         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 368         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 369         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 370         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 371         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 372
 373         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
 374         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 375
 376         // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
 377 }
 378
 379 #[test]
 380 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
 381         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 382         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 383         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 384         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 385         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
 386
 387         // A                                        B
 388         // update_fee/commitment_signed          ->
 389         //                                       .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
 390         // update_fee (never committed)          ->
 391         // (3) update_fee                        ->
 392         // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
 393         // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
 394         // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
 395         //                                       <- (1) RAA delivered
 396         // (3) is generated and send (4) CS      -.
 397         // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
 398         // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
 399         //                                       <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
 400         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 401         //                                          B should send no response here
 402         // (4) commitment_signed delivered       ->
 403         //                                       <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
 404         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 405
 406         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 407         let initial_feerate;
 408         {
 409                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 410                 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
 411                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
 412         }
 413         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 414         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 415
 416         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 417         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 418         let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 419                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 420                         (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
 421                 },
 422                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 423         };
 424
 425         // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
 426         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
 427         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
 428         let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 429         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 430
 431         // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
 432         // transaction:
 433         {
 434                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 435                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
 436         }
 437         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 438         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 439         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 440
 441         // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
 442         let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
 443                 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
 444                 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
 445         };
 446
 447         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 448
 449         update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
 450         // Deliver (3)
 451         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 452
 453         // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
 454         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
 455         let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 456         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 457         assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 458         assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 459         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 460         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 461         // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
 462         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
 463         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
 464
 465         // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
 466         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
 467         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 468         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 469         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 470
 471         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
 472         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 473         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 474
 475         // Delever (4)
 476         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
 477         let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 478         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 479
 480         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 481         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 482         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 483
 484         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
 485         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 486         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 487         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 488
 489         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
 490         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 491         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 492 }
 493
 494 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
 495         // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
 496         // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
 497         // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
 498         // Node objects.
 499
 500         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 501         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 502         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 503         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 504
 505         if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
 506                 let block = Block {
 507                         header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
 508                         txdata: vec![],
 509                 };
 510                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
 511                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
 512         }
 513
 514         if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
 515         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
 516         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 517
 518         if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
 519         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel);
 520         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 521
 522         if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
 523         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
 524
 525         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
 526
 527         if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
 528         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
 529         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 530         let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 531
 532         if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
 533         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
 534         {
 535                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 536                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 537                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 538                 added_monitors.clear();
 539         }
 540         let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 541
 542         if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
 543         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
 544         {
 545                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 546                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 547                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 548                 added_monitors.clear();
 549         }
 550
 551         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 552         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
 553
 554         if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
 555         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
 556
 557         if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
 558         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
 559         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
 560         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
 561         expect_channel_ready_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 562 }
 563
 564 #[test]
 565 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
 566         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
 567         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
 568         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
 569         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
 570         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
 571         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
 572         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
 573         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
 574         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
 575         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
 576         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
 577         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
 578         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
 579         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
 580         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
 581         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
 582         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
 583         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
 584 }
 585
 586 #[test]
 587 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
 588         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 589         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 590         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 591         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 592         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
 593
 594         {
 595                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 596                 *feerate_lock += 25;
 597         }
 598         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 599         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 600
 601         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 602         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 603         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 604                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 605                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 606                 },
 607                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 608         };
 609         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 610
 611         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 612         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 613         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 614
 615         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 616         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 617         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 618
 619         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 620         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 621         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 622         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 623
 624         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 625         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 626         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 627 }
 628
 629 #[test]
 630 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
 631         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 632         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 633         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 634         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 635         let channel_value = 5000;
 636         let push_sats = 700;
 637         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
 638         let channel_id = chan.2;
 639         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 640         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
 641         let bs_channel_reserve_sats = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value, &default_config);
 642
 643         let opt_anchors = false;
 644
 645         // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
 646         // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
 647         // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
 648         // remote limit.
 649         let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
 650         let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors)) as u32;
 651         {
 652                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 653                 *feerate_lock = feerate;
 654         }
 655         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 656         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 657         let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 658
 659         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
 660
 661         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
 662
 663         // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
 664         {
 665                 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
 666
 667                 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
 668                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
 669                 let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000;
 670                 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
 671                 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
 672                 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
 673         }
 674
 675         {
 676                 // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
 677                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 678                 *feerate_lock += 4;
 679         }
 680         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 681         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
 682         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 683
 684         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
 685
 686         // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
 687         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
 688         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
 689                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 690                 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 691                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 692                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
 693                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 694                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 695         };
 696         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
 697                 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 698                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 699                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
 700                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
 701                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 702                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
 703                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 704         };
 705
 706         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
 707         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
 708                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
 709
 710         let res = {
 711                 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 712                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 713                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 714                 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
 715                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
 716                         INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
 717                         push_sats,
 718                         channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000,
 719                         opt_anchors, local_funding, remote_funding,
 720                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
 721                         non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 722                         &mut htlcs,
 723                         &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
 724                 );
 725                 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
 726         };
 727
 728         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
 729                 channel_id: chan.2,
 730                 signature: res.0,
 731                 htlc_signatures: res.1
 732         };
 733
 734         let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
 735                 channel_id: chan.2,
 736                 feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 737         };
 738
 739         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
 740
 741         //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
 742         //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
 743         //Should produce and error.
 744         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
 745         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
 746         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 747         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 748         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") });
 749 }
 750
 751 #[test]
 752 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
 753         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 754         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 755         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 756         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 757         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
 758
 759         // balancing
 760         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 761
 762         {
 763                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 764                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 765         }
 766         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 767         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 768
 769         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 770         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 771         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 772                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 773                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 774                 },
 775                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 776         };
 777         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 778         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 779         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 780         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 781
 782         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
 783
 784         // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
 785         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
 786         {
 787                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 788                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
 789                 added_monitors.clear();
 790         }
 791         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 792         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 793         // node[1] has nothing to do
 794
 795         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 796         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 797         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 798
 799         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 800         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 801         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 802         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 803         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 804         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 805         // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
 806
 807         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 808         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
 809         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
 810         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
 811         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
 812         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
 813
 814         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
 815         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 816         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 817         let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 818
 819         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 820         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 821         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 822
 823         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 824         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 825         let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 826         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 827
 828         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 829         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 830         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 831
 832         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
 833
 834         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 835         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
 836         match events[0] {
 837                 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
 838                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 839         };
 840
 841         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
 842
 843         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
 844         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
 845         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 846         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 847         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 848 }
 849
 850 #[test]
 851 fn test_update_fee() {
 852         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 853         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 854         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 855         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 856         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
 857         let channel_id = chan.2;
 858
 859         // A                                        B
 860         // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 861         //                                       <- (2) revoke_and_ack
 862         //                                       .- send (3) commitment_signed
 863         // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 864         //                                       .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
 865         //                                       <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
 866         // send (6) revoke_and_ack               -.
 867         //                                       <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
 868         // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack            ->
 869         //                                       .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
 870         //                                       <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
 871         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 872
 873         // Create and deliver (1)...
 874         let feerate;
 875         {
 876                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 877                 feerate = *feerate_lock;
 878                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
 879         }
 880         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 881         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 882
 883         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 884         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 885         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 886                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 887                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 888                 },
 889                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 890         };
 891         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 892
 893         // Generate (2) and (3):
 894         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 895         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 896         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 897
 898         // Deliver (2):
 899         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 900         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 901         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 902
 903         // Create and deliver (4)...
 904         {
 905                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 906                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
 907         }
 908         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 909         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 910         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 911         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 912         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 913                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 914                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 915                 },
 916                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 917         };
 918
 919         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 920         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 921         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 922         // ... creating (5)
 923         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 924         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 925
 926         // Handle (3), creating (6):
 927         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
 928         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 929         let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 930         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 931
 932         // Deliver (5):
 933         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 934         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 935         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 936
 937         // Deliver (6), creating (7):
 938         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
 939         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 940         assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 941         assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 942         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 943         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 944         assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
 945         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 946
 947         // Deliver (7)
 948         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 949         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 950         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 951         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 952
 953         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 954         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 955         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 956
 957         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
 958         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
 959         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 960         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 961         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 962 }
 963
 964 #[test]
 965 fn fake_network_test() {
 966         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
 967         // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
 968         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
 969         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
 970         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
 971         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 972
 973         // Create some initial channels
 974         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
 975         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
 976         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
 977
 978         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
 979         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 980         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 981         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 982         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 983
 984         // Send some more payments
 985         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
 986         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
 987         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
 988
 989         // Test failure packets
 990         let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
 991         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
 992
 993         // Add a new channel that skips 3
 994         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
 995
 996         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
 997         send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
 998         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 999         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1000         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1001         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1002         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1003
1004         // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
1005         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1006         hops.push(RouteHop {
1007                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1008                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1009                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1010                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1011                 fee_msat: 0,
1012                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1013         });
1014         hops.push(RouteHop {
1015                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1016                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1017                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1018                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1019                 fee_msat: 0,
1020                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1021         });
1022         hops.push(RouteHop {
1023                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1024                 node_features: channelmanager::provided_node_features(),
1025                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1026                 channel_features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(),
1027                 fee_msat: 1000000,
1028                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1029         });
1030         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1031         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1032         let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
1033
1034         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1035         hops.push(RouteHop {
1036                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1037                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1038                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1039                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1040                 fee_msat: 0,
1041                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1042         });
1043         hops.push(RouteHop {
1044                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1045                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1046                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1047                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1048                 fee_msat: 0,
1049                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1050         });
1051         hops.push(RouteHop {
1052                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1053                 node_features: channelmanager::provided_node_features(),
1054                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1055                 channel_features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(),
1056                 fee_msat: 1000000,
1057                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1058         });
1059         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1060         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1061         let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1062
1063         // Claim the rebalances...
1064         fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1065         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1066
1067         // Close down the channels...
1068         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1069         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1070         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1071         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1072         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1073         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1074         close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1075         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1076         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1077         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1078         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1079         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1080 }
1081
1082 #[test]
1083 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1084         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1085         // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1086         // commitment dance rounds.
1087         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1088         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1089         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1090         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1091         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1092         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1093
1094         let mut payments = Vec::new();
1095         for _ in 0..crate::ln::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
1096                 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1097                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
1098                 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1099         }
1100         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1101
1102         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1103         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1104         let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1105         assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1106
1107         // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1108         // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1109         // another HTLC.
1110         let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1111         {
1112                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1113                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1114                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1115                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
1116         }
1117
1118         // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1119         let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1120         {
1121                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
1122                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1123         }
1124
1125         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1126         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1127         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1128         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1129
1130         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1131         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1132         // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1133         // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1134         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1135         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
1136         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1137
1138         let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1139         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1140         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1141
1142         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1143
1144         // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1145         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1146         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1147         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1148
1149         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1150         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1151         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1152         let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1153
1154         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1155         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1156         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1157
1158         for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1159                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1160         }
1161         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1162         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1163         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1164         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1165         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1166
1167         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1168         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1169         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1170         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1171         let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1172
1173         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1174         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1175
1176         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1177
1178         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1179         assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1180         for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1181                 match event {
1182                         &Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1183                                 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1184                         },
1185                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1186                 };
1187         }
1188
1189         for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1190                 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1191         }
1192
1193         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1194 }
1195
1196 #[test]
1197 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1198         // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1199         // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1200         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1201         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1202         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1203         let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1204
1205         // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1206         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1207         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1208         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1209         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1210         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1211
1212         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1213
1214         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1215         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1216
1217         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1218         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1219
1220         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1221         fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1222         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1223 }
1224
1225 #[test]
1226 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1227         // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1228         // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1229         // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1230         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1231         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1232         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1233         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1234
1235         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1236
1237         // balancing
1238         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1239
1240         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1241
1242         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1243         let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
1244         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1245
1246         // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1247         nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1248         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, 800_000);
1249         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1250
1251         // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1252         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1253
1254         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1255         let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1256         for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1257                 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1258                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1259                 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1260                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1261                 }
1262         }
1263         assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1264
1265         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1266         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1267         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1268         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1269
1270         let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1271         assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 5);
1272
1273         check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]); // Immediate HTLC claim with preimage
1274         check_spends!(claim_txn[1], chan_1.3); // Alternative commitment tx
1275         check_spends!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[1]); // HTLC spend in alternative commitment tx
1276
1277         check_spends!(claim_txn[3], remote_txn[0]);
1278         check_spends!(claim_txn[4], remote_txn[0]);
1279         let preimage_tx = &claim_txn[0];
1280         let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if claim_txn[3].input[0].previous_output == preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output {
1281                 (&claim_txn[3], &claim_txn[4])
1282         } else {
1283                 (&claim_txn[4], &claim_txn[3])
1284         };
1285
1286         assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1287         assert_eq!(preimage_bump_tx.input.len(), 1);
1288
1289         assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1290         assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1291         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1292
1293         assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input.len(), 1);
1294         assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1295         check_spends!(timeout_tx, remote_txn[0]);
1296         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1297
1298         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1299         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1300         for e in events {
1301                 match e {
1302                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1303                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
1304                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1305                                 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1306                         },
1307                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1308                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1309                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1310                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1311                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1312                                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1313                         },
1314                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1315                 }
1316         }
1317 }
1318
1319 #[test]
1320 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1321         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1322         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1323         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1324         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1325         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1326
1327         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1328         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1329
1330         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1331         let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2), 1 + 1, get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2));
1332         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1333         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send + 1);
1334         let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).err().unwrap();
1335         match err {
1336                 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedResendSafe(ref fails) => {
1337                         match &fails[0] {
1338                                 &APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ref err} =>
1339                                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)),
1340                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1341                         }
1342                 },
1343                 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1344         }
1345         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1346         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1347
1348         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1349 }
1350
1351 #[test]
1352 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1353         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1354         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1355         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1356         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1357         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1358
1359         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460001);
1360         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1361         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1362         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1363
1364         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1365
1366         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1367         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3460001, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1368         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1369         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1370                 channel_id: chan.2,
1371                 htlc_id: 0,
1372                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1373                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1374                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1375                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1376         };
1377
1378         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1379
1380         // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1381         // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1382         // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1383
1384         let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1385
1386         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1387
1388         // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1389         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1390         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1391                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1392                 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1393                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1394                 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1395                 chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1396
1397                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1398                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1399                  chan_signer.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1400                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1401                  chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1402         };
1403         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1404                 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1405                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1406                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1407                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1408                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1409                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1410                  chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1411         };
1412
1413         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1414         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1415                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
1416
1417         // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1418         // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1419         let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1420
1421         let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1422                 offered: false,
1423                 amount_msat: 3460001,
1424                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1425                 payment_hash,
1426                 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1427         };
1428
1429         let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1430
1431         let res = {
1432                 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1433                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1434                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1435                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1436                         commitment_number,
1437                         95000,
1438                         local_chan_balance,
1439                         local_chan.opt_anchors(), local_funding, remote_funding,
1440                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1441                         feerate_per_kw,
1442                         &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1443                         &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1444                 );
1445                 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1446         };
1447
1448         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1449                 channel_id: chan.2,
1450                 signature: res.0,
1451                 htlc_signatures: res.1
1452         };
1453
1454         // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1455         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1456         let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1457
1458         // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1459         let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1460                 channel_id: chan.2,
1461                 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1462                 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point
1463         };
1464         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1465
1466         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1467         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1468         // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1469         match events[0] {
1470                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1471                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1472                         update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1473                 },
1474                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1475         };
1476         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1477                 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", ::hex::encode(raa_msg.channel_id)), 1);
1478
1479         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1480 }
1481
1482 #[test]
1483 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1484         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1485         // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1486         // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1487         // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1488         // this situation.
1489         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1490         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1491         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1492         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1493         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1494         let opt_anchors = false;
1495
1496         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1497         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1498
1499         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1500
1501         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1502
1503         // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1504         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1505                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1506         }
1507
1508         // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1509         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1510         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1511                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1512         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1513         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1514 }
1515
1516 #[test]
1517 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1518         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1519         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1520         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1521         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1522         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1523         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1524         let opt_anchors = false;
1525
1526         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1527         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1528         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1529         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1530         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1531         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1532         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1533
1534         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1535         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1536                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1537         }
1538
1539         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 700_000);
1540         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1541         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1542         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1543         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1544         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1545         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 700_000, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1546         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1547         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1548                 channel_id: chan.2,
1549                 htlc_id: MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64,
1550                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1551                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1552                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1553                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1554         };
1555
1556         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1557         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1558         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1559         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1560         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1561         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1562         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1563         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() });
1564 }
1565
1566 #[test]
1567 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1568         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1569         // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1570         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1571         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1572
1573         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1574         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1575         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1576         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1577         let opt_anchors = false;
1578
1579         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1580         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1581         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1582         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1583         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1584         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1585         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1586
1587         let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1588                 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1589         // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1590         // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1591         // commitment transaction fee.
1592         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1593
1594         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1595         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1596                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1597         }
1598
1599         // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1600         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt + 1);
1601         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1602                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1603 }
1604
1605 #[test]
1606 fn test_chan_init_feerate_unaffordability() {
1607         // Test that we will reject channel opens which do not leave enough to pay for any HTLCs due to
1608         // channel reserve and feerate requirements.
1609         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1610         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1611         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1612         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1613         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1614         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1615         let opt_anchors = false;
1616
1617         // Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
1618         // HTLC.
1619         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1620         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1621         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None).unwrap_err(),
1622                 APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
1623
1624         // During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
1625         // requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
1626         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1627         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None).unwrap();
1628         let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1629         open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
1630         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_msg);
1631
1632         let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1633         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
1634         match msg_events[0] {
1635                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
1636                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve");
1637                 },
1638                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1639         }
1640 }
1641
1642 #[test]
1643 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1644         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1645         // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1646         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1647         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1648         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1649         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1650         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1651
1652         let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1653         // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1654         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1655         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1656         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1657         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1658
1659         // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1660         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1661         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1662         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1663         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1664         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1665
1666         // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1667         // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1668         // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1669         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1670 }
1671
1672 #[test]
1673 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1674         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1675         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1676         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1677         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1678         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1679         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1680
1681         let feemsat = 239;
1682         let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1683         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1684         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1685         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1686
1687         // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1688         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1689         let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1690         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1691
1692         // Add a pending HTLC.
1693         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1694         let payment_event_1 = {
1695                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
1696                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1697
1698                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1699                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1700                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1701         };
1702         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1703
1704         // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1705         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2, opt_anchors);
1706         let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1707         let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1708         let (route_2, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_2);
1709
1710         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1711         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1712         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1713         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1714         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1715         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, &None, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1716         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1);
1717         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1718                 channel_id: chan.2,
1719                 htlc_id: 1,
1720                 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1721                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1722                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1723                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1724         };
1725
1726         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1727         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1728         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1729         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1730         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1731         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1732         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1733         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() });
1734 }
1735
1736 #[test]
1737 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1738         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1739         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1740         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1741         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1742         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1743         let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1744         let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1745         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1746         assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1747         assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1748
1749         let reserve = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config);
1750         assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1751         assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1752
1753         assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1754         assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1755 }
1756
1757 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
1758         (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1759 }
1760
1761 #[test]
1762 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1763         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1764         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1765         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1766         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1767         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1768         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1769         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1770         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1771         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1772         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1773
1774         let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1775         let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1776
1777         let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1778         let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1779
1780         macro_rules! expect_forward {
1781                 ($node: expr) => {{
1782                         let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1783                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1784                         check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1785                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1786                         payment_event
1787                 }}
1788         }
1789
1790         let feemsat = 239; // set above
1791         let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1792         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1793         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1794
1795         let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1796
1797         // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1798         {
1799                 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id())
1800                         .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features()).with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1801                 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], payment_params, recv_value_0, TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
1802                 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1803                 assert!(route.paths[0].iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1804
1805                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1806                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1807                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1808                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
1809         }
1810
1811         // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1812         // nodes[0]'s wealth
1813         loop {
1814                 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1815                 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1816                 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1817                 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1818                 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1819                 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1820                 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1821                         break;
1822                 }
1823
1824                 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id())
1825                         .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features()).with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1826                 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, recv_value_0, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
1827                 let (payment_preimage, ..) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], recv_value_0);
1828                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
1829
1830                 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1831                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1832                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1833                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1834                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1835                 );
1836
1837                 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1838                 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1839                 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1840                 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1841                 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1842         }
1843
1844         // adding pending output.
1845         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1846         // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1847         // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1848         // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1849         // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1850         // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1851         // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1852         // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1853         // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1854         // policy.
1855         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1856         let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1857         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1858
1859         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1860         let payment_event_1 = {
1861                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
1862                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1863
1864                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1865                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1866                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1867         };
1868         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1869
1870         // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1871         let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1872         {
1873                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_2 + 1);
1874                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1875                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1876                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1877         }
1878
1879         // split the rest to test holding cell
1880         let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1881         let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1882         let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1883         let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1884         {
1885                 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1886                 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1887         }
1888
1889         // now see if they go through on both sides
1890         let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1891         // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1892         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21, &Some(our_payment_secret_21), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_21.0)).unwrap();
1893         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1894         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1895         assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1896
1897         // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1898         {
1899                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22+1);
1900                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1901                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1902                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1903                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 2);
1904         }
1905
1906         let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1907         // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1908         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22, &Some(our_payment_secret_22), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_22.0)).unwrap();
1909         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1910         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1911         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1912
1913         // flush the pending htlc
1914         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1915         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1916         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1917
1918         // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1919         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1920         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1921         let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1922
1923         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
1924         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1925         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1926         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1927
1928         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1929         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1930         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1931
1932         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1933
1934         let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1935         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
1936         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
1937
1938         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1939         expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
1940
1941         // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
1942         assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
1943         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
1944         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
1945         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
1946         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1947
1948         let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1949         assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
1950         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
1951         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
1952
1953         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
1954         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1955
1956         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1957         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1958         match events[0] {
1959                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat } => {
1960                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
1961                         assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amount_msat);
1962                         match &purpose {
1963                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1964                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1965                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
1966                                 },
1967                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1968                         }
1969                 },
1970                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1971         }
1972         match events[1] {
1973                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat } => {
1974                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
1975                         assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amount_msat);
1976                         match &purpose {
1977                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1978                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1979                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
1980                                 },
1981                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1982                         }
1983                 },
1984                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1985         }
1986
1987         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
1988         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
1989         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
1990
1991         let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1, opt_anchors);
1992         let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
1993         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
1994
1995         let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
1996         let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
1997         let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1998         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
1999         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
2000
2001         let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2002         assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
2003 }
2004
2005 #[test]
2006 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
2007         // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
2008         // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
2009         // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
2010         // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
2011         // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
2012         // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
2013         // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
2014         // To test this we:
2015         //  * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
2016         //    you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
2017         //    you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
2018         //  * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
2019         //  * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
2020         //    the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
2021         //  * deliver the first fulfill from B
2022         //  * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
2023         //    claim,
2024         //  * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
2025         //    This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
2026         //    removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
2027         //  * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
2028         //    of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
2029         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2030         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2031         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2032         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2033         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2034
2035         let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2036         // Route the first two HTLCs.
2037         let payment_value_1 = b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000;
2038         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_value_1);
2039         let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20_000);
2040
2041         // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
2042         let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
2043         let send_1 = {
2044                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_3, &Some(payment_secret_3), PaymentId(payment_hash_3.0)).unwrap();
2045                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2046                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2047                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2048                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2049         };
2050
2051         // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
2052         // initial fulfill/CS.
2053         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
2054         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, payment_value_1);
2055         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2056         let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2057
2058         // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
2059         // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
2060         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
2061         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000);
2062         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2063         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2064
2065         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2066         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
2067         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2068         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2069         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
2070
2071         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
2072         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
2073         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2074         // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
2075         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2076
2077         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2078         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2079         let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2080
2081         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2082         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2083         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2084
2085         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2086         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2087         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2088
2089         // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
2090         // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2091         // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
2092         // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
2093         // on-chain as necessary).
2094         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2095         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
2096         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2097         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2098         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
2099
2100         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2101         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2102         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2103
2104         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2105         expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2106
2107         // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2108         // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2109         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2110         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2111         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2112         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2113
2114         // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2115         // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2116         let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2117         let send_2 = {
2118                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_4, &Some(payment_secret_4), PaymentId(payment_hash_4.0)).unwrap();
2119                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2120                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2121                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2122                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2123         };
2124
2125         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2126         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2127         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2128         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2129
2130         // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2131
2132         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2133         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2134         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2135
2136         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2137         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2138
2139         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2140         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2141         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2142         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2143
2144         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2145         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2146         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2147
2148         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2149         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2150
2151         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2152         expect_payment_received!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2153
2154         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2155         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2156 }
2157
2158 #[test]
2159 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2160         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2161         // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2162         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2163         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2164         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2165         let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2166
2167         // Create some initial channels
2168         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2169         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2170         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2171         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2172
2173         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2174         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2175         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2176         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2177         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2178         connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2179
2180         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2181         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2182         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2183         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2184         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2185
2186         // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2187         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_1.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2188         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2189         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2190         {
2191                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2192                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2193                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2194                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2195                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2196         }
2197         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2198         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2199         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2200         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2201         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2202
2203         // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2204         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 3_000_000);
2205
2206         // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2207         // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2208         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_2.2, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2209         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2210         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2211         {
2212                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2213                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2214                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2215                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2216                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2217                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2218         }
2219         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2220         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2221         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2222         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2223         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2224
2225         macro_rules! claim_funds {
2226                 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
2227                         {
2228                                 $node.node.claim_funds($preimage);
2229                                 expect_payment_claimed!($node, $payment_hash, 3_000_000);
2230                                 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2231
2232                                 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2233                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2234                                 match events[0] {
2235                                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2236                                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2237                                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2238                                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2239                                         },
2240                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2241                                 };
2242                         }
2243                 }
2244         }
2245
2246         // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2247         // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2248         nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_3.2, &nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2249         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2250         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2251         let node2_commitment_txid;
2252         {
2253                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2254                 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2255                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2256                 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2257
2258                 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2259                 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1);
2260                 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2261                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2262                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2263         }
2264         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2265         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2266         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2267         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2268         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2269
2270         // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2271         // confusing us in the following tests.
2272         let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2273
2274         // One pending HTLC to time out:
2275         let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[3], &[&nodes[4]], 3_000_000);
2276         // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2277         // buffer space).
2278
2279         let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2280                 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2281                 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2282                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2283                 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2284                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2285                                 msg.clone()
2286                         },
2287                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2288                 };
2289                 match events[1] {
2290                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2291                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2292                         },
2293                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2294                 }
2295                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2296
2297                 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2298                 {
2299                         let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2300                         node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2301                                 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2302                                         false
2303                                 } else { true }
2304                         });
2305                 }
2306
2307                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2308
2309                 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2310                 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2);
2311
2312                 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2313                 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2314                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2315                 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2316                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2317                                 msg.clone()
2318                         },
2319                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2320                 };
2321                 match events[1] {
2322                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2323                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2324                         },
2325                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2326                 }
2327                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2328                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2329
2330                 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2331                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2332                 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2333         };
2334         nodes[3].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2335         nodes[4].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2336         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2337         assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2338
2339         assert_eq!(nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon),
2340                 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
2341         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2342         check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2343 }
2344
2345 #[test]
2346 fn test_justice_tx() {
2347         // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2348         let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2349         alice_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2350         alice_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2351         alice_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2352         let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2353         bob_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2354         bob_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2355         bob_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2356         let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2357         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2358         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2359         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2360         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2361         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2362         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2363         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen;
2364         // Create some new channels:
2365         let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2366
2367         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2368         let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2369         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2370         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2371         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2372         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2373         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2374         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2375         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2376         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2377         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2378         // Revoke the old state
2379         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2380
2381         {
2382                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2383                 {
2384                         let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2385                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2386                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2387
2388                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2389                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2390                         node_txn.truncate(1);
2391                 }
2392                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2393                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2394                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2395
2396                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2397                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2398                 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2399                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2400                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2401                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2402                 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2403                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2404                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2405         }
2406         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2407
2408         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2409         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2410
2411         // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
2412         // Create some new channels:
2413         let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2414         {
2415                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2416                 node_txn.clear();
2417         }
2418
2419         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2420         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2421         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2422         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2423         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2424         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2425         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2426         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2427         // Revoke the old state
2428         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2429         {
2430                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2431                 {
2432                         let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2433                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); //ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2434                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2435
2436                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2437                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2438                 }
2439                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2440                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2441
2442                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2443                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2444                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2445                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2446                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2447                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2448                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2449         }
2450         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2451         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2452         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2453 }
2454
2455 #[test]
2456 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2457         // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2458         // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2459         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2460         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2461         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2462         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2463         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2464         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2465         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2466         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2467         // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2468         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2469         // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2470         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2471
2472         // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2473         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2474         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2475         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2476         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2477         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2478
2479         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2480         check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
2481
2482         // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2483         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2484         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2485         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2486         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2487 }
2488
2489 #[test]
2490 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2491         // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2492         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2493         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2494         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2495         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2496         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2497
2498         // Create some new channel:
2499         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2500
2501         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2502         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2503         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2504         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2505         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2506
2507         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2508         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2509         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2510         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2511         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2512         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2513         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2514         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2515         check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2516
2517         //Revoke the old state
2518         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2519
2520         {
2521                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2522                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2523                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2524                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2525                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2526                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2527                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2528                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2529
2530                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2531                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment
2532
2533                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2534                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2535
2536                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2537                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2538                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2539                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2540                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2541                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2542                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2543                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2544
2545                 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
2546                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2547                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
2548
2549                 // Finally, mine the penalty transaction and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2550                 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2551                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
2552                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2553                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2554         }
2555         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2556         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2557         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2558 }
2559
2560 #[test]
2561 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2562         // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2563         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2564         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2565         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2566         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2567         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2568
2569         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2570
2571         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2572         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2573         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2574         // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2575         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2576         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2577
2578         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2579         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2580
2581         //Revoke the old state
2582         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2583
2584         {
2585                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2586                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2587                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2588                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2589                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2590                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2591                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2592                 match events.last().unwrap() {
2593                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2594                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2595                 }
2596
2597                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2598                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2599
2600                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2601                 assert!(node_txn.len() == 9 || node_txn.len() == 10);
2602
2603                 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2604                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2605                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2606                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2607                 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2608                 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2609                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2610
2611                 // Justice transactions are indices 1-2-4
2612                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2613                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
2614                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
2615
2616                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2617                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2618                 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2619
2620                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2621                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2622                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2623                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2624                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2625                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2626                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2627                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2628
2629                 // Finally, mine the penalty transactions and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2630                 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2631                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[2]);
2632                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[3]);
2633                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[4]);
2634                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2635                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2636         }
2637         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2638         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2639         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2640 }
2641
2642 #[test]
2643 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2644         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2645         // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2646         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2647         // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2648         // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2649         // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2650         // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2651         // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2652         // towards B.
2653         // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2654         // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2655         // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2656         // PaymentSent event).
2657
2658         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2659         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2660         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2661         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2662
2663         // Create some initial channels
2664         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2665         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2666
2667         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2668         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2669         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2670         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2671         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2672
2673         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2674         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2675         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2676
2677         let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2678         let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2679
2680         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2681         // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2682         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2683         assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2684         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2685         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2686         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_1, 3_000_000);
2687         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2688         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, 3_000_000);
2689         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2690         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2691         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2692         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2693         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2694         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2695
2696         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2697         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2698         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2699         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2700         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx, 2*htlc-success tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2701         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5);
2702         assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2703         assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2704         assert_eq!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2705         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2706         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2707         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2708         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2709         assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2710         assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2711         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0);
2712         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0);
2713
2714         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2715         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2716         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: node_txn});
2717         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2718         {
2719                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2720                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2721                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2722                 added_monitors.clear();
2723         }
2724         let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2725         assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2726         match forwarded_events[0] {
2727                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2728                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2729         }
2730         let chan_id = Some(chan_1.2);
2731         match forwarded_events[1] {
2732                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
2733                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2734                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2735                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2736                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2737                 },
2738                 _ => panic!()
2739         }
2740         match forwarded_events[2] {
2741                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
2742                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2743                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2744                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2745                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2746                 },
2747                 _ => panic!()
2748         }
2749         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2750         {
2751                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2752                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2753                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2754                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2755                 added_monitors.clear();
2756         }
2757         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2758         match events[0] {
2759                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2760                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2761         }
2762         match events[1] {
2763                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2764                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2765         }
2766
2767         match events[2] {
2768                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2769                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2770                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2771                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2772                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2773                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2774                 },
2775                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2776         };
2777         macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2778                 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $chan_tx: expr) => { {
2779                         let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2780                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
2781                         // Node[1]: ChannelManager: 3 (commitment tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (timeout tx)
2782                         // Node[0]: ChannelManager: 3 (commtiemtn tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 HTLC-timeout
2783                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2784                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], $commitment_tx);
2785                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0);
2786                         assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time.0, 0);
2787                         if $htlc_offered {
2788                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2789                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2790                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2791                                 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2792                         } else {
2793                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2794                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2795                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2796                                 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2797                         }
2798                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], $chan_tx);
2799                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2800                         node_txn.clear();
2801                 } }
2802         }
2803         // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own local state as a fallback, suggesting an alternate
2804         // commitment transaction with a corresponding HTLC-Timeout transactions, as well as a
2805         // timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2806         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2807
2808         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2809         // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx  on A's chain
2810         let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2811         check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2812         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2813         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2814         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2815         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2816         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2817         assert!(node_txn.len() == 4 || node_txn.len() == 6); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx + HTLC-Sucess * 2), ChannelMonitor : 3 (HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn)
2818         let commitment_spend =
2819                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2820                         if node_txn.len() == 6 {
2821                                 // In some block `ConnectionStyle`s we may avoid broadcasting the double-spending
2822                                 // transactions spending the HTLC outputs of C's commitment transaction. Otherwise,
2823                                 // check that the extra broadcasts (double-)spend those here.
2824                                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2825                                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2826                                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2827                         }
2828                         &node_txn[0]
2829                 } else {
2830                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2831                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2832                         assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2833                         &node_txn[2]
2834                 };
2835
2836         check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2837         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2838         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2839         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2840         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time.0, 0);
2841         assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2842         let funding_spend_offset = if node_txn.len() == 6 { 3 } else { 1 };
2843         check_spends!(node_txn[funding_spend_offset], chan_1.3);
2844         assert_eq!(node_txn[funding_spend_offset].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2845         check_spends!(node_txn[funding_spend_offset + 1], node_txn[funding_spend_offset]);
2846         check_spends!(node_txn[funding_spend_offset + 2], node_txn[funding_spend_offset]);
2847         // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
2848         // we already checked the same situation with A.
2849
2850         // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
2851         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2852         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()] });
2853         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2854         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2855         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2856         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2857         assert_eq!(events.len(), 5);
2858         let mut first_claimed = false;
2859         for event in events {
2860                 match event {
2861                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
2862                                 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
2863                                         assert!(!first_claimed);
2864                                         first_claimed = true;
2865                                 } else {
2866                                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
2867                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
2868                                 }
2869                         },
2870                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
2871                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
2872                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2873                 }
2874         }
2875         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2876 }
2877
2878 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
2879         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
2880         // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2881         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2882         // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
2883         //    B's commitment tx                 C's commitment tx
2884         //            \                                  \
2885         //         B's HTLC timeout tx               B's timeout tx
2886
2887         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2888         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2889         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2890         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2891         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2892         *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2893         *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2894
2895         // Create some intial channels
2896         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2897         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2898
2899         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
2900         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2901         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2902
2903         let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2904
2905         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2906         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2907         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2908         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
2909         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
2910         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }]);
2911         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2912
2913         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2914         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2915         match events[0] {
2916                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2917                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2918                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2919                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2920                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2921                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2922                 },
2923                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2924         };
2925         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2926         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2927         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2928         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2929         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx)
2930         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2931         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2932         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2933
2934         // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2935         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
2936         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2937         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
2938         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2939         let timeout_tx;
2940         {
2941                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2942                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-timeout), 1 timeout tx
2943                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2944                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2945
2946                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2947                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2948
2949                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2950                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2951                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2952                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2953
2954                 timeout_tx = node_txn[2].clone();
2955                 node_txn.clear();
2956         }
2957
2958         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
2959         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2960         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2961
2962         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2963
2964         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
2965         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2966         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2967         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2968         match events[0] {
2969                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2970                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2971                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2972                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2973                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2974                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2975                 },
2976                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2977         };
2978
2979         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
2980         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2981         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2982
2983         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
2984         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2985
2986         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2987         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2988         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2989         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 commitment tx, ChannelMonitor : 1 timeout tx
2990         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2991         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2992         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2993         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2994         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2995 }
2996
2997 #[test]
2998 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
2999         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
3000         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
3001         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
3002 }
3003
3004 #[test]
3005 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
3006         // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
3007         // and fail backward accordingly.
3008
3009         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3010         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3011         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3012         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3013
3014         // Create some initial channels
3015         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3016         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3017
3018         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3019         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3020         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3021         // Revoke the old state
3022         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3023
3024         let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3025
3026         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3027         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3028         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3029         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3030         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3031
3032         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
3033         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3034         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3035         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3036         match events[0] {
3037                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3038                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3039                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3040                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3041                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3042                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3043
3044                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3045                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3046                         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
3047                 },
3048                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3049         }
3050 }
3051
3052 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
3053         // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
3054         // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
3055         // commitment transaction anymore.
3056         // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
3057         // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
3058         // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
3059         // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
3060         // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
3061         // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
3062         // transactions:
3063         // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
3064         //   commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
3065         // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
3066         //   and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
3067         //   commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
3068         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3069         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3070         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3071         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3072
3073         // Create some initial channels
3074         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3075         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3076
3077         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
3078         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3079         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3080         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
3081         // Revoke the old state
3082         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3083
3084         let value = if use_dust {
3085                 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
3086                 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
3087                 nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
3088         } else { 3000000 };
3089
3090         let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3091         let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3092         let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3093
3094         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash);
3095         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: first_payment_hash }]);
3096         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3097         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3098         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3099         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3100         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3101         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3102         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3103         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3104         let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
3105         // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
3106
3107         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash);
3108         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: second_payment_hash }]);
3109         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3110         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3111         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3112         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3113         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3114         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3115         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3116         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3117         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3118         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3119         // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3120         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3121         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3122         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3123
3124         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash);
3125         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: third_payment_hash }]);
3126         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3127         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3128         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3129         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3130         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3131         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3132         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3133         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3134         // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3135         // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3136         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3137         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3138         // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3139         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3140         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3141         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3142
3143         // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3144         // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3145         let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3146         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, fourth_payment_hash, &Some(fourth_payment_secret), PaymentId(fourth_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3147         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3148         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3149         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3150
3151         if deliver_bs_raa {
3152                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3153                 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3154                 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3155                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3156                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3157                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3158                 match events[0] {
3159                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3160                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3161                 };
3162                 match events[1] {
3163                         Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { .. } => { },
3164                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3165                 }
3166                 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3167                 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3168         }
3169
3170         let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
3171         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3172
3173         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3174         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3175         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3176
3177         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3178         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 2 + nodes.len() - 1 } else { 3 + nodes.len() });
3179         match events[0] {
3180                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
3181                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
3182         }
3183         match events[1] {
3184                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3185                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3186                 },
3187                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3188         }
3189         if !deliver_bs_raa {
3190                 match events[2] {
3191                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3192                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3193                 };
3194                 nodes[1].node.abandon_payment(PaymentId(fourth_payment_hash.0));
3195                 let payment_failed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3196                 assert_eq!(payment_failed_events.len(), 1);
3197                 match payment_failed_events[0] {
3198                         Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3199                                 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3200                         },
3201                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3202                 }
3203         }
3204         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3205         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3206
3207         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3208         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3209         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 1 } else { 0 }] {
3210                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3211                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3212         }
3213         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 1 }] {
3214                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
3215                         assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3216                         assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3217                 },
3218                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3219         }
3220         if deliver_bs_raa {
3221                 match events[0] {
3222                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3223                                 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3224                                 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3225                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3226                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3227                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3228                         },
3229                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3230                 }
3231         }
3232         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 3 } else { 2 }] {
3233                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3234                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3235                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3236                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3237                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3238                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3239
3240                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3241                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3242                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3243
3244                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3245
3246                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3247                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3248                         match events[0] {
3249                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref network_update, .. } => {
3250                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3251                                         // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3252                                         // that we should update our routing table for.
3253                                         if !deliver_bs_raa {
3254                                                 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3255                                         }
3256                                 },
3257                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3258                         }
3259                         match events[1] {
3260                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref network_update, .. } => {
3261                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3262                                         assert!(network_update.is_some());
3263                                 },
3264                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3265                         }
3266                         match events[2] {
3267                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref network_update, .. } => {
3268                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3269                                         assert!(network_update.is_some());
3270                                 },
3271                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3272                         }
3273                 },
3274                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3275         }
3276
3277         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3278         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3279         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3280 }
3281
3282 #[test]
3283 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3284         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3285         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3286         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3287         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3288 }
3289
3290 #[test]
3291 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3292         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3293         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3294         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3295         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3296 }
3297
3298 #[test]
3299 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3300         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3301         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3302         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3303         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3304         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3305
3306         // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3307         {
3308                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3309                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3310                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3311
3312                 let payment_event = {
3313                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3314                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3315                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3316                 };
3317                 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3318                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3319         }
3320
3321         // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3322         let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3323         {
3324                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, failed_payment_hash, &Some(failed_payment_secret), PaymentId(failed_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3325                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3326
3327                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3328         }
3329
3330         // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3331         {
3332                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3333
3334                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3335                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3336                 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3337                 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 50_000, &Some(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3338                 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3339                 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
3340
3341                 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3342                 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3343                         channel_id: chan.2,
3344                         htlc_id: 0,
3345                         amount_msat: 0,
3346                         payment_hash,
3347                         cltv_expiry,
3348                         onion_routing_packet,
3349                 };
3350                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3351         }
3352         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3353         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3354         // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3355         match events[0] {
3356                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3357                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3358                 },
3359                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3360         }
3361         match events[1] {
3362                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3363                         assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3364                 },
3365                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3366         }
3367         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3368         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3369 }
3370
3371 #[test]
3372 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3373         // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3374         // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3375         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3376         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3377         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3378         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3379         if *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow() == ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen {
3380                 // We rely on the ability to connect a block redundantly, which isn't allowed via
3381                 // `chain::Listen`, so we never run the test if we randomly get assigned that
3382                 // connect_style.
3383                 return;
3384         }
3385         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3386
3387         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3388         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3389         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3390         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3391         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3392         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3393
3394         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
3395         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3396         assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
3397
3398         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3399         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
3400         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3401         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3402         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3403
3404         // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3405         // registering new transactions
3406         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
3407 }
3408
3409 #[test]
3410 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3411         // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3412         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3413         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3414         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3415         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3416         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3417         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3418
3419         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3420
3421         let mut payment_event = {
3422                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3423                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3424
3425                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3426                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3427                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3428         };
3429
3430         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3431         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3432
3433         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3434
3435         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3436         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3437         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3438         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3439
3440         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3441         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3442         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3443         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3444         let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3445
3446         // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3447         // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3448         // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3449
3450         nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3451         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3452         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3453         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3454         let tx = {
3455                 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3456                 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3457                 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3458                 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3459                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3460                 node_txn.remove(0)
3461         };
3462
3463         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3464
3465         // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3466         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3467         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3468         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3469
3470         // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3471         {
3472                 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3473                         .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator), &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3474         }
3475         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3476         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3477         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3478         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3479         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3480         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3481         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3482
3483         check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3484 }
3485
3486 #[test]
3487 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3488         // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3489         // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3490         // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3491         // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3492
3493         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3494         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3495         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3496         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3497         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3498
3499         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
3500
3501         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
3502         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_000_000);
3503         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3504         let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3505         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3506         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
3507
3508         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3509         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3510
3511         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3512         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3513 }
3514
3515 #[test]
3516 fn test_peer_disconnected_before_funding_broadcasted() {
3517         // Test that channels are closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` if the peer disconnects
3518         // before the funding transaction has been broadcasted.
3519         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3520         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3521         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3522         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3523
3524         // Open a channel between `nodes[0]` and `nodes[1]`, for which the funding transaction is never
3525         // broadcasted, even though it's created by `nodes[0]`.
3526         let expected_temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
3527         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3528         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel);
3529         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3530         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
3531
3532         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
3533         assert_eq!(temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3534
3535         assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
3536
3537         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3538         assert_eq!(funding_created_msg.temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3539
3540         // Even though the funding transaction is created by `nodes[0]`, the `FundingCreated` msg is
3541         // never sent to `nodes[1]`, and therefore the tx is never signed by either party nor
3542         // broadcasted.
3543         {
3544                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3545         }
3546
3547         // Ensure that the channel is closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` when the peers are
3548         // disconnected before the funding transaction was broadcasted.
3549         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3550         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3551
3552         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3553         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3554 }
3555
3556 #[test]
3557 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3558         // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3559         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3560         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3561         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3562         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3563         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3564         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3565
3566         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3567         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3568         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3569
3570         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3571         let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3572         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3573         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3574
3575         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3576         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3577         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3578
3579         let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3580         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3581         let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3582         let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3583
3584         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3585         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3586
3587         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3588         fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3589
3590         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
3591         {
3592                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3593                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3594                 match events[0] {
3595                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3596                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3597                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3598                         },
3599                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3600                 }
3601                 match events[1] {
3602                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, payment_failed_permanently, .. } => {
3603                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3604                                 assert!(payment_failed_permanently);
3605                         },
3606                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3607                 }
3608                 match events[2] {
3609                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3610                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3611                 }
3612         }
3613
3614         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3615         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3616 }
3617
3618 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3619         // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3620         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3621         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3622         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3623         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3624
3625         let mut as_channel_ready = None;
3626         if messages_delivered == 0 {
3627                 let (channel_ready, _, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3628                 as_channel_ready = Some(channel_ready);
3629                 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the channel_ready message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3630                 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3631                 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3632         } else {
3633                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3634         }
3635
3636         let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1_000_000);
3637
3638         let payment_event = {
3639                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
3640                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3641
3642                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3643                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3644                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3645         };
3646         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3647
3648         if messages_delivered < 2 {
3649                 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3650         } else {
3651                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3652                 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3653                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3654                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3655                         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3656
3657                         if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3658                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3659                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3660                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3661
3662                                 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3663                                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3664                                         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3665                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3666                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3667
3668                                         if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3669                                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3670                                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3671                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3672                                         }
3673                                 }
3674                         }
3675                 }
3676         }
3677
3678         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3679         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3680         if messages_delivered < 3 {
3681                 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3682                         // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a channel_ready prior to a
3683                         // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to channel_ready time.
3684                         //
3685                         // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a channel_ready immediately on
3686                         // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate channel_ready sent
3687                         // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3688                         //
3689                         // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3690                         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3691                 }
3692                 // Even if the channel_ready messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3693                 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3694                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3695         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3696                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3697                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3698         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3699                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3700                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3701         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3702                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3703                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3704         } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3705                 // Everything was delivered...
3706                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3707         }
3708
3709         let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3710         if messages_delivered == 0 {
3711                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 2);
3712                 match events_1[0] {
3713                         Event::ChannelReady { .. } => { },
3714                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3715                 };
3716                 match events_1[1] {
3717                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3718                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3719                 };
3720         } else {
3721                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3722                 match events_1[0] {
3723                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3724                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3725                 };
3726         }
3727
3728         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3729         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3730         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3731
3732         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3733
3734         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3735         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3736         match events_2[0] {
3737                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat } => {
3738                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3739                         assert_eq!(amount_msat, 1_000_000);
3740                         match &purpose {
3741                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3742                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3743                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3744                                 },
3745                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3746                         }
3747                 },
3748                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3749         }
3750
3751         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3752         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3753         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
3754
3755         let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3756         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3757         let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3758                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3759                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3760                         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3761                         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3762                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3763                         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3764                         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3765                         (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3766                 },
3767                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3768         };
3769
3770         if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3771                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3772
3773                 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3774                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3775                 match events_4[0] {
3776                         Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3777                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3778                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3779                         },
3780                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3781                 }
3782
3783                 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3784                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3785                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3786                         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3787
3788                         if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3789                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3790                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3791                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3792
3793                                 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3794                                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3795                                         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3796                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3797                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3798
3799                                         if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3800                                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3801                                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3802                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3803                                         }
3804                                 }
3805                         }
3806                 }
3807         }
3808
3809         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3810         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3811         if messages_delivered < 2 {
3812                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3813                 if messages_delivered < 1 {
3814                         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
3815                 } else {
3816                         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3817                 }
3818         } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
3819                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3820                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3821         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3822                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3823                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3824         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3825                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3826                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3827         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3828                 // Everything was delivered...
3829                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3830         }
3831
3832         if messages_delivered == 1 || messages_delivered == 2 {
3833                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3834         }
3835
3836         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3837         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3838         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3839
3840         if messages_delivered > 2 {
3841                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3842         }
3843
3844         // Channel should still work fine...
3845         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3846         let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3847         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3848 }
3849
3850 #[test]
3851 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
3852         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
3853         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
3854         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
3855         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
3856 }
3857
3858 #[test]
3859 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
3860         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
3861         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
3862         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
3863         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
3864 }
3865
3866 #[test]
3867 fn test_channel_ready_without_best_block_updated() {
3868         // Previously, if we were offline when a funding transaction was locked in, and then we came
3869         // back online, calling best_block_updated once followed by transactions_confirmed, we'd not
3870         // generate a channel_ready until a later best_block_updated. This tests that we generate the
3871         // channel_ready immediately instead.
3872         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3873         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3874         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3875         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3876         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
3877
3878         let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3879
3880         let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
3881         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
3882         let block_txn = [funding_tx];
3883         let conf_txn: Vec<_> = block_txn.iter().enumerate().collect();
3884         let conf_block_header = nodes[0].get_block_header(conf_height);
3885         nodes[0].node.transactions_confirmed(&conf_block_header, &conf_txn[..], conf_height);
3886
3887         // Ensure nodes[0] generates a channel_ready after the transactions_confirmed
3888         let as_channel_ready = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3889         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
3890 }
3891
3892 #[test]
3893 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
3894         // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
3895         // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
3896         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3897         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3898         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3899         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3900         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3901
3902         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
3903
3904         // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
3905         let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3906         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
3907         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3908
3909         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3910         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3911         match events_1[0] {
3912                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
3913                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3914         }
3915
3916         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3917         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
3918         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3919
3920         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3921         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3922         match events_2[0] {
3923                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3924                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3925                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3926                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3927                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3928                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3929                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3930
3931                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3932                         let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3933                         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3934                         match events_3[0] {
3935                                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3936                                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
3937                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
3938                                 },
3939                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3940                         }
3941
3942                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
3943                         let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3944                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3945                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3946                 },
3947                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3948         }
3949
3950         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3951         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3952
3953         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
3954         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
3955         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
3956         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
3957         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
3958         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
3959
3960         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
3961         let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
3962         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
3963         let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
3964
3965         assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
3966         assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
3967
3968         assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
3969         assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
3970
3971         assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
3972
3973         assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3974         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3975         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3976         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3977         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
3978         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
3979         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
3980         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3981         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3982         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3983
3984         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
3985         let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3986         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3987         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3988         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3989         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3990         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
3991         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3992
3993         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3994         let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3995         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3996         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3997         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3998         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3999         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4000         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4001
4002         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4003         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4004         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4005         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4006
4007         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4008         let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4009         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4010         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4011
4012         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
4013         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4014         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4015
4016         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4017
4018         let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4019         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
4020         match events_5[0] {
4021                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
4022                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
4023                         match &purpose {
4024                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
4025                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
4026                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
4027                                 },
4028                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
4029                         }
4030                 },
4031                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4032         }
4033
4034         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
4035         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4036         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4037
4038         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4039         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4040 }
4041
4042 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
4043         // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
4044         // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
4045         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4046         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4047         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4048         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4049
4050         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4051
4052         let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
4053                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
4054                 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
4055                 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
4056                 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
4057                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
4058                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
4059                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
4060                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4061                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4062                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4063                 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
4064                 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentReceived event(s).
4065                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
4066                 our_payment_hash
4067         } else {
4068                 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
4069         };
4070
4071         let mut block = Block {
4072                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
4073                 txdata: vec![],
4074         };
4075         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4076         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4077         let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4078         for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
4079                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
4080                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4081                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4082         }
4083
4084         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
4085
4086         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4087         let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4088         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4089         assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4090         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4091         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4092
4093         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4094         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4095         // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4096         let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(100_000).to_vec();
4097         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(block_count - 1));
4098         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4099 }
4100
4101 #[test]
4102 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4103         do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4104         do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4105 }
4106
4107 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4108         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4109         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4110         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4111         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4112         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4113         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4114         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4115
4116         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4117         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4118         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4119         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4120
4121         // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4122         let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4123         {
4124                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, first_payment_hash, &Some(first_payment_secret), PaymentId(first_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
4125         }
4126         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4127         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4128
4129         // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4130         let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4131         let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4132         sending_node.node.send_payment(&route, second_payment_hash, &Some(second_payment_secret), PaymentId(second_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
4133         if forwarded_htlc {
4134                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4135                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4136                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4137                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4138                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4139         }
4140         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4141
4142         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4143         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4144         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4145         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4146
4147         if forwarded_htlc {
4148                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
4149                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4150                 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4151                 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4152                 match fail_commit[0] {
4153                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4154                                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4155                                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4156                         },
4157                         _ => unreachable!(),
4158                 }
4159                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4160         } else {
4161                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], second_payment_hash, false);
4162         }
4163 }
4164
4165 #[test]
4166 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4167         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4168         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4169 }
4170
4171 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4172         ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4173                 {
4174                         let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4175                         let mut txn = Vec::new();
4176                         let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4177                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4178                         for event in events.drain(..) {
4179                                 match event {
4180                                         Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs } => {
4181                                                 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4182                                                         txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4183                                                         all_outputs.push(outp);
4184                                                 }
4185                                         },
4186                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4187                                 };
4188                         }
4189                         if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4190                                 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx) {
4191                                         txn.push(tx);
4192                                 }
4193                         }
4194                         txn
4195                 }
4196         }
4197 }
4198
4199 #[test]
4200 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4201         // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4202         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4203         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4204         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4205         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4206
4207         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4208         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4209         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4210         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4211         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4212         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4213         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4214         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4215         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4216
4217         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4218         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4219
4220         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4221         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4222         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4223         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4224         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4225 }
4226
4227 #[test]
4228 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4229         // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4230         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4231         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4232         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4233         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4234         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4235
4236         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4237         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4238         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4239         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4240         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4241
4242         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4243         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4244         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4245         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4246
4247         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4248         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4249         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4250         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4251         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4252
4253         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4254         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4255         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4256 }
4257
4258 #[test]
4259 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4260         // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4261         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4262
4263         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4264         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4265         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4266         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4267
4268         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4269         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4270         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4271         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4272         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4273
4274         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4275         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4276         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4277         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4278         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4279
4280         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4281         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4282         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4283
4284         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4285         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4286         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4287         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4288         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4289 }
4290
4291 #[test]
4292 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4293         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4294         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4295         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4296         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4297
4298         // Create some initial channels
4299         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4300
4301         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
4302
4303         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4304         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4305         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4306
4307         // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4308         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4309         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4310         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4311         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4312         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4313         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4314         match events[0] {
4315                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4316                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4317         }
4318         match events[1] {
4319                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4320                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4321         }
4322
4323         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4324         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-Success), ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4325         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4326         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4327         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4328         check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
4329         check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
4330
4331         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4332         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4333         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4334
4335         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4336         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4337         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4338 }
4339
4340 #[test]
4341 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4342         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4343         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4344         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4345         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4346
4347         // Create some initial channels
4348         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4349
4350         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4351         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4352
4353         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4354
4355         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4356         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4357         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4358
4359         // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4360         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4361         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4362         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4363         match events[0] {
4364                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4365                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4366         }
4367         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4368
4369         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4370         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4371         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelManager : 1 local commitent tx, ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4372         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
4373         check_spends!(node_txn[1],  commitment_tx[0].clone());
4374         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4375
4376         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4377         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4378         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4379         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, false);
4380
4381         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4382         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4383         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4384         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]);
4385         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4386 }
4387
4388 #[test]
4389 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4390         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4391         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4392         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4393         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4394
4395         // Create some initial channels
4396         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4397
4398         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4399         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4400         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4401         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4402
4403         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4404
4405         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4406         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4407         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4408         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4409
4410         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4411         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
4412         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4413         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4414
4415         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4416         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4417
4418         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4419         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4420         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4421 }
4422
4423 #[test]
4424 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4425         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4426         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4427         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4428         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4429         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4430
4431         // Create some initial channels
4432         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4433
4434         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4435         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4436         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4437         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4438
4439         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4440
4441         // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
4442         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4443         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4444         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4445         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4446         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4447
4448         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4449         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4450         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], chan_1.3);
4451         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4452         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4453         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4454         assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
4455
4456         // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4457         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4458         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()] });
4459         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4460         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4461         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4462
4463         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4464         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
4465         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4466         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4467         // transactions next...
4468         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
4469         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
4470
4471         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
4472         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
4473         if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid() {
4474                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4475         } else {
4476                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid());
4477                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4478         }
4479
4480         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4481         check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
4482
4483         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4484         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4485
4486         // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4487         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4488         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4489         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4490         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
4491 }
4492
4493 #[test]
4494 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
4495         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4496         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4497         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4498         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4499         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4500
4501         // Create some initial channels
4502         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4503
4504         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4505         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4506         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4507         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4508
4509         // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
4510         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
4511
4512         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4513
4514         // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
4515         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4516         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4517         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4518         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4519         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4520
4521         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4522         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4523         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4524         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4525
4526         // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
4527         let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
4528         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
4529
4530         // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4531         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4532         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
4533         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4534         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4535         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4536
4537         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4538         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
4539
4540         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4541         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4542         // transactions next...
4543         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4544         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4545         if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4546                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4547         } else {
4548                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4549                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4550         }
4551
4552         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4553         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4554
4555         check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
4556
4557         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
4558         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4559
4560         // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
4561         // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
4562
4563         // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4564         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
4565         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4566         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4567         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
4568         assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4569         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
4570         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
4571 }
4572
4573 #[test]
4574 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
4575         // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
4576         // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
4577         // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
4578         // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
4579         // channel.
4580         // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
4581         // gets broadcast.
4582
4583         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4584         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4585         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4586         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4587
4588         // Create some initial channels
4589         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4590         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4591
4592         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
4593         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4594         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4595         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4596         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4597
4598         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4599         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4600         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4601
4602         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
4603         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4604         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
4605         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4606         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4607         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4608         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4609         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4610         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4611         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4612         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4613
4614         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
4615         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
4616         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4617         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4618
4619         let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Success tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
4620         assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 3);
4621         assert_eq!(c_txn[0], c_txn[2]);
4622         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0], c_txn[1]);
4623         check_spends!(c_txn[1], chan_2.3);
4624         check_spends!(c_txn[2], c_txn[1]);
4625         assert_eq!(c_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
4626         assert_eq!(c_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4627         assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
4628         assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Success tx
4629
4630         // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
4631         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
4632         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![c_txn[1].clone(), c_txn[2].clone()]});
4633         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4634         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4635         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4636         match events[0] {
4637                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
4638                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4639         }
4640         match events[1] {
4641                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
4642                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
4643                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, Some(chan_1.2));
4644                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
4645                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
4646                 },
4647                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4648         }
4649         {
4650                 let mut b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4651                 // ChannelMonitor: claim tx
4652                 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
4653                 check_spends!(b_txn[0], chan_2.3); // B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
4654                 b_txn.clear();
4655         }
4656         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4657         let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4658         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
4659         match msg_events[0] {
4660                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4661                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4662         }
4663         match msg_events[1] {
4664                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
4665                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4666         }
4667         match msg_events[2] {
4668                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
4669                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4670                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4671                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4672                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4673                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
4674                 },
4675                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4676         };
4677         // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
4678         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4679         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4680         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4681         let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4682         // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success tx
4683         assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 3);
4684         check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_1.3);
4685         check_spends!(b_txn[2], b_txn[1]);
4686         check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4687         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4688         assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
4689         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Success tx
4690
4691         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4692         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4693 }
4694
4695 #[test]
4696 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
4697         // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
4698         // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
4699         // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
4700         // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
4701         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4702         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4703         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
4704         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
4705         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
4706         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
4707         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
4708                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
4709         let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4710
4711         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4712         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4713         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4714
4715         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4716         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4717         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4718         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4719         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
4720
4721         let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 900_000);
4722
4723         let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
4724         // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
4725         // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
4726         // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
4727         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id())
4728                 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
4729         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], payment_params, 900000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40);
4730         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 900000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
4731
4732         let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4733         assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4734         check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
4735
4736         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
4737         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4738         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4739         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4740         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4741
4742         let htlc_timeout_tx;
4743         { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
4744                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4745                 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 2-or-3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
4746                 assert!(node_txn.len() == 4 || node_txn.len() == 3);
4747                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
4748
4749                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
4750                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4751
4752                 if node_txn.len() > 3 {
4753                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
4754                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4755                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
4756
4757                         check_spends!(node_txn[3], commitment_txn[0]);
4758                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
4759                 } else {
4760                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
4761                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
4762                 }
4763
4764                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4765                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4766                 if node_txn.len() > 3 {
4767                         assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4768                 }
4769                 htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[1].clone();
4770         }
4771
4772         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
4773         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], duplicate_payment_hash, 900_000);
4774
4775         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
4776         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
4777         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4778         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4779         match events[0] {
4780                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4781                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4782         }
4783         match events[1] {
4784                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4785                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4786         }
4787         let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4788         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs), ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
4789         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
4790         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
4791         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4792         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4793         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4794         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4795         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4796         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
4797         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[3], htlc_success_txn[0]);
4798         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[4], htlc_success_txn[1]);
4799         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
4800
4801         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
4802         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4803         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
4804         let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4805         assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4806         assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4807         let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
4808         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4809         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4810         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4811
4812         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4813         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4814         {
4815                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
4816         }
4817         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
4818
4819         // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
4820         // Note that the fee paid is effectively double as the HTLC value (including the nodes[1] fee
4821         // and nodes[2] fee) is rounded down and then claimed in full.
4822         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[0]);
4823         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], Some(196*2), true, true);
4824         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4825         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4826         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4827         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4828         assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
4829         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4830         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4831
4832         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4833         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
4834
4835         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4836         match events[0] {
4837                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
4838                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
4839                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
4840                 }
4841                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4842         }
4843 }
4844
4845 #[test]
4846 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
4847         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4848         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4849         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4850         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4851
4852         // Create some initial channels
4853         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4854
4855         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
4856         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4857         assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
4858         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4859         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
4860
4861         // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
4862         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4863         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
4864         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4865
4866         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
4867         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4868         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4869         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4870         match events[0] {
4871                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4872                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4873         }
4874         match events[1] {
4875                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4876                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4877         }
4878         let node_tx = {
4879                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4880                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4881                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
4882                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
4883                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4884                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4885                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
4886                 node_txn[0].clone()
4887         };
4888
4889         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
4890         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4891
4892         // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
4893         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4894         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4895         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4896         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
4897         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4898 }
4899
4900 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
4901         // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
4902         // unrevoked commitment transaction.
4903         // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
4904         // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
4905         // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
4906         // use the same payment hashes.
4907         // Thus, we use a six-node network:
4908         //
4909         // A \         / E
4910         //    - C - D -
4911         // B /         \ F
4912         // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
4913         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
4914         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
4915         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
4916         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
4917         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
4918         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
4919         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
4920                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
4921         let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4922
4923         let _chan_0_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4924         let _chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4925         let chan_2_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4926         let chan_3_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4927         let chan_3_5  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4928
4929         // Rebalance and check output sanity...
4930         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
4931         send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
4932         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
4933
4934         let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2_3.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
4935         // 0th HTLC:
4936         let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4937         // 1st HTLC:
4938         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4939         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
4940         // 2nd HTLC:
4941         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4942         // 3rd HTLC:
4943         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4944         // 4th HTLC:
4945         let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
4946         // 5th HTLC:
4947         let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
4948         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
4949         // 6th HTLC:
4950         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200).unwrap());
4951         // 7th HTLC:
4952         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200).unwrap());
4953
4954         // 8th HTLC:
4955         let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
4956         // 9th HTLC:
4957         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
4958         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4959
4960         // 10th HTLC:
4961         let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4962         // 11th HTLC:
4963         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
4964         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200).unwrap());
4965
4966         // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
4967         // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
4968         // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
4969         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2).len(), 1);
4970         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
4971
4972         // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
4973         // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
4974         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1);
4975         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3);
4976         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5);
4977         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6);
4978         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
4979
4980         let failed_destinations = vec![
4981                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_1 },
4982                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_3 },
4983                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_5 },
4984                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_6 },
4985         ];
4986         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[4], failed_destinations);
4987         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
4988
4989         let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
4990         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4991         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
4992         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
4993         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
4994         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
4995
4996         // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
4997         nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
4998         nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4);
4999         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5000
5001         let failed_destinations_2 = vec![
5002                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 },
5003                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_4 },
5004         ];
5005         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[5], failed_destinations_2);
5006         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5007
5008         let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5009         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5010         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5011         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5012
5013         let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5014
5015         // After 4 and 2 removes respectively above in nodes[4] and nodes[5], nodes[3] should receive 6 PaymentForwardedFailed events
5016         let failed_destinations_3 = vec![
5017                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5018                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5019                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5020                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5021                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5022                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5023         ];
5024         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations_3);
5025         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5026         let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5027         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5028         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5029         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5030         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5031         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5032         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5033         if deliver_last_raa {
5034                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5035         } else {
5036                 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5037         }
5038
5039         // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5040         // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5041         // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5042         // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5043         //
5044         // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5045         // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5046         // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5047         //
5048         // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5049         // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5050         let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5051
5052         if announce_latest {
5053                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5054         } else {
5055                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5056         }
5057         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5058         let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5059                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2 + 6);
5060                 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5061         } else {
5062                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5063                 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5064         };
5065         match close_event {
5066                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5067                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5068         }
5069
5070         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5071         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5072         if deliver_last_raa {
5073                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5074
5075                 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(3).collect();
5076                 expect_htlc_handling_failed_destinations!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(), expected_destinations);
5077         } else {
5078                 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = if announce_latest {
5079                         repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(9).collect()
5080                 } else {
5081                         repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(6).collect()
5082                 };
5083
5084                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], expected_destinations);
5085         }
5086         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5087
5088         let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5089         assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5090         let mut a_done = false;
5091         for msg in cs_msgs {
5092                 match msg {
5093                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5094                                 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5095                                 // should be failed-backwards here.
5096                                 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5097                                         // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5098                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5099                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5100                                         }
5101                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5102                                         assert!(!a_done);
5103                                         a_done = true;
5104                                         &nodes[0]
5105                                 } else {
5106                                         // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5107                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5108                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5109                                         }
5110                                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5111                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5112                                         &nodes[1]
5113                                 };
5114                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5115                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5116                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5117                                 if announce_latest {
5118                                         target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5119                                         if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5120                                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5121                                         }
5122                                 }
5123                                 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5124                         },
5125                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5126                 }
5127         }
5128
5129         let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5130         assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5131         let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5132         let mut as_updates = 0;
5133         for event in as_events.iter() {
5134                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5135                         assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5136                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5137                                 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5138                         } else {
5139                                 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5140                         }
5141                         if network_update.is_some() {
5142                                 as_updates += 1;
5143                         }
5144                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5145         }
5146         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5147         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5148         if announce_latest {
5149                 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5150                 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5151         }
5152         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5153
5154         let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5155         assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5156         let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5157         let mut bs_updates = 0;
5158         for event in bs_events.iter() {
5159                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5160                         assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5161                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5162                                 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5163                         } else {
5164                                 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5165                         }
5166                         if network_update.is_some() {
5167                                 bs_updates += 1;
5168                         }
5169                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5170         }
5171         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5172         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5173         if announce_latest {
5174                 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5175         }
5176         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5177
5178         // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5179         // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5180         // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5181         // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5182         assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5183         assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5184 }
5185
5186 #[test]
5187 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5188         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5189 }
5190
5191 #[test]
5192 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5193         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5194 }
5195
5196 #[test]
5197 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5198         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5199         // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5200         // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5201 }
5202
5203 #[test]
5204 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5205         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5206         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5207         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5208         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5209
5210         // Create some initial channels
5211         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5212
5213         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5214         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5215         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5216         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5217
5218         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5219         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5220         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5221         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5222         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5223         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5224
5225         let htlc_timeout = {
5226                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5227                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
5228                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5229                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5230                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5231                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5232                 node_txn[1].clone()
5233         };
5234
5235         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5236         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5237         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5238
5239         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5240         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5241         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5242         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5243         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5244         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5245         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5246         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5247         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5248         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5249                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5250 }
5251
5252 #[test]
5253 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5254         // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with
5255         // a key manager rotation to test that key_derivation_params returned in DynamicOutputP2WSH
5256         // let us re-derive the channel key set to then derive a delayed_payment_key.
5257
5258         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5259
5260         // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5261         let seed = [42; 32];
5262         let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5263         let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5264         let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source.genesis_hash, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger);
5265         let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph, node_seed: seed, features: channelmanager::provided_init_features() };
5266         let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5267         node_cfgs.remove(0);
5268         node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5269
5270         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5271         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5272
5273         // Create some initial channels
5274         // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5275         // for node 0
5276         let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5277         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5278         assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5279
5280         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5281         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5282         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5283         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5284         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5285
5286         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5287         let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5288         let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5289         assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5290         check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5291
5292         // We check funding pubkey are unique
5293         let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5294         let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5295         if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5296             || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5297             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5298             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5299                 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5300         }
5301
5302         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5303         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5304         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5305         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5306         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5307         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5308
5309         let htlc_timeout = {
5310                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5311                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5312                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5313                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn_1[0]);
5314                 node_txn[1].clone()
5315         };
5316
5317         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5318         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5319         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5320
5321         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5322         let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5323         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5324         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5325         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5326         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5327         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5328         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5329         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5330         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5331         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5332                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5333 }
5334
5335 #[test]
5336 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5337         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5338         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5339         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5340         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5341
5342         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5343
5344         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5345         let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5346
5347         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5348         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5349         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5350
5351         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5352         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5353         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5354
5355         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5356         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5357         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5358
5359         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5360         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5361         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5362 }
5363
5364 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5365         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5366         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5367         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5368         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5369         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5370
5371         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5372
5373         // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5374         // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5375         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5376         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5377         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5378
5379         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5380         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5381         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
5382
5383         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5384         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5385         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5386         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5387         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5388
5389         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5390         let mut block = Block {
5391                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5392                 txdata: vec![],
5393         };
5394         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5395                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5396                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5397         }
5398         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5399         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5400         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5401         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5402 }
5403
5404 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5405         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5406         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5407         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5408         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5409         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5410
5411         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5412         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5413         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5414
5415         let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5416
5417         // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5418         // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5419         // to "time out" the HTLC.
5420
5421         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5422         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5423
5424         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5425                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: Vec::new()});
5426                 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
5427         }
5428         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5429         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5430         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5431         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5432 }
5433
5434 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5435         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5436         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5437         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5438         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5439         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5440
5441         // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
5442         // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5443         // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
5444         // actually revoked.
5445         let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
5446         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
5447         nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
5448         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
5449         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5450
5451         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5452         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5453         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5454         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5455         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5456         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5457         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5458         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
5459         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5460         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5461
5462         if check_revoke_no_close {
5463                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
5464                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5465         }
5466
5467         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5468         let mut block = Block {
5469                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5470                 txdata: vec![],
5471         };
5472         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
5473                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5474                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5475         }
5476         if !check_revoke_no_close {
5477                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5478                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5479                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5480                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5481         } else {
5482                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5483         }
5484 }
5485
5486 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
5487 // There are only a few cases to test here:
5488 //  * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
5489 //    broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
5490 //  * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
5491 //  * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
5492 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
5493 // non-dust HTLCs.
5494 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
5495 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
5496 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
5497 #[test]
5498 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
5499         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
5500         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
5501
5502         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
5503         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
5504 }
5505
5506 #[test]
5507 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
5508         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
5509         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
5510         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
5511         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
5512 }
5513
5514 #[test]
5515 #[should_panic]
5516 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
5517         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5518         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5519         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5520         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5521         // Force duplicate randomness for every get-random call
5522         for node in nodes.iter() {
5523                 *node.keys_manager.override_random_bytes.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
5524         }
5525
5526         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
5527         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5528         let push_msat=10001;
5529         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5530         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5531         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5532         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5533
5534         // Create a second channel with the same random values. This used to panic due to a colliding
5535         // channel_id, but now panics due to a colliding outbound SCID alias.
5536         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5537 }
5538
5539 #[test]
5540 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
5541         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5542         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5543         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5544         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5545
5546         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
5547         let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
5548         let push_msat=10001;
5549         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5550
5551         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
5552         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5553         // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
5554         let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
5555         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5556
5557         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
5558         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5559         let push_msat=10001;
5560         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
5561         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5562         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
5563
5564         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
5565         // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
5566         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
5567
5568         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
5569         assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
5570         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5571
5572         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
5573         let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
5574         assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
5575
5576         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
5577         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
5578         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5579         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5580         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
5581         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5582 }
5583
5584 #[test]
5585 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
5586         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5587         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5588         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5589         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5590
5591         let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
5592         let push_msat=10001;
5593         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5594         let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5595         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
5596         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
5597
5598         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5599         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5600         let err_msg = match events[0] {
5601                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
5602                         msg.clone()
5603                 },
5604                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5605         };
5606         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
5607 }
5608
5609 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
5610 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
5611 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
5612 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
5613 #[test]
5614 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
5615         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5616         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5617         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5618         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5619         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5620
5621         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5622         // pending_update_fee.
5623         {
5624                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5625                 *feerate_lock += 20;
5626         }
5627         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5628         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5629
5630         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5631         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5632         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5633                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5634                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5635                 },
5636                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5637         };
5638
5639         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5640
5641         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5642         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5643         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5644         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5645
5646         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5647         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
5648         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
5649
5650         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
5651         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5652         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5653         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
5654
5655         // Flush the pending fee update.
5656         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5657         let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5658         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5659         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
5660         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5661
5662         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
5663         // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
5664         // us to surface its failure to the user.
5665         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5666         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5667         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
5668         let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
5669                 hex::encode(our_payment_hash.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
5670         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
5671
5672         // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
5673         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5674         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5675         match &events[0] {
5676                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
5677                         assert_eq!(PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0), *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
5678                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
5679                         assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
5680                         assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
5681                         assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
5682                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id));
5683                 },
5684                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5685         }
5686 }
5687
5688 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
5689 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
5690 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
5691 #[test]
5692 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
5693         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5694         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5695         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5696         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5697         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5698
5699         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5700         // pending_update_fee.
5701         {
5702                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5703                 *feerate_lock += 200;
5704         }
5705         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5706         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5707
5708         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5709         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5710         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5711                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5712                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5713                 },
5714                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5715         };
5716
5717         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5718
5719         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5720         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5721         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5722         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5723
5724         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5725         let amt_1 = 20000;
5726         let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors) - amt_1;
5727         let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
5728         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
5729
5730         // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
5731         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
5732         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5733         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
5734         let payment_id_2 = PaymentId(nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5735         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2), payment_id_2).unwrap();
5736         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5737         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
5738
5739         // Flush the pending fee update.
5740         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5741         let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5742         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5743         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
5744         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5745         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
5746
5747         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
5748         // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
5749         // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
5750         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5751         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5752         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
5753         let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
5754                 hex::encode(payment_hash_2.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
5755         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
5756
5757         // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
5758         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5759         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5760         match &events[0] {
5761                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
5762                         assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
5763                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
5764                         assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
5765                         assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
5766                         assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
5767                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route_2.paths[0][0].short_channel_id));
5768                 },
5769                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5770         }
5771
5772         // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
5773         let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
5774                 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5775                 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
5776                 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
5777         };
5778         let raa = match send_raa_event {
5779                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
5780                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5781         };
5782         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5783         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5784         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5785         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5786         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5787         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5788         match events[0] {
5789                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
5790                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5791         }
5792         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5793         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5794         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5795         match events[0] {
5796                 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => {},
5797                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5798         }
5799         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
5800         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5801         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, amt_1);
5802
5803         let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5804         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5805         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
5806         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
5807 }
5808
5809 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
5810 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
5811 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
5812 // once it's freed.
5813 #[test]
5814 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
5815         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5816         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5817         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5818         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5819         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5820         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5821         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5822         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5823         let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5824         let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5825
5826         // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5827         // pending_update_fee.
5828         {
5829                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5830                 *feerate_lock += 20;
5831         }
5832         nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5833         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5834
5835         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5836         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5837         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5838                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5839                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5840                 },
5841                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5842         };
5843
5844         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5845
5846         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
5847         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5848         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
5849         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
5850
5851         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
5852         let feemsat = 239;
5853         let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
5854         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors) - total_routing_fee_msat;
5855         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
5856         let payment_event = {
5857                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5858                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5859
5860                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5861                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5862
5863                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
5864         };
5865         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5866         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5867         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5868         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5869
5870         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1_2.2);
5871         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
5872
5873         // Flush the pending fee update.
5874         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5875         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5876         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5877         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5878         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5879         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
5880
5881         // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
5882         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5883         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5884
5885         let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
5886                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
5887                         msg.clone()
5888                 },
5889                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5890         };
5891
5892         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
5893         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5894         assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5895
5896         // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
5897         let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5898         assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 2);
5899         match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
5900                 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
5901                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5902         }
5903
5904         // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
5905         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5906         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5907
5908         // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
5909         let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5910         assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
5911         let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
5912                 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
5913                         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
5914                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
5915                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
5916                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5917                         (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
5918                 },
5919                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5920         };
5921
5922         // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
5923         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
5924         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5925
5926         // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
5927         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5928         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5929         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5930         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5931         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
5932         let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5933         assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
5934         let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
5935                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
5936                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5937         };
5938         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5939         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
5940         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5941 }
5942
5943 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
5944 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
5945 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
5946
5947 #[test]
5948 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
5949         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
5950         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5951         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5952         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5953         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5954         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5955
5956         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
5957         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 100;
5958
5959         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
5960                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
5961         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5962         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value".to_string(), 1);
5963 }
5964
5965 #[test]
5966 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
5967         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
5968         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5969         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5970         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5971         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5972         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5973
5974         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
5975         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 0;
5976         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
5977                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
5978
5979         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5980         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
5981 }
5982
5983 #[test]
5984 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
5985         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
5986         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5987         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5988         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5989         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5990         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5991
5992         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
5993         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5994         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5995         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5996         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
5997
5998         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
5999         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6000         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6001         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6002         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() });
6003 }
6004
6005 #[test]
6006 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6007         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6008         //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6009         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6010         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6011         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6012         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6013         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6014
6015         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
6016                 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
6017         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], payment_params, 100000000, 0);
6018         route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = 500000001;
6019         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::RouteError { ref err },
6020                 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6021 }
6022
6023 #[test]
6024 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6025         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6026         //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6027         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6028         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6029         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6030         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6031         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6032         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6033         let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6034
6035         for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6036                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6037                 let payment_event = {
6038                         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6039                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6040
6041                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6042                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6043                         if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6044                                 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6045                         } else {
6046                                 assert!(false);
6047                         }
6048                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6049                 };
6050                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6051                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6052                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6053
6054                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6055                 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6056         }
6057         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6058         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6059                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6060
6061         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6062         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
6063 }
6064
6065 #[test]
6066 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6067         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6068         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6069         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6070         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6071         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6072         let channel_value = 100000;
6073         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6074         let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6075
6076         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6077
6078         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6079         // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6080         // limits us to.
6081         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat =  max_in_flight + 1;
6082         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6083                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6084
6085         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6086         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
6087
6088         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6089 }
6090
6091 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6092 #[test]
6093 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6094         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6095         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6096         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6097         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6098         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6099         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6100         let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6101         {
6102                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6103                 let channel = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6104                 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6105         }
6106
6107         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6108         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6109         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6110         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6111         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6112         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6113         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6114         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6115         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6116         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6117         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6118 }
6119
6120 #[test]
6121 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6122         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6123         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6124         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6125         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6126         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6127         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6128
6129         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6130         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6131         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6132         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6133         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6134         let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
6135
6136         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6137         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6138         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6139         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6140         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6141
6142         // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6143         // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6144         // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6145         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6146         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6147
6148         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6149         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6150         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6151         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6152         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6153 }
6154
6155 #[test]
6156 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6157         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6158         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6159         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6160         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6161         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6162         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6163         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6164
6165         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3999999);
6166         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6167         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6168         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6169         let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3999999, &Some(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6170         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash);
6171
6172         let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6173                 channel_id: chan.2,
6174                 htlc_id: 0,
6175                 amount_msat: 1000,
6176                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6177                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6178                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6179         };
6180
6181         for i in 0..super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
6182                 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6183                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6184         }
6185         msg.htlc_id = (super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS) as u64;
6186         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6187
6188         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6189         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6190         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6191         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6192         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6193 }
6194
6195 #[test]
6196 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6197         //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6198         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6199         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6200         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6201         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6202         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6203
6204         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6205         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6206         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6207         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6208         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6209         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6210
6211         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6212         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6213         assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6214         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6215         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6216 }
6217
6218 #[test]
6219 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6220         //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6221         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6222         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6223         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6224         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6225
6226         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6227         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6228         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6229         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6230         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6231         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6232         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6233
6234         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6235         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6236         assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6237         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6238         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6239 }
6240
6241 #[test]
6242 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6243         //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6244         // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6245         // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6246         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6247         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6248         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6249         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6250
6251         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6252         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6253         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6254         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6255         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6256         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6257
6258         //Disconnect and Reconnect
6259         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6260         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6261         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
6262         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6263         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6264         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
6265         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6266         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6267         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6268         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6269         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6270         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6271
6272         //Resend HTLC
6273         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6274         assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6275         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6276         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6277         let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6278
6279         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6280
6281         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6282         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6283         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6284         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6285         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6286 }
6287
6288 #[test]
6289 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6290         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6291
6292         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6293         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6294         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6295         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6296         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6297         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6298         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6299
6300         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6301         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6302         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6303
6304         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6305                 channel_id: chan.2,
6306                 htlc_id: 0,
6307                 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6308         };
6309
6310         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6311
6312         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6313         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6314         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6315         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6316         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6317 }
6318
6319 #[test]
6320 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6321         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6322
6323         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6324         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6325         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6326         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6327         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6328
6329         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6330         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6331         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6332         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6333         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6334
6335         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6336                 channel_id: chan.2,
6337                 htlc_id: 0,
6338                 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6339         };
6340
6341         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6342
6343         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6344         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6345         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6346         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6347         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6348 }
6349
6350 #[test]
6351 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6352         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6353
6354         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6355         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6356         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6357         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6358         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6359
6360         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6361         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6362         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6363         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6364         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6365         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6366                 channel_id: chan.2,
6367                 htlc_id: 0,
6368                 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6369                 failure_code: 0x8000,
6370         };
6371
6372         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6373
6374         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6375         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6376         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6377         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6378         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6379 }
6380
6381 #[test]
6382 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6383         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6384
6385         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6386         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6387         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6388         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6389         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6390
6391         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6392
6393         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6394         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6395         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6396
6397         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6398         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6399         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6400                 match events[0] {
6401                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6402                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6403                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6404                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6405                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6406                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6407                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6408                         },
6409                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6410                 }
6411         };
6412
6413         update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6414
6415         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6416
6417         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6418         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6419         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6420         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6421         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6422 }
6423
6424 #[test]
6425 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6426         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6427
6428         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6429         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6430         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6431         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6432         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6433
6434         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6435
6436         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6437         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6438         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6439
6440         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6441         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6442         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6443                 match events[0] {
6444                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6445                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6446                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6447                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6448                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6449                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6450                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6451                         },
6452                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6453                 }
6454         };
6455
6456         update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
6457
6458         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6459
6460         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6461         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6462         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6463         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6464         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6465 }
6466
6467 #[test]
6468 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
6469         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
6470
6471         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6472         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6473         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6474         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6475         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6476
6477         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6478         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6479         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6480
6481         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6482         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6483
6484         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6485         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6486         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6487
6488         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6489
6490         let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
6491                 match events[0] {
6492                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6493                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6494                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6495                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6496                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6497                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6498                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
6499                         },
6500                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6501                 }
6502         };
6503         update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
6504         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6505
6506         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6507         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6508         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
6509         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6510         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6511 }
6512
6513 #[test]
6514 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
6515         //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
6516         //    * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
6517
6518         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6519         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6520         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6521         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6522         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6523         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6524
6525         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
6526
6527         //First hop
6528         let mut payment_event = {
6529                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6530                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6531                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6532                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6533                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6534         };
6535         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6536         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6537         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6538         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6539         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6540         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6541         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6542         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6543         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6544
6545         //Second Hop
6546         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6547         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6548         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6549         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6550
6551         let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6552         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6553         let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
6554                 match events_3[0] {
6555                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6556                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6557                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6558                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6559                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6560                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6561                                 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
6562                         },
6563                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6564                 }
6565         };
6566
6567         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
6568
6569         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6570         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
6571         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
6572         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6573         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6574
6575         //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
6576         match events_4[0] {
6577                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6578                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6579                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6580                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6581                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6582                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6583                 },
6584                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6585         };
6586
6587         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6588 }
6589
6590 #[test]
6591 fn test_channel_failed_after_message_with_badonion_node_perm_bits_set() {
6592         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6593         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6594         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6595         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6596         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6597         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6598
6599         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100_000);
6600
6601         // First hop
6602         let mut payment_event = {
6603                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6604                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6605                 SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[0])
6606         };
6607
6608         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6609         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6610         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6611         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6612         payment_event = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[1]);
6613         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6614
6615         // Second Hop
6616         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; // Trigger an invalid_onion_version error
6617         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6618         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6619         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6620
6621         let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6622         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6623         match events_3[0] {
6624                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6625                         let mut update_msg = updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone();
6626                         // Set the NODE bit (BADONION and PERM already set in invalid_onion_version error)
6627                         update_msg.failure_code |= 0x2000;
6628
6629                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6630                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6631                 },
6632                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6633         }
6634
6635         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1],
6636                 vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel {
6637                         node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
6638         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6639         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6640         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6641
6642         match events_4[0] {
6643                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6644                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6645                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6646                 },
6647                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6648         }
6649
6650         let events_5 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6651         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
6652
6653         // Expect a PaymentPathFailed event with a ChannelFailure network update for the channel between
6654         // the node originating the error to its next hop.
6655         match events_5[0] {
6656                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { network_update:
6657                         Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure { short_channel_id, is_permanent }), error_code, ..
6658                 } => {
6659                         assert_eq!(short_channel_id, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id);
6660                         assert!(is_permanent);
6661                         assert_eq!(error_code, Some(0x8000|0x4000|0x2000|4));
6662                 },
6663                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6664         }
6665
6666         // TODO: Test actual removal of channel from NetworkGraph when it's implemented.
6667 }
6668
6669 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
6670         // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
6671         // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
6672         // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
6673
6674         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6675         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
6676         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6677         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6678         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6679         let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6680
6681         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6682
6683         // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
6684         let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6685         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6686         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6687
6688         // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
6689         let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6690
6691         // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
6692         nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
6693         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6694         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
6695         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6696
6697         let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6698         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6699         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
6700         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6701
6702         // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
6703         let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6704
6705         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6706         match events[0] {
6707                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
6708                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6709                 },
6710                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6711         }
6712         match events[1] {
6713                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
6714                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6715                 },
6716                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6717         }
6718
6719         assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
6720         // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
6721         if announce_latest {
6722                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
6723         } else {
6724                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
6725         }
6726
6727         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6728         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6729         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6730
6731         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6732         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6733         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6734         // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
6735         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6736         let mut first_failed = false;
6737         for event in events {
6738                 match event {
6739                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6740                                 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
6741                                         assert!(!first_failed);
6742                                         first_failed = true;
6743                                 } else {
6744                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
6745                                 }
6746                         }
6747                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6748                 }
6749         }
6750 }
6751
6752 #[test]
6753 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
6754         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
6755         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
6756 }
6757
6758 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
6759         // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
6760         // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
6761         // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6762         // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
6763         // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6764         // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
6765
6766         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6767         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6768         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6769         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6770         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6771
6772         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6773
6774         let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6775         let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6776
6777         let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6778         let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
6779
6780         // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
6781         if revoked {
6782                 let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6783                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
6784         }
6785
6786         let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
6787         if local {
6788                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
6789                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
6790                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6791                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6792                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
6793
6794                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
6795                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6796                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6797                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6798                 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
6799                 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6800                 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
6801                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6802                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
6803                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6804                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
6805         } else {
6806                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
6807                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
6808                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6809                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6810                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6811                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6812
6813                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
6814                 timeout_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..)
6815                         .filter(|tx| tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == bs_commitment_tx[0].txid()).collect();
6816                 check_spends!(timeout_tx[0], bs_commitment_tx[0]);
6817                 // For both a revoked or non-revoked commitment transaction, after ANTI_REORG_DELAY the
6818                 // dust HTLC should have been failed.
6819                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
6820
6821                 if !revoked {
6822                         assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6823                 } else {
6824                         assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].lock_time.0, 0);
6825                 }
6826                 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout/revocation-claim tx
6827                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
6828                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6829                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6830                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
6831         }
6832 }
6833
6834 #[test]
6835 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
6836         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
6837         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
6838         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
6839 }
6840
6841 #[test]
6842 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
6843         // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
6844
6845         let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
6846         low_our_to_self_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
6847         let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
6848         high_their_to_self_config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
6849         let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
6850         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6851         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6852         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
6853         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6854
6855         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
6856         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
6857                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 1000000, 1000000, 0,
6858                 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, 42)
6859         {
6860                 match error {
6861                         APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
6862                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6863                 }
6864         } else { assert!(false) }
6865
6866         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
6867         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
6868         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6869         open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
6870         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
6871                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
6872                 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
6873         {
6874                 match error {
6875                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str()));  },
6876                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6877                 }
6878         } else { assert!(false); }
6879
6880         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
6881         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
6882         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
6883         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6884         accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
6885         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
6886         let reason_msg;
6887         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
6888                 match action {
6889                         &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
6890                                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
6891                                 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
6892                         },
6893                         _ => { panic!(); }
6894                 }
6895         } else { panic!(); }
6896         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg });
6897
6898         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
6899         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
6900         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6901         open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
6902         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
6903                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
6904                 &high_their_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
6905         {
6906                 match error {
6907                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
6908                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6909                 }
6910         } else { assert!(false); }
6911 }
6912
6913 #[test]
6914 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
6915         // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
6916         // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
6917         // to B, B should refuse payment.
6918
6919         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6920         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6921         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6922         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6923
6924         // Create some initial channels
6925         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6926
6927         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
6928         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
6929         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
6930         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
6931         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6932         let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
6933         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6934         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6935
6936         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6937         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6938         let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
6939         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6940         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6941
6942         // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
6943         // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
6944         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6945         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
6946
6947         // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
6948         // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
6949         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6950
6951         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6952         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6953         let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6954                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6955                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6956                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6957                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6958                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6959                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6960                         (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
6961                 },
6962                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6963         };
6964         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6965
6966         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
6967         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
6968
6969         // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
6970         let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(10_000).to_vec();
6971         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH));
6972         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
6973 }
6974
6975 #[test]
6976 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
6977         // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
6978         // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
6979
6980         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6981         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6982         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6983         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6984
6985         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6986         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6987         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6988
6989         // Disconnect peers
6990         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6991         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6992
6993         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // Enabled -> DisabledStaged
6994         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // DisabledStaged -> Disabled
6995         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6996         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
6997         let mut chans_disabled = HashMap::new();
6998         for e in msg_events {
6999                 match e {
7000                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7001                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7002                                 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7003                                 if chans_disabled.insert(msg.contents.short_channel_id, msg.contents.timestamp).is_some() {
7004                                         panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7005                                 }
7006                         },
7007                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7008                 }
7009         }
7010         // Reconnect peers
7011         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7012         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7013         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7014         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7015         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7016         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7017
7018         // Reestablish chan_1
7019         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7020         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7021         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7022         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7023         // Reestablish chan_2
7024         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7025         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7026         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7027         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7028         // Reestablish chan_3
7029         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7030         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7031         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7032         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7033
7034         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7035         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7036         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7037         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7038         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7039         for e in msg_events {
7040                 match e {
7041                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7042                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7043                                 match chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7044                                         // Each update should have a higher timestamp than the previous one, replacing
7045                                         // the old one.
7046                                         Some(prev_timestamp) => assert!(msg.contents.timestamp > prev_timestamp),
7047                                         None => panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!"),
7048                                 }
7049                         },
7050                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7051                 }
7052         }
7053         // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7054         assert!(chans_disabled.is_empty());
7055 }
7056
7057 #[test]
7058 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7059         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7060         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7061
7062         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7063         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7064         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7065         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7066
7067         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7068
7069         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7070         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
7071                 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
7072         let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_params, 3000000, 30);
7073         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7074
7075         let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7076         // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7077         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7078         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7079         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7080         let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7081
7082         let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7083         for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7084                 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7085                         penalty_sum += outp.value;
7086                 }
7087         }
7088
7089         // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7090         let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7091
7092         // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7093         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7094         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_114, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7095         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()] });
7096         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7097
7098         // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7099         let penalty_1;
7100         let feerate_1;
7101         {
7102                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7103                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor) + local commitment tx
7104                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7105                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7106                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7107                 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7108                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7109                 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7110                 node_txn.clear();
7111         };
7112
7113         // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7114         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7115         let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7116         let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7117         {
7118                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7119                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7120                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7121                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7122                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7123                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7124                         penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7125                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7126                         assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7127                         let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7128                         feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7129                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7130                         assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7131                         node_txn.clear();
7132                 }
7133         }
7134         assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7135
7136         // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7137         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7138         let penalty_3;
7139         let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7140         {
7141                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7142                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7143                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7144                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7145                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7146                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7147                         penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7148                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7149                         assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7150                         let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7151                         feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7152                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7153                         assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7154                         node_txn.clear();
7155                 }
7156         }
7157         assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7158
7159         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7160         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7161 }
7162
7163 #[test]
7164 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7165         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7166         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7167
7168         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7169         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7170         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7171         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7172         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7173
7174         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7175         // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7176         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
7177         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7178         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7179         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7180                 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7181         let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7182         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
7183         let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[1].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7184                 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7185         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7186
7187         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7188         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7189         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7190
7191         // Revoke local commitment tx
7192         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7193
7194         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7195         // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7196         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7197         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7198         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7199         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7200         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 49); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7201
7202         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
7203         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
7204         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], chan.3);
7205
7206         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7207         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7208         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7209
7210         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7211         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7212         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
7213         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7214
7215         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7216         let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7217         let header_11 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: hash_128, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7218         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_11, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7219         let header_129 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_11.block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7220         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_129, txdata: vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[2].clone()] });
7221         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7222         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7223         match events.last().unwrap() {
7224                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7225                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7226         }
7227         let first;
7228         let feerate_1;
7229         let penalty_txn;
7230         {
7231                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7232                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + A commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7233                 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7234
7235                 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7236                 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7237                 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7238                 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7239                 // future).
7240                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7241                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7242                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7243                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7244                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7245                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7246
7247                 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7248                 // available, which we check here:
7249                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7250                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7251                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7252
7253                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7254                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7255
7256                 // node_txn[3] is the local commitment tx broadcast just because (and somewhat in case of
7257                 // reorgs, though its not clear its ever worth broadcasting conflicting txn like this when
7258                 // a remote commitment tx has already been confirmed).
7259                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan.3);
7260
7261                 // node_txn[4] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7262                 // output, checked above).
7263                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 2);
7264                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].output.len(), 1);
7265                 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7266
7267                 first = node_txn[4].txid();
7268                 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7269                 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[4].output[0].value;
7270                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[4].weight() as u64;
7271                 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7272                 node_txn.clear();
7273         }
7274
7275         // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7276         let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_129.block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7277         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7278         let header_131 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_130.block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7279         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_131, txdata: Vec::new() });
7280
7281         // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7282         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7283         assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7284         let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7285         let node_txn = {
7286                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7287                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7288
7289                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7290                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7291                 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7292                 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7293                 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7294                 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7295                 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7296                 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7297                 node_txn.clear();
7298                 txn
7299         };
7300         // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7301         let header_145 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_144, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7302         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_145, txdata: node_txn });
7303         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7304         {
7305                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7306                 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7307                 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7308                 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7309                 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7310                 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7311                 // up bumped justice generation.
7312                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7313                 node_txn.clear();
7314         }
7315         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7316         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7317 }
7318
7319 #[test]
7320 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
7321         // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7322         // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7323
7324         // Create 2 HTLCs
7325         // Provide preimage for one
7326         // Check aggregation
7327
7328         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7329         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7330         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7331         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7332
7333         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7334         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
7335         route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
7336
7337         // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7338         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7339         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7340         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7341         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7342
7343         // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
7344         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7345         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
7346         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
7347         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7348         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7349
7350         // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
7351         let timeout;
7352         let preimage;
7353         let preimage_bump;
7354         let feerate_timeout;
7355         let feerate_preimage;
7356         {
7357                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7358                 // 5 transactions including:
7359                 //   local commitment + HTLC-Success
7360                 //   preimage and timeout sweeps from remote commitment + preimage sweep bump
7361                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5);
7362                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7363                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
7364                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
7365                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7366                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], remote_txn[0]);
7367                 check_spends!(node_txn[4], remote_txn[0]);
7368
7369                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan.3); // local commitment
7370                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]); // local HTLC-Success
7371
7372                 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
7373                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7374                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7375                 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7376
7377                 let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output == node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output {
7378                         (node_txn[3].clone(), node_txn[4].clone())
7379                 } else {
7380                         (node_txn[4].clone(), node_txn[3].clone())
7381                 };
7382
7383                 preimage_bump = preimage_bump_tx;
7384                 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7385                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output);
7386
7387                 timeout = timeout_tx.txid();
7388                 let index = timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7389                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - timeout_tx.output[0].value;
7390                 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / timeout_tx.weight() as u64;
7391
7392                 node_txn.clear();
7393         };
7394         assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
7395         assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
7396
7397         // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
7398         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7399         {
7400                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7401                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7402                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7403                 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
7404                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7405                 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7406
7407                 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7408                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
7409                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.weight() as u64;
7410                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
7411                 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
7412
7413                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7414                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7415                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7416                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
7417                 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
7418
7419                 node_txn.clear();
7420         }
7421
7422         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7423         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7424 }
7425
7426 #[test]
7427 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
7428         // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
7429         // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
7430         // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
7431         // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
7432         // EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
7433         // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
7434         // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
7435         // implement that).
7436         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7437         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7438         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7439         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7440         let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).2;
7441
7442         let per_commitment_secret;
7443         let next_per_commitment_point;
7444         {
7445                 let mut guard = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
7446                 let keys = guard.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
7447
7448                 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
7449
7450                 // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
7451                 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7452                 per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
7453
7454                 // Must revoke without gaps
7455                 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7456                 keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
7457
7458                 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7459                 next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
7460                         &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
7461         }
7462
7463         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
7464                 &msgs::RevokeAndACK { channel_id, per_commitment_secret, next_per_commitment_point });
7465         assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
7466         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7467         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() });
7468 }
7469
7470 #[test]
7471 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
7472         // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
7473         // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7474
7475         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7476         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7477         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7478         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7479
7480         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7481         // Lock HTLC in both directions
7482         let (payment_preimage_1, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000);
7483         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000);
7484
7485         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7486         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7487         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7488
7489         // Revoke local commitment tx
7490         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
7491
7492         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7493         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
7494         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[0], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
7495         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7496
7497         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
7498         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7499         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7500         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7501         let penalty_txn = {
7502                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7503                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
7504                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7505                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7506                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7507                 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
7508                 node_txn.clear();
7509                 penalty_txn
7510         };
7511         let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7512         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7513         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7514         {
7515                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
7516                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
7517                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
7518         }
7519 }
7520
7521 #[test]
7522 fn test_pending_claimed_htlc_no_balance_underflow() {
7523         // Tests that if we have a pending outbound HTLC as well as a claimed-but-not-fully-removed
7524         // HTLC we will not underflow when we call `Channel::get_balance_msat()`.
7525         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7526         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7527         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7528         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7529         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7530
7531         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_010_000);
7532         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7533         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_010_000);
7534         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7535         let fulfill_ev = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7536
7537         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7538         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
7539         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.commitment_signed);
7540         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7541         let (_raa, _cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7542
7543         // At this point nodes[1] has received 1,010k msat (10k msat more than their reserve) and can
7544         // send an HTLC back (though it will go in the holding cell). Send an HTLC back and check we
7545         // can get our balance.
7546
7547         // Get a route from nodes[1] to nodes[0] by getting a route going the other way and then flip
7548         // the public key of the only hop. This works around ChannelDetails not showing the
7549         // almost-claimed HTLC as available balance.
7550         let (mut route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000);
7551         route.payment_params = None; // This is all wrong, but unnecessary
7552         route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7553         let (_, payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7554         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
7555
7556         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].balance_msat, 1_000_000);
7557 }
7558
7559 #[test]
7560 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
7561         // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
7562         // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
7563         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7564         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7565         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7566         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7567
7568         let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7569
7570         // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
7571         // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
7572         // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
7573         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
7574         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7575
7576         // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
7577         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
7578         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7579         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7580
7581         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7582         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7583         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
7584         let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7585         assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
7586         match close_ev[0] {
7587                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
7588                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7589                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
7590                 },
7591                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7592         }
7593 }
7594
7595 #[test]
7596 fn test_override_channel_config() {
7597         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7598         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7599         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7600         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7601
7602         // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
7603         let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
7604         override_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
7605
7606         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
7607
7608         // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
7609         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7610         assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
7611         assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
7612 }
7613
7614 #[test]
7615 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
7616         let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
7617         zero_config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
7618         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7619         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7620         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
7621         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7622
7623         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
7624         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7625         assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7626
7627         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &res);
7628         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7629         assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7630 }
7631
7632 #[test]
7633 fn test_channel_update_has_correct_htlc_maximum_msat() {
7634         // Tests that the `ChannelUpdate` message has the correct values for `htlc_maximum_msat` set.
7635         // Bolt 7 specifies that if present `htlc_maximum_msat`:
7636         // 1. MUST be set to less than or equal to the channel capacity. In LDK, this is capped to
7637         // 90% of the `channel_value`.
7638         // 2. MUST be set to less than or equal to the `max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` received from the peer.
7639
7640         let mut config_30_percent = UserConfig::default();
7641         config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7642         config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 30;
7643         let mut config_50_percent = UserConfig::default();
7644         config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7645         config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 50;
7646         let mut config_95_percent = UserConfig::default();
7647         config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7648         config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 95;
7649         let mut config_100_percent = UserConfig::default();
7650         config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7651         config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 100;
7652
7653         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7654         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7655         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config_30_percent), Some(config_50_percent), Some(config_95_percent), Some(config_100_percent)]);
7656         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7657
7658         let channel_value_satoshis = 100000;
7659         let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7660         let channel_value_30_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.3) as u64;
7661         let channel_value_50_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.5) as u64;
7662         let channel_value_90_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.9) as u64;
7663
7664         let (node_0_chan_update, node_1_chan_update, _, _)  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value_satoshis, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7665         let (node_2_chan_update, node_3_chan_update, _, _)  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, channel_value_satoshis, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7666
7667         // Assert that `node[0]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 50 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7668         // that's the value of `node[1]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
7669         assert_eq!(node_0_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_50_percent_msat);
7670         // Assert that `node[1]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 30 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7671         // that's the value of `node[0]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
7672         assert_eq!(node_1_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_30_percent_msat);
7673
7674         // Assert that `node[2]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7675         // the value of `node[3]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (100%), exceeds 90% of the
7676         // `channel_value`.
7677         assert_eq!(node_2_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
7678         // Assert that `node[3]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7679         // the value of `node[2]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (95%), exceeds 90% of the
7680         // `channel_value`.
7681         assert_eq!(node_3_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
7682 }
7683
7684 #[test]
7685 fn test_manually_accept_inbound_channel_request() {
7686         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7687         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7688         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7689         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7690         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7691         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7692
7693         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7694         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7695
7696         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &res);
7697
7698         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
7699         // accepting the inbound channel request.
7700         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7701
7702         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7703         match events[0] {
7704                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
7705                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap();
7706                 }
7707                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7708         }
7709
7710         let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7711         assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7712
7713         match accept_msg_ev[0] {
7714                 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
7715                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7716                 }
7717                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7718         }
7719
7720         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
7721
7722         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7723         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7724
7725         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7726         match events[0] {
7727                 Event::ChannelClosed { user_channel_id, .. } => {
7728                         assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 23);
7729                 }
7730                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7731         }
7732 }
7733
7734 #[test]
7735 fn test_manually_reject_inbound_channel_request() {
7736         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7737         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7738         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7739         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7740         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7741         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7742
7743         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7744         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7745
7746         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &res);
7747
7748         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
7749         // rejecting the inbound channel request.
7750         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7751
7752         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7753         match events[0] {
7754                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
7755                         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
7756                 }
7757                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7758         }
7759
7760         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7761         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7762
7763         match close_msg_ev[0] {
7764                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => {
7765                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7766                 }
7767                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7768         }
7769         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
7770 }
7771
7772 #[test]
7773 fn test_reject_funding_before_inbound_channel_accepted() {
7774         // This tests that when `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` is set to true, inbound
7775         // channels must to be manually accepted through `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel` by
7776         // the node operator before the counterparty sends a `FundingCreated` message. If a
7777         // `FundingCreated` message is received before the channel is accepted, it should be rejected
7778         // and the channel should be closed.
7779         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7780         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7781         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7782         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7783         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7784         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7785
7786         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7787         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7788         let temp_channel_id = res.temporary_channel_id;
7789
7790         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &res);
7791
7792         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in the `msg_events`.
7793         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7794
7795         // Clear the `Event::OpenChannelRequest` event without responding to the request.
7796         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7797
7798         // Get the `AcceptChannel` message of `nodes[1]` without calling
7799         // `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`, which generates a
7800         // `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` event. The message is passed to `nodes[0]`
7801         // `handle_accept_channel`, which is required in order for `create_funding_transaction` to
7802         // succeed when `nodes[0]` is passed to it.
7803         let accept_chan_msg = {
7804                 let mut lock;
7805                 let channel = get_channel_ref!(&nodes[1], lock, temp_channel_id);
7806                 channel.get_accept_channel_message()
7807         };
7808         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_chan_msg);
7809
7810         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
7811
7812         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
7813         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7814
7815         // The `funding_created_msg` should be rejected by `nodes[1]` as it hasn't accepted the channel
7816         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
7817
7818         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7819         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7820
7821         let expected_err = "FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted";
7822         match close_msg_ev[0] {
7823                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id, } => {
7824                         assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, temp_channel_id);
7825                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7826                         assert_eq!(msg.data, expected_err);
7827                 }
7828                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7829         }
7830
7831         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
7832 }
7833
7834 #[test]
7835 fn test_can_not_accept_inbound_channel_twice() {
7836         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7837         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7838         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7839         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7840         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7841         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7842
7843         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7844         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7845
7846         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &res);
7847
7848         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
7849         // accepting the inbound channel request.
7850         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7851
7852         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7853         match events[0] {
7854                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
7855                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0).unwrap();
7856                         let api_res = nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
7857                         match api_res {
7858                                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
7859                                         assert_eq!(err, "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.");
7860                                 },
7861                                 Ok(_) => panic!("Channel shouldn't be possible to be accepted twice"),
7862                                 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
7863                         }
7864                 }
7865                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7866         }
7867
7868         // Ensure that the channel wasn't closed after attempting to accept it twice.
7869         let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7870         assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7871
7872         match accept_msg_ev[0] {
7873                 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
7874                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7875                 }
7876                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7877         }
7878 }
7879
7880 #[test]
7881 fn test_can_not_accept_unknown_inbound_channel() {
7882         let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7883         let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
7884         let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
7885         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
7886
7887         let unknown_channel_id = [0; 32];
7888         let api_res = nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&unknown_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
7889         match api_res {
7890                 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
7891                         assert_eq!(err, "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist");
7892                 },
7893                 Ok(_) => panic!("It shouldn't be possible to accept an unkown channel"),
7894                 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
7895         }
7896 }
7897
7898 #[test]
7899 fn test_simple_mpp() {
7900         // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
7901         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7902         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7903         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
7904         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7905
7906         let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7907         let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7908         let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7909         let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7910
7911         let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
7912         let path = route.paths[0].clone();
7913         route.paths.push(path);
7914         route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7915         route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
7916         route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
7917         route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
7918         route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
7919         route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
7920         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
7921         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
7922 }
7923
7924 #[test]
7925 fn test_preimage_storage() {
7926         // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
7927         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7928         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7929         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7930         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7931
7932         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7933
7934         {
7935                 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
7936                 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7937                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
7938                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7939                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7940                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7941                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7942                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7943         }
7944         // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
7945         // values from previous calls.
7946         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7947         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7948         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7949         match events[0] {
7950                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref purpose, .. } => {
7951                         match &purpose {
7952                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
7953                                         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
7954                                 },
7955                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
7956                         }
7957                 },
7958                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7959         }
7960 }
7961
7962 #[test]
7963 #[allow(deprecated)]
7964 fn test_secret_timeout() {
7965         // Simple test of payment secret storage time outs. After
7966         // `create_inbound_payment(_for_hash)_legacy` is removed, this test will be removed as well.
7967         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7968         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7969         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7970         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7971
7972         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7973
7974         let (payment_hash, payment_secret_1) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_legacy(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
7975
7976         // We should fail to register the same payment hash twice, at least until we've connected a
7977         // block with time 7200 + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1.
7978         if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
7979                 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
7980         } else { panic!(); }
7981         let mut block = {
7982                 let node_1_blocks = nodes[1].blocks.lock().unwrap();
7983                 Block {
7984                         header: BlockHeader {
7985                                 version: 0x2000000,
7986                                 prev_blockhash: node_1_blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(),
7987                                 merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(),
7988                                 time: node_1_blocks.len() as u32 + 7200, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
7989                         txdata: vec![],
7990                 }
7991         };
7992         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
7993         if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
7994                 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
7995         } else { panic!(); }
7996
7997         // If we then connect the second block, we should be able to register the same payment hash
7998         // again (this time getting a new payment secret).
7999         block.header.prev_blockhash = block.header.block_hash();
8000         block.header.time += 1;
8001         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8002         let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8003         assert_ne!(payment_secret_1, our_payment_secret);
8004
8005         {
8006                 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8007                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8008                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8009                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8010                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8011                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8012                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8013         }
8014         // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8015         // values from previous calls.
8016         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8017         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8018         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8019         match events[0] {
8020                 Event::PaymentReceived { purpose: PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret }, .. } => {
8021                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
8022                         assert_eq!(payment_secret, our_payment_secret);
8023                         // We don't actually have the payment preimage with which to claim this payment!
8024                 },
8025                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8026         }
8027 }
8028
8029 #[test]
8030 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8031         // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8032         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8033         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8034         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8035         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8036
8037         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8038
8039         let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8040         let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8041         let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8042         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8043
8044         // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8045         // resulting events.
8046         macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8047                 ($payment_hash: expr) => {
8048                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8049                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8050                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8051                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8052                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8053
8054                         // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8055                         // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8056                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8057                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash: $payment_hash }]);
8058                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8059
8060                         // We should fail the payment back
8061                         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8062                         match events.pop().unwrap() {
8063                                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8064                                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8065                                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8066                                 },
8067                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8068                         }
8069                 }
8070         }
8071
8072         let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8073         // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8074         let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8075
8076         // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8077         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8078         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(our_payment_hash);
8079         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8080
8081         // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8082         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(random_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8083         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8084         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8085
8086         // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8087         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret), PaymentId(random_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8088         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8089         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8090 }
8091
8092 #[test]
8093 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8094         // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8095         // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8096         // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus
8097         // error.
8098         //
8099         // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8100         // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8101         // commitment at same time.
8102
8103         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8104         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8105         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8106         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8107
8108         // Create some initial channel
8109         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8110         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8111
8112         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8113         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8114
8115         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8116         let (preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
8117
8118         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8119         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8120         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8121         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8122         let watchtower = {
8123                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8124                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8125                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8126                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8127                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8128                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8129                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8130                 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8131                 watchtower
8132         };
8133         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8134         let block = Block { header, txdata: vec![] };
8135         // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8136         // transaction lock time requirements here.
8137         chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (block.clone(), 0));
8138         watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, 200);
8139
8140         // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8141         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage);
8142         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8143         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
8144
8145         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8146         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8147         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8148         if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8149                 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8150                         assert_eq!(watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure);
8151                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8152                 } else { assert!(false); }
8153         } else { assert!(false); };
8154         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8155         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8156         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8157         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8158 }
8159
8160 #[test]
8161 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8162         // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8163         // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8164         // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8165         // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8166
8167         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8168         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8169         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8170         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8171
8172         // Create some initial channel
8173         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8174         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8175
8176         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8177         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8178
8179         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8180         route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8181
8182         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8183         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8184         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8185         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8186         let watchtower_alice = {
8187                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8188                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8189                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8190                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8191                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8192                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8193                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8194                 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8195                 watchtower
8196         };
8197         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8198         let block = Block { header, txdata: vec![] };
8199         // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8200         // transaction lock time requirements here.
8201         chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as usize, (block.clone(), 0));
8202         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8203
8204         // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8205         {
8206                 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8207                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8208                 txn.clear();
8209         }
8210
8211         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8212         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8213         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8214         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8215         let watchtower_bob = {
8216                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8217                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8218                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8219                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8220                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8221                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8222                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8223                 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8224                 watchtower
8225         };
8226         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8227         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8228
8229         // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8230         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8231         {
8232                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8233         }
8234         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8235
8236         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8237         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8238         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8239         if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8240                 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8241                         // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8242                         assert_eq!(watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure);
8243                         assert_eq!(watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8244                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8245                 } else { assert!(false); }
8246         } else { assert!(false); };
8247         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8248         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8249
8250         //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8251         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8252         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8253
8254         // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8255         let bob_state_y;
8256         {
8257                 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8258                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8259                 bob_state_y = txn[0].clone();
8260                 txn.clear();
8261         };
8262
8263         // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8264         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8265         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![bob_state_y.clone()] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8266         {
8267                 let htlc_txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8268                 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 1);
8269                 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8270         }
8271 }
8272
8273 #[test]
8274 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8275         // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8276         // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8277         // message).
8278         //
8279         // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8280         // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8281         //
8282         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8283         // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8284         // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8285         // before receiving funding_signed.
8286         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8287         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8288         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8289         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8290
8291         // Create an initial channel
8292         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8293         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8294         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_chan_msg);
8295         let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8296         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_chan_msg);
8297
8298         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8299         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8300
8301         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8302         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8303
8304         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8305         let channel_id = crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
8306         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8307         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8308         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Hi".to_string() }, true);
8309 }
8310
8311 #[test]
8312 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8313         // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8314         // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8315         // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8316         // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
8317         // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
8318         // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
8319
8320         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8321         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8322         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8323         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8324
8325         // Create some initial channels
8326         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8327
8328         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
8329         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
8330         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
8331         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8332         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
8333         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
8334
8335         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8336         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8337         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] });
8338         // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
8339         // this test before #653 fix.
8340         chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
8341         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8342         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8343         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8344         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
8345
8346         let htlc_timeout = {
8347                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8348                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
8349                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8350                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
8351                 node_txn[1].clone()
8352         };
8353
8354         let header_201 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8355         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_201, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout.clone()] });
8356         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8357         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
8358 }
8359
8360 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
8361         // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
8362         // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
8363         // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
8364         //
8365         // Steps of the test:
8366         // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
8367         // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
8368         // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
8369         // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
8370         // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
8371         //    but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
8372         // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
8373         // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
8374         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8375         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8376         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8377         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8378
8379         // Create some initial channels
8380         let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8381         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8382
8383         // Steps (1) and (2):
8384         // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
8385         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
8386
8387         // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
8388         let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
8389         check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8390         assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
8391         check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
8392         assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8393         assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
8394
8395         // Steps (3) and (4):
8396         // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
8397         // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
8398         let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
8399         let mut counterparty_node = 1; // Bob if Alice force-closes
8400
8401         // Bob force-closes
8402         if !broadcast_alice {
8403                 force_closing_node = 1;
8404                 counterparty_node = 0;
8405         }
8406         nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_ab.2, &nodes[counterparty_node].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8407         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
8408         check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
8409         check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8410         if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8411                 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
8412                         true => alice_txn.clone(),
8413                         false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
8414                 };
8415                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8416                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8417                 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8418                 if broadcast_alice {
8419                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8420                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8421                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8422                 }
8423                 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8424                 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8425         }
8426
8427         // Step (5):
8428         // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
8429         // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
8430         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8431         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8432         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
8433
8434         let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8435         assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8436         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8437         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8438         assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
8439         assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8440
8441         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8442         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false, false);
8443         // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
8444         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
8445                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8446                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8447                 match events[0] {
8448                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
8449                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8450                         },
8451                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8452                 };
8453         }
8454         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
8455         // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
8456         // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
8457         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8458
8459         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8460         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8461         let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
8462                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8463                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8464                         (*msg).clone()
8465                 },
8466                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8467         };
8468         let bob_updates = match events[1] {
8469                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
8470                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8471                         (*updates).clone()
8472                 },
8473                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8474         };
8475
8476         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
8477         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8478         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
8479         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8480
8481         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8482         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8483         let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
8484                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8485                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8486                         (*msg).clone()
8487                 },
8488                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8489         };
8490         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
8491         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8492
8493         // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
8494         // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
8495         let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
8496         if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
8497         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8498                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8499                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8500                 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
8501                 if broadcast_alice {
8502                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8503                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8504                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8505                 }
8506                 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8507                 if broadcast_alice {
8508                         // In `connect_block()`, the ChainMonitor and ChannelManager are separately notified about a
8509                         // new block being connected. The ChannelManager being notified triggers a monitor update,
8510                         // which triggers broadcasting our commitment tx and an HTLC-claiming tx. The ChainMonitor
8511                         // being notified triggers the HTLC-claiming tx redundantly, resulting in 3 total txs being
8512                         // broadcasted.
8513                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 3);
8514                         check_spends!(bob_txn[1], chan_ab.3);
8515                 } else {
8516                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8517                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8518                 }
8519         }
8520
8521         // Step (6):
8522         // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
8523         // broadcasted commitment transaction.
8524         {
8525                 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8526                 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8527                         // Bob should now have an extra broadcasted tx, for the preimage-claiming transaction.
8528                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8529                 }
8530                 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
8531                         true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
8532                         false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
8533                 };
8534                 // If Alice force-closed and Bob didn't receive her commitment transaction until after he
8535                 // received Carol's fulfill, he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction first. Else if
8536                 // Bob force closed or if he found out about Alice's commitment tx before receiving Carol's
8537                 // fulfill, then he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction second.
8538                 if broadcast_alice && !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8539                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8540                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8541                 } else {
8542                         check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8543                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8544                 }
8545         }
8546 }
8547
8548 #[test]
8549 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
8550         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
8551         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
8552         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
8553         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
8554 }
8555
8556 #[test]
8557 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
8558         // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
8559         // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
8560         //
8561         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
8562         // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
8563         // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
8564         // updating logic for the existing channel.
8565         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8566         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8567         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8568         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8569
8570         // Create an initial channel
8571         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8572         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8573         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_chan_msg);
8574         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8575
8576         // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
8577         // that it is rejected.
8578         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_chan_msg);
8579         {
8580                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8581                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8582                 match events[0] {
8583                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8584                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
8585                                 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
8586                                 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
8587                                 // move forward with it.
8588                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8589                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8590                         },
8591                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8592                 }
8593         }
8594
8595         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8596         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8597
8598         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8599         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8600
8601         let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8602         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8603         {
8604                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8605                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8606                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8607                 added_monitors.clear();
8608         }
8609         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8610
8611         let funding_outpoint = crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
8612         let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
8613
8614         // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
8615         // temporary one).
8616
8617         // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
8618         // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
8619         // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
8620         open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
8621         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_chan_msg);
8622         {
8623                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8624                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8625                 match events[0] {
8626                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8627                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8628                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8629                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8630                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8631                         },
8632                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8633                 }
8634         }
8635
8636         // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
8637         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8638         let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8639         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_chan_2_msg);
8640         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8641         create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
8642
8643         let funding_created = {
8644                 let mut a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
8645                 // Once we call `get_outbound_funding_created` the channel has a duplicate channel_id as
8646                 // another channel in the ChannelManager - an invalid state. Thus, we'd panic later when we
8647                 // try to create another channel. Instead, we drop the channel entirely here (leaving the
8648                 // channelmanager in a possibly nonsense state instead).
8649                 let mut as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.remove(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
8650                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8651                 as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
8652         };
8653         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8654         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
8655         // At this point we'll try to add a duplicate channel monitor, which will be rejected, but
8656         // still needs to be cleared here.
8657         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8658
8659         // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
8660         {
8661                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8662                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8663                 match events[0] {
8664                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8665                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8666                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8667                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
8668                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8669                         },
8670                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8671                 }
8672         }
8673
8674         // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
8675         // everything is functional.
8676         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
8677         {
8678                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8679                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8680                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8681                 added_monitors.clear();
8682         }
8683
8684         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8685         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
8686         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
8687         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
8688
8689         let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8690         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8691         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
8692
8693         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
8694 }
8695
8696 #[test]
8697 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
8698         // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
8699         //
8700         // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
8701         // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
8702         // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
8703         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8704         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8705         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8706         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8707
8708         // Create some initial channels
8709         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8710         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8711         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8712
8713         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8714         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8715         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8716
8717         // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
8718         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8719         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8720
8721         // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
8722         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8723         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8724         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
8725         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
8726         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
8727         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8728         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
8729         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8730
8731         // A null channel ID should close all channels
8732         let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8733         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8734         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
8735         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
8736         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8737         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8738         match events[0] {
8739                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
8740                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
8741                 },
8742                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8743         }
8744         match events[1] {
8745                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
8746                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
8747                 },
8748                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8749         }
8750         // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
8751         // peer_disconnected with no_connection_possible set to false, duplicating the
8752         // close-all-channels logic. That's OK, we don't want to end up not force-closing channels for
8753         // users with their own peer handling logic. We duplicate the call here, however.
8754         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8755         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8756
8757         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
8758         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8759         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8760 }
8761
8762 #[test]
8763 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
8764         // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
8765         //
8766         // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
8767         // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
8768         // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
8769         // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
8770         //
8771         // Further, if the funding transaction is consensus-valid, confirms, and is later spent, we'd
8772         // previously have crashed in `ChannelMonitor` even though we closed the channel as bogus and
8773         // gave up on it. We test this here by generating such a transaction.
8774         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8775         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8776         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8777         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8778
8779         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8780         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8781         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8782
8783         let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
8784
8785         // Create a witness program which can be spent by a 4-empty-stack-elements witness and which is
8786         // 136 bytes long. This matches our "accepted HTLC preimage spend" matching, previously causing
8787         // a panic as we'd try to extract a 32 byte preimage from a witness element without checking
8788         // its length.
8789         let mut wit_program: Vec<u8> = channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program();
8790         let wit_program_script: Script = wit_program.into();
8791         for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
8792                 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
8793                 output.script_pubkey = Script::new_v0_p2wsh(&wit_program_script.wscript_hash());
8794         }
8795
8796         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
8797         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8798         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8799
8800         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8801         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8802
8803         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8804         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
8805
8806         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
8807         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
8808         nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
8809
8810         let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
8811         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
8812         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
8813         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8814         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8815         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
8816         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
8817                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8818                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
8819                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
8820                 } else { panic!(); }
8821         } else { panic!(); }
8822         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
8823
8824         // Now confirm a spend of the (bogus) funding transaction. As long as the witness is 5 elements
8825         // long the ChannelMonitor will try to read 32 bytes from the second-to-last element, panicing
8826         // as its not 32 bytes long.
8827         let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
8828                 version: 2i32, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
8829                 input: tx.output.iter().enumerate().map(|(idx, _)| TxIn {
8830                         previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
8831                                 txid: tx.txid(),
8832                                 vout: idx as u32,
8833                         },
8834                         script_sig: Script::new(),
8835                         sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
8836                         witness: Witness::from_vec(channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness())
8837                 }).collect(),
8838                 output: vec![TxOut {
8839                         value: 1000,
8840                         script_pubkey: Script::new(),
8841                 }]
8842         };
8843         check_spends!(spend_tx, tx);
8844         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &spend_tx);
8845 }
8846
8847 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
8848         // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
8849         // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
8850         // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
8851         // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
8852         // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
8853         // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
8854         // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
8855         // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
8856         // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
8857         // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
8858         // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
8859         // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
8860         // until we learned about an additional block.
8861         //
8862         // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
8863         // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
8864         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8865         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8866         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8867         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8868         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
8869
8870         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8871         let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8872         let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
8873         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8874         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8875
8876         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8877         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8878         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8879         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8880         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
8881         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8882
8883         let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
8884         if !test_height_before_timelock {
8885                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
8886         }
8887         nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
8888                 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
8889         if test_height_before_timelock {
8890                 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
8891                 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
8892                 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8893                 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
8894         } else {
8895                 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
8896                 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
8897                 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
8898                 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
8899                 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
8900                 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
8901                 // timelock is up).
8902                 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
8903                 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
8904
8905                 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
8906                 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
8907                 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
8908                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
8909                         &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
8910                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: channel_id }]);
8911                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8912
8913                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8914                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8915                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8916                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8917                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8918                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8919                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8920                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8921                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
8922         }
8923 }
8924
8925 #[test]
8926 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
8927         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
8928         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
8929 }
8930
8931 fn do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(test_for_second_fail_panic: bool) {
8932         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8933         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8934         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8935         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8936
8937         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8938
8939         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
8940                 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
8941         let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
8942
8943         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
8944
8945         {
8946                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8947                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8948                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8949                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8950                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8951                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8952                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8953         }
8954         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8955         expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 10_000);
8956
8957         {
8958                 // Note that we use a different PaymentId here to allow us to duplicativly pay
8959                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_secret.0)).unwrap();
8960                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8961                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8962                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8963                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8964                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8965                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8966                 // At this point, nodes[1] would notice it has too much value for the payment. It will
8967                 // assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
8968                 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC. Previously, it'd also have failed back
8969                 // the first HTLC delivered above.
8970         }
8971
8972         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
8973         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
8974
8975         if test_for_second_fail_panic {
8976                 // Now we go fail back the first HTLC from the user end.
8977                 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
8978
8979                 let expected_destinations = vec![
8980                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
8981                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
8982                 ];
8983                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1],  expected_destinations);
8984                 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
8985
8986                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8987                 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8988                 assert_eq!(fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 2);
8989
8990                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8991                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
8992                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
8993
8994                 let failure_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8995                 assert_eq!(failure_events.len(), 2);
8996                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
8997                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[1] {} else { panic!(); }
8998         } else {
8999                 // Let the second HTLC fail and claim the first
9000                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9001                 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9002
9003                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9004                 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9005                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9006                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9007
9008                 expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9009
9010                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
9011         }
9012 }
9013
9014 #[test]
9015 fn test_dup_htlc_second_fail_panic() {
9016         // Previously, if we received two HTLCs back-to-back, where the second overran the expected
9017         // value for the payment, we'd fail back both HTLCs after generating a `PaymentReceived` event.
9018         // Then, if the user failed the second payment, they'd hit a "tried to fail an already failed
9019         // HTLC" debug panic. This tests for this behavior, checking that only one HTLC is auto-failed.
9020         do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(true);
9021 }
9022
9023 #[test]
9024 fn test_dup_htlc_second_rejected() {
9025         // Test that if we receive a second HTLC for an MPP payment that overruns the payment amount we
9026         // simply reject the second HTLC but are still able to claim the first HTLC.
9027         do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(false);
9028 }
9029
9030 #[test]
9031 fn test_inconsistent_mpp_params() {
9032         // Test that if we recieve two HTLCs with different payment parameters we fail back the first
9033         // such HTLC and allow the second to stay.
9034         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9035         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9036         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9037         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9038
9039         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9040         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9041         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9042         let chan_2_3 =create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9043
9044         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id())
9045                 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
9046         let mut route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 15_000_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
9047         assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9048         route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9049                 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9050                 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9051                         core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9052         });
9053         let payment_params_opt = Some(payment_params);
9054
9055         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[3]);
9056
9057         let cur_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
9058         let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
9059
9060         let session_privs = {
9061                 // We create a fake route here so that we start with three pending HTLCs, which we'll
9062                 // ultimately have, just not right away.
9063                 let mut dup_route = route.clone();
9064                 dup_route.paths.push(route.paths[1].clone());
9065                 nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &dup_route).unwrap()
9066         };
9067         {
9068                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
9069                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9070
9071                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9072                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9073                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), false, None);
9074         }
9075         assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9076
9077         {
9078                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 14_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
9079                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9080
9081                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9082                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9083                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9084
9085                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9086                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9087
9088                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9089                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9090
9091                 let mut events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9092                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9093                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9094
9095                 nodes[3].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9096                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9097                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg, true, true);
9098
9099                 // At this point, nodes[3] should notice the two HTLCs don't contain the same total payment
9100                 // amount. It will assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9101                 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC.
9102         }
9103         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[3]);
9104         nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9105         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[3], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9106         nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9107
9108         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
9109
9110         let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9111         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9112         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9113
9114         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }]);
9115         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9116
9117         let fail_updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9118         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9119         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], fail_updates_2.commitment_signed, false);
9120
9121         expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9122
9123         nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[2]).unwrap();
9124         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9125
9126         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9127         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9128         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), true, None);
9129
9130         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, our_payment_preimage);
9131 }
9132
9133 #[test]
9134 fn test_keysend_payments_to_public_node() {
9135         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9136         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9137         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9138         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9139
9140         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9141         let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9142         let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9143         let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9144         let route_params = RouteParameters {
9145                 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9146                 final_value_msat: 10000,
9147                 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9148         };
9149         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
9150         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9151         let route = find_route(&payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
9152
9153         let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9154         let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(test_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9155         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9156         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9157         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9158         let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9159         let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9160         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9161         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9162 }
9163
9164 #[test]
9165 fn test_keysend_payments_to_private_node() {
9166         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9167         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9168         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9169         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9170
9171         let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9172         let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9173         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
9174         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
9175
9176         let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9177         let route_params = RouteParameters {
9178                 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9179                 final_value_msat: 10000,
9180                 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9181         };
9182         let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9183         let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9184         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
9185         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9186         let route = find_route(
9187                 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9188                 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
9189         ).unwrap();
9190
9191         let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9192         let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(test_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9193         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9194         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9195         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9196         let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9197         let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9198         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9199         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9200 }
9201
9202 #[test]
9203 fn test_double_partial_claim() {
9204         // Test what happens if a node receives a payment, generates a PaymentReceived event, the HTLCs
9205         // time out, the sender resends only some of the MPP parts, then the user processes the
9206         // PaymentReceived event, ensuring they don't inadvertently claim only part of the full payment
9207         // amount.
9208         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9209         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9210         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9211         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9212
9213         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9214         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9215         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9216         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9217
9218         let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], 15_000_000);
9219         assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9220         route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9221                 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9222                 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9223                         core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9224         });
9225
9226         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
9227         // nodes[3] has now received a PaymentReceived event...which it will take some (exorbitant)
9228         // amount of time to respond to.
9229
9230         // Connect some blocks to time out the payment
9231         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
9232         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // To get the same height for sending later
9233
9234         let failed_destinations = vec![
9235                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
9236                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
9237         ];
9238         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations);
9239
9240         pass_failed_payment_back(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_hash);
9241
9242         // nodes[1] now retries one of the two paths...
9243         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9244         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9245
9246         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9247         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9248         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
9249
9250         // At this point nodes[3] has received one half of the payment, and the user goes to handle
9251         // that PaymentReceived event they got hours ago and never handled...we should refuse to claim.
9252         nodes[3].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9253         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9254         assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9255 }
9256
9257 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
9258 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
9259 enum ExposureEvent {
9260         /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
9261         AtHTLCForward,
9262         /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
9263         AtHTLCReception,
9264         /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
9265         AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
9266 }
9267
9268 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool) {
9269         // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
9270         // policy.
9271         //
9272         // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
9273         // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
9274         // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
9275         // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
9276         // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
9277         // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
9278         // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
9279         // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
9280
9281         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9282         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
9283         config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = 5_000_000; // default setting value
9284         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9285         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
9286         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9287
9288         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9289         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9290         open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
9291         open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
9292         if on_holder_tx {
9293                 open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9294         }
9295         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel);
9296         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9297         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
9298
9299         let opt_anchors = false;
9300
9301         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9302
9303         if on_holder_tx {
9304                 if let Some(mut chan) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&temporary_channel_id) {
9305                         chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9306                 }
9307         }
9308
9309         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9310         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9311         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9312
9313         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9314         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9315
9316         let (channel_ready, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9317         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9318         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9319
9320         let dust_buffer_feerate = {
9321                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
9322                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
9323                 chan.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64
9324         };
9325         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9326         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9327
9328         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9329         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9330
9331         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 25;
9332         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
9333
9334         if on_holder_tx {
9335                 if dust_outbound_balance {
9336                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9337                         // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9338                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
9339                         for i in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9340                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9341                                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9342                         }
9343                 } else {
9344                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9345                         // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9346                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
9347                         for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9348                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9349                         }
9350                 }
9351         } else {
9352                 if dust_outbound_balance {
9353                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9354                         // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9355                         for i in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9356                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9357                                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9358                         }
9359                 } else {
9360                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9361                         // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9362                         for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9363                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9364                         }
9365                 }
9366         }
9367
9368         let dust_overflow = dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx + 1);
9369         if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
9370                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9371                 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9372                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9373                 if on_holder_tx {
9374                         let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9375                         let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9376                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9377                 } else {
9378                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9379                 }
9380         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
9381                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9382                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9383                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9384                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9385                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9386                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
9387                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9388                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9389                 if on_holder_tx {
9390                         // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
9391                         let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9392                         let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9393                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9394                 } else {
9395                         // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
9396                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9397                 }
9398         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
9399                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 2_500_000);
9400                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)) { panic!("Unexpected event at update_fee-swallowed HTLC", ); }
9401                 {
9402                         let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9403                         *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
9404                 }
9405                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9406                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9407                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure".to_string(), 1);
9408         }
9409
9410         let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9411         let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9412         added_monitors.clear();
9413 }
9414
9415 #[test]
9416 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
9417         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9418         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9419         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9420         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9421         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9422         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9423         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9424         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9425         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9426         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9427         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9428         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9429 }
9430
9431 #[test]
9432 fn test_non_final_funding_tx() {
9433         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9434         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9435         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9436         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9437
9438         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9439         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9440         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_message);
9441         let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9442         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel_message);
9443
9444         let best_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
9445
9446         let chan_id = *nodes[0].network_chan_count.borrow();
9447         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9448         let input = TxIn { previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint::null(), script_sig: bitcoin::Script::new(), sequence: Sequence(1), witness: Witness::from_vec(vec!(vec!(1))) };
9449         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9450         let mut tx = match events[0] {
9451                 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } => {
9452                         // Timelock the transaction _beyond_ the best client height + 2.
9453                         Transaction { version: chan_id as i32, lock_time: PackedLockTime(best_height + 3), input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut {
9454                                 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9455                         }]}
9456                 },
9457                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9458         };
9459         // Transaction should fail as it's evaluated as non-final for propagation.
9460         match nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()) {
9461                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
9462                         assert_eq!(format!("Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final"), err);
9463                 },
9464                 _ => panic!()
9465         }
9466
9467         // However, transaction should be accepted if it's in a +2 headroom from best block.
9468         tx.lock_time = PackedLockTime(tx.lock_time.0 - 1);
9469         assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
9470         get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9471 }