e5378e8ff0f85828b2c705870ac48aaf64dc0789
[rust-lightning] / lightning / src / ln / functional_tests.rs
1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
2 // history.
3 //
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
8 // licenses.
9
10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
13
14 use chain;
15 use chain::{ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Confirm, Listen, Watch};
16 use chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
17 use chain::channelmonitor;
18 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
19 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
20 use chain::keysinterface::{BaseSign, KeysInterface};
21 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
22 use ln::channel::{commitment_tx_base_weight, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT};
23 use ln::channelmanager::{self, ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS};
24 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
25 use ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
26 use ln::chan_utils::{OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
27 use routing::gossip::{NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate};
28 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, find_route, get_route};
29 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures};
30 use ln::msgs;
31 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
32 use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
33 use util::{byte_utils, test_utils};
34 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
35 use util::errors::APIError;
36 use util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
37 use util::config::UserConfig;
38
39 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
40 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
41 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
42 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
43 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
44 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
45 use bitcoin::{PackedLockTime, Sequence, Transaction, TxIn, TxMerkleNode, TxOut, Witness};
46 use bitcoin::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
47
48 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
49 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
50
51 use regex;
52
53 use io;
54 use prelude::*;
55 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
56 use core::default::Default;
57 use core::iter::repeat;
58 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
59 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
60
61 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
62 use ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
63
64 #[test]
65 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
66         // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
67         use ln::channel::TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS;
68         let mut cfg = UserConfig::default();
69         cfg.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1;
70         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
71         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
72         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(cfg)]);
73         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
74
75         // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
76         // funding satoshis
77         let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
78         let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat, &cfg);
79         let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
80
81         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
82         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
83
84         // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
85         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
86
87         // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
88         // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
89         let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
90                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
91                 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
92                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
93                 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
94                 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
95                         match action {
96                                 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
97                                         nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), expected_regex, 1);
98                                 },
99                                 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
100                         }
101                 } else { assert!(false); }
102         };
103
104         use ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
105
106         // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
107         insane_open_helper(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2; msg });
108         insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS; msg });
109
110         insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
111
112         insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than channel amount minus reserve \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
113
114         insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
115
116         insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
117
118         insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
119
120         insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
121
122         insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
123 }
124
125 #[test]
126 fn test_funding_exceeds_no_wumbo_limit() {
127         // Test that if a peer does not support wumbo channels, we'll refuse to open a wumbo channel to
128         // them.
129         use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO;
130         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
131         let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
132         node_cfgs[1].features = channelmanager::provided_init_features().clear_wumbo();
133         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
134         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
135
136         match nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1, 0, 42, None) {
137                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
138                         assert_eq!(format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1), err);
139                 },
140                 _ => panic!()
141         }
142 }
143
144 fn do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(send_from_initiator: bool) {
145         // A peer providing a channel_reserve_satoshis of 0 (or less than our dust limit) is insecure,
146         // but only for them. Because some LSPs do it with some level of trust of the clients (for a
147         // substantial UX improvement), we explicitly allow it. Because it's unlikely to happen often
148         // in normal testing, we test it explicitly here.
149         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
150         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
151         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
152         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
153         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
154
155         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
156         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
157         let feerate_per_kw = 253;
158         let opt_anchors = false;
159         push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
160         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
161
162         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None).unwrap();
163         let mut open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
164         if !send_from_initiator {
165                 open_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
166                 open_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
167         }
168         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_message);
169
170         // Extract the channel accept message from node1 to node0
171         let mut accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
172         if send_from_initiator {
173                 accept_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
174                 accept_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
175         }
176         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel_message);
177         {
178                 let mut lock;
179                 let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(if send_from_initiator { &nodes[1] } else { &nodes[0] }, lock, temp_channel_id);
180                 chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
181                 chan.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
182         }
183
184         let funding_tx = sign_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100_000, temp_channel_id);
185         let funding_msgs = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_tx);
186         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_msgs.0);
187
188         // nodes[0] should now be able to send the full balance to nodes[1], violating nodes[1]'s
189         // security model if it ever tries to send funds back to nodes[0] (but that's not our problem).
190         if send_from_initiator {
191                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000_000
192                         // Note that for outbound channels we have to consider the commitment tx fee and the
193                         // "fee spike buffer", which is currently a multiple of the total commitment tx fee as
194                         // well as an additional HTLC.
195                         - FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, 2, opt_anchors));
196         } else {
197                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], push_amt);
198         }
199 }
200
201 #[test]
202 fn test_counterparty_no_reserve() {
203         do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(true);
204         do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(false);
205 }
206
207 #[test]
208 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
209         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
210         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
211         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
212         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
213         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
214
215         // balancing
216         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
217
218         // A                                        B
219         // update_fee                            ->
220         // send (1) commitment_signed            -.
221         //                                       <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
222         // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
223         // (1) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
224         //                                       .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
225         // (2) RAA is delivered                  ->
226         //                                       .- send (4) commitment_signed
227         //                                       <- (3) RAA is delivered
228         // send (5) commitment_signed            -.
229         //                                       <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
230         // send (6) RAA                          -.
231         // (5) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
232         //                                       <- RAA
233         // (6) RAA is delivered                  ->
234
235         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
236         {
237                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
238                 *feerate_lock += 20;
239         }
240         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
241         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
242
243         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
244         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
245         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
246                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
247                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
248                 },
249                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
250         };
251
252         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
253
254         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
255         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
256         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
257         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
258
259         let payment_event = {
260                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
261                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
262                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
263         };
264         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
265         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
266
267         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
268         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
269         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
270         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
271         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
272         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
273
274         // deliver(1), generate (3):
275         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
276         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
277         // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
278         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
279
280         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
281         let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
282         assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
283         assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
284         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
285         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
286         assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
287         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
288
289         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
290         let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
291         assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
292         assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
293         assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
294         assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
295         assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
296         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
297
298         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
299         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
300         // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
301         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
302
303         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
304         let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
305         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
306
307         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
308         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
309
310         let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
311         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
312         match events_2[0] {
313                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
314                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
315         }
316
317         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
318         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
319 }
320
321 #[test]
322 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
323         // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
324         // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
325         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
326         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
327         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
328         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
329         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
330
331         // balancing
332         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
333
334         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
335         {
336                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
337                 *feerate_lock += 20;
338         }
339         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
340         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
341
342         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
343         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
344         let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
345                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
346                         update_fee.as_ref()
347                 },
348                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
349         };
350
351         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
352
353         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
354         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
355         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
356         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
357
358         let payment_event = {
359                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
360                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
361                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
362         };
363         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
364         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
365
366         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
367         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
368         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
369         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
370         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
371         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
372
373         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
374         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
375
376         // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
377 }
378
379 #[test]
380 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
381         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
382         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
383         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
384         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
385         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
386
387         // A                                        B
388         // update_fee/commitment_signed          ->
389         //                                       .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
390         // update_fee (never committed)          ->
391         // (3) update_fee                        ->
392         // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
393         // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
394         // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
395         //                                       <- (1) RAA delivered
396         // (3) is generated and send (4) CS      -.
397         // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
398         // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
399         //                                       <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
400         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
401         //                                          B should send no response here
402         // (4) commitment_signed delivered       ->
403         //                                       <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
404         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
405
406         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
407         let initial_feerate;
408         {
409                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
410                 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
411                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
412         }
413         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
414         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
415
416         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
417         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
418         let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
419                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
420                         (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
421                 },
422                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
423         };
424
425         // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
426         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
427         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
428         let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
429         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
430
431         // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
432         // transaction:
433         {
434                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
435                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
436         }
437         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
438         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
439         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
440
441         // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
442         let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
443                 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
444                 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
445         };
446
447         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
448
449         update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
450         // Deliver (3)
451         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
452
453         // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
454         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
455         let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
456         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
457         assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
458         assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
459         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
460         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
461         // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
462         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
463         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
464
465         // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
466         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
467         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
468         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
469         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
470
471         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
472         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
473         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
474
475         // Delever (4)
476         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
477         let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
478         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
479
480         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
481         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
482         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
483
484         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
485         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
486         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
487         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
488
489         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
490         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
491         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
492 }
493
494 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
495         // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
496         // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
497         // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
498         // Node objects.
499
500         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
501         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
502         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
503         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
504
505         if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
506                 let block = Block {
507                         header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
508                         txdata: vec![],
509                 };
510                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
511                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
512         }
513
514         if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
515         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
516         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
517
518         if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
519         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel);
520         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
521
522         if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
523         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
524
525         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
526
527         if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
528         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
529         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
530         let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
531
532         if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
533         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
534         {
535                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
536                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
537                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
538                 added_monitors.clear();
539         }
540         let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
541
542         if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
543         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
544         {
545                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
546                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
547                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
548                 added_monitors.clear();
549         }
550
551         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
552         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
553
554         if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
555         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
556
557         if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
558         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
559         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
560         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
561 }
562
563 #[test]
564 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
565         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
566         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
567         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
568         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
569         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
570         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
571         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
572         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
573         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
574         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
575         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
576         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
577         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
578         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
579         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
580         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
581         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
582         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
583 }
584
585 #[test]
586 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
587         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
588         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
589         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
590         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
591         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
592
593         {
594                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
595                 *feerate_lock += 25;
596         }
597         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
598         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
599
600         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
601         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
602         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
603                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
604                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
605                 },
606                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
607         };
608         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
609
610         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
611         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
612         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
613
614         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
615         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
616         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
617
618         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
619         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
620         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
621         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
622
623         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
624         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
625         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
626 }
627
628 #[test]
629 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
630         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
631         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
632         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
633         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
634         let channel_value = 5000;
635         let push_sats = 700;
636         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
637         let channel_id = chan.2;
638         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
639         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
640         let bs_channel_reserve_sats = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value, &default_config);
641
642         let opt_anchors = false;
643
644         // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
645         // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
646         // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
647         // remote limit.
648         let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
649         let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors)) as u32;
650         {
651                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
652                 *feerate_lock = feerate;
653         }
654         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
655         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
656         let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
657
658         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
659
660         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
661
662         // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
663         {
664                 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
665
666                 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
667                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
668                 let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000;
669                 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
670                 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
671                 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
672         }
673
674         {
675                 // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
676                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
677                 *feerate_lock += 4;
678         }
679         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
680         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
681         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
682
683         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
684
685         // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
686         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
687         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
688                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
689                 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
690                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
691                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
692                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
693                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
694         };
695         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
696                 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
697                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
698                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
699                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
700                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
701                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
702                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
703         };
704
705         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
706         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
707                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
708
709         let res = {
710                 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
711                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
712                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
713                 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
714                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
715                         INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
716                         push_sats,
717                         channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000,
718                         opt_anchors, local_funding, remote_funding,
719                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
720                         non_buffer_feerate + 4,
721                         &mut htlcs,
722                         &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
723                 );
724                 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
725         };
726
727         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
728                 channel_id: chan.2,
729                 signature: res.0,
730                 htlc_signatures: res.1
731         };
732
733         let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
734                 channel_id: chan.2,
735                 feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
736         };
737
738         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
739
740         //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
741         //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
742         //Should produce and error.
743         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
744         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
745         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
746         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
747         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") });
748 }
749
750 #[test]
751 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
752         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
753         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
754         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
755         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
756         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
757
758         // balancing
759         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
760
761         {
762                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
763                 *feerate_lock += 20;
764         }
765         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
766         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
767
768         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
769         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
770         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
771                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
772                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
773                 },
774                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
775         };
776         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
777         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
778         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
779         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
780
781         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
782
783         // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
784         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
785         {
786                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
787                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
788                 added_monitors.clear();
789         }
790         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
791         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
792         // node[1] has nothing to do
793
794         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
795         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
796         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
797
798         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
799         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
800         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
801         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
802         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
803         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
804         // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
805
806         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
807         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
808         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
809         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
810         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
811         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
812
813         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
814         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
815         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
816         let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
817
818         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
819         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
820         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
821
822         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
823         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
824         let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
825         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
826
827         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
828         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
829         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
830
831         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
832
833         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
834         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
835         match events[0] {
836                 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
837                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
838         };
839
840         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
841
842         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
843         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
844         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
845         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
846         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
847 }
848
849 #[test]
850 fn test_update_fee() {
851         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
852         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
853         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
854         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
855         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
856         let channel_id = chan.2;
857
858         // A                                        B
859         // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
860         //                                       <- (2) revoke_and_ack
861         //                                       .- send (3) commitment_signed
862         // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
863         //                                       .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
864         //                                       <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
865         // send (6) revoke_and_ack               -.
866         //                                       <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
867         // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack            ->
868         //                                       .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
869         //                                       <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
870         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
871
872         // Create and deliver (1)...
873         let feerate;
874         {
875                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
876                 feerate = *feerate_lock;
877                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
878         }
879         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
880         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
881
882         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
883         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
884         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
885                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
886                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
887                 },
888                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
889         };
890         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
891
892         // Generate (2) and (3):
893         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
894         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
895         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
896
897         // Deliver (2):
898         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
899         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
900         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
901
902         // Create and deliver (4)...
903         {
904                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
905                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
906         }
907         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
908         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
909         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
910         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
911         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
912                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
913                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
914                 },
915                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
916         };
917
918         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
919         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
920         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
921         // ... creating (5)
922         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
923         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
924
925         // Handle (3), creating (6):
926         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
927         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
928         let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
929         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
930
931         // Deliver (5):
932         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
933         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
934         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
935
936         // Deliver (6), creating (7):
937         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
938         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
939         assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
940         assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
941         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
942         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
943         assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
944         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
945
946         // Deliver (7)
947         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
948         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
949         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
950         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
951
952         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
953         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
954         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
955
956         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
957         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
958         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
959         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
960         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
961 }
962
963 #[test]
964 fn fake_network_test() {
965         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
966         // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
967         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
968         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
969         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
970         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
971
972         // Create some initial channels
973         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
974         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
975         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
976
977         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
978         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
979         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
980         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
981         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
982
983         // Send some more payments
984         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
985         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
986         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
987
988         // Test failure packets
989         let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
990         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
991
992         // Add a new channel that skips 3
993         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
994
995         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
996         send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
997         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
998         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
999         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1000         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1001         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1002
1003         // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
1004         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1005         hops.push(RouteHop {
1006                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1007                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1008                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1009                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1010                 fee_msat: 0,
1011                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1012         });
1013         hops.push(RouteHop {
1014                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1015                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1016                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1017                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1018                 fee_msat: 0,
1019                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1020         });
1021         hops.push(RouteHop {
1022                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1023                 node_features: channelmanager::provided_node_features(),
1024                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1025                 channel_features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(),
1026                 fee_msat: 1000000,
1027                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1028         });
1029         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1030         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1031         let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
1032
1033         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1034         hops.push(RouteHop {
1035                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1036                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1037                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1038                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1039                 fee_msat: 0,
1040                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1041         });
1042         hops.push(RouteHop {
1043                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1044                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1045                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1046                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1047                 fee_msat: 0,
1048                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1049         });
1050         hops.push(RouteHop {
1051                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1052                 node_features: channelmanager::provided_node_features(),
1053                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1054                 channel_features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(),
1055                 fee_msat: 1000000,
1056                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1057         });
1058         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1059         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1060         let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1061
1062         // Claim the rebalances...
1063         fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1064         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1065
1066         // Close down the channels...
1067         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1068         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1069         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1070         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1071         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1072         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1073         close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1074         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1075         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1076         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1077         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1078         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1079 }
1080
1081 #[test]
1082 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1083         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1084         // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1085         // commitment dance rounds.
1086         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1087         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1088         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1089         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1090         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1091         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1092
1093         let mut payments = Vec::new();
1094         for _ in 0..::ln::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
1095                 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1096                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
1097                 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1098         }
1099         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1100
1101         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1102         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1103         let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1104         assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1105
1106         // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1107         // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1108         // another HTLC.
1109         let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1110         {
1111                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1112                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1113                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1114                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
1115         }
1116
1117         // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1118         let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1119         {
1120                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
1121                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1122         }
1123
1124         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1125         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1126         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1127         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1128
1129         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1130         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1131         // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1132         // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1133         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1134         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
1135         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1136
1137         let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1138         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1139         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1140
1141         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1142
1143         // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1144         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1145         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1146         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1147
1148         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1149         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1150         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1151         let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1152
1153         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1154         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1155         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1156
1157         for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1158                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1159         }
1160         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1161         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1162         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1163         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1164         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1165
1166         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1167         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1168         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1169         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1170         let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1171
1172         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1173         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1174
1175         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1176
1177         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1178         assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1179         for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1180                 match event {
1181                         &Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1182                                 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1183                         },
1184                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1185                 };
1186         }
1187
1188         for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1189                 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1190         }
1191
1192         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1193 }
1194
1195 #[test]
1196 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1197         // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1198         // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1199         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1200         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1201         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1202         let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1203
1204         // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1205         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1206         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1207         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1208         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1209         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1210
1211         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1212
1213         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1214         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1215
1216         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1217         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1218
1219         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1220         fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1221         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1222 }
1223
1224 #[test]
1225 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1226         // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1227         // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1228         // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1229         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1230         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1231         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1232         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1233
1234         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1235
1236         // balancing
1237         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1238
1239         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1240
1241         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1242         let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
1243         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1244
1245         // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1246         nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1247         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, 800_000);
1248         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1249
1250         // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1251         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1252
1253         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1254         let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1255         for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1256                 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1257                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1258                 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1259                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1260                 }
1261         }
1262         assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1263
1264         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1265         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1266         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1267         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1268
1269         let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1270         assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 5);
1271
1272         check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]); // Immediate HTLC claim with preimage
1273         check_spends!(claim_txn[1], chan_1.3); // Alternative commitment tx
1274         check_spends!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[1]); // HTLC spend in alternative commitment tx
1275
1276         check_spends!(claim_txn[3], remote_txn[0]);
1277         check_spends!(claim_txn[4], remote_txn[0]);
1278         let preimage_tx = &claim_txn[0];
1279         let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if claim_txn[3].input[0].previous_output == preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output {
1280                 (&claim_txn[3], &claim_txn[4])
1281         } else {
1282                 (&claim_txn[4], &claim_txn[3])
1283         };
1284
1285         assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1286         assert_eq!(preimage_bump_tx.input.len(), 1);
1287
1288         assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1289         assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1290         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1291
1292         assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input.len(), 1);
1293         assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1294         check_spends!(timeout_tx, remote_txn[0]);
1295         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1296
1297         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1298         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1299         for e in events {
1300                 match e {
1301                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1302                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
1303                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1304                                 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1305                         },
1306                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1307                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1308                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1309                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1310                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1311                                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1312                         },
1313                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1314                 }
1315         }
1316 }
1317
1318 #[test]
1319 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1320         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1321         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1322         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1323         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1324         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1325
1326         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1327         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1328
1329         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1330         let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2), 1 + 1, get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2));
1331         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1332         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send + 1);
1333         let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).err().unwrap();
1334         match err {
1335                 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(ref fails) => {
1336                         match &fails[0] {
1337                                 &APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ref err} =>
1338                                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)),
1339                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1340                         }
1341                 },
1342                 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1343         }
1344         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1345         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1346
1347         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1348 }
1349
1350 #[test]
1351 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1352         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1353         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1354         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1355         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1356         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1357
1358         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460001);
1359         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1360         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1361         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1362
1363         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1364
1365         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1366         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3460001, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1367         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1368         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1369                 channel_id: chan.2,
1370                 htlc_id: 0,
1371                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1372                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1373                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1374                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1375         };
1376
1377         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1378
1379         // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1380         // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1381         // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1382
1383         let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1384
1385         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1386
1387         // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1388         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1389         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1390                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1391                 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1392                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1393                 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1394                 chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1395
1396                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1397                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1398                  chan_signer.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1399                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1400                  chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1401         };
1402         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1403                 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1404                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1405                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1406                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1407                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1408                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1409                  chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1410         };
1411
1412         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1413         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1414                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
1415
1416         // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1417         // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1418         let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1419
1420         let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1421                 offered: false,
1422                 amount_msat: 3460001,
1423                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1424                 payment_hash,
1425                 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1426         };
1427
1428         let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1429
1430         let res = {
1431                 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1432                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1433                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1434                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1435                         commitment_number,
1436                         95000,
1437                         local_chan_balance,
1438                         local_chan.opt_anchors(), local_funding, remote_funding,
1439                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1440                         feerate_per_kw,
1441                         &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1442                         &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1443                 );
1444                 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1445         };
1446
1447         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1448                 channel_id: chan.2,
1449                 signature: res.0,
1450                 htlc_signatures: res.1
1451         };
1452
1453         // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1454         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1455         let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1456
1457         // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1458         let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1459                 channel_id: chan.2,
1460                 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1461                 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point
1462         };
1463         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1464
1465         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1466         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1467         // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1468         match events[0] {
1469                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1470                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1471                         update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1472                 },
1473                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1474         };
1475         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1476                 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", ::hex::encode(raa_msg.channel_id)), 1);
1477
1478         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1479 }
1480
1481 #[test]
1482 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1483         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1484         // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1485         // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1486         // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1487         // this situation.
1488         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1489         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1490         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1491         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1492         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1493         let opt_anchors = false;
1494
1495         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1496         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1497
1498         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1499
1500         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1501
1502         // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1503         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1504                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1505         }
1506
1507         // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1508         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1509         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1510                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1511         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1512         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1513 }
1514
1515 #[test]
1516 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1517         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1518         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1519         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1520         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1521         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1522         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1523         let opt_anchors = false;
1524
1525         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1526         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1527         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1528         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1529         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1530         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1531         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1532
1533         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1534         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1535                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1536         }
1537
1538         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 700_000);
1539         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1540         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1541         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1542         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1543         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1544         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 700_000, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1545         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1546         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1547                 channel_id: chan.2,
1548                 htlc_id: MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64,
1549                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1550                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1551                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1552                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1553         };
1554
1555         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1556         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1557         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1558         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1559         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1560         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1561         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1562         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() });
1563 }
1564
1565 #[test]
1566 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1567         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1568         // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1569         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1570         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1571
1572         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1573         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1574         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1575         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1576         let opt_anchors = false;
1577
1578         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1579         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1580         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1581         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1582         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1583         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1584         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1585
1586         let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1587                 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1588         // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1589         // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1590         // commitment transaction fee.
1591         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1592
1593         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1594         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1595                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1596         }
1597
1598         // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1599         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt + 1);
1600         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1601                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1602 }
1603
1604 #[test]
1605 fn test_chan_init_feerate_unaffordability() {
1606         // Test that we will reject channel opens which do not leave enough to pay for any HTLCs due to
1607         // channel reserve and feerate requirements.
1608         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1609         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1610         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1611         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1612         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1613         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1614         let opt_anchors = false;
1615
1616         // Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
1617         // HTLC.
1618         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1619         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1620         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None).unwrap_err(),
1621                 APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
1622
1623         // During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
1624         // requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
1625         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1626         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None).unwrap();
1627         let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1628         open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
1629         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_msg);
1630
1631         let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1632         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
1633         match msg_events[0] {
1634                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
1635                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve");
1636                 },
1637                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1638         }
1639 }
1640
1641 #[test]
1642 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1643         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1644         // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1645         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1646         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1647         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1648         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1649         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1650
1651         let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1652         // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1653         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1654         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1655         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1656         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1657
1658         // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1659         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1660         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1661         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1662         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1663         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1664
1665         // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1666         // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1667         // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1668         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1669 }
1670
1671 #[test]
1672 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1673         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1674         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1675         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1676         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1677         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1678         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1679
1680         let feemsat = 239;
1681         let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1682         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1683         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1684         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1685
1686         // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1687         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1688         let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1689         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1690
1691         // Add a pending HTLC.
1692         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1693         let payment_event_1 = {
1694                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1695                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1696
1697                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1698                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1699                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1700         };
1701         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1702
1703         // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1704         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2, opt_anchors);
1705         let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1706         let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1707         let (route_2, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_2);
1708
1709         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1710         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1711         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1712         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1713         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1714         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, &None, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1715         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1);
1716         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1717                 channel_id: chan.2,
1718                 htlc_id: 1,
1719                 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1720                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1721                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1722                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1723         };
1724
1725         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1726         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1727         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1728         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1729         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1730         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1731         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1732         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() });
1733 }
1734
1735 #[test]
1736 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1737         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1738         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1739         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1740         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1741         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1742         let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1743         let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1744         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1745         assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1746         assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1747
1748         let reserve = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config);
1749         assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1750         assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1751
1752         assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1753         assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1754 }
1755
1756 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
1757         (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1758 }
1759
1760 #[test]
1761 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1762         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1763         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1764         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1765         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1766         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1767         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1768         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1769         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1770         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1771         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1772
1773         let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1774         let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1775
1776         let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1777         let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1778
1779         macro_rules! expect_forward {
1780                 ($node: expr) => {{
1781                         let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1782                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1783                         check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1784                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1785                         payment_event
1786                 }}
1787         }
1788
1789         let feemsat = 239; // set above
1790         let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1791         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1792         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1793
1794         let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1795
1796         // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1797         {
1798                 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id())
1799                         .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features()).with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1800                 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], payment_params, recv_value_0, TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
1801                 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1802                 assert!(route.paths[0].iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1803
1804                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1805                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1806                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1807                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
1808         }
1809
1810         // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1811         // nodes[0]'s wealth
1812         loop {
1813                 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1814                 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1815                 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1816                 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1817                 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1818                 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1819                 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1820                         break;
1821                 }
1822
1823                 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id())
1824                         .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features()).with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1825                 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, recv_value_0, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
1826                 let (payment_preimage, ..) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], recv_value_0);
1827                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
1828
1829                 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1830                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1831                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1832                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1833                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1834                 );
1835
1836                 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1837                 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1838                 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1839                 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1840                 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1841         }
1842
1843         // adding pending output.
1844         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1845         // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1846         // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1847         // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1848         // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1849         // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1850         // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1851         // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1852         // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1853         // policy.
1854         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1855         let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1856         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1857
1858         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1859         let payment_event_1 = {
1860                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1861                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1862
1863                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1864                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1865                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1866         };
1867         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1868
1869         // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1870         let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1871         {
1872                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_2 + 1);
1873                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1874                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1875                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1876         }
1877
1878         // split the rest to test holding cell
1879         let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1880         let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1881         let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1882         let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1883         {
1884                 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1885                 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1886         }
1887
1888         // now see if they go through on both sides
1889         let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1890         // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1891         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21, &Some(our_payment_secret_21)).unwrap();
1892         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1893         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1894         assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1895
1896         // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1897         {
1898                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22+1);
1899                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1900                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1901                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1902                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 2);
1903         }
1904
1905         let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1906         // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1907         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22, &Some(our_payment_secret_22)).unwrap();
1908         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1909         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1910         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1911
1912         // flush the pending htlc
1913         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1914         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1915         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1916
1917         // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1918         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1919         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1920         let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1921
1922         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
1923         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1924         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1925         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1926
1927         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1928         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1929         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1930
1931         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1932
1933         let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1934         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
1935         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
1936
1937         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1938         expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
1939
1940         // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
1941         assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
1942         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
1943         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
1944         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
1945         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1946
1947         let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1948         assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
1949         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
1950         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
1951
1952         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
1953         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1954
1955         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1956         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1957         match events[0] {
1958                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat } => {
1959                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
1960                         assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amount_msat);
1961                         match &purpose {
1962                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1963                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1964                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
1965                                 },
1966                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1967                         }
1968                 },
1969                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1970         }
1971         match events[1] {
1972                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat } => {
1973                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
1974                         assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amount_msat);
1975                         match &purpose {
1976                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1977                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1978                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
1979                                 },
1980                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1981                         }
1982                 },
1983                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1984         }
1985
1986         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
1987         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
1988         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
1989
1990         let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1, opt_anchors);
1991         let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
1992         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
1993
1994         let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
1995         let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
1996         let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1997         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
1998         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
1999
2000         let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2001         assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
2002 }
2003
2004 #[test]
2005 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
2006         // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
2007         // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
2008         // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
2009         // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
2010         // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
2011         // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
2012         // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
2013         // To test this we:
2014         //  * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
2015         //    you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
2016         //    you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
2017         //  * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
2018         //  * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
2019         //    the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
2020         //  * deliver the first fulfill from B
2021         //  * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
2022         //    claim,
2023         //  * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
2024         //    This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
2025         //    removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
2026         //  * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
2027         //    of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
2028         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2029         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2030         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2031         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2032         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2033
2034         let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2035         // Route the first two HTLCs.
2036         let payment_value_1 = b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000;
2037         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_value_1);
2038         let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20_000);
2039
2040         // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
2041         let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
2042         let send_1 = {
2043                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_3, &Some(payment_secret_3)).unwrap();
2044                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2045                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2046                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2047                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2048         };
2049
2050         // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
2051         // initial fulfill/CS.
2052         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
2053         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, payment_value_1);
2054         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2055         let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2056
2057         // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
2058         // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
2059         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
2060         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000);
2061         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2062         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2063
2064         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2065         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
2066         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2067         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2068         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
2069
2070         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
2071         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
2072         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2073         // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
2074         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2075
2076         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2077         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2078         let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2079
2080         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2081         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2082         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2083
2084         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2085         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2086         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2087
2088         // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
2089         // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2090         // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
2091         // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
2092         // on-chain as necessary).
2093         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2094         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
2095         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2096         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2097         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
2098
2099         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2100         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2101         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2102
2103         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2104         expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2105
2106         // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2107         // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2108         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2109         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2110         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2111         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2112
2113         // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2114         // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2115         let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2116         let send_2 = {
2117                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_4, &Some(payment_secret_4)).unwrap();
2118                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2119                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2120                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2121                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2122         };
2123
2124         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2125         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2126         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2127         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2128
2129         // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2130
2131         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2132         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2133         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2134
2135         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2136         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2137
2138         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2139         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2140         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2141         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2142
2143         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2144         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2145         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2146
2147         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2148         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2149
2150         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2151         expect_payment_received!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2152
2153         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2154         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2155 }
2156
2157 #[test]
2158 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2159         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2160         // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2161         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2162         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2163         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2164         let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2165
2166         // Create some initial channels
2167         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2168         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2169         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2170         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2171
2172         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2173         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2174         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2175         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2176         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2177         connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2178
2179         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2180         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2181         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2182         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2183         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2184
2185         // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2186         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_1.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2187         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2188         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2189         {
2190                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2191                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2192                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2193                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2194                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2195         }
2196         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2197         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2198         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2199         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2200         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2201
2202         // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2203         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 3_000_000);
2204
2205         // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2206         // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2207         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_2.2, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2208         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2209         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2210         {
2211                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2212                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2213                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2214                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2215                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2216                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2217         }
2218         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2219         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2220         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2221         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2222         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2223
2224         macro_rules! claim_funds {
2225                 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
2226                         {
2227                                 $node.node.claim_funds($preimage);
2228                                 expect_payment_claimed!($node, $payment_hash, 3_000_000);
2229                                 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2230
2231                                 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2232                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2233                                 match events[0] {
2234                                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2235                                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2236                                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2237                                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2238                                         },
2239                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2240                                 };
2241                         }
2242                 }
2243         }
2244
2245         // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2246         // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2247         nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_3.2, &nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2248         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2249         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2250         let node2_commitment_txid;
2251         {
2252                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2253                 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2254                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2255                 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2256
2257                 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2258                 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1);
2259                 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2260                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2261                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2262         }
2263         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2264         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2265         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2266         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2267         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2268
2269         // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2270         // confusing us in the following tests.
2271         let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2272
2273         // One pending HTLC to time out:
2274         let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[3], &[&nodes[4]], 3_000_000);
2275         // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2276         // buffer space).
2277
2278         let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2279                 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2280                 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2281                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2282                 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2283                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2284                                 msg.clone()
2285                         },
2286                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2287                 };
2288                 match events[1] {
2289                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2290                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2291                         },
2292                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2293                 }
2294                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2295
2296                 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2297                 {
2298                         let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2299                         node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2300                                 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2301                                         false
2302                                 } else { true }
2303                         });
2304                 }
2305
2306                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2307
2308                 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2309                 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2);
2310
2311                 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2312                 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2313                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2314                 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2315                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2316                                 msg.clone()
2317                         },
2318                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2319                 };
2320                 match events[1] {
2321                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2322                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2323                         },
2324                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2325                 }
2326                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2327                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2328
2329                 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2330                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2331                 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2332         };
2333         nodes[3].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2334         nodes[4].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2335         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2336         assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2337
2338         assert_eq!(nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon),
2339                 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
2340         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2341         check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2342 }
2343
2344 #[test]
2345 fn test_justice_tx() {
2346         // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2347         let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2348         alice_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2349         alice_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2350         alice_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2351         let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2352         bob_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2353         bob_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2354         bob_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2355         let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2356         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2357         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2358         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2359         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2360         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2361         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2362         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen;
2363         // Create some new channels:
2364         let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2365
2366         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2367         let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2368         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2369         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2370         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2371         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2372         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2373         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2374         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2375         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2376         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2377         // Revoke the old state
2378         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2379
2380         {
2381                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2382                 {
2383                         let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2384                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2385                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2386
2387                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2388                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2389                         node_txn.truncate(1);
2390                 }
2391                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2392                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2393                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2394
2395                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2396                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2397                 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2398                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2399                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2400                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2401                 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2402                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2403                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2404         }
2405         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2406
2407         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2408         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2409
2410         // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
2411         // Create some new channels:
2412         let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2413         {
2414                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2415                 node_txn.clear();
2416         }
2417
2418         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2419         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2420         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2421         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2422         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2423         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2424         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2425         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2426         // Revoke the old state
2427         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2428         {
2429                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2430                 {
2431                         let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2432                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); //ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2433                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2434
2435                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2436                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2437                 }
2438                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2439                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2440
2441                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2442                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2443                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2444                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2445                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2446                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2447                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2448         }
2449         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2450         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2451         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2452 }
2453
2454 #[test]
2455 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2456         // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2457         // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2458         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2459         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2460         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2461         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2462         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2463         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2464         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2465         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2466         // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2467         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2468         // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2469         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2470
2471         // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2472         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2473         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2474         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2475         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2476         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2477
2478         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2479         check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
2480
2481         // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2482         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2483         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2484         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2485         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2486 }
2487
2488 #[test]
2489 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2490         // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2491         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2492         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2493         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2494         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2495         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2496
2497         // Create some new channel:
2498         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2499
2500         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2501         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2502         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2503         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2504         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2505
2506         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2507         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2508         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2509         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2510         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2511         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2512         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2513         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2514         check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2515
2516         //Revoke the old state
2517         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2518
2519         {
2520                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2521                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2522                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2523                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2524                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2525                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2526                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2527                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2528
2529                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2530                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment
2531
2532                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2533                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2534
2535                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2536                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2537                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2538                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2539                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2540                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2541                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2542                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2543
2544                 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
2545                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2546                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
2547
2548                 // Finally, mine the penalty transaction and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2549                 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2550                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
2551                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2552                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2553         }
2554         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2555         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2556         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2557 }
2558
2559 #[test]
2560 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2561         // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2562         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2563         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2564         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2565         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2566         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2567
2568         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2569
2570         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2571         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2572         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2573         // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2574         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2575         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2576
2577         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2578         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2579
2580         //Revoke the old state
2581         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2582
2583         {
2584                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2585                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2586                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2587                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2588                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2589                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2590                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2591                 match events.last().unwrap() {
2592                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2593                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2594                 }
2595
2596                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2597                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2598
2599                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2600                 assert!(node_txn.len() == 9 || node_txn.len() == 10);
2601
2602                 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2603                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2604                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2605                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2606                 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2607                 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2608                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2609
2610                 // Justice transactions are indices 1-2-4
2611                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2612                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
2613                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
2614
2615                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2616                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2617                 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2618
2619                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2620                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2621                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2622                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2623                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2624                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2625                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2626                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2627
2628                 // Finally, mine the penalty transactions and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2629                 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2630                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[2]);
2631                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[3]);
2632                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[4]);
2633                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2634                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2635         }
2636         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2637         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2638         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2639 }
2640
2641 #[test]
2642 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2643         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2644         // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2645         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2646         // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2647         // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2648         // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2649         // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2650         // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2651         // towards B.
2652         // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2653         // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2654         // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2655         // PaymentSent event).
2656
2657         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2658         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2659         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2660         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2661
2662         // Create some initial channels
2663         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2664         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2665
2666         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2667         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2668         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2669         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2670         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2671
2672         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2673         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2674         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2675
2676         let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2677         let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2678
2679         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2680         // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2681         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2682         assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2683         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2684         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2685         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_1, 3_000_000);
2686         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2687         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, 3_000_000);
2688         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2689         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2690         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2691         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2692         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2693         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2694
2695         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2696         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2697         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2698         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2699         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx, 2*htlc-success tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2700         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5);
2701         assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2702         assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2703         assert_eq!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2704         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2705         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2706         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2707         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2708         assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2709         assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2710         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0);
2711         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0);
2712
2713         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2714         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2715         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: node_txn});
2716         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2717         {
2718                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2719                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2720                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2721                 added_monitors.clear();
2722         }
2723         let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2724         assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2725         match forwarded_events[0] {
2726                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2727                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2728         }
2729         let chan_id = Some(chan_1.2);
2730         match forwarded_events[1] {
2731                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
2732                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2733                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2734                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2735                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2736                 },
2737                 _ => panic!()
2738         }
2739         match forwarded_events[2] {
2740                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
2741                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2742                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2743                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2744                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2745                 },
2746                 _ => panic!()
2747         }
2748         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2749         {
2750                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2751                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2752                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2753                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2754                 added_monitors.clear();
2755         }
2756         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2757         match events[0] {
2758                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2759                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2760         }
2761         match events[1] {
2762                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2763                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2764         }
2765
2766         match events[2] {
2767                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2768                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2769                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2770                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2771                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2772                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2773                 },
2774                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2775         };
2776         macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2777                 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $chan_tx: expr) => { {
2778                         let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2779                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
2780                         // Node[1]: ChannelManager: 3 (commitment tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (timeout tx)
2781                         // Node[0]: ChannelManager: 3 (commtiemtn tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 HTLC-timeout
2782                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2783                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], $commitment_tx);
2784                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0);
2785                         assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time.0, 0);
2786                         if $htlc_offered {
2787                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2788                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2789                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2790                                 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2791                         } else {
2792                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2793                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2794                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2795                                 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2796                         }
2797                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], $chan_tx);
2798                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2799                         node_txn.clear();
2800                 } }
2801         }
2802         // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own local state as a fallback, suggesting an alternate
2803         // commitment transaction with a corresponding HTLC-Timeout transactions, as well as a
2804         // timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2805         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2806
2807         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2808         // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx  on A's chain
2809         let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2810         check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2811         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2812         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2813         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2814         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2815         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2816         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 6); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx + HTLC-Sucess * 2), ChannelMonitor : 3 (HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn)
2817         let commitment_spend =
2818                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2819                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2820                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2821                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2822                         &node_txn[0]
2823                 } else {
2824                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2825                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2826                         assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2827                         &node_txn[2]
2828                 };
2829
2830         check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2831         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2832         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2833         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2834         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time.0, 0);
2835         assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2836         check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3);
2837         assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2838         check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[3]);
2839         check_spends!(node_txn[5], node_txn[3]);
2840         // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
2841         // we already checked the same situation with A.
2842
2843         // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
2844         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2845         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()] });
2846         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2847         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2848         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2849         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2850         assert_eq!(events.len(), 5);
2851         let mut first_claimed = false;
2852         for event in events {
2853                 match event {
2854                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
2855                                 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
2856                                         assert!(!first_claimed);
2857                                         first_claimed = true;
2858                                 } else {
2859                                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
2860                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
2861                                 }
2862                         },
2863                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
2864                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
2865                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2866                 }
2867         }
2868         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2869 }
2870
2871 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
2872         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
2873         // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2874         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2875         // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
2876         //    B's commitment tx                 C's commitment tx
2877         //            \                                  \
2878         //         B's HTLC timeout tx               B's timeout tx
2879
2880         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2881         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2882         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2883         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2884         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2885         *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2886         *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2887
2888         // Create some intial channels
2889         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2890         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2891
2892         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
2893         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2894         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2895
2896         let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2897
2898         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2899         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2900         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2901         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
2902         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
2903         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }]);
2904         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2905
2906         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2907         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2908         match events[0] {
2909                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2910                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2911                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2912                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2913                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2914                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2915                 },
2916                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2917         };
2918         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2919         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2920         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2921         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2922         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx)
2923         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2924         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2925         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2926
2927         // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2928         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
2929         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2930         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
2931         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2932         let timeout_tx;
2933         {
2934                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2935                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-timeout), 1 timeout tx
2936                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2937                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2938
2939                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2940                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2941
2942                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2943                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2944                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2945                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2946
2947                 timeout_tx = node_txn[2].clone();
2948                 node_txn.clear();
2949         }
2950
2951         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
2952         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2953         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2954         {
2955                 // B will rebroadcast a fee-bumped timeout transaction here.
2956                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2957                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2958                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2959         }
2960
2961         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2962         {
2963                 // B may rebroadcast its own holder commitment transaction here, as a safeguard against
2964                 // some incredibly unlikely partial-eclipse-attack scenarios. That said, because the
2965                 // original commitment_tx[0] (also spending chan_2.3) has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY B really
2966                 // shouldn't broadcast anything here, and in some connect style scenarios we do not.
2967                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2968                 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
2969                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2970                 } else {
2971                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
2972                 }
2973         }
2974
2975         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
2976         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2977         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2978         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2979         match events[0] {
2980                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2981                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2982                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2983                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2984                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2985                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2986                 },
2987                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2988         };
2989
2990         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
2991         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2992         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2993
2994         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
2995         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2996
2997         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2998         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2999         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3000         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 commitment tx, ChannelMonitor : 1 timeout tx
3001         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
3002         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
3003         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
3004         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
3005         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3006 }
3007
3008 #[test]
3009 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
3010         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
3011         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
3012         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
3013 }
3014
3015 #[test]
3016 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
3017         // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
3018         // and fail backward accordingly.
3019
3020         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3021         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3022         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3023         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3024
3025         // Create some initial channels
3026         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3027         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3028
3029         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3030         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3031         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3032         // Revoke the old state
3033         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3034
3035         let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3036
3037         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3038         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3039         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3040         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3041         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3042
3043         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
3044         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3045         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3046         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3047         match events[0] {
3048                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3049                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3050                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3051                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3052                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3053                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3054
3055                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3056                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3057                         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
3058                 },
3059                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3060         }
3061 }
3062
3063 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
3064         // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
3065         // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
3066         // commitment transaction anymore.
3067         // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
3068         // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
3069         // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
3070         // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
3071         // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
3072         // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
3073         // transactions:
3074         // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
3075         //   commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
3076         // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
3077         //   and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
3078         //   commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
3079         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3080         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3081         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3082         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3083
3084         // Create some initial channels
3085         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3086         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3087
3088         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
3089         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3090         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3091         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
3092         // Revoke the old state
3093         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3094
3095         let value = if use_dust {
3096                 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
3097                 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
3098                 nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
3099         } else { 3000000 };
3100
3101         let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3102         let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3103         let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3104
3105         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash);
3106         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: first_payment_hash }]);
3107         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3108         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3109         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3110         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3111         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3112         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3113         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3114         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3115         let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
3116         // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
3117
3118         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash);
3119         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: second_payment_hash }]);
3120         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3121         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3122         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3123         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3124         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3125         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3126         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3127         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3128         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3129         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3130         // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3131         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3132         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3133         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3134
3135         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash);
3136         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: third_payment_hash }]);
3137         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3138         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3139         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3140         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3141         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3142         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3143         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3144         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3145         // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3146         // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3147         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3148         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3149         // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3150         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3151         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3152         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3153
3154         // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3155         // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3156         let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3157         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, fourth_payment_hash, &Some(fourth_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3158         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3159         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3160         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3161
3162         if deliver_bs_raa {
3163                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3164                 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3165                 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3166                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3167                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3168                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3169                 match events[0] {
3170                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3171                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3172                 };
3173                 match events[1] {
3174                         Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { .. } => { },
3175                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3176                 }
3177                 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3178                 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3179         }
3180
3181         let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
3182         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3183
3184         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3185         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3186         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3187         assert!(ANTI_REORG_DELAY > PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS); // We assume payments will also expire
3188
3189         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3190         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 2 + (nodes.len() - 1) } else { 4 + nodes.len() });
3191         match events[0] {
3192                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
3193                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
3194         }
3195         match events[1] {
3196                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3197                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3198                 },
3199                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3200         }
3201         if !deliver_bs_raa {
3202                 match events[2] {
3203                         Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3204                                 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3205                         },
3206                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3207                 }
3208                 match events[3] {
3209                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3210                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3211                 };
3212         }
3213         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3214         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3215
3216         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3217         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3218         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 1 } else { 0 }] {
3219                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3220                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3221         }
3222         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 1 }] {
3223                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
3224                         assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3225                         assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3226                 },
3227                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3228         }
3229         if deliver_bs_raa {
3230                 match events[0] {
3231                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3232                                 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3233                                 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3234                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3235                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3236                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3237                         },
3238                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3239                 }
3240         }
3241         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 3 } else { 2 }] {
3242                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3243                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3244                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3245                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3246                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3247                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3248
3249                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3250                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3251                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3252
3253                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3254
3255                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3256                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3257                         match events[0] {
3258                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref network_update, .. } => {
3259                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3260                                         // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3261                                         // that we should update our routing table for.
3262                                         if !deliver_bs_raa {
3263                                                 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3264                                         }
3265                                 },
3266                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3267                         }
3268                         match events[1] {
3269                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref network_update, .. } => {
3270                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3271                                         assert!(network_update.is_some());
3272                                 },
3273                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3274                         }
3275                         match events[2] {
3276                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref network_update, .. } => {
3277                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3278                                         assert!(network_update.is_some());
3279                                 },
3280                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3281                         }
3282                 },
3283                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3284         }
3285
3286         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3287         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3288         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3289 }
3290
3291 #[test]
3292 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3293         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3294         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3295         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3296         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3297 }
3298
3299 #[test]
3300 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3301         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3302         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3303         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3304         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3305 }
3306
3307 #[test]
3308 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3309         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3310         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3311         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3312         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3313         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3314
3315         // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3316         {
3317                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3318                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
3319                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3320
3321                 let payment_event = {
3322                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3323                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3324                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3325                 };
3326                 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3327                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3328         }
3329
3330         // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3331         let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3332         {
3333                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, failed_payment_hash, &Some(failed_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3334                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3335
3336                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3337         }
3338
3339         // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3340         {
3341                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3342
3343                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3344                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3345                 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3346                 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 50_000, &Some(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3347                 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3348                 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
3349
3350                 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3351                 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3352                         channel_id: chan.2,
3353                         htlc_id: 0,
3354                         amount_msat: 0,
3355                         payment_hash,
3356                         cltv_expiry,
3357                         onion_routing_packet,
3358                 };
3359                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3360         }
3361         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3362         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3363         // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3364         match events[0] {
3365                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3366                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3367                 },
3368                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3369         }
3370         match events[1] {
3371                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3372                         assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3373                 },
3374                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3375         }
3376         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3377         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3378 }
3379
3380 #[test]
3381 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3382         // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3383         // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3384         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3385         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3386         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3387         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3388         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3389
3390         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3391         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3392         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3393         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3394         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3395         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3396
3397         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
3398         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3399         assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
3400
3401         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3402         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
3403         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3404         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3405         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3406
3407         // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3408         // registering new transactions
3409         header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
3410         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
3411 }
3412
3413 #[test]
3414 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3415         // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3416         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3417         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3418         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3419         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3420         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3421         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3422
3423         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3424
3425         let mut payment_event = {
3426                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3427                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3428
3429                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3430                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3431                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3432         };
3433
3434         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3435         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3436
3437         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3438
3439         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3440         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3441         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3442         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3443
3444         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3445         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3446         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3447         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3448         let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3449
3450         // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3451         // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3452         // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3453
3454         nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3455         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3456         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3457         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3458         let tx = {
3459                 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3460                 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3461                 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3462                 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3463                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3464                 node_txn.remove(0)
3465         };
3466
3467         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3468
3469         // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3470         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3471         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3472         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3473
3474         // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3475         {
3476                 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3477                         .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator), &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3478         }
3479         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3480         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3481         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3482         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3483         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3484         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3485         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3486
3487         check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3488 }
3489
3490 #[test]
3491 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3492         // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3493         // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3494         // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3495         // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3496
3497         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3498         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3499         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3500         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3501         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3502
3503         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
3504
3505         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
3506         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_000_000);
3507         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3508         let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3509         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3510         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
3511
3512         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3513         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3514
3515         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3516         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3517 }
3518
3519 #[test]
3520 fn test_peer_disconnected_before_funding_broadcasted() {
3521         // Test that channels are closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` if the peer disconnects
3522         // before the funding transaction has been broadcasted.
3523         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3524         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3525         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3526         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3527
3528         // Open a channel between `nodes[0]` and `nodes[1]`, for which the funding transaction is never
3529         // broadcasted, even though it's created by `nodes[0]`.
3530         let expected_temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
3531         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3532         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel);
3533         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3534         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
3535
3536         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
3537         assert_eq!(temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3538
3539         assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
3540
3541         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3542         assert_eq!(funding_created_msg.temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3543
3544         // Even though the funding transaction is created by `nodes[0]`, the `FundingCreated` msg is
3545         // never sent to `nodes[1]`, and therefore the tx is never signed by either party nor
3546         // broadcasted.
3547         {
3548                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3549         }
3550
3551         // Ensure that the channel is closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` when the peers are
3552         // disconnected before the funding transaction was broadcasted.
3553         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3554         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3555
3556         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3557         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3558 }
3559
3560 #[test]
3561 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3562         // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3563         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3564         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3565         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3566         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3567         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3568         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3569
3570         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3571         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3572         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3573
3574         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3575         let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3576         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3577         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3578
3579         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3580         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3581         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3582
3583         let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3584         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3585         let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3586         let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3587
3588         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3589         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3590
3591         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3592         fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3593
3594         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
3595         {
3596                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3597                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3598                 match events[0] {
3599                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3600                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3601                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3602                         },
3603                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3604                 }
3605                 match events[1] {
3606                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, payment_failed_permanently, .. } => {
3607                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3608                                 assert!(payment_failed_permanently);
3609                         },
3610                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3611                 }
3612                 match events[2] {
3613                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3614                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3615                 }
3616         }
3617
3618         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3619         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3620 }
3621
3622 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3623         // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3624         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3625         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3626         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3627         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3628
3629         let mut as_channel_ready = None;
3630         if messages_delivered == 0 {
3631                 let (channel_ready, _, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3632                 as_channel_ready = Some(channel_ready);
3633                 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the channel_ready message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3634                 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3635                 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3636         } else {
3637                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3638         }
3639
3640         let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1_000_000);
3641
3642         let payment_event = {
3643                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
3644                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3645
3646                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3647                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3648                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3649         };
3650         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3651
3652         if messages_delivered < 2 {
3653                 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3654         } else {
3655                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3656                 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3657                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3658                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3659                         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3660
3661                         if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3662                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3663                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3664                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3665
3666                                 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3667                                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3668                                         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3669                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3670                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3671
3672                                         if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3673                                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3674                                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3675                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3676                                         }
3677                                 }
3678                         }
3679                 }
3680         }
3681
3682         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3683         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3684         if messages_delivered < 3 {
3685                 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3686                         // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a channel_ready prior to a
3687                         // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to channel_ready time.
3688                         //
3689                         // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a channel_ready immediately on
3690                         // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate channel_ready sent
3691                         // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3692                         //
3693                         // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3694                         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3695                 }
3696                 // Even if the channel_ready messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3697                 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3698                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3699         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3700                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3701                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3702         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3703                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3704                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3705         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3706                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3707                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3708         } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3709                 // Everything was delivered...
3710                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3711         }
3712
3713         let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3714         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3715         match events_1[0] {
3716                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3717                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3718         };
3719
3720         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3721         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3722         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3723
3724         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3725
3726         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3727         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3728         match events_2[0] {
3729                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat } => {
3730                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3731                         assert_eq!(amount_msat, 1_000_000);
3732                         match &purpose {
3733                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3734                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3735                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3736                                 },
3737                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3738                         }
3739                 },
3740                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3741         }
3742
3743         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3744         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3745         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
3746
3747         let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3748         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3749         let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3750                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3751                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3752                         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3753                         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3754                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3755                         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3756                         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3757                         (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3758                 },
3759                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3760         };
3761
3762         if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3763                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3764
3765                 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3766                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3767                 match events_4[0] {
3768                         Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3769                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3770                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3771                         },
3772                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3773                 }
3774
3775                 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3776                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3777                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3778                         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3779
3780                         if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3781                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3782                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3783                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3784
3785                                 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3786                                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3787                                         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3788                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3789                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3790
3791                                         if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3792                                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3793                                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3794                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3795                                         }
3796                                 }
3797                         }
3798                 }
3799         }
3800
3801         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3802         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3803         if messages_delivered < 2 {
3804                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3805                 if messages_delivered < 1 {
3806                         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
3807                 } else {
3808                         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3809                 }
3810         } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
3811                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3812                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3813         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3814                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3815                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3816         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3817                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3818                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3819         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3820                 // Everything was delivered...
3821                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3822         }
3823
3824         if messages_delivered == 1 || messages_delivered == 2 {
3825                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3826         }
3827
3828         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3829         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3830         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3831
3832         if messages_delivered > 2 {
3833                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3834         }
3835
3836         // Channel should still work fine...
3837         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3838         let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3839         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3840 }
3841
3842 #[test]
3843 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
3844         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
3845         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
3846         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
3847         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
3848 }
3849
3850 #[test]
3851 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
3852         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
3853         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
3854         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
3855         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
3856 }
3857
3858 #[test]
3859 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
3860         // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
3861         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3862         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3863         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3864         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
3865         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
3866         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
3867         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3868         let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3869
3870         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3871         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3872
3873         confirm_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
3874         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3875         assert!(events_1.is_empty());
3876
3877         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3878
3879         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3880         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3881
3882         confirm_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3883         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3884         assert!(events_2.is_empty());
3885
3886         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
3887         let as_reestablish = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]).pop().unwrap();
3888         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
3889         let bs_reestablish = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]).pop().unwrap();
3890
3891         // nodes[0] hasn't yet received a channel_ready, so it only sends that on reconnect.
3892         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
3893         let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3894         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3895         let as_channel_ready = match events_3[0] {
3896                 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3897                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3898                         msg.clone()
3899                 },
3900                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_3[0]),
3901         };
3902
3903         // nodes[1] received nodes[0]'s channel_ready on the first reconnect above, so it should send
3904         // announcement_signatures as well as channel_update.
3905         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish);
3906         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3907         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 3);
3908         let chan_id;
3909         let bs_channel_ready = match events_4[0] {
3910                 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3911                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3912                         chan_id = msg.channel_id;
3913                         msg.clone()
3914                 },
3915                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[0]),
3916         };
3917         let bs_announcement_sigs = match events_4[1] {
3918                 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3919                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3920                         msg.clone()
3921                 },
3922                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[1]),
3923         };
3924         match events_4[2] {
3925                 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
3926                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3927                 },
3928                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[2]),
3929         }
3930
3931         // Re-deliver nodes[0]'s channel_ready, which nodes[1] can safely ignore. It currently
3932         // generates a duplicative private channel_update
3933         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
3934         let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3935         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
3936         match events_5[0] {
3937                 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
3938                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3939                 },
3940                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_5[0]),
3941         };
3942
3943         // When we deliver nodes[1]'s channel_ready, however, nodes[0] will generate its
3944         // announcement_signatures.
3945         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_channel_ready);
3946         let events_6 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3947         assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
3948         let as_announcement_sigs = match events_6[0] {
3949                 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3950                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3951                         msg.clone()
3952                 },
3953                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_6[0]),
3954         };
3955
3956         // When we deliver nodes[1]'s announcement_signatures to nodes[0], nodes[0] should immediately
3957         // broadcast the channel announcement globally, as well as re-send its (now-public)
3958         // channel_update.
3959         nodes[0].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs);
3960         let events_7 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3961         assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
3962         let (chan_announcement, as_update) = match events_7[0] {
3963                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3964                         (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
3965                 },
3966                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_7[0]),
3967         };
3968
3969         // Finally, deliver nodes[0]'s announcement_signatures to nodes[1] and make sure it creates the
3970         // same channel_announcement.
3971         nodes[1].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs);
3972         let events_8 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3973         assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
3974         let bs_update = match events_8[0] {
3975                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3976                         assert_eq!(*msg, chan_announcement);
3977                         update_msg.clone()
3978                 },
3979                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_8[0]),
3980         };
3981
3982         // Provide the channel announcement and public updates to the network graph
3983         nodes[0].gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap();
3984         nodes[0].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
3985         nodes[0].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
3986
3987         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3988         let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3989         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
3990
3991         // Check that after deserialization and reconnection we can still generate an identical
3992         // channel_announcement from the cached signatures.
3993         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3994
3995         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
3996         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
3997         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
3998
3999         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4000         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4001         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[0].logger, node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4002         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4003         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4004         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4005                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4006         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4007
4008         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4009         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4010                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4011                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4012                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4013                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4014                         keys_manager,
4015                         fee_estimator: node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator,
4016                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4017                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4018                         logger: nodes[0].logger,
4019                         channel_monitors,
4020                 }).unwrap()
4021         };
4022         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4023         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4024
4025         assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor),
4026                 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
4027         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4028         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4029
4030         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4031 }
4032
4033 #[test]
4034 fn test_channel_ready_without_best_block_updated() {
4035         // Previously, if we were offline when a funding transaction was locked in, and then we came
4036         // back online, calling best_block_updated once followed by transactions_confirmed, we'd not
4037         // generate a channel_ready until a later best_block_updated. This tests that we generate the
4038         // channel_ready immediately instead.
4039         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4040         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4041         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4042         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4043         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
4044
4045         let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4046
4047         let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
4048         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
4049         let block_txn = [funding_tx];
4050         let conf_txn: Vec<_> = block_txn.iter().enumerate().collect();
4051         let conf_block_header = nodes[0].get_block_header(conf_height);
4052         nodes[0].node.transactions_confirmed(&conf_block_header, &conf_txn[..], conf_height);
4053
4054         // Ensure nodes[0] generates a channel_ready after the transactions_confirmed
4055         let as_channel_ready = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4056         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
4057 }
4058
4059 #[test]
4060 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
4061         // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
4062         // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
4063         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4064         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4065         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4066         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4067         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4068
4069         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
4070
4071         // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
4072         let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
4073         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
4074         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4075
4076         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4077         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4078         match events_1[0] {
4079                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4080                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4081         }
4082
4083         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
4084         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
4085         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4086
4087         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4088         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4089         match events_2[0] {
4090                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4091                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4092                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4093                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4094                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4095                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4096                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4097
4098                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4099                         let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4100                         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
4101                         match events_3[0] {
4102                                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
4103                                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
4104                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
4105                                 },
4106                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4107                         }
4108
4109                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
4110                         let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4111                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4112                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4113                 },
4114                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4115         }
4116
4117         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4118         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4119
4120         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
4121         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4122         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
4123         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
4124         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4125         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
4126
4127         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4128         let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4129         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4130         let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4131
4132         assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
4133         assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
4134
4135         assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
4136         assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
4137
4138         assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
4139
4140         assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4141         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4142         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4143         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4144         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
4145         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
4146         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
4147         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4148         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4149         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4150
4151         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
4152         let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4153         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4154         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4155         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4156         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4157         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4158         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4159
4160         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
4161         let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4162         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4163         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4164         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4165         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4166         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4167         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4168
4169         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4170         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4171         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4172         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4173
4174         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4175         let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4176         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4177         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4178
4179         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
4180         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4181         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4182
4183         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4184
4185         let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4186         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
4187         match events_5[0] {
4188                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
4189                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
4190                         match &purpose {
4191                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
4192                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
4193                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
4194                                 },
4195                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
4196                         }
4197                 },
4198                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4199         }
4200
4201         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
4202         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4203         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4204
4205         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4206         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4207 }
4208
4209 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
4210         // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
4211         // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
4212         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4213         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4214         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4215         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4216
4217         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4218
4219         let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
4220                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
4221                 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
4222                 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
4223                 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
4224                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
4225                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
4226                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4227                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4228                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4229                 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
4230                 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentReceived event(s).
4231                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
4232                 our_payment_hash
4233         } else {
4234                 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
4235         };
4236
4237         let mut block = Block {
4238                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
4239                 txdata: vec![],
4240         };
4241         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4242         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4243         let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4244         for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
4245                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
4246                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4247                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4248         }
4249
4250         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
4251
4252         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4253         let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4254         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4255         assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4256         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4257         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4258
4259         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4260         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4261         // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4262         let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(100_000).to_vec();
4263         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(block_count - 1));
4264         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4265 }
4266
4267 #[test]
4268 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4269         do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4270         do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4271 }
4272
4273 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4274         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4275         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4276         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4277         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4278         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4279         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4280         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4281
4282         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4283         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4284         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4285         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4286
4287         // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4288         let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4289         {
4290                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, first_payment_hash, &Some(first_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4291         }
4292         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4293         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4294
4295         // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4296         let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4297         let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4298         sending_node.node.send_payment(&route, second_payment_hash, &Some(second_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4299         if forwarded_htlc {
4300                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4301                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4302                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4303                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4304                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4305         }
4306         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4307
4308         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4309         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4310         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4311         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4312
4313         if forwarded_htlc {
4314                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
4315                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4316                 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4317                 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4318                 match fail_commit[0] {
4319                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4320                                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4321                                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4322                         },
4323                         _ => unreachable!(),
4324                 }
4325                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4326         } else {
4327                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4328                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4329                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[0] {
4330                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
4331                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
4332                 if let Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[1] {
4333                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
4334                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
4335         }
4336 }
4337
4338 #[test]
4339 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4340         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4341         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4342 }
4343
4344 #[test]
4345 fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4346         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4347         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4348         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4349         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4350         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4351         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4352         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4353         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4354         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4355
4356         let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4357
4358         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4359
4360         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4361         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4362         get_monitor!(nodes[0], OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id())
4363                 .write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4364
4365         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4366         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4367         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4368         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4369         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4370         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4371         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4372         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4373                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4374         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4375
4376         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4377         let config = UserConfig::default();
4378         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4379                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4380                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4381                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4382                         default_config: config,
4383                         keys_manager,
4384                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4385                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4386                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4387                         logger: &logger,
4388                         channel_monitors,
4389                 }).unwrap()
4390         };
4391         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4392         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4393
4394         assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor),
4395                 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
4396         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4397         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4398         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4399
4400         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
4401         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4402         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
4403         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4404
4405         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4406         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4407         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4408         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4409
4410         let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4411         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
4412         for node in nodes.iter() {
4413                 assert!(node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4414                 node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4415                 node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4416         }
4417
4418         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4419 }
4420
4421 #[test]
4422 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_events() {
4423         // This test makes sure the events field in ChannelManager survives de/serialization
4424         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4425         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4426         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4427         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4428         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4429         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4430         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4431         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4432         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4433
4434         // Start creating a channel, but stop right before broadcasting the funding transaction
4435         let channel_value = 100000;
4436         let push_msat = 10001;
4437         let a_flags = channelmanager::provided_init_features();
4438         let b_flags = channelmanager::provided_init_features();
4439         let node_a = nodes.remove(0);
4440         let node_b = nodes.remove(0);
4441         node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
4442         node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), a_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4443         node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), b_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id()));
4444
4445         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&node_a, &node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, 42);
4446
4447         node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
4448         check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
4449
4450         node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4451         {
4452                 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4453                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4454                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4455                 added_monitors.clear();
4456         }
4457
4458         let bs_funding_signed = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
4459         node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_funding_signed);
4460         {
4461                 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4462                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4463                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4464                 added_monitors.clear();
4465         }
4466         // Normally, this is where node_a would broadcast the funding transaction, but the test de/serializes first instead
4467
4468         nodes.push(node_a);
4469         nodes.push(node_b);
4470
4471         // Start the de/seriailization process mid-channel creation to check that the channel manager will hold onto events that are serialized
4472         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4473         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4474         get_monitor!(nodes[0], bs_funding_signed.channel_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4475
4476         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4477         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4478         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4479         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4480         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4481         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4482         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4483         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4484                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4485         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4486
4487         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4488         let config = UserConfig::default();
4489         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4490                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4491                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4492                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4493                         default_config: config,
4494                         keys_manager,
4495                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4496                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4497                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4498                         logger: &logger,
4499                         channel_monitors,
4500                 }).unwrap()
4501         };
4502         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4503         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4504
4505         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4506
4507         assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor),
4508                 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
4509         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4510
4511         // After deserializing, make sure the funding_transaction is still held by the channel manager
4512         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4513         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
4514         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4515         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
4516
4517         // Make sure the channel is functioning as though the de/serialization never happened
4518         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4519         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4520
4521         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
4522         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4523         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
4524         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4525
4526         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4527         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4528         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4529         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4530
4531         let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4532         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
4533         for node in nodes.iter() {
4534                 assert!(node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4535                 node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4536                 node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4537         }
4538
4539         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4540 }
4541
4542 #[test]
4543 fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4544         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4545         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4546         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4547         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4548         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4549         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4550         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4551         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4552         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4553         let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).2;
4554
4555         let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4556         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4557
4558         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4559
4560         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4561         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4562         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4563
4564         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4565         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4566         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4567         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4568         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4569         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4570         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4571         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4572                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4573         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4574
4575         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4576         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4577                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4578                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4579                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4580                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4581                         keys_manager,
4582                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4583                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4584                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4585                         logger: &logger,
4586                         channel_monitors,
4587                 }).unwrap()
4588         };
4589         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4590         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4591
4592         assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor),
4593                 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
4594         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4595         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4596
4597         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4598
4599         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
4600         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4601 }
4602
4603 #[test]
4604 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
4605         // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with an out-of-date ChannelMonitor
4606         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4607         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4608         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
4609         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4610         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4611         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4612         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4613         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4614         let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4615         let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).2;
4616         let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).2;
4617         let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4618
4619         let mut node_0_stale_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4620         for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4621                 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4622                 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4623                 node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4624         }
4625
4626         let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
4627
4628         // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
4629         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4630
4631         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
4632         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4633         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4634         nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4635
4636         // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
4637         // nodes[3])
4638         let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4639         for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4640                 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4641                 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4642                 node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4643         }
4644
4645         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4646         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4647         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4648         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4649         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4650         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4651
4652
4653         let mut node_0_stale_monitors = Vec::new();
4654         for serialized in node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4655                 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4656                 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4657                 assert!(read.is_empty());
4658                 node_0_stale_monitors.push(monitor);
4659         }
4660
4661         let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
4662         for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4663                 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4664                 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4665                 assert!(read.is_empty());
4666                 node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
4667         }
4668
4669         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4670         if let Err(msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue) =
4671                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4672                 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4673                 keys_manager,
4674                 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4675                 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4676                 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4677                 logger: &logger,
4678                 channel_monitors: node_0_stale_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4679         }) { } else {
4680                 panic!("If the monitor(s) are stale, this indicates a bug and we should get an Err return");
4681         };
4682
4683         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4684         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) =
4685                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4686                 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4687                 keys_manager,
4688                 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4689                 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4690                 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4691                 logger: &logger,
4692                 channel_monitors: node_0_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4693         }).unwrap();
4694         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4695         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4696
4697         { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx
4698                 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4699                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
4700                 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
4701                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
4702         }
4703
4704         for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
4705                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor),
4706                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
4707                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4708         }
4709         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4710         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
4711
4712         // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
4713         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4714         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4715         //... and we can even still claim the payment!
4716         claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4717
4718         nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
4719         let reestablish = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[0]).pop().unwrap();
4720         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
4721         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish);
4722         let mut found_err = false;
4723         for msg_event in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
4724                 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_event {
4725                         match action {
4726                                 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
4727                                         assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
4728                                         assert!(!found_err);
4729                                         found_err = true;
4730                                 },
4731                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
4732                         }
4733                 }
4734         }
4735         assert!(found_err);
4736 }
4737
4738 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4739         ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4740                 {
4741                         let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4742                         let mut txn = Vec::new();
4743                         let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4744                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4745                         for event in events.drain(..) {
4746                                 match event {
4747                                         Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs } => {
4748                                                 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4749                                                         txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4750                                                         all_outputs.push(outp);
4751                                                 }
4752                                         },
4753                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4754                                 };
4755                         }
4756                         if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4757                                 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx) {
4758                                         txn.push(tx);
4759                                 }
4760                         }
4761                         txn
4762                 }
4763         }
4764 }
4765
4766 #[test]
4767 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4768         // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4769         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4770         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4771         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4772         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4773
4774         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4775         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4776         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4777         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4778         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4779         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4780         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4781         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4782         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4783
4784         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4785         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4786
4787         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4788         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4789         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4790         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4791         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4792 }
4793
4794 #[test]
4795 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4796         // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4797         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4798         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4799         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4800         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4801         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4802
4803         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4804         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4805         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4806         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4807         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4808
4809         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4810         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4811         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4812         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4813
4814         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4815         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4816         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4817         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4818         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4819
4820         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4821         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4822         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4823 }
4824
4825 #[test]
4826 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4827         // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4828         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4829
4830         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4831         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4832         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4833         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4834
4835         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4836         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4837         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4838         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4839         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4840
4841         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4842         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4843         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4844         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4845         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4846
4847         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4848         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4849         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4850
4851         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4852         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4853         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4854         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4855         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4856 }
4857
4858 #[test]
4859 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4860         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4861         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4862         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4863         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4864
4865         // Create some initial channels
4866         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4867
4868         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
4869
4870         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4871         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4872         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4873
4874         // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4875         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4876         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4877         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4878         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4879         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4880         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4881         match events[0] {
4882                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4883                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4884         }
4885         match events[1] {
4886                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4887                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4888         }
4889
4890         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4891         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-Success), ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4892         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4893         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4894         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4895         check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
4896         check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
4897
4898         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4899         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4900         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4901
4902         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4903         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4904         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4905 }
4906
4907 #[test]
4908 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4909         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4910         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4911         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4912         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4913
4914         // Create some initial channels
4915         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4916
4917         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4918         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4919
4920         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4921
4922         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4923         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4924         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4925
4926         // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4927         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4928         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4929         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4930         match events[0] {
4931                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4932                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4933         }
4934         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4935
4936         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4937         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4938         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelManager : 1 local commitent tx, ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4939         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
4940         check_spends!(node_txn[1],  commitment_tx[0].clone());
4941         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4942
4943         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4944         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4945         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4946         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, false);
4947
4948         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4949         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4950         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4951         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]);
4952         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4953 }
4954
4955 #[test]
4956 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4957         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4958         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4959         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4960         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4961
4962         // Create some initial channels
4963         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4964
4965         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4966         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4967         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4968         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4969
4970         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4971
4972         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4973         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4974         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4975         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4976
4977         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4978         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
4979         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4980         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4981
4982         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4983         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4984
4985         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4986         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4987         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4988 }
4989
4990 #[test]
4991 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4992         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4993         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4994         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4995         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4996         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4997
4998         // Create some initial channels
4999         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5000
5001         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5002         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5003         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5004         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
5005
5006         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
5007
5008         // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
5009         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
5010         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5011         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5012         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5013         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5014
5015         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
5016         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
5017         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5018         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5019         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5020         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
5021         assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
5022
5023         // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
5024         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5025         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()] });
5026         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5027         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5028         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5029
5030         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5031         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5032         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
5033         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
5034         // transactions next...
5035         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
5036         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
5037
5038         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
5039         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
5040         if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid() {
5041                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5042         } else {
5043                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid());
5044                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5045         }
5046
5047         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5048         check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
5049
5050         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
5051         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5052
5053         // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
5054         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5055         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5056         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5057         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
5058 }
5059
5060 #[test]
5061 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
5062         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5063         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
5064         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5065         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5066         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5067
5068         // Create some initial channels
5069         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5070
5071         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5072         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5073         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5074         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
5075
5076         // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
5077         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
5078
5079         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
5080
5081         // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
5082         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
5083         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5084         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5085         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5086         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5087
5088         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
5089         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5090         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5091         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
5092
5093         // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
5094         let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
5095         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
5096
5097         // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
5098         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5099         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
5100         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5101         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5102         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5103
5104         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5105         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5106
5107         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
5108         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
5109         // transactions next...
5110         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
5111         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
5112         if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
5113                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5114         } else {
5115                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
5116                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5117         }
5118
5119         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5120         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
5121
5122         check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
5123
5124         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
5125         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5126
5127         // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
5128         // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
5129
5130         // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
5131         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5132         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5133         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5134         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
5135         assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5136         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
5137         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
5138 }
5139
5140 #[test]
5141 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
5142         // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
5143         // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
5144         // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
5145         // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
5146         // channel.
5147         // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
5148         // gets broadcast.
5149
5150         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5151         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5152         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5153         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5154
5155         // Create some initial channels
5156         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5157         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5158
5159         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5160         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5161         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5162         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5163         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5164
5165         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
5166         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
5167         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
5168
5169         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
5170         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5171         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
5172         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5173         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
5174         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5175         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5176         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5177         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5178         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5179         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5180
5181         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
5182         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5183         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5184         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5185
5186         let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Success tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
5187         assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 3);
5188         assert_eq!(c_txn[0], c_txn[2]);
5189         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0], c_txn[1]);
5190         check_spends!(c_txn[1], chan_2.3);
5191         check_spends!(c_txn[2], c_txn[1]);
5192         assert_eq!(c_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
5193         assert_eq!(c_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5194         assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
5195         assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Success tx
5196
5197         // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
5198         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
5199         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![c_txn[1].clone(), c_txn[2].clone()]});
5200         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5201         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5202         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5203         match events[0] {
5204                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5205                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5206         }
5207         match events[1] {
5208                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
5209                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
5210                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, Some(chan_1.2));
5211                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
5212                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
5213                 },
5214                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5215         }
5216         {
5217                 let mut b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5218                 // ChannelMonitor: claim tx
5219                 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
5220                 check_spends!(b_txn[0], chan_2.3); // B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
5221                 b_txn.clear();
5222         }
5223         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5224         let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5225         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
5226         match msg_events[0] {
5227                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5228                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5229         }
5230         match msg_events[1] {
5231                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
5232                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5233         }
5234         match msg_events[2] {
5235                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
5236                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5237                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5238                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5239                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5240                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
5241                 },
5242                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5243         };
5244         // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
5245         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5246         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
5247         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5248         let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5249         // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success tx
5250         assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 3);
5251         check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_1.3);
5252         check_spends!(b_txn[2], b_txn[1]);
5253         check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
5254         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5255         assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
5256         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Success tx
5257
5258         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5259         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5260 }
5261
5262 #[test]
5263 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
5264         // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
5265         // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
5266         // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
5267         // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
5268         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
5269         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
5270         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5271         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5272         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5273         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5274         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
5275                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5276         let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5277
5278         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5279         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5280         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5281
5282         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5283         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5284         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5285         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5286         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
5287
5288         let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 900_000);
5289
5290         let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
5291         // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
5292         // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
5293         // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
5294         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id())
5295                 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
5296         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], payment_params, 900000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40);
5297         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 900000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
5298
5299         let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5300         assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5301         check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5302
5303         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
5304         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5305         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5306         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5307         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5308
5309         let htlc_timeout_tx;
5310         { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
5311                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5312                 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 2-or-3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5313                 assert!(node_txn.len() == 4 || node_txn.len() == 3);
5314                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5315
5316                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5317                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5318
5319                 if node_txn.len() > 3 {
5320                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5321                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5322                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
5323
5324                         check_spends!(node_txn[3], commitment_txn[0]);
5325                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
5326                 } else {
5327                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5328                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
5329                 }
5330
5331                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5332                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5333                 if node_txn.len() > 3 {
5334                         assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5335                 }
5336                 htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[1].clone();
5337         }
5338
5339         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
5340         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], duplicate_payment_hash, 900_000);
5341
5342         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
5343         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
5344         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5345         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5346         match events[0] {
5347                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5348                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5349         }
5350         match events[1] {
5351                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5352                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5353         }
5354         let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5355         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs), ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
5356         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
5357         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5358         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5359         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5360         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5361         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5362         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5363         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5364         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[3], htlc_success_txn[0]);
5365         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[4], htlc_success_txn[1]);
5366         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
5367
5368         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
5369         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5370         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
5371         let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5372         assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5373         assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5374         let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
5375         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5376         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5377         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5378
5379         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5380         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5381         {
5382                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5383         }
5384         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
5385
5386         // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
5387         // Note that the fee paid is effectively double as the HTLC value (including the nodes[1] fee
5388         // and nodes[2] fee) is rounded down and then claimed in full.
5389         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[0]);
5390         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], Some(196*2), true, true);
5391         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5392         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5393         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5394         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5395         assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
5396         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5397         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5398
5399         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5400         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
5401
5402         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5403         match events[0] {
5404                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5405                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
5406                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
5407                 }
5408                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5409         }
5410 }
5411
5412 #[test]
5413 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
5414         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5415         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5416         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5417         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5418
5419         // Create some initial channels
5420         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5421
5422         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
5423         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5424         assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
5425         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5426         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5427
5428         // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
5429         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5430         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
5431         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5432
5433         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
5434         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5435         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5436         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5437         match events[0] {
5438                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5439                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5440         }
5441         match events[1] {
5442                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5443                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5444         }
5445         let node_tx = {
5446                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5447                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5448                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
5449                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5450                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5451                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5452                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5453                 node_txn[0].clone()
5454         };
5455
5456         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
5457         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5458
5459         // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5460         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5461         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5462         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5463         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
5464         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5465 }
5466
5467 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
5468         // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
5469         // unrevoked commitment transaction.
5470         // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
5471         // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
5472         // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
5473         // use the same payment hashes.
5474         // Thus, we use a six-node network:
5475         //
5476         // A \         / E
5477         //    - C - D -
5478         // B /         \ F
5479         // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
5480         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
5481         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
5482         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5483         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5484         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5485         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5486         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
5487                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5488         let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5489
5490         let _chan_0_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5491         let _chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5492         let chan_2_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5493         let chan_3_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5494         let chan_3_5  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5495
5496         // Rebalance and check output sanity...
5497         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
5498         send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
5499         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
5500
5501         let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2_3.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5502         // 0th HTLC:
5503         let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5504         // 1st HTLC:
5505         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5506         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5507         // 2nd HTLC:
5508         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5509         // 3rd HTLC:
5510         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5511         // 4th HTLC:
5512         let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5513         // 5th HTLC:
5514         let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5515         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5516         // 6th HTLC:
5517         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200).unwrap());
5518         // 7th HTLC:
5519         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200).unwrap());
5520
5521         // 8th HTLC:
5522         let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5523         // 9th HTLC:
5524         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5525         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5526
5527         // 10th HTLC:
5528         let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5529         // 11th HTLC:
5530         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5531         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200).unwrap());
5532
5533         // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
5534         // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
5535         // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
5536         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2).len(), 1);
5537         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
5538
5539         // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
5540         // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5541         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1);
5542         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3);
5543         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5);
5544         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6);
5545         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
5546
5547         let failed_destinations = vec![
5548                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_1 },
5549                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_3 },
5550                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_5 },
5551                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_6 },
5552         ];
5553         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[4], failed_destinations);
5554         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
5555
5556         let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5557         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5558         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5559         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5560         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5561         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5562
5563         // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5564         nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
5565         nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4);
5566         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5567
5568         let failed_destinations_2 = vec![
5569                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 },
5570                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_4 },
5571         ];
5572         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[5], failed_destinations_2);
5573         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5574
5575         let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5576         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5577         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5578         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5579
5580         let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5581
5582         // After 4 and 2 removes respectively above in nodes[4] and nodes[5], nodes[3] should receive 6 PaymentForwardedFailed events
5583         let failed_destinations_3 = vec![
5584                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5585                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5586                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5587                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5588                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5589                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5590         ];
5591         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations_3);
5592         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5593         let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5594         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5595         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5596         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5597         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5598         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5599         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5600         if deliver_last_raa {
5601                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5602         } else {
5603                 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5604         }
5605
5606         // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5607         // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5608         // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5609         // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5610         //
5611         // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5612         // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5613         // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5614         //
5615         // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5616         // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5617         let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5618
5619         if announce_latest {
5620                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5621         } else {
5622                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5623         }
5624         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5625         let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5626                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2 + 6);
5627                 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5628         } else {
5629                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5630                 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5631         };
5632         match close_event {
5633                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5634                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5635         }
5636
5637         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5638         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5639         if deliver_last_raa {
5640                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5641
5642                 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(3).collect();
5643                 expect_htlc_handling_failed_destinations!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(), expected_destinations);
5644         } else {
5645                 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = if announce_latest {
5646                         repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(9).collect()
5647                 } else {
5648                         repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(6).collect()
5649                 };
5650
5651                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], expected_destinations);
5652         }
5653         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5654
5655         let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5656         assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5657         let mut a_done = false;
5658         for msg in cs_msgs {
5659                 match msg {
5660                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5661                                 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5662                                 // should be failed-backwards here.
5663                                 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5664                                         // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5665                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5666                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5667                                         }
5668                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5669                                         assert!(!a_done);
5670                                         a_done = true;
5671                                         &nodes[0]
5672                                 } else {
5673                                         // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5674                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5675                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5676                                         }
5677                                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5678                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5679                                         &nodes[1]
5680                                 };
5681                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5682                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5683                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5684                                 if announce_latest {
5685                                         target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5686                                         if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5687                                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5688                                         }
5689                                 }
5690                                 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5691                         },
5692                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5693                 }
5694         }
5695
5696         let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5697         assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5698         let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5699         let mut as_updates = 0;
5700         for event in as_events.iter() {
5701                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5702                         assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5703                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5704                                 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5705                         } else {
5706                                 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5707                         }
5708                         if network_update.is_some() {
5709                                 as_updates += 1;
5710                         }
5711                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5712         }
5713         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5714         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5715         if announce_latest {
5716                 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5717                 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5718         }
5719         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5720
5721         let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5722         assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5723         let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5724         let mut bs_updates = 0;
5725         for event in bs_events.iter() {
5726                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5727                         assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5728                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5729                                 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5730                         } else {
5731                                 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5732                         }
5733                         if network_update.is_some() {
5734                                 bs_updates += 1;
5735                         }
5736                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5737         }
5738         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5739         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5740         if announce_latest {
5741                 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5742         }
5743         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5744
5745         // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5746         // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5747         // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5748         // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5749         assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5750         assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5751 }
5752
5753 #[test]
5754 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5755         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5756 }
5757
5758 #[test]
5759 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5760         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5761 }
5762
5763 #[test]
5764 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5765         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5766         // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5767         // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5768 }
5769
5770 #[test]
5771 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5772         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5773         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5774         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5775         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5776
5777         // Create some initial channels
5778         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5779
5780         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5781         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5782         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5783         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5784
5785         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5786         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5787         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5788         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5789         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5790         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5791
5792         let htlc_timeout = {
5793                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5794                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
5795                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5796                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5797                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5798                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5799                 node_txn[1].clone()
5800         };
5801
5802         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5803         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5804         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5805
5806         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5807         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5808         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5809         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5810         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5811         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5812         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5813         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5814         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5815         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5816                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5817 }
5818
5819 #[test]
5820 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5821         // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with
5822         // a key manager rotation to test that key_derivation_params returned in DynamicOutputP2WSH
5823         // let us re-derive the channel key set to then derive a delayed_payment_key.
5824
5825         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5826
5827         // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5828         let seed = [42; 32];
5829         let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5830         let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5831         let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source.genesis_hash, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger);
5832         let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph, node_seed: seed, features: channelmanager::provided_init_features() };
5833         let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5834         node_cfgs.remove(0);
5835         node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5836
5837         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5838         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5839
5840         // Create some initial channels
5841         // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5842         // for node 0
5843         let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5844         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5845         assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5846
5847         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5848         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5849         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5850         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5851         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5852
5853         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5854         let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5855         let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5856         assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5857         check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5858
5859         // We check funding pubkey are unique
5860         let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5861         let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5862         if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5863             || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5864             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5865             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5866                 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5867         }
5868
5869         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5870         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5871         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5872         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5873         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5874         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5875
5876         let htlc_timeout = {
5877                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5878                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5879                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5880                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn_1[0]);
5881                 node_txn[1].clone()
5882         };
5883
5884         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5885         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5886         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5887
5888         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5889         let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5890         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5891         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5892         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5893         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5894         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5895         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5896         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5897         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5898         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5899                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5900 }
5901
5902 #[test]
5903 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5904         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5905         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5906         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5907         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5908
5909         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5910
5911         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5912         let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5913
5914         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5915         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5916         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5917
5918         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5919         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5920         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5921
5922         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5923         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5924         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5925
5926         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5927         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5928         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5929 }
5930
5931 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5932         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5933         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5934         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5935         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5936         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5937
5938         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5939
5940         // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5941         // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5942         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5943         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5944         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5945
5946         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5947         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5948         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
5949
5950         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5951         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5952         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5953         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5954         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5955
5956         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5957         let mut block = Block {
5958                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5959                 txdata: vec![],
5960         };
5961         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5962                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5963                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5964         }
5965         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5966         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5967         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5968         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5969 }
5970
5971 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5972         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5973         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5974         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5975         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5976         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5977
5978         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5979         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5980         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5981
5982         let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5983
5984         // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5985         // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5986         // to "time out" the HTLC.
5987
5988         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5989         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5990
5991         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5992                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: Vec::new()});
5993                 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
5994         }
5995         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5996         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5997         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5998         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5999 }
6000
6001 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
6002         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6003         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6004         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6005         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6006         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6007
6008         // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
6009         // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
6010         // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
6011         // actually revoked.
6012         let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
6013         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
6014         nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
6015         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
6016         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6017
6018         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6019         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6020         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
6021         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6022         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6023         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
6024         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6025         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
6026         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6027         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6028
6029         if check_revoke_no_close {
6030                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
6031                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6032         }
6033
6034         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
6035         let mut block = Block {
6036                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
6037                 txdata: vec![],
6038         };
6039         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
6040                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
6041                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
6042         }
6043         if !check_revoke_no_close {
6044                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
6045                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6046                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6047                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6048         } else {
6049                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6050                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6051                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[0] {
6052                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
6053                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
6054                 if let Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[1] {
6055                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
6056                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
6057         }
6058 }
6059
6060 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
6061 // There are only a few cases to test here:
6062 //  * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
6063 //    broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
6064 //  * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
6065 //  * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
6066 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
6067 // non-dust HTLCs.
6068 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
6069 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
6070 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
6071 #[test]
6072 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
6073         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
6074         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
6075
6076         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
6077         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
6078 }
6079
6080 #[test]
6081 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
6082         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
6083         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
6084         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
6085         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
6086 }
6087
6088 #[test]
6089 #[should_panic]
6090 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
6091         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6092         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6093         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6094         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6095         // Force duplicate randomness for every get-random call
6096         for node in nodes.iter() {
6097                 *node.keys_manager.override_random_bytes.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
6098         }
6099
6100         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
6101         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
6102         let push_msat=10001;
6103         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
6104         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6105         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
6106         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6107
6108         // Create a second channel with the same random values. This used to panic due to a colliding
6109         // channel_id, but now panics due to a colliding outbound SCID alias.
6110         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
6111 }
6112
6113 #[test]
6114 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
6115         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6116         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6117         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6118         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6119
6120         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
6121         let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
6122         let push_msat=10001;
6123         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
6124
6125         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
6126         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
6127         // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
6128         let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
6129         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
6130
6131         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
6132         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
6133         let push_msat=10001;
6134         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
6135         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6136         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
6137
6138         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
6139         // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
6140         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
6141
6142         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
6143         assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
6144         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6145
6146         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
6147         let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
6148         assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
6149
6150         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
6151         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
6152         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6153         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6154         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
6155         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6156 }
6157
6158 #[test]
6159 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
6160         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6161         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6162         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6163         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6164
6165         let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
6166         let push_msat=10001;
6167         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
6168         let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6169         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
6170         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
6171
6172         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
6173         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6174         let err_msg = match events[0] {
6175                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
6176                         msg.clone()
6177                 },
6178                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6179         };
6180         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
6181 }
6182
6183 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
6184 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
6185 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
6186 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
6187 #[test]
6188 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
6189         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6190         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6191         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6192         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6193         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6194
6195         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6196         // pending_update_fee.
6197         {
6198                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6199                 *feerate_lock += 20;
6200         }
6201         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6202         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6203
6204         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6205         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6206         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6207                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6208                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6209                 },
6210                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6211         };
6212
6213         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6214
6215         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6216         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6217         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6218         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6219
6220         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6221         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
6222         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6223
6224         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6225         let our_payment_id = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6226         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6227         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6228
6229         // Flush the pending fee update.
6230         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6231         let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6232         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6233         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
6234         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6235
6236         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
6237         // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
6238         // us to surface its failure to the user.
6239         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6240         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6241         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6242         let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6243                 hex::encode(our_payment_hash.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6244         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6245
6246         // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
6247         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6248         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6249         match &events[0] {
6250                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
6251                         assert_eq!(our_payment_id, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6252                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
6253                         assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
6254                         assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6255                         assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6256                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id));
6257                 },
6258                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6259         }
6260 }
6261
6262 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
6263 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
6264 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
6265 #[test]
6266 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
6267         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6268         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6269         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6270         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6271         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6272
6273         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6274         // pending_update_fee.
6275         {
6276                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6277                 *feerate_lock += 200;
6278         }
6279         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6280         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6281
6282         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6283         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6284         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6285                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6286                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6287                 },
6288                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6289         };
6290
6291         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6292
6293         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6294         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6295         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6296         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6297
6298         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6299         let amt_1 = 20000;
6300         let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors) - amt_1;
6301         let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
6302         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
6303
6304         // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
6305         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
6306         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6307         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
6308         let payment_id_2 = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
6309         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6310         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
6311
6312         // Flush the pending fee update.
6313         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6314         let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6315         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6316         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
6317         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6318         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
6319
6320         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
6321         // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
6322         // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
6323         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6324         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6325         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6326         let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6327                 hex::encode(payment_hash_2.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6328         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6329
6330         // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
6331         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6332         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6333         match &events[0] {
6334                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
6335                         assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6336                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
6337                         assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
6338                         assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6339                         assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6340                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route_2.paths[0][0].short_channel_id));
6341                 },
6342                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6343         }
6344
6345         // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
6346         let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
6347                 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6348                 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
6349                 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
6350         };
6351         let raa = match send_raa_event {
6352                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
6353                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6354         };
6355         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6356         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6357         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6358         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6359         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6360         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6361         match events[0] {
6362                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6363                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6364         }
6365         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6366         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6367         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6368         match events[0] {
6369                 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => {},
6370                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6371         }
6372         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
6373         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6374         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, amt_1);
6375
6376         let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6377         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6378         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
6379         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
6380 }
6381
6382 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
6383 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
6384 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
6385 // once it's freed.
6386 #[test]
6387 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
6388         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6389         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6390         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
6391         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
6392         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
6393         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
6394         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
6395         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6396         let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6397         let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6398
6399         // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6400         // pending_update_fee.
6401         {
6402                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6403                 *feerate_lock += 20;
6404         }
6405         nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6406         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6407
6408         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6409         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6410         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6411                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6412                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6413                 },
6414                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6415         };
6416
6417         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6418
6419         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6420         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6421         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6422         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6423
6424         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6425         let feemsat = 239;
6426         let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
6427         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors) - total_routing_fee_msat;
6428         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
6429         let payment_event = {
6430                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6431                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6432
6433                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6434                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6435
6436                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6437         };
6438         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6439         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6440         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6441         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6442
6443         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1_2.2);
6444         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6445
6446         // Flush the pending fee update.
6447         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6448         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6449         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6450         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6451         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6452         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6453
6454         // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
6455         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6456         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6457
6458         let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
6459                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
6460                         msg.clone()
6461                 },
6462                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6463         };
6464
6465         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
6466         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6467         assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6468
6469         // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
6470         let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6471         assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 2);
6472         match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
6473                 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6474                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6475         }
6476
6477         // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
6478         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6479         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6480
6481         // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
6482         let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6483         assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
6484         let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
6485                 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6486                         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
6487                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
6488                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
6489                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6490                         (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6491                 },
6492                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6493         };
6494
6495         // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
6496         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
6497         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6498
6499         // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
6500         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6501         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6502         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6503         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6504         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6505         let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6506         assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
6507         let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
6508                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
6509                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6510         };
6511         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6512         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
6513         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6514 }
6515
6516 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
6517 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
6518 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
6519
6520 #[test]
6521 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
6522         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
6523         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6524         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6525         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6526         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6527         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6528
6529         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6530         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 100;
6531
6532         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6533                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6534         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6535         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value".to_string(), 1);
6536 }
6537
6538 #[test]
6539 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
6540         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6541         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6542         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6543         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6544         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6545         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6546
6547         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6548         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 0;
6549         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6550                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
6551
6552         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6553         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6554 }
6555
6556 #[test]
6557 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
6558         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6559         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6560         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6561         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6562         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6563         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6564
6565         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6566         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6567         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6568         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6569         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6570
6571         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6572         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6573         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6574         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6575         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() });
6576 }
6577
6578 #[test]
6579 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6580         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6581         //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6582         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6583         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6584         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6585         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6586         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6587
6588         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
6589                 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
6590         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], payment_params, 100000000, 0);
6591         route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = 500000001;
6592         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::RouteError { ref err },
6593                 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6594 }
6595
6596 #[test]
6597 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6598         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6599         //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6600         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6601         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6602         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6603         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6604         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6605         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6606         let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6607
6608         for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6609                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6610                 let payment_event = {
6611                         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6612                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6613
6614                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6615                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6616                         if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6617                                 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6618                         } else {
6619                                 assert!(false);
6620                         }
6621                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6622                 };
6623                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6624                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6625                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6626
6627                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6628                 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6629         }
6630         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6631         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6632                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6633
6634         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6635         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
6636 }
6637
6638 #[test]
6639 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6640         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6641         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6642         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6643         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6644         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6645         let channel_value = 100000;
6646         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6647         let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6648
6649         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6650
6651         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6652         // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6653         // limits us to.
6654         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat =  max_in_flight + 1;
6655         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6656                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6657
6658         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6659         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
6660
6661         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6662 }
6663
6664 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6665 #[test]
6666 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6667         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6668         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6669         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6670         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6671         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6672         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6673         let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6674         {
6675                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6676                 let channel = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6677                 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6678         }
6679
6680         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6681         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6682         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6683         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6684         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6685         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6686         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6687         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6688         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6689         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6690         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6691 }
6692
6693 #[test]
6694 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6695         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6696         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6697         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6698         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6699         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6700         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6701
6702         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6703         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6704         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6705         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6706         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6707         let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
6708
6709         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6710         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6711         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6712         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6713         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6714
6715         // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6716         // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6717         // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6718         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6719         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6720
6721         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6722         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6723         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6724         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6725         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6726 }
6727
6728 #[test]
6729 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6730         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6731         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6732         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6733         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6734         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6735         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6736         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6737
6738         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3999999);
6739         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6740         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6741         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6742         let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3999999, &Some(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6743         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash);
6744
6745         let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6746                 channel_id: chan.2,
6747                 htlc_id: 0,
6748                 amount_msat: 1000,
6749                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6750                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6751                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6752         };
6753
6754         for i in 0..super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
6755                 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6756                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6757         }
6758         msg.htlc_id = (super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS) as u64;
6759         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6760
6761         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6762         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6763         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6764         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6765         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6766 }
6767
6768 #[test]
6769 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6770         //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6771         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6772         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6773         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6774         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6775         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6776
6777         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6778         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6779         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6780         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6781         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6782         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6783
6784         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6785         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6786         assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6787         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6788         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6789 }
6790
6791 #[test]
6792 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6793         //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6794         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6795         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6796         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6797         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6798
6799         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6800         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6801         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6802         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6803         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6804         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6805         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6806
6807         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6808         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6809         assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6810         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6811         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6812 }
6813
6814 #[test]
6815 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6816         //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6817         // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6818         // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6819         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6820         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6821         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6822         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6823
6824         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6825         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6826         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6827         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6828         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6829         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6830
6831         //Disconnect and Reconnect
6832         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6833         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6834         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
6835         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6836         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6837         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
6838         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6839         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6840         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6841         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6842         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6843         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6844
6845         //Resend HTLC
6846         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6847         assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6848         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6849         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6850         let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6851
6852         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6853
6854         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6855         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6856         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6857         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6858         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6859 }
6860
6861 #[test]
6862 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6863         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6864
6865         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6866         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6867         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6868         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6869         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6870         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6871         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6872
6873         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6874         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6875         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6876
6877         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6878                 channel_id: chan.2,
6879                 htlc_id: 0,
6880                 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6881         };
6882
6883         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6884
6885         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6886         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6887         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6888         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6889         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6890 }
6891
6892 #[test]
6893 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6894         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6895
6896         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6897         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6898         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6899         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6900         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6901
6902         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6903         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6904         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6905         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6906         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6907
6908         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6909                 channel_id: chan.2,
6910                 htlc_id: 0,
6911                 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6912         };
6913
6914         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6915
6916         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6917         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6918         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6919         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6920         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6921 }
6922
6923 #[test]
6924 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6925         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6926
6927         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6928         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6929         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6930         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6931         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6932
6933         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6934         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6935         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6936         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6937         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6938         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6939                 channel_id: chan.2,
6940                 htlc_id: 0,
6941                 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6942                 failure_code: 0x8000,
6943         };
6944
6945         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6946
6947         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6948         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6949         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6950         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6951         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6952 }
6953
6954 #[test]
6955 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6956         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6957
6958         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6959         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6960         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6961         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6962         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6963
6964         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6965
6966         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6967         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6968         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6969
6970         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6971         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6972         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6973                 match events[0] {
6974                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6975                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6976                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6977                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6978                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6979                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6980                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6981                         },
6982                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6983                 }
6984         };
6985
6986         update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6987
6988         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6989
6990         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6991         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6992         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6993         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6994         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6995 }
6996
6997 #[test]
6998 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6999         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
7000
7001         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7002         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7003         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7004         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7005         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7006
7007         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
7008
7009         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
7010         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7011         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
7012
7013         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7014         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7015         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
7016                 match events[0] {
7017                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
7018                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7019                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
7020                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7021                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7022                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7023                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
7024                         },
7025                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7026                 }
7027         };
7028
7029         update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
7030
7031         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
7032
7033         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
7034         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
7035         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
7036         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7037         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
7038 }
7039
7040 #[test]
7041 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
7042         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
7043
7044         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7045         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7046         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7047         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7048         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7049
7050         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
7051         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7052         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7053
7054         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7055         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
7056
7057         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7058         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7059         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
7060
7061         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7062
7063         let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
7064                 match events[0] {
7065                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
7066                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7067                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7068                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7069                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
7070                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7071                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
7072                         },
7073                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7074                 }
7075         };
7076         update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
7077         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
7078
7079         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
7080         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
7081         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
7082         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7083         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
7084 }
7085
7086 #[test]
7087 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
7088         //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
7089         //    * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
7090
7091         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7092         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7093         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7094         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7095         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7096         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7097
7098         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
7099
7100         //First hop
7101         let mut payment_event = {
7102                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7103                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7104                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7105                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7106                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
7107         };
7108         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7109         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7110         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7111         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7112         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7113         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
7114         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7115         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
7116         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
7117
7118         //Second Hop
7119         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
7120         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7121         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
7122         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
7123
7124         let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7125         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7126         let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
7127                 match events_3[0] {
7128                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7129                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7130                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7131                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7132                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
7133                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7134                                 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
7135                         },
7136                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7137                 }
7138         };
7139
7140         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
7141
7142         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7143         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
7144         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
7145         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7146         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
7147
7148         //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
7149         match events_4[0] {
7150                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
7151                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7152                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7153                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7154                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7155                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7156                 },
7157                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7158         };
7159
7160         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7161 }
7162
7163 #[test]
7164 fn test_channel_failed_after_message_with_badonion_node_perm_bits_set() {
7165         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7166         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7167         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7168         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7169         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7170         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7171
7172         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100_000);
7173
7174         // First hop
7175         let mut payment_event = {
7176                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7177                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7178                 SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[0])
7179         };
7180
7181         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7182         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7183         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7184         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7185         payment_event = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[1]);
7186         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
7187
7188         // Second Hop
7189         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; // Trigger an invalid_onion_version error
7190         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7191         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
7192         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
7193
7194         let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7195         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7196         match events_3[0] {
7197                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
7198                         let mut update_msg = updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone();
7199                         // Set the NODE bit (BADONION and PERM already set in invalid_onion_version error)
7200                         update_msg.failure_code |= 0x2000;
7201
7202                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
7203                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
7204                 },
7205                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7206         }
7207
7208         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1],
7209                 vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel {
7210                         node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
7211         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7212         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
7213         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7214
7215         match events_4[0] {
7216                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
7217                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7218                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
7219                 },
7220                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7221         }
7222
7223         let events_5 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7224         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
7225
7226         // Expect a PaymentPathFailed event with a ChannelFailure network update for the channel between
7227         // the node originating the error to its next hop.
7228         match events_5[0] {
7229                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { network_update:
7230                         Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure { short_channel_id, is_permanent }), error_code, ..
7231                 } => {
7232                         assert_eq!(short_channel_id, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id);
7233                         assert!(is_permanent);
7234                         assert_eq!(error_code, Some(0x8000|0x4000|0x2000|4));
7235                 },
7236                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7237         }
7238
7239         // TODO: Test actual removal of channel from NetworkGraph when it's implemented.
7240 }
7241
7242 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
7243         // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
7244         // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
7245         // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
7246
7247         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7248         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7249         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7250         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7251         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7252         let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7253
7254         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7255
7256         // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
7257         let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7258         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7259         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7260
7261         // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
7262         let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7263
7264         // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
7265         nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
7266         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7267         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
7268         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7269
7270         let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7271         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7272         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
7273         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7274
7275         // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
7276         let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7277
7278         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7279         match events[0] {
7280                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
7281                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7282                 },
7283                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7284         }
7285         match events[1] {
7286                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
7287                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7288                 },
7289                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7290         }
7291
7292         assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
7293         // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
7294         if announce_latest {
7295                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
7296         } else {
7297                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
7298         }
7299
7300         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7301         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7302         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7303
7304         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7305         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7306         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7307         // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
7308         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7309         let mut first_failed = false;
7310         for event in events {
7311                 match event {
7312                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7313                                 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
7314                                         assert!(!first_failed);
7315                                         first_failed = true;
7316                                 } else {
7317                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
7318                                 }
7319                         }
7320                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7321                 }
7322         }
7323 }
7324
7325 #[test]
7326 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
7327         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
7328         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
7329 }
7330
7331 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
7332         // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7333         // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
7334         // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7335         // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
7336         // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7337         // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
7338
7339         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7340         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7341         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7342         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7343         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7344
7345         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7346
7347         let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7348         let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7349
7350         let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7351         let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7352
7353         // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
7354         if revoked {
7355                 let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7356                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
7357         }
7358
7359         let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
7360         if local {
7361                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
7362                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
7363                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7364                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7365                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
7366
7367                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
7368                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7369                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7370                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7371                 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7372                 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7373                 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
7374                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7375                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7376                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7377                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
7378         } else {
7379                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
7380                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7381                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7382                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7383                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7384                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7385
7386                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7387                 timeout_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..)
7388                         .filter(|tx| tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == bs_commitment_tx[0].txid()).collect();
7389                 check_spends!(timeout_tx[0], bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7390                 // For both a revoked or non-revoked commitment transaction, after ANTI_REORG_DELAY the
7391                 // dust HTLC should have been failed.
7392                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
7393
7394                 if !revoked {
7395                         assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7396                 } else {
7397                         assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].lock_time.0, 0);
7398                 }
7399                 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout/revocation-claim tx
7400                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7401                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7402                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7403                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
7404         }
7405 }
7406
7407 #[test]
7408 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
7409         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
7410         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
7411         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
7412 }
7413
7414 #[test]
7415 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
7416         // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
7417
7418         let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7419         low_our_to_self_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
7420         let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7421         high_their_to_self_config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
7422         let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
7423         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7424         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7425         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
7426         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7427
7428         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
7429         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7430                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 1000000, 1000000, 0,
7431                 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, 42)
7432         {
7433                 match error {
7434                         APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7435                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7436                 }
7437         } else { assert!(false) }
7438
7439         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7440         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7441         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7442         open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7443         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7444                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
7445                 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
7446         {
7447                 match error {
7448                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str()));  },
7449                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7450                 }
7451         } else { assert!(false); }
7452
7453         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
7454         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7455         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7456         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7457         accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7458         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
7459         let reason_msg;
7460         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
7461                 match action {
7462                         &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7463                                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
7464                                 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
7465                         },
7466                         _ => { panic!(); }
7467                 }
7468         } else { panic!(); }
7469         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg });
7470
7471         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7472         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7473         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7474         open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7475         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7476                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
7477                 &high_their_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
7478         {
7479                 match error {
7480                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7481                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7482                 }
7483         } else { assert!(false); }
7484 }
7485
7486 fn do_test_data_loss_protect(reconnect_panicing: bool) {
7487         // When we get a data_loss_protect proving we're behind, we immediately panic as the
7488         // chain::Watch API requirements have been violated (e.g. the user restored from a backup). The
7489         // panic message informs the user they should force-close without broadcasting, which is tested
7490         // if `reconnect_panicing` is not set.
7491         let persister;
7492         let logger;
7493         let fee_estimator;
7494         let tx_broadcaster;
7495         let chain_source;
7496         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7497         // We broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr, which would cause a panic
7498         // during signing due to revoked tx
7499         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7500         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
7501         let monitor;
7502         let node_state_0;
7503         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7504         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7505         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7506
7507         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7508
7509         // Cache node A state before any channel update
7510         let previous_node_state = nodes[0].node.encode();
7511         let mut previous_chain_monitor_state = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7512         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan.2).write(&mut previous_chain_monitor_state).unwrap();
7513
7514         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7515         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7516
7517         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7518         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7519
7520         // Restore node A from previous state
7521         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
7522         let mut chain_monitor = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_chain_monitor_state.0), keys_manager).unwrap().1;
7523         chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
7524         tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster { txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new())) };
7525         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7526         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7527         monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &tx_broadcaster, &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7528         node_state_0 = {
7529                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7530                 channel_monitors.insert(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, &mut chain_monitor);
7531                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_node_state), ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7532                         keys_manager: keys_manager,
7533                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
7534                         chain_monitor: &monitor,
7535                         logger: &logger,
7536                         tx_broadcaster: &tx_broadcaster,
7537                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
7538                         channel_monitors,
7539                 }).unwrap().1
7540         };
7541         nodes[0].node = &node_state_0;
7542         assert_eq!(monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chain_monitor),
7543                 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
7544         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &monitor;
7545         nodes[0].chain_source = &chain_source;
7546
7547         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7548
7549         if reconnect_panicing {
7550                 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7551                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7552
7553                 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7554
7555                 // Check we close channel detecting A is fallen-behind
7556                 // Check that we sent the warning message when we detected that A has fallen behind,
7557                 // and give the possibility for A to recover from the warning.
7558                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7559                 let warn_msg = "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned();
7560                 assert!(check_warn_msg!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), chan.2).contains(&warn_msg));
7561
7562                 {
7563                         let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7564                         // The node B should not broadcast the transaction to force close the channel!
7565                         assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
7566                 }
7567
7568                 let reestablish_0 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7569                 // Check A panics upon seeing proof it has fallen behind.
7570                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_0[0]);
7571                 return; // By this point we should have panic'ed!
7572         }
7573
7574         nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
7575         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7576         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
7577         {
7578                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7579                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7580         }
7581
7582         for msg in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
7583                 if let MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } = msg {
7584                 } else if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg {
7585                         match action {
7586                                 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7587                                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel force-closed");
7588                                 },
7589                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
7590                         }
7591                 } else {
7592                         panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", msg)
7593                 }
7594         }
7595
7596         // after the warning message sent by B, we should not able to
7597         // use the channel, or reconnect with success to the channel.
7598         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().is_empty());
7599         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7600         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7601         let retry_reestablish = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7602
7603         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &retry_reestablish[0]);
7604         let mut err_msgs_0 = Vec::with_capacity(1);
7605         for msg in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
7606                 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg {
7607                         match action {
7608                                 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7609                                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Failed to find corresponding channel");
7610                                         err_msgs_0.push(msg.clone());
7611                                 },
7612                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
7613                         }
7614                 } else {
7615                         panic!("Unexpected event!");
7616                 }
7617         }
7618         assert_eq!(err_msgs_0.len(), 1);
7619         nodes[1].node.handle_error(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &err_msgs_0[0]);
7620         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().is_empty());
7621         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7622         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned() });
7623         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
7624 }
7625
7626 #[test]
7627 #[should_panic]
7628 fn test_data_loss_protect_showing_stale_state_panics() {
7629         do_test_data_loss_protect(true);
7630 }
7631
7632 #[test]
7633 fn test_force_close_without_broadcast() {
7634         do_test_data_loss_protect(false);
7635 }
7636
7637 #[test]
7638 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
7639         // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
7640         // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
7641         // to B, B should refuse payment.
7642
7643         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7644         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7645         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7646         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7647
7648         // Create some initial channels
7649         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7650
7651         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7652         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7653         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
7654         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7655         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7656         let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
7657         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7658         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7659
7660         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7661         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7662         let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7663         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7664         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7665
7666         // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
7667         // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
7668         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7669         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
7670
7671         // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
7672         // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
7673         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7674
7675         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7676         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7677         let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
7678                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7679                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7680                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7681                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7682                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7683                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7684                         (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
7685                 },
7686                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7687         };
7688         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7689
7690         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
7691         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
7692
7693         // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
7694         let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(10_000).to_vec();
7695         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH));
7696         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
7697 }
7698
7699 #[test]
7700 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
7701         // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
7702         // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
7703
7704         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7705         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7706         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7707         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7708
7709         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7710         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7711         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7712
7713         // Disconnect peers
7714         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7715         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7716
7717         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // Enabled -> DisabledStaged
7718         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // DisabledStaged -> Disabled
7719         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7720         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7721         let mut chans_disabled = HashMap::new();
7722         for e in msg_events {
7723                 match e {
7724                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7725                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7726                                 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7727                                 if chans_disabled.insert(msg.contents.short_channel_id, msg.contents.timestamp).is_some() {
7728                                         panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7729                                 }
7730                         },
7731                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7732                 }
7733         }
7734         // Reconnect peers
7735         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7736         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7737         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7738         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7739         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7740         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7741
7742         // Reestablish chan_1
7743         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7744         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7745         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7746         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7747         // Reestablish chan_2
7748         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7749         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7750         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7751         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7752         // Reestablish chan_3
7753         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7754         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7755         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7756         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7757
7758         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7759         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7760         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7761         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7762         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7763         for e in msg_events {
7764                 match e {
7765                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7766                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7767                                 match chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7768                                         // Each update should have a higher timestamp than the previous one, replacing
7769                                         // the old one.
7770                                         Some(prev_timestamp) => assert!(msg.contents.timestamp > prev_timestamp),
7771                                         None => panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!"),
7772                                 }
7773                         },
7774                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7775                 }
7776         }
7777         // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7778         assert!(chans_disabled.is_empty());
7779 }
7780
7781 #[test]
7782 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7783         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7784         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7785
7786         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7787         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7788         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7789         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7790
7791         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7792
7793         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7794         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
7795                 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
7796         let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_params, 3000000, 30);
7797         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7798
7799         let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7800         // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7801         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7802         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7803         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7804         let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7805
7806         let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7807         for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7808                 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7809                         penalty_sum += outp.value;
7810                 }
7811         }
7812
7813         // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7814         let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7815
7816         // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7817         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7818         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_114, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7819         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()] });
7820         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7821
7822         // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7823         let penalty_1;
7824         let feerate_1;
7825         {
7826                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7827                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor) + local commitment tx
7828                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7829                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7830                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7831                 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7832                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7833                 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7834                 node_txn.clear();
7835         };
7836
7837         // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7838         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7839         let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7840         let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7841         {
7842                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7843                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7844                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7845                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7846                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7847                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7848                         penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7849                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7850                         assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7851                         let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7852                         feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7853                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7854                         assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7855                         node_txn.clear();
7856                 }
7857         }
7858         assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7859
7860         // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7861         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7862         let penalty_3;
7863         let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7864         {
7865                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7866                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7867                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7868                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7869                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7870                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7871                         penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7872                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7873                         assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7874                         let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7875                         feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7876                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7877                         assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7878                         node_txn.clear();
7879                 }
7880         }
7881         assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7882
7883         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7884         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7885 }
7886
7887 #[test]
7888 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7889         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7890         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7891
7892         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7893         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7894         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7895         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7896         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7897
7898         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7899         // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7900         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
7901         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7902         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7903         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7904                 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7905         let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7906         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
7907         let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[1].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7908                 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7909         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7910
7911         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7912         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7913         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7914
7915         // Revoke local commitment tx
7916         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7917
7918         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7919         // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7920         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7921         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7922         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7923         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7924         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 49); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7925
7926         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
7927         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
7928         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], chan.3);
7929
7930         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7931         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7932         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7933
7934         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7935         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7936         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
7937         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7938
7939         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7940         let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7941         let header_11 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: hash_128, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7942         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_11, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7943         let header_129 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_11.block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7944         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_129, txdata: vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[2].clone()] });
7945         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7946         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7947         match events.last().unwrap() {
7948                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7949                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7950         }
7951         let first;
7952         let feerate_1;
7953         let penalty_txn;
7954         {
7955                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7956                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + A commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7957                 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7958
7959                 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7960                 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7961                 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7962                 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7963                 // future).
7964                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7965                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7966                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7967                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7968                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7969                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7970
7971                 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7972                 // available, which we check here:
7973                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7974                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7975                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7976
7977                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7978                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7979
7980                 // node_txn[3] is the local commitment tx broadcast just because (and somewhat in case of
7981                 // reorgs, though its not clear its ever worth broadcasting conflicting txn like this when
7982                 // a remote commitment tx has already been confirmed).
7983                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan.3);
7984
7985                 // node_txn[4] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7986                 // output, checked above).
7987                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 2);
7988                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].output.len(), 1);
7989                 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7990
7991                 first = node_txn[4].txid();
7992                 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7993                 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[4].output[0].value;
7994                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[4].weight() as u64;
7995                 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7996                 node_txn.clear();
7997         }
7998
7999         // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
8000         let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_129.block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8001         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
8002         let header_131 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_130.block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8003         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_131, txdata: Vec::new() });
8004         {
8005                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8006                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // 2 bumped penalty txn on revoked commitment tx
8007
8008                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8009                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8010                 // Note that these are both bogus - they spend outputs already claimed in block 129:
8011                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output  {
8012                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
8013                 } else {
8014                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
8015                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
8016                 }
8017
8018                 node_txn.clear();
8019         };
8020
8021         // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
8022         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
8023         assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8024         let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
8025         let node_txn = {
8026                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8027                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8028
8029                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
8030                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
8031                 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
8032                 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
8033                 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
8034                 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
8035                 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
8036                 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
8037                 node_txn.clear();
8038                 txn
8039         };
8040         // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
8041         let header_145 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_144, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8042         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_145, txdata: node_txn });
8043         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
8044         {
8045                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8046                 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
8047                 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
8048                 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
8049                 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
8050                 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
8051                 // up bumped justice generation.
8052                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
8053                 node_txn.clear();
8054         }
8055         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8056         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8057 }
8058
8059 #[test]
8060 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
8061         // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
8062         // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
8063
8064         // Create 2 HTLCs
8065         // Provide preimage for one
8066         // Check aggregation
8067
8068         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8069         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8070         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8071         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8072
8073         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8074         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
8075         route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
8076
8077         // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
8078         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
8079         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
8080         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8081         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
8082
8083         // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
8084         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8085         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
8086         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
8087         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8088         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
8089
8090         // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
8091         let timeout;
8092         let preimage;
8093         let preimage_bump;
8094         let feerate_timeout;
8095         let feerate_preimage;
8096         {
8097                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8098                 // 5 transactions including:
8099                 //   local commitment + HTLC-Success
8100                 //   preimage and timeout sweeps from remote commitment + preimage sweep bump
8101                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5);
8102                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8103                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
8104                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
8105                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
8106                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], remote_txn[0]);
8107                 check_spends!(node_txn[4], remote_txn[0]);
8108
8109                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan.3); // local commitment
8110                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]); // local HTLC-Success
8111
8112                 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
8113                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
8114                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
8115                 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
8116
8117                 let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output == node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output {
8118                         (node_txn[3].clone(), node_txn[4].clone())
8119                 } else {
8120                         (node_txn[4].clone(), node_txn[3].clone())
8121                 };
8122
8123                 preimage_bump = preimage_bump_tx;
8124                 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
8125                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output);
8126
8127                 timeout = timeout_tx.txid();
8128                 let index = timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout;
8129                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - timeout_tx.output[0].value;
8130                 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / timeout_tx.weight() as u64;
8131
8132                 node_txn.clear();
8133         };
8134         assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
8135         assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
8136
8137         // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
8138         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
8139         {
8140                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8141                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8142                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8143                 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
8144                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
8145                 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
8146
8147                 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
8148                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
8149                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.weight() as u64;
8150                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
8151                 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
8152
8153                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
8154                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
8155                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
8156                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
8157                 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
8158
8159                 node_txn.clear();
8160         }
8161
8162         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8163         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8164 }
8165
8166 #[test]
8167 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
8168         // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
8169         // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
8170         // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
8171         // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
8172         // EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
8173         // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
8174         // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
8175         // implement that).
8176         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8177         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8178         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8179         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8180         let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).2;
8181
8182         let per_commitment_secret;
8183         let next_per_commitment_point;
8184         {
8185                 let mut guard = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
8186                 let keys = guard.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
8187
8188                 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
8189
8190                 // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
8191                 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8192                 per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
8193
8194                 // Must revoke without gaps
8195                 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8196                 keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
8197
8198                 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8199                 next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
8200                         &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
8201         }
8202
8203         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
8204                 &msgs::RevokeAndACK { channel_id, per_commitment_secret, next_per_commitment_point });
8205         assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
8206         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8207         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() });
8208 }
8209
8210 #[test]
8211 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
8212         // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
8213         // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
8214
8215         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8216         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8217         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8218         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8219
8220         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8221         // Lock HTLC in both directions
8222         let (payment_preimage_1, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000);
8223         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000);
8224
8225         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
8226         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8227         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
8228
8229         // Revoke local commitment tx
8230         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
8231
8232         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
8233         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
8234         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[0], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
8235         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8236
8237         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
8238         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8239         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8240         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8241         let penalty_txn = {
8242                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8243                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
8244                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8245                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8246                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8247                 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
8248                 node_txn.clear();
8249                 penalty_txn
8250         };
8251         let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8252         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
8253         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8254         {
8255                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
8256                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
8257                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
8258         }
8259 }
8260
8261 #[test]
8262 fn test_pending_claimed_htlc_no_balance_underflow() {
8263         // Tests that if we have a pending outbound HTLC as well as a claimed-but-not-fully-removed
8264         // HTLC we will not underflow when we call `Channel::get_balance_msat()`.
8265         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8266         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8267         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8268         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8269         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8270
8271         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_010_000);
8272         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8273         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_010_000);
8274         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8275         let fulfill_ev = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8276
8277         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8278         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
8279         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.commitment_signed);
8280         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8281         let (_raa, _cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8282
8283         // At this point nodes[1] has received 1,010k msat (10k msat more than their reserve) and can
8284         // send an HTLC back (though it will go in the holding cell). Send an HTLC back and check we
8285         // can get our balance.
8286
8287         // Get a route from nodes[1] to nodes[0] by getting a route going the other way and then flip
8288         // the public key of the only hop. This works around ChannelDetails not showing the
8289         // almost-claimed HTLC as available balance.
8290         let (mut route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000);
8291         route.payment_params = None; // This is all wrong, but unnecessary
8292         route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8293         let (_, payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
8294         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
8295
8296         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].balance_msat, 1_000_000);
8297 }
8298
8299 #[test]
8300 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
8301         // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
8302         // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
8303         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8304         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8305         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8306         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8307
8308         let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8309
8310         // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
8311         // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
8312         // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
8313         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
8314         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8315
8316         // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
8317         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
8318         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8319         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8320
8321         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
8322         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8323         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
8324         let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8325         assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
8326         match close_ev[0] {
8327                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
8328                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8329                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
8330                 },
8331                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8332         }
8333 }
8334
8335 #[test]
8336 fn test_override_channel_config() {
8337         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8338         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8339         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8340         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8341
8342         // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
8343         let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
8344         override_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
8345
8346         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
8347
8348         // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
8349         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8350         assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
8351         assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
8352 }
8353
8354 #[test]
8355 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
8356         let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
8357         zero_config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
8358         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8359         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8360         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
8361         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8362
8363         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
8364         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8365         assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8366
8367         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &res);
8368         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8369         assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8370 }
8371
8372 #[test]
8373 fn test_channel_update_has_correct_htlc_maximum_msat() {
8374         // Tests that the `ChannelUpdate` message has the correct values for `htlc_maximum_msat` set.
8375         // Bolt 7 specifies that if present `htlc_maximum_msat`:
8376         // 1. MUST be set to less than or equal to the channel capacity. In LDK, this is capped to
8377         // 90% of the `channel_value`.
8378         // 2. MUST be set to less than or equal to the `max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` received from the peer.
8379
8380         let mut config_30_percent = UserConfig::default();
8381         config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
8382         config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 30;
8383         let mut config_50_percent = UserConfig::default();
8384         config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
8385         config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 50;
8386         let mut config_95_percent = UserConfig::default();
8387         config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
8388         config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 95;
8389         let mut config_100_percent = UserConfig::default();
8390         config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
8391         config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 100;
8392
8393         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8394         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8395         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config_30_percent), Some(config_50_percent), Some(config_95_percent), Some(config_100_percent)]);
8396         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8397
8398         let channel_value_satoshis = 100000;
8399         let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8400         let channel_value_30_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.3) as u64;
8401         let channel_value_50_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.5) as u64;
8402         let channel_value_90_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.9) as u64;
8403
8404         let (node_0_chan_update, node_1_chan_update, _, _)  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value_satoshis, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8405         let (node_2_chan_update, node_3_chan_update, _, _)  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, channel_value_satoshis, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8406
8407         // Assert that `node[0]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 50 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8408         // that's the value of `node[1]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
8409         assert_eq!(node_0_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_50_percent_msat);
8410         // Assert that `node[1]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 30 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8411         // that's the value of `node[0]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
8412         assert_eq!(node_1_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_30_percent_msat);
8413
8414         // Assert that `node[2]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8415         // the value of `node[3]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (100%), exceeds 90% of the
8416         // `channel_value`.
8417         assert_eq!(node_2_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
8418         // Assert that `node[3]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8419         // the value of `node[2]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (95%), exceeds 90% of the
8420         // `channel_value`.
8421         assert_eq!(node_3_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
8422 }
8423
8424 #[test]
8425 fn test_manually_accept_inbound_channel_request() {
8426         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8427         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8428         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8429         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8430         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8431         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8432
8433         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8434         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8435
8436         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &res);
8437
8438         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8439         // accepting the inbound channel request.
8440         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8441
8442         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8443         match events[0] {
8444                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8445                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap();
8446                 }
8447                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8448         }
8449
8450         let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8451         assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8452
8453         match accept_msg_ev[0] {
8454                 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
8455                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8456                 }
8457                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8458         }
8459
8460         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8461
8462         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8463         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8464
8465         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8466         match events[0] {
8467                 Event::ChannelClosed { user_channel_id, .. } => {
8468                         assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 23);
8469                 }
8470                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8471         }
8472 }
8473
8474 #[test]
8475 fn test_manually_reject_inbound_channel_request() {
8476         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8477         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8478         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8479         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8480         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8481         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8482
8483         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8484         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8485
8486         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &res);
8487
8488         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8489         // rejecting the inbound channel request.
8490         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8491
8492         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8493         match events[0] {
8494                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8495                         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8496                 }
8497                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8498         }
8499
8500         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8501         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8502
8503         match close_msg_ev[0] {
8504                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => {
8505                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8506                 }
8507                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8508         }
8509         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8510 }
8511
8512 #[test]
8513 fn test_reject_funding_before_inbound_channel_accepted() {
8514         // This tests that when `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` is set to true, inbound
8515         // channels must to be manually accepted through `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel` by
8516         // the node operator before the counterparty sends a `FundingCreated` message. If a
8517         // `FundingCreated` message is received before the channel is accepted, it should be rejected
8518         // and the channel should be closed.
8519         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8520         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8521         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8522         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8523         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8524         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8525
8526         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8527         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8528         let temp_channel_id = res.temporary_channel_id;
8529
8530         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &res);
8531
8532         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in the `msg_events`.
8533         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8534
8535         // Clear the `Event::OpenChannelRequest` event without responding to the request.
8536         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8537
8538         // Get the `AcceptChannel` message of `nodes[1]` without calling
8539         // `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`, which generates a
8540         // `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` event. The message is passed to `nodes[0]`
8541         // `handle_accept_channel`, which is required in order for `create_funding_transaction` to
8542         // succeed when `nodes[0]` is passed to it.
8543         let accept_chan_msg = {
8544                 let mut lock;
8545                 let channel = get_channel_ref!(&nodes[1], lock, temp_channel_id);
8546                 channel.get_accept_channel_message()
8547         };
8548         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_chan_msg);
8549
8550         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8551
8552         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8553         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8554
8555         // The `funding_created_msg` should be rejected by `nodes[1]` as it hasn't accepted the channel
8556         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8557
8558         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8559         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8560
8561         let expected_err = "FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted";
8562         match close_msg_ev[0] {
8563                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id, } => {
8564                         assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, temp_channel_id);
8565                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8566                         assert_eq!(msg.data, expected_err);
8567                 }
8568                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8569         }
8570
8571         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
8572 }
8573
8574 #[test]
8575 fn test_can_not_accept_inbound_channel_twice() {
8576         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8577         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8578         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8579         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8580         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8581         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8582
8583         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8584         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8585
8586         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &res);
8587
8588         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8589         // accepting the inbound channel request.
8590         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8591
8592         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8593         match events[0] {
8594                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8595                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0).unwrap();
8596                         let api_res = nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
8597                         match api_res {
8598                                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8599                                         assert_eq!(err, "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.");
8600                                 },
8601                                 Ok(_) => panic!("Channel shouldn't be possible to be accepted twice"),
8602                                 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8603                         }
8604                 }
8605                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8606         }
8607
8608         // Ensure that the channel wasn't closed after attempting to accept it twice.
8609         let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8610         assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8611
8612         match accept_msg_ev[0] {
8613                 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
8614                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8615                 }
8616                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8617         }
8618 }
8619
8620 #[test]
8621 fn test_can_not_accept_unknown_inbound_channel() {
8622         let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8623         let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
8624         let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
8625         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
8626
8627         let unknown_channel_id = [0; 32];
8628         let api_res = nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&unknown_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
8629         match api_res {
8630                 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
8631                         assert_eq!(err, "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist");
8632                 },
8633                 Ok(_) => panic!("It shouldn't be possible to accept an unkown channel"),
8634                 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8635         }
8636 }
8637
8638 #[test]
8639 fn test_simple_mpp() {
8640         // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
8641         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8642         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8643         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8644         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8645
8646         let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8647         let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8648         let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8649         let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8650
8651         let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8652         let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8653         route.paths.push(path);
8654         route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8655         route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8656         route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8657         route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8658         route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8659         route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8660         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
8661         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
8662 }
8663
8664 #[test]
8665 fn test_preimage_storage() {
8666         // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
8667         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8668         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8669         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8670         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8671
8672         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8673
8674         {
8675                 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
8676                 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8677                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8678                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8679                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8680                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8681                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8682                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8683         }
8684         // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8685         // values from previous calls.
8686         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8687         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8688         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8689         match events[0] {
8690                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref purpose, .. } => {
8691                         match &purpose {
8692                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
8693                                         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
8694                                 },
8695                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
8696                         }
8697                 },
8698                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8699         }
8700 }
8701
8702 #[test]
8703 #[allow(deprecated)]
8704 fn test_secret_timeout() {
8705         // Simple test of payment secret storage time outs. After
8706         // `create_inbound_payment(_for_hash)_legacy` is removed, this test will be removed as well.
8707         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8708         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8709         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8710         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8711
8712         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8713
8714         let (payment_hash, payment_secret_1) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_legacy(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8715
8716         // We should fail to register the same payment hash twice, at least until we've connected a
8717         // block with time 7200 + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1.
8718         if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8719                 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8720         } else { panic!(); }
8721         let mut block = {
8722                 let node_1_blocks = nodes[1].blocks.lock().unwrap();
8723                 Block {
8724                         header: BlockHeader {
8725                                 version: 0x2000000,
8726                                 prev_blockhash: node_1_blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(),
8727                                 merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(),
8728                                 time: node_1_blocks.len() as u32 + 7200, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8729                         txdata: vec![],
8730                 }
8731         };
8732         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8733         if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8734                 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8735         } else { panic!(); }
8736
8737         // If we then connect the second block, we should be able to register the same payment hash
8738         // again (this time getting a new payment secret).
8739         block.header.prev_blockhash = block.header.block_hash();
8740         block.header.time += 1;
8741         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8742         let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8743         assert_ne!(payment_secret_1, our_payment_secret);
8744
8745         {
8746                 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8747                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8748                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8749                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8750                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8751                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8752                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8753         }
8754         // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8755         // values from previous calls.
8756         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8757         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8758         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8759         match events[0] {
8760                 Event::PaymentReceived { purpose: PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret }, .. } => {
8761                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
8762                         assert_eq!(payment_secret, our_payment_secret);
8763                         // We don't actually have the payment preimage with which to claim this payment!
8764                 },
8765                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8766         }
8767 }
8768
8769 #[test]
8770 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8771         // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8772         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8773         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8774         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8775         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8776
8777         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8778
8779         let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8780         let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8781         let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8782         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8783
8784         // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8785         // resulting events.
8786         macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8787                 ($payment_hash: expr) => {
8788                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8789                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8790                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8791                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8792                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8793
8794                         // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8795                         // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8796                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8797                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash: $payment_hash }]);
8798                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8799
8800                         // We should fail the payment back
8801                         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8802                         match events.pop().unwrap() {
8803                                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8804                                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8805                                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8806                                 },
8807                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8808                         }
8809                 }
8810         }
8811
8812         let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8813         // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8814         let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8815
8816         // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8817         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8818         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(our_payment_hash);
8819         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8820
8821         // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8822         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8823         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8824         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8825
8826         // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8827         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8828         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8829         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8830 }
8831
8832 #[test]
8833 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8834         // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8835         // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8836         // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus
8837         // error.
8838         //
8839         // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8840         // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8841         // commitment at same time.
8842
8843         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8844         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8845         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8846         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8847
8848         // Create some initial channel
8849         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8850         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8851
8852         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8853         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8854
8855         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8856         let (preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
8857
8858         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8859         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8860         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8861         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8862         let watchtower = {
8863                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8864                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8865                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8866                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8867                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8868                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8869                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8870                 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8871                 watchtower
8872         };
8873         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8874         let block = Block { header, txdata: vec![] };
8875         // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8876         // transaction lock time requirements here.
8877         chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (block.clone(), 0));
8878         watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, 200);
8879
8880         // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8881         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage);
8882         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8883         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
8884
8885         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8886         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8887         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8888         if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8889                 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8890                         assert_eq!(watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure);
8891                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8892                 } else { assert!(false); }
8893         } else { assert!(false); };
8894         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8895         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8896         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8897         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8898 }
8899
8900 #[test]
8901 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8902         // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8903         // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8904         // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8905         // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8906
8907         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8908         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8909         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8910         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8911
8912         // Create some initial channel
8913         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8914         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8915
8916         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8917         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8918
8919         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8920         route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8921
8922         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8923         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8924         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8925         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8926         let watchtower_alice = {
8927                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8928                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8929                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8930                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8931                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8932                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8933                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8934                 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8935                 watchtower
8936         };
8937         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8938         let block = Block { header, txdata: vec![] };
8939         // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8940         // transaction lock time requirements here.
8941         chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as usize, (block.clone(), 0));
8942         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8943
8944         // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8945         {
8946                 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8947                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8948                 txn.clear();
8949         }
8950
8951         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8952         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8953         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8954         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8955         let watchtower_bob = {
8956                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8957                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8958                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8959                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8960                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8961                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8962                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8963                 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8964                 watchtower
8965         };
8966         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8967         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8968
8969         // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8970         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8971         {
8972                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8973         }
8974         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8975
8976         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8977         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8978         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8979         if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8980                 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8981                         // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8982                         assert_eq!(watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure);
8983                         assert_eq!(watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8984                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8985                 } else { assert!(false); }
8986         } else { assert!(false); };
8987         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8988         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8989
8990         //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8991         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8992         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8993
8994         // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8995         let bob_state_y;
8996         {
8997                 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8998                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8999                 bob_state_y = txn[0].clone();
9000                 txn.clear();
9001         };
9002
9003         // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
9004         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9005         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![bob_state_y.clone()] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
9006         {
9007                 let htlc_txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9008                 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 1);
9009                 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
9010         }
9011 }
9012
9013 #[test]
9014 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
9015         // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
9016         // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
9017         // message).
9018         //
9019         // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
9020         // registration, violating our API guarantees.
9021         //
9022         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
9023         // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
9024         // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
9025         // before receiving funding_signed.
9026         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9027         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9028         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9029         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9030
9031         // Create an initial channel
9032         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
9033         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9034         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_chan_msg);
9035         let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9036         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_chan_msg);
9037
9038         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
9039         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
9040
9041         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9042         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9043
9044         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9045         let channel_id = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
9046         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
9047         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
9048         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Hi".to_string() }, true);
9049 }
9050
9051 #[test]
9052 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
9053         // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
9054         // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
9055         // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
9056         // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
9057         // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
9058         // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
9059
9060         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9061         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9062         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9063         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9064
9065         // Create some initial channels
9066         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9067
9068         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
9069         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
9070         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
9071         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9072         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
9073         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
9074
9075         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
9076         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9077         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] });
9078         // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
9079         // this test before #653 fix.
9080         chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
9081         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
9082         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9083         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
9084         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
9085
9086         let htlc_timeout = {
9087                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9088                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
9089                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9090                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
9091                 node_txn[1].clone()
9092         };
9093
9094         let header_201 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9095         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_201, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout.clone()] });
9096         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
9097         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
9098 }
9099
9100 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
9101         // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
9102         // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
9103         // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
9104         //
9105         // Steps of the test:
9106         // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
9107         // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
9108         // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
9109         // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
9110         // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
9111         //    but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
9112         // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
9113         // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
9114         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9115         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9116         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9117         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9118
9119         // Create some initial channels
9120         let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9121         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9122
9123         // Steps (1) and (2):
9124         // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
9125         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
9126
9127         // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
9128         let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
9129         check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
9130         assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
9131         check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
9132         assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9133         assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
9134
9135         // Steps (3) and (4):
9136         // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
9137         // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
9138         let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
9139         let mut counterparty_node = 1; // Bob if Alice force-closes
9140
9141         // Bob force-closes
9142         if !broadcast_alice {
9143                 force_closing_node = 1;
9144                 counterparty_node = 0;
9145         }
9146         nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_ab.2, &nodes[counterparty_node].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9147         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
9148         check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
9149         check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9150         if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9151                 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
9152                         true => alice_txn.clone(),
9153                         false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
9154                 };
9155                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
9156                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
9157                 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
9158                 if broadcast_alice {
9159                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9160                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9161                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
9162                 }
9163                 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
9164                 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
9165         }
9166
9167         // Step (5):
9168         // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
9169         // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
9170         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9171         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9172         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
9173
9174         let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9175         assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9176         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9177         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9178         assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
9179         assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
9180
9181         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9182         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false, false);
9183         // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
9184         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
9185                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9186                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9187                 match events[0] {
9188                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
9189                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9190                         },
9191                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9192                 };
9193         }
9194         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
9195         // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
9196         // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
9197         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9198
9199         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9200         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9201         let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
9202                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
9203                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9204                         (*msg).clone()
9205                 },
9206                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9207         };
9208         let bob_updates = match events[1] {
9209                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
9210                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9211                         (*updates).clone()
9212                 },
9213                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9214         };
9215
9216         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
9217         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9218         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
9219         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9220
9221         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9222         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9223         let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
9224                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
9225                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9226                         (*msg).clone()
9227                 },
9228                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9229         };
9230         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
9231         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9232
9233         // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
9234         // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
9235         let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
9236         if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
9237         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9238                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
9239                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
9240                 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
9241                 if broadcast_alice {
9242                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9243                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9244                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
9245                 }
9246                 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9247                 if broadcast_alice {
9248                         // In `connect_block()`, the ChainMonitor and ChannelManager are separately notified about a
9249                         // new block being connected. The ChannelManager being notified triggers a monitor update,
9250                         // which triggers broadcasting our commitment tx and an HTLC-claiming tx. The ChainMonitor
9251                         // being notified triggers the HTLC-claiming tx redundantly, resulting in 3 total txs being
9252                         // broadcasted.
9253                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 3);
9254                         check_spends!(bob_txn[1], chan_ab.3);
9255                 } else {
9256                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
9257                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
9258                 }
9259         }
9260
9261         // Step (6):
9262         // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
9263         // broadcasted commitment transaction.
9264         {
9265                 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
9266                 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9267                         // Bob should now have an extra broadcasted tx, for the preimage-claiming transaction.
9268                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
9269                 }
9270                 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
9271                         true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
9272                         false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
9273                 };
9274                 // If Alice force-closed and Bob didn't receive her commitment transaction until after he
9275                 // received Carol's fulfill, he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction first. Else if
9276                 // Bob force closed or if he found out about Alice's commitment tx before receiving Carol's
9277                 // fulfill, then he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction second.
9278                 if broadcast_alice && !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9279                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
9280                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
9281                 } else {
9282                         check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
9283                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
9284                 }
9285         }
9286 }
9287
9288 #[test]
9289 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
9290         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
9291         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
9292         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
9293         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
9294 }
9295
9296 #[test]
9297 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
9298         // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
9299         // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
9300         //
9301         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
9302         // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
9303         // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
9304         // updating logic for the existing channel.
9305         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9306         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9307         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9308         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9309
9310         // Create an initial channel
9311         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
9312         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9313         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_chan_msg);
9314         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9315
9316         // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
9317         // that it is rejected.
9318         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_chan_msg);
9319         {
9320                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9321                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9322                 match events[0] {
9323                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9324                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
9325                                 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
9326                                 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
9327                                 // move forward with it.
9328                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9329                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9330                         },
9331                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9332                 }
9333         }
9334
9335         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
9336         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
9337
9338         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9339         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9340
9341         let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9342         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9343         {
9344                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9345                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
9346                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
9347                 added_monitors.clear();
9348         }
9349         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9350
9351         let funding_outpoint = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
9352         let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
9353
9354         // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
9355         // temporary one).
9356
9357         // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
9358         // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
9359         // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
9360         open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
9361         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_chan_msg);
9362         {
9363                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9364                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9365                 match events[0] {
9366                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9367                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
9368                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
9369                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9370                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9371                         },
9372                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9373                 }
9374         }
9375
9376         // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
9377         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
9378         let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9379         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_chan_2_msg);
9380         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9381         create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
9382
9383         let funding_created = {
9384                 let mut a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
9385                 // Once we call `get_outbound_funding_created` the channel has a duplicate channel_id as
9386                 // another channel in the ChannelManager - an invalid state. Thus, we'd panic later when we
9387                 // try to create another channel. Instead, we drop the channel entirely here (leaving the
9388                 // channelmanager in a possibly nonsense state instead).
9389                 let mut as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.remove(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
9390                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9391                 as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
9392         };
9393         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9394         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
9395         // At this point we'll try to add a duplicate channel monitor, which will be rejected, but
9396         // still needs to be cleared here.
9397         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9398
9399         // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
9400         {
9401                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9402                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9403                 match events[0] {
9404                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9405                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
9406                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
9407                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
9408                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9409                         },
9410                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9411                 }
9412         }
9413
9414         // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
9415         // everything is functional.
9416         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
9417         {
9418                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9419                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
9420                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
9421                 added_monitors.clear();
9422         }
9423
9424         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9425         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
9426         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9427         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9428
9429         let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9430         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9431         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9432         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
9433 }
9434
9435 #[test]
9436 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
9437         // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
9438         //
9439         // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
9440         // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
9441         // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
9442         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9443         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9444         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9445         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9446
9447         // Create some initial channels
9448         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9449         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9450         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9451
9452         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9453         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9454         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9455
9456         // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
9457         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9458         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9459
9460         // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
9461         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9462         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9463         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
9464         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
9465         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
9466         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9467         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
9468         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9469
9470         // A null channel ID should close all channels
9471         let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9472         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9473         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9474         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
9475         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9476         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9477         match events[0] {
9478                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9479                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9480                 },
9481                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9482         }
9483         match events[1] {
9484                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9485                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9486                 },
9487                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9488         }
9489         // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
9490         // peer_disconnected with no_connection_possible set to false, duplicating the
9491         // close-all-channels logic. That's OK, we don't want to end up not force-closing channels for
9492         // users with their own peer handling logic. We duplicate the call here, however.
9493         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9494         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9495
9496         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
9497         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9498         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9499 }
9500
9501 #[test]
9502 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
9503         // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
9504         //
9505         // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
9506         // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
9507         // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
9508         // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
9509         //
9510         // Further, if the funding transaction is consensus-valid, confirms, and is later spent, we'd
9511         // previously have crashed in `ChannelMonitor` even though we closed the channel as bogus and
9512         // gave up on it. We test this here by generating such a transaction.
9513         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9514         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9515         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9516         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9517
9518         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9519         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9520         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9521
9522         let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
9523
9524         // Create a witness program which can be spent by a 4-empty-stack-elements witness and which is
9525         // 136 bytes long. This matches our "accepted HTLC preimage spend" matching, previously causing
9526         // a panic as we'd try to extract a 32 byte preimage from a witness element without checking
9527         // its length.
9528         let mut wit_program: Vec<u8> = channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program();
9529         let wit_program_script: Script = wit_program.into();
9530         for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
9531                 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
9532                 output.script_pubkey = Script::new_v0_p2wsh(&wit_program_script.wscript_hash());
9533         }
9534
9535         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
9536         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9537         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9538
9539         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9540         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9541
9542         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9543         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
9544
9545         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9546         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9547         nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
9548
9549         let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
9550         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
9551         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
9552         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9553         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9554         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
9555         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
9556                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9557                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
9558                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
9559                 } else { panic!(); }
9560         } else { panic!(); }
9561         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
9562
9563         // Now confirm a spend of the (bogus) funding transaction. As long as the witness is 5 elements
9564         // long the ChannelMonitor will try to read 32 bytes from the second-to-last element, panicing
9565         // as its not 32 bytes long.
9566         let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
9567                 version: 2i32, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
9568                 input: tx.output.iter().enumerate().map(|(idx, _)| TxIn {
9569                         previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
9570                                 txid: tx.txid(),
9571                                 vout: idx as u32,
9572                         },
9573                         script_sig: Script::new(),
9574                         sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
9575                         witness: Witness::from_vec(channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness())
9576                 }).collect(),
9577                 output: vec![TxOut {
9578                         value: 1000,
9579                         script_pubkey: Script::new(),
9580                 }]
9581         };
9582         check_spends!(spend_tx, tx);
9583         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &spend_tx);
9584 }
9585
9586 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
9587         // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
9588         // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
9589         // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
9590         // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
9591         // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
9592         // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
9593         // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
9594         // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
9595         // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
9596         // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
9597         // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
9598         // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
9599         // until we learned about an additional block.
9600         //
9601         // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
9602         // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
9603         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9604         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9605         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9606         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9607         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
9608
9609         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9610         let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9611         let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
9612         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9613         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9614
9615         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9616         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9617         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9618         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9619         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9620         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
9621
9622         let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
9623         if !test_height_before_timelock {
9624                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
9625         }
9626         nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9627                 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
9628         if test_height_before_timelock {
9629                 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
9630                 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
9631                 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
9632                 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9633         } else {
9634                 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
9635                 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9636                 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
9637                 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
9638                 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
9639                 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
9640                 // timelock is up).
9641                 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
9642                 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
9643
9644                 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
9645                 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
9646                 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
9647                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9648                         &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
9649                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: channel_id }]);
9650                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9651
9652                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9653                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9654                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9655                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9656                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9657                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9658                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9659                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9660                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
9661         }
9662 }
9663
9664 #[test]
9665 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
9666         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
9667         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
9668 }
9669
9670 #[test]
9671 fn test_forwardable_regen() {
9672         // Tests that if we reload a ChannelManager while forwards are pending we will regenerate the
9673         // PendingHTLCsForwardable event automatically, ensuring we don't forget to forward/receive
9674         // HTLCs.
9675         // We test it for both payment receipt and payment forwarding.
9676
9677         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9678         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9679         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9680         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
9681         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
9682         let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
9683         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9684         let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).2;
9685         let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).2;
9686
9687         // First send a payment to nodes[1]
9688         let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
9689         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9690         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9691
9692         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9693         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9694         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9695         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9696         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9697
9698         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9699
9700         // Next send a payment which is forwarded by nodes[1]
9701         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 200_000);
9702         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
9703         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9704
9705         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9706         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9707         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9708         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9709         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9710
9711         // There is already a PendingHTLCsForwardable event "pending" so another one will not be
9712         // generated
9713         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9714
9715         // Now restart nodes[1] and make sure it regenerates a single PendingHTLCsForwardable
9716         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9717         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9718
9719         let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
9720         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9721         let mut chan_1_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9722         get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_1).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9723         get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_2).write(&mut chan_1_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9724
9725         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
9726         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
9727         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
9728         nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
9729
9730         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9731         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9732                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9733         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
9734         let mut chan_1_monitor_read = &chan_1_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9735         let (_, mut chan_1_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9736                 &mut chan_1_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9737         assert!(chan_1_monitor_read.is_empty());
9738
9739         let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
9740         let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
9741                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
9742                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
9743                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_1_monitor);
9744                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
9745                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
9746                         keys_manager,
9747                         fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
9748                         chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
9749                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
9750                         logger: nodes[1].logger,
9751                         channel_monitors,
9752                 }).unwrap()
9753         };
9754         nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
9755         assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
9756
9757         assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor),
9758                 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
9759         assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_1_monitor),
9760                 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
9761         nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
9762         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9763
9764         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9765         // Note that nodes[1] and nodes[2] resend their channel_ready here since they haven't updated
9766         // the commitment state.
9767         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9768
9769         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9770
9771         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9772         expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 100_000);
9773         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9774
9775         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9776         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9777         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9778         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9779         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9780         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9781         expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 200_000);
9782
9783         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
9784         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage_2);
9785 }
9786
9787 fn do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(test_for_second_fail_panic: bool) {
9788         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9789         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9790         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9791         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9792
9793         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9794
9795         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
9796                 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
9797         let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
9798
9799         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
9800
9801         {
9802                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
9803                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9804                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9805                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9806                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9807                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9808                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9809         }
9810         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9811         expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 10_000);
9812
9813         {
9814                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
9815                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9816                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9817                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9818                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9819                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9820                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9821                 // At this point, nodes[1] would notice it has too much value for the payment. It will
9822                 // assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9823                 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC. Previously, it'd also have failed back
9824                 // the first HTLC delivered above.
9825         }
9826
9827         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9828         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9829
9830         if test_for_second_fail_panic {
9831                 // Now we go fail back the first HTLC from the user end.
9832                 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
9833
9834                 let expected_destinations = vec![
9835                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
9836                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
9837                 ];
9838                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1],  expected_destinations);
9839                 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9840
9841                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9842                 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9843                 assert_eq!(fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 2);
9844
9845                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9846                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
9847                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9848
9849                 let failure_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9850                 assert_eq!(failure_events.len(), 2);
9851                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
9852                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[1] {} else { panic!(); }
9853         } else {
9854                 // Let the second HTLC fail and claim the first
9855                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9856                 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9857
9858                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9859                 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9860                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9861                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9862
9863                 expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9864
9865                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
9866         }
9867 }
9868
9869 #[test]
9870 fn test_dup_htlc_second_fail_panic() {
9871         // Previously, if we received two HTLCs back-to-back, where the second overran the expected
9872         // value for the payment, we'd fail back both HTLCs after generating a `PaymentReceived` event.
9873         // Then, if the user failed the second payment, they'd hit a "tried to fail an already failed
9874         // HTLC" debug panic. This tests for this behavior, checking that only one HTLC is auto-failed.
9875         do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(true);
9876 }
9877
9878 #[test]
9879 fn test_dup_htlc_second_rejected() {
9880         // Test that if we receive a second HTLC for an MPP payment that overruns the payment amount we
9881         // simply reject the second HTLC but are still able to claim the first HTLC.
9882         do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(false);
9883 }
9884
9885 #[test]
9886 fn test_inconsistent_mpp_params() {
9887         // Test that if we recieve two HTLCs with different payment parameters we fail back the first
9888         // such HTLC and allow the second to stay.
9889         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9890         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9891         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9892         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9893
9894         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9895         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9896         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9897         let chan_2_3 =create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9898
9899         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id())
9900                 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
9901         let mut route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 15_000_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
9902         assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9903         route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9904                 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9905                 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9906                         core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9907         });
9908         let payment_params_opt = Some(payment_params);
9909
9910         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[3]);
9911
9912         let cur_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
9913         let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
9914         {
9915                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
9916                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9917
9918                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9919                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9920                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), false, None);
9921         }
9922         assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9923
9924         {
9925                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 14_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
9926                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9927
9928                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9929                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9930                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9931
9932                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9933                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9934
9935                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9936                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9937
9938                 let mut events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9939                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9940                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9941
9942                 nodes[3].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9943                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9944                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg, true, true);
9945
9946                 // At this point, nodes[3] should notice the two HTLCs don't contain the same total payment
9947                 // amount. It will assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9948                 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC.
9949         }
9950         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[3]);
9951         nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9952         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[3], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9953         nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9954
9955         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
9956
9957         let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9958         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9959         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9960
9961         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }]);
9962         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9963
9964         let fail_updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9965         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9966         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], fail_updates_2.commitment_signed, false);
9967
9968         expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9969
9970         nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
9971         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9972
9973         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9974         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9975         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), true, None);
9976
9977         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, our_payment_preimage);
9978 }
9979
9980 #[test]
9981 fn test_keysend_payments_to_public_node() {
9982         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9983         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9984         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9985         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9986
9987         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9988         let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9989         let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9990         let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9991         let route_params = RouteParameters {
9992                 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9993                 final_value_msat: 10000,
9994                 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9995         };
9996         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
9997         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9998         let route = find_route(&payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
9999
10000         let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
10001         let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
10002         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10003         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10004         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10005         let event = events.pop().unwrap();
10006         let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
10007         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
10008         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
10009 }
10010
10011 #[test]
10012 fn test_keysend_payments_to_private_node() {
10013         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10014         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10015         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10016         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10017
10018         let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
10019         let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
10020         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
10021         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
10022
10023         let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
10024         let route_params = RouteParameters {
10025                 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
10026                 final_value_msat: 10000,
10027                 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
10028         };
10029         let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
10030         let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
10031         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
10032         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10033         let route = find_route(
10034                 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
10035                 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
10036         ).unwrap();
10037
10038         let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
10039         let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
10040         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10041         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10042         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10043         let event = events.pop().unwrap();
10044         let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
10045         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
10046         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
10047 }
10048
10049 #[test]
10050 fn test_double_partial_claim() {
10051         // Test what happens if a node receives a payment, generates a PaymentReceived event, the HTLCs
10052         // time out, the sender resends only some of the MPP parts, then the user processes the
10053         // PaymentReceived event, ensuring they don't inadvertently claim only part of the full payment
10054         // amount.
10055         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
10056         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
10057         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
10058         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10059
10060         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
10061         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
10062         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
10063         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
10064
10065         let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], 15_000_000);
10066         assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
10067         route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
10068                 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
10069                 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
10070                         core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
10071         });
10072
10073         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
10074         // nodes[3] has now received a PaymentReceived event...which it will take some (exorbitant)
10075         // amount of time to respond to.
10076
10077         // Connect some blocks to time out the payment
10078         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
10079         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // To get the same height for sending later
10080
10081         let failed_destinations = vec![
10082                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
10083                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
10084         ];
10085         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations);
10086
10087         pass_failed_payment_back(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_hash);
10088
10089         // nodes[1] now retries one of the two paths...
10090         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
10091         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
10092
10093         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10094         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
10095         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
10096
10097         // At this point nodes[3] has received one half of the payment, and the user goes to handle
10098         // that PaymentReceived event they got hours ago and never handled...we should refuse to claim.
10099         nodes[3].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
10100         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
10101         assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
10102 }
10103
10104 fn do_test_partial_claim_before_restart(persist_both_monitors: bool) {
10105         // Test what happens if a node receives an MPP payment, claims it, but crashes before
10106         // persisting the ChannelManager. If `persist_both_monitors` is false, also crash after only
10107         // updating one of the two channels' ChannelMonitors. As a result, on startup, we'll (a) still
10108         // have the PaymentReceived event, (b) have one (or two) channel(s) that goes on chain with the
10109         // HTLC preimage in them, and (c) optionally have one channel that is live off-chain but does
10110         // not have the preimage tied to the still-pending HTLC.
10111         //
10112         // To get to the correct state, on startup we should propagate the preimage to the
10113         // still-off-chain channel, claiming the HTLC as soon as the peer connects, with the monitor
10114         // receiving the preimage without a state update.
10115         //
10116         // Further, we should generate a `PaymentClaimed` event to inform the user that the payment was
10117         // definitely claimed.
10118         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
10119         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
10120         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
10121
10122         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
10123         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
10124         let nodes_3_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
10125
10126         let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10127
10128         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
10129         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
10130         let chan_id_persisted = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).2;
10131         let chan_id_not_persisted = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).2;
10132
10133         // Create an MPP route for 15k sats, more than the default htlc-max of 10%
10134         let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], 15_000_000);
10135         assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
10136         route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
10137                 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
10138                 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
10139                         core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
10140         });
10141
10142         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
10143         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
10144
10145         // Send the payment through to nodes[3] *without* clearing the PaymentReceived event
10146         let mut send_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10147         assert_eq!(send_events.len(), 2);
10148         do_pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), send_events[0].clone(), true, false, None);
10149         do_pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), send_events[1].clone(), true, false, None);
10150
10151         // Now that we have an MPP payment pending, get the latest encoded copies of nodes[3]'s
10152         // monitors and ChannelManager, for use later, if we don't want to persist both monitors.
10153         let mut original_monitor = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
10154         if !persist_both_monitors {
10155                 for outpoint in nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.list_monitors() {
10156                         if outpoint.to_channel_id() == chan_id_not_persisted {
10157                                 assert!(original_monitor.0.is_empty());
10158                                 nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap().write(&mut original_monitor).unwrap();
10159                         }
10160                 }
10161         }
10162
10163         let mut original_manager = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
10164         nodes[3].node.write(&mut original_manager).unwrap();
10165
10166         expect_payment_received!(nodes[3], payment_hash, payment_secret, 15_000_000);
10167
10168         nodes[3].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
10169         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 2);
10170         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[3], payment_hash, 15_000_000);
10171
10172         // Now fetch one of the two updated ChannelMonitors from nodes[3], and restart pretending we
10173         // crashed in between the two persistence calls - using one old ChannelMonitor and one new one,
10174         // with the old ChannelManager.
10175         let mut updated_monitor = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
10176         for outpoint in nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.list_monitors() {
10177                 if outpoint.to_channel_id() == chan_id_persisted {
10178                         assert!(updated_monitor.0.is_empty());
10179                         nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap().write(&mut updated_monitor).unwrap();
10180                 }
10181         }
10182         // If `persist_both_monitors` is set, get the second monitor here as well
10183         if persist_both_monitors {
10184                 for outpoint in nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.list_monitors() {
10185                         if outpoint.to_channel_id() == chan_id_not_persisted {
10186                                 assert!(original_monitor.0.is_empty());
10187                                 nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap().write(&mut original_monitor).unwrap();
10188                         }
10189                 }
10190         }
10191
10192         // Now restart nodes[3].
10193         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
10194         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[3].keys_manager;
10195         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[3].chain_source), nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[3].logger, node_cfgs[3].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
10196         nodes[3].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
10197         let mut monitors = Vec::new();
10198         for mut monitor_data in [original_monitor, updated_monitor].iter() {
10199                 let (_, mut deserialized_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut &monitor_data.0[..], keys_manager).unwrap();
10200                 monitors.push(deserialized_monitor);
10201         }
10202
10203         let config = UserConfig::default();
10204         nodes_3_deserialized = {
10205                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
10206                 for monitor in monitors.iter_mut() {
10207                         channel_monitors.insert(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
10208                 }
10209                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut &original_manager.0[..], ChannelManagerReadArgs {
10210                         default_config: config,
10211                         keys_manager,
10212                         fee_estimator: node_cfgs[3].fee_estimator,
10213                         chain_monitor: nodes[3].chain_monitor,
10214                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
10215                         logger: nodes[3].logger,
10216                         channel_monitors,
10217                 }).unwrap().1
10218         };
10219         nodes[3].node = &nodes_3_deserialized;
10220
10221         for monitor in monitors {
10222                 // On startup the preimage should have been copied into the non-persisted monitor:
10223                 assert!(monitor.get_stored_preimages().contains_key(&payment_hash));
10224                 assert_eq!(nodes[3].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.clone(), monitor),
10225                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
10226         }
10227         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 2);
10228
10229         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
10230         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
10231
10232         // During deserialization, we should have closed one channel and broadcast its latest
10233         // commitment transaction. We should also still have the original PaymentReceived event we
10234         // never finished processing.
10235         let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10236         assert_eq!(events.len(), if persist_both_monitors { 4 } else { 3 });
10237         if let Event::PaymentReceived { amount_msat: 15_000_000, .. } = events[0] { } else { panic!(); }
10238         if let Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager, .. } = events[1] { } else { panic!(); }
10239         if persist_both_monitors {
10240                 if let Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager, .. } = events[2] { } else { panic!(); }
10241         }
10242
10243         // On restart, we should also get a duplicate PaymentClaimed event as we persisted the
10244         // ChannelManager prior to handling the original one.
10245         if let Event::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: our_payment_hash, amount_msat: 15_000_000, .. } =
10246                 events[if persist_both_monitors { 3 } else { 2 }]
10247         {
10248                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
10249         } else { panic!(); }
10250
10251         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), if persist_both_monitors { 0 } else { 1 });
10252         if !persist_both_monitors {
10253                 // If one of the two channels is still live, reveal the payment preimage over it.
10254
10255                 nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
10256                 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2]);
10257                 nodes[2].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
10258                 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[3]);
10259
10260                 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
10261                 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
10262                 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
10263
10264                 nodes[3].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
10265
10266                 // Once we call `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` the holding cell is cleared and the HTLC
10267                 // claim should fly.
10268                 let ds_msgs = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10269                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
10270                 assert_eq!(ds_msgs.len(), 2);
10271                 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } = ds_msgs[1] {} else { panic!(); }
10272
10273                 let cs_updates = match ds_msgs[0] {
10274                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
10275                                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10276                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
10277                                 let cs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10278                                 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[2], nodes[0], nodes[3], Some(1000), false, false);
10279                                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
10280                                 cs_updates
10281                         }
10282                         _ => panic!(),
10283                 };
10284
10285                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10286                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], cs_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
10287                 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
10288         }
10289 }
10290
10291 #[test]
10292 fn test_partial_claim_before_restart() {
10293         do_test_partial_claim_before_restart(false);
10294         do_test_partial_claim_before_restart(true);
10295 }
10296
10297 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
10298 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
10299 enum ExposureEvent {
10300         /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
10301         AtHTLCForward,
10302         /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
10303         AtHTLCReception,
10304         /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
10305         AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
10306 }
10307
10308 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool) {
10309         // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
10310         // policy.
10311         //
10312         // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
10313         // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
10314         // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
10315         // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
10316         // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
10317         // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
10318         // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
10319         // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
10320
10321         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10322         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
10323         config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = 5_000_000; // default setting value
10324         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10325         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
10326         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10327
10328         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
10329         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10330         open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
10331         open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
10332         if on_holder_tx {
10333                 open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10334         }
10335         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel);
10336         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10337         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
10338
10339         let opt_anchors = false;
10340
10341         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
10342
10343         if on_holder_tx {
10344                 if let Some(mut chan) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&temporary_channel_id) {
10345                         chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10346                 }
10347         }
10348
10349         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
10350         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
10351         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10352
10353         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
10354         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10355
10356         let (channel_ready, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
10357         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
10358         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
10359
10360         let dust_buffer_feerate = {
10361                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
10362                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
10363                 chan.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64
10364         };
10365         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
10366         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
10367
10368         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
10369         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
10370
10371         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 25;
10372         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
10373
10374         if on_holder_tx {
10375                 if dust_outbound_balance {
10376                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
10377                         // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
10378                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
10379                         for i in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
10380                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
10381                                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
10382                         }
10383                 } else {
10384                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
10385                         // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
10386                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
10387                         for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
10388                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
10389                         }
10390                 }
10391         } else {
10392                 if dust_outbound_balance {
10393                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
10394                         // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
10395                         for i in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
10396                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
10397                                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
10398                         }
10399                 } else {
10400                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
10401                         // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
10402                         for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
10403                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
10404                         }
10405                 }
10406         }
10407
10408         let dust_overflow = dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx + 1);
10409         if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
10410                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
10411                 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
10412                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
10413                 if on_holder_tx {
10414                         let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
10415                         let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
10416                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
10417                 } else {
10418                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
10419                 }
10420         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
10421                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
10422                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
10423                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10424                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10425                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10426                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
10427                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10428                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
10429                 if on_holder_tx {
10430                         // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
10431                         let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
10432                         let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
10433                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
10434                 } else {
10435                         // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
10436                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
10437                 }
10438         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
10439                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 2_500_000);
10440                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at update_fee-swallowed HTLC", ); }
10441                 {
10442                         let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
10443                         *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
10444                 }
10445                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10446                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10447                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure".to_string(), 1);
10448         }
10449
10450         let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10451         let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
10452         added_monitors.clear();
10453 }
10454
10455 #[test]
10456 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
10457         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
10458         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
10459         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
10460         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
10461         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
10462         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
10463         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
10464         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
10465         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
10466         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
10467         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
10468         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
10469 }
10470
10471 #[test]
10472 fn test_non_final_funding_tx() {
10473         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10474         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10475         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10476         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10477
10478         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10479         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10480         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_message);
10481         let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10482         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel_message);
10483
10484         let best_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
10485
10486         let chan_id = *nodes[0].network_chan_count.borrow();
10487         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10488         let input = TxIn { previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint::null(), script_sig: bitcoin::Script::new(), sequence: Sequence(1), witness: Witness::from_vec(vec!(vec!(1))) };
10489         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10490         let mut tx = match events[0] {
10491                 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } => {
10492                         // Timelock the transaction _beyond_ the best client height + 2.
10493                         Transaction { version: chan_id as i32, lock_time: PackedLockTime(best_height + 3), input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut {
10494                                 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
10495                         }]}
10496                 },
10497                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10498         };
10499         // Transaction should fail as it's evaluated as non-final for propagation.
10500         match nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()) {
10501                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
10502                         assert_eq!(format!("Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final"), err);
10503                 },
10504                 _ => panic!()
10505         }
10506
10507         // However, transaction should be accepted if it's in a +2 headroom from best block.
10508         tx.lock_time = PackedLockTime(tx.lock_time.0 - 1);
10509         assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
10510         get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10511 }