1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
15 use crate::chain::{ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Confirm, Listen, Watch};
16 use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
17 use crate::chain::channelmonitor;
18 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
19 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
20 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{BaseSign, KeysInterface};
21 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
22 use crate::ln::channel::{commitment_tx_base_weight, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT};
23 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA};
24 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
25 use crate::ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
26 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
27 use crate::routing::gossip::{NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate};
28 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, find_route, get_route};
29 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures};
31 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
32 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
33 use crate::util::{byte_utils, test_utils};
34 use crate::util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
35 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
36 use crate::util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
37 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
39 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
40 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
41 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
42 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
43 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
44 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
45 use bitcoin::{PackedLockTime, Sequence, Transaction, TxIn, TxMerkleNode, TxOut, Witness};
46 use bitcoin::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
48 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
49 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
54 use crate::prelude::*;
55 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
56 use core::default::Default;
57 use core::iter::repeat;
58 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
59 use crate::sync::Mutex;
61 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
62 use crate::ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
65 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
66 // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
67 use crate::ln::channel::TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS;
68 let mut cfg = UserConfig::default();
69 cfg.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1;
70 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
71 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
72 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(cfg)]);
73 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
75 // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
77 let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
78 let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat, &cfg);
79 let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
81 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
82 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
84 // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
85 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
87 // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
88 // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
89 let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
90 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
91 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
92 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
93 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
94 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
96 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
97 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), expected_regex, 1);
99 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
101 } else { assert!(false); }
104 use crate::ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
106 // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
107 insane_open_helper(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2; msg });
108 insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS; msg });
110 insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
112 insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than channel amount minus reserve \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
114 insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
116 insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
118 insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
120 insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
122 insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
126 fn test_funding_exceeds_no_wumbo_limit() {
127 // Test that if a peer does not support wumbo channels, we'll refuse to open a wumbo channel to
129 use crate::ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO;
130 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
131 let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
132 node_cfgs[1].features = channelmanager::provided_init_features().clear_wumbo();
133 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
134 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
136 match nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1, 0, 42, None) {
137 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
138 assert_eq!(format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1), err);
144 fn do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(send_from_initiator: bool) {
145 // A peer providing a channel_reserve_satoshis of 0 (or less than our dust limit) is insecure,
146 // but only for them. Because some LSPs do it with some level of trust of the clients (for a
147 // substantial UX improvement), we explicitly allow it. Because it's unlikely to happen often
148 // in normal testing, we test it explicitly here.
149 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
150 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
151 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
152 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
153 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
155 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
156 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
157 let feerate_per_kw = 253;
158 let opt_anchors = false;
159 push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
160 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
162 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None).unwrap();
163 let mut open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
164 if !send_from_initiator {
165 open_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
166 open_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
168 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_message);
170 // Extract the channel accept message from node1 to node0
171 let mut accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
172 if send_from_initiator {
173 accept_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
174 accept_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
176 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel_message);
179 let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(if send_from_initiator { &nodes[1] } else { &nodes[0] }, lock, temp_channel_id);
180 chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
181 chan.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
184 let funding_tx = sign_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100_000, temp_channel_id);
185 let funding_msgs = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_tx);
186 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_msgs.0);
188 // nodes[0] should now be able to send the full balance to nodes[1], violating nodes[1]'s
189 // security model if it ever tries to send funds back to nodes[0] (but that's not our problem).
190 if send_from_initiator {
191 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000_000
192 // Note that for outbound channels we have to consider the commitment tx fee and the
193 // "fee spike buffer", which is currently a multiple of the total commitment tx fee as
194 // well as an additional HTLC.
195 - FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, 2, opt_anchors));
197 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], push_amt);
202 fn test_counterparty_no_reserve() {
203 do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(true);
204 do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(false);
208 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
209 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
210 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
211 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
212 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
213 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
216 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
220 // send (1) commitment_signed -.
221 // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
222 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
223 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
224 // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
225 // (2) RAA is delivered ->
226 // .- send (4) commitment_signed
227 // <- (3) RAA is delivered
228 // send (5) commitment_signed -.
229 // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
231 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
233 // (6) RAA is delivered ->
235 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
237 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
240 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
241 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
243 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
244 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
245 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
246 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
247 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
249 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
252 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
254 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
255 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
256 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
257 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
259 let payment_event = {
260 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
261 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
262 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
264 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
265 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
267 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
268 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
269 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
270 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
271 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
272 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
274 // deliver(1), generate (3):
275 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
276 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
277 // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
278 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
280 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
281 let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
282 assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
283 assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
284 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
285 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
286 assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
287 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
289 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
290 let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
291 assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
292 assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
293 assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
294 assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
295 assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
296 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
298 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
299 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
300 // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
301 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
303 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
304 let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
305 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
307 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
308 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
310 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
311 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
313 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
314 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
317 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
318 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
322 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
323 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
324 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
325 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
326 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
327 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
328 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
329 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
332 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
334 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
336 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
339 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
340 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
342 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
343 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
344 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
345 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
348 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
351 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
353 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
354 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
355 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
356 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
358 let payment_event = {
359 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
360 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
361 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
363 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
364 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
366 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
367 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
368 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
369 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
370 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
371 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
373 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
374 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
376 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
380 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
381 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
382 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
383 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
384 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
385 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
388 // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
389 // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
390 // update_fee (never committed) ->
392 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
393 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
394 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
395 // <- (1) RAA delivered
396 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
397 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
398 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
399 // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
401 // B should send no response here
402 // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
403 // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
406 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
409 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
410 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
411 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
413 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
414 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
416 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
417 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
418 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
419 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
420 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
422 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
425 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
426 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
427 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
428 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
429 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
431 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
434 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
435 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
437 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
438 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
439 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
441 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
442 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
443 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
444 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
447 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
449 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
451 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
453 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
454 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
455 let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
456 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
457 assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
458 assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
459 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
460 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
461 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
462 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
463 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
465 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
466 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
467 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
468 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
469 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
471 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
472 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
473 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
476 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
477 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
478 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
480 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
481 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
482 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
484 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
485 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
486 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
487 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
489 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
490 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
491 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
494 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
495 // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
496 // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
497 // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
500 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
501 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
502 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
503 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
505 if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
507 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
510 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
511 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
514 if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
515 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
516 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
518 if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
519 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel);
520 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
522 if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
523 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
525 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
527 if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
528 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
529 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
530 let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
532 if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
533 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
535 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
536 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
537 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
538 added_monitors.clear();
540 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
542 if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
543 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
545 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
546 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
547 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
548 added_monitors.clear();
551 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
552 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
554 if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
555 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
557 if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
558 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
559 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
560 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
561 expect_channel_ready_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
565 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
566 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
567 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
568 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
569 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
570 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
571 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
572 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
573 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
574 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
575 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
576 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
577 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
578 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
579 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
580 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
581 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
582 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
583 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
587 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
588 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
589 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
590 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
591 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
592 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
595 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
598 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
599 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
601 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
602 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
603 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
604 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
605 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
607 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
609 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
611 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
612 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
613 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
615 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
616 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
617 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
619 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
620 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
621 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
622 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
624 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
625 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
626 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
630 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
631 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
632 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
633 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
634 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
635 let channel_value = 5000;
637 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
638 let channel_id = chan.2;
639 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
640 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
641 let bs_channel_reserve_sats = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value, &default_config);
643 let opt_anchors = false;
645 // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
646 // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
647 // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
649 let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
650 let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors)) as u32;
652 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
653 *feerate_lock = feerate;
655 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
656 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
657 let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
659 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
661 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
663 // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
665 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
667 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
668 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
669 let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000;
670 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
671 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
672 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
676 // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
677 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
680 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
681 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
682 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
684 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
686 // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
687 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
688 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
689 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
690 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
691 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
692 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
693 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
694 pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
696 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
697 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
698 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
699 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
700 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
701 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
702 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
703 pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
706 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
707 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
708 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
711 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
712 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
713 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
714 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
715 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
716 INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
718 channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000,
719 opt_anchors, local_funding, remote_funding,
720 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
721 non_buffer_feerate + 4,
723 &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
725 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
728 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
731 htlc_signatures: res.1
734 let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
736 feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
739 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
741 //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
742 //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
743 //Should produce and error.
744 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
745 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
746 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
747 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
748 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") });
752 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
753 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
754 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
755 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
756 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
757 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
760 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
763 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
766 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
767 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
769 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
770 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
771 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
772 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
773 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
775 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
777 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
778 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
779 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
780 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
782 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
784 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
785 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
787 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
788 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
789 added_monitors.clear();
791 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
792 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
793 // node[1] has nothing to do
795 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
796 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
797 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
799 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
800 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
801 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
802 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
803 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
804 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
805 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
807 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
808 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
809 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
810 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
811 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
812 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
814 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
815 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
816 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
817 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
819 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
820 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
821 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
823 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
824 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
825 let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
826 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
828 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
829 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
830 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
832 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
834 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
835 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
837 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
838 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
841 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
843 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
844 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
845 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
846 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
847 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
851 fn test_update_fee() {
852 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
853 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
854 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
855 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
856 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
857 let channel_id = chan.2;
860 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
861 // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
862 // .- send (3) commitment_signed
863 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
864 // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
865 // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
866 // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
867 // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
868 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
869 // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
870 // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
873 // Create and deliver (1)...
876 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
877 feerate = *feerate_lock;
878 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
880 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
881 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
883 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
884 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
885 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
886 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
887 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
889 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
891 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
893 // Generate (2) and (3):
894 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
895 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
896 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
899 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
900 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
901 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
903 // Create and deliver (4)...
905 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
906 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
908 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
909 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
910 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
911 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
912 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
913 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
914 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
916 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
919 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
920 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
921 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
923 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
924 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
926 // Handle (3), creating (6):
927 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
928 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
929 let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
930 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
933 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
934 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
935 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
937 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
938 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
939 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
940 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
941 assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
942 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
943 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
944 assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
945 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
948 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
949 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
950 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
951 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
953 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
954 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
955 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
957 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
958 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
959 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
960 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
961 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
965 fn fake_network_test() {
966 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
967 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
968 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
969 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
970 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
971 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
973 // Create some initial channels
974 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
975 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
976 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
978 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
979 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
980 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
981 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
982 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
984 // Send some more payments
985 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
986 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
987 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
989 // Test failure packets
990 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
991 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
993 // Add a new channel that skips 3
994 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
996 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
997 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
998 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
999 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1000 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1001 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1002 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1004 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
1005 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1006 hops.push(RouteHop {
1007 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1008 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1009 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1010 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1012 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1014 hops.push(RouteHop {
1015 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1016 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1017 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1018 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1020 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1022 hops.push(RouteHop {
1023 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1024 node_features: channelmanager::provided_node_features(),
1025 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1026 channel_features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(),
1028 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1030 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1031 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1032 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
1034 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1035 hops.push(RouteHop {
1036 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1037 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1038 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1039 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1041 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1043 hops.push(RouteHop {
1044 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1045 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1046 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1047 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1049 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1051 hops.push(RouteHop {
1052 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1053 node_features: channelmanager::provided_node_features(),
1054 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1055 channel_features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(),
1057 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1059 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1060 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1061 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1063 // Claim the rebalances...
1064 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1065 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1067 // Close down the channels...
1068 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1069 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1070 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1071 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1072 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1073 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1074 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1075 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1076 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1077 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1078 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1079 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1083 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1084 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1085 // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1086 // commitment dance rounds.
1087 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1088 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1089 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1090 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1091 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1092 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1094 let mut payments = Vec::new();
1095 for _ in 0..crate::ln::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
1096 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1097 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
1098 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1100 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1102 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1103 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1104 let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1105 assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1107 // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1108 // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1110 let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1112 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1113 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1114 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1115 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
1118 // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1119 let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1121 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
1122 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1125 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1126 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1127 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1128 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1130 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1131 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1132 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1133 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1134 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1135 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
1136 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1138 let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1139 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1140 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1142 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1144 // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1145 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1146 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1147 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1149 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1150 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1151 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1152 let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1154 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1155 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1156 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1158 for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1159 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1161 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1162 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1163 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1164 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1165 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1167 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1168 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1169 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1170 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1171 let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1173 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1174 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1176 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1178 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1179 assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1180 for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1182 &Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1183 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1185 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1189 for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1190 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1193 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1197 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1198 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1199 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1200 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1201 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1202 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1203 let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1205 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1206 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1207 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1208 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1209 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1210 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1212 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1214 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1215 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1217 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1218 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1220 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1221 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1222 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1226 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1227 // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1228 // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1229 // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1230 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1231 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1232 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1233 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1235 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1238 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1240 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1242 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1243 let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
1244 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1246 // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1247 nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1248 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, 800_000);
1249 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1251 // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1252 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1254 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1255 let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1256 for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1257 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1258 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1259 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1260 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1263 assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1265 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1266 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1267 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1268 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1270 let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1271 assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 5);
1273 check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]); // Immediate HTLC claim with preimage
1274 check_spends!(claim_txn[1], chan_1.3); // Alternative commitment tx
1275 check_spends!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[1]); // HTLC spend in alternative commitment tx
1277 check_spends!(claim_txn[3], remote_txn[0]);
1278 check_spends!(claim_txn[4], remote_txn[0]);
1279 let preimage_tx = &claim_txn[0];
1280 let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if claim_txn[3].input[0].previous_output == preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output {
1281 (&claim_txn[3], &claim_txn[4])
1283 (&claim_txn[4], &claim_txn[3])
1286 assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1287 assert_eq!(preimage_bump_tx.input.len(), 1);
1289 assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1290 assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1291 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1293 assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input.len(), 1);
1294 assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1295 check_spends!(timeout_tx, remote_txn[0]);
1296 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1298 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1299 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1302 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1303 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
1304 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1305 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1307 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1308 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1309 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1310 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1311 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1312 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1314 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1320 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1321 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1322 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1323 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1324 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1325 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1327 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1328 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1330 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1331 let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2), 1 + 1, get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2));
1332 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1333 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send + 1);
1334 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).err().unwrap();
1336 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedResendSafe(ref fails) => {
1338 &APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ref err} =>
1339 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)),
1340 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1343 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1345 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1346 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1348 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1352 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1353 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1354 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1355 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1356 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1357 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1359 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460001);
1360 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1361 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1362 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1364 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1366 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1367 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3460001, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1368 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1369 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1372 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1373 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1374 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1375 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1378 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1380 // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1381 // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1382 // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1384 let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1386 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1388 // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1389 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1390 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1391 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1392 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1393 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1394 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1395 chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1397 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1398 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1399 chan_signer.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1400 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1401 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1403 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1404 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1405 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1406 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1407 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1408 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1409 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1410 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1413 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1414 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1415 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
1417 // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1418 // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1419 let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1421 let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1423 amount_msat: 3460001,
1424 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1426 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1429 let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1432 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1433 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1434 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1435 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1439 local_chan.opt_anchors(), local_funding, remote_funding,
1440 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1442 &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1443 &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1445 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1448 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1451 htlc_signatures: res.1
1454 // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1455 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1456 let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1458 // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1459 let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1461 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1462 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point
1464 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1466 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1467 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1468 // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1470 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1471 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1472 update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1474 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1476 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1477 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", ::hex::encode(raa_msg.channel_id)), 1);
1479 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1483 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1484 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1485 // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1486 // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1487 // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1489 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1490 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1491 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1492 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1493 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1494 let opt_anchors = false;
1496 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1497 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1499 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1501 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1503 // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1504 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1505 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1508 // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1509 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1510 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1511 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1512 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1513 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1517 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1518 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1519 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1520 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1521 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1522 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1523 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1524 let opt_anchors = false;
1526 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1527 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1528 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1529 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1530 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1531 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1532 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1534 // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1535 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1536 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1539 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 700_000);
1540 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1541 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1542 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1543 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1544 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1545 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 700_000, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1546 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1547 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1549 htlc_id: MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64,
1550 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1551 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1552 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1553 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1556 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1557 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1558 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1559 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1560 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1561 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1562 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1563 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() });
1567 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1568 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1569 // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1570 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1571 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1573 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1574 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1575 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1576 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1577 let opt_anchors = false;
1579 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1580 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1581 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1582 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1583 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1584 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1585 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1587 let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1588 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1589 // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1590 // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1591 // commitment transaction fee.
1592 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1594 // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1595 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1596 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1599 // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1600 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt + 1);
1601 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1602 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1606 fn test_chan_init_feerate_unaffordability() {
1607 // Test that we will reject channel opens which do not leave enough to pay for any HTLCs due to
1608 // channel reserve and feerate requirements.
1609 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1610 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1611 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1612 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1613 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1614 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1615 let opt_anchors = false;
1617 // Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
1619 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1620 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1621 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None).unwrap_err(),
1622 APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
1624 // During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
1625 // requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
1626 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1627 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None).unwrap();
1628 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1629 open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
1630 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_msg);
1632 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1633 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
1634 match msg_events[0] {
1635 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
1636 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve");
1638 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1643 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1644 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1645 // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1646 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1647 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1648 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1649 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1650 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1652 let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1653 // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1654 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1655 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1656 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1657 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1659 // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1660 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1661 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1662 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1663 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1664 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1666 // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1667 // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1668 // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1669 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1673 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1674 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1675 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1676 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1677 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1678 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1679 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1682 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1683 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1684 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1685 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1687 // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1688 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1689 let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1690 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1692 // Add a pending HTLC.
1693 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1694 let payment_event_1 = {
1695 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
1696 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1698 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1699 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1700 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1702 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1704 // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1705 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2, opt_anchors);
1706 let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1707 let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1708 let (route_2, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_2);
1710 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1711 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1712 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1713 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1714 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1715 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, &None, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1716 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1);
1717 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1720 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1721 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1722 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1723 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1726 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1727 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1728 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1729 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1730 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1731 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1732 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1733 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() });
1737 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1738 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1739 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1740 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1741 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1742 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1743 let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1744 let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1745 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1746 assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1747 assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1749 let reserve = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config);
1750 assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1751 assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1753 assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1754 assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1757 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
1758 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1762 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1763 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1764 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1765 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1766 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1767 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1768 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1769 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1770 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1771 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1772 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1774 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1775 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1777 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1778 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1780 macro_rules! expect_forward {
1782 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1783 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1784 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1785 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1790 let feemsat = 239; // set above
1791 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1792 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1793 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1795 let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1797 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1799 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id())
1800 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features()).with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1801 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], payment_params, recv_value_0, TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
1802 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1803 assert!(route.paths[0].iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1805 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1806 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1807 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1808 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
1811 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1812 // nodes[0]'s wealth
1814 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1815 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1816 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1817 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1818 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1819 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1820 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1824 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id())
1825 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features()).with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1826 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, recv_value_0, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
1827 let (payment_preimage, ..) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], recv_value_0);
1828 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
1830 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1831 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1832 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1833 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1834 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1837 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1838 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1839 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1840 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1841 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1844 // adding pending output.
1845 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1846 // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1847 // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1848 // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1849 // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1850 // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1851 // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1852 // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1853 // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1855 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1856 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1857 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1859 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1860 let payment_event_1 = {
1861 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
1862 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1864 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1865 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1866 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1868 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1870 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1871 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1873 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_2 + 1);
1874 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1875 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1876 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1879 // split the rest to test holding cell
1880 let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1881 let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1882 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1883 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1885 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1886 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1889 // now see if they go through on both sides
1890 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1891 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1892 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21, &Some(our_payment_secret_21), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_21.0)).unwrap();
1893 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1894 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1895 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1897 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1899 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22+1);
1900 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1901 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1902 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1903 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 2);
1906 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1907 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1908 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22, &Some(our_payment_secret_22), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_22.0)).unwrap();
1909 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1910 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1911 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1913 // flush the pending htlc
1914 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1915 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1916 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1918 // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1919 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1920 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1921 let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1923 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
1924 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1925 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1926 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1928 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1929 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1930 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1932 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1934 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1935 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
1936 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
1938 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1939 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
1941 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
1942 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
1943 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
1944 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
1945 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
1946 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1948 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1949 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
1950 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
1951 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
1953 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
1954 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1956 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1957 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1959 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, via_user_channel_id: _ } => {
1960 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
1961 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amount_msat);
1962 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), receiver_node_id.unwrap());
1963 assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
1965 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1966 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1967 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
1969 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1972 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1975 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, via_user_channel_id: _ } => {
1976 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
1977 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amount_msat);
1978 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), receiver_node_id.unwrap());
1979 assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
1981 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1982 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1983 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
1985 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1988 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1991 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
1992 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
1993 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
1995 let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1, opt_anchors);
1996 let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
1997 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
1999 let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
2000 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
2001 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2002 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
2003 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
2005 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2006 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
2010 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
2011 // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
2012 // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
2013 // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
2014 // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
2015 // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
2016 // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
2017 // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
2019 // * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
2020 // you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
2021 // you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
2022 // * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
2023 // * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
2024 // the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
2025 // * deliver the first fulfill from B
2026 // * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
2028 // * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
2029 // This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
2030 // removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
2031 // * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
2032 // of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
2033 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2034 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2035 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2036 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2037 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2039 let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2040 // Route the first two HTLCs.
2041 let payment_value_1 = b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000;
2042 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_value_1);
2043 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20_000);
2045 // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
2046 let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
2048 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_3, &Some(payment_secret_3), PaymentId(payment_hash_3.0)).unwrap();
2049 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2050 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2051 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2052 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2055 // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
2056 // initial fulfill/CS.
2057 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
2058 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, payment_value_1);
2059 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2060 let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2062 // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
2063 // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
2064 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
2065 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000);
2066 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2067 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2069 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2070 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
2071 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2072 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2073 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
2075 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
2076 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
2077 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2078 // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
2079 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2081 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2082 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2083 let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2085 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2086 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2087 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2089 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2090 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2091 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2093 // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
2094 // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2095 // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
2096 // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
2097 // on-chain as necessary).
2098 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2099 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
2100 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2101 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2102 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
2104 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2105 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2106 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2108 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2109 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2111 // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2112 // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2113 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2114 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2115 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2116 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2118 // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2119 // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2120 let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2122 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_4, &Some(payment_secret_4), PaymentId(payment_hash_4.0)).unwrap();
2123 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2124 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2125 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2126 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2129 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2130 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2131 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2132 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2134 // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2136 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2137 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2138 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2140 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2141 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2143 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2144 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2145 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2146 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2148 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2149 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2150 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2152 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2153 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2155 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2156 expect_payment_received!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2158 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2159 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2163 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2164 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2165 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2166 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2167 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2168 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2169 let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2171 // Create some initial channels
2172 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2173 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2174 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2175 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2177 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2178 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2179 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2180 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2181 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2182 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2184 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2185 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2186 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2187 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2188 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2190 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2191 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_1.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2192 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2193 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2195 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2196 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2197 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2198 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2199 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2201 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2202 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2203 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2204 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2205 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2207 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2208 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 3_000_000);
2210 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2211 // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2212 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_2.2, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2213 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2214 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2216 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2217 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2218 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2219 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2220 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2221 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2223 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2224 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2225 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2226 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2227 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2229 macro_rules! claim_funds {
2230 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
2232 $node.node.claim_funds($preimage);
2233 expect_payment_claimed!($node, $payment_hash, 3_000_000);
2234 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2236 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2237 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2239 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2240 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2241 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2242 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2244 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2250 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2251 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2252 nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_3.2, &nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2253 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2254 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2255 let node2_commitment_txid;
2257 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2258 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2259 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2260 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2262 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2263 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1);
2264 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2265 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2266 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2268 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2269 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2270 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2271 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2272 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2274 // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2275 // confusing us in the following tests.
2276 let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2278 // One pending HTLC to time out:
2279 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[3], &[&nodes[4]], 3_000_000);
2280 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2283 let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2284 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2285 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2286 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2287 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2288 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2291 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2294 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2295 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2297 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2299 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2301 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2303 let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2304 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2305 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2311 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2313 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2314 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2);
2316 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2317 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2318 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2319 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2320 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2323 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2326 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2327 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2329 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2331 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2332 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2334 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2335 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2336 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2338 nodes[3].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2339 nodes[4].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2340 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2341 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2343 assert_eq!(nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon),
2344 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
2345 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2346 check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2350 fn test_justice_tx() {
2351 // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2352 let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2353 alice_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2354 alice_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2355 alice_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2356 let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2357 bob_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2358 bob_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2359 bob_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2360 let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2361 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2362 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2363 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2364 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2365 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2366 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2367 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen;
2368 // Create some new channels:
2369 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2371 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2372 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2373 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2374 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2375 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2376 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2377 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2378 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2379 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2380 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2381 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2382 // Revoke the old state
2383 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2386 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2388 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2389 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2390 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2392 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2393 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2394 node_txn.truncate(1);
2396 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2397 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2398 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2400 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2401 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2402 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2403 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2404 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2405 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2406 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2407 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2408 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2410 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2412 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2413 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2415 // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
2416 // Create some new channels:
2417 let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2419 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2423 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2424 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2425 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2426 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2427 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2428 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2429 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2430 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2431 // Revoke the old state
2432 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2434 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2436 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2437 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); //ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2438 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2440 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2441 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2443 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2444 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2446 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2447 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2448 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2449 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2450 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2451 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2452 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2454 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2455 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2456 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2460 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2461 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2462 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2463 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2464 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2465 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2466 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2467 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2468 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2469 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2470 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2471 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2472 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2473 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2474 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2476 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2477 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2478 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2479 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2480 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2481 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2483 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2484 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
2486 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2487 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2488 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2489 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2490 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2494 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2495 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2496 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2497 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2498 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2499 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2500 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2502 // Create some new channel:
2503 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2505 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2506 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2507 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2508 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2509 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2511 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2512 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2513 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2514 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2515 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2516 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2517 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2518 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2519 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2521 //Revoke the old state
2522 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2525 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2526 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2527 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2528 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2529 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2530 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2531 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2532 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2534 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2535 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment
2537 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2538 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2540 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2541 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2542 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2543 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2544 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2545 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2546 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2547 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2549 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
2550 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2551 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
2553 // Finally, mine the penalty transaction and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2554 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2555 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
2556 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2557 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2559 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2560 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2561 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2565 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2566 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2567 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2568 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2569 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2570 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2571 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2573 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2575 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2576 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2577 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2578 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2579 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2580 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2582 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2583 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2585 //Revoke the old state
2586 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2589 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2590 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2591 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2592 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2593 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2594 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2595 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2596 match events.last().unwrap() {
2597 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2598 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2601 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2602 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2604 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2605 assert!(node_txn.len() == 9 || node_txn.len() == 10);
2607 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2608 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2609 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2610 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2611 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2612 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2613 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2615 // Justice transactions are indices 1-2-4
2616 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2617 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
2618 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
2620 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2621 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2622 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2624 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2625 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2626 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2627 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2628 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2629 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2630 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2631 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2633 // Finally, mine the penalty transactions and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2634 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2635 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[2]);
2636 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[3]);
2637 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[4]);
2638 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2639 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2641 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2642 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2643 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2647 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2648 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2649 // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2650 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2651 // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2652 // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2653 // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2654 // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2655 // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2657 // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2658 // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2659 // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2660 // PaymentSent event).
2662 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2663 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2664 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2665 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2667 // Create some initial channels
2668 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2669 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2671 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2672 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2673 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2674 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2675 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2677 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2678 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2679 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2681 let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2682 let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2684 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2685 // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2686 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2687 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2688 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2689 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2690 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_1, 3_000_000);
2691 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2692 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, 3_000_000);
2693 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2694 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2695 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2696 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2697 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2698 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2700 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2701 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2702 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2703 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2704 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx, 2*htlc-success tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2705 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5);
2706 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2707 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2708 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2709 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2710 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2711 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2712 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2713 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2714 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2715 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0);
2716 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0);
2718 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2719 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2720 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: node_txn});
2721 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2723 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2724 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2725 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2726 added_monitors.clear();
2728 let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2729 assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2730 match forwarded_events[0] {
2731 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2732 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2734 let chan_id = Some(chan_1.2);
2735 match forwarded_events[1] {
2736 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
2737 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2738 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2739 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2740 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2744 match forwarded_events[2] {
2745 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
2746 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2747 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2748 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2749 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2753 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2755 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2756 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2757 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2758 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2759 added_monitors.clear();
2761 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2763 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2764 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2767 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2768 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2772 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2773 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2774 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2775 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2776 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2777 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2779 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2781 macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2782 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $chan_tx: expr) => { {
2783 let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2784 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
2785 // Node[1]: ChannelManager: 3 (commitment tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (timeout tx)
2786 // Node[0]: ChannelManager: 3 (commtiemtn tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 HTLC-timeout
2787 check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2788 check_spends!(node_txn[2], $commitment_tx);
2789 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0);
2790 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time.0, 0);
2792 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2793 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2794 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2795 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2797 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2798 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2799 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2800 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2802 check_spends!(node_txn[0], $chan_tx);
2803 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2807 // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own local state as a fallback, suggesting an alternate
2808 // commitment transaction with a corresponding HTLC-Timeout transactions, as well as a
2809 // timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2810 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2812 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2813 // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx on A's chain
2814 let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2815 check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2816 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2817 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2818 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2819 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2820 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2821 assert!(node_txn.len() == 4 || node_txn.len() == 6); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx + HTLC-Sucess * 2), ChannelMonitor : 3 (HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn)
2822 let commitment_spend =
2823 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2824 if node_txn.len() == 6 {
2825 // In some block `ConnectionStyle`s we may avoid broadcasting the double-spending
2826 // transactions spending the HTLC outputs of C's commitment transaction. Otherwise,
2827 // check that the extra broadcasts (double-)spend those here.
2828 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2829 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2830 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2834 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2835 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2836 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2840 check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2841 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2842 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2843 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2844 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time.0, 0);
2845 assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2846 let funding_spend_offset = if node_txn.len() == 6 { 3 } else { 1 };
2847 check_spends!(node_txn[funding_spend_offset], chan_1.3);
2848 assert_eq!(node_txn[funding_spend_offset].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2849 check_spends!(node_txn[funding_spend_offset + 1], node_txn[funding_spend_offset]);
2850 check_spends!(node_txn[funding_spend_offset + 2], node_txn[funding_spend_offset]);
2851 // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
2852 // we already checked the same situation with A.
2854 // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
2855 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2856 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()] });
2857 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2858 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2859 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2860 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2861 assert_eq!(events.len(), 5);
2862 let mut first_claimed = false;
2863 for event in events {
2865 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
2866 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
2867 assert!(!first_claimed);
2868 first_claimed = true;
2870 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
2871 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
2874 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
2875 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
2876 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2879 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2882 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
2883 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
2884 // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2885 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2886 // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
2887 // B's commitment tx C's commitment tx
2889 // B's HTLC timeout tx B's timeout tx
2891 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2892 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2893 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2894 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2895 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2896 *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2897 *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2899 // Create some intial channels
2900 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2901 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2903 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
2904 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2905 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2907 let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2909 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2910 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2911 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2912 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
2913 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
2914 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }]);
2915 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2917 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2918 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2920 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2921 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2922 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2923 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2924 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2925 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2927 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2929 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2930 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2931 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2932 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2933 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx)
2934 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2935 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2936 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2938 // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2939 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
2940 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2941 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
2942 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2945 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2946 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-timeout), 1 timeout tx
2947 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2948 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2950 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2951 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2953 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2954 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2955 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2956 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2958 timeout_tx = node_txn[2].clone();
2962 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
2963 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2964 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2966 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2968 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
2969 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2970 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2971 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2973 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2974 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2975 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2976 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2977 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2978 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2980 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2983 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
2984 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2985 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2987 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
2988 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2990 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2991 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2992 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2993 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 commitment tx, ChannelMonitor : 1 timeout tx
2994 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2995 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2996 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2997 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2998 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3002 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
3003 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
3004 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
3005 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
3009 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
3010 // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
3011 // and fail backward accordingly.
3013 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3014 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3015 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3016 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3018 // Create some initial channels
3019 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3020 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3022 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3023 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3024 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3025 // Revoke the old state
3026 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3028 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3030 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3031 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3032 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3033 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3034 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3036 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
3037 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3038 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3039 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3041 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3042 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3043 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3044 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3045 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3046 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3048 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3049 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3050 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
3052 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3056 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
3057 // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
3058 // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
3059 // commitment transaction anymore.
3060 // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
3061 // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
3062 // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
3063 // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
3064 // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
3065 // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
3067 // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
3068 // commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
3069 // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
3070 // and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
3071 // commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
3072 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3073 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3074 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3075 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3077 // Create some initial channels
3078 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3079 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3081 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
3082 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3083 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3084 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
3085 // Revoke the old state
3086 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3088 let value = if use_dust {
3089 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
3090 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
3091 nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
3094 let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3095 let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3096 let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3098 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash);
3099 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: first_payment_hash }]);
3100 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3101 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3102 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3103 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3104 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3105 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3106 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3107 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3108 let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
3109 // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
3111 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash);
3112 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: second_payment_hash }]);
3113 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3114 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3115 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3116 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3117 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3118 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3119 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3120 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3121 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3122 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3123 // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3124 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3125 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3126 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3128 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash);
3129 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: third_payment_hash }]);
3130 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3131 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3132 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3133 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3134 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3135 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3136 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3137 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3138 // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3139 // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3140 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3141 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3142 // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3143 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3144 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3145 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3147 // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3148 // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3149 let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3150 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, fourth_payment_hash, &Some(fourth_payment_secret), PaymentId(fourth_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3151 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3152 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3153 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3156 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3157 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3158 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3159 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3160 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3161 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3163 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3164 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3167 Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { .. } => { },
3168 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3170 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3171 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3174 let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
3175 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3177 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3178 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3179 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3181 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3182 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 2 + nodes.len() - 1 } else { 3 + nodes.len() });
3184 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
3185 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
3188 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3189 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3191 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3193 if !deliver_bs_raa {
3195 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3196 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3198 nodes[1].node.abandon_payment(PaymentId(fourth_payment_hash.0));
3199 let payment_failed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3200 assert_eq!(payment_failed_events.len(), 1);
3201 match payment_failed_events[0] {
3202 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3203 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3205 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3208 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3209 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3211 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3212 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3213 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 1 } else { 0 }] {
3214 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3215 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3217 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 1 }] {
3218 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
3219 assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3220 assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3222 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3226 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3227 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3228 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3229 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3230 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3231 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3233 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3236 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 3 } else { 2 }] {
3237 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3238 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3239 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3240 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3241 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3242 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3244 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3245 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3246 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3248 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3250 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3251 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3253 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref network_update, .. } => {
3254 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3255 // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3256 // that we should update our routing table for.
3257 if !deliver_bs_raa {
3258 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3261 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3264 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref network_update, .. } => {
3265 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3266 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3268 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3271 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref network_update, .. } => {
3272 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3273 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3275 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3278 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3281 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3282 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3283 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3287 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3288 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3289 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3290 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3291 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3295 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3296 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3297 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3298 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3299 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3303 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3304 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3305 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3306 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3307 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3308 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3310 // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3312 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3313 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3314 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3316 let payment_event = {
3317 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3318 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3319 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3321 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3322 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3325 // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3326 let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3328 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, failed_payment_hash, &Some(failed_payment_secret), PaymentId(failed_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3329 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3331 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3334 // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3336 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3338 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3339 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3340 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3341 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 50_000, &Some(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3342 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3343 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
3345 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3346 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3352 onion_routing_packet,
3354 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3356 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3357 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3358 // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3360 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3361 assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3363 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3366 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3367 assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3369 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3371 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3372 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3376 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3377 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3378 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3379 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3380 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3381 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3382 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3383 if *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow() == ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen {
3384 // We rely on the ability to connect a block redundantly, which isn't allowed via
3385 // `chain::Listen`, so we never run the test if we randomly get assigned that
3389 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3391 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3392 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3393 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3394 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3395 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3396 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3398 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
3399 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3400 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
3402 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3403 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
3404 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3405 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3406 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3408 // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3409 // registering new transactions
3410 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
3414 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3415 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3416 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3417 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3418 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3419 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3420 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3421 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3423 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3425 let mut payment_event = {
3426 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3427 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3429 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3430 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3431 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3434 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3435 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3437 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3439 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3440 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3441 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3442 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3444 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3445 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3446 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3447 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3448 let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3450 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3451 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3452 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3454 nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3455 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3456 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3457 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3459 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3460 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3461 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3462 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3463 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3467 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3469 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3470 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3471 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3472 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3474 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3476 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3477 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator), &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3479 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3480 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3481 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3482 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3483 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3484 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3485 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3487 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3491 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3492 // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3493 // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3494 // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3495 // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3497 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3498 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3499 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3500 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3501 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3503 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
3505 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
3506 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_000_000);
3507 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3508 let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3509 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3510 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
3512 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3513 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3515 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3516 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3520 fn test_peer_disconnected_before_funding_broadcasted() {
3521 // Test that channels are closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` if the peer disconnects
3522 // before the funding transaction has been broadcasted.
3523 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3524 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3525 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3526 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3528 // Open a channel between `nodes[0]` and `nodes[1]`, for which the funding transaction is never
3529 // broadcasted, even though it's created by `nodes[0]`.
3530 let expected_temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
3531 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3532 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel);
3533 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3534 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
3536 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
3537 assert_eq!(temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3539 assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
3541 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3542 assert_eq!(funding_created_msg.temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3544 // Even though the funding transaction is created by `nodes[0]`, the `FundingCreated` msg is
3545 // never sent to `nodes[1]`, and therefore the tx is never signed by either party nor
3548 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3551 // Ensure that the channel is closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` when the peers are
3552 // disconnected before the funding transaction was broadcasted.
3553 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3554 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3556 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3557 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3561 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3562 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3563 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3564 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3565 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3566 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3567 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3568 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3570 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3571 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3572 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3574 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3575 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3576 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3577 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3579 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3580 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3581 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3583 let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3584 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3585 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3586 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3588 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3589 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3591 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3592 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3594 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
3596 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3597 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3599 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3600 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3601 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3603 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3606 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, payment_failed_permanently, .. } => {
3607 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3608 assert!(payment_failed_permanently);
3610 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3613 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3614 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3618 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3619 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3622 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3623 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3624 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3625 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3626 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3627 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3629 let mut as_channel_ready = None;
3630 let channel_id = if messages_delivered == 0 {
3631 let (channel_ready, chan_id, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3632 as_channel_ready = Some(channel_ready);
3633 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the channel_ready message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3634 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3635 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3638 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).2
3641 let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1_000_000);
3643 let payment_event = {
3644 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
3645 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3647 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3648 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3649 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3651 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3653 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3654 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3656 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3657 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3658 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3659 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3660 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3662 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3663 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3664 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3665 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3667 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3668 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3669 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3670 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3671 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3673 if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3674 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3675 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3676 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3683 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3684 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3685 if messages_delivered < 3 {
3686 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3687 // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a channel_ready prior to a
3688 // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to channel_ready time.
3690 // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a channel_ready immediately on
3691 // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate channel_ready sent
3692 // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3694 // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3695 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3697 // Even if the channel_ready messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3698 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3699 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3700 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3701 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3702 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3703 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3704 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3705 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3706 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3707 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3708 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3709 } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3710 // Everything was delivered...
3711 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3714 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3715 if messages_delivered == 0 {
3716 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 2);
3718 Event::ChannelReady { .. } => { },
3719 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3722 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3723 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3726 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3728 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3729 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3733 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3734 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3735 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3737 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3739 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3740 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3742 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, via_user_channel_id: _ } => {
3743 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3744 assert_eq!(amount_msat, 1_000_000);
3745 assert_eq!(receiver_node_id.unwrap(), nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3746 assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(channel_id));
3748 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3749 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3750 assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3752 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3755 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3758 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3759 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3760 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
3762 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3763 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3764 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3765 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3766 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3767 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3768 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3769 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3770 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3771 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3772 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3774 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3777 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3778 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3780 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3781 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3783 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3784 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3785 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3787 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3790 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3791 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3792 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3793 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3795 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3796 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3797 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3798 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3800 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3801 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3802 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3803 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3804 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3806 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3807 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3808 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3809 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3816 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3817 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3818 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3819 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3820 if messages_delivered < 1 {
3821 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
3823 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3825 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
3826 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3827 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3828 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3829 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3830 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3831 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3832 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3833 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3834 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3835 // Everything was delivered...
3836 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3839 if messages_delivered == 1 || messages_delivered == 2 {
3840 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3843 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3844 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3845 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3847 if messages_delivered > 2 {
3848 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3851 // Channel should still work fine...
3852 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3853 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3854 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3858 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
3859 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
3860 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
3861 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
3862 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
3866 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
3867 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
3868 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
3869 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
3870 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
3874 fn test_channel_ready_without_best_block_updated() {
3875 // Previously, if we were offline when a funding transaction was locked in, and then we came
3876 // back online, calling best_block_updated once followed by transactions_confirmed, we'd not
3877 // generate a channel_ready until a later best_block_updated. This tests that we generate the
3878 // channel_ready immediately instead.
3879 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3880 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3881 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3882 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3883 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
3885 let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3887 let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
3888 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
3889 let block_txn = [funding_tx];
3890 let conf_txn: Vec<_> = block_txn.iter().enumerate().collect();
3891 let conf_block_header = nodes[0].get_block_header(conf_height);
3892 nodes[0].node.transactions_confirmed(&conf_block_header, &conf_txn[..], conf_height);
3894 // Ensure nodes[0] generates a channel_ready after the transactions_confirmed
3895 let as_channel_ready = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3896 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
3900 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
3901 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
3902 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
3903 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3904 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3905 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3906 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3907 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3909 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
3911 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
3912 let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3913 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
3914 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3916 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3917 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3919 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
3920 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3923 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3924 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
3925 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3927 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3928 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3930 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3931 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3932 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3933 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3934 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3935 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3936 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3938 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3939 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3940 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3942 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3943 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
3944 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
3946 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3949 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
3950 let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3951 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3952 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3954 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3957 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3958 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3960 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
3961 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
3962 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
3963 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
3964 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
3965 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
3967 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
3968 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
3969 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
3970 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
3972 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
3973 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
3975 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
3976 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
3978 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
3980 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3981 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3982 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3983 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3984 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
3985 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
3986 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
3987 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3988 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3989 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3991 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
3992 let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3993 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3994 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3995 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3996 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3997 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
3998 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4000 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
4001 let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4002 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4003 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4004 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4005 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4006 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4007 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4009 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4010 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4011 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4012 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4014 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4015 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4016 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4017 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4019 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
4020 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4021 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4023 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4025 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4026 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
4028 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
4029 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
4031 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
4032 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
4033 assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
4035 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
4038 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4041 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
4042 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4043 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4045 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4046 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4049 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
4050 // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
4051 // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
4052 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4053 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4054 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4055 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4057 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4059 let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
4060 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
4061 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
4062 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
4063 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
4064 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
4065 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
4066 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
4067 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4068 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4069 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4070 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
4071 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentReceived event(s).
4072 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
4075 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
4078 let mut block = Block {
4079 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
4082 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4083 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4084 let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4085 for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
4086 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
4087 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4088 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4091 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
4093 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4094 let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4095 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4096 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4097 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4098 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4100 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4101 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4102 // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4103 let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(100_000).to_vec();
4104 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(block_count - 1));
4105 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4109 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4110 do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4111 do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4114 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4115 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4116 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4117 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4118 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4119 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4120 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4121 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4123 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4124 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4125 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4126 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4128 // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4129 let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4131 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, first_payment_hash, &Some(first_payment_secret), PaymentId(first_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
4133 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4134 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4136 // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4137 let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4138 let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4139 sending_node.node.send_payment(&route, second_payment_hash, &Some(second_payment_secret), PaymentId(second_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
4141 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4142 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4143 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4144 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4145 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4147 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4149 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4150 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4151 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4152 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4155 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
4156 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4157 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4158 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4159 match fail_commit[0] {
4160 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4161 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4162 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4164 _ => unreachable!(),
4166 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4168 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], second_payment_hash, false);
4173 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4174 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4175 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4178 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4179 ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4181 let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4182 let mut txn = Vec::new();
4183 let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4184 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4185 for event in events.drain(..) {
4187 Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs } => {
4188 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4189 txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4190 all_outputs.push(outp);
4193 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4196 if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4197 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx) {
4207 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4208 // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4209 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4210 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4211 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4212 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4214 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4215 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4216 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4217 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4218 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4219 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4220 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4221 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4222 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4224 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4225 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4227 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4228 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4229 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4230 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4231 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4235 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4236 // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4237 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4238 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4239 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4240 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4241 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4243 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4244 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4245 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4246 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4247 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4249 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4250 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4251 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4252 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4254 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4255 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4256 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4257 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4258 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4260 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4261 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4262 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4266 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4267 // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4268 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4270 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4271 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4272 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4273 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4275 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4276 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4277 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4278 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4279 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4281 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4282 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4283 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4284 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4285 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4287 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4288 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4289 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4291 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4292 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4293 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4294 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4295 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4299 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4300 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4301 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4302 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4303 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4305 // Create some initial channels
4306 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4308 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
4310 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4311 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4312 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4314 // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4315 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4316 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4317 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4318 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4319 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4320 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4322 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4323 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4326 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4327 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4330 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4331 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-Success), ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4332 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4333 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4334 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4335 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
4336 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
4338 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4339 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4340 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4342 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4343 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4344 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4348 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4349 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4350 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4351 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4352 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4354 // Create some initial channels
4355 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4357 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4358 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4360 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4362 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4363 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4364 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4366 // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4367 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4368 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4369 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4371 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4372 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4374 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4376 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4377 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4378 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelManager : 1 local commitent tx, ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4379 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
4380 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0].clone());
4381 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4383 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4384 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4385 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4386 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, false);
4388 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4389 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4390 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4391 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]);
4392 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4396 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4397 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4398 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4399 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4400 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4402 // Create some initial channels
4403 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4405 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4406 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4407 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4408 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4410 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4412 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4413 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4414 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4415 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4417 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4418 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
4419 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4420 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4422 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4423 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4425 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4426 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4427 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4431 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4432 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4433 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4434 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4435 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4436 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4438 // Create some initial channels
4439 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4441 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4442 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4443 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4444 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4446 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4448 // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
4449 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4450 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4451 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4452 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4453 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4455 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4456 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4457 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], chan_1.3);
4458 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4459 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4460 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4461 assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
4463 // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4464 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4465 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()] });
4466 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4467 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4468 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4470 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4471 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
4472 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4473 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4474 // transactions next...
4475 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
4476 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
4478 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
4479 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
4480 if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid() {
4481 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4483 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid());
4484 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4487 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4488 check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
4490 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4491 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4493 // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4494 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4495 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4496 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4497 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
4501 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
4502 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4503 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4504 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4505 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4506 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4508 // Create some initial channels
4509 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4511 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4512 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4513 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4514 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4516 // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
4517 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
4519 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4521 // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
4522 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4523 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4524 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4525 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4526 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4528 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4529 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4530 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4531 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4533 // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
4534 let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
4535 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
4537 // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4538 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4539 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
4540 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4541 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4542 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4544 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4545 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
4547 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4548 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4549 // transactions next...
4550 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4551 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4552 if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4553 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4555 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4556 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4559 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4560 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4562 check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
4564 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
4565 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4567 // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
4568 // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
4570 // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4571 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
4572 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4573 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4574 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
4575 assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4576 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
4577 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
4581 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
4582 // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
4583 // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
4584 // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
4585 // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
4587 // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
4590 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4591 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4592 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4593 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4595 // Create some initial channels
4596 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4597 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4599 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
4600 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4601 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4602 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4603 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4605 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4606 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4607 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4609 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
4610 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4611 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
4612 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4613 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4614 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4615 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4616 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4617 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4618 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4619 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4621 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
4622 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
4623 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4624 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4626 let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Success tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
4627 assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 3);
4628 assert_eq!(c_txn[0], c_txn[2]);
4629 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0], c_txn[1]);
4630 check_spends!(c_txn[1], chan_2.3);
4631 check_spends!(c_txn[2], c_txn[1]);
4632 assert_eq!(c_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
4633 assert_eq!(c_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4634 assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
4635 assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Success tx
4637 // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
4638 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
4639 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![c_txn[1].clone(), c_txn[2].clone()]});
4640 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4641 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4642 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4644 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
4645 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4648 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
4649 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
4650 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, Some(chan_1.2));
4651 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
4652 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
4654 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4657 let mut b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4658 // ChannelMonitor: claim tx
4659 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
4660 check_spends!(b_txn[0], chan_2.3); // B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
4663 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4664 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4665 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
4666 match msg_events[0] {
4667 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4668 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4670 match msg_events[1] {
4671 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
4672 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4674 match msg_events[2] {
4675 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
4676 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4677 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4678 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4679 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4680 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
4682 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4684 // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
4685 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4686 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4687 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4688 let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4689 // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success tx
4690 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 3);
4691 check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_1.3);
4692 check_spends!(b_txn[2], b_txn[1]);
4693 check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4694 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4695 assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
4696 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Success tx
4698 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4699 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4703 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
4704 // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
4705 // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
4706 // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
4707 // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
4708 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4709 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4710 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
4711 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
4712 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
4713 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
4714 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
4715 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
4716 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4718 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4719 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4720 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4722 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4723 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4724 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4725 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4726 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
4728 let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 900_000);
4730 let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
4731 // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
4732 // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
4733 // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
4734 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id())
4735 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
4736 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], payment_params, 900000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40);
4737 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 900000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
4739 let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4740 assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4741 check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
4743 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
4744 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4745 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4746 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4747 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4749 let htlc_timeout_tx;
4750 { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
4751 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4752 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 2-or-3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
4753 assert!(node_txn.len() == 4 || node_txn.len() == 3);
4754 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
4756 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
4757 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4759 if node_txn.len() > 3 {
4760 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
4761 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4762 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
4764 check_spends!(node_txn[3], commitment_txn[0]);
4765 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
4767 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
4768 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
4771 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4772 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4773 if node_txn.len() > 3 {
4774 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4776 htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[1].clone();
4779 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
4780 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], duplicate_payment_hash, 900_000);
4782 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
4783 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
4784 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4785 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4787 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4788 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4791 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4792 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4794 let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4795 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs), ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
4796 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
4797 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
4798 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4799 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4800 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4801 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4802 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4803 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
4804 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[3], htlc_success_txn[0]);
4805 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[4], htlc_success_txn[1]);
4806 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
4808 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
4809 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4810 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
4811 let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4812 assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4813 assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4814 let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
4815 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4816 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4817 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4819 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4820 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4822 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
4824 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
4826 // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
4827 // Note that the fee paid is effectively double as the HTLC value (including the nodes[1] fee
4828 // and nodes[2] fee) is rounded down and then claimed in full.
4829 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[0]);
4830 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], Some(196*2), true, true);
4831 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4832 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4833 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4834 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4835 assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
4836 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4837 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4839 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4840 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
4842 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4844 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
4845 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
4846 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
4848 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4853 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
4854 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4855 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4856 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4857 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4859 // Create some initial channels
4860 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4862 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
4863 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4864 assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
4865 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4866 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
4868 // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
4869 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4870 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
4871 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4873 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
4874 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4875 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4876 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4878 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4879 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4882 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4883 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4886 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4887 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4888 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
4889 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
4890 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4891 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4892 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
4896 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
4897 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4899 // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
4900 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4901 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4902 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4903 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
4904 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4907 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
4908 // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
4909 // unrevoked commitment transaction.
4910 // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
4911 // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
4912 // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
4913 // use the same payment hashes.
4914 // Thus, we use a six-node network:
4919 // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
4920 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
4921 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
4922 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
4923 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
4924 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
4925 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
4926 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
4927 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
4928 let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4930 let _chan_0_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4931 let _chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4932 let chan_2_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4933 let chan_3_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4934 let chan_3_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4936 // Rebalance and check output sanity...
4937 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
4938 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
4939 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
4941 let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2_3.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
4943 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4945 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4946 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
4948 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4950 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4952 let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
4954 let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
4955 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
4957 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200).unwrap());
4959 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200).unwrap());
4962 let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
4964 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
4965 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4968 let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4970 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
4971 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200).unwrap());
4973 // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
4974 // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
4975 // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
4976 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2).len(), 1);
4977 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
4979 // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
4980 // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
4981 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1);
4982 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3);
4983 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5);
4984 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6);
4985 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
4987 let failed_destinations = vec![
4988 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_1 },
4989 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_3 },
4990 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_5 },
4991 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_6 },
4993 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[4], failed_destinations);
4994 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
4996 let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
4997 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4998 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
4999 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5000 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5001 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5003 // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5004 nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
5005 nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4);
5006 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5008 let failed_destinations_2 = vec![
5009 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 },
5010 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_4 },
5012 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[5], failed_destinations_2);
5013 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5015 let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5016 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5017 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5018 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5020 let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5022 // After 4 and 2 removes respectively above in nodes[4] and nodes[5], nodes[3] should receive 6 PaymentForwardedFailed events
5023 let failed_destinations_3 = vec![
5024 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5025 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5026 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5027 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5028 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5029 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5031 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations_3);
5032 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5033 let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5034 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5035 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5036 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5037 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5038 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5039 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5040 if deliver_last_raa {
5041 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5043 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5046 // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5047 // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5048 // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5049 // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5051 // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5052 // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5053 // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5055 // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5056 // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5057 let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5059 if announce_latest {
5060 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5062 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5064 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5065 let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5066 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2 + 6);
5067 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5069 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5070 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5073 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5074 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5077 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5078 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5079 if deliver_last_raa {
5080 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5082 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(3).collect();
5083 expect_htlc_handling_failed_destinations!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(), expected_destinations);
5085 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = if announce_latest {
5086 repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(9).collect()
5088 repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(6).collect()
5091 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], expected_destinations);
5093 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5095 let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5096 assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5097 let mut a_done = false;
5098 for msg in cs_msgs {
5100 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5101 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5102 // should be failed-backwards here.
5103 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5104 // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5105 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5106 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5108 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5113 // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5114 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5115 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5117 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5118 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5121 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5122 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5123 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5124 if announce_latest {
5125 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5126 if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5127 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5130 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5132 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5136 let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5137 assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5138 let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5139 let mut as_updates = 0;
5140 for event in as_events.iter() {
5141 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5142 assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5143 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5144 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5146 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5148 if network_update.is_some() {
5151 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5153 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5154 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5155 if announce_latest {
5156 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5157 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5159 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5161 let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5162 assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5163 let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5164 let mut bs_updates = 0;
5165 for event in bs_events.iter() {
5166 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5167 assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5168 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5169 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5171 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5173 if network_update.is_some() {
5176 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5178 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5179 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5180 if announce_latest {
5181 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5183 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5185 // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5186 // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5187 // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5188 // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5189 assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5190 assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5194 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5195 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5199 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5200 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5204 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5205 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5206 // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5207 // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5211 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5212 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5213 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5214 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5215 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5217 // Create some initial channels
5218 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5220 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5221 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5222 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5223 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5225 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5226 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5227 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5228 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5229 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5230 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5232 let htlc_timeout = {
5233 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5234 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
5235 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5236 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5237 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5238 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5242 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5243 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5244 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5246 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5247 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5248 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5249 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5250 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5251 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5252 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5253 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5254 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5255 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5256 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5260 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5261 // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with
5262 // a key manager rotation to test that key_derivation_params returned in DynamicOutputP2WSH
5263 // let us re-derive the channel key set to then derive a delayed_payment_key.
5265 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5267 // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5268 let seed = [42; 32];
5269 let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5270 let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5271 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source.genesis_hash, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger);
5272 let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph, node_seed: seed, features: channelmanager::provided_init_features() };
5273 let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5274 node_cfgs.remove(0);
5275 node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5277 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5278 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5280 // Create some initial channels
5281 // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5283 let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5284 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5285 assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5287 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5288 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5289 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5290 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5291 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5293 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5294 let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5295 let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5296 assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5297 check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5299 // We check funding pubkey are unique
5300 let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5301 let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5302 if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5303 || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5304 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5305 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5306 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5309 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5310 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5311 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5312 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5313 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5314 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5316 let htlc_timeout = {
5317 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5318 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5319 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5320 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn_1[0]);
5324 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5325 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5326 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5328 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5329 let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5330 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5331 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5332 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5333 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5334 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5335 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5336 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5337 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5338 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5339 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5343 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5344 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5345 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5346 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5347 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5349 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5351 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5352 let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5354 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5355 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5356 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5358 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5359 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5360 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5362 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5363 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5364 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5366 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5367 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5368 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5371 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5372 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5373 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5374 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5375 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5376 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5378 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5380 // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5381 // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5382 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5383 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5384 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5386 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5387 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5388 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
5390 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5391 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5392 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5393 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5394 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5396 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5397 let mut block = Block {
5398 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5401 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5402 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5403 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5405 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5406 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5407 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5408 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5411 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5412 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5413 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5414 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5415 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5416 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5418 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5419 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5420 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5422 let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5424 // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5425 // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5426 // to "time out" the HTLC.
5428 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5429 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5431 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5432 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: Vec::new()});
5433 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
5435 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5436 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5437 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5438 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5441 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5442 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5443 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5444 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5445 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5446 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5448 // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
5449 // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5450 // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
5451 // actually revoked.
5452 let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
5453 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
5454 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
5455 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
5456 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5458 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5459 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5460 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5461 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5462 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5463 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5464 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5465 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
5466 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5467 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5469 if check_revoke_no_close {
5470 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
5471 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5474 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5475 let mut block = Block {
5476 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5479 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
5480 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5481 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5483 if !check_revoke_no_close {
5484 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5485 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5486 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5487 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5489 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5493 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
5494 // There are only a few cases to test here:
5495 // * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
5496 // broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
5497 // * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
5498 // * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
5499 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
5501 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
5502 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
5503 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
5505 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
5506 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
5507 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
5509 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
5510 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
5514 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
5515 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
5516 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
5517 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
5518 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
5523 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
5524 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5525 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5526 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5527 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5528 // Force duplicate randomness for every get-random call
5529 for node in nodes.iter() {
5530 *node.keys_manager.override_random_bytes.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
5533 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
5534 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5535 let push_msat=10001;
5536 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5537 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5538 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5539 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5541 // Create a second channel with the same random values. This used to panic due to a colliding
5542 // channel_id, but now panics due to a colliding outbound SCID alias.
5543 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5547 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
5548 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5549 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5550 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5551 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5553 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
5554 let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
5555 let push_msat=10001;
5556 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5558 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
5559 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5560 // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
5561 let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
5562 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5564 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
5565 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5566 let push_msat=10001;
5567 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
5568 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5569 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
5571 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
5572 // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
5573 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
5575 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
5576 assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
5577 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5579 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
5580 let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
5581 assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
5583 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
5584 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
5585 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5586 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5587 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
5588 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5592 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
5593 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5594 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5595 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5596 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5598 let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
5599 let push_msat=10001;
5600 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5601 let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5602 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
5603 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
5605 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5606 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5607 let err_msg = match events[0] {
5608 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
5611 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5613 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
5616 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
5617 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
5618 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
5619 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
5621 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
5622 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5623 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5624 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5625 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5626 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5628 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5629 // pending_update_fee.
5631 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5632 *feerate_lock += 20;
5634 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5635 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5637 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5638 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5639 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5640 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5641 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5643 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5646 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5648 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5649 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5650 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5651 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5653 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5654 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
5655 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
5657 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
5658 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5659 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5660 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
5662 // Flush the pending fee update.
5663 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5664 let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5665 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5666 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
5667 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5669 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
5670 // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
5671 // us to surface its failure to the user.
5672 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5673 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5674 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
5675 let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
5676 hex::encode(our_payment_hash.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
5677 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
5679 // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
5680 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5681 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5683 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
5684 assert_eq!(PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0), *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
5685 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
5686 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
5687 assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
5688 assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
5689 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id));
5691 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5695 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
5696 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
5697 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
5699 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
5700 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5701 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5702 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5703 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5704 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5706 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5707 // pending_update_fee.
5709 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5710 *feerate_lock += 200;
5712 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5713 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5715 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5716 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5717 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5718 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5719 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5721 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5724 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5726 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5727 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5728 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5729 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5731 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5733 let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors) - amt_1;
5734 let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
5735 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
5737 // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
5738 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
5739 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5740 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
5741 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId(nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5742 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2), payment_id_2).unwrap();
5743 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5744 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
5746 // Flush the pending fee update.
5747 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5748 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5749 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5750 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
5751 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5752 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
5754 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
5755 // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
5756 // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
5757 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5758 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5759 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
5760 let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
5761 hex::encode(payment_hash_2.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
5762 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
5764 // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
5765 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5766 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5768 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
5769 assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
5770 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
5771 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
5772 assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
5773 assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
5774 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route_2.paths[0][0].short_channel_id));
5776 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5779 // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
5780 let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
5781 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5782 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
5783 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
5785 let raa = match send_raa_event {
5786 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
5787 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5789 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5790 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5791 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5792 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5793 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5794 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5796 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
5797 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5799 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5800 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5801 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5803 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => {},
5804 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5806 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
5807 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5808 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, amt_1);
5810 let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5811 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5812 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
5813 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
5816 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
5817 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
5818 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
5821 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
5822 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5823 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5824 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5825 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5826 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5827 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5828 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5829 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5830 let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5831 let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5833 // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5834 // pending_update_fee.
5836 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5837 *feerate_lock += 20;
5839 nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5840 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5842 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5843 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5844 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5845 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5846 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5848 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5851 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5853 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
5854 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5855 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
5856 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
5858 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
5860 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
5861 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors) - total_routing_fee_msat;
5862 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
5863 let payment_event = {
5864 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5865 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5867 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5868 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5870 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
5872 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5873 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5874 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5875 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5877 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1_2.2);
5878 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
5880 // Flush the pending fee update.
5881 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5882 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5883 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5884 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5885 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5886 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
5888 // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
5889 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5890 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5892 let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
5893 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
5896 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5899 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
5900 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5901 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5903 // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
5904 let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5905 assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 2);
5906 match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
5907 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
5908 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5911 // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
5912 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5913 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5915 // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
5916 let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5917 assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
5918 let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
5919 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
5920 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
5921 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
5922 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
5923 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5924 (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
5926 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5929 // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
5930 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
5931 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5933 // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
5934 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5935 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5936 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5937 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5938 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
5939 let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5940 assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
5941 let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
5942 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
5943 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5945 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5946 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
5947 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5950 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
5951 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
5952 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
5955 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
5956 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
5957 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5958 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5959 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5960 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5961 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5963 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
5964 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 100;
5966 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
5967 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
5968 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5969 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value".to_string(), 1);
5973 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
5974 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
5975 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5976 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5977 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5978 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5979 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5981 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
5982 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 0;
5983 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
5984 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
5986 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5987 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
5991 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
5992 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
5993 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5994 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5995 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5996 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5997 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5999 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6000 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6001 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6002 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6003 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6005 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6006 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6007 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6008 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6009 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() });
6013 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6014 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6015 //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6016 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6017 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6018 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6019 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6020 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6022 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
6023 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
6024 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], payment_params, 100000000, 0);
6025 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = 500000001;
6026 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::RouteError { ref err },
6027 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6031 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6032 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6033 //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6034 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6035 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6036 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6037 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6038 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6039 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6040 let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6042 for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6043 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6044 let payment_event = {
6045 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6046 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6048 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6049 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6050 if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6051 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6055 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6057 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6058 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6059 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6061 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6062 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6064 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6065 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6066 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6068 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6069 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
6073 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6074 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6075 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6076 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6077 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6078 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6079 let channel_value = 100000;
6080 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6081 let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6083 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6085 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6086 // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6088 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = max_in_flight + 1;
6089 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6090 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6092 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6093 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
6095 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6098 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6100 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6101 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6102 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6103 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6104 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6105 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6106 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6107 let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6109 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6110 let channel = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6111 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6114 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6115 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6116 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6117 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6118 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6119 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6120 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6121 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6122 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6123 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6124 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6128 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6129 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6130 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6131 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6132 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6133 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6134 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6136 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6137 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6138 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6139 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6140 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6141 let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
6143 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6144 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6145 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6146 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6147 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6149 // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6150 // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6151 // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6152 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6153 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6155 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6156 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6157 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6158 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6159 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6163 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6164 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6165 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6166 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6167 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6168 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6169 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6170 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6172 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3999999);
6173 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6174 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6175 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6176 let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3999999, &Some(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6177 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash);
6179 let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6183 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6184 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6185 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6188 for i in 0..super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
6189 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6190 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6192 msg.htlc_id = (super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS) as u64;
6193 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6195 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6196 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6197 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6198 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6199 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6203 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6204 //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6205 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6206 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6207 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6208 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6209 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6211 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6212 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6213 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6214 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6215 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6216 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6218 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6219 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6220 assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6221 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6222 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6226 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6227 //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6228 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6229 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6230 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6231 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6233 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6234 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6235 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6236 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6237 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6238 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6239 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6241 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6242 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6243 assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6244 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6245 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6249 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6250 //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6251 // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6252 // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6253 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6254 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6255 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6256 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6258 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6259 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6260 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6261 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6262 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6263 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6265 //Disconnect and Reconnect
6266 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6267 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6268 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
6269 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6270 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6271 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
6272 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6273 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6274 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6275 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6276 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6277 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6280 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6281 assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6282 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6283 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6284 let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6286 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6288 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6289 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6290 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6291 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6292 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6296 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6297 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6299 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6300 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6301 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6302 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6303 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6304 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6305 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6307 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6308 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6309 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6311 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6314 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6317 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6319 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6320 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6321 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6322 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6323 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6327 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6328 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6330 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6331 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6332 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6333 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6334 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6336 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6337 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6338 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6339 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6340 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6342 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6345 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6348 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6350 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6351 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6352 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6353 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6354 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6358 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6359 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6361 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6362 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6363 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6364 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6365 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6367 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6368 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6369 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6370 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6371 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6372 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6375 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6376 failure_code: 0x8000,
6379 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6381 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6382 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6383 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6384 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6385 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6389 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6390 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6392 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6393 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6394 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6395 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6396 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6398 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6400 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6401 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6402 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6404 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6405 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6406 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6408 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6409 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6410 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6411 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6412 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6413 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6414 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6416 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6420 update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6422 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6424 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6425 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6426 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6427 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6428 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6432 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6433 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6435 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6436 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6437 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6438 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6439 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6441 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6443 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6444 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6445 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6447 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6448 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6449 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6451 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6452 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6453 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6454 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6455 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6456 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6457 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6459 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6463 update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
6465 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6467 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6468 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6469 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6470 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6471 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6475 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
6476 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
6478 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6479 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6480 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6481 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6482 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6484 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6485 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6486 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6488 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6489 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6491 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6492 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6493 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6495 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6497 let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
6499 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6500 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6501 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6502 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6503 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6504 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6505 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
6507 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6510 update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
6511 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6513 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6514 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6515 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
6516 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6517 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6521 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
6522 //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
6523 // * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
6525 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6526 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6527 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6528 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6529 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6530 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6532 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
6535 let mut payment_event = {
6536 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6537 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6538 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6539 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6540 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6542 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6543 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6544 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6545 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6546 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6547 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6548 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6549 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6550 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6553 payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6554 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6555 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6556 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6558 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6559 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6560 let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
6562 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6563 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6564 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6565 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6566 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6567 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6568 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
6570 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6574 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
6576 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6577 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
6578 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
6579 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6580 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6582 //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
6584 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6585 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6586 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6587 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6588 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6589 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6591 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6594 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6598 fn test_channel_failed_after_message_with_badonion_node_perm_bits_set() {
6599 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6600 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6601 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6602 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6603 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6604 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6606 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100_000);
6609 let mut payment_event = {
6610 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6611 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6612 SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[0])
6615 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6616 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6617 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6618 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6619 payment_event = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[1]);
6620 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6623 payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; // Trigger an invalid_onion_version error
6624 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6625 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6626 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6628 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6629 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6631 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6632 let mut update_msg = updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone();
6633 // Set the NODE bit (BADONION and PERM already set in invalid_onion_version error)
6634 update_msg.failure_code |= 0x2000;
6636 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6637 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6639 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6642 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1],
6643 vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel {
6644 node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
6645 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6646 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6647 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6650 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6651 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6652 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6654 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6657 let events_5 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6658 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
6660 // Expect a PaymentPathFailed event with a ChannelFailure network update for the channel between
6661 // the node originating the error to its next hop.
6663 Event::PaymentPathFailed { network_update:
6664 Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure { short_channel_id, is_permanent }), error_code, ..
6666 assert_eq!(short_channel_id, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id);
6667 assert!(is_permanent);
6668 assert_eq!(error_code, Some(0x8000|0x4000|0x2000|4));
6670 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6673 // TODO: Test actual removal of channel from NetworkGraph when it's implemented.
6676 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
6677 // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
6678 // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
6679 // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
6681 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6682 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
6683 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6684 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6685 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6686 let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6688 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6690 // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
6691 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6692 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6693 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6695 // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
6696 let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6698 // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
6699 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
6700 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6701 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
6702 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6704 let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6705 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6706 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
6707 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6709 // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
6710 let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6712 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6714 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
6715 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6717 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6720 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
6721 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6723 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6726 assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
6727 // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
6728 if announce_latest {
6729 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
6731 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
6734 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6735 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6736 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6738 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6739 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6740 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6741 // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
6742 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6743 let mut first_failed = false;
6744 for event in events {
6746 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6747 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
6748 assert!(!first_failed);
6749 first_failed = true;
6751 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
6754 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6760 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
6761 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
6762 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
6765 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
6766 // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
6767 // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
6768 // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6769 // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
6770 // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6771 // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
6773 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6774 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6775 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6776 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6777 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6779 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6781 let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6782 let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6784 let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6785 let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
6787 // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
6789 let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6790 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
6793 let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
6795 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
6796 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
6797 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6798 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6799 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
6801 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
6802 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6803 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6804 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6805 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
6806 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6807 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
6808 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6809 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
6810 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6811 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
6813 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
6814 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
6815 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6816 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6817 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6818 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6820 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
6821 timeout_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..)
6822 .filter(|tx| tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == bs_commitment_tx[0].txid()).collect();
6823 check_spends!(timeout_tx[0], bs_commitment_tx[0]);
6824 // For both a revoked or non-revoked commitment transaction, after ANTI_REORG_DELAY the
6825 // dust HTLC should have been failed.
6826 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
6829 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6831 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].lock_time.0, 0);
6833 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout/revocation-claim tx
6834 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
6835 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6836 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6837 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
6842 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
6843 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
6844 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
6845 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
6849 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
6850 // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
6852 let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
6853 low_our_to_self_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
6854 let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
6855 high_their_to_self_config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
6856 let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
6857 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6858 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6859 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
6860 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6862 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
6863 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
6864 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 1000000, 1000000, 0,
6865 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, 42)
6868 APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
6869 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6871 } else { assert!(false) }
6873 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
6874 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
6875 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6876 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
6877 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
6878 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
6879 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
6882 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
6883 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6885 } else { assert!(false); }
6887 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
6888 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
6889 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
6890 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6891 accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
6892 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
6894 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
6896 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
6897 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
6898 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
6902 } else { panic!(); }
6903 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg });
6905 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
6906 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
6907 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6908 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
6909 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
6910 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
6911 &high_their_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
6914 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
6915 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6917 } else { assert!(false); }
6921 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
6922 // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
6923 // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
6924 // to B, B should refuse payment.
6926 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6927 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6928 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6929 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6931 // Create some initial channels
6932 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6934 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
6935 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
6936 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
6937 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
6938 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6939 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
6940 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6941 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6943 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6944 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6945 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
6946 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6947 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6949 // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
6950 // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
6951 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6952 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
6954 // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
6955 // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
6956 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6958 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6959 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6960 let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6961 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6962 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6963 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6964 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6965 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6966 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6967 (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
6969 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6971 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6973 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
6974 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
6976 // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
6977 let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(10_000).to_vec();
6978 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH));
6979 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
6983 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
6984 // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
6985 // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
6987 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6988 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6989 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6990 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6992 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6993 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6994 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6997 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6998 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7000 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // Enabled -> DisabledStaged
7001 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // DisabledStaged -> Disabled
7002 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7003 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7004 let mut chans_disabled = HashMap::new();
7005 for e in msg_events {
7007 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7008 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7009 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7010 if chans_disabled.insert(msg.contents.short_channel_id, msg.contents.timestamp).is_some() {
7011 panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7014 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7018 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7019 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7020 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7021 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7022 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7023 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7025 // Reestablish chan_1
7026 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7027 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7028 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7029 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7030 // Reestablish chan_2
7031 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7032 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7033 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7034 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7035 // Reestablish chan_3
7036 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7037 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7038 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7039 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7041 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7042 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7043 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7044 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7045 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7046 for e in msg_events {
7048 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7049 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7050 match chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7051 // Each update should have a higher timestamp than the previous one, replacing
7053 Some(prev_timestamp) => assert!(msg.contents.timestamp > prev_timestamp),
7054 None => panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!"),
7057 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7060 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7061 assert!(chans_disabled.is_empty());
7065 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7066 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7067 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7069 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7070 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7071 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7072 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7074 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7076 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7077 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
7078 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
7079 let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_params, 3000000, 30);
7080 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7082 let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7083 // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7084 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7085 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7086 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7087 let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7089 let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7090 for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7091 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7092 penalty_sum += outp.value;
7096 // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7097 let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7099 // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7100 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7101 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_114, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7102 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()] });
7103 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7105 // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7109 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7110 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor) + local commitment tx
7111 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7112 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7113 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7114 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7115 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7116 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7120 // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7121 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7122 let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7123 let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7125 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7126 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7127 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7128 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7129 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7130 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7131 penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7132 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7133 assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7134 let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7135 feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7136 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7137 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7141 assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7143 // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7144 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7146 let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7148 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7149 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7150 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7151 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7152 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7153 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7154 penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7155 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7156 assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7157 let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7158 feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7159 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7160 assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7164 assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7166 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7167 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7171 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7172 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7173 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7175 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7176 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7177 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7178 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7179 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7181 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7182 // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7183 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
7184 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7185 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7186 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7187 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7188 let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7189 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
7190 let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[1].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7191 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7192 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7194 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7195 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7196 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7198 // Revoke local commitment tx
7199 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7201 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7202 // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7203 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7204 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7205 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7206 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7207 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 49); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7209 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
7210 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
7211 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], chan.3);
7213 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7214 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7215 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7217 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7218 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7219 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
7220 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7222 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7223 let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7224 let header_11 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: hash_128, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7225 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_11, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7226 let header_129 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_11.block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7227 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_129, txdata: vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[2].clone()] });
7228 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7229 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7230 match events.last().unwrap() {
7231 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7232 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7238 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7239 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + A commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7240 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7242 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7243 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7244 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7245 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7247 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7248 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7249 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7250 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7251 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7252 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7254 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7255 // available, which we check here:
7256 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7257 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7258 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7260 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7261 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7263 // node_txn[3] is the local commitment tx broadcast just because (and somewhat in case of
7264 // reorgs, though its not clear its ever worth broadcasting conflicting txn like this when
7265 // a remote commitment tx has already been confirmed).
7266 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan.3);
7268 // node_txn[4] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7269 // output, checked above).
7270 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 2);
7271 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].output.len(), 1);
7272 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7274 first = node_txn[4].txid();
7275 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7276 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[4].output[0].value;
7277 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[4].weight() as u64;
7278 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7282 // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7283 let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_129.block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7284 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7285 let header_131 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_130.block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7286 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_131, txdata: Vec::new() });
7288 // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7289 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7290 assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7291 let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7293 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7294 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7296 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7297 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7298 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7299 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7300 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7301 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7302 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7303 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7307 // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7308 let header_145 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_144, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7309 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_145, txdata: node_txn });
7310 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7312 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7313 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7314 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7315 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7316 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7317 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7318 // up bumped justice generation.
7319 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7322 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7323 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7327 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
7328 // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7329 // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7332 // Provide preimage for one
7333 // Check aggregation
7335 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7336 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7337 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7338 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7340 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7341 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
7342 route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
7344 // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7345 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7346 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7347 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7348 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7350 // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
7351 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7352 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
7353 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
7354 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7355 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7357 // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
7361 let feerate_timeout;
7362 let feerate_preimage;
7364 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7365 // 5 transactions including:
7366 // local commitment + HTLC-Success
7367 // preimage and timeout sweeps from remote commitment + preimage sweep bump
7368 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5);
7369 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7370 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
7371 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
7372 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7373 check_spends!(node_txn[3], remote_txn[0]);
7374 check_spends!(node_txn[4], remote_txn[0]);
7376 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan.3); // local commitment
7377 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]); // local HTLC-Success
7379 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
7380 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7381 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7382 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7384 let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output == node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output {
7385 (node_txn[3].clone(), node_txn[4].clone())
7387 (node_txn[4].clone(), node_txn[3].clone())
7390 preimage_bump = preimage_bump_tx;
7391 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7392 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output);
7394 timeout = timeout_tx.txid();
7395 let index = timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7396 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - timeout_tx.output[0].value;
7397 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / timeout_tx.weight() as u64;
7401 assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
7402 assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
7404 // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
7405 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7407 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7408 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7409 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7410 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
7411 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7412 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7414 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7415 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
7416 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.weight() as u64;
7417 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
7418 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
7420 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7421 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7422 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7423 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
7424 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
7429 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7430 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7434 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
7435 // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
7436 // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
7437 // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
7438 // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
7439 // EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
7440 // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
7441 // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
7443 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7444 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7445 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7446 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7447 let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).2;
7449 let per_commitment_secret;
7450 let next_per_commitment_point;
7452 let mut guard = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
7453 let keys = guard.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
7455 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
7457 // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
7458 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7459 per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
7461 // Must revoke without gaps
7462 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7463 keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
7465 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7466 next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
7467 &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
7470 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
7471 &msgs::RevokeAndACK { channel_id, per_commitment_secret, next_per_commitment_point });
7472 assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
7473 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7474 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() });
7478 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
7479 // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
7480 // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7482 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7483 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7484 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7485 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7487 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7488 // Lock HTLC in both directions
7489 let (payment_preimage_1, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000);
7490 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000);
7492 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7493 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7494 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7496 // Revoke local commitment tx
7497 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
7499 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7500 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
7501 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[0], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
7502 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7504 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
7505 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7506 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7507 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7509 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7510 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
7511 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7512 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7513 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7514 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
7518 let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7519 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7520 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7522 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
7523 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
7524 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
7529 fn test_pending_claimed_htlc_no_balance_underflow() {
7530 // Tests that if we have a pending outbound HTLC as well as a claimed-but-not-fully-removed
7531 // HTLC we will not underflow when we call `Channel::get_balance_msat()`.
7532 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7533 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7534 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7535 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7536 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7538 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_010_000);
7539 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7540 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_010_000);
7541 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7542 let fulfill_ev = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7544 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7545 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
7546 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.commitment_signed);
7547 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7548 let (_raa, _cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7550 // At this point nodes[1] has received 1,010k msat (10k msat more than their reserve) and can
7551 // send an HTLC back (though it will go in the holding cell). Send an HTLC back and check we
7552 // can get our balance.
7554 // Get a route from nodes[1] to nodes[0] by getting a route going the other way and then flip
7555 // the public key of the only hop. This works around ChannelDetails not showing the
7556 // almost-claimed HTLC as available balance.
7557 let (mut route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000);
7558 route.payment_params = None; // This is all wrong, but unnecessary
7559 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7560 let (_, payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7561 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
7563 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].balance_msat, 1_000_000);
7567 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
7568 // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
7569 // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
7570 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7571 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7572 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7573 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7575 let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7577 // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
7578 // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
7579 // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
7580 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
7581 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7583 // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
7584 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
7585 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7586 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7588 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7589 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7590 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
7591 let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7592 assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
7594 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
7595 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7596 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
7598 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7603 fn test_override_channel_config() {
7604 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7605 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7606 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7607 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7609 // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
7610 let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
7611 override_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
7613 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
7615 // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
7616 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7617 assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
7618 assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
7622 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
7623 let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
7624 zero_config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
7625 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7626 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7627 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
7628 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7630 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
7631 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7632 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7634 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &res);
7635 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7636 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7640 fn test_channel_update_has_correct_htlc_maximum_msat() {
7641 // Tests that the `ChannelUpdate` message has the correct values for `htlc_maximum_msat` set.
7642 // Bolt 7 specifies that if present `htlc_maximum_msat`:
7643 // 1. MUST be set to less than or equal to the channel capacity. In LDK, this is capped to
7644 // 90% of the `channel_value`.
7645 // 2. MUST be set to less than or equal to the `max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` received from the peer.
7647 let mut config_30_percent = UserConfig::default();
7648 config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7649 config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 30;
7650 let mut config_50_percent = UserConfig::default();
7651 config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7652 config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 50;
7653 let mut config_95_percent = UserConfig::default();
7654 config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7655 config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 95;
7656 let mut config_100_percent = UserConfig::default();
7657 config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7658 config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 100;
7660 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7661 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7662 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config_30_percent), Some(config_50_percent), Some(config_95_percent), Some(config_100_percent)]);
7663 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7665 let channel_value_satoshis = 100000;
7666 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7667 let channel_value_30_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.3) as u64;
7668 let channel_value_50_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.5) as u64;
7669 let channel_value_90_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.9) as u64;
7671 let (node_0_chan_update, node_1_chan_update, _, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value_satoshis, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7672 let (node_2_chan_update, node_3_chan_update, _, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, channel_value_satoshis, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7674 // Assert that `node[0]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 50 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7675 // that's the value of `node[1]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
7676 assert_eq!(node_0_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_50_percent_msat);
7677 // Assert that `node[1]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 30 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7678 // that's the value of `node[0]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
7679 assert_eq!(node_1_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_30_percent_msat);
7681 // Assert that `node[2]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7682 // the value of `node[3]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (100%), exceeds 90% of the
7684 assert_eq!(node_2_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
7685 // Assert that `node[3]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7686 // the value of `node[2]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (95%), exceeds 90% of the
7688 assert_eq!(node_3_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
7692 fn test_manually_accept_inbound_channel_request() {
7693 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7694 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7695 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7696 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7697 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7698 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7700 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7701 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7703 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &res);
7705 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
7706 // accepting the inbound channel request.
7707 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7709 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7711 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
7712 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap();
7714 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7717 let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7718 assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7720 match accept_msg_ev[0] {
7721 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
7722 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7724 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7727 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
7729 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7730 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7732 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7734 Event::ChannelClosed { user_channel_id, .. } => {
7735 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 23);
7737 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7742 fn test_manually_reject_inbound_channel_request() {
7743 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7744 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7745 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7746 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7747 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7748 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7750 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7751 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7753 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &res);
7755 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
7756 // rejecting the inbound channel request.
7757 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7759 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7761 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
7762 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
7764 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7767 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7768 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7770 match close_msg_ev[0] {
7771 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => {
7772 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7774 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7776 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
7780 fn test_reject_funding_before_inbound_channel_accepted() {
7781 // This tests that when `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` is set to true, inbound
7782 // channels must to be manually accepted through `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel` by
7783 // the node operator before the counterparty sends a `FundingCreated` message. If a
7784 // `FundingCreated` message is received before the channel is accepted, it should be rejected
7785 // and the channel should be closed.
7786 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7787 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7788 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7789 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7790 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7791 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7793 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7794 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7795 let temp_channel_id = res.temporary_channel_id;
7797 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &res);
7799 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in the `msg_events`.
7800 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7802 // Clear the `Event::OpenChannelRequest` event without responding to the request.
7803 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7805 // Get the `AcceptChannel` message of `nodes[1]` without calling
7806 // `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`, which generates a
7807 // `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` event. The message is passed to `nodes[0]`
7808 // `handle_accept_channel`, which is required in order for `create_funding_transaction` to
7809 // succeed when `nodes[0]` is passed to it.
7810 let accept_chan_msg = {
7812 let channel = get_channel_ref!(&nodes[1], lock, temp_channel_id);
7813 channel.get_accept_channel_message()
7815 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_chan_msg);
7817 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
7819 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
7820 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7822 // The `funding_created_msg` should be rejected by `nodes[1]` as it hasn't accepted the channel
7823 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
7825 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7826 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7828 let expected_err = "FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted";
7829 match close_msg_ev[0] {
7830 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id, } => {
7831 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, temp_channel_id);
7832 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7833 assert_eq!(msg.data, expected_err);
7835 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7838 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
7842 fn test_can_not_accept_inbound_channel_twice() {
7843 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7844 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7845 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7846 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7847 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7848 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7850 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7851 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7853 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &res);
7855 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
7856 // accepting the inbound channel request.
7857 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7859 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7861 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
7862 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0).unwrap();
7863 let api_res = nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
7865 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
7866 assert_eq!(err, "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.");
7868 Ok(_) => panic!("Channel shouldn't be possible to be accepted twice"),
7869 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
7872 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7875 // Ensure that the channel wasn't closed after attempting to accept it twice.
7876 let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7877 assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7879 match accept_msg_ev[0] {
7880 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
7881 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7883 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7888 fn test_can_not_accept_unknown_inbound_channel() {
7889 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7890 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
7891 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
7892 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
7894 let unknown_channel_id = [0; 32];
7895 let api_res = nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&unknown_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
7897 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
7898 assert_eq!(err, "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist");
7900 Ok(_) => panic!("It shouldn't be possible to accept an unkown channel"),
7901 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
7906 fn test_simple_mpp() {
7907 // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
7908 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7909 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7910 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
7911 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7913 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7914 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7915 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7916 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7918 let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
7919 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
7920 route.paths.push(path);
7921 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7922 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
7923 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
7924 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
7925 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
7926 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
7927 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
7928 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
7932 fn test_preimage_storage() {
7933 // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
7934 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7935 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7936 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7937 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7939 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7942 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
7943 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7944 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
7945 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7946 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7947 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7948 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7949 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7951 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
7952 // values from previous calls.
7953 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7954 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7955 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7957 Event::PaymentReceived { ref purpose, .. } => {
7959 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
7960 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
7962 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
7965 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7970 #[allow(deprecated)]
7971 fn test_secret_timeout() {
7972 // Simple test of payment secret storage time outs. After
7973 // `create_inbound_payment(_for_hash)_legacy` is removed, this test will be removed as well.
7974 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7975 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7976 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7977 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7979 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7981 let (payment_hash, payment_secret_1) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_legacy(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
7983 // We should fail to register the same payment hash twice, at least until we've connected a
7984 // block with time 7200 + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1.
7985 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
7986 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
7987 } else { panic!(); }
7989 let node_1_blocks = nodes[1].blocks.lock().unwrap();
7991 header: BlockHeader {
7993 prev_blockhash: node_1_blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(),
7994 merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(),
7995 time: node_1_blocks.len() as u32 + 7200, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
7999 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8000 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8001 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8002 } else { panic!(); }
8004 // If we then connect the second block, we should be able to register the same payment hash
8005 // again (this time getting a new payment secret).
8006 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.header.block_hash();
8007 block.header.time += 1;
8008 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8009 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8010 assert_ne!(payment_secret_1, our_payment_secret);
8013 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8014 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8015 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8016 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8017 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8018 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8019 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8021 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8022 // values from previous calls.
8023 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8024 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8025 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8027 Event::PaymentReceived { purpose: PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret }, .. } => {
8028 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
8029 assert_eq!(payment_secret, our_payment_secret);
8030 // We don't actually have the payment preimage with which to claim this payment!
8032 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8037 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8038 // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8039 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8040 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8041 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8042 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8044 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8046 let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8047 let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8048 let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8049 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8051 // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8052 // resulting events.
8053 macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8054 ($payment_hash: expr) => {
8055 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8056 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8057 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8058 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8059 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8061 // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8062 // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8063 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8064 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash: $payment_hash }]);
8065 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8067 // We should fail the payment back
8068 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8069 match events.pop().unwrap() {
8070 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8071 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8072 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8074 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8079 let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8080 // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8081 let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8083 // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8084 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8085 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(our_payment_hash);
8086 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8088 // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8089 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(random_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8090 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8091 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8093 // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8094 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret), PaymentId(random_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8095 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8096 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8100 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8101 // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8102 // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8103 // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus
8106 // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8107 // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8108 // commitment at same time.
8110 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8111 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8112 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8113 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8115 // Create some initial channel
8116 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8117 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8119 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8120 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8122 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8123 let (preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
8125 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8126 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8127 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8128 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8130 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8131 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8132 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8133 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8134 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8135 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8136 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8137 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8140 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8141 let block = Block { header, txdata: vec![] };
8142 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8143 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8144 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (block.clone(), 0));
8145 watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, 200);
8147 // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8148 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage);
8149 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8150 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
8152 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8153 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8154 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8155 if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8156 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8157 assert_eq!(watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure);
8158 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8159 } else { assert!(false); }
8160 } else { assert!(false); };
8161 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8162 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8163 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8164 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8168 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8169 // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8170 // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8171 // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8172 // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8174 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8175 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8176 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8177 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8179 // Create some initial channel
8180 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8181 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8183 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8184 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8186 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8187 route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8189 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8190 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8191 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8192 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8193 let watchtower_alice = {
8194 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8195 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8196 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8197 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8198 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8199 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8200 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8201 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8204 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8205 let block = Block { header, txdata: vec![] };
8206 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8207 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8208 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as usize, (block.clone(), 0));
8209 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8211 // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8213 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8214 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8218 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8219 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8220 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8221 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8222 let watchtower_bob = {
8223 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8224 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8225 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8226 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8227 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8228 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8229 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8230 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8233 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8234 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8236 // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8237 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8239 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8241 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8243 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8244 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8245 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8246 if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8247 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8248 // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8249 assert_eq!(watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure);
8250 assert_eq!(watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8251 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8252 } else { assert!(false); }
8253 } else { assert!(false); };
8254 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8255 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8257 //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8258 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8259 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8261 // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8264 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8265 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8266 bob_state_y = txn[0].clone();
8270 // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8271 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8272 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![bob_state_y.clone()] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8274 let htlc_txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8275 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 1);
8276 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8281 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8282 // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8283 // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8286 // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8287 // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8289 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8290 // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8291 // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8292 // before receiving funding_signed.
8293 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8294 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8295 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8296 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8298 // Create an initial channel
8299 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8300 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8301 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_chan_msg);
8302 let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8303 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_chan_msg);
8305 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8306 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8308 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8309 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8311 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8312 let channel_id = crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
8313 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8314 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8315 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Hi".to_string() }, true);
8319 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8320 // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8321 // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8322 // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8323 // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
8324 // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
8325 // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
8327 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8328 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8329 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8330 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8332 // Create some initial channels
8333 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8335 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
8336 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
8337 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
8338 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8339 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
8340 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
8342 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8343 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8344 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] });
8345 // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
8346 // this test before #653 fix.
8347 chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
8348 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8349 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8350 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8351 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
8353 let htlc_timeout = {
8354 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8355 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
8356 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8357 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
8361 let header_201 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8362 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_201, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout.clone()] });
8363 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8364 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
8367 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
8368 // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
8369 // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
8370 // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
8372 // Steps of the test:
8373 // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
8374 // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
8375 // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
8376 // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
8377 // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
8378 // but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
8379 // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
8380 // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
8381 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8382 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8383 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8384 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8386 // Create some initial channels
8387 let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8388 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8390 // Steps (1) and (2):
8391 // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
8392 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
8394 // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
8395 let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
8396 check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8397 assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
8398 check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
8399 assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8400 assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
8402 // Steps (3) and (4):
8403 // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
8404 // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
8405 let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
8406 let mut counterparty_node = 1; // Bob if Alice force-closes
8409 if !broadcast_alice {
8410 force_closing_node = 1;
8411 counterparty_node = 0;
8413 nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_ab.2, &nodes[counterparty_node].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8414 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
8415 check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
8416 check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8417 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8418 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
8419 true => alice_txn.clone(),
8420 false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
8422 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8423 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8424 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8425 if broadcast_alice {
8426 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8427 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8428 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8430 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8431 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8435 // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
8436 // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
8437 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8438 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8439 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
8441 let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8442 assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8443 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8444 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8445 assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
8446 assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8448 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8449 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false, false);
8450 // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
8451 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
8452 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8453 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8455 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
8456 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8458 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8461 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
8462 // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
8463 // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
8464 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8466 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8467 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8468 let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
8469 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8470 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8473 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8475 let bob_updates = match events[1] {
8476 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
8477 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8480 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8483 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
8484 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8485 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
8486 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8488 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8489 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8490 let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
8491 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8492 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8495 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8497 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
8498 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8500 // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
8501 // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
8502 let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
8503 if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
8504 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8505 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8506 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8507 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
8508 if broadcast_alice {
8509 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8510 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8511 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8513 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8514 if broadcast_alice {
8515 // In `connect_block()`, the ChainMonitor and ChannelManager are separately notified about a
8516 // new block being connected. The ChannelManager being notified triggers a monitor update,
8517 // which triggers broadcasting our commitment tx and an HTLC-claiming tx. The ChainMonitor
8518 // being notified triggers the HTLC-claiming tx redundantly, resulting in 3 total txs being
8520 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 3);
8521 check_spends!(bob_txn[1], chan_ab.3);
8523 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8524 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8529 // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
8530 // broadcasted commitment transaction.
8532 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8533 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8534 // Bob should now have an extra broadcasted tx, for the preimage-claiming transaction.
8535 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8537 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
8538 true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
8539 false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
8541 // If Alice force-closed and Bob didn't receive her commitment transaction until after he
8542 // received Carol's fulfill, he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction first. Else if
8543 // Bob force closed or if he found out about Alice's commitment tx before receiving Carol's
8544 // fulfill, then he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction second.
8545 if broadcast_alice && !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8546 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8547 assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8549 check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8550 assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8556 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
8557 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
8558 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
8559 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
8560 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
8564 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
8565 // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
8566 // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
8568 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
8569 // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
8570 // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
8571 // updating logic for the existing channel.
8572 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8573 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8574 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8575 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8577 // Create an initial channel
8578 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8579 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8580 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_chan_msg);
8581 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8583 // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
8584 // that it is rejected.
8585 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_chan_msg);
8587 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8588 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8590 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8591 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
8592 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
8593 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
8594 // move forward with it.
8595 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8596 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8598 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8602 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8603 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8605 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8606 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8608 let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8609 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8611 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8612 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8613 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8614 added_monitors.clear();
8616 let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8618 let funding_outpoint = crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
8619 let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
8621 // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
8624 // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
8625 // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
8626 // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
8627 open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
8628 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_chan_msg);
8630 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8631 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8633 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8634 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8635 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8636 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8637 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8639 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8643 // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
8644 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8645 let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8646 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_chan_2_msg);
8647 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8648 create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
8650 let funding_created = {
8651 let mut a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
8652 // Once we call `get_outbound_funding_created` the channel has a duplicate channel_id as
8653 // another channel in the ChannelManager - an invalid state. Thus, we'd panic later when we
8654 // try to create another channel. Instead, we drop the channel entirely here (leaving the
8655 // channelmanager in a possibly nonsense state instead).
8656 let mut as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.remove(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
8657 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8658 as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
8660 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8661 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
8662 // At this point we'll try to add a duplicate channel monitor, which will be rejected, but
8663 // still needs to be cleared here.
8664 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8666 // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
8668 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8669 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8671 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8672 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8673 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8674 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
8675 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8677 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8681 // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
8682 // everything is functional.
8683 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
8685 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8686 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8687 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8688 added_monitors.clear();
8691 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8692 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
8693 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
8694 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
8696 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8697 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8698 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
8700 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
8704 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
8705 // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
8707 // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
8708 // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
8709 // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
8710 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8711 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8712 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8713 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8715 // Create some initial channels
8716 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8717 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8718 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8720 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8721 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8722 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8724 // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
8725 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8726 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8728 // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
8729 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8730 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8731 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
8732 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
8733 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
8734 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8735 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
8736 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8738 // A null channel ID should close all channels
8739 let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8740 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8741 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
8742 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
8743 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8744 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8746 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
8747 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
8749 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8752 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
8753 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
8755 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8757 // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
8758 // peer_disconnected with no_connection_possible set to false, duplicating the
8759 // close-all-channels logic. That's OK, we don't want to end up not force-closing channels for
8760 // users with their own peer handling logic. We duplicate the call here, however.
8761 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8762 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8764 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
8765 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8766 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8770 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
8771 // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
8773 // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
8774 // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
8775 // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
8776 // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
8778 // Further, if the funding transaction is consensus-valid, confirms, and is later spent, we'd
8779 // previously have crashed in `ChannelMonitor` even though we closed the channel as bogus and
8780 // gave up on it. We test this here by generating such a transaction.
8781 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8782 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8783 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8784 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8786 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8787 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8788 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8790 let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
8792 // Create a witness program which can be spent by a 4-empty-stack-elements witness and which is
8793 // 136 bytes long. This matches our "accepted HTLC preimage spend" matching, previously causing
8794 // a panic as we'd try to extract a 32 byte preimage from a witness element without checking
8796 let mut wit_program: Vec<u8> = channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program();
8797 let wit_program_script: Script = wit_program.into();
8798 for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
8799 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
8800 output.script_pubkey = Script::new_v0_p2wsh(&wit_program_script.wscript_hash());
8803 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
8804 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8805 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8807 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8808 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8810 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8811 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
8813 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
8814 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
8815 nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
8817 let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
8818 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
8819 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
8820 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8821 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8822 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
8823 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
8824 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8825 if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
8826 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
8827 } else { panic!(); }
8828 } else { panic!(); }
8829 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
8831 // Now confirm a spend of the (bogus) funding transaction. As long as the witness is 5 elements
8832 // long the ChannelMonitor will try to read 32 bytes from the second-to-last element, panicing
8833 // as its not 32 bytes long.
8834 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
8835 version: 2i32, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
8836 input: tx.output.iter().enumerate().map(|(idx, _)| TxIn {
8837 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
8841 script_sig: Script::new(),
8842 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
8843 witness: Witness::from_vec(channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness())
8845 output: vec![TxOut {
8847 script_pubkey: Script::new(),
8850 check_spends!(spend_tx, tx);
8851 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &spend_tx);
8854 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
8855 // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
8856 // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
8857 // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
8858 // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
8859 // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
8860 // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
8861 // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
8862 // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
8863 // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
8864 // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
8865 // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
8866 // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
8867 // until we learned about an additional block.
8869 // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
8870 // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
8871 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8872 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8873 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8874 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8875 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
8877 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8878 let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8879 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
8880 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8881 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8883 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8884 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8885 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8886 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8887 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
8888 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8890 let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
8891 if !test_height_before_timelock {
8892 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
8894 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
8895 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
8896 if test_height_before_timelock {
8897 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
8898 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
8899 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8900 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
8902 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
8903 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
8904 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
8905 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
8906 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
8907 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
8909 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
8910 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
8912 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
8913 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
8914 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
8915 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
8916 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
8917 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: channel_id }]);
8918 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8920 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8921 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8922 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8923 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8924 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8925 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8926 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8927 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8928 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
8933 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
8934 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
8935 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
8938 fn do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(test_for_second_fail_panic: bool) {
8939 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8940 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8941 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8942 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8944 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8946 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
8947 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
8948 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
8950 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
8953 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8954 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8955 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8956 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8957 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8958 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8959 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8961 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8962 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 10_000);
8965 // Note that we use a different PaymentId here to allow us to duplicativly pay
8966 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_secret.0)).unwrap();
8967 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8968 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8969 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8970 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8971 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8972 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8973 // At this point, nodes[1] would notice it has too much value for the payment. It will
8974 // assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
8975 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC. Previously, it'd also have failed back
8976 // the first HTLC delivered above.
8979 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
8980 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
8982 if test_for_second_fail_panic {
8983 // Now we go fail back the first HTLC from the user end.
8984 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
8986 let expected_destinations = vec![
8987 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
8988 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
8990 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1], expected_destinations);
8991 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
8993 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8994 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8995 assert_eq!(fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 2);
8997 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8998 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
8999 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9001 let failure_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9002 assert_eq!(failure_events.len(), 2);
9003 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
9004 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[1] {} else { panic!(); }
9006 // Let the second HTLC fail and claim the first
9007 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9008 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9010 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9011 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9012 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9013 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9015 expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9017 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
9022 fn test_dup_htlc_second_fail_panic() {
9023 // Previously, if we received two HTLCs back-to-back, where the second overran the expected
9024 // value for the payment, we'd fail back both HTLCs after generating a `PaymentReceived` event.
9025 // Then, if the user failed the second payment, they'd hit a "tried to fail an already failed
9026 // HTLC" debug panic. This tests for this behavior, checking that only one HTLC is auto-failed.
9027 do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(true);
9031 fn test_dup_htlc_second_rejected() {
9032 // Test that if we receive a second HTLC for an MPP payment that overruns the payment amount we
9033 // simply reject the second HTLC but are still able to claim the first HTLC.
9034 do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(false);
9038 fn test_inconsistent_mpp_params() {
9039 // Test that if we recieve two HTLCs with different payment parameters we fail back the first
9040 // such HTLC and allow the second to stay.
9041 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9042 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9043 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9044 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9046 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9047 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9048 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9049 let chan_2_3 =create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9051 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id())
9052 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
9053 let mut route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 15_000_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
9054 assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9055 route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9056 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9057 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9058 core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9060 let payment_params_opt = Some(payment_params);
9062 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[3]);
9064 let cur_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
9065 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
9067 let session_privs = {
9068 // We create a fake route here so that we start with three pending HTLCs, which we'll
9069 // ultimately have, just not right away.
9070 let mut dup_route = route.clone();
9071 dup_route.paths.push(route.paths[1].clone());
9072 nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &dup_route).unwrap()
9075 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
9076 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9078 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9079 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9080 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), false, None);
9082 assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9085 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 14_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
9086 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9088 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9089 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9090 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9092 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9093 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9095 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9096 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9098 let mut events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9099 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9100 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9102 nodes[3].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9103 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9104 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg, true, true);
9106 // At this point, nodes[3] should notice the two HTLCs don't contain the same total payment
9107 // amount. It will assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9108 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC.
9110 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[3]);
9111 nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9112 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[3], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9113 nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9115 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
9117 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9118 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9119 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9121 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }]);
9122 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9124 let fail_updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9125 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9126 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], fail_updates_2.commitment_signed, false);
9128 expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9130 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[2]).unwrap();
9131 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9133 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9134 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9135 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), true, None);
9137 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, our_payment_preimage);
9141 fn test_keysend_payments_to_public_node() {
9142 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9143 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9144 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9145 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9147 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9148 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9149 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9150 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9151 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9152 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9153 final_value_msat: 10000,
9154 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9156 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
9157 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9158 let route = find_route(&payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
9160 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9161 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(test_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9162 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9163 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9164 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9165 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9166 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9167 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9168 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9172 fn test_keysend_payments_to_private_node() {
9173 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9174 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9175 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9176 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9178 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9179 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9180 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
9181 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
9183 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9184 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9185 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9186 final_value_msat: 10000,
9187 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9189 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9190 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9191 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
9192 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9193 let route = find_route(
9194 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9195 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
9198 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9199 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(test_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9200 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9201 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9202 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9203 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9204 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9205 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9206 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9210 fn test_double_partial_claim() {
9211 // Test what happens if a node receives a payment, generates a PaymentReceived event, the HTLCs
9212 // time out, the sender resends only some of the MPP parts, then the user processes the
9213 // PaymentReceived event, ensuring they don't inadvertently claim only part of the full payment
9215 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9216 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9217 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9218 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9220 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9221 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9222 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9223 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9225 let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], 15_000_000);
9226 assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9227 route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9228 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9229 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9230 core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9233 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
9234 // nodes[3] has now received a PaymentReceived event...which it will take some (exorbitant)
9235 // amount of time to respond to.
9237 // Connect some blocks to time out the payment
9238 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
9239 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // To get the same height for sending later
9241 let failed_destinations = vec![
9242 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
9243 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
9245 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations);
9247 pass_failed_payment_back(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_hash);
9249 // nodes[1] now retries one of the two paths...
9250 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9251 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9253 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9254 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9255 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
9257 // At this point nodes[3] has received one half of the payment, and the user goes to handle
9258 // that PaymentReceived event they got hours ago and never handled...we should refuse to claim.
9259 nodes[3].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9260 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9261 assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9264 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
9265 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
9266 enum ExposureEvent {
9267 /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
9269 /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
9271 /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
9272 AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
9275 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool) {
9276 // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
9279 // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
9280 // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
9281 // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
9282 // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
9283 // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
9284 // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
9285 // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
9286 // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
9288 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9289 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
9290 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = 5_000_000; // default setting value
9291 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9292 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
9293 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9295 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9296 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9297 open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
9298 open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
9300 open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9302 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel);
9303 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9304 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
9306 let opt_anchors = false;
9308 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9311 if let Some(mut chan) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&temporary_channel_id) {
9312 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9316 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9317 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9318 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9320 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9321 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9323 let (channel_ready, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9324 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9325 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9327 let dust_buffer_feerate = {
9328 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
9329 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
9330 chan.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64
9332 let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9333 let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9335 let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9336 let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9338 let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 25;
9339 let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
9342 if dust_outbound_balance {
9343 // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9344 // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9345 // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
9346 for i in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9347 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9348 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9351 // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9352 // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9353 // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
9354 for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9355 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9359 if dust_outbound_balance {
9360 // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9361 // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9362 for i in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9363 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9364 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9367 // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9368 // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9369 for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9370 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9375 let dust_overflow = dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx + 1);
9376 if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
9377 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9378 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9379 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9381 let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9382 let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9383 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9385 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9387 } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
9388 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9389 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9390 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9391 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9392 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9393 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
9394 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9395 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9397 // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
9398 let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9399 let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9400 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9402 // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
9403 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9405 } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
9406 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 2_500_000);
9407 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)) { panic!("Unexpected event at update_fee-swallowed HTLC", ); }
9409 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9410 *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
9412 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9413 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9414 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure".to_string(), 1);
9417 let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9418 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9419 added_monitors.clear();
9423 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
9424 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9425 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9426 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9427 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9428 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9429 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9430 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9431 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9432 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9433 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9434 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9435 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9439 fn test_non_final_funding_tx() {
9440 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9441 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9442 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9443 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9445 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9446 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9447 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_message);
9448 let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9449 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel_message);
9451 let best_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
9453 let chan_id = *nodes[0].network_chan_count.borrow();
9454 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9455 let input = TxIn { previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint::null(), script_sig: bitcoin::Script::new(), sequence: Sequence(1), witness: Witness::from_vec(vec!(vec!(1))) };
9456 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9457 let mut tx = match events[0] {
9458 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } => {
9459 // Timelock the transaction _beyond_ the best client height + 2.
9460 Transaction { version: chan_id as i32, lock_time: PackedLockTime(best_height + 3), input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut {
9461 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9464 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9466 // Transaction should fail as it's evaluated as non-final for propagation.
9467 match nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()) {
9468 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
9469 assert_eq!(format!("Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final"), err);
9474 // However, transaction should be accepted if it's in a +2 headroom from best block.
9475 tx.lock_time = PackedLockTime(tx.lock_time.0 - 1);
9476 assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
9477 get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9481 fn accept_busted_but_better_fee() {
9482 // If a peer sends us a fee update that is too low, but higher than our previous channel
9483 // feerate, we should accept it. In the future we may want to consider closing the channel
9484 // later, but for now we only accept the update.
9485 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9486 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9487 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9488 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9490 create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9492 // Set nodes[1] to expect 5,000 sat/kW.
9494 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9495 *feerate_lock = 5000;
9498 // If nodes[0] increases their feerate, even if its not enough, nodes[1] should accept it.
9500 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9501 *feerate_lock = 1000;
9503 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9504 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9506 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9507 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9509 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
9510 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
9511 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], commitment_signed, false);
9513 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9516 // If nodes[0] increases their feerate further, even if its not enough, nodes[1] should accept
9519 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9520 *feerate_lock = 2000;
9522 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9523 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9525 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9526 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9528 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
9529 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
9530 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], commitment_signed, false);
9532 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9535 // However, if nodes[0] decreases their feerate, nodes[1] should reject it and close the
9538 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9539 *feerate_lock = 1000;
9541 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9542 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9544 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9545 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9547 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
9548 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
9549 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
9550 err: "Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: 1000. Our expected lower limit: 5000 (- 250)".to_owned() });
9551 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9552 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9554 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),