_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
  11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
  12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
  13
  14 use crate::chain;
  15 use crate::chain::{ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Confirm, Listen, Watch};
  16 use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
  17 use crate::chain::channelmonitor;
  18 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
  19 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  20 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{BaseSign, KeysInterface};
  21 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
  22 use crate::ln::channel::{commitment_tx_base_weight, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT};
  23 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA};
  24 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
  25 use crate::ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
  26 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
  27 use crate::routing::gossip::{NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate};
  28 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, find_route, get_route};
  29 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures};
  30 use crate::ln::msgs;
  31 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
  32 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
  33 use crate::util::{byte_utils, test_utils};
  34 use crate::util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
  35 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
  36 use crate::util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
  37 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
  38
  39 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
  40 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
  41 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
  42 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  43 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
  44 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
  45 use bitcoin::{PackedLockTime, Sequence, Transaction, TxIn, TxMerkleNode, TxOut, Witness};
  46 use bitcoin::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
  47
  48 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
  49 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
  50
  51 use regex;
  52
  53 use crate::io;
  54 use crate::prelude::*;
  55 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
  56 use core::default::Default;
  57 use core::iter::repeat;
  58 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
  59 use crate::sync::Mutex;
  60
  61 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
  62 use crate::ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
  63
  64 #[test]
  65 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
  66         // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
  67         use crate::ln::channel::TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS;
  68         let mut cfg = UserConfig::default();
  69         cfg.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1;
  70         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
  71         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
  72         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(cfg)]);
  73         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
  74
  75         // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
  76         // funding satoshis
  77         let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
  78         let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat, &cfg);
  79         let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
  80
  81         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
  82         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
  83
  84         // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
  85         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
  86
  87         // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
  88         // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
  89         let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
  90                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
  91                 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
  92                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
  93                 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
  94                 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
  95                         match action {
  96                                 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
  97                                         nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), expected_regex, 1);
  98                                 },
  99                                 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
 100                         }
 101                 } else { assert!(false); }
 102         };
 103
 104         use crate::ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
 105
 106         // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
 107         insane_open_helper(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2; msg });
 108         insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS; msg });
 109
 110         insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
 111
 112         insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than channel amount minus reserve \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
 113
 114         insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
 115
 116         insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
 117
 118         insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
 119
 120         insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
 121
 122         insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
 123 }
 124
 125 #[test]
 126 fn test_funding_exceeds_no_wumbo_limit() {
 127         // Test that if a peer does not support wumbo channels, we'll refuse to open a wumbo channel to
 128         // them.
 129         use crate::ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO;
 130         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 131         let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 132         node_cfgs[1].features = channelmanager::provided_init_features().clear_wumbo();
 133         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 134         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 135
 136         match nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1, 0, 42, None) {
 137                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
 138                         assert_eq!(format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1), err);
 139                 },
 140                 _ => panic!()
 141         }
 142 }
 143
 144 fn do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(send_from_initiator: bool) {
 145         // A peer providing a channel_reserve_satoshis of 0 (or less than our dust limit) is insecure,
 146         // but only for them. Because some LSPs do it with some level of trust of the clients (for a
 147         // substantial UX improvement), we explicitly allow it. Because it's unlikely to happen often
 148         // in normal testing, we test it explicitly here.
 149         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 150         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 151         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 152         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 153         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
 154
 155         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
 156         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
 157         let feerate_per_kw = 253;
 158         let opt_anchors = false;
 159         push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
 160         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
 161
 162         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None).unwrap();
 163         let mut open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 164         if !send_from_initiator {
 165                 open_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 166                 open_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 167         }
 168         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_message);
 169
 170         // Extract the channel accept message from node1 to node0
 171         let mut accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 172         if send_from_initiator {
 173                 accept_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 174                 accept_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 175         }
 176         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel_message);
 177         {
 178                 let mut lock;
 179                 let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(if send_from_initiator { &nodes[1] } else { &nodes[0] }, lock, temp_channel_id);
 180                 chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 181                 chan.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 182         }
 183
 184         let funding_tx = sign_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100_000, temp_channel_id);
 185         let funding_msgs = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_tx);
 186         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_msgs.0);
 187
 188         // nodes[0] should now be able to send the full balance to nodes[1], violating nodes[1]'s
 189         // security model if it ever tries to send funds back to nodes[0] (but that's not our problem).
 190         if send_from_initiator {
 191                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000_000
 192                         // Note that for outbound channels we have to consider the commitment tx fee and the
 193                         // "fee spike buffer", which is currently a multiple of the total commitment tx fee as
 194                         // well as an additional HTLC.
 195                         - FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, 2, opt_anchors));
 196         } else {
 197                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], push_amt);
 198         }
 199 }
 200
 201 #[test]
 202 fn test_counterparty_no_reserve() {
 203         do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(true);
 204         do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(false);
 205 }
 206
 207 #[test]
 208 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
 209         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 210         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 211         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 212         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 213         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
 214
 215         // balancing
 216         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 217
 218         // A                                        B
 219         // update_fee                            ->
 220         // send (1) commitment_signed            -.
 221         //                                       <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
 222         // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
 223         // (1) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 224         //                                       .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
 225         // (2) RAA is delivered                  ->
 226         //                                       .- send (4) commitment_signed
 227         //                                       <- (3) RAA is delivered
 228         // send (5) commitment_signed            -.
 229         //                                       <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
 230         // send (6) RAA                          -.
 231         // (5) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 232         //                                       <- RAA
 233         // (6) RAA is delivered                  ->
 234
 235         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 236         {
 237                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 238                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 239         }
 240         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 241         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 242
 243         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 244         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 245         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 246                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 247                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 248                 },
 249                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 250         };
 251
 252         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 253
 254         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 255         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 256         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
 257         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 258
 259         let payment_event = {
 260                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 261                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 262                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 263         };
 264         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 265         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 266
 267         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 268         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 269         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 270         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 271         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 272         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 273
 274         // deliver(1), generate (3):
 275         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 276         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 277         // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 278         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 279
 280         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
 281         let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 282         assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 283         assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 284         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 285         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 286         assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
 287         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 288
 289         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
 290         let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 291         assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 292         assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 293         assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 294         assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 295         assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
 296         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 297
 298         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
 299         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 300         // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 301         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 302
 303         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
 304         let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 305         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 306
 307         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 308         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 309
 310         let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 311         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
 312         match events_2[0] {
 313                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
 314                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 315         }
 316
 317         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
 318         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 319 }
 320
 321 #[test]
 322 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
 323         // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
 324         // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
 325         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 326         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 327         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 328         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 329         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
 330
 331         // balancing
 332         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 333
 334         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 335         {
 336                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 337                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 338         }
 339         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 340         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 341
 342         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 343         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 344         let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 345                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
 346                         update_fee.as_ref()
 347                 },
 348                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 349         };
 350
 351         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 352
 353         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 354         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 355         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
 356         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 357
 358         let payment_event = {
 359                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 360                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 361                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 362         };
 363         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 364         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 365
 366         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 367         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 368         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 369         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 370         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 371         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 372
 373         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
 374         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 375
 376         // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
 377 }
 378
 379 #[test]
 380 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
 381         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 382         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 383         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 384         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 385         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
 386
 387         // A                                        B
 388         // update_fee/commitment_signed          ->
 389         //                                       .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
 390         // update_fee (never committed)          ->
 391         // (3) update_fee                        ->
 392         // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
 393         // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
 394         // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
 395         //                                       <- (1) RAA delivered
 396         // (3) is generated and send (4) CS      -.
 397         // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
 398         // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
 399         //                                       <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
 400         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 401         //                                          B should send no response here
 402         // (4) commitment_signed delivered       ->
 403         //                                       <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
 404         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 405
 406         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 407         let initial_feerate;
 408         {
 409                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 410                 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
 411                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
 412         }
 413         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 414         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 415
 416         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 417         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 418         let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 419                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 420                         (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
 421                 },
 422                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 423         };
 424
 425         // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
 426         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
 427         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
 428         let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 429         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 430
 431         // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
 432         // transaction:
 433         {
 434                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 435                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
 436         }
 437         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 438         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 439         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 440
 441         // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
 442         let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
 443                 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
 444                 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
 445         };
 446
 447         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 448
 449         update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
 450         // Deliver (3)
 451         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 452
 453         // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
 454         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
 455         let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 456         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 457         assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 458         assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 459         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 460         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 461         // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
 462         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
 463         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
 464
 465         // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
 466         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
 467         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 468         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 469         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 470
 471         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
 472         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 473         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 474
 475         // Delever (4)
 476         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
 477         let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 478         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 479
 480         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 481         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 482         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 483
 484         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
 485         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 486         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 487         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 488
 489         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
 490         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 491         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 492 }
 493
 494 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
 495         // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
 496         // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
 497         // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
 498         // Node objects.
 499
 500         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 501         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 502         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 503         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 504
 505         if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
 506                 let block = Block {
 507                         header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
 508                         txdata: vec![],
 509                 };
 510                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
 511                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
 512         }
 513
 514         if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
 515         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
 516         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 517
 518         if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
 519         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel);
 520         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 521
 522         if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
 523         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
 524
 525         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
 526
 527         if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
 528         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
 529         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 530         let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 531
 532         if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
 533         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
 534         {
 535                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 536                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 537                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 538                 added_monitors.clear();
 539         }
 540         let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 541
 542         if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
 543         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
 544         {
 545                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 546                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 547                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 548                 added_monitors.clear();
 549         }
 550
 551         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 552         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
 553
 554         if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
 555         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
 556
 557         if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
 558         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
 559         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
 560         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
 561         expect_channel_ready_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 562 }
 563
 564 #[test]
 565 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
 566         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
 567         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
 568         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
 569         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
 570         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
 571         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
 572         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
 573         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
 574         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
 575         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
 576         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
 577         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
 578         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
 579         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
 580         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
 581         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
 582         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
 583         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
 584 }
 585
 586 #[test]
 587 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
 588         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 589         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 590         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 591         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 592         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
 593
 594         {
 595                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 596                 *feerate_lock += 25;
 597         }
 598         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 599         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 600
 601         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 602         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 603         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 604                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 605                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 606                 },
 607                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 608         };
 609         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 610
 611         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 612         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 613         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 614
 615         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 616         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 617         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 618
 619         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 620         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 621         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 622         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 623
 624         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 625         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 626         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 627 }
 628
 629 #[test]
 630 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
 631         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 632         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 633         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 634         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 635         let channel_value = 5000;
 636         let push_sats = 700;
 637         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
 638         let channel_id = chan.2;
 639         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 640         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
 641         let bs_channel_reserve_sats = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value, &default_config);
 642
 643         let opt_anchors = false;
 644
 645         // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
 646         // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
 647         // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
 648         // remote limit.
 649         let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
 650         let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors)) as u32;
 651         {
 652                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 653                 *feerate_lock = feerate;
 654         }
 655         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 656         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 657         let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 658
 659         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
 660
 661         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
 662
 663         // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
 664         {
 665                 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
 666
 667                 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
 668                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
 669                 let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000;
 670                 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
 671                 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
 672                 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
 673         }
 674
 675         {
 676                 // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
 677                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 678                 *feerate_lock += 4;
 679         }
 680         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 681         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
 682         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 683
 684         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
 685
 686         // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
 687         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
 688         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
 689                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 690                 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 691                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 692                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
 693                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 694                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 695         };
 696         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
 697                 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 698                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 699                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
 700                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
 701                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 702                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
 703                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 704         };
 705
 706         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
 707         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
 708                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
 709
 710         let res = {
 711                 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 712                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 713                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 714                 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
 715                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
 716                         INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
 717                         push_sats,
 718                         channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000,
 719                         opt_anchors, local_funding, remote_funding,
 720                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
 721                         non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 722                         &mut htlcs,
 723                         &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
 724                 );
 725                 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
 726         };
 727
 728         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
 729                 channel_id: chan.2,
 730                 signature: res.0,
 731                 htlc_signatures: res.1
 732         };
 733
 734         let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
 735                 channel_id: chan.2,
 736                 feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 737         };
 738
 739         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
 740
 741         //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
 742         //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
 743         //Should produce and error.
 744         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
 745         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
 746         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 747         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 748         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") });
 749 }
 750
 751 #[test]
 752 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
 753         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 754         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 755         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 756         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 757         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
 758
 759         // balancing
 760         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 761
 762         {
 763                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 764                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 765         }
 766         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 767         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 768
 769         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 770         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 771         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 772                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 773                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 774                 },
 775                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 776         };
 777         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 778         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 779         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 780         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 781
 782         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
 783
 784         // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
 785         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
 786         {
 787                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 788                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
 789                 added_monitors.clear();
 790         }
 791         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 792         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 793         // node[1] has nothing to do
 794
 795         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 796         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 797         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 798
 799         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 800         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 801         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 802         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 803         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 804         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 805         // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
 806
 807         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 808         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
 809         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
 810         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
 811         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
 812         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
 813
 814         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
 815         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 816         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 817         let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 818
 819         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 820         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 821         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 822
 823         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 824         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 825         let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 826         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 827
 828         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 829         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 830         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 831
 832         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
 833
 834         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 835         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
 836         match events[0] {
 837                 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
 838                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 839         };
 840
 841         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
 842
 843         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
 844         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
 845         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 846         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 847         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 848 }
 849
 850 #[test]
 851 fn test_update_fee() {
 852         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 853         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 854         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 855         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 856         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
 857         let channel_id = chan.2;
 858
 859         // A                                        B
 860         // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 861         //                                       <- (2) revoke_and_ack
 862         //                                       .- send (3) commitment_signed
 863         // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 864         //                                       .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
 865         //                                       <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
 866         // send (6) revoke_and_ack               -.
 867         //                                       <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
 868         // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack            ->
 869         //                                       .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
 870         //                                       <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
 871         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 872
 873         // Create and deliver (1)...
 874         let feerate;
 875         {
 876                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 877                 feerate = *feerate_lock;
 878                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
 879         }
 880         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 881         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 882
 883         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 884         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 885         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 886                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 887                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 888                 },
 889                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 890         };
 891         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 892
 893         // Generate (2) and (3):
 894         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 895         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 896         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 897
 898         // Deliver (2):
 899         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 900         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 901         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 902
 903         // Create and deliver (4)...
 904         {
 905                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 906                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
 907         }
 908         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 909         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 910         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 911         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 912         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 913                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 914                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 915                 },
 916                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 917         };
 918
 919         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 920         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 921         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 922         // ... creating (5)
 923         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 924         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 925
 926         // Handle (3), creating (6):
 927         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
 928         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 929         let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 930         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 931
 932         // Deliver (5):
 933         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 934         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 935         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 936
 937         // Deliver (6), creating (7):
 938         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
 939         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 940         assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 941         assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 942         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 943         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 944         assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
 945         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 946
 947         // Deliver (7)
 948         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 949         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 950         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 951         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 952
 953         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 954         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 955         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 956
 957         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
 958         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
 959         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 960         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 961         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 962 }
 963
 964 #[test]
 965 fn fake_network_test() {
 966         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
 967         // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
 968         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
 969         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
 970         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
 971         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 972
 973         // Create some initial channels
 974         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
 975         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
 976         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
 977
 978         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
 979         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 980         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 981         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 982         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 983
 984         // Send some more payments
 985         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
 986         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
 987         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
 988
 989         // Test failure packets
 990         let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
 991         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
 992
 993         // Add a new channel that skips 3
 994         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
 995
 996         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
 997         send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
 998         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 999         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1000         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1001         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1002         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1003
1004         // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
1005         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1006         hops.push(RouteHop {
1007                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1008                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1009                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1010                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1011                 fee_msat: 0,
1012                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1013         });
1014         hops.push(RouteHop {
1015                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1016                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1017                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1018                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1019                 fee_msat: 0,
1020                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1021         });
1022         hops.push(RouteHop {
1023                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1024                 node_features: channelmanager::provided_node_features(),
1025                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1026                 channel_features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(),
1027                 fee_msat: 1000000,
1028                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1029         });
1030         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1031         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1032         let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
1033
1034         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1035         hops.push(RouteHop {
1036                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1037                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1038                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1039                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1040                 fee_msat: 0,
1041                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1042         });
1043         hops.push(RouteHop {
1044                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1045                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1046                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1047                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1048                 fee_msat: 0,
1049                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1050         });
1051         hops.push(RouteHop {
1052                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1053                 node_features: channelmanager::provided_node_features(),
1054                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1055                 channel_features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(),
1056                 fee_msat: 1000000,
1057                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1058         });
1059         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1060         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1061         let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1062
1063         // Claim the rebalances...
1064         fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1065         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1066
1067         // Close down the channels...
1068         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1069         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1070         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1071         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1072         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1073         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1074         close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1075         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1076         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1077         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1078         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1079         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1080 }
1081
1082 #[test]
1083 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1084         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1085         // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1086         // commitment dance rounds.
1087         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1088         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1089         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1090         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1091         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1092         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1093
1094         let mut payments = Vec::new();
1095         for _ in 0..crate::ln::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
1096                 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1097                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
1098                 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1099         }
1100         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1101
1102         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1103         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1104         let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1105         assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1106
1107         // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1108         // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1109         // another HTLC.
1110         let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1111         {
1112                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1113                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1114                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1115                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
1116         }
1117
1118         // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1119         let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1120         {
1121                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
1122                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1123         }
1124
1125         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1126         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1127         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1128         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1129
1130         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1131         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1132         // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1133         // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1134         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1135         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
1136         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1137
1138         let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1139         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1140         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1141
1142         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1143
1144         // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1145         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1146         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1147         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1148
1149         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1150         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1151         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1152         let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1153
1154         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1155         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1156         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1157
1158         for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1159                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1160         }
1161         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1162         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1163         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1164         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1165         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1166
1167         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1168         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1169         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1170         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1171         let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1172
1173         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1174         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1175
1176         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1177
1178         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1179         assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1180         for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1181                 match event {
1182                         &Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1183                                 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1184                         },
1185                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1186                 };
1187         }
1188
1189         for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1190                 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1191         }
1192
1193         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1194 }
1195
1196 #[test]
1197 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1198         // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1199         // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1200         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1201         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1202         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1203         let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1204
1205         // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1206         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1207         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1208         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1209         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1210         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1211
1212         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1213
1214         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1215         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1216
1217         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1218         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1219
1220         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1221         fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1222         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1223 }
1224
1225 #[test]
1226 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1227         // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1228         // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1229         // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1230         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1231         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1232         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1233         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1234
1235         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1236
1237         // balancing
1238         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1239
1240         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1241
1242         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1243         let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
1244         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1245
1246         // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1247         nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1248         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, 800_000);
1249         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1250
1251         // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1252         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1253
1254         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1255         let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1256         for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1257                 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1258                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1259                 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1260                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1261                 }
1262         }
1263         assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1264
1265         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1266         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1267         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1268         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1269
1270         let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1271         assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 5);
1272
1273         check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]); // Immediate HTLC claim with preimage
1274         check_spends!(claim_txn[1], chan_1.3); // Alternative commitment tx
1275         check_spends!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[1]); // HTLC spend in alternative commitment tx
1276
1277         check_spends!(claim_txn[3], remote_txn[0]);
1278         check_spends!(claim_txn[4], remote_txn[0]);
1279         let preimage_tx = &claim_txn[0];
1280         let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if claim_txn[3].input[0].previous_output == preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output {
1281                 (&claim_txn[3], &claim_txn[4])
1282         } else {
1283                 (&claim_txn[4], &claim_txn[3])
1284         };
1285
1286         assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1287         assert_eq!(preimage_bump_tx.input.len(), 1);
1288
1289         assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1290         assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1291         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1292
1293         assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input.len(), 1);
1294         assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1295         check_spends!(timeout_tx, remote_txn[0]);
1296         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1297
1298         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1299         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1300         for e in events {
1301                 match e {
1302                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1303                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
1304                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1305                                 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1306                         },
1307                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1308                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1309                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1310                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1311                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1312                                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1313                         },
1314                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1315                 }
1316         }
1317 }
1318
1319 #[test]
1320 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1321         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1322         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1323         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1324         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1325         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1326
1327         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1328         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1329
1330         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1331         let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2), 1 + 1, get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2));
1332         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1333         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send + 1);
1334         let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).err().unwrap();
1335         match err {
1336                 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedResendSafe(ref fails) => {
1337                         match &fails[0] {
1338                                 &APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ref err} =>
1339                                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)),
1340                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1341                         }
1342                 },
1343                 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1344         }
1345         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1346         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1347
1348         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1349 }
1350
1351 #[test]
1352 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1353         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1354         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1355         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1356         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1357         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1358
1359         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460001);
1360         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1361         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1362         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1363
1364         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1365
1366         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1367         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3460001, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1368         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1369         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1370                 channel_id: chan.2,
1371                 htlc_id: 0,
1372                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1373                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1374                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1375                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1376         };
1377
1378         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1379
1380         // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1381         // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1382         // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1383
1384         let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1385
1386         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1387
1388         // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1389         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1390         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1391                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1392                 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1393                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1394                 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1395                 chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1396
1397                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1398                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1399                  chan_signer.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1400                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1401                  chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1402         };
1403         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1404                 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1405                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1406                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1407                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1408                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1409                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1410                  chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1411         };
1412
1413         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1414         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1415                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
1416
1417         // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1418         // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1419         let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1420
1421         let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1422                 offered: false,
1423                 amount_msat: 3460001,
1424                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1425                 payment_hash,
1426                 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1427         };
1428
1429         let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1430
1431         let res = {
1432                 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1433                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1434                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1435                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1436                         commitment_number,
1437                         95000,
1438                         local_chan_balance,
1439                         local_chan.opt_anchors(), local_funding, remote_funding,
1440                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1441                         feerate_per_kw,
1442                         &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1443                         &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1444                 );
1445                 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1446         };
1447
1448         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1449                 channel_id: chan.2,
1450                 signature: res.0,
1451                 htlc_signatures: res.1
1452         };
1453
1454         // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1455         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1456         let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1457
1458         // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1459         let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1460                 channel_id: chan.2,
1461                 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1462                 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point
1463         };
1464         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1465
1466         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1467         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1468         // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1469         match events[0] {
1470                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1471                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1472                         update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1473                 },
1474                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1475         };
1476         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1477                 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", ::hex::encode(raa_msg.channel_id)), 1);
1478
1479         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1480 }
1481
1482 #[test]
1483 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1484         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1485         // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1486         // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1487         // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1488         // this situation.
1489         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1490         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1491         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1492         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1493         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1494         let opt_anchors = false;
1495
1496         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1497         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1498
1499         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1500
1501         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1502
1503         // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1504         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1505                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1506         }
1507
1508         // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1509         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1510         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1511                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1512         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1513         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1514 }
1515
1516 #[test]
1517 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1518         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1519         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1520         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1521         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1522         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1523         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1524         let opt_anchors = false;
1525
1526         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1527         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1528         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1529         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1530         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1531         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1532         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1533
1534         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1535         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1536                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1537         }
1538
1539         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 700_000);
1540         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1541         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1542         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1543         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1544         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1545         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 700_000, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1546         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1547         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1548                 channel_id: chan.2,
1549                 htlc_id: MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64,
1550                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1551                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1552                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1553                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1554         };
1555
1556         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1557         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1558         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1559         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1560         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1561         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1562         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1563         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() });
1564 }
1565
1566 #[test]
1567 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1568         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1569         // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1570         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1571         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1572
1573         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1574         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1575         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1576         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1577         let opt_anchors = false;
1578
1579         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1580         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1581         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1582         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1583         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1584         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1585         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1586
1587         let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1588                 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1589         // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1590         // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1591         // commitment transaction fee.
1592         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1593
1594         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1595         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1596                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1597         }
1598
1599         // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1600         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt + 1);
1601         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1602                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1603 }
1604
1605 #[test]
1606 fn test_chan_init_feerate_unaffordability() {
1607         // Test that we will reject channel opens which do not leave enough to pay for any HTLCs due to
1608         // channel reserve and feerate requirements.
1609         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1610         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1611         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1612         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1613         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1614         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1615         let opt_anchors = false;
1616
1617         // Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
1618         // HTLC.
1619         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1620         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1621         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None).unwrap_err(),
1622                 APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
1623
1624         // During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
1625         // requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
1626         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1627         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None).unwrap();
1628         let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1629         open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
1630         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_msg);
1631
1632         let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1633         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
1634         match msg_events[0] {
1635                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
1636                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve");
1637                 },
1638                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1639         }
1640 }
1641
1642 #[test]
1643 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1644         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1645         // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1646         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1647         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1648         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1649         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1650         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1651
1652         let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1653         // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1654         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1655         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1656         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1657         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1658
1659         // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1660         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1661         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1662         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1663         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1664         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1665
1666         // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1667         // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1668         // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1669         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1670 }
1671
1672 #[test]
1673 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1674         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1675         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1676         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1677         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1678         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1679         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1680
1681         let feemsat = 239;
1682         let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1683         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1684         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1685         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1686
1687         // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1688         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1689         let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1690         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1691
1692         // Add a pending HTLC.
1693         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1694         let payment_event_1 = {
1695                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
1696                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1697
1698                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1699                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1700                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1701         };
1702         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1703
1704         // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1705         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2, opt_anchors);
1706         let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1707         let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1708         let (route_2, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_2);
1709
1710         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1711         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1712         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1713         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1714         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1715         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, &None, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1716         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1);
1717         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1718                 channel_id: chan.2,
1719                 htlc_id: 1,
1720                 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1721                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1722                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1723                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1724         };
1725
1726         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1727         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1728         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1729         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1730         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1731         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1732         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1733         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() });
1734 }
1735
1736 #[test]
1737 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1738         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1739         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1740         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1741         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1742         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1743         let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1744         let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1745         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1746         assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1747         assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1748
1749         let reserve = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config);
1750         assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1751         assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1752
1753         assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1754         assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1755 }
1756
1757 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
1758         (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1759 }
1760
1761 #[test]
1762 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1763         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1764         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1765         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1766         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1767         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1768         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1769         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1770         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1771         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1772         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1773
1774         let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1775         let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1776
1777         let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1778         let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1779
1780         macro_rules! expect_forward {
1781                 ($node: expr) => {{
1782                         let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1783                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1784                         check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1785                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1786                         payment_event
1787                 }}
1788         }
1789
1790         let feemsat = 239; // set above
1791         let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1792         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1793         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1794
1795         let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1796
1797         // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1798         {
1799                 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id())
1800                         .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features()).with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1801                 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], payment_params, recv_value_0, TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
1802                 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1803                 assert!(route.paths[0].iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1804
1805                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1806                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1807                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1808                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
1809         }
1810
1811         // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1812         // nodes[0]'s wealth
1813         loop {
1814                 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1815                 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1816                 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1817                 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1818                 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1819                 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1820                 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1821                         break;
1822                 }
1823
1824                 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id())
1825                         .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features()).with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1826                 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, recv_value_0, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
1827                 let (payment_preimage, ..) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], recv_value_0);
1828                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
1829
1830                 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1831                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1832                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1833                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1834                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1835                 );
1836
1837                 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1838                 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1839                 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1840                 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1841                 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1842         }
1843
1844         // adding pending output.
1845         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1846         // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1847         // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1848         // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1849         // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1850         // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1851         // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1852         // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1853         // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1854         // policy.
1855         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1856         let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1857         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1858
1859         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1860         let payment_event_1 = {
1861                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
1862                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1863
1864                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1865                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1866                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1867         };
1868         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1869
1870         // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1871         let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1872         {
1873                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_2 + 1);
1874                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1875                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1876                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1877         }
1878
1879         // split the rest to test holding cell
1880         let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1881         let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1882         let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1883         let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1884         {
1885                 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1886                 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1887         }
1888
1889         // now see if they go through on both sides
1890         let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1891         // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1892         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21, &Some(our_payment_secret_21), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_21.0)).unwrap();
1893         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1894         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1895         assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1896
1897         // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1898         {
1899                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22+1);
1900                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1901                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1902                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1903                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 2);
1904         }
1905
1906         let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1907         // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1908         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22, &Some(our_payment_secret_22), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_22.0)).unwrap();
1909         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1910         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1911         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1912
1913         // flush the pending htlc
1914         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1915         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1916         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1917
1918         // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1919         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1920         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1921         let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1922
1923         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
1924         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1925         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1926         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1927
1928         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1929         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1930         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1931
1932         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1933
1934         let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1935         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
1936         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
1937
1938         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1939         expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
1940
1941         // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
1942         assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
1943         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
1944         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
1945         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
1946         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1947
1948         let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1949         assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
1950         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
1951         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
1952
1953         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
1954         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1955
1956         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1957         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1958         match events[0] {
1959                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat } => {
1960                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
1961                         assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amount_msat);
1962                         match &purpose {
1963                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1964                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1965                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
1966                                 },
1967                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1968                         }
1969                 },
1970                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1971         }
1972         match events[1] {
1973                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat } => {
1974                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
1975                         assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amount_msat);
1976                         match &purpose {
1977                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1978                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1979                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
1980                                 },
1981                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1982                         }
1983                 },
1984                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1985         }
1986
1987         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
1988         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
1989         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
1990
1991         let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1, opt_anchors);
1992         let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
1993         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
1994
1995         let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
1996         let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
1997         let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1998         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
1999         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
2000
2001         let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2002         assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
2003 }
2004
2005 #[test]
2006 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
2007         // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
2008         // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
2009         // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
2010         // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
2011         // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
2012         // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
2013         // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
2014         // To test this we:
2015         //  * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
2016         //    you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
2017         //    you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
2018         //  * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
2019         //  * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
2020         //    the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
2021         //  * deliver the first fulfill from B
2022         //  * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
2023         //    claim,
2024         //  * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
2025         //    This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
2026         //    removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
2027         //  * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
2028         //    of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
2029         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2030         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2031         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2032         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2033         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2034
2035         let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2036         // Route the first two HTLCs.
2037         let payment_value_1 = b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000;
2038         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_value_1);
2039         let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20_000);
2040
2041         // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
2042         let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
2043         let send_1 = {
2044                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_3, &Some(payment_secret_3), PaymentId(payment_hash_3.0)).unwrap();
2045                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2046                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2047                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2048                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2049         };
2050
2051         // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
2052         // initial fulfill/CS.
2053         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
2054         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, payment_value_1);
2055         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2056         let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2057
2058         // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
2059         // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
2060         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
2061         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000);
2062         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2063         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2064
2065         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2066         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
2067         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2068         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2069         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
2070
2071         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
2072         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
2073         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2074         // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
2075         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2076
2077         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2078         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2079         let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2080
2081         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2082         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2083         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2084
2085         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2086         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2087         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2088
2089         // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
2090         // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2091         // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
2092         // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
2093         // on-chain as necessary).
2094         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2095         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
2096         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2097         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2098         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
2099
2100         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2101         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2102         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2103
2104         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2105         expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2106
2107         // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2108         // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2109         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2110         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2111         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2112         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2113
2114         // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2115         // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2116         let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2117         let send_2 = {
2118                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_4, &Some(payment_secret_4), PaymentId(payment_hash_4.0)).unwrap();
2119                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2120                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2121                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2122                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2123         };
2124
2125         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2126         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2127         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2128         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2129
2130         // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2131
2132         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2133         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2134         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2135
2136         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2137         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2138
2139         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2140         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2141         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2142         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2143
2144         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2145         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2146         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2147
2148         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2149         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2150
2151         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2152         expect_payment_received!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2153
2154         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2155         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2156 }
2157
2158 #[test]
2159 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2160         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2161         // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2162         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2163         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2164         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2165         let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2166
2167         // Create some initial channels
2168         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2169         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2170         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2171         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2172
2173         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2174         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2175         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2176         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2177         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2178         connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2179
2180         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2181         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2182         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2183         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2184         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2185
2186         // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2187         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_1.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2188         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2189         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2190         {
2191                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2192                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2193                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2194                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2195                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2196         }
2197         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2198         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2199         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2200         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2201         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2202
2203         // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2204         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 3_000_000);
2205
2206         // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2207         // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2208         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_2.2, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2209         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2210         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2211         {
2212                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2213                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2214                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2215                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2216                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2217                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2218         }
2219         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2220         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2221         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2222         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2223         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2224
2225         macro_rules! claim_funds {
2226                 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
2227                         {
2228                                 $node.node.claim_funds($preimage);
2229                                 expect_payment_claimed!($node, $payment_hash, 3_000_000);
2230                                 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2231
2232                                 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2233                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2234                                 match events[0] {
2235                                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2236                                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2237                                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2238                                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2239                                         },
2240                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2241                                 };
2242                         }
2243                 }
2244         }
2245
2246         // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2247         // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2248         nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_3.2, &nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2249         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2250         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2251         let node2_commitment_txid;
2252         {
2253                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2254                 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2255                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2256                 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2257
2258                 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2259                 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1);
2260                 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2261                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2262                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2263         }
2264         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2265         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2266         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2267         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2268         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2269
2270         // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2271         // confusing us in the following tests.
2272         let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2273
2274         // One pending HTLC to time out:
2275         let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[3], &[&nodes[4]], 3_000_000);
2276         // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2277         // buffer space).
2278
2279         let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2280                 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2281                 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2282                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2283                 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2284                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2285                                 msg.clone()
2286                         },
2287                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2288                 };
2289                 match events[1] {
2290                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2291                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2292                         },
2293                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2294                 }
2295                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2296
2297                 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2298                 {
2299                         let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2300                         node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2301                                 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2302                                         false
2303                                 } else { true }
2304                         });
2305                 }
2306
2307                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2308
2309                 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2310                 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2);
2311
2312                 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2313                 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2314                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2315                 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2316                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2317                                 msg.clone()
2318                         },
2319                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2320                 };
2321                 match events[1] {
2322                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2323                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2324                         },
2325                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2326                 }
2327                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2328                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2329
2330                 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2331                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2332                 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2333         };
2334         nodes[3].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2335         nodes[4].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2336         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2337         assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2338
2339         assert_eq!(nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon),
2340                 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
2341         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2342         check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2343 }
2344
2345 #[test]
2346 fn test_justice_tx() {
2347         // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2348         let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2349         alice_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2350         alice_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2351         alice_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2352         let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2353         bob_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2354         bob_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2355         bob_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2356         let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2357         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2358         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2359         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2360         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2361         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2362         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2363         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen;
2364         // Create some new channels:
2365         let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2366
2367         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2368         let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2369         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2370         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2371         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2372         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2373         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2374         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2375         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2376         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2377         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2378         // Revoke the old state
2379         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2380
2381         {
2382                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2383                 {
2384                         let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2385                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2386                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2387
2388                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2389                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2390                         node_txn.truncate(1);
2391                 }
2392                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2393                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2394                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2395
2396                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2397                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2398                 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2399                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2400                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2401                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2402                 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2403                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2404                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2405         }
2406         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2407
2408         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2409         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2410
2411         // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
2412         // Create some new channels:
2413         let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2414         {
2415                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2416                 node_txn.clear();
2417         }
2418
2419         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2420         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2421         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2422         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2423         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2424         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2425         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2426         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2427         // Revoke the old state
2428         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2429         {
2430                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2431                 {
2432                         let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2433                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); //ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2434                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2435
2436                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2437                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2438                 }
2439                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2440                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2441
2442                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2443                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2444                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2445                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2446                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2447                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2448                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2449         }
2450         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2451         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2452         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2453 }
2454
2455 #[test]
2456 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2457         // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2458         // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2459         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2460         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2461         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2462         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2463         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2464         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2465         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2466         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2467         // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2468         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2469         // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2470         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2471
2472         // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2473         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2474         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2475         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2476         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2477         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2478
2479         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2480         check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
2481
2482         // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2483         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2484         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2485         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2486         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2487 }
2488
2489 #[test]
2490 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2491         // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2492         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2493         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2494         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2495         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2496         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2497
2498         // Create some new channel:
2499         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2500
2501         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2502         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2503         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2504         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2505         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2506
2507         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2508         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2509         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2510         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2511         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2512         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2513         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2514         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2515         check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2516
2517         //Revoke the old state
2518         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2519
2520         {
2521                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2522                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2523                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2524                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2525                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2526                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2527                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2528                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2529
2530                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2531                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment
2532
2533                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2534                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2535
2536                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2537                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2538                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2539                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2540                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2541                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2542                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2543                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2544
2545                 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
2546                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2547                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
2548
2549                 // Finally, mine the penalty transaction and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2550                 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2551                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
2552                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2553                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2554         }
2555         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2556         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2557         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2558 }
2559
2560 #[test]
2561 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2562         // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2563         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2564         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2565         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2566         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2567         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2568
2569         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2570
2571         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2572         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2573         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2574         // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2575         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2576         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2577
2578         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2579         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2580
2581         //Revoke the old state
2582         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2583
2584         {
2585                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2586                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2587                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2588                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2589                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2590                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2591                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2592                 match events.last().unwrap() {
2593                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2594                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2595                 }
2596
2597                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2598                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2599
2600                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2601                 assert!(node_txn.len() == 9 || node_txn.len() == 10);
2602
2603                 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2604                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2605                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2606                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2607                 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2608                 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2609                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2610
2611                 // Justice transactions are indices 1-2-4
2612                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2613                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
2614                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
2615
2616                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2617                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2618                 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2619
2620                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2621                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2622                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2623                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2624                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2625                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2626                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2627                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2628
2629                 // Finally, mine the penalty transactions and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2630                 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2631                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[2]);
2632                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[3]);
2633                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[4]);
2634                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2635                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2636         }
2637         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2638         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2639         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2640 }
2641
2642 #[test]
2643 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2644         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2645         // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2646         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2647         // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2648         // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2649         // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2650         // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2651         // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2652         // towards B.
2653         // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2654         // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2655         // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2656         // PaymentSent event).
2657
2658         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2659         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2660         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2661         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2662
2663         // Create some initial channels
2664         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2665         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2666
2667         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2668         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2669         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2670         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2671         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2672
2673         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2674         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2675         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2676
2677         let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2678         let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2679
2680         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2681         // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2682         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2683         assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2684         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2685         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2686         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_1, 3_000_000);
2687         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2688         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, 3_000_000);
2689         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2690         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2691         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2692         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2693         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2694         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2695
2696         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2697         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2698         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2699         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2700         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx, 2*htlc-success tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2701         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5);
2702         assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2703         assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2704         assert_eq!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2705         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2706         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2707         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2708         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2709         assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2710         assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2711         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0);
2712         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0);
2713
2714         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2715         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2716         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: node_txn});
2717         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2718         {
2719                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2720                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2721                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2722                 added_monitors.clear();
2723         }
2724         let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2725         assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2726         match forwarded_events[0] {
2727                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2728                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2729         }
2730         let chan_id = Some(chan_1.2);
2731         match forwarded_events[1] {
2732                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
2733                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2734                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2735                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2736                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2737                 },
2738                 _ => panic!()
2739         }
2740         match forwarded_events[2] {
2741                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
2742                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2743                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2744                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2745                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2746                 },
2747                 _ => panic!()
2748         }
2749         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2750         {
2751                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2752                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2753                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2754                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2755                 added_monitors.clear();
2756         }
2757         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2758         match events[0] {
2759                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2760                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2761         }
2762         match events[1] {
2763                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2764                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2765         }
2766
2767         match events[2] {
2768                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2769                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2770                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2771                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2772                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2773                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2774                 },
2775                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2776         };
2777         macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2778                 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $chan_tx: expr) => { {
2779                         let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2780                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
2781                         // Node[1]: ChannelManager: 3 (commitment tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (timeout tx)
2782                         // Node[0]: ChannelManager: 3 (commtiemtn tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 HTLC-timeout
2783                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2784                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], $commitment_tx);
2785                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0);
2786                         assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time.0, 0);
2787                         if $htlc_offered {
2788                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2789                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2790                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2791                                 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2792                         } else {
2793                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2794                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2795                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2796                                 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2797                         }
2798                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], $chan_tx);
2799                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2800                         node_txn.clear();
2801                 } }
2802         }
2803         // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own local state as a fallback, suggesting an alternate
2804         // commitment transaction with a corresponding HTLC-Timeout transactions, as well as a
2805         // timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2806         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2807
2808         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2809         // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx  on A's chain
2810         let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2811         check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2812         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2813         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2814         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2815         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2816         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2817         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 6); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx + HTLC-Sucess * 2), ChannelMonitor : 3 (HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn)
2818         let commitment_spend =
2819                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2820                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2821                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2822                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2823                         &node_txn[0]
2824                 } else {
2825                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2826                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2827                         assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2828                         &node_txn[2]
2829                 };
2830
2831         check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2832         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2833         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2834         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2835         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time.0, 0);
2836         assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2837         check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3);
2838         assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2839         check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[3]);
2840         check_spends!(node_txn[5], node_txn[3]);
2841         // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
2842         // we already checked the same situation with A.
2843
2844         // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
2845         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2846         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()] });
2847         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2848         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2849         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2850         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2851         assert_eq!(events.len(), 5);
2852         let mut first_claimed = false;
2853         for event in events {
2854                 match event {
2855                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
2856                                 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
2857                                         assert!(!first_claimed);
2858                                         first_claimed = true;
2859                                 } else {
2860                                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
2861                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
2862                                 }
2863                         },
2864                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
2865                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
2866                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2867                 }
2868         }
2869         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2870 }
2871
2872 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
2873         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
2874         // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2875         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2876         // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
2877         //    B's commitment tx                 C's commitment tx
2878         //            \                                  \
2879         //         B's HTLC timeout tx               B's timeout tx
2880
2881         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2882         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2883         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2884         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2885         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2886         *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2887         *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2888
2889         // Create some intial channels
2890         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2891         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2892
2893         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
2894         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2895         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2896
2897         let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2898
2899         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2900         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2901         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2902         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
2903         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
2904         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }]);
2905         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2906
2907         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2908         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2909         match events[0] {
2910                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2911                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2912                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2913                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2914                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2915                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2916                 },
2917                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2918         };
2919         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2920         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2921         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2922         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2923         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx)
2924         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2925         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2926         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2927
2928         // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2929         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
2930         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2931         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
2932         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2933         let timeout_tx;
2934         {
2935                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2936                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-timeout), 1 timeout tx
2937                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2938                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2939
2940                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2941                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2942
2943                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2944                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2945                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2946                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2947
2948                 timeout_tx = node_txn[2].clone();
2949                 node_txn.clear();
2950         }
2951
2952         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
2953         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2954         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2955
2956         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2957
2958         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
2959         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2960         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2961         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2962         match events[0] {
2963                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2964                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2965                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2966                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2967                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2968                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2969                 },
2970                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2971         };
2972
2973         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
2974         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2975         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2976
2977         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
2978         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2979
2980         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2981         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2982         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2983         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 commitment tx, ChannelMonitor : 1 timeout tx
2984         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2985         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2986         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2987         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2988         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2989 }
2990
2991 #[test]
2992 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
2993         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
2994         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
2995         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
2996 }
2997
2998 #[test]
2999 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
3000         // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
3001         // and fail backward accordingly.
3002
3003         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3004         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3005         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3006         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3007
3008         // Create some initial channels
3009         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3010         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3011
3012         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3013         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3014         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3015         // Revoke the old state
3016         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3017
3018         let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3019
3020         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3021         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3022         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3023         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3024         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3025
3026         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
3027         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3028         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3029         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3030         match events[0] {
3031                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3032                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3033                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3034                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3035                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3036                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3037
3038                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3039                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3040                         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
3041                 },
3042                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3043         }
3044 }
3045
3046 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
3047         // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
3048         // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
3049         // commitment transaction anymore.
3050         // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
3051         // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
3052         // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
3053         // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
3054         // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
3055         // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
3056         // transactions:
3057         // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
3058         //   commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
3059         // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
3060         //   and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
3061         //   commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
3062         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3063         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3064         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3065         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3066
3067         // Create some initial channels
3068         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3069         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3070
3071         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
3072         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3073         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3074         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
3075         // Revoke the old state
3076         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3077
3078         let value = if use_dust {
3079                 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
3080                 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
3081                 nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
3082         } else { 3000000 };
3083
3084         let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3085         let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3086         let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3087
3088         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash);
3089         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: first_payment_hash }]);
3090         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3091         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3092         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3093         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3094         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3095         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3096         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3097         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3098         let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
3099         // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
3100
3101         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash);
3102         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: second_payment_hash }]);
3103         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3104         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3105         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3106         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3107         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3108         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3109         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3110         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3111         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3112         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3113         // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3114         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3115         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3116         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3117
3118         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash);
3119         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: third_payment_hash }]);
3120         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3121         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3122         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3123         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3124         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3125         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3126         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3127         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3128         // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3129         // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3130         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3131         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3132         // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3133         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3134         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3135         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3136
3137         // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3138         // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3139         let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3140         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, fourth_payment_hash, &Some(fourth_payment_secret), PaymentId(fourth_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3141         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3142         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3143         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3144
3145         if deliver_bs_raa {
3146                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3147                 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3148                 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3149                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3150                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3151                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3152                 match events[0] {
3153                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3154                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3155                 };
3156                 match events[1] {
3157                         Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { .. } => { },
3158                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3159                 }
3160                 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3161                 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3162         }
3163
3164         let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
3165         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3166
3167         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3168         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3169         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3170
3171         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3172         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 2 + nodes.len() - 1 } else { 3 + nodes.len() });
3173         match events[0] {
3174                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
3175                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
3176         }
3177         match events[1] {
3178                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3179                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3180                 },
3181                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3182         }
3183         if !deliver_bs_raa {
3184                 match events[2] {
3185                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3186                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3187                 };
3188                 nodes[1].node.abandon_payment(PaymentId(fourth_payment_hash.0));
3189                 let payment_failed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3190                 assert_eq!(payment_failed_events.len(), 1);
3191                 match payment_failed_events[0] {
3192                         Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3193                                 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3194                         },
3195                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3196                 }
3197         }
3198         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3199         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3200
3201         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3202         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3203         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 1 } else { 0 }] {
3204                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3205                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3206         }
3207         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 1 }] {
3208                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
3209                         assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3210                         assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3211                 },
3212                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3213         }
3214         if deliver_bs_raa {
3215                 match events[0] {
3216                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3217                                 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3218                                 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3219                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3220                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3221                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3222                         },
3223                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3224                 }
3225         }
3226         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 3 } else { 2 }] {
3227                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3228                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3229                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3230                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3231                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3232                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3233
3234                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3235                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3236                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3237
3238                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3239
3240                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3241                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3242                         match events[0] {
3243                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref network_update, .. } => {
3244                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3245                                         // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3246                                         // that we should update our routing table for.
3247                                         if !deliver_bs_raa {
3248                                                 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3249                                         }
3250                                 },
3251                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3252                         }
3253                         match events[1] {
3254                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref network_update, .. } => {
3255                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3256                                         assert!(network_update.is_some());
3257                                 },
3258                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3259                         }
3260                         match events[2] {
3261                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref network_update, .. } => {
3262                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3263                                         assert!(network_update.is_some());
3264                                 },
3265                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3266                         }
3267                 },
3268                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3269         }
3270
3271         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3272         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3273         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3274 }
3275
3276 #[test]
3277 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3278         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3279         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3280         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3281         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3282 }
3283
3284 #[test]
3285 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3286         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3287         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3288         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3289         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3290 }
3291
3292 #[test]
3293 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3294         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3295         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3296         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3297         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3298         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3299
3300         // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3301         {
3302                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3303                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3304                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3305
3306                 let payment_event = {
3307                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3308                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3309                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3310                 };
3311                 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3312                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3313         }
3314
3315         // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3316         let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3317         {
3318                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, failed_payment_hash, &Some(failed_payment_secret), PaymentId(failed_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3319                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3320
3321                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3322         }
3323
3324         // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3325         {
3326                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3327
3328                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3329                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3330                 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3331                 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 50_000, &Some(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3332                 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3333                 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
3334
3335                 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3336                 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3337                         channel_id: chan.2,
3338                         htlc_id: 0,
3339                         amount_msat: 0,
3340                         payment_hash,
3341                         cltv_expiry,
3342                         onion_routing_packet,
3343                 };
3344                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3345         }
3346         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3347         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3348         // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3349         match events[0] {
3350                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3351                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3352                 },
3353                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3354         }
3355         match events[1] {
3356                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3357                         assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3358                 },
3359                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3360         }
3361         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3362         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3363 }
3364
3365 #[test]
3366 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3367         // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3368         // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3369         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3370         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3371         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3372         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3373         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3374
3375         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3376         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3377         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3378         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3379         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3380         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3381
3382         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
3383         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3384         assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
3385
3386         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3387         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
3388         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3389         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3390         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3391
3392         // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3393         // registering new transactions
3394         header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
3395         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
3396 }
3397
3398 #[test]
3399 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3400         // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3401         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3402         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3403         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3404         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3405         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3406         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3407
3408         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3409
3410         let mut payment_event = {
3411                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3412                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3413
3414                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3415                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3416                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3417         };
3418
3419         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3420         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3421
3422         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3423
3424         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3425         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3426         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3427         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3428
3429         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3430         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3431         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3432         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3433         let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3434
3435         // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3436         // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3437         // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3438
3439         nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3440         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3441         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3442         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3443         let tx = {
3444                 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3445                 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3446                 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3447                 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3448                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3449                 node_txn.remove(0)
3450         };
3451
3452         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3453
3454         // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3455         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3456         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3457         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3458
3459         // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3460         {
3461                 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3462                         .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator), &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3463         }
3464         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3465         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3466         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3467         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3468         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3469         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3470         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3471
3472         check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3473 }
3474
3475 #[test]
3476 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3477         // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3478         // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3479         // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3480         // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3481
3482         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3483         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3484         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3485         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3486         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3487
3488         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
3489
3490         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
3491         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_000_000);
3492         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3493         let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3494         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3495         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
3496
3497         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3498         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3499
3500         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3501         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3502 }
3503
3504 #[test]
3505 fn test_peer_disconnected_before_funding_broadcasted() {
3506         // Test that channels are closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` if the peer disconnects
3507         // before the funding transaction has been broadcasted.
3508         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3509         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3510         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3511         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3512
3513         // Open a channel between `nodes[0]` and `nodes[1]`, for which the funding transaction is never
3514         // broadcasted, even though it's created by `nodes[0]`.
3515         let expected_temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
3516         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3517         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel);
3518         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3519         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
3520
3521         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
3522         assert_eq!(temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3523
3524         assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
3525
3526         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3527         assert_eq!(funding_created_msg.temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3528
3529         // Even though the funding transaction is created by `nodes[0]`, the `FundingCreated` msg is
3530         // never sent to `nodes[1]`, and therefore the tx is never signed by either party nor
3531         // broadcasted.
3532         {
3533                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3534         }
3535
3536         // Ensure that the channel is closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` when the peers are
3537         // disconnected before the funding transaction was broadcasted.
3538         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3539         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3540
3541         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3542         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3543 }
3544
3545 #[test]
3546 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3547         // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3548         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3549         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3550         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3551         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3552         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3553         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3554
3555         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3556         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3557         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3558
3559         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3560         let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3561         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3562         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3563
3564         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3565         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3566         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3567
3568         let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3569         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3570         let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3571         let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3572
3573         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3574         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3575
3576         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3577         fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3578
3579         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
3580         {
3581                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3582                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3583                 match events[0] {
3584                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3585                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3586                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3587                         },
3588                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3589                 }
3590                 match events[1] {
3591                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, payment_failed_permanently, .. } => {
3592                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3593                                 assert!(payment_failed_permanently);
3594                         },
3595                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3596                 }
3597                 match events[2] {
3598                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3599                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3600                 }
3601         }
3602
3603         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3604         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3605 }
3606
3607 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3608         // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3609         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3610         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3611         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3612         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3613
3614         let mut as_channel_ready = None;
3615         if messages_delivered == 0 {
3616                 let (channel_ready, _, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3617                 as_channel_ready = Some(channel_ready);
3618                 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the channel_ready message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3619                 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3620                 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3621         } else {
3622                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3623         }
3624
3625         let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1_000_000);
3626
3627         let payment_event = {
3628                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
3629                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3630
3631                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3632                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3633                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3634         };
3635         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3636
3637         if messages_delivered < 2 {
3638                 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3639         } else {
3640                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3641                 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3642                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3643                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3644                         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3645
3646                         if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3647                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3648                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3649                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3650
3651                                 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3652                                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3653                                         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3654                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3655                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3656
3657                                         if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3658                                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3659                                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3660                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3661                                         }
3662                                 }
3663                         }
3664                 }
3665         }
3666
3667         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3668         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3669         if messages_delivered < 3 {
3670                 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3671                         // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a channel_ready prior to a
3672                         // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to channel_ready time.
3673                         //
3674                         // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a channel_ready immediately on
3675                         // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate channel_ready sent
3676                         // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3677                         //
3678                         // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3679                         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3680                 }
3681                 // Even if the channel_ready messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3682                 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3683                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3684         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3685                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3686                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3687         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3688                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3689                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3690         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3691                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3692                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3693         } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3694                 // Everything was delivered...
3695                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3696         }
3697
3698         let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3699         if messages_delivered == 0 {
3700                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 2);
3701                 match events_1[0] {
3702                         Event::ChannelReady { .. } => { },
3703                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3704                 };
3705                 match events_1[1] {
3706                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3707                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3708                 };
3709         } else {
3710                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3711                 match events_1[0] {
3712                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3713                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3714                 };
3715         }
3716
3717         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3718         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3719         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3720
3721         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3722
3723         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3724         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3725         match events_2[0] {
3726                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat } => {
3727                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3728                         assert_eq!(amount_msat, 1_000_000);
3729                         match &purpose {
3730                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3731                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3732                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3733                                 },
3734                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3735                         }
3736                 },
3737                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3738         }
3739
3740         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3741         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3742         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
3743
3744         let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3745         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3746         let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3747                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3748                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3749                         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3750                         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3751                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3752                         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3753                         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3754                         (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3755                 },
3756                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3757         };
3758
3759         if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3760                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3761
3762                 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3763                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3764                 match events_4[0] {
3765                         Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3766                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3767                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3768                         },
3769                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3770                 }
3771
3772                 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3773                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3774                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3775                         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3776
3777                         if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3778                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3779                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3780                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3781
3782                                 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3783                                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3784                                         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3785                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3786                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3787
3788                                         if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3789                                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3790                                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3791                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3792                                         }
3793                                 }
3794                         }
3795                 }
3796         }
3797
3798         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3799         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3800         if messages_delivered < 2 {
3801                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3802                 if messages_delivered < 1 {
3803                         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
3804                 } else {
3805                         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3806                 }
3807         } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
3808                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3809                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3810         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3811                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3812                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3813         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3814                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3815                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3816         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3817                 // Everything was delivered...
3818                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3819         }
3820
3821         if messages_delivered == 1 || messages_delivered == 2 {
3822                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3823         }
3824
3825         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3826         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3827         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3828
3829         if messages_delivered > 2 {
3830                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3831         }
3832
3833         // Channel should still work fine...
3834         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3835         let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3836         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3837 }
3838
3839 #[test]
3840 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
3841         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
3842         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
3843         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
3844         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
3845 }
3846
3847 #[test]
3848 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
3849         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
3850         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
3851         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
3852         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
3853 }
3854
3855 #[test]
3856 fn test_channel_ready_without_best_block_updated() {
3857         // Previously, if we were offline when a funding transaction was locked in, and then we came
3858         // back online, calling best_block_updated once followed by transactions_confirmed, we'd not
3859         // generate a channel_ready until a later best_block_updated. This tests that we generate the
3860         // channel_ready immediately instead.
3861         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3862         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3863         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3864         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3865         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
3866
3867         let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3868
3869         let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
3870         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
3871         let block_txn = [funding_tx];
3872         let conf_txn: Vec<_> = block_txn.iter().enumerate().collect();
3873         let conf_block_header = nodes[0].get_block_header(conf_height);
3874         nodes[0].node.transactions_confirmed(&conf_block_header, &conf_txn[..], conf_height);
3875
3876         // Ensure nodes[0] generates a channel_ready after the transactions_confirmed
3877         let as_channel_ready = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3878         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
3879 }
3880
3881 #[test]
3882 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
3883         // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
3884         // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
3885         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3886         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3887         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3888         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3889         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3890
3891         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
3892
3893         // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
3894         let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3895         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
3896         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3897
3898         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3899         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3900         match events_1[0] {
3901                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
3902                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3903         }
3904
3905         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3906         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
3907         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3908
3909         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3910         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3911         match events_2[0] {
3912                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3913                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3914                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3915                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3916                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3917                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3918                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3919
3920                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3921                         let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3922                         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3923                         match events_3[0] {
3924                                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3925                                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
3926                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
3927                                 },
3928                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3929                         }
3930
3931                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
3932                         let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3933                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3934                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3935                 },
3936                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3937         }
3938
3939         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3940         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3941
3942         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
3943         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
3944         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
3945         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
3946         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
3947         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
3948
3949         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
3950         let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
3951         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
3952         let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
3953
3954         assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
3955         assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
3956
3957         assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
3958         assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
3959
3960         assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
3961
3962         assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3963         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3964         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3965         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3966         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
3967         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
3968         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
3969         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3970         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3971         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3972
3973         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
3974         let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3975         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3976         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3977         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3978         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3979         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
3980         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3981
3982         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3983         let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3984         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3985         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3986         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3987         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3988         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
3989         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3990
3991         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
3992         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3993         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3994         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3995
3996         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
3997         let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3998         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3999         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4000
4001         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
4002         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4003         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4004
4005         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4006
4007         let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4008         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
4009         match events_5[0] {
4010                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
4011                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
4012                         match &purpose {
4013                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
4014                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
4015                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
4016                                 },
4017                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
4018                         }
4019                 },
4020                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4021         }
4022
4023         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
4024         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4025         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4026
4027         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4028         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4029 }
4030
4031 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
4032         // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
4033         // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
4034         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4035         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4036         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4037         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4038
4039         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4040
4041         let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
4042                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
4043                 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
4044                 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
4045                 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
4046                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
4047                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
4048                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
4049                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4050                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4051                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4052                 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
4053                 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentReceived event(s).
4054                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
4055                 our_payment_hash
4056         } else {
4057                 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
4058         };
4059
4060         let mut block = Block {
4061                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
4062                 txdata: vec![],
4063         };
4064         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4065         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4066         let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4067         for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
4068                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
4069                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4070                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4071         }
4072
4073         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
4074
4075         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4076         let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4077         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4078         assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4079         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4080         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4081
4082         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4083         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4084         // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4085         let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(100_000).to_vec();
4086         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(block_count - 1));
4087         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4088 }
4089
4090 #[test]
4091 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4092         do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4093         do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4094 }
4095
4096 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4097         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4098         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4099         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4100         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4101         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4102         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4103         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4104
4105         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4106         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4107         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4108         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4109
4110         // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4111         let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4112         {
4113                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, first_payment_hash, &Some(first_payment_secret), PaymentId(first_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
4114         }
4115         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4116         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4117
4118         // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4119         let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4120         let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4121         sending_node.node.send_payment(&route, second_payment_hash, &Some(second_payment_secret), PaymentId(second_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
4122         if forwarded_htlc {
4123                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4124                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4125                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4126                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4127                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4128         }
4129         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4130
4131         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4132         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4133         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4134         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4135
4136         if forwarded_htlc {
4137                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
4138                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4139                 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4140                 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4141                 match fail_commit[0] {
4142                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4143                                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4144                                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4145                         },
4146                         _ => unreachable!(),
4147                 }
4148                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4149         } else {
4150                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], second_payment_hash, false);
4151         }
4152 }
4153
4154 #[test]
4155 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4156         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4157         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4158 }
4159
4160 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4161         ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4162                 {
4163                         let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4164                         let mut txn = Vec::new();
4165                         let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4166                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4167                         for event in events.drain(..) {
4168                                 match event {
4169                                         Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs } => {
4170                                                 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4171                                                         txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4172                                                         all_outputs.push(outp);
4173                                                 }
4174                                         },
4175                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4176                                 };
4177                         }
4178                         if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4179                                 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx) {
4180                                         txn.push(tx);
4181                                 }
4182                         }
4183                         txn
4184                 }
4185         }
4186 }
4187
4188 #[test]
4189 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4190         // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4191         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4192         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4193         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4194         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4195
4196         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4197         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4198         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4199         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4200         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4201         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4202         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4203         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4204         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4205
4206         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4207         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4208
4209         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4210         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4211         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4212         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4213         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4214 }
4215
4216 #[test]
4217 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4218         // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4219         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4220         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4221         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4222         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4223         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4224
4225         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4226         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4227         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4228         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4229         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4230
4231         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4232         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4233         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4234         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4235
4236         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4237         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4238         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4239         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4240         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4241
4242         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4243         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4244         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4245 }
4246
4247 #[test]
4248 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4249         // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4250         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4251
4252         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4253         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4254         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4255         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4256
4257         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4258         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4259         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4260         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4261         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4262
4263         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4264         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4265         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4266         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4267         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4268
4269         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4270         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4271         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4272
4273         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4274         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4275         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4276         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4277         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4278 }
4279
4280 #[test]
4281 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4282         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4283         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4284         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4285         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4286
4287         // Create some initial channels
4288         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4289
4290         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
4291
4292         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4293         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4294         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4295
4296         // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4297         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4298         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4299         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4300         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4301         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4302         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4303         match events[0] {
4304                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4305                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4306         }
4307         match events[1] {
4308                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4309                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4310         }
4311
4312         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4313         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-Success), ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4314         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4315         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4316         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4317         check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
4318         check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
4319
4320         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4321         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4322         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4323
4324         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4325         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4326         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4327 }
4328
4329 #[test]
4330 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4331         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4332         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4333         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4334         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4335
4336         // Create some initial channels
4337         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4338
4339         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4340         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4341
4342         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4343
4344         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4345         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4346         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4347
4348         // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4349         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4350         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4351         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4352         match events[0] {
4353                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4354                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4355         }
4356         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4357
4358         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4359         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4360         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelManager : 1 local commitent tx, ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4361         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
4362         check_spends!(node_txn[1],  commitment_tx[0].clone());
4363         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4364
4365         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4366         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4367         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4368         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, false);
4369
4370         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4371         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4372         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4373         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]);
4374         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4375 }
4376
4377 #[test]
4378 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4379         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4380         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4381         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4382         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4383
4384         // Create some initial channels
4385         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4386
4387         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4388         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4389         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4390         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4391
4392         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4393
4394         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4395         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4396         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4397         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4398
4399         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4400         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
4401         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4402         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4403
4404         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4405         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4406
4407         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4408         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4409         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4410 }
4411
4412 #[test]
4413 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4414         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4415         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4416         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4417         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4418         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4419
4420         // Create some initial channels
4421         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4422
4423         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4424         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4425         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4426         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4427
4428         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4429
4430         // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
4431         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4432         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4433         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4434         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4435         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4436
4437         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4438         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4439         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], chan_1.3);
4440         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4441         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4442         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4443         assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
4444
4445         // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4446         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4447         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()] });
4448         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4449         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4450         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4451
4452         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4453         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
4454         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4455         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4456         // transactions next...
4457         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
4458         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
4459
4460         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
4461         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
4462         if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid() {
4463                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4464         } else {
4465                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid());
4466                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4467         }
4468
4469         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4470         check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
4471
4472         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4473         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4474
4475         // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4476         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4477         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4478         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4479         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
4480 }
4481
4482 #[test]
4483 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
4484         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4485         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4486         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4487         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4488         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4489
4490         // Create some initial channels
4491         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4492
4493         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4494         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4495         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4496         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4497
4498         // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
4499         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
4500
4501         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4502
4503         // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
4504         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4505         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4506         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4507         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4508         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4509
4510         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4511         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4512         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4513         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4514
4515         // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
4516         let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
4517         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
4518
4519         // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4520         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4521         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
4522         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4523         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4524         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4525
4526         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4527         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
4528
4529         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4530         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4531         // transactions next...
4532         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4533         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4534         if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4535                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4536         } else {
4537                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4538                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4539         }
4540
4541         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4542         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4543
4544         check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
4545
4546         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
4547         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4548
4549         // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
4550         // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
4551
4552         // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4553         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
4554         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4555         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4556         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
4557         assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4558         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
4559         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
4560 }
4561
4562 #[test]
4563 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
4564         // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
4565         // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
4566         // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
4567         // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
4568         // channel.
4569         // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
4570         // gets broadcast.
4571
4572         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4573         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4574         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4575         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4576
4577         // Create some initial channels
4578         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4579         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4580
4581         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
4582         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4583         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4584         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4585         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4586
4587         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4588         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4589         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4590
4591         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
4592         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4593         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
4594         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4595         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4596         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4597         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4598         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4599         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4600         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4601         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4602
4603         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
4604         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
4605         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4606         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4607
4608         let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Success tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
4609         assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 3);
4610         assert_eq!(c_txn[0], c_txn[2]);
4611         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0], c_txn[1]);
4612         check_spends!(c_txn[1], chan_2.3);
4613         check_spends!(c_txn[2], c_txn[1]);
4614         assert_eq!(c_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
4615         assert_eq!(c_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4616         assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
4617         assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Success tx
4618
4619         // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
4620         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
4621         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![c_txn[1].clone(), c_txn[2].clone()]});
4622         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4623         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4624         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4625         match events[0] {
4626                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
4627                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4628         }
4629         match events[1] {
4630                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
4631                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
4632                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, Some(chan_1.2));
4633                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
4634                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
4635                 },
4636                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4637         }
4638         {
4639                 let mut b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4640                 // ChannelMonitor: claim tx
4641                 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
4642                 check_spends!(b_txn[0], chan_2.3); // B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
4643                 b_txn.clear();
4644         }
4645         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4646         let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4647         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
4648         match msg_events[0] {
4649                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4650                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4651         }
4652         match msg_events[1] {
4653                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
4654                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4655         }
4656         match msg_events[2] {
4657                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
4658                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4659                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4660                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4661                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4662                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
4663                 },
4664                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4665         };
4666         // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
4667         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4668         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4669         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4670         let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4671         // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success tx
4672         assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 3);
4673         check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_1.3);
4674         check_spends!(b_txn[2], b_txn[1]);
4675         check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4676         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4677         assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
4678         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Success tx
4679
4680         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4681         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4682 }
4683
4684 #[test]
4685 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
4686         // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
4687         // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
4688         // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
4689         // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
4690         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4691         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4692         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
4693         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
4694         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
4695         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
4696         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
4697                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
4698         let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4699
4700         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4701         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4702         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4703
4704         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4705         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4706         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4707         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4708         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
4709
4710         let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 900_000);
4711
4712         let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
4713         // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
4714         // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
4715         // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
4716         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id())
4717                 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
4718         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], payment_params, 900000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40);
4719         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 900000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
4720
4721         let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4722         assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4723         check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
4724
4725         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
4726         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4727         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4728         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4729         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4730
4731         let htlc_timeout_tx;
4732         { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
4733                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4734                 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 2-or-3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
4735                 assert!(node_txn.len() == 4 || node_txn.len() == 3);
4736                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
4737
4738                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
4739                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4740
4741                 if node_txn.len() > 3 {
4742                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
4743                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4744                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
4745
4746                         check_spends!(node_txn[3], commitment_txn[0]);
4747                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
4748                 } else {
4749                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
4750                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
4751                 }
4752
4753                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4754                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4755                 if node_txn.len() > 3 {
4756                         assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4757                 }
4758                 htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[1].clone();
4759         }
4760
4761         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
4762         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], duplicate_payment_hash, 900_000);
4763
4764         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
4765         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
4766         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4767         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4768         match events[0] {
4769                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4770                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4771         }
4772         match events[1] {
4773                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4774                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4775         }
4776         let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4777         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs), ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
4778         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
4779         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
4780         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4781         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4782         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4783         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4784         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4785         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
4786         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[3], htlc_success_txn[0]);
4787         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[4], htlc_success_txn[1]);
4788         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
4789
4790         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
4791         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4792         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
4793         let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4794         assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4795         assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4796         let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
4797         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4798         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4799         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4800
4801         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4802         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4803         {
4804                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
4805         }
4806         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
4807
4808         // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
4809         // Note that the fee paid is effectively double as the HTLC value (including the nodes[1] fee
4810         // and nodes[2] fee) is rounded down and then claimed in full.
4811         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[0]);
4812         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], Some(196*2), true, true);
4813         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4814         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4815         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4816         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4817         assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
4818         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4819         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4820
4821         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4822         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
4823
4824         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4825         match events[0] {
4826                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
4827                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
4828                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
4829                 }
4830                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4831         }
4832 }
4833
4834 #[test]
4835 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
4836         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4837         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4838         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4839         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4840
4841         // Create some initial channels
4842         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4843
4844         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
4845         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4846         assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
4847         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4848         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
4849
4850         // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
4851         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4852         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
4853         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4854
4855         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
4856         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4857         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4858         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4859         match events[0] {
4860                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4861                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4862         }
4863         match events[1] {
4864                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4865                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4866         }
4867         let node_tx = {
4868                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4869                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4870                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
4871                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
4872                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4873                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4874                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
4875                 node_txn[0].clone()
4876         };
4877
4878         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
4879         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4880
4881         // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
4882         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4883         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4884         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4885         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
4886         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4887 }
4888
4889 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
4890         // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
4891         // unrevoked commitment transaction.
4892         // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
4893         // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
4894         // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
4895         // use the same payment hashes.
4896         // Thus, we use a six-node network:
4897         //
4898         // A \         / E
4899         //    - C - D -
4900         // B /         \ F
4901         // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
4902         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
4903         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
4904         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
4905         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
4906         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
4907         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
4908         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
4909                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
4910         let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4911
4912         let _chan_0_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4913         let _chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4914         let chan_2_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4915         let chan_3_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4916         let chan_3_5  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4917
4918         // Rebalance and check output sanity...
4919         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
4920         send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
4921         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
4922
4923         let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2_3.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
4924         // 0th HTLC:
4925         let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4926         // 1st HTLC:
4927         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4928         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
4929         // 2nd HTLC:
4930         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4931         // 3rd HTLC:
4932         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4933         // 4th HTLC:
4934         let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
4935         // 5th HTLC:
4936         let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
4937         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
4938         // 6th HTLC:
4939         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200).unwrap());
4940         // 7th HTLC:
4941         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200).unwrap());
4942
4943         // 8th HTLC:
4944         let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
4945         // 9th HTLC:
4946         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
4947         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4948
4949         // 10th HTLC:
4950         let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4951         // 11th HTLC:
4952         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
4953         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200).unwrap());
4954
4955         // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
4956         // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
4957         // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
4958         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2).len(), 1);
4959         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
4960
4961         // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
4962         // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
4963         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1);
4964         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3);
4965         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5);
4966         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6);
4967         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
4968
4969         let failed_destinations = vec![
4970                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_1 },
4971                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_3 },
4972                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_5 },
4973                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_6 },
4974         ];
4975         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[4], failed_destinations);
4976         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
4977
4978         let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
4979         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4980         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
4981         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
4982         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
4983         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
4984
4985         // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
4986         nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
4987         nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4);
4988         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
4989
4990         let failed_destinations_2 = vec![
4991                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 },
4992                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_4 },
4993         ];
4994         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[5], failed_destinations_2);
4995         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
4996
4997         let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
4998         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4999         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5000         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5001
5002         let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5003
5004         // After 4 and 2 removes respectively above in nodes[4] and nodes[5], nodes[3] should receive 6 PaymentForwardedFailed events
5005         let failed_destinations_3 = vec![
5006                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5007                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5008                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5009                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5010                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5011                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5012         ];
5013         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations_3);
5014         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5015         let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5016         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5017         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5018         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5019         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5020         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5021         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5022         if deliver_last_raa {
5023                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5024         } else {
5025                 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5026         }
5027
5028         // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5029         // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5030         // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5031         // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5032         //
5033         // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5034         // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5035         // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5036         //
5037         // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5038         // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5039         let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5040
5041         if announce_latest {
5042                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5043         } else {
5044                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5045         }
5046         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5047         let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5048                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2 + 6);
5049                 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5050         } else {
5051                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5052                 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5053         };
5054         match close_event {
5055                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5056                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5057         }
5058
5059         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5060         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5061         if deliver_last_raa {
5062                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5063
5064                 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(3).collect();
5065                 expect_htlc_handling_failed_destinations!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(), expected_destinations);
5066         } else {
5067                 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = if announce_latest {
5068                         repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(9).collect()
5069                 } else {
5070                         repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(6).collect()
5071                 };
5072
5073                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], expected_destinations);
5074         }
5075         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5076
5077         let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5078         assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5079         let mut a_done = false;
5080         for msg in cs_msgs {
5081                 match msg {
5082                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5083                                 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5084                                 // should be failed-backwards here.
5085                                 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5086                                         // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5087                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5088                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5089                                         }
5090                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5091                                         assert!(!a_done);
5092                                         a_done = true;
5093                                         &nodes[0]
5094                                 } else {
5095                                         // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5096                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5097                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5098                                         }
5099                                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5100                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5101                                         &nodes[1]
5102                                 };
5103                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5104                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5105                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5106                                 if announce_latest {
5107                                         target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5108                                         if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5109                                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5110                                         }
5111                                 }
5112                                 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5113                         },
5114                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5115                 }
5116         }
5117
5118         let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5119         assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5120         let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5121         let mut as_updates = 0;
5122         for event in as_events.iter() {
5123                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5124                         assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5125                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5126                                 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5127                         } else {
5128                                 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5129                         }
5130                         if network_update.is_some() {
5131                                 as_updates += 1;
5132                         }
5133                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5134         }
5135         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5136         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5137         if announce_latest {
5138                 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5139                 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5140         }
5141         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5142
5143         let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5144         assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5145         let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5146         let mut bs_updates = 0;
5147         for event in bs_events.iter() {
5148                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5149                         assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5150                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5151                                 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5152                         } else {
5153                                 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5154                         }
5155                         if network_update.is_some() {
5156                                 bs_updates += 1;
5157                         }
5158                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5159         }
5160         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5161         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5162         if announce_latest {
5163                 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5164         }
5165         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5166
5167         // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5168         // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5169         // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5170         // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5171         assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5172         assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5173 }
5174
5175 #[test]
5176 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5177         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5178 }
5179
5180 #[test]
5181 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5182         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5183 }
5184
5185 #[test]
5186 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5187         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5188         // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5189         // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5190 }
5191
5192 #[test]
5193 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5194         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5195         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5196         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5197         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5198
5199         // Create some initial channels
5200         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5201
5202         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5203         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5204         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5205         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5206
5207         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5208         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5209         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5210         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5211         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5212         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5213
5214         let htlc_timeout = {
5215                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5216                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
5217                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5218                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5219                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5220                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5221                 node_txn[1].clone()
5222         };
5223
5224         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5225         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5226         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5227
5228         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5229         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5230         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5231         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5232         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5233         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5234         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5235         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5236         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5237         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5238                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5239 }
5240
5241 #[test]
5242 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5243         // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with
5244         // a key manager rotation to test that key_derivation_params returned in DynamicOutputP2WSH
5245         // let us re-derive the channel key set to then derive a delayed_payment_key.
5246
5247         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5248
5249         // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5250         let seed = [42; 32];
5251         let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5252         let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5253         let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source.genesis_hash, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger);
5254         let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph, node_seed: seed, features: channelmanager::provided_init_features() };
5255         let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5256         node_cfgs.remove(0);
5257         node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5258
5259         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5260         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5261
5262         // Create some initial channels
5263         // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5264         // for node 0
5265         let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5266         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5267         assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5268
5269         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5270         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5271         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5272         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5273         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5274
5275         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5276         let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5277         let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5278         assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5279         check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5280
5281         // We check funding pubkey are unique
5282         let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5283         let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5284         if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5285             || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5286             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5287             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5288                 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5289         }
5290
5291         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5292         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5293         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5294         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5295         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5296         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5297
5298         let htlc_timeout = {
5299                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5300                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5301                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5302                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn_1[0]);
5303                 node_txn[1].clone()
5304         };
5305
5306         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5307         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5308         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5309
5310         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5311         let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5312         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5313         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5314         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5315         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5316         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5317         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5318         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5319         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5320         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5321                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5322 }
5323
5324 #[test]
5325 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5326         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5327         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5328         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5329         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5330
5331         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5332
5333         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5334         let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5335
5336         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5337         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5338         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5339
5340         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5341         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5342         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5343
5344         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5345         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5346         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5347
5348         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5349         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5350         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5351 }
5352
5353 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5354         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5355         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5356         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5357         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5358         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5359
5360         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5361
5362         // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5363         // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5364         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5365         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5366         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5367
5368         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5369         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5370         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
5371
5372         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5373         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5374         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5375         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5376         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5377
5378         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5379         let mut block = Block {
5380                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5381                 txdata: vec![],
5382         };
5383         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5384                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5385                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5386         }
5387         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5388         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5389         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5390         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5391 }
5392
5393 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5394         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5395         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5396         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5397         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5398         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5399
5400         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5401         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5402         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5403
5404         let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5405
5406         // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5407         // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5408         // to "time out" the HTLC.
5409
5410         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5411         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5412
5413         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5414                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: Vec::new()});
5415                 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
5416         }
5417         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5418         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5419         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5420         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5421 }
5422
5423 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5424         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5425         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5426         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5427         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5428         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5429
5430         // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
5431         // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5432         // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
5433         // actually revoked.
5434         let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
5435         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
5436         nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
5437         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
5438         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5439
5440         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5441         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5442         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5443         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5444         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5445         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5446         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5447         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
5448         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5449         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5450
5451         if check_revoke_no_close {
5452                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
5453                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5454         }
5455
5456         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5457         let mut block = Block {
5458                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5459                 txdata: vec![],
5460         };
5461         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
5462                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5463                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5464         }
5465         if !check_revoke_no_close {
5466                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5467                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5468                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5469                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5470         } else {
5471                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5472         }
5473 }
5474
5475 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
5476 // There are only a few cases to test here:
5477 //  * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
5478 //    broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
5479 //  * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
5480 //  * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
5481 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
5482 // non-dust HTLCs.
5483 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
5484 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
5485 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
5486 #[test]
5487 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
5488         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
5489         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
5490
5491         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
5492         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
5493 }
5494
5495 #[test]
5496 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
5497         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
5498         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
5499         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
5500         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
5501 }
5502
5503 #[test]
5504 #[should_panic]
5505 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
5506         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5507         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5508         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5509         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5510         // Force duplicate randomness for every get-random call
5511         for node in nodes.iter() {
5512                 *node.keys_manager.override_random_bytes.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
5513         }
5514
5515         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
5516         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5517         let push_msat=10001;
5518         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5519         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5520         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5521         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5522
5523         // Create a second channel with the same random values. This used to panic due to a colliding
5524         // channel_id, but now panics due to a colliding outbound SCID alias.
5525         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5526 }
5527
5528 #[test]
5529 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
5530         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5531         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5532         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5533         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5534
5535         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
5536         let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
5537         let push_msat=10001;
5538         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5539
5540         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
5541         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5542         // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
5543         let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
5544         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5545
5546         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
5547         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5548         let push_msat=10001;
5549         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
5550         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5551         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
5552
5553         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
5554         // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
5555         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
5556
5557         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
5558         assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
5559         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5560
5561         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
5562         let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
5563         assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
5564
5565         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
5566         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
5567         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5568         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5569         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
5570         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5571 }
5572
5573 #[test]
5574 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
5575         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5576         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5577         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5578         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5579
5580         let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
5581         let push_msat=10001;
5582         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5583         let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5584         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
5585         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
5586
5587         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5588         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5589         let err_msg = match events[0] {
5590                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
5591                         msg.clone()
5592                 },
5593                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5594         };
5595         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
5596 }
5597
5598 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
5599 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
5600 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
5601 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
5602 #[test]
5603 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
5604         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5605         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5606         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5607         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5608         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5609
5610         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5611         // pending_update_fee.
5612         {
5613                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5614                 *feerate_lock += 20;
5615         }
5616         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5617         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5618
5619         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5620         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5621         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5622                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5623                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5624                 },
5625                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5626         };
5627
5628         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5629
5630         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5631         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5632         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5633         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5634
5635         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5636         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
5637         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
5638
5639         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
5640         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5641         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5642         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
5643
5644         // Flush the pending fee update.
5645         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5646         let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5647         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5648         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
5649         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5650
5651         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
5652         // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
5653         // us to surface its failure to the user.
5654         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5655         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5656         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
5657         let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
5658                 hex::encode(our_payment_hash.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
5659         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
5660
5661         // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
5662         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5663         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5664         match &events[0] {
5665                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
5666                         assert_eq!(PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0), *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
5667                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
5668                         assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
5669                         assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
5670                         assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
5671                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id));
5672                 },
5673                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5674         }
5675 }
5676
5677 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
5678 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
5679 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
5680 #[test]
5681 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
5682         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5683         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5684         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5685         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5686         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5687
5688         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5689         // pending_update_fee.
5690         {
5691                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5692                 *feerate_lock += 200;
5693         }
5694         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5695         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5696
5697         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5698         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5699         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5700                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5701                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5702                 },
5703                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5704         };
5705
5706         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5707
5708         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5709         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5710         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5711         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5712
5713         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5714         let amt_1 = 20000;
5715         let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors) - amt_1;
5716         let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
5717         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
5718
5719         // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
5720         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
5721         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5722         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
5723         let payment_id_2 = PaymentId(nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5724         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2), payment_id_2).unwrap();
5725         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5726         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
5727
5728         // Flush the pending fee update.
5729         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5730         let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5731         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5732         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
5733         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5734         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
5735
5736         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
5737         // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
5738         // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
5739         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5740         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5741         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
5742         let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
5743                 hex::encode(payment_hash_2.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
5744         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
5745
5746         // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
5747         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5748         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5749         match &events[0] {
5750                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
5751                         assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
5752                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
5753                         assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
5754                         assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
5755                         assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
5756                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route_2.paths[0][0].short_channel_id));
5757                 },
5758                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5759         }
5760
5761         // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
5762         let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
5763                 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5764                 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
5765                 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
5766         };
5767         let raa = match send_raa_event {
5768                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
5769                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5770         };
5771         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5772         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5773         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5774         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5775         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5776         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5777         match events[0] {
5778                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
5779                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5780         }
5781         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5782         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5783         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5784         match events[0] {
5785                 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => {},
5786                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5787         }
5788         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
5789         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5790         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, amt_1);
5791
5792         let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5793         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5794         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
5795         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
5796 }
5797
5798 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
5799 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
5800 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
5801 // once it's freed.
5802 #[test]
5803 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
5804         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5805         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5806         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5807         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5808         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5809         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5810         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5811         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5812         let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5813         let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5814
5815         // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5816         // pending_update_fee.
5817         {
5818                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5819                 *feerate_lock += 20;
5820         }
5821         nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5822         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5823
5824         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5825         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5826         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5827                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5828                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5829                 },
5830                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5831         };
5832
5833         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5834
5835         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
5836         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5837         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
5838         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
5839
5840         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
5841         let feemsat = 239;
5842         let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
5843         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors) - total_routing_fee_msat;
5844         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
5845         let payment_event = {
5846                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5847                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5848
5849                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5850                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5851
5852                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
5853         };
5854         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5855         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5856         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5857         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5858
5859         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1_2.2);
5860         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
5861
5862         // Flush the pending fee update.
5863         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5864         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5865         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5866         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5867         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5868         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
5869
5870         // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
5871         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5872         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5873
5874         let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
5875                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
5876                         msg.clone()
5877                 },
5878                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5879         };
5880
5881         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
5882         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5883         assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5884
5885         // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
5886         let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5887         assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 2);
5888         match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
5889                 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
5890                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5891         }
5892
5893         // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
5894         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5895         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5896
5897         // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
5898         let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5899         assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
5900         let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
5901                 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
5902                         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
5903                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
5904                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
5905                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5906                         (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
5907                 },
5908                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5909         };
5910
5911         // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
5912         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
5913         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5914
5915         // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
5916         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5917         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5918         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5919         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5920         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
5921         let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5922         assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
5923         let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
5924                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
5925                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5926         };
5927         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5928         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
5929         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5930 }
5931
5932 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
5933 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
5934 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
5935
5936 #[test]
5937 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
5938         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
5939         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5940         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5941         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5942         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5943         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5944
5945         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
5946         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 100;
5947
5948         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
5949                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
5950         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5951         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value".to_string(), 1);
5952 }
5953
5954 #[test]
5955 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
5956         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
5957         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5958         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5959         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5960         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5961         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5962
5963         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
5964         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 0;
5965         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
5966                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
5967
5968         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5969         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
5970 }
5971
5972 #[test]
5973 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
5974         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
5975         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5976         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5977         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5978         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5979         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5980
5981         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
5982         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5983         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5984         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5985         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
5986
5987         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
5988         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
5989         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
5990         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5991         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() });
5992 }
5993
5994 #[test]
5995 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
5996         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
5997         //It is enforced when constructing a route.
5998         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5999         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6000         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6001         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6002         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6003
6004         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
6005                 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
6006         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], payment_params, 100000000, 0);
6007         route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = 500000001;
6008         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::RouteError { ref err },
6009                 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6010 }
6011
6012 #[test]
6013 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6014         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6015         //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6016         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6017         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6018         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6019         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6020         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6021         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6022         let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6023
6024         for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6025                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6026                 let payment_event = {
6027                         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6028                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6029
6030                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6031                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6032                         if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6033                                 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6034                         } else {
6035                                 assert!(false);
6036                         }
6037                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6038                 };
6039                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6040                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6041                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6042
6043                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6044                 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6045         }
6046         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6047         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6048                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6049
6050         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6051         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
6052 }
6053
6054 #[test]
6055 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6056         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6057         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6058         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6059         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6060         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6061         let channel_value = 100000;
6062         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6063         let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6064
6065         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6066
6067         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6068         // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6069         // limits us to.
6070         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat =  max_in_flight + 1;
6071         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6072                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6073
6074         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6075         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
6076
6077         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6078 }
6079
6080 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6081 #[test]
6082 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6083         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6084         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6085         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6086         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6087         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6088         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6089         let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6090         {
6091                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6092                 let channel = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6093                 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6094         }
6095
6096         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6097         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6098         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6099         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6100         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6101         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6102         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6103         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6104         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6105         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6106         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6107 }
6108
6109 #[test]
6110 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6111         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6112         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6113         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6114         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6115         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6116         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6117
6118         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6119         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6120         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6121         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6122         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6123         let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
6124
6125         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6126         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6127         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6128         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6129         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6130
6131         // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6132         // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6133         // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6134         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6135         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6136
6137         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6138         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6139         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6140         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6141         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6142 }
6143
6144 #[test]
6145 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6146         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6147         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6148         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6149         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6150         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6151         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6152         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6153
6154         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3999999);
6155         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6156         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6157         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6158         let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3999999, &Some(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6159         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash);
6160
6161         let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6162                 channel_id: chan.2,
6163                 htlc_id: 0,
6164                 amount_msat: 1000,
6165                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6166                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6167                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6168         };
6169
6170         for i in 0..super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
6171                 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6172                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6173         }
6174         msg.htlc_id = (super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS) as u64;
6175         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6176
6177         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6178         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6179         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6180         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6181         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6182 }
6183
6184 #[test]
6185 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6186         //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6187         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6188         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6189         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6190         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6191         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6192
6193         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6194         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6195         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6196         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6197         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6198         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6199
6200         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6201         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6202         assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6203         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6204         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6205 }
6206
6207 #[test]
6208 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6209         //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6210         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6211         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6212         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6213         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6214
6215         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6216         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6217         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6218         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6219         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6220         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6221         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6222
6223         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6224         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6225         assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6226         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6227         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6228 }
6229
6230 #[test]
6231 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6232         //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6233         // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6234         // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6235         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6236         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6237         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6238         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6239
6240         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6241         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6242         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6243         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6244         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6245         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6246
6247         //Disconnect and Reconnect
6248         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6249         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6250         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
6251         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6252         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6253         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
6254         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6255         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6256         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6257         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6258         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6259         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6260
6261         //Resend HTLC
6262         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6263         assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6264         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6265         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6266         let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6267
6268         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6269
6270         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6271         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6272         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6273         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6274         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6275 }
6276
6277 #[test]
6278 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6279         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6280
6281         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6282         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6283         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6284         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6285         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6286         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6287         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6288
6289         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6290         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6291         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6292
6293         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6294                 channel_id: chan.2,
6295                 htlc_id: 0,
6296                 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6297         };
6298
6299         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6300
6301         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6302         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6303         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6304         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6305         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6306 }
6307
6308 #[test]
6309 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6310         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6311
6312         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6313         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6314         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6315         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6316         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6317
6318         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6319         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6320         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6321         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6322         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6323
6324         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6325                 channel_id: chan.2,
6326                 htlc_id: 0,
6327                 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6328         };
6329
6330         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6331
6332         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6333         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6334         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6335         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6336         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6337 }
6338
6339 #[test]
6340 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6341         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6342
6343         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6344         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6345         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6346         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6347         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6348
6349         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6350         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6351         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6352         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6353         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6354         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6355                 channel_id: chan.2,
6356                 htlc_id: 0,
6357                 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6358                 failure_code: 0x8000,
6359         };
6360
6361         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6362
6363         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6364         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6365         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6366         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6367         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6368 }
6369
6370 #[test]
6371 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6372         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6373
6374         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6375         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6376         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6377         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6378         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6379
6380         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6381
6382         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6383         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6384         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6385
6386         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6387         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6388         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6389                 match events[0] {
6390                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6391                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6392                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6393                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6394                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6395                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6396                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6397                         },
6398                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6399                 }
6400         };
6401
6402         update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6403
6404         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6405
6406         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6407         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6408         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6409         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6410         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6411 }
6412
6413 #[test]
6414 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6415         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6416
6417         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6418         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6419         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6420         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6421         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6422
6423         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6424
6425         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6426         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6427         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6428
6429         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6430         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6431         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6432                 match events[0] {
6433                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6434                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6435                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6436                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6437                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6438                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6439                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6440                         },
6441                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6442                 }
6443         };
6444
6445         update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
6446
6447         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6448
6449         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6450         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6451         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6452         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6453         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6454 }
6455
6456 #[test]
6457 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
6458         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
6459
6460         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6461         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6462         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6463         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6464         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6465
6466         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6467         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6468         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6469
6470         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6471         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6472
6473         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6474         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6475         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6476
6477         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6478
6479         let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
6480                 match events[0] {
6481                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6482                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6483                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6484                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6485                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6486                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6487                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
6488                         },
6489                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6490                 }
6491         };
6492         update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
6493         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6494
6495         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6496         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6497         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
6498         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6499         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6500 }
6501
6502 #[test]
6503 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
6504         //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
6505         //    * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
6506
6507         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6508         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6509         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6510         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6511         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6512         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6513
6514         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
6515
6516         //First hop
6517         let mut payment_event = {
6518                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6519                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6520                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6521                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6522                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6523         };
6524         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6525         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6526         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6527         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6528         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6529         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6530         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6531         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6532         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6533
6534         //Second Hop
6535         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6536         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6537         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6538         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6539
6540         let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6541         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6542         let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
6543                 match events_3[0] {
6544                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6545                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6546                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6547                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6548                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6549                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6550                                 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
6551                         },
6552                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6553                 }
6554         };
6555
6556         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
6557
6558         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6559         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
6560         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
6561         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6562         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6563
6564         //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
6565         match events_4[0] {
6566                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6567                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6568                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6569                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6570                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6571                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6572                 },
6573                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6574         };
6575
6576         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6577 }
6578
6579 #[test]
6580 fn test_channel_failed_after_message_with_badonion_node_perm_bits_set() {
6581         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6582         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6583         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6584         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6585         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6586         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6587
6588         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100_000);
6589
6590         // First hop
6591         let mut payment_event = {
6592                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6593                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6594                 SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[0])
6595         };
6596
6597         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6598         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6599         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6600         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6601         payment_event = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[1]);
6602         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6603
6604         // Second Hop
6605         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; // Trigger an invalid_onion_version error
6606         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6607         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6608         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6609
6610         let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6611         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6612         match events_3[0] {
6613                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6614                         let mut update_msg = updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone();
6615                         // Set the NODE bit (BADONION and PERM already set in invalid_onion_version error)
6616                         update_msg.failure_code |= 0x2000;
6617
6618                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6619                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6620                 },
6621                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6622         }
6623
6624         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1],
6625                 vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel {
6626                         node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
6627         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6628         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6629         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6630
6631         match events_4[0] {
6632                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6633                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6634                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6635                 },
6636                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6637         }
6638
6639         let events_5 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6640         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
6641
6642         // Expect a PaymentPathFailed event with a ChannelFailure network update for the channel between
6643         // the node originating the error to its next hop.
6644         match events_5[0] {
6645                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { network_update:
6646                         Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure { short_channel_id, is_permanent }), error_code, ..
6647                 } => {
6648                         assert_eq!(short_channel_id, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id);
6649                         assert!(is_permanent);
6650                         assert_eq!(error_code, Some(0x8000|0x4000|0x2000|4));
6651                 },
6652                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6653         }
6654
6655         // TODO: Test actual removal of channel from NetworkGraph when it's implemented.
6656 }
6657
6658 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
6659         // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
6660         // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
6661         // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
6662
6663         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6664         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
6665         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6666         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6667         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6668         let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6669
6670         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6671
6672         // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
6673         let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6674         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6675         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6676
6677         // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
6678         let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6679
6680         // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
6681         nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
6682         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6683         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
6684         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6685
6686         let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6687         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6688         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
6689         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6690
6691         // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
6692         let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6693
6694         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6695         match events[0] {
6696                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
6697                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6698                 },
6699                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6700         }
6701         match events[1] {
6702                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
6703                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6704                 },
6705                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6706         }
6707
6708         assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
6709         // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
6710         if announce_latest {
6711                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
6712         } else {
6713                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
6714         }
6715
6716         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6717         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6718         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6719
6720         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6721         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6722         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6723         // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
6724         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6725         let mut first_failed = false;
6726         for event in events {
6727                 match event {
6728                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6729                                 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
6730                                         assert!(!first_failed);
6731                                         first_failed = true;
6732                                 } else {
6733                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
6734                                 }
6735                         }
6736                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6737                 }
6738         }
6739 }
6740
6741 #[test]
6742 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
6743         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
6744         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
6745 }
6746
6747 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
6748         // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
6749         // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
6750         // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6751         // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
6752         // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6753         // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
6754
6755         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6756         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6757         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6758         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6759         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6760
6761         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6762
6763         let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6764         let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6765
6766         let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6767         let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
6768
6769         // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
6770         if revoked {
6771                 let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6772                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
6773         }
6774
6775         let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
6776         if local {
6777                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
6778                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
6779                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6780                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6781                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
6782
6783                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
6784                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6785                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6786                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6787                 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
6788                 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6789                 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
6790                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6791                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
6792                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6793                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
6794         } else {
6795                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
6796                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
6797                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6798                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6799                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6800                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6801
6802                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
6803                 timeout_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..)
6804                         .filter(|tx| tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == bs_commitment_tx[0].txid()).collect();
6805                 check_spends!(timeout_tx[0], bs_commitment_tx[0]);
6806                 // For both a revoked or non-revoked commitment transaction, after ANTI_REORG_DELAY the
6807                 // dust HTLC should have been failed.
6808                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
6809
6810                 if !revoked {
6811                         assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6812                 } else {
6813                         assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].lock_time.0, 0);
6814                 }
6815                 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout/revocation-claim tx
6816                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
6817                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6818                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6819                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
6820         }
6821 }
6822
6823 #[test]
6824 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
6825         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
6826         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
6827         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
6828 }
6829
6830 #[test]
6831 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
6832         // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
6833
6834         let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
6835         low_our_to_self_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
6836         let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
6837         high_their_to_self_config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
6838         let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
6839         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6840         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6841         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
6842         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6843
6844         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
6845         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
6846                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 1000000, 1000000, 0,
6847                 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, 42)
6848         {
6849                 match error {
6850                         APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
6851                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6852                 }
6853         } else { assert!(false) }
6854
6855         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
6856         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
6857         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6858         open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
6859         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
6860                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
6861                 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
6862         {
6863                 match error {
6864                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str()));  },
6865                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6866                 }
6867         } else { assert!(false); }
6868
6869         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
6870         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
6871         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
6872         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6873         accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
6874         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
6875         let reason_msg;
6876         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
6877                 match action {
6878                         &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
6879                                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
6880                                 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
6881                         },
6882                         _ => { panic!(); }
6883                 }
6884         } else { panic!(); }
6885         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg });
6886
6887         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
6888         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
6889         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6890         open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
6891         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
6892                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
6893                 &high_their_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
6894         {
6895                 match error {
6896                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
6897                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6898                 }
6899         } else { assert!(false); }
6900 }
6901
6902 #[test]
6903 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
6904         // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
6905         // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
6906         // to B, B should refuse payment.
6907
6908         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6909         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6910         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6911         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6912
6913         // Create some initial channels
6914         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6915
6916         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
6917         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
6918         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
6919         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
6920         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6921         let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
6922         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6923         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6924
6925         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6926         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6927         let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
6928         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6929         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6930
6931         // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
6932         // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
6933         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6934         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
6935
6936         // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
6937         // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
6938         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6939
6940         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6941         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6942         let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6943                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6944                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6945                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6946                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6947                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6948                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6949                         (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
6950                 },
6951                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6952         };
6953         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6954
6955         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
6956         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
6957
6958         // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
6959         let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(10_000).to_vec();
6960         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH));
6961         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
6962 }
6963
6964 #[test]
6965 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
6966         // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
6967         // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
6968
6969         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6970         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6971         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6972         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6973
6974         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6975         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6976         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6977
6978         // Disconnect peers
6979         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6980         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6981
6982         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // Enabled -> DisabledStaged
6983         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // DisabledStaged -> Disabled
6984         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6985         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
6986         let mut chans_disabled = HashMap::new();
6987         for e in msg_events {
6988                 match e {
6989                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
6990                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
6991                                 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
6992                                 if chans_disabled.insert(msg.contents.short_channel_id, msg.contents.timestamp).is_some() {
6993                                         panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
6994                                 }
6995                         },
6996                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6997                 }
6998         }
6999         // Reconnect peers
7000         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7001         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7002         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7003         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7004         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7005         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7006
7007         // Reestablish chan_1
7008         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7009         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7010         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7011         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7012         // Reestablish chan_2
7013         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7014         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7015         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7016         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7017         // Reestablish chan_3
7018         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7019         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7020         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7021         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7022
7023         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7024         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7025         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7026         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7027         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7028         for e in msg_events {
7029                 match e {
7030                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7031                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7032                                 match chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7033                                         // Each update should have a higher timestamp than the previous one, replacing
7034                                         // the old one.
7035                                         Some(prev_timestamp) => assert!(msg.contents.timestamp > prev_timestamp),
7036                                         None => panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!"),
7037                                 }
7038                         },
7039                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7040                 }
7041         }
7042         // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7043         assert!(chans_disabled.is_empty());
7044 }
7045
7046 #[test]
7047 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7048         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7049         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7050
7051         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7052         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7053         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7054         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7055
7056         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7057
7058         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7059         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
7060                 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
7061         let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_params, 3000000, 30);
7062         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7063
7064         let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7065         // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7066         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7067         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7068         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7069         let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7070
7071         let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7072         for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7073                 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7074                         penalty_sum += outp.value;
7075                 }
7076         }
7077
7078         // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7079         let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7080
7081         // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7082         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7083         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_114, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7084         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()] });
7085         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7086
7087         // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7088         let penalty_1;
7089         let feerate_1;
7090         {
7091                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7092                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor) + local commitment tx
7093                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7094                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7095                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7096                 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7097                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7098                 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7099                 node_txn.clear();
7100         };
7101
7102         // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7103         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7104         let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7105         let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7106         {
7107                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7108                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7109                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7110                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7111                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7112                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7113                         penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7114                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7115                         assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7116                         let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7117                         feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7118                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7119                         assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7120                         node_txn.clear();
7121                 }
7122         }
7123         assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7124
7125         // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7126         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7127         let penalty_3;
7128         let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7129         {
7130                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7131                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7132                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7133                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7134                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7135                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7136                         penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7137                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7138                         assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7139                         let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7140                         feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7141                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7142                         assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7143                         node_txn.clear();
7144                 }
7145         }
7146         assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7147
7148         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7149         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7150 }
7151
7152 #[test]
7153 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7154         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7155         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7156
7157         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7158         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7159         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7160         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7161         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7162
7163         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7164         // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7165         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
7166         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7167         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7168         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7169                 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7170         let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7171         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
7172         let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[1].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7173                 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7174         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7175
7176         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7177         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7178         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7179
7180         // Revoke local commitment tx
7181         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7182
7183         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7184         // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7185         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7186         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7187         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7188         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7189         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 49); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7190
7191         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
7192         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
7193         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], chan.3);
7194
7195         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7196         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7197         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7198
7199         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7200         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7201         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
7202         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7203
7204         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7205         let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7206         let header_11 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: hash_128, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7207         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_11, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7208         let header_129 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_11.block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7209         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_129, txdata: vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[2].clone()] });
7210         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7211         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7212         match events.last().unwrap() {
7213                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7214                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7215         }
7216         let first;
7217         let feerate_1;
7218         let penalty_txn;
7219         {
7220                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7221                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + A commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7222                 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7223
7224                 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7225                 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7226                 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7227                 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7228                 // future).
7229                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7230                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7231                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7232                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7233                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7234                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7235
7236                 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7237                 // available, which we check here:
7238                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7239                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7240                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7241
7242                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7243                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7244
7245                 // node_txn[3] is the local commitment tx broadcast just because (and somewhat in case of
7246                 // reorgs, though its not clear its ever worth broadcasting conflicting txn like this when
7247                 // a remote commitment tx has already been confirmed).
7248                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan.3);
7249
7250                 // node_txn[4] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7251                 // output, checked above).
7252                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 2);
7253                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].output.len(), 1);
7254                 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7255
7256                 first = node_txn[4].txid();
7257                 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7258                 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[4].output[0].value;
7259                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[4].weight() as u64;
7260                 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7261                 node_txn.clear();
7262         }
7263
7264         // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7265         let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_129.block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7266         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7267         let header_131 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_130.block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7268         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_131, txdata: Vec::new() });
7269
7270         // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7271         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7272         assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7273         let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7274         let node_txn = {
7275                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7276                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7277
7278                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7279                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7280                 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7281                 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7282                 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7283                 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7284                 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7285                 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7286                 node_txn.clear();
7287                 txn
7288         };
7289         // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7290         let header_145 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_144, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7291         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_145, txdata: node_txn });
7292         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7293         {
7294                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7295                 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7296                 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7297                 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7298                 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7299                 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7300                 // up bumped justice generation.
7301                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7302                 node_txn.clear();
7303         }
7304         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7305         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7306 }
7307
7308 #[test]
7309 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
7310         // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7311         // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7312
7313         // Create 2 HTLCs
7314         // Provide preimage for one
7315         // Check aggregation
7316
7317         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7318         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7319         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7320         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7321
7322         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7323         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
7324         route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
7325
7326         // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7327         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7328         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7329         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7330         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7331
7332         // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
7333         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7334         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
7335         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
7336         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7337         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7338
7339         // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
7340         let timeout;
7341         let preimage;
7342         let preimage_bump;
7343         let feerate_timeout;
7344         let feerate_preimage;
7345         {
7346                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7347                 // 5 transactions including:
7348                 //   local commitment + HTLC-Success
7349                 //   preimage and timeout sweeps from remote commitment + preimage sweep bump
7350                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5);
7351                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7352                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
7353                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
7354                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7355                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], remote_txn[0]);
7356                 check_spends!(node_txn[4], remote_txn[0]);
7357
7358                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan.3); // local commitment
7359                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]); // local HTLC-Success
7360
7361                 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
7362                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7363                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7364                 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7365
7366                 let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output == node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output {
7367                         (node_txn[3].clone(), node_txn[4].clone())
7368                 } else {
7369                         (node_txn[4].clone(), node_txn[3].clone())
7370                 };
7371
7372                 preimage_bump = preimage_bump_tx;
7373                 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7374                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output);
7375
7376                 timeout = timeout_tx.txid();
7377                 let index = timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7378                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - timeout_tx.output[0].value;
7379                 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / timeout_tx.weight() as u64;
7380
7381                 node_txn.clear();
7382         };
7383         assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
7384         assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
7385
7386         // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
7387         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7388         {
7389                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7390                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7391                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7392                 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
7393                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7394                 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7395
7396                 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7397                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
7398                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.weight() as u64;
7399                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
7400                 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
7401
7402                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7403                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7404                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7405                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
7406                 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
7407
7408                 node_txn.clear();
7409         }
7410
7411         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7412         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7413 }
7414
7415 #[test]
7416 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
7417         // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
7418         // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
7419         // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
7420         // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
7421         // EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
7422         // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
7423         // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
7424         // implement that).
7425         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7426         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7427         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7428         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7429         let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).2;
7430
7431         let per_commitment_secret;
7432         let next_per_commitment_point;
7433         {
7434                 let mut guard = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
7435                 let keys = guard.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
7436
7437                 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
7438
7439                 // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
7440                 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7441                 per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
7442
7443                 // Must revoke without gaps
7444                 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7445                 keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
7446
7447                 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7448                 next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
7449                         &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
7450         }
7451
7452         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
7453                 &msgs::RevokeAndACK { channel_id, per_commitment_secret, next_per_commitment_point });
7454         assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
7455         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7456         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() });
7457 }
7458
7459 #[test]
7460 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
7461         // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
7462         // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7463
7464         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7465         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7466         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7467         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7468
7469         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7470         // Lock HTLC in both directions
7471         let (payment_preimage_1, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000);
7472         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000);
7473
7474         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7475         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7476         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7477
7478         // Revoke local commitment tx
7479         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
7480
7481         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7482         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
7483         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[0], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
7484         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7485
7486         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
7487         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7488         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7489         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7490         let penalty_txn = {
7491                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7492                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
7493                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7494                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7495                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7496                 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
7497                 node_txn.clear();
7498                 penalty_txn
7499         };
7500         let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7501         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7502         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7503         {
7504                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
7505                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
7506                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
7507         }
7508 }
7509
7510 #[test]
7511 fn test_pending_claimed_htlc_no_balance_underflow() {
7512         // Tests that if we have a pending outbound HTLC as well as a claimed-but-not-fully-removed
7513         // HTLC we will not underflow when we call `Channel::get_balance_msat()`.
7514         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7515         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7516         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7517         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7518         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7519
7520         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_010_000);
7521         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7522         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_010_000);
7523         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7524         let fulfill_ev = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7525
7526         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7527         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
7528         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.commitment_signed);
7529         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7530         let (_raa, _cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7531
7532         // At this point nodes[1] has received 1,010k msat (10k msat more than their reserve) and can
7533         // send an HTLC back (though it will go in the holding cell). Send an HTLC back and check we
7534         // can get our balance.
7535
7536         // Get a route from nodes[1] to nodes[0] by getting a route going the other way and then flip
7537         // the public key of the only hop. This works around ChannelDetails not showing the
7538         // almost-claimed HTLC as available balance.
7539         let (mut route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000);
7540         route.payment_params = None; // This is all wrong, but unnecessary
7541         route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7542         let (_, payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7543         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
7544
7545         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].balance_msat, 1_000_000);
7546 }
7547
7548 #[test]
7549 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
7550         // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
7551         // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
7552         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7553         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7554         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7555         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7556
7557         let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7558
7559         // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
7560         // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
7561         // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
7562         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
7563         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7564
7565         // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
7566         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
7567         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7568         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7569
7570         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7571         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7572         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
7573         let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7574         assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
7575         match close_ev[0] {
7576                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
7577                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7578                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
7579                 },
7580                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7581         }
7582 }
7583
7584 #[test]
7585 fn test_override_channel_config() {
7586         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7587         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7588         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7589         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7590
7591         // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
7592         let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
7593         override_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
7594
7595         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
7596
7597         // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
7598         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7599         assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
7600         assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
7601 }
7602
7603 #[test]
7604 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
7605         let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
7606         zero_config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
7607         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7608         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7609         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
7610         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7611
7612         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
7613         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7614         assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7615
7616         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &res);
7617         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7618         assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7619 }
7620
7621 #[test]
7622 fn test_channel_update_has_correct_htlc_maximum_msat() {
7623         // Tests that the `ChannelUpdate` message has the correct values for `htlc_maximum_msat` set.
7624         // Bolt 7 specifies that if present `htlc_maximum_msat`:
7625         // 1. MUST be set to less than or equal to the channel capacity. In LDK, this is capped to
7626         // 90% of the `channel_value`.
7627         // 2. MUST be set to less than or equal to the `max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` received from the peer.
7628
7629         let mut config_30_percent = UserConfig::default();
7630         config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7631         config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 30;
7632         let mut config_50_percent = UserConfig::default();
7633         config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7634         config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 50;
7635         let mut config_95_percent = UserConfig::default();
7636         config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7637         config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 95;
7638         let mut config_100_percent = UserConfig::default();
7639         config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7640         config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 100;
7641
7642         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7643         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7644         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config_30_percent), Some(config_50_percent), Some(config_95_percent), Some(config_100_percent)]);
7645         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7646
7647         let channel_value_satoshis = 100000;
7648         let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7649         let channel_value_30_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.3) as u64;
7650         let channel_value_50_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.5) as u64;
7651         let channel_value_90_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.9) as u64;
7652
7653         let (node_0_chan_update, node_1_chan_update, _, _)  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value_satoshis, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7654         let (node_2_chan_update, node_3_chan_update, _, _)  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, channel_value_satoshis, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7655
7656         // Assert that `node[0]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 50 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7657         // that's the value of `node[1]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
7658         assert_eq!(node_0_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_50_percent_msat);
7659         // Assert that `node[1]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 30 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7660         // that's the value of `node[0]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
7661         assert_eq!(node_1_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_30_percent_msat);
7662
7663         // Assert that `node[2]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7664         // the value of `node[3]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (100%), exceeds 90% of the
7665         // `channel_value`.
7666         assert_eq!(node_2_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
7667         // Assert that `node[3]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7668         // the value of `node[2]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (95%), exceeds 90% of the
7669         // `channel_value`.
7670         assert_eq!(node_3_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
7671 }
7672
7673 #[test]
7674 fn test_manually_accept_inbound_channel_request() {
7675         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7676         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7677         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7678         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7679         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7680         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7681
7682         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7683         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7684
7685         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &res);
7686
7687         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
7688         // accepting the inbound channel request.
7689         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7690
7691         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7692         match events[0] {
7693                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
7694                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap();
7695                 }
7696                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7697         }
7698
7699         let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7700         assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7701
7702         match accept_msg_ev[0] {
7703                 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
7704                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7705                 }
7706                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7707         }
7708
7709         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
7710
7711         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7712         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7713
7714         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7715         match events[0] {
7716                 Event::ChannelClosed { user_channel_id, .. } => {
7717                         assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 23);
7718                 }
7719                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7720         }
7721 }
7722
7723 #[test]
7724 fn test_manually_reject_inbound_channel_request() {
7725         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7726         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7727         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7728         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7729         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7730         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7731
7732         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7733         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7734
7735         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &res);
7736
7737         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
7738         // rejecting the inbound channel request.
7739         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7740
7741         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7742         match events[0] {
7743                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
7744                         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
7745                 }
7746                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7747         }
7748
7749         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7750         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7751
7752         match close_msg_ev[0] {
7753                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => {
7754                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7755                 }
7756                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7757         }
7758         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
7759 }
7760
7761 #[test]
7762 fn test_reject_funding_before_inbound_channel_accepted() {
7763         // This tests that when `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` is set to true, inbound
7764         // channels must to be manually accepted through `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel` by
7765         // the node operator before the counterparty sends a `FundingCreated` message. If a
7766         // `FundingCreated` message is received before the channel is accepted, it should be rejected
7767         // and the channel should be closed.
7768         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7769         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7770         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7771         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7772         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7773         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7774
7775         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7776         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7777         let temp_channel_id = res.temporary_channel_id;
7778
7779         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &res);
7780
7781         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in the `msg_events`.
7782         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7783
7784         // Clear the `Event::OpenChannelRequest` event without responding to the request.
7785         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7786
7787         // Get the `AcceptChannel` message of `nodes[1]` without calling
7788         // `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`, which generates a
7789         // `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` event. The message is passed to `nodes[0]`
7790         // `handle_accept_channel`, which is required in order for `create_funding_transaction` to
7791         // succeed when `nodes[0]` is passed to it.
7792         let accept_chan_msg = {
7793                 let mut lock;
7794                 let channel = get_channel_ref!(&nodes[1], lock, temp_channel_id);
7795                 channel.get_accept_channel_message()
7796         };
7797         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_chan_msg);
7798
7799         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
7800
7801         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
7802         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7803
7804         // The `funding_created_msg` should be rejected by `nodes[1]` as it hasn't accepted the channel
7805         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
7806
7807         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7808         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7809
7810         let expected_err = "FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted";
7811         match close_msg_ev[0] {
7812                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id, } => {
7813                         assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, temp_channel_id);
7814                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7815                         assert_eq!(msg.data, expected_err);
7816                 }
7817                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7818         }
7819
7820         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
7821 }
7822
7823 #[test]
7824 fn test_can_not_accept_inbound_channel_twice() {
7825         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7826         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7827         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7828         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7829         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7830         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7831
7832         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7833         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7834
7835         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &res);
7836
7837         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
7838         // accepting the inbound channel request.
7839         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7840
7841         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7842         match events[0] {
7843                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
7844                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0).unwrap();
7845                         let api_res = nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
7846                         match api_res {
7847                                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
7848                                         assert_eq!(err, "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.");
7849                                 },
7850                                 Ok(_) => panic!("Channel shouldn't be possible to be accepted twice"),
7851                                 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
7852                         }
7853                 }
7854                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7855         }
7856
7857         // Ensure that the channel wasn't closed after attempting to accept it twice.
7858         let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7859         assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7860
7861         match accept_msg_ev[0] {
7862                 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
7863                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7864                 }
7865                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7866         }
7867 }
7868
7869 #[test]
7870 fn test_can_not_accept_unknown_inbound_channel() {
7871         let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7872         let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
7873         let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
7874         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
7875
7876         let unknown_channel_id = [0; 32];
7877         let api_res = nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&unknown_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
7878         match api_res {
7879                 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
7880                         assert_eq!(err, "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist");
7881                 },
7882                 Ok(_) => panic!("It shouldn't be possible to accept an unkown channel"),
7883                 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
7884         }
7885 }
7886
7887 #[test]
7888 fn test_simple_mpp() {
7889         // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
7890         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7891         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7892         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
7893         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7894
7895         let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7896         let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7897         let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7898         let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7899
7900         let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
7901         let path = route.paths[0].clone();
7902         route.paths.push(path);
7903         route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7904         route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
7905         route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
7906         route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
7907         route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
7908         route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
7909         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
7910         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
7911 }
7912
7913 #[test]
7914 fn test_preimage_storage() {
7915         // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
7916         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7917         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7918         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7919         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7920
7921         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7922
7923         {
7924                 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
7925                 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7926                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
7927                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7928                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7929                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7930                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7931                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7932         }
7933         // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
7934         // values from previous calls.
7935         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7936         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7937         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7938         match events[0] {
7939                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref purpose, .. } => {
7940                         match &purpose {
7941                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
7942                                         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
7943                                 },
7944                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
7945                         }
7946                 },
7947                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7948         }
7949 }
7950
7951 #[test]
7952 #[allow(deprecated)]
7953 fn test_secret_timeout() {
7954         // Simple test of payment secret storage time outs. After
7955         // `create_inbound_payment(_for_hash)_legacy` is removed, this test will be removed as well.
7956         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7957         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7958         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7959         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7960
7961         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7962
7963         let (payment_hash, payment_secret_1) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_legacy(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
7964
7965         // We should fail to register the same payment hash twice, at least until we've connected a
7966         // block with time 7200 + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1.
7967         if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
7968                 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
7969         } else { panic!(); }
7970         let mut block = {
7971                 let node_1_blocks = nodes[1].blocks.lock().unwrap();
7972                 Block {
7973                         header: BlockHeader {
7974                                 version: 0x2000000,
7975                                 prev_blockhash: node_1_blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(),
7976                                 merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(),
7977                                 time: node_1_blocks.len() as u32 + 7200, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
7978                         txdata: vec![],
7979                 }
7980         };
7981         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
7982         if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
7983                 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
7984         } else { panic!(); }
7985
7986         // If we then connect the second block, we should be able to register the same payment hash
7987         // again (this time getting a new payment secret).
7988         block.header.prev_blockhash = block.header.block_hash();
7989         block.header.time += 1;
7990         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
7991         let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
7992         assert_ne!(payment_secret_1, our_payment_secret);
7993
7994         {
7995                 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7996                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
7997                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7998                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7999                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8000                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8001                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8002         }
8003         // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8004         // values from previous calls.
8005         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8006         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8007         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8008         match events[0] {
8009                 Event::PaymentReceived { purpose: PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret }, .. } => {
8010                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
8011                         assert_eq!(payment_secret, our_payment_secret);
8012                         // We don't actually have the payment preimage with which to claim this payment!
8013                 },
8014                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8015         }
8016 }
8017
8018 #[test]
8019 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8020         // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8021         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8022         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8023         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8024         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8025
8026         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8027
8028         let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8029         let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8030         let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8031         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8032
8033         // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8034         // resulting events.
8035         macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8036                 ($payment_hash: expr) => {
8037                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8038                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8039                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8040                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8041                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8042
8043                         // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8044                         // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8045                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8046                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash: $payment_hash }]);
8047                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8048
8049                         // We should fail the payment back
8050                         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8051                         match events.pop().unwrap() {
8052                                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8053                                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8054                                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8055                                 },
8056                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8057                         }
8058                 }
8059         }
8060
8061         let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8062         // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8063         let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8064
8065         // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8066         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8067         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(our_payment_hash);
8068         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8069
8070         // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8071         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(random_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8072         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8073         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8074
8075         // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8076         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret), PaymentId(random_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8077         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8078         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8079 }
8080
8081 #[test]
8082 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8083         // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8084         // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8085         // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus
8086         // error.
8087         //
8088         // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8089         // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8090         // commitment at same time.
8091
8092         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8093         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8094         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8095         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8096
8097         // Create some initial channel
8098         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8099         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8100
8101         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8102         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8103
8104         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8105         let (preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
8106
8107         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8108         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8109         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8110         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8111         let watchtower = {
8112                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8113                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8114                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8115                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8116                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8117                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8118                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8119                 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8120                 watchtower
8121         };
8122         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8123         let block = Block { header, txdata: vec![] };
8124         // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8125         // transaction lock time requirements here.
8126         chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (block.clone(), 0));
8127         watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, 200);
8128
8129         // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8130         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage);
8131         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8132         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
8133
8134         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8135         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8136         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8137         if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8138                 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8139                         assert_eq!(watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure);
8140                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8141                 } else { assert!(false); }
8142         } else { assert!(false); };
8143         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8144         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8145         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8146         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8147 }
8148
8149 #[test]
8150 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8151         // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8152         // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8153         // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8154         // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8155
8156         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8157         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8158         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8159         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8160
8161         // Create some initial channel
8162         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8163         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8164
8165         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8166         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8167
8168         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8169         route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8170
8171         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8172         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8173         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8174         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8175         let watchtower_alice = {
8176                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8177                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8178                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8179                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8180                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8181                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8182                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8183                 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8184                 watchtower
8185         };
8186         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8187         let block = Block { header, txdata: vec![] };
8188         // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8189         // transaction lock time requirements here.
8190         chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as usize, (block.clone(), 0));
8191         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8192
8193         // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8194         {
8195                 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8196                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8197                 txn.clear();
8198         }
8199
8200         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8201         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8202         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8203         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8204         let watchtower_bob = {
8205                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8206                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8207                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8208                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8209                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8210                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8211                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8212                 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8213                 watchtower
8214         };
8215         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8216         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8217
8218         // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8219         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8220         {
8221                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8222         }
8223         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8224
8225         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8226         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8227         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8228         if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8229                 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8230                         // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8231                         assert_eq!(watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure);
8232                         assert_eq!(watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8233                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8234                 } else { assert!(false); }
8235         } else { assert!(false); };
8236         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8237         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8238
8239         //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8240         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8241         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8242
8243         // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8244         let bob_state_y;
8245         {
8246                 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8247                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8248                 bob_state_y = txn[0].clone();
8249                 txn.clear();
8250         };
8251
8252         // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8253         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8254         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![bob_state_y.clone()] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8255         {
8256                 let htlc_txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8257                 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 1);
8258                 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8259         }
8260 }
8261
8262 #[test]
8263 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8264         // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8265         // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8266         // message).
8267         //
8268         // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8269         // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8270         //
8271         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8272         // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8273         // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8274         // before receiving funding_signed.
8275         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8276         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8277         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8278         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8279
8280         // Create an initial channel
8281         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8282         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8283         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_chan_msg);
8284         let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8285         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_chan_msg);
8286
8287         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8288         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8289
8290         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8291         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8292
8293         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8294         let channel_id = crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
8295         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8296         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8297         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Hi".to_string() }, true);
8298 }
8299
8300 #[test]
8301 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8302         // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8303         // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8304         // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8305         // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
8306         // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
8307         // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
8308
8309         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8310         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8311         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8312         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8313
8314         // Create some initial channels
8315         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8316
8317         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
8318         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
8319         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
8320         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8321         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
8322         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
8323
8324         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8325         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8326         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] });
8327         // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
8328         // this test before #653 fix.
8329         chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
8330         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8331         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8332         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8333         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
8334
8335         let htlc_timeout = {
8336                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8337                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
8338                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8339                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
8340                 node_txn[1].clone()
8341         };
8342
8343         let header_201 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8344         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_201, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout.clone()] });
8345         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8346         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
8347 }
8348
8349 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
8350         // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
8351         // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
8352         // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
8353         //
8354         // Steps of the test:
8355         // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
8356         // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
8357         // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
8358         // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
8359         // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
8360         //    but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
8361         // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
8362         // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
8363         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8364         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8365         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8366         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8367
8368         // Create some initial channels
8369         let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8370         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8371
8372         // Steps (1) and (2):
8373         // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
8374         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
8375
8376         // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
8377         let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
8378         check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8379         assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
8380         check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
8381         assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8382         assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
8383
8384         // Steps (3) and (4):
8385         // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
8386         // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
8387         let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
8388         let mut counterparty_node = 1; // Bob if Alice force-closes
8389
8390         // Bob force-closes
8391         if !broadcast_alice {
8392                 force_closing_node = 1;
8393                 counterparty_node = 0;
8394         }
8395         nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_ab.2, &nodes[counterparty_node].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8396         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
8397         check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
8398         check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8399         if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8400                 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
8401                         true => alice_txn.clone(),
8402                         false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
8403                 };
8404                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8405                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8406                 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8407                 if broadcast_alice {
8408                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8409                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8410                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8411                 }
8412                 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8413                 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8414         }
8415
8416         // Step (5):
8417         // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
8418         // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
8419         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8420         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8421         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
8422
8423         let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8424         assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8425         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8426         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8427         assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
8428         assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8429
8430         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8431         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false, false);
8432         // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
8433         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
8434                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8435                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8436                 match events[0] {
8437                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
8438                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8439                         },
8440                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8441                 };
8442         }
8443         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
8444         // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
8445         // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
8446         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8447
8448         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8449         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8450         let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
8451                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8452                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8453                         (*msg).clone()
8454                 },
8455                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8456         };
8457         let bob_updates = match events[1] {
8458                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
8459                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8460                         (*updates).clone()
8461                 },
8462                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8463         };
8464
8465         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
8466         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8467         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
8468         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8469
8470         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8471         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8472         let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
8473                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8474                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8475                         (*msg).clone()
8476                 },
8477                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8478         };
8479         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
8480         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8481
8482         // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
8483         // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
8484         let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
8485         if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
8486         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8487                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8488                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8489                 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
8490                 if broadcast_alice {
8491                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8492                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8493                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8494                 }
8495                 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8496                 if broadcast_alice {
8497                         // In `connect_block()`, the ChainMonitor and ChannelManager are separately notified about a
8498                         // new block being connected. The ChannelManager being notified triggers a monitor update,
8499                         // which triggers broadcasting our commitment tx and an HTLC-claiming tx. The ChainMonitor
8500                         // being notified triggers the HTLC-claiming tx redundantly, resulting in 3 total txs being
8501                         // broadcasted.
8502                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 3);
8503                         check_spends!(bob_txn[1], chan_ab.3);
8504                 } else {
8505                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8506                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8507                 }
8508         }
8509
8510         // Step (6):
8511         // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
8512         // broadcasted commitment transaction.
8513         {
8514                 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8515                 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8516                         // Bob should now have an extra broadcasted tx, for the preimage-claiming transaction.
8517                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8518                 }
8519                 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
8520                         true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
8521                         false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
8522                 };
8523                 // If Alice force-closed and Bob didn't receive her commitment transaction until after he
8524                 // received Carol's fulfill, he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction first. Else if
8525                 // Bob force closed or if he found out about Alice's commitment tx before receiving Carol's
8526                 // fulfill, then he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction second.
8527                 if broadcast_alice && !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8528                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8529                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8530                 } else {
8531                         check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8532                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8533                 }
8534         }
8535 }
8536
8537 #[test]
8538 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
8539         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
8540         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
8541         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
8542         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
8543 }
8544
8545 #[test]
8546 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
8547         // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
8548         // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
8549         //
8550         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
8551         // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
8552         // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
8553         // updating logic for the existing channel.
8554         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8555         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8556         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8557         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8558
8559         // Create an initial channel
8560         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8561         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8562         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_chan_msg);
8563         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8564
8565         // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
8566         // that it is rejected.
8567         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_chan_msg);
8568         {
8569                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8570                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8571                 match events[0] {
8572                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8573                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
8574                                 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
8575                                 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
8576                                 // move forward with it.
8577                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8578                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8579                         },
8580                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8581                 }
8582         }
8583
8584         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8585         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8586
8587         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8588         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8589
8590         let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8591         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8592         {
8593                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8594                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8595                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8596                 added_monitors.clear();
8597         }
8598         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8599
8600         let funding_outpoint = crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
8601         let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
8602
8603         // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
8604         // temporary one).
8605
8606         // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
8607         // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
8608         // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
8609         open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
8610         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_chan_msg);
8611         {
8612                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8613                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8614                 match events[0] {
8615                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8616                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8617                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8618                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8619                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8620                         },
8621                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8622                 }
8623         }
8624
8625         // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
8626         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8627         let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8628         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_chan_2_msg);
8629         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8630         create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
8631
8632         let funding_created = {
8633                 let mut a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
8634                 // Once we call `get_outbound_funding_created` the channel has a duplicate channel_id as
8635                 // another channel in the ChannelManager - an invalid state. Thus, we'd panic later when we
8636                 // try to create another channel. Instead, we drop the channel entirely here (leaving the
8637                 // channelmanager in a possibly nonsense state instead).
8638                 let mut as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.remove(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
8639                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8640                 as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
8641         };
8642         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8643         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
8644         // At this point we'll try to add a duplicate channel monitor, which will be rejected, but
8645         // still needs to be cleared here.
8646         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8647
8648         // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
8649         {
8650                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8651                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8652                 match events[0] {
8653                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8654                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8655                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8656                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
8657                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8658                         },
8659                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8660                 }
8661         }
8662
8663         // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
8664         // everything is functional.
8665         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
8666         {
8667                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8668                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8669                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8670                 added_monitors.clear();
8671         }
8672
8673         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8674         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
8675         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
8676         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
8677
8678         let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8679         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8680         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
8681
8682         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
8683 }
8684
8685 #[test]
8686 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
8687         // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
8688         //
8689         // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
8690         // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
8691         // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
8692         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8693         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8694         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8695         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8696
8697         // Create some initial channels
8698         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8699         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8700         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8701
8702         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8703         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8704         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8705
8706         // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
8707         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8708         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8709
8710         // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
8711         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8712         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8713         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
8714         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
8715         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
8716         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8717         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
8718         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8719
8720         // A null channel ID should close all channels
8721         let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8722         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8723         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
8724         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
8725         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8726         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8727         match events[0] {
8728                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
8729                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
8730                 },
8731                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8732         }
8733         match events[1] {
8734                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
8735                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
8736                 },
8737                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8738         }
8739         // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
8740         // peer_disconnected with no_connection_possible set to false, duplicating the
8741         // close-all-channels logic. That's OK, we don't want to end up not force-closing channels for
8742         // users with their own peer handling logic. We duplicate the call here, however.
8743         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8744         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8745
8746         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
8747         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8748         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8749 }
8750
8751 #[test]
8752 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
8753         // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
8754         //
8755         // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
8756         // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
8757         // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
8758         // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
8759         //
8760         // Further, if the funding transaction is consensus-valid, confirms, and is later spent, we'd
8761         // previously have crashed in `ChannelMonitor` even though we closed the channel as bogus and
8762         // gave up on it. We test this here by generating such a transaction.
8763         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8764         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8765         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8766         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8767
8768         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8769         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8770         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8771
8772         let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
8773
8774         // Create a witness program which can be spent by a 4-empty-stack-elements witness and which is
8775         // 136 bytes long. This matches our "accepted HTLC preimage spend" matching, previously causing
8776         // a panic as we'd try to extract a 32 byte preimage from a witness element without checking
8777         // its length.
8778         let mut wit_program: Vec<u8> = channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program();
8779         let wit_program_script: Script = wit_program.into();
8780         for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
8781                 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
8782                 output.script_pubkey = Script::new_v0_p2wsh(&wit_program_script.wscript_hash());
8783         }
8784
8785         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
8786         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8787         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8788
8789         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8790         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8791
8792         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8793         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
8794
8795         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
8796         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
8797         nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
8798
8799         let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
8800         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
8801         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
8802         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8803         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8804         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
8805         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
8806                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8807                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
8808                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
8809                 } else { panic!(); }
8810         } else { panic!(); }
8811         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
8812
8813         // Now confirm a spend of the (bogus) funding transaction. As long as the witness is 5 elements
8814         // long the ChannelMonitor will try to read 32 bytes from the second-to-last element, panicing
8815         // as its not 32 bytes long.
8816         let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
8817                 version: 2i32, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
8818                 input: tx.output.iter().enumerate().map(|(idx, _)| TxIn {
8819                         previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
8820                                 txid: tx.txid(),
8821                                 vout: idx as u32,
8822                         },
8823                         script_sig: Script::new(),
8824                         sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
8825                         witness: Witness::from_vec(channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness())
8826                 }).collect(),
8827                 output: vec![TxOut {
8828                         value: 1000,
8829                         script_pubkey: Script::new(),
8830                 }]
8831         };
8832         check_spends!(spend_tx, tx);
8833         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &spend_tx);
8834 }
8835
8836 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
8837         // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
8838         // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
8839         // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
8840         // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
8841         // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
8842         // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
8843         // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
8844         // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
8845         // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
8846         // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
8847         // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
8848         // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
8849         // until we learned about an additional block.
8850         //
8851         // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
8852         // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
8853         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8854         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8855         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8856         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8857         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
8858
8859         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8860         let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8861         let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
8862         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8863         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8864
8865         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8866         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8867         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8868         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8869         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
8870         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8871
8872         let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
8873         if !test_height_before_timelock {
8874                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
8875         }
8876         nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
8877                 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
8878         if test_height_before_timelock {
8879                 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
8880                 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
8881                 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8882                 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
8883         } else {
8884                 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
8885                 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
8886                 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
8887                 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
8888                 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
8889                 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
8890                 // timelock is up).
8891                 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
8892                 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
8893
8894                 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
8895                 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
8896                 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
8897                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
8898                         &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
8899                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: channel_id }]);
8900                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8901
8902                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8903                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8904                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8905                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8906                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8907                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8908                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8909                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8910                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
8911         }
8912 }
8913
8914 #[test]
8915 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
8916         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
8917         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
8918 }
8919
8920 fn do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(test_for_second_fail_panic: bool) {
8921         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8922         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8923         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8924         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8925
8926         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8927
8928         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
8929                 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
8930         let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
8931
8932         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
8933
8934         {
8935                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8936                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8937                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8938                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8939                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8940                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8941                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8942         }
8943         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8944         expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 10_000);
8945
8946         {
8947                 // Note that we use a different PaymentId here to allow us to duplicativly pay
8948                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_secret.0)).unwrap();
8949                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8950                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8951                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8952                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8953                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8954                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8955                 // At this point, nodes[1] would notice it has too much value for the payment. It will
8956                 // assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
8957                 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC. Previously, it'd also have failed back
8958                 // the first HTLC delivered above.
8959         }
8960
8961         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
8962         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
8963
8964         if test_for_second_fail_panic {
8965                 // Now we go fail back the first HTLC from the user end.
8966                 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
8967
8968                 let expected_destinations = vec![
8969                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
8970                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
8971                 ];
8972                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1],  expected_destinations);
8973                 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
8974
8975                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8976                 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8977                 assert_eq!(fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 2);
8978
8979                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8980                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
8981                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
8982
8983                 let failure_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8984                 assert_eq!(failure_events.len(), 2);
8985                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
8986                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[1] {} else { panic!(); }
8987         } else {
8988                 // Let the second HTLC fail and claim the first
8989                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
8990                 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
8991
8992                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8993                 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8994                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8995                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
8996
8997                 expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
8998
8999                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
9000         }
9001 }
9002
9003 #[test]
9004 fn test_dup_htlc_second_fail_panic() {
9005         // Previously, if we received two HTLCs back-to-back, where the second overran the expected
9006         // value for the payment, we'd fail back both HTLCs after generating a `PaymentReceived` event.
9007         // Then, if the user failed the second payment, they'd hit a "tried to fail an already failed
9008         // HTLC" debug panic. This tests for this behavior, checking that only one HTLC is auto-failed.
9009         do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(true);
9010 }
9011
9012 #[test]
9013 fn test_dup_htlc_second_rejected() {
9014         // Test that if we receive a second HTLC for an MPP payment that overruns the payment amount we
9015         // simply reject the second HTLC but are still able to claim the first HTLC.
9016         do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(false);
9017 }
9018
9019 #[test]
9020 fn test_inconsistent_mpp_params() {
9021         // Test that if we recieve two HTLCs with different payment parameters we fail back the first
9022         // such HTLC and allow the second to stay.
9023         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9024         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9025         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9026         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9027
9028         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9029         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9030         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9031         let chan_2_3 =create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9032
9033         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id())
9034                 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
9035         let mut route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 15_000_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
9036         assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9037         route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9038                 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9039                 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9040                         core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9041         });
9042         let payment_params_opt = Some(payment_params);
9043
9044         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[3]);
9045
9046         let cur_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
9047         let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
9048
9049         let session_privs = {
9050                 // We create a fake route here so that we start with three pending HTLCs, which we'll
9051                 // ultimately have, just not right away.
9052                 let mut dup_route = route.clone();
9053                 dup_route.paths.push(route.paths[1].clone());
9054                 nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &dup_route).unwrap()
9055         };
9056         {
9057                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
9058                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9059
9060                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9061                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9062                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), false, None);
9063         }
9064         assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9065
9066         {
9067                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 14_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
9068                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9069
9070                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9071                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9072                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9073
9074                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9075                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9076
9077                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9078                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9079
9080                 let mut events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9081                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9082                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9083
9084                 nodes[3].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9085                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9086                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg, true, true);
9087
9088                 // At this point, nodes[3] should notice the two HTLCs don't contain the same total payment
9089                 // amount. It will assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9090                 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC.
9091         }
9092         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[3]);
9093         nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9094         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[3], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9095         nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9096
9097         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
9098
9099         let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9100         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9101         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9102
9103         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }]);
9104         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9105
9106         let fail_updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9107         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9108         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], fail_updates_2.commitment_signed, false);
9109
9110         expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9111
9112         nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[2]).unwrap();
9113         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9114
9115         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9116         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9117         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), true, None);
9118
9119         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, our_payment_preimage);
9120 }
9121
9122 #[test]
9123 fn test_keysend_payments_to_public_node() {
9124         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9125         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9126         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9127         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9128
9129         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9130         let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9131         let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9132         let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9133         let route_params = RouteParameters {
9134                 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9135                 final_value_msat: 10000,
9136                 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9137         };
9138         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
9139         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9140         let route = find_route(&payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
9141
9142         let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9143         let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(test_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9144         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9145         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9146         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9147         let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9148         let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9149         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9150         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9151 }
9152
9153 #[test]
9154 fn test_keysend_payments_to_private_node() {
9155         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9156         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9157         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9158         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9159
9160         let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9161         let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9162         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
9163         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
9164
9165         let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9166         let route_params = RouteParameters {
9167                 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9168                 final_value_msat: 10000,
9169                 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9170         };
9171         let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9172         let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9173         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
9174         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9175         let route = find_route(
9176                 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9177                 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
9178         ).unwrap();
9179
9180         let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9181         let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(test_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9182         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9183         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9184         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9185         let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9186         let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9187         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9188         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9189 }
9190
9191 #[test]
9192 fn test_double_partial_claim() {
9193         // Test what happens if a node receives a payment, generates a PaymentReceived event, the HTLCs
9194         // time out, the sender resends only some of the MPP parts, then the user processes the
9195         // PaymentReceived event, ensuring they don't inadvertently claim only part of the full payment
9196         // amount.
9197         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9198         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9199         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9200         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9201
9202         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9203         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9204         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9205         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9206
9207         let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], 15_000_000);
9208         assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9209         route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9210                 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9211                 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9212                         core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9213         });
9214
9215         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
9216         // nodes[3] has now received a PaymentReceived event...which it will take some (exorbitant)
9217         // amount of time to respond to.
9218
9219         // Connect some blocks to time out the payment
9220         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
9221         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // To get the same height for sending later
9222
9223         let failed_destinations = vec![
9224                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
9225                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
9226         ];
9227         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations);
9228
9229         pass_failed_payment_back(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_hash);
9230
9231         // nodes[1] now retries one of the two paths...
9232         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9233         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9234
9235         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9236         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9237         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
9238
9239         // At this point nodes[3] has received one half of the payment, and the user goes to handle
9240         // that PaymentReceived event they got hours ago and never handled...we should refuse to claim.
9241         nodes[3].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9242         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9243         assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9244 }
9245
9246 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
9247 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
9248 enum ExposureEvent {
9249         /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
9250         AtHTLCForward,
9251         /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
9252         AtHTLCReception,
9253         /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
9254         AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
9255 }
9256
9257 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool) {
9258         // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
9259         // policy.
9260         //
9261         // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
9262         // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
9263         // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
9264         // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
9265         // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
9266         // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
9267         // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
9268         // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
9269
9270         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9271         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
9272         config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = 5_000_000; // default setting value
9273         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9274         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
9275         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9276
9277         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9278         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9279         open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
9280         open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
9281         if on_holder_tx {
9282                 open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9283         }
9284         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel);
9285         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9286         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
9287
9288         let opt_anchors = false;
9289
9290         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9291
9292         if on_holder_tx {
9293                 if let Some(mut chan) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&temporary_channel_id) {
9294                         chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9295                 }
9296         }
9297
9298         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9299         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9300         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9301
9302         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9303         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9304
9305         let (channel_ready, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9306         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9307         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9308
9309         let dust_buffer_feerate = {
9310                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
9311                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
9312                 chan.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64
9313         };
9314         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9315         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9316
9317         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9318         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9319
9320         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 25;
9321         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
9322
9323         if on_holder_tx {
9324                 if dust_outbound_balance {
9325                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9326                         // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9327                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
9328                         for i in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9329                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9330                                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9331                         }
9332                 } else {
9333                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9334                         // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9335                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
9336                         for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9337                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9338                         }
9339                 }
9340         } else {
9341                 if dust_outbound_balance {
9342                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9343                         // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9344                         for i in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9345                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9346                                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9347                         }
9348                 } else {
9349                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9350                         // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9351                         for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9352                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9353                         }
9354                 }
9355         }
9356
9357         let dust_overflow = dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx + 1);
9358         if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
9359                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9360                 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9361                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9362                 if on_holder_tx {
9363                         let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9364                         let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9365                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9366                 } else {
9367                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9368                 }
9369         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
9370                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9371                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9372                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9373                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9374                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9375                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
9376                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9377                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9378                 if on_holder_tx {
9379                         // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
9380                         let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9381                         let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9382                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9383                 } else {
9384                         // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
9385                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9386                 }
9387         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
9388                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 2_500_000);
9389                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)) { panic!("Unexpected event at update_fee-swallowed HTLC", ); }
9390                 {
9391                         let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9392                         *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
9393                 }
9394                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9395                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9396                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure".to_string(), 1);
9397         }
9398
9399         let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9400         let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9401         added_monitors.clear();
9402 }
9403
9404 #[test]
9405 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
9406         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9407         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9408         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9409         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9410         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9411         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9412         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9413         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9414         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9415         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9416         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9417         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9418 }
9419
9420 #[test]
9421 fn test_non_final_funding_tx() {
9422         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9423         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9424         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9425         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9426
9427         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9428         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9429         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_message);
9430         let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9431         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel_message);
9432
9433         let best_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
9434
9435         let chan_id = *nodes[0].network_chan_count.borrow();
9436         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9437         let input = TxIn { previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint::null(), script_sig: bitcoin::Script::new(), sequence: Sequence(1), witness: Witness::from_vec(vec!(vec!(1))) };
9438         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9439         let mut tx = match events[0] {
9440                 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } => {
9441                         // Timelock the transaction _beyond_ the best client height + 2.
9442                         Transaction { version: chan_id as i32, lock_time: PackedLockTime(best_height + 3), input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut {
9443                                 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9444                         }]}
9445                 },
9446                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9447         };
9448         // Transaction should fail as it's evaluated as non-final for propagation.
9449         match nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()) {
9450                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
9451                         assert_eq!(format!("Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final"), err);
9452                 },
9453                 _ => panic!()
9454         }
9455
9456         // However, transaction should be accepted if it's in a +2 headroom from best block.
9457         tx.lock_time = PackedLockTime(tx.lock_time.0 - 1);
9458         assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
9459         get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9460 }
9461
9462 #[test]
9463 fn accept_busted_but_better_fee() {
9464         // If a peer sends us a fee update that is too low, but higher than our previous channel
9465         // feerate, we should accept it. In the future we may want to consider closing the channel
9466         // later, but for now we only accept the update.
9467         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9468         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9469         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9470         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9471
9472         create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9473
9474         // Set nodes[1] to expect 5,000 sat/kW.
9475         {
9476                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9477                 *feerate_lock = 5000;
9478         }
9479
9480         // If nodes[0] increases their feerate, even if its not enough, nodes[1] should accept it.
9481         {
9482                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9483                 *feerate_lock = 1000;
9484         }
9485         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9486         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9487
9488         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9489         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9490         match events[0] {
9491                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
9492                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
9493                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], commitment_signed, false);
9494                 },
9495                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9496         };
9497
9498         // If nodes[0] increases their feerate further, even if its not enough, nodes[1] should accept
9499         // it.
9500         {
9501                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9502                 *feerate_lock = 2000;
9503         }
9504         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9505         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9506
9507         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9508         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9509         match events[0] {
9510                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
9511                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
9512                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], commitment_signed, false);
9513                 },
9514                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9515         };
9516
9517         // However, if nodes[0] decreases their feerate, nodes[1] should reject it and close the
9518         // channel.
9519         {
9520                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9521                 *feerate_lock = 1000;
9522         }
9523         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9524         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9525
9526         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9527         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9528         match events[0] {
9529                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
9530                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
9531                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
9532                                 err: "Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: 1000. Our expected lower limit: 5000 (- 250)".to_owned() });
9533                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9534                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9535                 },
9536                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9537         };
9538 }