1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
15 use chain::{Confirm, Listen, Watch};
16 use chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
17 use chain::channelmonitor;
18 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
19 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
20 use chain::keysinterface::{BaseSign, KeysInterface};
21 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
22 use ln::channel::{commitment_tx_base_weight, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT};
23 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS };
24 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
25 use ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
26 use ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
27 use routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
28 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, find_route, get_route};
29 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures, NodeFeatures};
31 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
32 use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
33 use util::{byte_utils, test_utils};
34 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
35 use util::errors::APIError;
36 use util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
37 use util::config::UserConfig;
39 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
40 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
41 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
42 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
43 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
44 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
45 use bitcoin::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, Witness};
46 use bitcoin::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
48 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
49 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
55 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
56 use core::default::Default;
57 use core::iter::repeat;
58 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
60 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
61 use ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
64 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
65 // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
66 use ln::channel::TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS;
67 let mut cfg = UserConfig::default();
68 cfg.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1;
69 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
70 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
71 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(cfg)]);
72 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
74 // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
76 let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
77 let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat, &cfg);
78 let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
80 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
81 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
83 // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
84 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
86 // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
87 // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
88 let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
89 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
90 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
91 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
92 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
93 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
95 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
96 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), expected_regex, 1);
98 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
100 } else { assert!(false); }
103 use ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
105 // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
106 insane_open_helper(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2; msg });
107 insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS; msg });
109 insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
111 insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than channel amount minus reserve \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
113 insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
115 insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
117 insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
119 insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
121 insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
125 fn test_funding_exceeds_no_wumbo_limit() {
126 // Test that if a peer does not support wumbo channels, we'll refuse to open a wumbo channel to
128 use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO;
129 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
130 let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
131 node_cfgs[1].features = InitFeatures::known().clear_wumbo();
132 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
133 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
135 match nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1, 0, 42, None) {
136 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
137 assert_eq!(format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1), err);
143 fn do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(send_from_initiator: bool) {
144 // A peer providing a channel_reserve_satoshis of 0 (or less than our dust limit) is insecure,
145 // but only for them. Because some LSPs do it with some level of trust of the clients (for a
146 // substantial UX improvement), we explicitly allow it. Because it's unlikely to happen often
147 // in normal testing, we test it explicitly here.
148 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
149 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
150 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
151 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
152 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
154 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
155 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
156 let feerate_per_kw = 253;
157 let opt_anchors = false;
158 push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
159 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
161 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None).unwrap();
162 let mut open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
163 if !send_from_initiator {
164 open_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
165 open_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
167 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_message);
169 // Extract the channel accept message from node1 to node0
170 let mut accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
171 if send_from_initiator {
172 accept_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
173 accept_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
175 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel_message);
178 let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(if send_from_initiator { &nodes[1] } else { &nodes[0] }, lock, temp_channel_id);
179 chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
180 chan.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
183 let funding_tx = sign_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100_000, temp_channel_id);
184 let funding_msgs = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_tx);
185 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_msgs.0);
187 // nodes[0] should now be able to send the full balance to nodes[1], violating nodes[1]'s
188 // security model if it ever tries to send funds back to nodes[0] (but that's not our problem).
189 if send_from_initiator {
190 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000_000
191 // Note that for outbound channels we have to consider the commitment tx fee and the
192 // "fee spike buffer", which is currently a multiple of the total commitment tx fee as
193 // well as an additional HTLC.
194 - FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, 2, opt_anchors));
196 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], push_amt);
201 fn test_counterparty_no_reserve() {
202 do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(true);
203 do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(false);
207 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
208 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
209 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
210 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
211 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
212 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
215 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
219 // send (1) commitment_signed -.
220 // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
221 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
222 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
223 // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
224 // (2) RAA is delivered ->
225 // .- send (4) commitment_signed
226 // <- (3) RAA is delivered
227 // send (5) commitment_signed -.
228 // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
230 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
232 // (6) RAA is delivered ->
234 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
236 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
239 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
240 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
242 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
243 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
244 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
245 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
246 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
248 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
251 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
253 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
254 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
255 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
256 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
258 let payment_event = {
259 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
260 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
261 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
263 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
264 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
266 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
267 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
268 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
269 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
270 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
271 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
273 // deliver(1), generate (3):
274 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
275 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
276 // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
277 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
279 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
280 let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
281 assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
282 assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
283 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
284 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
285 assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
286 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
288 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
289 let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
290 assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
291 assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
292 assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
293 assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
294 assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
295 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
297 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
298 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
299 // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
300 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
302 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
303 let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
304 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
306 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
307 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
309 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
310 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
312 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
313 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
316 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
317 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
321 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
322 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
323 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
324 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
325 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
326 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
327 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
328 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
331 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
333 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
335 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
338 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
339 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
341 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
342 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
343 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
344 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
347 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
350 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
352 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
353 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
354 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
355 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
357 let payment_event = {
358 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
359 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
360 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
362 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
363 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
365 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
366 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
367 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
368 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
369 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
370 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
372 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
373 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
375 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
379 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
380 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
381 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
382 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
383 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
384 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
387 // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
388 // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
389 // update_fee (never committed) ->
391 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
392 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
393 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
394 // <- (1) RAA delivered
395 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
396 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
397 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
398 // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
400 // B should send no response here
401 // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
402 // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
405 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
408 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
409 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
410 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
412 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
413 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
415 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
416 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
417 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
418 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
419 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
421 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
424 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
425 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
426 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
427 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
428 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
430 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
433 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
434 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
436 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
437 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
438 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
440 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
441 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
442 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
443 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
446 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
448 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
450 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
452 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
453 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
454 let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
455 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
456 assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
457 assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
458 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
459 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
460 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
461 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
462 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
464 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
465 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
466 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
467 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
468 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
470 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
471 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
472 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
475 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
476 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
477 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
479 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
480 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
481 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
483 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
484 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
485 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
486 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
488 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
489 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
490 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
493 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
494 // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
495 // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
496 // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
499 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
500 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
501 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
502 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
504 if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
506 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
509 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
510 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
513 if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
514 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
515 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
517 if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
518 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
519 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
521 if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
522 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
524 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
526 if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
527 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
528 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
529 let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
531 if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
532 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
534 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
535 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
536 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
537 added_monitors.clear();
539 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
541 if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
542 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
544 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
545 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
546 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
547 added_monitors.clear();
550 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
551 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
553 if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
554 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
556 if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
557 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
558 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
559 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
563 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
564 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
565 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
566 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
567 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
568 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
569 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
570 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
571 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
572 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
573 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
574 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
575 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
576 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
577 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
578 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
579 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
580 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
581 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
585 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
586 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
587 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
588 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
589 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
590 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
593 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
596 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
597 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
599 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
600 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
601 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
602 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
603 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
605 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
607 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
609 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
610 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
611 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
613 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
614 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
615 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
617 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
618 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
619 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
620 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
622 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
623 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
624 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
628 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
629 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
630 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
631 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
632 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
633 let channel_value = 5000;
635 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
636 let channel_id = chan.2;
637 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
638 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
639 let bs_channel_reserve_sats = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value, &default_config);
641 let opt_anchors = false;
643 // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
644 // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
645 // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
647 let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
648 let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors)) as u32;
650 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
651 *feerate_lock = feerate;
653 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
654 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
655 let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
657 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
659 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
661 // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
663 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
665 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
666 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
667 let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000;
668 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
669 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
670 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
674 // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
675 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
678 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
679 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
680 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
682 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
684 // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
685 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
686 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
687 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
688 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
689 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
690 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
691 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
692 pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
694 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
695 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
696 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
697 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
698 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
699 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
700 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
701 pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
704 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
705 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
706 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
709 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
710 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
711 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
712 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
713 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
714 INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
716 channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000,
717 opt_anchors, local_funding, remote_funding,
718 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
719 non_buffer_feerate + 4,
721 &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
723 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
726 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
729 htlc_signatures: res.1
732 let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
734 feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
737 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
739 //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
740 //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
741 //Should produce and error.
742 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
743 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
744 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
745 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
746 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") });
750 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
751 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
752 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
753 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
754 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
755 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
758 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
761 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
764 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
765 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
767 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
768 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
769 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
770 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
771 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
773 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
775 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
776 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
777 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
778 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
780 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
782 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
783 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
785 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
786 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
787 added_monitors.clear();
789 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
790 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
791 // node[1] has nothing to do
793 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
794 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
795 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
797 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
798 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
799 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
800 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
801 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
802 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
803 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
805 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
806 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
807 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
808 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
809 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
810 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
812 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
813 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
814 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
815 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
817 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
818 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
819 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
821 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
822 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
823 let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
824 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
826 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
827 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
828 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
830 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
832 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
833 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
835 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
836 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
839 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
841 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
842 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
843 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
844 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
845 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
849 fn test_update_fee() {
850 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
851 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
852 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
853 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
854 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
855 let channel_id = chan.2;
858 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
859 // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
860 // .- send (3) commitment_signed
861 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
862 // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
863 // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
864 // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
865 // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
866 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
867 // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
868 // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
871 // Create and deliver (1)...
874 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
875 feerate = *feerate_lock;
876 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
878 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
879 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
881 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
882 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
883 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
884 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
885 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
887 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
889 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
891 // Generate (2) and (3):
892 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
893 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
894 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
897 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
898 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
899 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
901 // Create and deliver (4)...
903 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
904 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
906 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
907 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
908 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
909 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
910 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
911 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
912 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
914 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
917 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
918 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
919 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
921 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
922 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
924 // Handle (3), creating (6):
925 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
926 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
927 let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
928 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
931 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
932 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
933 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
935 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
936 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
937 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
938 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
939 assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
940 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
941 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
942 assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
943 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
946 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
947 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
948 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
949 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
951 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
952 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
953 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
955 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
956 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
957 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
958 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
959 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
963 fn fake_network_test() {
964 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
965 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
966 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
967 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
968 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
969 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
971 // Create some initial channels
972 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
973 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
974 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
976 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
977 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
978 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
979 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
980 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
982 // Send some more payments
983 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
984 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
985 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
987 // Test failure packets
988 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
989 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
991 // Add a new channel that skips 3
992 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
994 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
995 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
996 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
997 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
998 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
999 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1000 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1002 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
1003 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1004 hops.push(RouteHop {
1005 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1006 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1007 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1008 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1010 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1012 hops.push(RouteHop {
1013 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1014 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1015 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1016 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1018 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1020 hops.push(RouteHop {
1021 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1022 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1023 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1024 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1026 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1028 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1029 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1030 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
1032 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1033 hops.push(RouteHop {
1034 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1035 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1036 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1037 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1039 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1041 hops.push(RouteHop {
1042 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1043 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1044 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1045 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1047 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1049 hops.push(RouteHop {
1050 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1051 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1052 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1053 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1055 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1057 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1058 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1059 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1061 // Claim the rebalances...
1062 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1063 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1065 // Close down the channels...
1066 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1067 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1068 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1069 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1070 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1071 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1072 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1073 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1074 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1075 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1076 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1077 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1081 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1082 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1083 // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1084 // commitment dance rounds.
1085 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1086 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1087 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1088 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1089 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1090 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1092 let mut payments = Vec::new();
1093 for _ in 0..::ln::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
1094 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1095 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
1096 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1098 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1100 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1101 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1102 let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1103 assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1105 // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1106 // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1108 let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1110 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1111 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1112 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1113 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
1116 // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1117 let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1119 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
1120 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1123 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1124 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1125 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1126 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1128 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1129 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1130 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1131 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1132 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1133 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
1134 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1136 let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1137 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1138 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1140 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1142 // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1143 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1144 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1145 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1147 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1148 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1149 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1150 let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1152 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1153 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1154 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1156 for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1157 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1159 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1160 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1161 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1162 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1163 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1165 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1166 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1167 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1168 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1169 let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1171 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1172 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1174 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1176 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1177 assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1178 for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1180 &Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1181 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1183 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1187 for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1188 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1191 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1195 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1196 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1197 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1198 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1199 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1200 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1201 let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1203 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1204 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1205 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1206 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1207 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1208 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1210 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1212 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1213 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1215 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1216 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1218 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1219 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1220 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1224 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1225 // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1226 // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1227 // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1228 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1229 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1230 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1231 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1233 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1236 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1238 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1240 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1241 let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
1242 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1244 // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1245 nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1246 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, 800_000);
1247 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1249 // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1250 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1252 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1253 let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1254 for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1255 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1256 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1257 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1258 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1261 assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1263 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1264 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1265 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1266 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1268 let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1269 assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 8);
1271 check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]); // Immediate HTLC claim with preimage
1273 check_spends!(claim_txn[1], chan_1.3); // Alternative commitment tx
1274 check_spends!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[1]); // HTLC spend in alternative commitment tx
1276 let bump_tx = if claim_txn[1] == claim_txn[4] {
1277 assert_eq!(claim_txn[1], claim_txn[4]);
1278 assert_eq!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[5]);
1280 check_spends!(claim_txn[7], claim_txn[1]); // HTLC timeout on alternative commitment tx
1282 check_spends!(claim_txn[3], remote_txn[0]); // HTLC timeout on broadcasted commitment tx
1285 assert_eq!(claim_txn[1], claim_txn[3]);
1286 assert_eq!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[4]);
1288 check_spends!(claim_txn[5], claim_txn[1]); // HTLC timeout on alternative commitment tx
1290 check_spends!(claim_txn[7], remote_txn[0]); // HTLC timeout on broadcasted commitment tx
1295 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1296 assert_eq!(bump_tx.input.len(), 1);
1297 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, bump_tx.input[0].previous_output);
1299 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1300 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1301 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1303 assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
1304 assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1305 check_spends!(claim_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
1306 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1308 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1309 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1312 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1313 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
1314 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1315 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1317 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1318 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1319 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1320 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1321 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1322 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1324 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1330 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1331 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1332 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1333 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1334 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1335 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1337 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1338 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1340 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1341 let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2), 1 + 1, get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2));
1342 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1343 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send + 1);
1344 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).err().unwrap();
1346 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(ref fails) => {
1348 &APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ref err} =>
1349 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)),
1350 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1353 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1355 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1356 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1358 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1362 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1363 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1364 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1365 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1366 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1367 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1369 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460001);
1370 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1371 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1372 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1374 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1376 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1377 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3460001, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1378 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1379 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1382 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1383 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1384 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1385 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1388 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1390 // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1391 // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1392 // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1394 let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1396 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1398 // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1399 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1400 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1401 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1402 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1403 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1404 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1405 chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1407 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1408 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1409 chan_signer.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1410 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1411 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1413 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1414 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1415 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1416 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1417 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1418 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1419 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1420 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1423 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1424 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1425 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
1427 // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1428 // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1429 let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1431 let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1433 amount_msat: 3460001,
1434 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1436 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1439 let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1442 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1443 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1444 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1445 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1449 local_chan.opt_anchors(), local_funding, remote_funding,
1450 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1452 &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1453 &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1455 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1458 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1461 htlc_signatures: res.1
1464 // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1465 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1466 let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1468 // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1469 let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1471 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1472 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point
1474 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1476 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1477 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1478 // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1480 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1481 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1482 update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1484 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1486 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1487 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", ::hex::encode(raa_msg.channel_id)), 1);
1489 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1493 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1494 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1495 // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1496 // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1497 // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1499 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1500 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1501 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1502 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1503 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1504 let opt_anchors = false;
1506 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1507 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1509 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1511 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1513 // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1514 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1515 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1518 // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1519 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1520 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1521 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1522 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1523 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1527 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1528 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1529 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1530 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1531 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1532 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1533 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1534 let opt_anchors = false;
1536 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1537 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1538 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1539 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1540 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1541 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1542 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1544 // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1545 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1546 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1549 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 700_000);
1550 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1551 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1552 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1553 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1554 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1555 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 700_000, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1556 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1557 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1559 htlc_id: MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64,
1560 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1561 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1562 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1563 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1566 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1567 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1568 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1569 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1570 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1571 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1572 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1573 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() });
1577 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1578 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1579 // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1580 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1581 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1583 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1584 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1585 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1586 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1587 let opt_anchors = false;
1589 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1590 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1591 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1592 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1593 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1594 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1595 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1597 let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1598 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1599 // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1600 // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1601 // commitment transaction fee.
1602 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1604 // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1605 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1606 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1609 // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1610 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt + 1);
1611 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1612 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1616 fn test_chan_init_feerate_unaffordability() {
1617 // Test that we will reject channel opens which do not leave enough to pay for any HTLCs due to
1618 // channel reserve and feerate requirements.
1619 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1620 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1621 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1622 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1623 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1624 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1625 let opt_anchors = false;
1627 // Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
1629 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1630 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1631 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None).unwrap_err(),
1632 APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
1634 // During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
1635 // requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
1636 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1637 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None).unwrap();
1638 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1639 open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
1640 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg);
1642 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1643 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
1644 match msg_events[0] {
1645 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
1646 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve");
1648 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1653 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1654 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1655 // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1656 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1657 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1658 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1659 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1660 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1662 let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1663 // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1664 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1665 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1666 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1667 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1669 // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1670 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1671 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1672 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1673 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1674 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1676 // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1677 // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1678 // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1679 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1683 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1684 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1685 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1686 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1687 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1688 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1689 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1692 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1693 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1694 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1695 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1697 // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1698 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1699 let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1700 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1702 // Add a pending HTLC.
1703 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1704 let payment_event_1 = {
1705 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1706 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1708 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1709 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1710 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1712 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1714 // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1715 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2, opt_anchors);
1716 let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1717 let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1718 let (route_2, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_2);
1720 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1721 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1722 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1723 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1724 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1725 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, &None, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1726 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1);
1727 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1730 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1731 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1732 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1733 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1736 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1737 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1738 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1739 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1740 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1741 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1742 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1743 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() });
1747 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1748 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1749 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1750 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1751 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1752 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1753 let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1754 let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1755 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1756 assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1757 assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1759 let reserve = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config);
1760 assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1761 assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1763 assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1764 assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1767 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
1768 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1772 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1773 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1774 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1775 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1776 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1777 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1778 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1779 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1780 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1781 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1782 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1784 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1785 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1787 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1788 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1790 macro_rules! expect_forward {
1792 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1793 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1794 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1795 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1800 let feemsat = 239; // set above
1801 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1802 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1803 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1805 let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1807 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1809 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id())
1810 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known()).with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1811 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], payment_params, recv_value_0, TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
1812 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1813 assert!(route.paths[0].iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1815 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1816 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1817 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1818 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
1821 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1822 // nodes[0]'s wealth
1824 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1825 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1826 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1827 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1828 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1829 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1830 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1834 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id())
1835 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known()).with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1836 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, recv_value_0, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
1837 let (payment_preimage, ..) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], recv_value_0);
1838 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
1840 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1841 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1842 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1843 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1844 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1847 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1848 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1849 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1850 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1851 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1854 // adding pending output.
1855 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1856 // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1857 // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1858 // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1859 // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1860 // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1861 // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1862 // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1863 // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1865 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1866 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1867 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1869 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1870 let payment_event_1 = {
1871 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1872 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1874 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1875 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1876 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1878 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1880 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1881 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1883 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_2 + 1);
1884 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1885 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1886 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1889 // split the rest to test holding cell
1890 let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1891 let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1892 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1893 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1895 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1896 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1899 // now see if they go through on both sides
1900 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1901 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1902 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21, &Some(our_payment_secret_21)).unwrap();
1903 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1904 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1905 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1907 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1909 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22+1);
1910 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1911 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1912 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1913 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 2);
1916 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1917 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1918 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22, &Some(our_payment_secret_22)).unwrap();
1919 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1920 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1921 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1923 // flush the pending htlc
1924 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1925 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1926 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1928 // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1929 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1930 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1931 let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1933 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
1934 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1935 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1936 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1938 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1939 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1940 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1942 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1944 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1945 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
1946 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
1948 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1949 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
1951 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
1952 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
1953 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
1954 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
1955 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
1956 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1958 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1959 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
1960 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
1961 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
1963 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
1964 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1966 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1967 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1969 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat } => {
1970 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
1971 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amount_msat);
1973 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1974 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1975 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
1977 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1980 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1983 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat } => {
1984 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
1985 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amount_msat);
1987 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1988 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1989 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
1991 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1994 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1997 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
1998 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
1999 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
2001 let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1, opt_anchors);
2002 let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
2003 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
2005 let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
2006 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
2007 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2008 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
2009 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
2011 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2012 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
2016 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
2017 // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
2018 // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
2019 // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
2020 // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
2021 // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
2022 // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
2023 // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
2025 // * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
2026 // you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
2027 // you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
2028 // * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
2029 // * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
2030 // the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
2031 // * deliver the first fulfill from B
2032 // * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
2034 // * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
2035 // This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
2036 // removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
2037 // * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
2038 // of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
2039 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2040 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2041 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2042 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2043 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2045 let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2046 // Route the first two HTLCs.
2047 let payment_value_1 = b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000;
2048 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_value_1);
2049 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20_000);
2051 // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
2052 let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
2054 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_3, &Some(payment_secret_3)).unwrap();
2055 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2056 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2057 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2058 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2061 // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
2062 // initial fulfill/CS.
2063 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
2064 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, payment_value_1);
2065 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2066 let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2068 // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
2069 // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
2070 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
2071 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000);
2072 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2073 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2075 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2076 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
2077 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2078 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2079 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
2081 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
2082 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
2083 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2084 // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
2085 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2087 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2088 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2089 let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2091 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2092 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2093 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2095 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2096 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2097 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2099 // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
2100 // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2101 // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
2102 // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
2103 // on-chain as necessary).
2104 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2105 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
2106 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2107 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2108 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
2110 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2111 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2112 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2114 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2115 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2117 // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2118 // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2119 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2120 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2121 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2122 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2124 // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2125 // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2126 let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2128 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_4, &Some(payment_secret_4)).unwrap();
2129 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2130 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2131 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2132 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2135 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2136 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2137 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2138 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2140 // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2142 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2143 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2144 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2146 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2147 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2149 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2150 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2151 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2152 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2154 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2155 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2156 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2158 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2159 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2161 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2162 expect_payment_received!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2164 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2165 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2169 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2170 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2171 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2172 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2173 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2174 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2175 let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2177 // Create some initial channels
2178 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2179 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2180 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2181 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2183 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2184 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2185 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2186 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2187 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2188 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2190 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2191 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2192 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2193 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2194 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2196 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2197 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_1.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2198 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2199 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2201 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2202 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2203 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2204 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2205 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2207 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2208 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2209 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2210 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2211 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2213 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2214 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 3_000_000);
2216 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2217 // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2218 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_2.2, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2219 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2220 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2222 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2223 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2224 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2225 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2226 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2227 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2229 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2230 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2231 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2232 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2233 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2235 macro_rules! claim_funds {
2236 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
2238 $node.node.claim_funds($preimage);
2239 expect_payment_claimed!($node, $payment_hash, 3_000_000);
2240 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2242 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2243 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2245 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2246 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2247 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2248 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2250 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2256 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2257 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2258 nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_3.2, &nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2259 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2260 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2261 let node2_commitment_txid;
2263 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2264 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2265 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2266 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2268 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2269 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1);
2270 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2271 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2272 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2274 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2275 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2276 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2277 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2278 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2280 // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2281 // confusing us in the following tests.
2282 let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2284 // One pending HTLC to time out:
2285 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[3], &[&nodes[4]], 3_000_000);
2286 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2289 let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2290 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2291 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2292 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2293 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2294 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2297 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2300 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2301 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2303 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2305 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2307 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2309 let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2310 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2311 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2317 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2319 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2320 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2);
2322 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2323 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2324 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2325 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2326 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2329 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2332 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2333 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2335 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2337 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2338 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2340 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2341 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2342 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2344 nodes[3].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2345 nodes[4].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2346 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2347 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2349 nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon).unwrap();
2350 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2351 check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2355 fn test_justice_tx() {
2356 // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2357 let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2358 alice_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2359 alice_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2360 alice_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2361 let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2362 bob_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2363 bob_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2364 bob_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2365 let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2366 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2367 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2368 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2369 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2370 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2371 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2372 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen;
2373 // Create some new channels:
2374 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2376 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2377 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2378 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2379 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2380 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2381 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2382 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2383 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2384 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2385 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2386 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2387 // Revoke the old state
2388 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2391 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2393 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2394 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2395 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2397 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2398 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2399 node_txn.truncate(1);
2401 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2402 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2403 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2405 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2406 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2407 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2408 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2409 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2410 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2411 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2412 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2413 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2415 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2417 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2418 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2420 // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
2421 // Create some new channels:
2422 let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2424 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2428 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2429 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2430 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2431 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2432 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2433 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2434 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2435 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2436 // Revoke the old state
2437 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2439 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2441 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2442 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); //ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2443 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2445 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2446 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2448 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2449 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2451 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2452 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2453 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2454 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2455 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2456 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2457 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2459 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2460 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2461 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2465 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2466 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2467 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2468 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2469 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2470 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2471 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2472 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2473 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2474 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2475 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2476 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2477 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2478 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2479 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2481 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2482 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2483 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2484 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2485 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2486 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2488 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2489 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
2491 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2492 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2493 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2494 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2495 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2499 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2500 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2501 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2502 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2503 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2504 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2505 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2507 // Create some new channel:
2508 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2510 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2511 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2512 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2513 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2514 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2516 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2517 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2518 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2519 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2520 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2521 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2522 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2523 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2524 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2526 //Revoke the old state
2527 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2530 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2531 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2532 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2533 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2534 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2535 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2536 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2537 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2539 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2540 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment
2542 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2543 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2545 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2546 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2547 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2548 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2549 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2550 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2551 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2552 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2554 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
2555 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2556 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
2558 // Finally, mine the penalty transaction and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2559 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2560 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
2561 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2562 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2564 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2565 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2566 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2570 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2571 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2572 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2573 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2574 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2575 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2576 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2578 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2580 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2581 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2582 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2583 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2584 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2585 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2587 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2588 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2590 //Revoke the old state
2591 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2594 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2595 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2596 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2597 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2598 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2599 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2600 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2601 match events.last().unwrap() {
2602 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2603 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2606 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2607 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2609 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2610 assert!(node_txn.len() == 9 || node_txn.len() == 10);
2612 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2613 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2614 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2615 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2616 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2617 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2618 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2620 // Justice transactions are indices 1-2-4
2621 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2622 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
2623 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
2625 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2626 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2627 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2629 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2630 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2631 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2632 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2633 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2634 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2635 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2636 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2638 // Finally, mine the penalty transactions and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2639 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2640 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[2]);
2641 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[3]);
2642 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[4]);
2643 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2644 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2646 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2647 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2648 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2652 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2653 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2654 // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2655 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2656 // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2657 // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2658 // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2659 // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2660 // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2662 // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2663 // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2664 // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2665 // PaymentSent event).
2667 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2668 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2669 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2670 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2672 // Create some initial channels
2673 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2674 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2676 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2677 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2678 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2679 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2680 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2682 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2683 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2684 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2686 let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2687 let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2689 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2690 // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2691 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2692 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2693 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2694 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2695 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_1, 3_000_000);
2696 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2697 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, 3_000_000);
2698 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2699 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2700 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2701 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2702 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2703 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2705 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2706 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2707 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2708 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2709 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx, 2*htlc-success tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2710 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5);
2711 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2712 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2713 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2714 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2715 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2716 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2717 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2718 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2719 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2720 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
2721 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2723 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2724 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2725 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: node_txn});
2726 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2728 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2729 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2730 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2731 added_monitors.clear();
2733 let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2734 assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2735 match forwarded_events[0] {
2736 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2737 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2739 let chan_id = Some(chan_1.2);
2740 match forwarded_events[1] {
2741 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
2742 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2743 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2744 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2745 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2749 match forwarded_events[2] {
2750 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
2751 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2752 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2753 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2754 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2758 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2760 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2761 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2762 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2763 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2764 added_monitors.clear();
2766 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2768 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2769 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2772 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2773 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2777 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2778 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2779 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2780 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2781 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2782 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2784 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2786 macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2787 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $chan_tx: expr) => { {
2788 let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2789 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
2790 // Node[1]: ChannelManager: 3 (commitment tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (timeout tx)
2791 // Node[0]: ChannelManager: 3 (commtiemtn tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 HTLC-timeout
2792 check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2793 check_spends!(node_txn[2], $commitment_tx);
2794 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2795 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time, 0);
2797 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2798 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2799 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2800 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2802 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2803 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2804 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2805 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2807 check_spends!(node_txn[0], $chan_tx);
2808 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2812 // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own local state as a fallback, suggesting an alternate
2813 // commitment transaction with a corresponding HTLC-Timeout transactions, as well as a
2814 // timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2815 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2817 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2818 // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx on A's chain
2819 let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2820 check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2821 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2822 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2823 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2824 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2825 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2826 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 6); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx + HTLC-Sucess * 2), ChannelMonitor : 3 (HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn)
2827 let commitment_spend =
2828 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2829 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2830 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2831 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2834 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2835 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2836 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2840 check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2841 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2842 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2843 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2844 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time, 0);
2845 assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2846 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3);
2847 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2848 check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[3]);
2849 check_spends!(node_txn[5], node_txn[3]);
2850 // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
2851 // we already checked the same situation with A.
2853 // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
2854 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2855 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()] });
2856 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2857 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2858 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2859 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2860 assert_eq!(events.len(), 5);
2861 let mut first_claimed = false;
2862 for event in events {
2864 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
2865 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
2866 assert!(!first_claimed);
2867 first_claimed = true;
2869 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
2870 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
2873 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
2874 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
2875 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2878 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2881 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
2882 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
2883 // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2884 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2885 // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
2886 // B's commitment tx C's commitment tx
2888 // B's HTLC timeout tx B's timeout tx
2890 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2891 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2892 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2893 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2894 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2895 *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2896 *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2898 // Create some intial channels
2899 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2900 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2902 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
2903 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2904 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2906 let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2908 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2909 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2910 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2911 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
2912 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
2913 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }]);
2914 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2916 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2917 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2919 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2920 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2921 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2922 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2923 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2924 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2926 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2928 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2929 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2930 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2931 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2932 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx)
2933 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2934 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2935 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2937 // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2938 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
2939 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2940 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
2941 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2944 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2945 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-timeout), 1 timeout tx
2946 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2947 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2949 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2950 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2952 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2953 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2954 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2955 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2957 timeout_tx = node_txn[2].clone();
2961 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
2962 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2963 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2965 // B will rebroadcast a fee-bumped timeout transaction here.
2966 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2967 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2968 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2971 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2973 // B may rebroadcast its own holder commitment transaction here, as a safeguard against
2974 // some incredibly unlikely partial-eclipse-attack scenarios. That said, because the
2975 // original commitment_tx[0] (also spending chan_2.3) has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY B really
2976 // shouldn't broadcast anything here, and in some connect style scenarios we do not.
2977 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2978 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
2979 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2981 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
2985 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
2986 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2987 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2988 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2990 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2991 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2992 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2993 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2994 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2995 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2997 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3000 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
3001 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
3002 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
3004 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
3005 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
3007 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3008 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3009 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3010 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 commitment tx, ChannelMonitor : 1 timeout tx
3011 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
3012 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
3013 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
3014 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
3015 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3019 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
3020 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
3021 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
3022 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
3026 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
3027 // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
3028 // and fail backward accordingly.
3030 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3031 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3032 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3033 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3035 // Create some initial channels
3036 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3037 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3039 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3040 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3041 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3042 // Revoke the old state
3043 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3045 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3047 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3048 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3049 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3050 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3051 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3053 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
3054 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3055 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3056 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3058 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3059 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3060 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3061 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3062 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3063 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3065 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3066 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3067 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
3069 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3073 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
3074 // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
3075 // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
3076 // commitment transaction anymore.
3077 // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
3078 // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
3079 // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
3080 // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
3081 // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
3082 // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
3084 // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
3085 // commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
3086 // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
3087 // and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
3088 // commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
3089 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3090 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3091 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3092 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3094 // Create some initial channels
3095 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3096 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3098 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
3099 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3100 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3101 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
3102 // Revoke the old state
3103 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3105 let value = if use_dust {
3106 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
3107 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
3108 nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
3111 let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3112 let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3113 let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3115 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash);
3116 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: first_payment_hash }]);
3117 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3118 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3119 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3120 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3121 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3122 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3123 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3124 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3125 let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
3126 // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
3128 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash);
3129 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: second_payment_hash }]);
3130 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3131 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3132 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3133 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3134 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3135 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3136 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3137 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3138 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3139 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3140 // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3141 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3142 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3143 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3145 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash);
3146 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: third_payment_hash }]);
3147 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3148 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3149 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3150 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3151 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3152 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3153 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3154 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3155 // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3156 // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3157 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3158 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3159 // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3160 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3161 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3162 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3164 // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3165 // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3166 let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3167 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, fourth_payment_hash, &Some(fourth_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3168 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3169 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3170 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3173 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3174 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3175 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3176 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3177 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3178 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3180 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3181 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3184 Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { .. } => { },
3185 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3187 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3188 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3191 let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
3192 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3194 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3195 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3196 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3197 assert!(ANTI_REORG_DELAY > PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS); // We assume payments will also expire
3199 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3200 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 2 + (nodes.len() - 1) } else { 4 + nodes.len() });
3202 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
3203 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
3206 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3207 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3209 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3211 if !deliver_bs_raa {
3213 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3214 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3216 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3219 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3220 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3223 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3224 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3226 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3227 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3228 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 1 } else { 0 }] {
3229 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3230 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3232 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 1 }] {
3233 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
3234 assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3235 assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3237 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3241 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3242 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3243 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3244 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3245 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3246 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3248 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3251 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 3 } else { 2 }] {
3252 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3253 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3254 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3255 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3256 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3257 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3259 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3260 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3261 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3263 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3265 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3266 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3268 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3269 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3270 // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3271 // that we should update our routing table for.
3272 if !deliver_bs_raa {
3273 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3276 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3279 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3280 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3281 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3283 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3286 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3287 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3288 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3290 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3293 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3296 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3297 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3298 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3302 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3303 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3304 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3305 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3306 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3310 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3311 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3312 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3313 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3314 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3318 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3319 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3320 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3321 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3322 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3323 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3325 // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3327 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3328 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
3329 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3331 let payment_event = {
3332 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3333 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3334 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3336 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3337 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3340 // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3341 let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3343 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, failed_payment_hash, &Some(failed_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3344 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3346 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3349 // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3351 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3353 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3354 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3355 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3356 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 50_000, &Some(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3357 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3358 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
3360 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3361 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3367 onion_routing_packet,
3369 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3371 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3372 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3373 // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3375 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3376 assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3378 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3381 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3382 assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3384 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3386 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3387 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3391 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3392 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3393 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3394 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3395 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3396 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3397 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3398 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3400 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3401 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3402 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3403 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3404 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3405 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3407 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
3408 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3409 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
3411 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3412 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
3413 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3414 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3415 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3417 // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3418 // registering new transactions
3419 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
3420 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
3424 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3425 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3426 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3427 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3428 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3429 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3430 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3431 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3433 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3435 let mut payment_event = {
3436 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3437 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3439 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3440 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3441 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3444 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3445 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3447 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3449 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3450 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3451 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3452 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3454 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3455 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3456 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3457 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3458 let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3460 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3461 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3462 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3464 nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3465 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3466 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3467 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3469 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3470 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3471 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3472 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3473 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3477 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3479 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3480 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3481 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3482 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3484 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3486 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3487 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator), &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3489 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3490 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3491 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3492 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3493 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3494 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3495 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3497 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3501 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3502 // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3503 // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3504 // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3505 // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3507 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3508 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3509 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3510 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3511 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3513 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
3515 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
3516 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_000_000);
3517 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3518 let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3519 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3520 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
3522 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3523 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3525 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3526 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3530 fn test_peer_disconnected_before_funding_broadcasted() {
3531 // Test that channels are closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` if the peer disconnects
3532 // before the funding transaction has been broadcasted.
3533 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3534 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3535 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3536 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3538 // Open a channel between `nodes[0]` and `nodes[1]`, for which the funding transaction is never
3539 // broadcasted, even though it's created by `nodes[0]`.
3540 let expected_temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
3541 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3542 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
3543 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3544 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
3546 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
3547 assert_eq!(temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3549 assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
3551 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3552 assert_eq!(funding_created_msg.temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3554 // Even though the funding transaction is created by `nodes[0]`, the `FundingCreated` msg is
3555 // never sent to `nodes[1]`, and therefore the tx is never signed by either party nor
3558 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3561 // Ensure that the channel is closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` when the peers are
3562 // disconnected before the funding transaction was broadcasted.
3563 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3564 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3566 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3567 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3571 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3572 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3573 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3574 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3575 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3576 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3577 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3578 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3580 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3581 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3582 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3584 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3585 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3586 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3587 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3589 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3590 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3591 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3593 let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3594 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3595 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3596 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3598 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3599 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3601 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3602 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3604 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
3606 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3607 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3609 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3610 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3611 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3613 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3616 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
3617 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3618 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
3620 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3623 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3624 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3628 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3629 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3632 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3633 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3634 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3635 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3636 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3637 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3639 let mut as_channel_ready = None;
3640 if messages_delivered == 0 {
3641 let (channel_ready, _, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3642 as_channel_ready = Some(channel_ready);
3643 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the channel_ready message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3644 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3645 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3647 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3650 let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1_000_000);
3652 let payment_event = {
3653 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
3654 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3656 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3657 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3658 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3660 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3662 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3663 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3665 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3666 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3667 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3668 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3669 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3671 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3672 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3673 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3674 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3676 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3677 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3678 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3679 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3680 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3682 if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3683 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3684 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3685 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3692 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3693 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3694 if messages_delivered < 3 {
3695 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3696 // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a channel_ready prior to a
3697 // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to channel_ready time.
3699 // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a channel_ready immediately on
3700 // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate channel_ready sent
3701 // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3703 // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3704 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3706 // Even if the channel_ready messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3707 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3708 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3709 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3710 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3711 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3712 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3713 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3714 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3715 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3716 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3717 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3718 } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3719 // Everything was delivered...
3720 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3723 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3724 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3726 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3727 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3730 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3731 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3732 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3734 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3736 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3737 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3739 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat } => {
3740 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3741 assert_eq!(amount_msat, 1_000_000);
3743 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3744 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3745 assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3747 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3750 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3753 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3754 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3755 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
3757 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3758 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3759 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3760 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3761 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3762 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3763 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3764 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3765 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3766 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3767 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3769 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3772 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3773 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3775 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3776 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3778 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3779 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3780 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3782 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3785 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3786 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3787 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3788 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3790 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3791 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3792 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3793 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3795 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3796 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3797 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3798 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3799 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3801 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3802 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3803 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3804 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3811 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3812 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3813 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3814 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3815 if messages_delivered < 1 {
3816 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
3818 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3820 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
3821 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3822 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3823 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3824 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3825 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3826 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3827 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3828 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3829 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3830 // Everything was delivered...
3831 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3834 if messages_delivered == 1 || messages_delivered == 2 {
3835 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3838 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3839 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3840 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3842 if messages_delivered > 2 {
3843 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3846 // Channel should still work fine...
3847 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3848 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3849 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3853 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
3854 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
3855 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
3856 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
3857 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
3861 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
3862 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
3863 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
3864 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
3865 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
3869 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
3870 // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
3871 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3872 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3873 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3874 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
3875 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
3876 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
3877 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3878 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3880 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3881 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3883 confirm_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
3884 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3885 assert!(events_1.is_empty());
3887 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3889 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3890 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3892 confirm_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3893 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3894 assert!(events_2.is_empty());
3896 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
3897 let as_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3898 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
3899 let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3901 // nodes[0] hasn't yet received a channel_ready, so it only sends that on reconnect.
3902 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
3903 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3904 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3905 let as_channel_ready = match events_3[0] {
3906 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3907 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3910 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_3[0]),
3913 // nodes[1] received nodes[0]'s channel_ready on the first reconnect above, so it should send
3914 // announcement_signatures as well as channel_update.
3915 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish);
3916 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3917 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 3);
3919 let bs_channel_ready = match events_4[0] {
3920 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3921 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3922 chan_id = msg.channel_id;
3925 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[0]),
3927 let bs_announcement_sigs = match events_4[1] {
3928 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3929 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3932 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[1]),
3935 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
3936 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3938 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[2]),
3941 // Re-deliver nodes[0]'s channel_ready, which nodes[1] can safely ignore. It currently
3942 // generates a duplicative private channel_update
3943 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
3944 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3945 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
3947 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
3948 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3950 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_5[0]),
3953 // When we deliver nodes[1]'s channel_ready, however, nodes[0] will generate its
3954 // announcement_signatures.
3955 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_channel_ready);
3956 let events_6 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3957 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
3958 let as_announcement_sigs = match events_6[0] {
3959 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3960 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3963 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_6[0]),
3966 // When we deliver nodes[1]'s announcement_signatures to nodes[0], nodes[0] should immediately
3967 // broadcast the channel announcement globally, as well as re-send its (now-public)
3969 nodes[0].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs);
3970 let events_7 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3971 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
3972 let (chan_announcement, as_update) = match events_7[0] {
3973 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3974 (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
3976 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_7[0]),
3979 // Finally, deliver nodes[0]'s announcement_signatures to nodes[1] and make sure it creates the
3980 // same channel_announcement.
3981 nodes[1].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs);
3982 let events_8 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3983 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
3984 let bs_update = match events_8[0] {
3985 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3986 assert_eq!(*msg, chan_announcement);
3989 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_8[0]),
3992 // Provide the channel announcement and public updates to the network graph
3993 nodes[0].gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap();
3994 nodes[0].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
3995 nodes[0].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
3997 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3998 let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3999 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
4001 // Check that after deserialization and reconnection we can still generate an identical
4002 // channel_announcement from the cached signatures.
4003 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4005 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4006 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4007 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4009 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4010 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4011 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[0].logger, node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4012 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4013 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4014 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4015 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4016 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4018 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4019 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4020 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4021 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4022 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4023 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4025 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator,
4026 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4027 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4028 logger: nodes[0].logger,
4032 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4033 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4035 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4036 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4037 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4039 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4041 // The channel announcement should be re-generated exactly by broadcast_node_announcement.
4042 nodes[0].node.broadcast_node_announcement([0, 0, 0], [0; 32], Vec::new());
4043 let msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4044 let mut found_announcement = false;
4045 for event in msgs.iter() {
4047 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, .. } => {
4048 if *msg == chan_announcement { found_announcement = true; }
4050 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => {},
4051 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4054 assert!(found_announcement);
4058 fn test_channel_ready_without_best_block_updated() {
4059 // Previously, if we were offline when a funding transaction was locked in, and then we came
4060 // back online, calling best_block_updated once followed by transactions_confirmed, we'd not
4061 // generate a channel_ready until a later best_block_updated. This tests that we generate the
4062 // channel_ready immediately instead.
4063 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4064 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4065 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4066 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4067 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
4069 let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4071 let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
4072 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
4073 let block_txn = [funding_tx];
4074 let conf_txn: Vec<_> = block_txn.iter().enumerate().collect();
4075 let conf_block_header = nodes[0].get_block_header(conf_height);
4076 nodes[0].node.transactions_confirmed(&conf_block_header, &conf_txn[..], conf_height);
4078 // Ensure nodes[0] generates a channel_ready after the transactions_confirmed
4079 let as_channel_ready = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4080 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
4084 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
4085 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
4086 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
4087 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4088 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4089 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4090 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4091 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4093 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
4095 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
4096 let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
4097 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
4098 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4100 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4101 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4103 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4104 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4107 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
4108 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
4109 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4111 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4112 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4114 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4115 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4116 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4117 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4118 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4119 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4120 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4122 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4123 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4124 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
4126 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
4127 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
4128 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
4130 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4133 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
4134 let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4135 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4136 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4138 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4141 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4142 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4144 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4145 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4146 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
4147 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4148 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4149 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
4151 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4152 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4153 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4154 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4156 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
4157 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
4159 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
4160 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
4162 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
4164 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4165 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4166 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4167 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4168 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
4169 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
4170 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
4171 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4172 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4173 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4175 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
4176 let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4177 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4178 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4179 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4180 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4181 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4182 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4184 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
4185 let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4186 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4187 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4188 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4189 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4190 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4191 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4193 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4194 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4195 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4196 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4198 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4199 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4200 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4201 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4203 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
4204 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4205 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4207 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4209 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4210 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
4212 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
4213 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
4215 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
4216 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
4217 assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
4219 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
4222 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4225 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
4226 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4227 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4229 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4230 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4233 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
4234 // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
4235 // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
4236 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4237 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4238 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4239 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4241 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4243 let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
4244 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
4245 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
4246 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
4247 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
4248 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
4249 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
4250 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4251 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4252 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4253 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
4254 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentReceived event(s).
4255 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
4258 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
4261 let mut block = Block {
4262 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
4265 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4266 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4267 let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4268 for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
4269 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
4270 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4271 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4274 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
4276 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4277 let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4278 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4279 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4280 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4281 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4283 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4284 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4285 // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4286 let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(100_000).to_vec();
4287 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(block_count - 1));
4288 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4292 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4293 do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4294 do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4297 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4298 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4299 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4300 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4301 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4302 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4303 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4304 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4306 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4307 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4308 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4309 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4311 // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4312 let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4314 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, first_payment_hash, &Some(first_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4316 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4317 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4319 // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4320 let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4321 let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4322 sending_node.node.send_payment(&route, second_payment_hash, &Some(second_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4324 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4325 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4326 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4327 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4328 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4330 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4332 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4333 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4334 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4335 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4338 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
4339 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4340 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4341 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4342 match fail_commit[0] {
4343 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4344 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4345 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4347 _ => unreachable!(),
4349 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4351 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4352 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4353 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[0] {
4354 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
4355 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
4356 if let Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[1] {
4357 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
4358 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
4363 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4364 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4365 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4369 fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4370 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4371 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4372 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4373 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4374 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4375 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4376 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4377 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4378 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4380 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4382 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4384 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4385 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4386 get_monitor!(nodes[0], OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id())
4387 .write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4389 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4390 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4391 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4392 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4393 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4394 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4395 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4396 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4397 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4398 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4400 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4401 let config = UserConfig::default();
4402 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4403 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4404 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4405 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4406 default_config: config,
4408 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4409 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4410 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4415 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4416 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4418 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4419 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4420 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4421 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4423 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4424 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4425 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4426 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4428 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4429 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4430 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4431 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4433 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4434 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
4435 for node in nodes.iter() {
4436 assert!(node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4437 node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4438 node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4441 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4445 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_events() {
4446 // This test makes sure the events field in ChannelManager survives de/serialization
4447 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4448 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4449 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4450 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4451 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4452 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4453 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4454 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4455 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4457 // Start creating a channel, but stop right before broadcasting the funding transaction
4458 let channel_value = 100000;
4459 let push_msat = 10001;
4460 let a_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4461 let b_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4462 let node_a = nodes.remove(0);
4463 let node_b = nodes.remove(0);
4464 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
4465 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), a_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4466 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), b_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id()));
4468 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&node_a, &node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, 42);
4470 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
4471 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
4473 node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4475 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4476 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4477 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4478 added_monitors.clear();
4481 let bs_funding_signed = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
4482 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_funding_signed);
4484 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4485 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4486 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4487 added_monitors.clear();
4489 // Normally, this is where node_a would broadcast the funding transaction, but the test de/serializes first instead
4494 // Start the de/seriailization process mid-channel creation to check that the channel manager will hold onto events that are serialized
4495 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4496 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4497 get_monitor!(nodes[0], bs_funding_signed.channel_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4499 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4500 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4501 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4502 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4503 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4504 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4505 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4506 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4507 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4508 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4510 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4511 let config = UserConfig::default();
4512 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4513 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4514 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4515 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4516 default_config: config,
4518 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4519 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4520 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4525 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4526 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4528 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4530 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4531 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4533 // After deserializing, make sure the funding_transaction is still held by the channel manager
4534 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4535 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
4536 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4537 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
4539 // Make sure the channel is functioning as though the de/serialization never happened
4540 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4541 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4543 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4544 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4545 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4546 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4548 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4549 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4550 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4551 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4553 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4554 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
4555 for node in nodes.iter() {
4556 assert!(node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4557 node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4558 node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4561 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4565 fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4566 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4567 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4568 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4569 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4570 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4571 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4572 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4573 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4574 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4575 let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4577 let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4578 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4580 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4582 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4583 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4584 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4586 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4587 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4588 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4589 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4590 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4591 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4592 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4593 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4594 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4595 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4597 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4598 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4599 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4600 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4601 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4602 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4604 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4605 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4606 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4611 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4612 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4614 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4615 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4616 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4618 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4620 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
4621 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4625 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
4626 // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with an out-of-date ChannelMonitor
4627 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4628 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4629 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
4630 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4631 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4632 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4633 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4634 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4635 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4636 let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4637 let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4638 let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4640 let mut node_0_stale_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4641 for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4642 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4643 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4644 node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4647 let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
4649 // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
4650 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4652 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
4653 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4654 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4655 nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4657 // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
4659 let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4660 for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4661 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4662 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4663 node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4666 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4667 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4668 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4669 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4670 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4671 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4674 let mut node_0_stale_monitors = Vec::new();
4675 for serialized in node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4676 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4677 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4678 assert!(read.is_empty());
4679 node_0_stale_monitors.push(monitor);
4682 let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
4683 for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4684 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4685 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4686 assert!(read.is_empty());
4687 node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
4690 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4691 if let Err(msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue) =
4692 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4693 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4695 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4696 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4697 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4699 channel_monitors: node_0_stale_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4701 panic!("If the monitor(s) are stale, this indicates a bug and we should get an Err return");
4704 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4705 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) =
4706 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4707 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4709 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4710 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4711 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4713 channel_monitors: node_0_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4715 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4716 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4718 { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx
4719 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4720 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
4721 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
4722 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
4725 for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
4726 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor).is_ok());
4727 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4729 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4730 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
4732 // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
4733 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4734 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4735 //... and we can even still claim the payment!
4736 claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4738 nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4739 let reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[3], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4740 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4741 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish);
4742 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4743 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
4744 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
4746 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
4747 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
4749 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
4754 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4755 ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4757 let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4758 let mut txn = Vec::new();
4759 let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4760 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4761 for event in events.drain(..) {
4763 Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs } => {
4764 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4765 txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4766 all_outputs.push(outp);
4769 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4772 if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4773 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx) {
4783 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4784 // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4785 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4786 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4787 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4788 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4790 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4791 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4792 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4793 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4794 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4795 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4796 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4797 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4798 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4800 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4801 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4803 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4804 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4805 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4806 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4807 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4811 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4812 // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4813 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4814 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4815 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4816 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4817 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4819 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4820 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4821 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4822 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4823 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4825 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4826 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4827 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4828 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4830 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4831 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4832 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4833 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4834 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4836 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4837 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4838 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4842 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4843 // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4844 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4846 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4847 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4848 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4849 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4851 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4852 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4853 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4854 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4855 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4857 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4858 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4859 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4860 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4861 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4863 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4864 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4865 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4867 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4868 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4869 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4870 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4871 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4875 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4876 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4877 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4878 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4879 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4881 // Create some initial channels
4882 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4884 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
4886 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4887 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4888 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4890 // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4891 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4892 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4893 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4894 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4895 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4896 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4898 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4899 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4902 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4903 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4906 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4907 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-Success), ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4908 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4909 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4910 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4911 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
4912 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
4914 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4915 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4916 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4918 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4919 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4920 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4924 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4925 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4926 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4927 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4928 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4930 // Create some initial channels
4931 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4933 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4934 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4936 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4938 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4939 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4940 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4942 // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4943 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4944 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4945 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4947 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4948 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4950 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4952 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4953 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4954 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelManager : 1 local commitent tx, ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4955 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
4956 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0].clone());
4957 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4959 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4960 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4961 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4962 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, true);
4964 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4965 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4966 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4967 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]);
4968 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4972 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4973 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4974 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4975 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4976 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4978 // Create some initial channels
4979 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4981 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4982 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4983 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4984 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4986 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4988 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4989 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4990 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4991 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4993 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4994 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
4995 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4996 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4998 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4999 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5001 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5002 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5003 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
5007 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5008 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5009 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
5010 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5011 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5012 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5014 // Create some initial channels
5015 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5017 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5018 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5019 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5020 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
5022 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
5024 // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
5025 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
5026 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5027 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5028 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5029 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5031 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
5032 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
5033 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5034 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5035 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5036 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
5037 assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].lock_time, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
5039 // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
5040 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5041 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()] });
5042 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5043 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5044 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5046 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5047 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5048 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
5049 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
5050 // transactions next...
5051 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
5052 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
5054 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
5055 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
5056 if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid() {
5057 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5059 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid());
5060 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5063 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5064 check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
5066 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
5067 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5069 // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
5070 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5071 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5072 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5073 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
5077 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
5078 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5079 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
5080 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5081 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5082 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5084 // Create some initial channels
5085 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5087 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5088 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5089 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5090 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
5092 // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
5093 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
5095 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
5097 // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
5098 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
5099 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5100 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5101 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5102 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5104 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
5105 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5106 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5107 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
5109 // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
5110 let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
5111 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
5113 // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
5114 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5115 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
5116 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5117 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5118 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5120 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5121 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5123 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
5124 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
5125 // transactions next...
5126 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
5127 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
5128 if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
5129 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5131 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
5132 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5135 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5136 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
5138 check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
5140 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
5141 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5143 // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
5144 // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
5146 // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
5147 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5148 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5149 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5150 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
5151 assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5152 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
5153 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
5157 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
5158 // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
5159 // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
5160 // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
5161 // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
5163 // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
5166 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5167 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5168 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5169 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5171 // Create some initial channels
5172 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5173 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5175 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5176 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5177 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5178 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5179 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5181 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
5182 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
5183 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
5185 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
5186 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5187 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
5188 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5189 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
5190 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5191 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5192 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5193 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5194 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5195 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5197 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
5198 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5199 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5200 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5202 let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Success tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
5203 assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 3);
5204 assert_eq!(c_txn[0], c_txn[2]);
5205 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0], c_txn[1]);
5206 check_spends!(c_txn[1], chan_2.3);
5207 check_spends!(c_txn[2], c_txn[1]);
5208 assert_eq!(c_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
5209 assert_eq!(c_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5210 assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
5211 assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
5213 // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
5214 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
5215 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![c_txn[1].clone(), c_txn[2].clone()]});
5216 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5217 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5218 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5220 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5221 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5224 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
5225 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
5226 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, Some(chan_1.2));
5227 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
5228 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
5230 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5233 let mut b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5234 // ChannelMonitor: claim tx
5235 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
5236 check_spends!(b_txn[0], chan_2.3); // B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
5239 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5240 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5241 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
5242 match msg_events[0] {
5243 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5244 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5246 match msg_events[1] {
5247 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
5248 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5250 match msg_events[2] {
5251 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
5252 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5253 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5254 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5255 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5256 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
5258 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5260 // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
5261 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5262 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
5263 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5264 let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5265 // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success tx
5266 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 3);
5267 check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_1.3);
5268 check_spends!(b_txn[2], b_txn[1]);
5269 check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
5270 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5271 assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
5272 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
5274 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5275 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5279 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
5280 // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
5281 // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
5282 // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
5283 // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
5284 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
5285 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
5286 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5287 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5288 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5289 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5290 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
5291 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5292 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5294 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5295 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5296 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5298 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5299 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5300 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5301 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5302 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
5304 let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 900_000);
5306 let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
5307 // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
5308 // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
5309 // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
5310 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id())
5311 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
5312 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], payment_params, 900000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40);
5313 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 900000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
5315 let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5316 assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5317 check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5319 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
5320 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5321 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5322 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5323 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5325 let htlc_timeout_tx;
5326 { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
5327 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5328 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 2-or-3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5329 assert!(node_txn.len() == 4 || node_txn.len() == 3);
5330 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5332 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5333 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5335 if node_txn.len() > 3 {
5336 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5337 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5338 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
5340 check_spends!(node_txn[3], commitment_txn[0]);
5341 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
5343 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5344 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
5347 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5348 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5349 if node_txn.len() > 3 {
5350 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5352 htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[1].clone();
5355 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
5356 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], duplicate_payment_hash, 900_000);
5358 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
5359 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
5360 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5361 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5363 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5364 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5367 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5368 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5370 let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5371 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs), ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
5372 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
5373 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5374 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5375 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5376 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5377 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5378 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5379 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5380 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[3], htlc_success_txn[0]);
5381 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[4], htlc_success_txn[1]);
5382 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
5384 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
5385 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5386 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
5387 let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5388 assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5389 assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5390 let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
5391 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5392 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5393 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5395 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5396 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5398 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5400 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
5402 // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
5403 // Note that the fee paid is effectively double as the HTLC value (including the nodes[1] fee
5404 // and nodes[2] fee) is rounded down and then claimed in full.
5405 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[0]);
5406 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], Some(196*2), true, true);
5407 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5408 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5409 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5410 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5411 assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
5412 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5413 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5415 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5416 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
5418 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5420 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5421 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
5422 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
5424 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5429 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
5430 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5431 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5432 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5433 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5435 // Create some initial channels
5436 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5438 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
5439 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5440 assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
5441 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5442 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5444 // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
5445 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5446 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
5447 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5449 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
5450 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5451 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5452 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5454 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5455 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5458 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5459 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5462 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5463 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5464 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
5465 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5466 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5467 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5468 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5472 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
5473 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5475 // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5476 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5477 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5478 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5479 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
5480 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5483 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
5484 // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
5485 // unrevoked commitment transaction.
5486 // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
5487 // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
5488 // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
5489 // use the same payment hashes.
5490 // Thus, we use a six-node network:
5495 // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
5496 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
5497 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
5498 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5499 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5500 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5501 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5502 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
5503 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5504 let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5506 let _chan_0_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5507 let _chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5508 let chan_2_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5509 let chan_3_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5510 let chan_3_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5512 // Rebalance and check output sanity...
5513 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
5514 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
5515 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
5517 let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2_3.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5519 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5521 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5522 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5524 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5526 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5528 let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5530 let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5531 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5533 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200).unwrap());
5535 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200).unwrap());
5538 let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5540 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5541 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5544 let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5546 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5547 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200).unwrap());
5549 // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
5550 // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
5551 // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
5552 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2).len(), 1);
5553 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
5555 // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
5556 // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5557 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1);
5558 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3);
5559 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5);
5560 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6);
5561 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
5563 let failed_destinations = vec![
5564 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_1 },
5565 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_3 },
5566 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_5 },
5567 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_6 },
5569 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[4], failed_destinations);
5570 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
5572 let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5573 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5574 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5575 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5576 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5577 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5579 // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5580 nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
5581 nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4);
5582 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5584 let failed_destinations_2 = vec![
5585 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 },
5586 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_4 },
5588 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[5], failed_destinations_2);
5589 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5591 let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5592 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5593 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5594 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5596 let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5598 // After 4 and 2 removes respectively above in nodes[4] and nodes[5], nodes[3] should receive 6 PaymentForwardedFailed events
5599 let failed_destinations_3 = vec![
5600 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5601 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5602 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5603 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5604 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5605 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5607 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations_3);
5608 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5609 let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5610 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5611 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5612 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5613 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5614 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5615 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5616 if deliver_last_raa {
5617 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5619 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5622 // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5623 // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5624 // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5625 // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5627 // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5628 // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5629 // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5631 // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5632 // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5633 let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5635 if announce_latest {
5636 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5638 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5640 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5641 let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5642 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2 + 6);
5643 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5645 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5646 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5649 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5650 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5653 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5654 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5655 if deliver_last_raa {
5656 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5658 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(3).collect();
5659 expect_htlc_handling_failed_destinations!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(), expected_destinations);
5661 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = if announce_latest {
5662 repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(9).collect()
5664 repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(6).collect()
5667 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], expected_destinations);
5669 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5671 let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5672 assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5673 let mut a_done = false;
5674 for msg in cs_msgs {
5676 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5677 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5678 // should be failed-backwards here.
5679 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5680 // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5681 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5682 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5684 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5689 // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5690 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5691 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5693 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5694 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5697 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5698 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5699 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5700 if announce_latest {
5701 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5702 if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5703 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5706 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5708 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5712 let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5713 assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5714 let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5715 let mut as_updates = 0;
5716 for event in as_events.iter() {
5717 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5718 assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5719 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5720 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5722 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5724 if network_update.is_some() {
5727 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5729 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5730 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5731 if announce_latest {
5732 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5733 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5735 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5737 let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5738 assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5739 let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5740 let mut bs_updates = 0;
5741 for event in bs_events.iter() {
5742 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5743 assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5744 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5745 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5747 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5749 if network_update.is_some() {
5752 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5754 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5755 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5756 if announce_latest {
5757 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5759 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5761 // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5762 // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5763 // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5764 // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5765 assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5766 assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5770 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5771 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5775 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5776 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5780 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5781 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5782 // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5783 // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5787 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5788 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5789 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5790 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5791 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5793 // Create some initial channels
5794 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5796 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5797 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5798 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5799 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5801 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5802 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5803 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5804 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5805 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5806 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5808 let htlc_timeout = {
5809 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5810 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
5811 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5812 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5813 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5814 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5818 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5819 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5820 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5822 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5823 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5824 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5825 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5826 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5827 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5828 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5829 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5830 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5831 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5832 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5836 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5837 // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with
5838 // a key manager rotation to test that key_derivation_params returned in DynamicOutputP2WSH
5839 // let us re-derive the channel key set to then derive a delayed_payment_key.
5841 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5843 // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5844 let seed = [42; 32];
5845 let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5846 let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5847 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source.genesis_hash, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger);
5848 let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph, node_seed: seed, features: InitFeatures::known() };
5849 let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5850 node_cfgs.remove(0);
5851 node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5853 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5854 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5856 // Create some initial channels
5857 // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5859 let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5860 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5861 assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5863 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5864 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5865 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5866 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5867 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5869 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5870 let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5871 let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5872 assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5873 check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5875 // We check funding pubkey are unique
5876 let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5877 let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5878 if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5879 || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5880 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5881 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5882 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5885 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5886 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5887 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5888 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5889 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5890 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5892 let htlc_timeout = {
5893 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5894 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5895 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5896 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn_1[0]);
5900 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5901 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5902 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5904 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5905 let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5906 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5907 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5908 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5909 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5910 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5911 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5912 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5913 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5914 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5915 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5919 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5920 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5921 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5922 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5923 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5925 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5927 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5928 let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5930 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5931 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5932 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5934 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5935 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5936 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5938 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5939 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5940 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5942 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5943 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5944 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5947 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5948 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5949 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5950 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5951 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5952 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5954 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5956 // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5957 // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5958 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5959 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5960 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5962 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5963 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5964 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
5966 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5967 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5968 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5969 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5970 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5972 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5973 let mut block = Block {
5974 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5977 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5978 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5979 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5981 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5982 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5983 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5984 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5987 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5988 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5989 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5990 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5991 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5992 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5994 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5995 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5996 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5998 let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6000 // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
6001 // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
6002 // to "time out" the HTLC.
6004 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
6005 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6007 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
6008 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: Vec::new()});
6009 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
6011 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
6012 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6013 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6014 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6017 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
6018 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6019 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6020 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6021 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6022 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6024 // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
6025 // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
6026 // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
6027 // actually revoked.
6028 let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
6029 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
6030 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
6031 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
6032 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6034 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6035 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6036 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
6037 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6038 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6039 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
6040 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6041 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
6042 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6043 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6045 if check_revoke_no_close {
6046 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
6047 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6050 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
6051 let mut block = Block {
6052 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
6055 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
6056 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
6057 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
6059 if !check_revoke_no_close {
6060 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
6061 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6062 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6063 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6065 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6066 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6067 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[0] {
6068 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
6069 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
6070 if let Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[1] {
6071 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
6072 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
6076 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
6077 // There are only a few cases to test here:
6078 // * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
6079 // broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
6080 // * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
6081 // * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
6082 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
6084 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
6085 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
6086 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
6088 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
6089 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
6090 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
6092 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
6093 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
6097 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
6098 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
6099 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
6100 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
6101 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
6106 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
6107 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6108 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6109 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6110 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6111 // Force duplicate randomness for every get-random call
6112 for node in nodes.iter() {
6113 *node.keys_manager.override_random_bytes.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
6116 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
6117 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
6118 let push_msat=10001;
6119 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
6120 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6121 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
6122 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6124 // Create a second channel with the same random values. This used to panic due to a colliding
6125 // channel_id, but now panics due to a colliding outbound SCID alias.
6126 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
6130 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
6131 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6132 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6133 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6134 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6136 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
6137 let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
6138 let push_msat=10001;
6139 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
6141 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
6142 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
6143 // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
6144 let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
6145 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
6147 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
6148 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
6149 let push_msat=10001;
6150 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
6151 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6152 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
6154 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
6155 // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
6156 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
6158 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
6159 assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
6160 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6162 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
6163 let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
6164 assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
6166 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
6167 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
6168 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6169 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6170 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
6171 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6175 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
6176 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6177 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6178 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6179 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6181 let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
6182 let push_msat=10001;
6183 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
6184 let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6185 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
6186 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
6188 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
6189 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6190 let err_msg = match events[0] {
6191 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
6194 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6196 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
6199 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
6200 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
6201 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
6202 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
6204 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
6205 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6206 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6207 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6208 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6209 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6211 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6212 // pending_update_fee.
6214 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6215 *feerate_lock += 20;
6217 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6218 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6220 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6221 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6222 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6223 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6224 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6226 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6229 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6231 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6232 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6233 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6234 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6236 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6237 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
6238 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6240 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6241 let our_payment_id = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6242 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6243 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6245 // Flush the pending fee update.
6246 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6247 let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6248 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6249 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
6250 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6252 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
6253 // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
6254 // us to surface its failure to the user.
6255 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6256 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6257 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6258 let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6259 hex::encode(our_payment_hash.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6260 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6262 // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
6263 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6264 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6266 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data, .. } => {
6267 assert_eq!(our_payment_id, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6268 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
6269 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
6270 assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6271 assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6272 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
6273 assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
6274 assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
6276 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6280 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
6281 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
6282 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
6284 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
6285 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6286 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6287 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6288 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6289 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6291 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6292 // pending_update_fee.
6294 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6295 *feerate_lock += 200;
6297 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6298 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6300 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6301 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6302 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6303 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6304 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6306 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6309 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6311 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6312 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6313 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6314 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6316 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6318 let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors) - amt_1;
6319 let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
6320 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
6322 // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
6323 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
6324 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6325 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
6326 let payment_id_2 = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
6327 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6328 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
6330 // Flush the pending fee update.
6331 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6332 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6333 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6334 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
6335 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6336 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
6338 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
6339 // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
6340 // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
6341 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6342 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6343 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6344 let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6345 hex::encode(payment_hash_2.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6346 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6348 // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
6349 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6350 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6352 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data, .. } => {
6353 assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6354 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
6355 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
6356 assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6357 assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6358 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
6359 assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
6360 assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
6362 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6365 // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
6366 let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
6367 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6368 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
6369 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
6371 let raa = match send_raa_event {
6372 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
6373 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6375 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6376 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6377 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6378 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6379 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6380 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6382 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6383 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6385 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6386 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6387 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6389 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => {},
6390 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6392 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
6393 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6394 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, amt_1);
6396 let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6397 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6398 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
6399 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
6402 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
6403 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
6404 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
6407 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
6408 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6409 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6410 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
6411 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
6412 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
6413 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
6414 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
6415 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6416 let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6417 let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6419 // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6420 // pending_update_fee.
6422 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6423 *feerate_lock += 20;
6425 nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6426 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6428 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6429 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6430 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6431 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6432 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6434 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6437 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6439 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6440 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6441 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6442 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6444 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6446 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
6447 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors) - total_routing_fee_msat;
6448 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
6449 let payment_event = {
6450 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6451 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6453 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6454 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6456 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6458 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6459 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6460 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6461 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6463 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1_2.2);
6464 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6466 // Flush the pending fee update.
6467 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6468 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6469 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6470 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6471 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6472 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6474 // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
6475 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6476 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6478 let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
6479 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
6482 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6485 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
6486 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6487 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6489 // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
6490 let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6491 assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 2);
6492 match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
6493 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6494 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6497 // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
6498 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6499 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6501 // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
6502 let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6503 assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
6504 let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
6505 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6506 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
6507 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
6508 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
6509 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6510 (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6512 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6515 // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
6516 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
6517 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6519 // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
6520 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6521 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6522 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6523 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6524 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6525 let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6526 assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
6527 let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
6528 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
6529 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6531 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6532 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
6533 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6536 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
6537 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
6538 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
6541 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
6542 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
6543 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6544 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6545 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6546 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6547 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6549 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6550 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 100;
6552 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6553 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6554 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6555 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value".to_string(), 1);
6559 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
6560 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6561 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6562 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6563 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6564 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6565 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6567 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6568 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 0;
6569 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6570 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
6572 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6573 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6577 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
6578 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6579 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6580 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6581 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6582 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6583 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6585 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6586 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6587 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6588 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6589 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6591 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6592 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6593 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6594 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6595 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() });
6599 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6600 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6601 //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6602 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6603 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6604 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6605 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6606 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6608 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
6609 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
6610 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], payment_params, 100000000, 0);
6611 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = 500000001;
6612 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::RouteError { ref err },
6613 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6617 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6618 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6619 //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6620 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6621 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6622 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6623 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6624 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6625 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6626 let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6628 for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6629 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6630 let payment_event = {
6631 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6632 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6634 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6635 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6636 if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6637 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6641 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6643 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6644 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6645 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6647 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6648 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6650 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6651 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6652 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6654 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6655 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
6659 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6660 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6661 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6662 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6663 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6664 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6665 let channel_value = 100000;
6666 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6667 let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6669 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6671 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6672 // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6674 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = max_in_flight + 1;
6675 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6676 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6678 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6679 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
6681 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6684 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6686 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6687 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6688 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6689 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6690 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6691 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6692 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6693 let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6695 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6696 let channel = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6697 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6700 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6701 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6702 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6703 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6704 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6705 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6706 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6707 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6708 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6709 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6710 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6714 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6715 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6716 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6717 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6718 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6719 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6720 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6722 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6723 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6724 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6725 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6726 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6727 let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
6729 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6730 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6731 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6732 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6733 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6735 // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6736 // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6737 // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6738 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6739 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6741 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6742 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6743 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6744 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6745 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6749 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6750 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6751 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6752 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6753 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6754 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6755 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6756 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6758 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3999999);
6759 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6760 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6761 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6762 let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3999999, &Some(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6763 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash);
6765 let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6769 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6770 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6771 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6774 for i in 0..super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
6775 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6776 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6778 msg.htlc_id = (super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS) as u64;
6779 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6781 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6782 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6783 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6784 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6785 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6789 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6790 //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6791 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6792 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6793 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6794 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6795 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6797 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6798 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6799 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6800 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6801 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6802 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6804 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6805 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6806 assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6807 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6808 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6812 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6813 //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6814 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6815 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6816 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6817 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6819 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6820 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6821 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6822 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6823 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6824 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6825 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6827 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6828 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6829 assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6830 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6831 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6835 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6836 //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6837 // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6838 // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6839 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6840 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6841 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6842 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6844 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6845 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6846 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6847 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6848 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6849 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6851 //Disconnect and Reconnect
6852 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6853 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6854 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
6855 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6856 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6857 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
6858 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6859 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6860 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6861 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6862 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6863 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6866 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6867 assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6868 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6869 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6870 let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6872 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6874 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6875 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6876 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6877 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6878 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6882 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6883 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6885 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6886 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6887 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6888 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6889 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6890 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6891 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6893 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6894 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6895 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6897 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6900 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6903 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6905 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6906 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6907 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6908 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6909 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6913 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6914 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6916 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6917 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6918 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6919 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6920 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6922 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6923 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6924 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6925 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6926 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6928 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6931 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6934 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6936 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6937 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6938 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6939 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6940 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6944 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6945 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6947 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6948 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6949 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6950 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6951 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6953 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6954 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6955 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6956 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6957 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6958 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6961 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6962 failure_code: 0x8000,
6965 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6967 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6968 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6969 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6970 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6971 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6975 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6976 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6978 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6979 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6980 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6981 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6982 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6984 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6986 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6987 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6988 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6990 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6991 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6992 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6994 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6995 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6996 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6997 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6998 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6999 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7000 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
7002 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7006 update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
7008 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
7010 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
7011 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
7012 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
7013 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7014 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
7018 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
7019 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
7021 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7022 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7023 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7024 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7025 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7027 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
7029 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
7030 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7031 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
7033 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7034 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7035 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
7037 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
7038 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7039 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
7040 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7041 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7042 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7043 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
7045 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7049 update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
7051 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
7053 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
7054 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
7055 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
7056 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7057 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
7061 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
7062 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
7064 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7065 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7066 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7067 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7068 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7070 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
7071 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7072 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7074 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7075 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
7077 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7078 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7079 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
7081 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7083 let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
7085 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
7086 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7087 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7088 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7089 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
7090 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7091 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
7093 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7096 update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
7097 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
7099 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
7100 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
7101 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
7102 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7103 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
7107 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
7108 //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
7109 // * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
7111 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7112 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7113 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7114 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7115 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7116 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7118 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
7121 let mut payment_event = {
7122 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7123 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7124 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7125 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7126 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
7128 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7129 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7130 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7131 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7132 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7133 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
7134 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7135 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
7136 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
7139 payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
7140 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7141 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
7142 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
7144 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7145 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7146 let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
7148 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7149 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7150 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7151 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7152 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
7153 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7154 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
7156 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7160 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
7162 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7163 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
7164 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
7165 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7166 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
7168 //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
7170 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
7171 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7172 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7173 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7174 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7175 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7177 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7180 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7183 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
7184 // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
7185 // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
7186 // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
7188 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7189 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7190 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7191 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7192 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7193 let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7195 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7197 // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
7198 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7199 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7200 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7202 // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
7203 let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7205 // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
7206 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
7207 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7208 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
7209 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7211 let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7212 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7213 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
7214 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7216 // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
7217 let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7219 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7221 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
7222 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7224 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7227 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
7228 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7230 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7233 assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
7234 // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
7235 if announce_latest {
7236 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
7238 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
7241 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7242 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7243 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7245 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7246 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7247 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7248 // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
7249 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7250 let mut first_failed = false;
7251 for event in events {
7253 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7254 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
7255 assert!(!first_failed);
7256 first_failed = true;
7258 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
7261 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7267 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
7268 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
7269 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
7272 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
7273 // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7274 // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
7275 // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7276 // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
7277 // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7278 // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
7280 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7281 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7282 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7283 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7284 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7286 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7288 let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7289 let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7291 let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7292 let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7294 // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
7296 let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7297 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
7300 let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
7302 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
7303 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
7304 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7305 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7306 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
7308 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
7309 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7310 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7311 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7312 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7313 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7314 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
7315 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7316 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7317 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7318 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7320 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
7321 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7322 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7323 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7324 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7325 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7327 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7328 timeout_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..)
7329 .filter(|tx| tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == bs_commitment_tx[0].txid()).collect();
7330 check_spends!(timeout_tx[0], bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7331 // For both a revoked or non-revoked commitment transaction, after ANTI_REORG_DELAY the
7332 // dust HTLC should have been failed.
7333 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
7336 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7338 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].lock_time, 0);
7340 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout/revocation-claim tx
7341 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7342 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7343 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7344 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7349 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
7350 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
7351 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
7352 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
7356 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
7357 // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
7359 let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7360 low_our_to_self_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
7361 let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7362 high_their_to_self_config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
7363 let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
7364 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7365 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7366 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
7367 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7369 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
7370 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7371 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), 1000000, 1000000, 0,
7372 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, 42)
7375 APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7376 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7378 } else { assert!(false) }
7380 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7381 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7382 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7383 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7384 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7385 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0,
7386 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
7389 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7390 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7392 } else { assert!(false); }
7394 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
7395 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7396 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7397 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7398 accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7399 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7401 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
7403 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7404 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
7405 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
7409 } else { panic!(); }
7410 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg });
7412 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7413 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7414 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7415 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7416 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7417 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0,
7418 &high_their_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
7421 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7422 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7424 } else { assert!(false); }
7427 fn do_test_data_loss_protect(reconnect_panicing: bool) {
7428 // When we get a data_loss_protect proving we're behind, we immediately panic as the
7429 // chain::Watch API requirements have been violated (e.g. the user restored from a backup). The
7430 // panic message informs the user they should force-close without broadcasting, which is tested
7431 // if `reconnect_panicing` is not set.
7437 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7438 // We broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr, which would cause a panic
7439 // during signing due to revoked tx
7440 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7441 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
7444 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7445 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7446 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7448 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7450 // Cache node A state before any channel update
7451 let previous_node_state = nodes[0].node.encode();
7452 let mut previous_chain_monitor_state = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7453 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan.2).write(&mut previous_chain_monitor_state).unwrap();
7455 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7456 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7458 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7459 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7461 // Restore node A from previous state
7462 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
7463 let mut chain_monitor = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_chain_monitor_state.0), keys_manager).unwrap().1;
7464 chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
7465 tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster { txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new())) };
7466 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7467 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7468 monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &tx_broadcaster, &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7470 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7471 channel_monitors.insert(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, &mut chain_monitor);
7472 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_node_state), ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7473 keys_manager: keys_manager,
7474 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
7475 chain_monitor: &monitor,
7477 tx_broadcaster: &tx_broadcaster,
7478 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
7482 nodes[0].node = &node_state_0;
7483 assert!(monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chain_monitor).is_ok());
7484 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &monitor;
7485 nodes[0].chain_source = &chain_source;
7487 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7489 if reconnect_panicing {
7490 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7491 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7493 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7495 // Check we close channel detecting A is fallen-behind
7496 // Check that we sent the warning message when we detected that A has fallen behind,
7497 // and give the possibility for A to recover from the warning.
7498 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7499 let warn_msg = "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned();
7500 assert!(check_warn_msg!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), chan.2).contains(&warn_msg));
7503 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7504 // The node B should not broadcast the transaction to force close the channel!
7505 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
7508 let reestablish_0 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7509 // Check A panics upon seeing proof it has fallen behind.
7510 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_0[0]);
7511 return; // By this point we should have panic'ed!
7514 nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
7515 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7516 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
7518 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7519 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7522 for msg in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
7523 if let MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } = msg {
7524 } else if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg {
7526 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7527 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel force-closed");
7529 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
7532 panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", msg)
7536 // after the warning message sent by B, we should not able to
7537 // use the channel, or reconnect with success to the channel.
7538 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().is_empty());
7539 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7540 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7541 let retry_reestablish = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7543 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &retry_reestablish[0]);
7544 let mut err_msgs_0 = Vec::with_capacity(1);
7545 for msg in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
7546 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg {
7548 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7549 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Failed to find corresponding channel");
7550 err_msgs_0.push(msg.clone());
7552 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
7555 panic!("Unexpected event!");
7558 assert_eq!(err_msgs_0.len(), 1);
7559 nodes[1].node.handle_error(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &err_msgs_0[0]);
7560 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().is_empty());
7561 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7562 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned() });
7563 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
7568 fn test_data_loss_protect_showing_stale_state_panics() {
7569 do_test_data_loss_protect(true);
7573 fn test_force_close_without_broadcast() {
7574 do_test_data_loss_protect(false);
7578 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
7579 // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
7580 // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
7581 // to B, B should refuse payment.
7583 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7584 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7585 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7586 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7588 // Create some initial channels
7589 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7591 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7592 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7593 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7594 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7595 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7596 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
7597 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7598 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7600 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7601 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7602 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7603 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7604 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7606 // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
7607 // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
7608 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7609 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
7611 // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
7612 // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
7613 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7615 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7616 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7617 let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
7618 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7619 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7620 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7621 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7622 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7623 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7624 (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
7626 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7628 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7630 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
7631 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
7633 // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
7634 let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(10_000).to_vec();
7635 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH));
7636 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
7640 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
7641 // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
7642 // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
7644 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7645 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7646 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7647 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7649 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7650 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7651 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7654 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7655 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7657 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // Enabled -> DisabledStaged
7658 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // DisabledStaged -> Disabled
7659 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7660 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7661 let mut chans_disabled = HashMap::new();
7662 for e in msg_events {
7664 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7665 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7666 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7667 if chans_disabled.insert(msg.contents.short_channel_id, msg.contents.timestamp).is_some() {
7668 panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7671 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7675 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7676 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7677 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7678 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7679 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7680 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7682 // Reestablish chan_1
7683 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7684 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7685 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7686 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7687 // Reestablish chan_2
7688 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7689 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7690 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7691 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7692 // Reestablish chan_3
7693 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7694 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7695 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7696 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7698 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7699 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7700 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7701 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7702 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7703 for e in msg_events {
7705 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7706 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7707 match chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7708 // Each update should have a higher timestamp than the previous one, replacing
7710 Some(prev_timestamp) => assert!(msg.contents.timestamp > prev_timestamp),
7711 None => panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!"),
7714 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7717 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7718 assert!(chans_disabled.is_empty());
7722 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7723 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7724 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7726 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7727 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7728 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7729 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7731 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7733 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7734 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
7735 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7736 let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_params, 3000000, 30);
7737 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7739 let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7740 // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7741 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7742 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7743 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7744 let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7746 let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7747 for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7748 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7749 penalty_sum += outp.value;
7753 // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7754 let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7756 // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7757 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7758 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_114, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7759 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()] });
7760 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7762 // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7766 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7767 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor) + local commitment tx
7768 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7769 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7770 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7771 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7772 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7773 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7777 // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7778 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7779 let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7780 let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7782 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7783 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7784 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7785 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7786 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7787 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7788 penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7789 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7790 assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7791 let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7792 feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7793 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7794 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7798 assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7800 // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7801 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7803 let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7805 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7806 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7807 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7808 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7809 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7810 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7811 penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7812 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7813 assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7814 let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7815 feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7816 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7817 assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7821 assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7823 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7824 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7828 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7829 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7830 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7832 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7833 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7834 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7835 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7836 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7838 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7839 // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7840 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7841 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7842 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7843 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7844 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7845 let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7846 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7847 let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[1].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7848 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7849 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7851 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7852 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7853 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7855 // Revoke local commitment tx
7856 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7858 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7859 // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7860 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7861 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7862 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7863 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7864 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 49); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7866 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
7867 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
7868 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], chan.3);
7870 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7871 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7872 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7874 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7875 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7876 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
7877 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7879 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7880 let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7881 let header_11 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: hash_128, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7882 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_11, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7883 let header_129 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_11.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7884 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_129, txdata: vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[2].clone()] });
7885 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7886 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7887 match events.last().unwrap() {
7888 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7889 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7895 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7896 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + A commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7897 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7899 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7900 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7901 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7902 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7904 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7905 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7906 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7907 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7908 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7909 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7911 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7912 // available, which we check here:
7913 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7914 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7915 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7917 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7918 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7920 // node_txn[3] is the local commitment tx broadcast just because (and somewhat in case of
7921 // reorgs, though its not clear its ever worth broadcasting conflicting txn like this when
7922 // a remote commitment tx has already been confirmed).
7923 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan.3);
7925 // node_txn[4] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7926 // output, checked above).
7927 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 2);
7928 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].output.len(), 1);
7929 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7931 first = node_txn[4].txid();
7932 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7933 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[4].output[0].value;
7934 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[4].weight() as u64;
7935 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7939 // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7940 let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_129.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7941 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7942 let header_131 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_130.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7943 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_131, txdata: Vec::new() });
7945 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7946 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // 2 bumped penalty txn on revoked commitment tx
7948 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7949 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7950 // Note that these are both bogus - they spend outputs already claimed in block 129:
7951 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output {
7952 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7954 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7955 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7961 // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7962 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7963 assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7964 let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7966 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7967 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7969 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7970 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7971 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7972 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7973 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7974 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7975 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7976 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7980 // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7981 let header_145 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_144, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7982 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_145, txdata: node_txn });
7983 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7985 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7986 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7987 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7988 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7989 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7990 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7991 // up bumped justice generation.
7992 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7995 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7996 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8000 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
8001 // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
8002 // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
8005 // Provide preimage for one
8006 // Check aggregation
8008 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8009 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8010 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8011 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8013 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8014 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
8015 route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
8017 // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
8018 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
8019 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
8020 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8021 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
8023 // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
8024 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8025 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
8026 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
8027 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8028 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
8030 // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
8034 let feerate_timeout;
8035 let feerate_preimage;
8037 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8038 // 9 transactions including:
8039 // 1*2 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success
8040 // 1*3 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success + HTLC-Timeout
8041 // 2 * HTLC-Success (one RBF bump we'll check later)
8043 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 8);
8044 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8045 assert_eq!(node_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
8046 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
8047 check_spends!(node_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
8049 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan.3);
8050 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
8052 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output == node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output {
8053 preimage_bump = node_txn[3].clone();
8054 check_spends!(node_txn[3], remote_txn[0]);
8056 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
8057 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[5]);
8059 preimage_bump = node_txn[7].clone();
8060 check_spends!(node_txn[7], remote_txn[0]);
8061 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[7].input[0].previous_output);
8063 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[3]);
8064 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[4]);
8067 timeout = node_txn[6].txid();
8068 let index = node_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout;
8069 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[6].output[0].value;
8070 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / node_txn[6].weight() as u64;
8072 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
8073 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
8074 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
8075 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
8079 assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
8080 assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
8082 // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
8083 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
8085 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8086 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8087 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8088 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
8089 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
8090 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
8092 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
8093 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
8094 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.weight() as u64;
8095 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
8096 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
8098 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
8099 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
8100 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
8101 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
8102 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
8107 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8108 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8112 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
8113 // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
8114 // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
8115 // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
8116 // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
8117 // EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
8118 // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
8119 // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
8121 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8122 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8123 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8124 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8125 let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
8127 let per_commitment_secret;
8128 let next_per_commitment_point;
8130 let mut guard = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
8131 let keys = guard.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
8133 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
8135 // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
8136 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8137 per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
8139 // Must revoke without gaps
8140 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8141 keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
8143 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8144 next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
8145 &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
8148 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
8149 &msgs::RevokeAndACK { channel_id, per_commitment_secret, next_per_commitment_point });
8150 assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
8151 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8152 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() });
8156 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
8157 // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
8158 // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
8160 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8161 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8162 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8163 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8165 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8166 // Lock HTLC in both directions
8167 let (payment_preimage_1, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000);
8168 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000);
8170 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
8171 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8172 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
8174 // Revoke local commitment tx
8175 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
8177 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
8178 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
8179 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[0], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
8180 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8182 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
8183 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8184 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8185 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8187 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8188 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
8189 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8190 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8191 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8192 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
8196 let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8197 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
8198 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8200 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
8201 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
8202 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
8207 fn test_pending_claimed_htlc_no_balance_underflow() {
8208 // Tests that if we have a pending outbound HTLC as well as a claimed-but-not-fully-removed
8209 // HTLC we will not underflow when we call `Channel::get_balance_msat()`.
8210 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8211 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8212 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8213 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8214 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8216 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_010_000);
8217 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8218 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_010_000);
8219 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8220 let fulfill_ev = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8222 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8223 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
8224 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.commitment_signed);
8225 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8226 let (_raa, _cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8228 // At this point nodes[1] has received 1,010k msat (10k msat more than their reserve) and can
8229 // send an HTLC back (though it will go in the holding cell). Send an HTLC back and check we
8230 // can get our balance.
8232 // Get a route from nodes[1] to nodes[0] by getting a route going the other way and then flip
8233 // the public key of the only hop. This works around ChannelDetails not showing the
8234 // almost-claimed HTLC as available balance.
8235 let (mut route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000);
8236 route.payment_params = None; // This is all wrong, but unnecessary
8237 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8238 let (_, payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
8239 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
8241 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].balance_msat, 1_000_000);
8245 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
8246 // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
8247 // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
8248 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8249 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8250 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8251 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8253 let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8255 // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
8256 // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
8257 // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
8258 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
8259 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8261 // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
8262 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
8263 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8264 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8266 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
8267 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8268 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
8269 let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8270 assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
8272 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
8273 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8274 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
8276 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8281 fn test_override_channel_config() {
8282 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8283 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8284 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8285 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8287 // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
8288 let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
8289 override_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
8291 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
8293 // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
8294 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8295 assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
8296 assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
8300 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
8301 let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
8302 zero_config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
8303 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8304 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8305 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
8306 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8308 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
8309 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8310 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8312 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8313 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8314 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8318 fn test_channel_update_has_correct_htlc_maximum_msat() {
8319 // Tests that the `ChannelUpdate` message has the correct values for `htlc_maximum_msat` set.
8320 // Bolt 7 specifies that if present `htlc_maximum_msat`:
8321 // 1. MUST be set to less than or equal to the channel capacity. In LDK, this is capped to
8322 // 90% of the `channel_value`.
8323 // 2. MUST be set to less than or equal to the `max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` received from the peer.
8325 let mut config_30_percent = UserConfig::default();
8326 config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
8327 config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 30;
8328 let mut config_50_percent = UserConfig::default();
8329 config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
8330 config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 50;
8331 let mut config_95_percent = UserConfig::default();
8332 config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
8333 config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 95;
8334 let mut config_100_percent = UserConfig::default();
8335 config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
8336 config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 100;
8338 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8339 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8340 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config_30_percent), Some(config_50_percent), Some(config_95_percent), Some(config_100_percent)]);
8341 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8343 let channel_value_satoshis = 100000;
8344 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8345 let channel_value_30_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.3) as u64;
8346 let channel_value_50_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.5) as u64;
8347 let channel_value_90_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.9) as u64;
8349 let (node_0_chan_update, node_1_chan_update, _, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value_satoshis, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8350 let (node_2_chan_update, node_3_chan_update, _, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, channel_value_satoshis, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8352 // Assert that `node[0]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 50 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8353 // that's the value of `node[1]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
8354 assert_eq!(node_0_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_50_percent_msat);
8355 // Assert that `node[1]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 30 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8356 // that's the value of `node[0]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
8357 assert_eq!(node_1_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_30_percent_msat);
8359 // Assert that `node[2]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8360 // the value of `node[3]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (100%), exceeds 90% of the
8362 assert_eq!(node_2_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
8363 // Assert that `node[3]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8364 // the value of `node[2]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (95%), exceeds 90% of the
8366 assert_eq!(node_3_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
8370 fn test_manually_accept_inbound_channel_request() {
8371 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8372 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8373 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8374 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8375 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8376 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8378 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8379 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8381 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8383 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8384 // accepting the inbound channel request.
8385 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8387 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8389 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8390 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap();
8392 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8395 let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8396 assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8398 match accept_msg_ev[0] {
8399 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
8400 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8402 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8405 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8407 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8408 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8410 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8412 Event::ChannelClosed { user_channel_id, .. } => {
8413 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 23);
8415 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8420 fn test_manually_reject_inbound_channel_request() {
8421 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8422 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8423 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8424 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8425 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8426 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8428 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8429 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8431 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8433 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8434 // rejecting the inbound channel request.
8435 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8437 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8439 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8440 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8442 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8445 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8446 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8448 match close_msg_ev[0] {
8449 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => {
8450 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8452 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8454 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8458 fn test_reject_funding_before_inbound_channel_accepted() {
8459 // This tests that when `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` is set to true, inbound
8460 // channels must to be manually accepted through `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel` by
8461 // the node operator before the counterparty sends a `FundingCreated` message. If a
8462 // `FundingCreated` message is received before the channel is accepted, it should be rejected
8463 // and the channel should be closed.
8464 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8465 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8466 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8467 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8468 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8469 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8471 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8472 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8473 let temp_channel_id = res.temporary_channel_id;
8475 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8477 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in the `msg_events`.
8478 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8480 // Clear the `Event::OpenChannelRequest` event without responding to the request.
8481 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8483 // Get the `AcceptChannel` message of `nodes[1]` without calling
8484 // `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`, which generates a
8485 // `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` event. The message is passed to `nodes[0]`
8486 // `handle_accept_channel`, which is required in order for `create_funding_transaction` to
8487 // succeed when `nodes[0]` is passed to it.
8488 let accept_chan_msg = {
8490 let channel = get_channel_ref!(&nodes[1], lock, temp_channel_id);
8491 channel.get_accept_channel_message()
8493 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_chan_msg);
8495 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8497 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8498 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8500 // The `funding_created_msg` should be rejected by `nodes[1]` as it hasn't accepted the channel
8501 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8503 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8504 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8506 let expected_err = "FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted";
8507 match close_msg_ev[0] {
8508 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id, } => {
8509 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, temp_channel_id);
8510 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8511 assert_eq!(msg.data, expected_err);
8513 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8516 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
8520 fn test_can_not_accept_inbound_channel_twice() {
8521 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8522 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8523 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8524 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8525 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8526 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8528 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8529 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8531 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8533 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8534 // accepting the inbound channel request.
8535 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8537 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8539 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8540 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0).unwrap();
8541 let api_res = nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
8543 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8544 assert_eq!(err, "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.");
8546 Ok(_) => panic!("Channel shouldn't be possible to be accepted twice"),
8547 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8550 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8553 // Ensure that the channel wasn't closed after attempting to accept it twice.
8554 let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8555 assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8557 match accept_msg_ev[0] {
8558 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
8559 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8561 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8566 fn test_can_not_accept_unknown_inbound_channel() {
8567 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8568 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
8569 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
8570 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
8572 let unknown_channel_id = [0; 32];
8573 let api_res = nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&unknown_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
8575 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
8576 assert_eq!(err, "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist");
8578 Ok(_) => panic!("It shouldn't be possible to accept an unkown channel"),
8579 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8584 fn test_simple_mpp() {
8585 // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
8586 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8587 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8588 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8589 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8591 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8592 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8593 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8594 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8596 let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8597 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8598 route.paths.push(path);
8599 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8600 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8601 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8602 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8603 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8604 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8605 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
8606 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
8610 fn test_preimage_storage() {
8611 // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
8612 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8613 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8614 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8615 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8617 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8620 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
8621 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8622 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8623 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8624 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8625 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8626 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8627 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8629 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8630 // values from previous calls.
8631 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8632 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8633 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8635 Event::PaymentReceived { ref purpose, .. } => {
8637 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
8638 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
8640 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
8643 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8648 #[allow(deprecated)]
8649 fn test_secret_timeout() {
8650 // Simple test of payment secret storage time outs. After
8651 // `create_inbound_payment(_for_hash)_legacy` is removed, this test will be removed as well.
8652 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8653 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8654 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8655 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8657 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8659 let (payment_hash, payment_secret_1) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_legacy(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8661 // We should fail to register the same payment hash twice, at least until we've connected a
8662 // block with time 7200 + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1.
8663 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8664 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8665 } else { panic!(); }
8667 let node_1_blocks = nodes[1].blocks.lock().unwrap();
8669 header: BlockHeader {
8671 prev_blockhash: node_1_blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(),
8672 merkle_root: Default::default(),
8673 time: node_1_blocks.len() as u32 + 7200, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8677 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8678 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8679 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8680 } else { panic!(); }
8682 // If we then connect the second block, we should be able to register the same payment hash
8683 // again (this time getting a new payment secret).
8684 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.header.block_hash();
8685 block.header.time += 1;
8686 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8687 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8688 assert_ne!(payment_secret_1, our_payment_secret);
8691 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8692 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8693 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8694 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8695 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8696 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8697 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8699 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8700 // values from previous calls.
8701 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8702 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8703 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8705 Event::PaymentReceived { purpose: PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret }, .. } => {
8706 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
8707 assert_eq!(payment_secret, our_payment_secret);
8708 // We don't actually have the payment preimage with which to claim this payment!
8710 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8715 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8716 // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8717 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8718 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8719 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8720 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8722 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8724 let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8725 let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8726 let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8727 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8729 // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8730 // resulting events.
8731 macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8732 ($payment_hash: expr) => {
8733 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8734 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8735 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8736 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8737 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8739 // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8740 // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8741 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8742 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash: $payment_hash }]);
8743 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8745 // We should fail the payment back
8746 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8747 match events.pop().unwrap() {
8748 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8749 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8750 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8752 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8757 let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8758 // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8759 let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8761 // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8762 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8763 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(our_payment_hash);
8764 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8766 // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8767 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8768 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8769 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8771 // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8772 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8773 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8774 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8778 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8779 // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8780 // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8781 // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateErr.
8783 // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8784 // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8785 // commitment at same time.
8787 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8788 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8789 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8790 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8792 // Create some initial channel
8793 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8794 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8796 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8797 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8799 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8800 let (preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
8802 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8803 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8804 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8805 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8807 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8808 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8809 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8810 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8811 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8812 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8813 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8814 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8817 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8818 let block = Block { header, txdata: vec![] };
8819 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8820 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8821 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (block.clone(), 0));
8822 watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, 200);
8824 // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8825 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage);
8826 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8827 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
8829 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8830 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8831 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8832 if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8833 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8834 if let Err(_) = watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8835 if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8836 } else { assert!(false); }
8837 } else { assert!(false); };
8838 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8839 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8840 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8841 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8845 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8846 // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8847 // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8848 // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8849 // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8851 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8852 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8853 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8854 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8856 // Create some initial channel
8857 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8858 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8860 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8861 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8863 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8864 route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8866 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8867 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8868 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8869 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8870 let watchtower_alice = {
8871 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8872 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8873 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8874 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8875 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8876 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8877 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8878 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8881 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8882 let block = Block { header, txdata: vec![] };
8883 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8884 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8885 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as usize, (block.clone(), 0));
8886 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8888 // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8890 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8891 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8895 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8896 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8897 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8898 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8899 let watchtower_bob = {
8900 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8901 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8902 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8903 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8904 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8905 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8906 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8907 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8910 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8911 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8913 // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8914 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8916 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8918 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8920 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8921 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8922 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8923 if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8924 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8925 // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8926 if let Err(_) = watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8927 if let Ok(_) = watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8928 if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8929 } else { assert!(false); }
8930 } else { assert!(false); };
8931 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8932 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8934 //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8935 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8936 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8938 // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8941 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8942 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8943 bob_state_y = txn[0].clone();
8947 // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8948 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8949 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![bob_state_y.clone()] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8951 let htlc_txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8952 // We broadcast twice the transaction, once due to the HTLC-timeout, once due
8953 // the onchain detection of the HTLC output
8954 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
8955 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8956 check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], bob_state_y);
8961 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8962 // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8963 // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8966 // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8967 // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8969 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8970 // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8971 // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8972 // before receiving funding_signed.
8973 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8974 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8975 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8976 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8978 // Create an initial channel
8979 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8980 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8981 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8982 let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8983 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_chan_msg);
8985 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8986 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8988 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8989 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8991 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8992 let channel_id = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
8993 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8994 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8995 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Hi".to_string() }, true);
8999 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
9000 // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
9001 // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
9002 // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
9003 // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
9004 // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
9005 // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
9007 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9008 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9009 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9010 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9012 // Create some initial channels
9013 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9015 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
9016 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
9017 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
9018 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9019 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
9020 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
9022 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
9023 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9024 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] });
9025 // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
9026 // this test before #653 fix.
9027 chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
9028 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
9029 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9030 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
9031 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
9033 let htlc_timeout = {
9034 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9035 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
9036 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9037 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
9041 let header_201 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9042 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_201, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout.clone()] });
9043 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
9044 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
9047 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
9048 // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
9049 // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
9050 // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
9052 // Steps of the test:
9053 // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
9054 // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
9055 // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
9056 // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
9057 // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
9058 // but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
9059 // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
9060 // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
9061 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9062 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9063 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9064 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9066 // Create some initial channels
9067 let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9068 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9070 // Steps (1) and (2):
9071 // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
9072 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
9074 // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
9075 let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
9076 check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
9077 assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
9078 check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
9079 assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9080 assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
9082 // Steps (3) and (4):
9083 // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
9084 // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
9085 let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
9086 let mut counterparty_node = 1; // Bob if Alice force-closes
9089 if !broadcast_alice {
9090 force_closing_node = 1;
9091 counterparty_node = 0;
9093 nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_ab.2, &nodes[counterparty_node].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9094 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
9095 check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
9096 check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9097 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9098 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
9099 true => alice_txn.clone(),
9100 false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
9102 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
9103 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
9104 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
9105 if broadcast_alice {
9106 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9107 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9108 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
9110 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
9111 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
9115 // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
9116 // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
9117 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9118 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9119 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
9121 let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9122 assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9123 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9124 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9125 assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
9126 assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
9128 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9129 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false, false);
9130 // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
9131 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
9132 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9133 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9135 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
9136 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9138 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9141 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
9142 // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
9143 // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
9144 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9146 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9147 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9148 let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
9149 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
9150 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9153 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9155 let bob_updates = match events[1] {
9156 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
9157 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9160 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9163 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
9164 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9165 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
9166 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9168 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9169 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9170 let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
9171 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
9172 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9175 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9177 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
9178 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9180 // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
9181 // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
9182 let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
9183 if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
9184 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9185 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
9186 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
9187 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
9188 if broadcast_alice {
9189 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9190 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9191 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
9193 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9194 if broadcast_alice {
9195 // In `connect_block()`, the ChainMonitor and ChannelManager are separately notified about a
9196 // new block being connected. The ChannelManager being notified triggers a monitor update,
9197 // which triggers broadcasting our commitment tx and an HTLC-claiming tx. The ChainMonitor
9198 // being notified triggers the HTLC-claiming tx redundantly, resulting in 3 total txs being
9200 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 3);
9201 check_spends!(bob_txn[1], chan_ab.3);
9203 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
9204 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
9209 // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
9210 // broadcasted commitment transaction.
9212 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
9213 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9214 // Bob should now have an extra broadcasted tx, for the preimage-claiming transaction.
9215 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
9217 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
9218 true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
9219 false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
9221 // If Alice force-closed and Bob didn't receive her commitment transaction until after he
9222 // received Carol's fulfill, he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction first. Else if
9223 // Bob force closed or if he found out about Alice's commitment tx before receiving Carol's
9224 // fulfill, then he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction second.
9225 if broadcast_alice && !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9226 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
9227 assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
9229 check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
9230 assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
9236 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
9237 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
9238 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
9239 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
9240 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
9244 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
9245 // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
9246 // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
9248 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
9249 // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
9250 // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
9251 // updating logic for the existing channel.
9252 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9253 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9254 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9255 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9257 // Create an initial channel
9258 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
9259 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9260 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
9261 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9263 // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
9264 // that it is rejected.
9265 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
9267 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9268 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9270 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9271 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
9272 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
9273 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
9274 // move forward with it.
9275 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9276 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9278 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9282 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
9283 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
9285 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9286 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9288 let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9289 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9291 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9292 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
9293 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
9294 added_monitors.clear();
9296 let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9298 let funding_outpoint = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
9299 let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
9301 // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
9304 // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
9305 // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
9306 // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
9307 open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
9308 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
9310 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9311 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9313 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9314 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
9315 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
9316 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9317 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9319 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9323 // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
9324 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
9325 let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9326 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_2_msg);
9327 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9328 create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
9330 let funding_created = {
9331 let mut a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
9332 // Once we call `get_outbound_funding_created` the channel has a duplicate channel_id as
9333 // another channel in the ChannelManager - an invalid state. Thus, we'd panic later when we
9334 // try to create another channel. Instead, we drop the channel entirely here (leaving the
9335 // channelmanager in a possibly nonsense state instead).
9336 let mut as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.remove(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
9337 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9338 as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
9340 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9341 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
9342 // At this point we'll try to add a duplicate channel monitor, which will be rejected, but
9343 // still needs to be cleared here.
9344 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9346 // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
9348 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9349 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9351 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9352 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
9353 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
9354 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
9355 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9357 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9361 // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
9362 // everything is functional.
9363 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
9365 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9366 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
9367 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
9368 added_monitors.clear();
9371 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9372 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
9373 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9374 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9376 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9377 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9378 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9379 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
9383 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
9384 // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
9386 // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
9387 // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
9388 // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
9389 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9390 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9391 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9392 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9394 // Create some initial channels
9395 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9396 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9397 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9399 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9400 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9401 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9403 // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
9404 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9405 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9407 // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
9408 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9409 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9410 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
9411 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
9412 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
9413 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9414 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
9415 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9417 // A null channel ID should close all channels
9418 let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9419 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9420 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9421 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
9422 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9423 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9425 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9426 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9428 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9431 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9432 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9434 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9436 // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
9437 // peer_disconnected with no_connection_possible set to false, duplicating the
9438 // close-all-channels logic. That's OK, we don't want to end up not force-closing channels for
9439 // users with their own peer handling logic. We duplicate the call here, however.
9440 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9441 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9443 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
9444 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9445 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9449 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
9450 // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
9452 // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
9453 // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
9454 // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
9455 // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
9457 // Further, if the funding transaction is consensus-valid, confirms, and is later spent, we'd
9458 // previously have crashed in `ChannelMonitor` even though we closed the channel as bogus and
9459 // gave up on it. We test this here by generating such a transaction.
9460 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9461 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9462 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9463 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9465 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9466 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9467 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9469 let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
9471 // Create a witness program which can be spent by a 4-empty-stack-elements witness and which is
9472 // 136 bytes long. This matches our "accepted HTLC preimage spend" matching, previously causing
9473 // a panic as we'd try to extract a 32 byte preimage from a witness element without checking
9475 let mut wit_program: Vec<u8> = channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program();
9476 assert!(chan_utils::HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(wit_program.len()).unwrap() ==
9477 chan_utils::HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC);
9479 let wit_program_script: Script = wit_program.clone().into();
9480 for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
9481 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
9482 output.script_pubkey = Script::new_v0_p2wsh(&wit_program_script.wscript_hash());
9485 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
9486 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9487 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9489 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9490 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9492 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9493 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
9495 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9496 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9497 nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
9499 let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
9500 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
9501 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
9502 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9503 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9504 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
9505 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
9506 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9507 if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
9508 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
9509 } else { panic!(); }
9510 } else { panic!(); }
9511 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
9513 // Now confirm a spend of the (bogus) funding transaction. As long as the witness is 5 elements
9514 // long the ChannelMonitor will try to read 32 bytes from the second-to-last element, panicing
9515 // as its not 32 bytes long.
9516 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
9517 version: 2i32, lock_time: 0,
9518 input: tx.output.iter().enumerate().map(|(idx, _)| TxIn {
9519 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
9523 script_sig: Script::new(),
9524 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
9525 witness: Witness::from_vec(channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness())
9527 output: vec![TxOut {
9529 script_pubkey: Script::new(),
9532 check_spends!(spend_tx, tx);
9533 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &spend_tx);
9536 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
9537 // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
9538 // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
9539 // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
9540 // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
9541 // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
9542 // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
9543 // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
9544 // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
9545 // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
9546 // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
9547 // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
9548 // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
9549 // until we learned about an additional block.
9551 // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
9552 // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
9553 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9554 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9555 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9556 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9557 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
9559 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9560 let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9561 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
9562 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9563 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9565 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9566 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9567 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9568 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9569 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9570 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
9572 let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
9573 if !test_height_before_timelock {
9574 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
9576 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9577 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
9578 if test_height_before_timelock {
9579 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
9580 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
9581 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
9582 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9584 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
9585 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9586 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
9587 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
9588 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
9589 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
9591 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
9592 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
9594 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
9595 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
9596 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
9597 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9598 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
9599 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: channel_id }]);
9600 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9602 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9603 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9604 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9605 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9606 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9607 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9608 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9609 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9610 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
9615 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
9616 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
9617 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
9621 fn test_forwardable_regen() {
9622 // Tests that if we reload a ChannelManager while forwards are pending we will regenerate the
9623 // PendingHTLCsForwardable event automatically, ensuring we don't forget to forward/receive
9625 // We test it for both payment receipt and payment forwarding.
9627 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9628 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9629 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9630 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
9631 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
9632 let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
9633 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9634 let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9635 let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9637 // First send a payment to nodes[1]
9638 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
9639 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9640 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9642 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9643 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9644 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9645 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9646 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9648 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9650 // Next send a payment which is forwarded by nodes[1]
9651 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 200_000);
9652 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
9653 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9655 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9656 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9657 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9658 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9659 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9661 // There is already a PendingHTLCsForwardable event "pending" so another one will not be
9663 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9665 // Now restart nodes[1] and make sure it regenerates a single PendingHTLCsForwardable
9666 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9667 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9669 let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
9670 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9671 let mut chan_1_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9672 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_1).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9673 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_2).write(&mut chan_1_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9675 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
9676 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
9677 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
9678 nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
9680 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9681 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9682 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9683 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
9684 let mut chan_1_monitor_read = &chan_1_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9685 let (_, mut chan_1_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9686 &mut chan_1_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9687 assert!(chan_1_monitor_read.is_empty());
9689 let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
9690 let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
9691 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
9692 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
9693 channel_monitors.insert(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_1_monitor);
9694 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
9695 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
9697 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
9698 chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
9699 tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
9700 logger: nodes[1].logger,
9704 nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
9705 assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
9707 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
9708 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_1_monitor).is_ok());
9709 nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
9710 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9712 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9713 // Note that nodes[1] and nodes[2] resend their channel_ready here since they haven't updated
9714 // the commitment state.
9715 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9717 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9719 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9720 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 100_000);
9721 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9723 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9724 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9725 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9726 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9727 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9728 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9729 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 200_000);
9731 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
9732 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage_2);
9735 fn do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(test_for_second_fail_panic: bool) {
9736 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9737 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9738 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9739 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9741 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9743 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
9744 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
9745 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
9747 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
9750 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
9751 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9752 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9753 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9754 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9755 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9756 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9758 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9759 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 10_000);
9762 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
9763 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9764 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9765 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9766 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9767 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9768 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9769 // At this point, nodes[1] would notice it has too much value for the payment. It will
9770 // assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9771 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC. Previously, it'd also have failed back
9772 // the first HTLC delivered above.
9775 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9776 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9778 if test_for_second_fail_panic {
9779 // Now we go fail back the first HTLC from the user end.
9780 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
9782 let expected_destinations = vec![
9783 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
9784 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
9786 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1], expected_destinations);
9787 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9789 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9790 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9791 assert_eq!(fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 2);
9793 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9794 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
9795 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9797 let failure_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9798 assert_eq!(failure_events.len(), 2);
9799 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
9800 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[1] {} else { panic!(); }
9802 // Let the second HTLC fail and claim the first
9803 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9804 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9806 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9807 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9808 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9809 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9811 expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9813 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
9818 fn test_dup_htlc_second_fail_panic() {
9819 // Previously, if we received two HTLCs back-to-back, where the second overran the expected
9820 // value for the payment, we'd fail back both HTLCs after generating a `PaymentReceived` event.
9821 // Then, if the user failed the second payment, they'd hit a "tried to fail an already failed
9822 // HTLC" debug panic. This tests for this behavior, checking that only one HTLC is auto-failed.
9823 do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(true);
9827 fn test_dup_htlc_second_rejected() {
9828 // Test that if we receive a second HTLC for an MPP payment that overruns the payment amount we
9829 // simply reject the second HTLC but are still able to claim the first HTLC.
9830 do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(false);
9834 fn test_inconsistent_mpp_params() {
9835 // Test that if we recieve two HTLCs with different payment parameters we fail back the first
9836 // such HTLC and allow the second to stay.
9837 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9838 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9839 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9840 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9842 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9843 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9844 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9845 let chan_2_3 =create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9847 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id())
9848 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
9849 let mut route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 15_000_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
9850 assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9851 route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9852 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9853 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9854 core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9856 let payment_params_opt = Some(payment_params);
9858 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[3]);
9860 let cur_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
9861 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
9863 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
9864 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9866 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9867 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9868 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), false, None);
9870 assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9873 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 14_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
9874 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9876 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9877 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9878 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9880 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9881 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9883 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9884 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9886 let mut events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9887 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9888 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9890 nodes[3].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9891 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9892 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg, true, true);
9894 // At this point, nodes[3] should notice the two HTLCs don't contain the same total payment
9895 // amount. It will assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9896 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC.
9898 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[3]);
9899 nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9900 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[3], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9901 nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9903 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
9905 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9906 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9907 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9909 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }]);
9910 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9912 let fail_updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9913 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9914 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], fail_updates_2.commitment_signed, false);
9916 expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9918 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
9919 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9921 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9922 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9923 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), true, None);
9925 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, our_payment_preimage);
9929 fn test_keysend_payments_to_public_node() {
9930 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9931 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9932 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9933 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9935 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9936 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9937 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9938 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9939 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9940 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9941 final_value_msat: 10000,
9942 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9944 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
9945 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9946 let route = find_route(&payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
9948 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9949 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9950 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9951 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9952 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9953 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9954 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9955 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9956 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9960 fn test_keysend_payments_to_private_node() {
9961 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9962 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9963 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9964 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9966 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9967 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9968 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
9969 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
9971 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9972 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9973 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9974 final_value_msat: 10000,
9975 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9977 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9978 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9979 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
9980 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9981 let route = find_route(
9982 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9983 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
9986 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9987 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9988 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9989 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9990 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9991 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9992 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9993 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9994 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9998 fn test_double_partial_claim() {
9999 // Test what happens if a node receives a payment, generates a PaymentReceived event, the HTLCs
10000 // time out, the sender resends only some of the MPP parts, then the user processes the
10001 // PaymentReceived event, ensuring they don't inadvertently claim only part of the full payment
10003 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
10004 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
10005 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
10006 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10008 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
10009 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
10010 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
10011 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
10013 let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], 15_000_000);
10014 assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
10015 route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
10016 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
10017 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
10018 core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
10021 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
10022 // nodes[3] has now received a PaymentReceived event...which it will take some (exorbitant)
10023 // amount of time to respond to.
10025 // Connect some blocks to time out the payment
10026 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
10027 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // To get the same height for sending later
10029 let failed_destinations = vec![
10030 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
10031 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
10033 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations);
10035 pass_failed_payment_back(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_hash);
10037 // nodes[1] now retries one of the two paths...
10038 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
10039 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
10041 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10042 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
10043 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
10045 // At this point nodes[3] has received one half of the payment, and the user goes to handle
10046 // that PaymentReceived event they got hours ago and never handled...we should refuse to claim.
10047 nodes[3].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
10048 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
10049 assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
10052 fn do_test_partial_claim_before_restart(persist_both_monitors: bool) {
10053 // Test what happens if a node receives an MPP payment, claims it, but crashes before
10054 // persisting the ChannelManager. If `persist_both_monitors` is false, also crash after only
10055 // updating one of the two channels' ChannelMonitors. As a result, on startup, we'll (a) still
10056 // have the PaymentReceived event, (b) have one (or two) channel(s) that goes on chain with the
10057 // HTLC preimage in them, and (c) optionally have one channel that is live off-chain but does
10058 // not have the preimage tied to the still-pending HTLC.
10060 // To get to the correct state, on startup we should propagate the preimage to the
10061 // still-off-chain channel, claiming the HTLC as soon as the peer connects, with the monitor
10062 // receiving the preimage without a state update.
10064 // Further, we should generate a `PaymentClaimed` event to inform the user that the payment was
10065 // definitely claimed.
10066 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
10067 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
10068 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
10070 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
10071 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
10072 let nodes_3_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
10074 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10076 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
10077 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
10078 let chan_id_persisted = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
10079 let chan_id_not_persisted = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
10081 // Create an MPP route for 15k sats, more than the default htlc-max of 10%
10082 let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], 15_000_000);
10083 assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
10084 route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
10085 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
10086 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
10087 core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
10090 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
10091 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
10093 // Send the payment through to nodes[3] *without* clearing the PaymentReceived event
10094 let mut send_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10095 assert_eq!(send_events.len(), 2);
10096 do_pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), send_events[0].clone(), true, false, None);
10097 do_pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), send_events[1].clone(), true, false, None);
10099 // Now that we have an MPP payment pending, get the latest encoded copies of nodes[3]'s
10100 // monitors and ChannelManager, for use later, if we don't want to persist both monitors.
10101 let mut original_monitor = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
10102 if !persist_both_monitors {
10103 for outpoint in nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.list_monitors() {
10104 if outpoint.to_channel_id() == chan_id_not_persisted {
10105 assert!(original_monitor.0.is_empty());
10106 nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap().write(&mut original_monitor).unwrap();
10111 let mut original_manager = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
10112 nodes[3].node.write(&mut original_manager).unwrap();
10114 expect_payment_received!(nodes[3], payment_hash, payment_secret, 15_000_000);
10116 nodes[3].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
10117 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 2);
10118 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[3], payment_hash, 15_000_000);
10120 // Now fetch one of the two updated ChannelMonitors from nodes[3], and restart pretending we
10121 // crashed in between the two persistence calls - using one old ChannelMonitor and one new one,
10122 // with the old ChannelManager.
10123 let mut updated_monitor = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
10124 for outpoint in nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.list_monitors() {
10125 if outpoint.to_channel_id() == chan_id_persisted {
10126 assert!(updated_monitor.0.is_empty());
10127 nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap().write(&mut updated_monitor).unwrap();
10130 // If `persist_both_monitors` is set, get the second monitor here as well
10131 if persist_both_monitors {
10132 for outpoint in nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.list_monitors() {
10133 if outpoint.to_channel_id() == chan_id_not_persisted {
10134 assert!(original_monitor.0.is_empty());
10135 nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap().write(&mut original_monitor).unwrap();
10140 // Now restart nodes[3].
10141 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
10142 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[3].keys_manager;
10143 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[3].chain_source), nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[3].logger, node_cfgs[3].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
10144 nodes[3].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
10145 let mut monitors = Vec::new();
10146 for mut monitor_data in [original_monitor, updated_monitor].iter() {
10147 let (_, mut deserialized_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut &monitor_data.0[..], keys_manager).unwrap();
10148 monitors.push(deserialized_monitor);
10151 let config = UserConfig::default();
10152 nodes_3_deserialized = {
10153 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
10154 for monitor in monitors.iter_mut() {
10155 channel_monitors.insert(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
10157 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut &original_manager.0[..], ChannelManagerReadArgs {
10158 default_config: config,
10160 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[3].fee_estimator,
10161 chain_monitor: nodes[3].chain_monitor,
10162 tx_broadcaster: nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
10163 logger: nodes[3].logger,
10167 nodes[3].node = &nodes_3_deserialized;
10169 for monitor in monitors {
10170 // On startup the preimage should have been copied into the non-persisted monitor:
10171 assert!(monitor.get_stored_preimages().contains_key(&payment_hash));
10172 nodes[3].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.clone(), monitor).unwrap();
10174 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 2);
10176 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
10177 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
10179 // During deserialization, we should have closed one channel and broadcast its latest
10180 // commitment transaction. We should also still have the original PaymentReceived event we
10181 // never finished processing.
10182 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10183 assert_eq!(events.len(), if persist_both_monitors { 4 } else { 3 });
10184 if let Event::PaymentReceived { amount_msat: 15_000_000, .. } = events[0] { } else { panic!(); }
10185 if let Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager, .. } = events[1] { } else { panic!(); }
10186 if persist_both_monitors {
10187 if let Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager, .. } = events[2] { } else { panic!(); }
10190 // On restart, we should also get a duplicate PaymentClaimed event as we persisted the
10191 // ChannelManager prior to handling the original one.
10192 if let Event::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: our_payment_hash, amount_msat: 15_000_000, .. } =
10193 events[if persist_both_monitors { 3 } else { 2 }]
10195 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
10196 } else { panic!(); }
10198 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), if persist_both_monitors { 0 } else { 1 });
10199 if !persist_both_monitors {
10200 // If one of the two channels is still live, reveal the payment preimage over it.
10202 nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
10203 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2]);
10204 nodes[2].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
10205 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[3]);
10207 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
10208 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
10209 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
10211 nodes[3].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
10213 // Once we call `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` the holding cell is cleared and the HTLC
10214 // claim should fly.
10215 let ds_msgs = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10216 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
10217 assert_eq!(ds_msgs.len(), 2);
10218 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } = ds_msgs[1] {} else { panic!(); }
10220 let cs_updates = match ds_msgs[0] {
10221 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
10222 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10223 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
10224 let cs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10225 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[2], nodes[0], nodes[3], Some(1000), false, false);
10226 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
10232 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10233 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], cs_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
10234 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
10239 fn test_partial_claim_before_restart() {
10240 do_test_partial_claim_before_restart(false);
10241 do_test_partial_claim_before_restart(true);
10244 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
10245 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
10246 enum ExposureEvent {
10247 /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
10249 /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
10251 /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
10252 AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
10255 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool) {
10256 // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
10259 // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
10260 // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
10261 // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
10262 // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
10263 // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
10264 // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
10265 // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
10266 // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
10268 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10269 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
10270 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = 5_000_000; // default setting value
10271 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10272 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
10273 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10275 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
10276 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10277 open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
10278 open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
10280 open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10282 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
10283 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10284 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
10286 let opt_anchors = false;
10288 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
10291 if let Some(mut chan) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&temporary_channel_id) {
10292 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10296 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
10297 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
10298 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10300 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
10301 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10303 let (channel_ready, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
10304 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
10305 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
10307 let dust_buffer_feerate = {
10308 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
10309 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
10310 chan.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64
10312 let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
10313 let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
10315 let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
10316 let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
10318 let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 25;
10319 let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
10322 if dust_outbound_balance {
10323 // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
10324 // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
10325 // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
10326 for i in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
10327 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
10328 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
10331 // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
10332 // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
10333 // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
10334 for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
10335 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
10339 if dust_outbound_balance {
10340 // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
10341 // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
10342 for i in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
10343 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
10344 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
10347 // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
10348 // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
10349 for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
10350 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
10355 let dust_overflow = dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx + 1);
10356 if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
10357 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
10358 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
10359 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
10361 let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
10362 let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
10363 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
10365 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
10367 } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
10368 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
10369 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
10370 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10371 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10372 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10373 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
10374 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10375 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
10377 // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
10378 let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
10379 let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
10380 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
10382 // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
10383 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
10385 } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
10386 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 2_500_000);
10387 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at update_fee-swallowed HTLC", ); }
10389 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
10390 *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
10392 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10393 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10394 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure".to_string(), 1);
10397 let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10398 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
10399 added_monitors.clear();
10403 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
10404 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
10405 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
10406 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
10407 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
10408 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
10409 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
10410 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
10411 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
10412 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
10413 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
10414 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
10415 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
10419 fn test_non_final_funding_tx() {
10420 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10421 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10422 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10423 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10425 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10426 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10427 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_message);
10428 let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10429 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel_message);
10431 let best_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
10433 let chan_id = *nodes[0].network_chan_count.borrow();
10434 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10435 let input = TxIn { previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint::null(), script_sig: bitcoin::Script::new(), sequence: 0x1, witness: Witness::from_vec(vec!(vec!(1))) };
10436 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10437 let mut tx = match events[0] {
10438 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } => {
10439 // Timelock the transaction _beyond_ the best client height + 2.
10440 Transaction { version: chan_id as i32, lock_time: best_height + 3, input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut {
10441 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
10444 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10446 // Transaction should fail as it's evaluated as non-final for propagation.
10447 match nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()) {
10448 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
10449 assert_eq!(format!("Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final"), err);
10454 // However, transaction should be accepted if it's in a +2 headroom from best block.
10456 assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
10457 get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());