_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
  11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
  12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
  13
  14 use chain;
  15 use chain::{Confirm, Listen, Watch};
  16 use chain::channelmonitor;
  17 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
  18 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  19 use chain::keysinterface::{BaseSign, KeysInterface};
  20 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
  21 use ln::channel::{commitment_tx_base_weight, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT};
  22 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS };
  23 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
  24 use ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
  25 use ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
  26 use routing::network_graph::RoutingFees;
  27 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteHint, RouteHintHop, RouteParameters, find_route, get_route};
  28 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures, NodeFeatures};
  29 use ln::msgs;
  30 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
  31 use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
  32 use util::{byte_utils, test_utils};
  33 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason};
  34 use util::errors::APIError;
  35 use util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
  36 use util::config::UserConfig;
  37
  38 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
  39 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
  40 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
  41 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  42 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
  43 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
  44
  45 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
  46 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
  47
  48 use regex;
  49
  50 use io;
  51 use prelude::*;
  52 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
  53 use core::default::Default;
  54 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
  55
  56 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
  57 use ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
  58
  59 #[test]
  60 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
  61         // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
  62         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
  63         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
  64         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
  65         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
  66
  67         // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
  68         // funding satoshis
  69         let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
  70         let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat);
  71         let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
  72
  73         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
  74         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
  75
  76         // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
  77         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
  78
  79         // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
  80         // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
  81         let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
  82                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
  83                 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
  84                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
  85                 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
  86                 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
  87                         match action {
  88                                 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
  89                                         nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), expected_regex, 1);
  90                                 },
  91                                 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
  92                         }
  93                 } else { assert!(false); }
  94         };
  95
  96         use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
  97         use ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
  98
  99         // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
 100         insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than {}. It was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS; msg });
 101
 102         insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
 103
 104         insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than funding value \d+", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
 105
 106         insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
 107
 108         insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
 109
 110         insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
 111
 112         insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
 113
 114         insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
 115 }
 116
 117 fn do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(send_from_initiator: bool) {
 118         // A peer providing a channel_reserve_satoshis of 0 (or less than our dust limit) is insecure,
 119         // but only for them. Because some LSPs do it with some level of trust of the clients (for a
 120         // substantial UX improvement), we explicitly allow it. Because it's unlikely to happen often
 121         // in normal testing, we test it explicitly here.
 122         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 123         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 124         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 125         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 126
 127         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
 128         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
 129         let feerate_per_kw = 253;
 130         let opt_anchors = false;
 131         push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
 132         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
 133
 134         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None).unwrap();
 135         let mut open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 136         if !send_from_initiator {
 137                 open_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 138                 open_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 139         }
 140         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_message);
 141
 142         // Extract the channel accept message from node1 to node0
 143         let mut accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 144         if send_from_initiator {
 145                 accept_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 146                 accept_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 147         }
 148         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel_message);
 149         {
 150                 let mut lock;
 151                 let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(if send_from_initiator { &nodes[1] } else { &nodes[0] }, lock, temp_channel_id);
 152                 chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 153                 chan.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 154         }
 155
 156         let funding_tx = sign_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100_000, temp_channel_id);
 157         let funding_msgs = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_tx);
 158         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_msgs.0);
 159
 160         // nodes[0] should now be able to send the full balance to nodes[1], violating nodes[1]'s
 161         // security model if it ever tries to send funds back to nodes[0] (but that's not our problem).
 162         if send_from_initiator {
 163                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000_000
 164                         // Note that for outbound channels we have to consider the commitment tx fee and the
 165                         // "fee spike buffer", which is currently a multiple of the total commitment tx fee as
 166                         // well as an additional HTLC.
 167                         - FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, 2, opt_anchors));
 168         } else {
 169                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], push_amt);
 170         }
 171 }
 172
 173 #[test]
 174 fn test_counterparty_no_reserve() {
 175         do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(true);
 176         do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(false);
 177 }
 178
 179 #[test]
 180 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
 181         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 182         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 183         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 184         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 185         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 186
 187         // balancing
 188         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 189
 190         // A                                        B
 191         // update_fee                            ->
 192         // send (1) commitment_signed            -.
 193         //                                       <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
 194         // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
 195         // (1) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 196         //                                       .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
 197         // (2) RAA is delivered                  ->
 198         //                                       .- send (4) commitment_signed
 199         //                                       <- (3) RAA is delivered
 200         // send (5) commitment_signed            -.
 201         //                                       <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
 202         // send (6) RAA                          -.
 203         // (5) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 204         //                                       <- RAA
 205         // (6) RAA is delivered                  ->
 206
 207         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 208         {
 209                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 210                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 211         }
 212         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 213         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 214
 215         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 216         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 217         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 218                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 219                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 220                 },
 221                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 222         };
 223
 224         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 225
 226         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 227         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 228         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
 229         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 230
 231         let payment_event = {
 232                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 233                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 234                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 235         };
 236         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 237         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 238
 239         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 240         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 241         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 242         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 243         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 244         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 245
 246         // deliver(1), generate (3):
 247         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 248         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 249         // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 250         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 251
 252         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
 253         let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 254         assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 255         assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 256         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 257         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 258         assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
 259         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 260
 261         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
 262         let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 263         assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 264         assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 265         assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 266         assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 267         assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
 268         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 269
 270         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
 271         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 272         // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 273         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 274
 275         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
 276         let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 277         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 278
 279         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 280         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 281
 282         let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 283         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
 284         match events_2[0] {
 285                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
 286                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 287         }
 288
 289         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
 290         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 291 }
 292
 293 #[test]
 294 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
 295         // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
 296         // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
 297         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 298         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 299         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 300         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 301         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 302
 303         // balancing
 304         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 305
 306         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 307         {
 308                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 309                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 310         }
 311         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 312         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 313
 314         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 315         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 316         let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 317                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
 318                         update_fee.as_ref()
 319                 },
 320                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 321         };
 322
 323         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 324
 325         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 326         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 327         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
 328         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 329
 330         let payment_event = {
 331                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 332                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 333                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 334         };
 335         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 336         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 337
 338         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 339         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 340         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 341         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 342         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 343         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 344
 345         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
 346         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 347
 348         // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
 349 }
 350
 351 #[test]
 352 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
 353         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 354         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 355         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 356         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 357         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 358
 359         // A                                        B
 360         // update_fee/commitment_signed          ->
 361         //                                       .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
 362         // update_fee (never committed)          ->
 363         // (3) update_fee                        ->
 364         // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
 365         // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
 366         // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
 367         //                                       <- (1) RAA delivered
 368         // (3) is generated and send (4) CS      -.
 369         // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
 370         // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
 371         //                                       <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
 372         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 373         //                                          B should send no response here
 374         // (4) commitment_signed delivered       ->
 375         //                                       <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
 376         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 377
 378         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 379         let initial_feerate;
 380         {
 381                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 382                 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
 383                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
 384         }
 385         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 386         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 387
 388         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 389         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 390         let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 391                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 392                         (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
 393                 },
 394                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 395         };
 396
 397         // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
 398         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
 399         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
 400         let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 401         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 402
 403         // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
 404         // transaction:
 405         {
 406                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 407                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
 408         }
 409         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 410         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 411         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 412
 413         // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
 414         let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
 415                 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
 416                 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
 417         };
 418
 419         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 420
 421         update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
 422         // Deliver (3)
 423         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 424
 425         // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
 426         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
 427         let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 428         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 429         assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 430         assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 431         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 432         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 433         // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
 434         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
 435         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
 436
 437         // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
 438         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
 439         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 440         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 441         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 442
 443         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
 444         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 445         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 446
 447         // Delever (4)
 448         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
 449         let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 450         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 451
 452         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 453         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 454         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 455
 456         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
 457         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 458         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 459         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 460
 461         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
 462         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 463         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 464 }
 465
 466 fn do_test_1_conf_open(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
 467         // Previously, if the minium_depth config was set to 1, we'd never send a funding_locked. This
 468         // tests that we properly send one in that case.
 469         let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
 470         alice_config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
 471         alice_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
 472         alice_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
 473         let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
 474         bob_config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
 475         bob_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
 476         bob_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
 477         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 478         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 479         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)]);
 480         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 481         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
 482
 483         let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 484         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
 485         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
 486         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 487
 488         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
 489         let as_msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 490         assert_eq!(as_msg_events.len(), 2);
 491         let as_funding_locked = if let MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } = as_msg_events[0] {
 492                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 493                 msg.clone()
 494         } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); };
 495         if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, msg: _ } = as_msg_events[1] {
 496                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 497         } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
 498
 499         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked);
 500         let bs_msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 501         assert_eq!(bs_msg_events.len(), 1);
 502         if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, msg: _ } = bs_msg_events[0] {
 503                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 504         } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
 505
 506         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
 507
 508         // After 6 confirmations, as required by the spec, we'll send announcement_signatures and
 509         // broadcast the channel_announcement (but not before exactly 6 confirmations).
 510         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
 511         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 512         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
 513         nodes[1].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
 514         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 515
 516         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
 517         let bs_announce_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 518         assert_eq!(bs_announce_events.len(), 2);
 519         let bs_announcement_sigs = if let MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } = bs_announce_events[0] {
 520                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 521                 msg.clone()
 522         } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); };
 523         let (bs_announcement, bs_update) = if let MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } = bs_announce_events[1] {
 524                 (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
 525         } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); };
 526
 527         nodes[0].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs);
 528         let as_announce_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 529         assert_eq!(as_announce_events.len(), 1);
 530         let (announcement, as_update) = if let MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } = as_announce_events[0] {
 531                 (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
 532         } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); };
 533         assert_eq!(announcement, bs_announcement);
 534
 535         for node in nodes {
 536                 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
 537                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
 538                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
 539         }
 540 }
 541 #[test]
 542 fn test_1_conf_open() {
 543         do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst);
 544         do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirst);
 545         do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
 546 }
 547
 548 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
 549         // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
 550         // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
 551         // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
 552         // Node objects.
 553
 554         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 555         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 556         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 557         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 558
 559         if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
 560                 let block = Block {
 561                         header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
 562                         txdata: vec![],
 563                 };
 564                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
 565                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
 566         }
 567
 568         if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
 569         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
 570         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 571
 572         if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
 573         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
 574         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 575
 576         if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
 577         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
 578
 579         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
 580
 581         if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
 582         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
 583         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 584         let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 585
 586         if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
 587         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
 588         {
 589                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 590                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 591                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 592                 added_monitors.clear();
 593         }
 594         let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 595
 596         if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
 597         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
 598         {
 599                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 600                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 601                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 602                 added_monitors.clear();
 603         }
 604
 605         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 606         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
 607
 608         if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
 609         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
 610
 611         if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
 612         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
 613         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
 614         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
 615 }
 616
 617 #[test]
 618 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
 619         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
 620         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
 621         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
 622         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
 623         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
 624         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
 625         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
 626         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
 627         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
 628         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
 629         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
 630         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
 631         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
 632         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
 633         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
 634         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
 635         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
 636         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
 637 }
 638
 639 #[test]
 640 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
 641         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 642         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 643         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 644         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 645         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 646
 647         {
 648                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 649                 *feerate_lock += 25;
 650         }
 651         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 652         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 653
 654         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 655         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 656         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 657                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 658                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 659                 },
 660                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 661         };
 662         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 663
 664         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 665         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 666         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 667
 668         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 669         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 670         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 671
 672         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 673         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 674         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 675         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 676
 677         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 678         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 679         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 680 }
 681
 682 #[test]
 683 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
 684         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 685         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 686         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 687         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 688         let channel_value = 5000;
 689         let push_sats = 700;
 690         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 691         let channel_id = chan.2;
 692         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 693         let bs_channel_reserve_sats = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value);
 694
 695         let opt_anchors = false;
 696
 697         // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
 698         // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
 699         // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
 700         // remote limit.
 701         let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
 702         let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors)) as u32;
 703         {
 704                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 705                 *feerate_lock = feerate;
 706         }
 707         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 708         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 709         let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 710
 711         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
 712
 713         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
 714
 715         // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
 716         {
 717                 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
 718
 719                 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
 720                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
 721                 let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000;
 722                 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
 723                 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
 724                 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
 725         }
 726
 727         {
 728                 // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
 729                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 730                 *feerate_lock += 4;
 731         }
 732         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 733         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
 734         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 735
 736         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
 737
 738         // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
 739         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
 740         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
 741                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 742                 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 743                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 744                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
 745                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 746                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 747         };
 748         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
 749                 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 750                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 751                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
 752                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
 753                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 754                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
 755                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 756         };
 757
 758         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
 759         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
 760                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
 761
 762         let res = {
 763                 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 764                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 765                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 766                 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
 767                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
 768                         INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
 769                         push_sats,
 770                         channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000,
 771                         opt_anchors, local_funding, remote_funding,
 772                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
 773                         non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 774                         &mut htlcs,
 775                         &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
 776                 );
 777                 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
 778         };
 779
 780         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
 781                 channel_id: chan.2,
 782                 signature: res.0,
 783                 htlc_signatures: res.1
 784         };
 785
 786         let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
 787                 channel_id: chan.2,
 788                 feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 789         };
 790
 791         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
 792
 793         //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
 794         //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
 795         //Should produce and error.
 796         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
 797         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
 798         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 799         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 800         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") });
 801 }
 802
 803 #[test]
 804 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
 805         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 806         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 807         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 808         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 809         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 810
 811         // balancing
 812         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 813
 814         {
 815                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 816                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 817         }
 818         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 819         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 820
 821         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 822         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 823         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 824                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 825                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 826                 },
 827                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 828         };
 829         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 830         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 831         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 832         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 833
 834         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
 835
 836         // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
 837         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
 838         {
 839                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 840                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
 841                 added_monitors.clear();
 842         }
 843         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 844         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 845         // node[1] has nothing to do
 846
 847         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 848         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 849         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 850
 851         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 852         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 853         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 854         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 855         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 856         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 857         // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
 858
 859         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 860         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
 861         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
 862         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
 863         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
 864         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
 865
 866         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
 867         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 868         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 869         let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 870
 871         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 872         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 873         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 874
 875         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 876         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 877         let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 878         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 879
 880         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 881         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 882         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 883
 884         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
 885
 886         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 887         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
 888         match events[0] {
 889                 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
 890                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 891         };
 892
 893         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
 894
 895         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
 896         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
 897         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 898         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 899         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 900 }
 901
 902 #[test]
 903 fn test_update_fee() {
 904         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 905         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 906         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 907         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 908         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 909         let channel_id = chan.2;
 910
 911         // A                                        B
 912         // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 913         //                                       <- (2) revoke_and_ack
 914         //                                       .- send (3) commitment_signed
 915         // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 916         //                                       .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
 917         //                                       <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
 918         // send (6) revoke_and_ack               -.
 919         //                                       <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
 920         // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack            ->
 921         //                                       .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
 922         //                                       <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
 923         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 924
 925         // Create and deliver (1)...
 926         let feerate;
 927         {
 928                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 929                 feerate = *feerate_lock;
 930                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
 931         }
 932         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 933         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 934
 935         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 936         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 937         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 938                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 939                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 940                 },
 941                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 942         };
 943         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 944
 945         // Generate (2) and (3):
 946         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 947         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 948         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 949
 950         // Deliver (2):
 951         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 952         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 953         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 954
 955         // Create and deliver (4)...
 956         {
 957                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 958                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
 959         }
 960         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 961         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 962         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 963         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 964         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 965                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 966                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 967                 },
 968                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 969         };
 970
 971         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 972         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 973         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 974         // ... creating (5)
 975         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 976         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 977
 978         // Handle (3), creating (6):
 979         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
 980         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 981         let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 982         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 983
 984         // Deliver (5):
 985         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 986         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 987         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 988
 989         // Deliver (6), creating (7):
 990         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
 991         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 992         assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 993         assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 994         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 995         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 996         assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
 997         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 998
 999         // Deliver (7)
1000         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
1001         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1002         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1003         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1004
1005         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
1006         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1007         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1008
1009         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
1010         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
1011         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
1012         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1013         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1014 }
1015
1016 #[test]
1017 fn fake_network_test() {
1018         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
1019         // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
1020         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
1021         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
1022         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
1023         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1024
1025         // Create some initial channels
1026         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1027         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1028         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1029
1030         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
1031         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1032         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1033         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1034         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1035
1036         // Send some more payments
1037         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1038         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
1039         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
1040
1041         // Test failure packets
1042         let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
1043         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
1044
1045         // Add a new channel that skips 3
1046         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1047
1048         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1049         send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1050         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1051         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1052         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1053         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1054         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1055
1056         // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
1057         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1058         hops.push(RouteHop {
1059                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1060                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1061                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1062                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1063                 fee_msat: 0,
1064                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1065         });
1066         hops.push(RouteHop {
1067                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1068                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1069                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1070                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1071                 fee_msat: 0,
1072                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1073         });
1074         hops.push(RouteHop {
1075                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1076                 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1077                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1078                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1079                 fee_msat: 1000000,
1080                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1081         });
1082         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1083         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1084         let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
1085
1086         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1087         hops.push(RouteHop {
1088                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1089                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1090                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1091                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1092                 fee_msat: 0,
1093                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1094         });
1095         hops.push(RouteHop {
1096                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1097                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1098                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1099                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1100                 fee_msat: 0,
1101                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1102         });
1103         hops.push(RouteHop {
1104                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1105                 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1106                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1107                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1108                 fee_msat: 1000000,
1109                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1110         });
1111         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1112         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1113         let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1114
1115         // Claim the rebalances...
1116         fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1117         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1118
1119         // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
1120         let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1121
1122         // Send some payments across both channels
1123         let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1124         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1125         let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1126
1127
1128         route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
1129         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1130         assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1131         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap(), 1);
1132
1133         //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
1134
1135         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
1136         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
1137         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
1138
1139         // Close down the channels...
1140         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1141         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1142         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1143         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1144         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1145         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1146         close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1147         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1148         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1149         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1150         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1151         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1152         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
1153         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1154         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1155 }
1156
1157 #[test]
1158 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1159         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1160         // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1161         // commitment dance rounds.
1162         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1163         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1164         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1165         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1166         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1167         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1168
1169         let mut payments = Vec::new();
1170         for _ in 0..::ln::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
1171                 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1172                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
1173                 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1174         }
1175         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1176
1177         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1178         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1179         let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1180         assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1181
1182         // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1183         // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1184         // another HTLC.
1185         let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1186         {
1187                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1188                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1189                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1190                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
1191         }
1192
1193         // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1194         let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1195         {
1196                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
1197                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1198         }
1199
1200         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1201         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1202         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1203         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1204
1205         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1206         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1207         // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1208         // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1209         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1210         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1211         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1212
1213         let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1214         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1215         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1216
1217         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1218
1219         // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1220         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1221         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1222         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1223
1224         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1225         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1226         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1227         let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1228
1229         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1230         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1231         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1232
1233         for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1234                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1235         }
1236         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1237         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1238         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1239         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1240         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1241
1242         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1243         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1244         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1245         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1246         let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1247
1248         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1249         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1250
1251         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1252
1253         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1254         assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1255         for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1256                 match event {
1257                         &Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1258                                 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1259                         },
1260                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1261                 };
1262         }
1263
1264         for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1265                 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1266         }
1267
1268         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1269 }
1270
1271 #[test]
1272 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1273         // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1274         // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1275         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1276         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1277         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1278         let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1279
1280         // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1281         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1282         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1283         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1284         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1285         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1286
1287         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1288
1289         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1290         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1291
1292         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1293         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1294
1295         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1296         fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1297         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1298 }
1299
1300 #[test]
1301 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1302         // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1303         // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1304         // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1305         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1306         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1307         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1308         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1309
1310         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1311
1312         // balancing
1313         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1314
1315         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1316
1317         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1318         let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
1319         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1320
1321         // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1322         nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1323         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1324
1325         // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1326         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1327
1328         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1329         let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1330         for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1331                 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1332                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1333                 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1334                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1335                 }
1336         }
1337         assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1338
1339         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1340         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1341         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1342         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1343
1344         // Check we only broadcast 1 timeout tx
1345         let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1346         assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 8);
1347         assert_eq!(claim_txn[1], claim_txn[4]);
1348         assert_eq!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[5]);
1349         check_spends!(claim_txn[1], chan_1.3);
1350         check_spends!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[1]);
1351         check_spends!(claim_txn[7], claim_txn[1]);
1352
1353         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1354         assert_eq!(claim_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
1355         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, claim_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
1356
1357         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1358         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1359         check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
1360         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1361         assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
1362         assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1363         check_spends!(claim_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
1364         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1365
1366         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1367         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1368         for e in events {
1369                 match e {
1370                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1371                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
1372                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1373                                 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1374                         },
1375                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1376                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1377                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1378                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1379                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1380                                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1381                         },
1382                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1383                 }
1384         }
1385 }
1386
1387 #[test]
1388 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1389         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1390         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1391         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1392         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1393         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1394
1395         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1396         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1397
1398         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1399         let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2), 1 + 1, get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2));
1400         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1401         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send + 1);
1402         let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).err().unwrap();
1403         match err {
1404                 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(ref fails) => {
1405                         match &fails[0] {
1406                                 &APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ref err} =>
1407                                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)),
1408                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1409                         }
1410                 },
1411                 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1412         }
1413         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1414         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1415
1416         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1417 }
1418
1419 #[test]
1420 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1421         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1422         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1423         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1424         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1425         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1426
1427         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460001);
1428         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1429         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1430         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1431
1432         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1433
1434         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1435         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3460001, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1436         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1437         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1438                 channel_id: chan.2,
1439                 htlc_id: 0,
1440                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1441                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1442                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1443                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1444         };
1445
1446         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1447
1448         // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1449         // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1450         // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1451
1452         let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1453
1454         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1455
1456         // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1457         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1458         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1459                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1460                 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1461                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1462                 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1463                 chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1464
1465                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1466                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1467                  chan_signer.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1468                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1469                  chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1470         };
1471         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1472                 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1473                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1474                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1475                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1476                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1477                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1478                  chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1479         };
1480
1481         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1482         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1483                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
1484
1485         // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1486         // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1487         let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1488
1489         let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1490                 offered: false,
1491                 amount_msat: 3460001,
1492                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1493                 payment_hash,
1494                 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1495         };
1496
1497         let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1498
1499         let res = {
1500                 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1501                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1502                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1503                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1504                         commitment_number,
1505                         95000,
1506                         local_chan_balance,
1507                         local_chan.opt_anchors(), local_funding, remote_funding,
1508                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1509                         feerate_per_kw,
1510                         &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1511                         &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1512                 );
1513                 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1514         };
1515
1516         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1517                 channel_id: chan.2,
1518                 signature: res.0,
1519                 htlc_signatures: res.1
1520         };
1521
1522         // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1523         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1524         let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1525
1526         // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1527         let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1528                 channel_id: chan.2,
1529                 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1530                 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point
1531         };
1532         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1533
1534         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1535         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1536         // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1537         match events[0] {
1538                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1539                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1540                         update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1541                 },
1542                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1543         };
1544         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1545                 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", ::hex::encode(raa_msg.channel_id)), 1);
1546
1547         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1548 }
1549
1550 #[test]
1551 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1552         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1553         // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1554         // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1555         // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1556         // this situation.
1557         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1558         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1559         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1560         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1561
1562         let opt_anchors = false;
1563
1564         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1565         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1566         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1567
1568         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1569
1570         // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1571         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1572                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1573         }
1574
1575         // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1576         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1577         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1578                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1579         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1580         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1581 }
1582
1583 #[test]
1584 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1585         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1586         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1587         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1588         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1589         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1590
1591         let opt_anchors = false;
1592
1593         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1594         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1595         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1596         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1597         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1598         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1599         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1600
1601         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1602         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1603                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1604         }
1605
1606         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 700_000);
1607         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1608         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1609         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1610         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1611         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1612         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 700_000, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1613         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1614         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1615                 channel_id: chan.2,
1616                 htlc_id: MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64,
1617                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1618                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1619                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1620                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1621         };
1622
1623         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1624         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1625         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1626         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1627         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1628         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1629         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1630         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() });
1631 }
1632
1633 #[test]
1634 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1635         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1636         // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1637         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1638         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1639
1640         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1641         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1642         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1643
1644         let opt_anchors = false;
1645
1646         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1647         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1648         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1649         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1650         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1651         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1652         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1653
1654         let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1655                 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1656         // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1657         // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1658         // commitment transaction fee.
1659         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1660
1661         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1662         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1663                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1664         }
1665
1666         // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1667         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt + 1);
1668         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1669                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1670 }
1671
1672 #[test]
1673 fn test_chan_init_feerate_unaffordability() {
1674         // Test that we will reject channel opens which do not leave enough to pay for any HTLCs due to
1675         // channel reserve and feerate requirements.
1676         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1677         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1678         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1679         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1680         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1681
1682         let opt_anchors = false;
1683
1684         // Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
1685         // HTLC.
1686         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1687         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1688         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None).unwrap_err(),
1689                 APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
1690
1691         // During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
1692         // requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
1693         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1694         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None).unwrap();
1695         let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1696         open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
1697         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg);
1698
1699         let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1700         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
1701         match msg_events[0] {
1702                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
1703                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve");
1704                 },
1705                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1706         }
1707 }
1708
1709 #[test]
1710 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1711         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1712         // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1713         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1714         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1715         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1716         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1717         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1718
1719         let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1720         // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1721         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1722         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1723         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1724         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1725
1726         // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1727         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1728         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1729         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1730         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1731         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1732
1733         // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1734         // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1735         // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1736         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1737 }
1738
1739 #[test]
1740 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1741         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1742         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1743         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1744         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1745         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1746         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1747
1748         let feemsat = 239;
1749         let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1750         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1751         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1752         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1753
1754         // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1755         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1756         let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1757         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1758
1759         // Add a pending HTLC.
1760         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1761         let payment_event_1 = {
1762                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1763                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1764
1765                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1766                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1767                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1768         };
1769         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1770
1771         // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1772         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2, opt_anchors);
1773         let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1774         let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1775         let (route_2, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_2);
1776
1777         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1778         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1779         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1780         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1781         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1782         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, &None, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1783         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1);
1784         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1785                 channel_id: chan.2,
1786                 htlc_id: 1,
1787                 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1788                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1789                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1790                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1791         };
1792
1793         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1794         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1795         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1796         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1797         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1798         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1799         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1800         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() });
1801 }
1802
1803 #[test]
1804 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1805         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1806         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1807         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1808         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1809         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1810         let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1811         let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1812         assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1813         assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1814
1815         let reserve = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100000);
1816         assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1817         assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1818
1819         assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1820         assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1821 }
1822
1823 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
1824         (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1825 }
1826
1827 #[test]
1828 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1829         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1830         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1831         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1832         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1833         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1834         config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1835         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1836         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1837         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1838         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1839
1840         let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1841         let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1842
1843         let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1844         let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1845
1846         macro_rules! expect_forward {
1847                 ($node: expr) => {{
1848                         let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1849                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1850                         check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1851                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1852                         payment_event
1853                 }}
1854         }
1855
1856         let feemsat = 239; // set above
1857         let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1858         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1859         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1860
1861         let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1862
1863         // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1864         {
1865                 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_0);
1866                 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1867                 assert!(route.paths[0].iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1868                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1869                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1870                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1871                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
1872         }
1873
1874         // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1875         // nodes[0]'s wealth
1876         loop {
1877                 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1878                 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1879                 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1880                 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1881                 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1882                 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1883                 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1884                         break;
1885                 }
1886                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
1887
1888                 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1889                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1890                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1891                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1892                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1893                 );
1894
1895                 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1896                 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1897                 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1898                 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1899                 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1900         }
1901
1902         // adding pending output.
1903         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1904         // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1905         // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1906         // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1907         // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1908         // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1909         // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1910         // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1911         // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1912         // policy.
1913         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1914         let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1915         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1916
1917         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1918         let payment_event_1 = {
1919                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1920                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1921
1922                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1923                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1924                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1925         };
1926         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1927
1928         // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1929         let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1930         {
1931                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_2 + 1);
1932                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1933                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1934                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1935         }
1936
1937         // split the rest to test holding cell
1938         let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1939         let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1940         let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1941         let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1942         {
1943                 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1944                 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1945         }
1946
1947         // now see if they go through on both sides
1948         let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1949         // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1950         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21, &Some(our_payment_secret_21)).unwrap();
1951         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1952         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1953         assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1954
1955         // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1956         {
1957                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22+1);
1958                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1959                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1960                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1961                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 2);
1962         }
1963
1964         let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1965         // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1966         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22, &Some(our_payment_secret_22)).unwrap();
1967         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1968         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1969         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1970
1971         // flush the pending htlc
1972         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1973         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1974         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1975
1976         // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1977         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1978         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1979         let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1980
1981         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
1982         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1983         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1984         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1985
1986         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1987         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1988         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1989
1990         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1991
1992         let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1993         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
1994         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
1995
1996         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1997         expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
1998
1999         // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
2000         assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
2001         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
2002         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
2003         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
2004         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2005
2006         let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
2007         assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
2008         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
2009         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
2010
2011         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
2012         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2013
2014         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2015         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2016         match events[0] {
2017                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
2018                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
2019                         assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
2020                         match &purpose {
2021                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
2022                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
2023                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
2024                                 },
2025                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
2026                         }
2027                 },
2028                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2029         }
2030         match events[1] {
2031                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
2032                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
2033                         assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
2034                         match &purpose {
2035                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
2036                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
2037                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
2038                                 },
2039                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
2040                         }
2041                 },
2042                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2043         }
2044
2045         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
2046         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
2047         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
2048
2049         let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1, opt_anchors);
2050         let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
2051         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
2052
2053         let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
2054         let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
2055         let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2056         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
2057         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
2058
2059         let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2060         assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
2061 }
2062
2063 #[test]
2064 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
2065         // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
2066         // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
2067         // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
2068         // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
2069         // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
2070         // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
2071         // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
2072         // To test this we:
2073         //  * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
2074         //    you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
2075         //    you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
2076         //  * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
2077         //  * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
2078         //    the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
2079         //  * deliver the first fulfill from B
2080         //  * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
2081         //    claim,
2082         //  * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
2083         //    This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
2084         //    removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
2085         //  * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
2086         //    of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
2087         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2088         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2089         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2090         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2091         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2092
2093         let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2094         // Route the first two HTLCs.
2095         let (payment_preimage_1, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000);
2096         let (payment_preimage_2, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20000);
2097
2098         // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
2099         let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
2100         let send_1 = {
2101                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_3, &Some(payment_secret_3)).unwrap();
2102                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2103                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2104                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2105                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2106         };
2107
2108         // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
2109         // initial fulfill/CS.
2110         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
2111         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2112         let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2113
2114         // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
2115         // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
2116         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2));
2117         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2118         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2119
2120         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2121         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
2122         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2123         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2124         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
2125
2126         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
2127         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
2128         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2129         // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
2130         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2131
2132         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2133         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2134         let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2135
2136         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2137         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2138         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2139
2140         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2141         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2142         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2143
2144         // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
2145         // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2146         // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
2147         // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
2148         // on-chain as necessary).
2149         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2150         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
2151         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2152         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2153         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
2154
2155         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2156         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2157         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2158
2159         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2160         expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2161
2162         // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2163         // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2164         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2165         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2166         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2167         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2168
2169         // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2170         // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2171         let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2172         let send_2 = {
2173                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_4, &Some(payment_secret_4)).unwrap();
2174                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2175                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2176                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2177                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2178         };
2179
2180         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2181         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2182         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2183         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2184
2185         // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2186
2187         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2188         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2189         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2190
2191         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2192         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2193
2194         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2195         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2196         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2197         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2198
2199         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2200         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2201         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2202
2203         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2204         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2205
2206         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2207         expect_payment_received!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2208
2209         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2210         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2211 }
2212
2213 #[test]
2214 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2215         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2216         // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2217         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2218         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2219         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2220         let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2221
2222         // Create some initial channels
2223         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2224         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2225         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2226         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2227
2228         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2229         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2230         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2231         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2232         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2233         connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2234
2235         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2236         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2237         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2238         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2239         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2240
2241         // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2242         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2243         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2244         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
2245         {
2246                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2247                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2248                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2249                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2250                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2251         }
2252         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2253         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2254         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2255         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2256         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2257
2258         // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2259         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2260
2261         // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2262         // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2263         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2264         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
2265         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2266         {
2267                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2268                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2269                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2270                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2271                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2272                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2273         }
2274         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2275         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2276         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2277         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2278         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2279
2280         macro_rules! claim_funds {
2281                 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
2282                         {
2283                                 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
2284                                 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2285
2286                                 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2287                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2288                                 match events[0] {
2289                                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2290                                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2291                                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2292                                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2293                                         },
2294                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2295                                 };
2296                         }
2297                 }
2298         }
2299
2300         // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2301         // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2302         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2303         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2304         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], false);
2305         let node2_commitment_txid;
2306         {
2307                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2308                 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2309                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2310                 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2311
2312                 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2313                 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
2314                 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2315                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2316                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2317         }
2318         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2319         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2320         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2321         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2322         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2323
2324         // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2325         // confusing us in the following tests.
2326         let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2327
2328         // One pending HTLC to time out:
2329         let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
2330         // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2331         // buffer space).
2332
2333         let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2334                 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2335                 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2336                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2337                 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2338                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2339                                 msg.clone()
2340                         },
2341                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2342                 };
2343                 match events[1] {
2344                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2345                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2346                         },
2347                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2348                 }
2349                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2350
2351                 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2352                 {
2353                         let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2354                         node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2355                                 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2356                                         false
2357                                 } else { true }
2358                         });
2359                 }
2360
2361                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2362
2363                 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2364                 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
2365
2366                 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2367                 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2368                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2369                 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2370                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2371                                 msg.clone()
2372                         },
2373                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2374                 };
2375                 match events[1] {
2376                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2377                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2378                         },
2379                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2380                 }
2381                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2382                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2383
2384                 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2385                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2386                 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2387         };
2388         nodes[3].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2389         nodes[4].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2390         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2391         assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2392
2393         nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon).unwrap();
2394         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2395         check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2396 }
2397
2398 #[test]
2399 fn test_justice_tx() {
2400         // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2401         let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2402         alice_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
2403         alice_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2404         alice_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2405         let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2406         bob_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
2407         bob_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2408         bob_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2409         let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2410         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2411         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2412         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2413         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2414         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2415         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2416         // Create some new channels:
2417         let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2418
2419         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2420         let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2421         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2422         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2423         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2424         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2425         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2426         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2427         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2428         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2429         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2430         // Revoke the old state
2431         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2432
2433         {
2434                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2435                 {
2436                         let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2437                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2438                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2439
2440                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2441                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2442                         node_txn.truncate(1);
2443                 }
2444                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2445                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2446                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2447
2448                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2449                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2450                 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2451                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2452                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2453                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2454                 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2455                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2456                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2457         }
2458         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2459
2460         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2461         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2462
2463         // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
2464         // Create some new channels:
2465         let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2466         {
2467                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2468                 node_txn.clear();
2469         }
2470
2471         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2472         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2473         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2474         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2475         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2476         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2477         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2478         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2479         // Revoke the old state
2480         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2481         {
2482                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2483                 {
2484                         let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2485                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); //ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2486                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2487
2488                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2489                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2490                 }
2491                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2492                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2493
2494                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2495                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2496                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2497                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2498                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2499                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2500                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2501         }
2502         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2503         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2504         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2505 }
2506
2507 #[test]
2508 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2509         // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2510         // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2511         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2512         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2513         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2514         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2515         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2516         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2517         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2518         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2519         // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2520         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2521         // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2522         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2523
2524         // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2525         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2526         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2527         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2528         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2529         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2530
2531         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2532         check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
2533
2534         // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2535         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2536         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2537         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2538         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2539 }
2540
2541 #[test]
2542 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2543         // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2544         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2545         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2546         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2547         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2548         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2549
2550         // Create some new channel:
2551         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2552
2553         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2554         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2555         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2556         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2557         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2558
2559         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2560         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2561         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2562         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2563         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2564         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2565         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2566         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2567         check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2568
2569         //Revoke the old state
2570         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2571
2572         {
2573                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2574                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2575                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2576                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2577                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2578                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2579                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2580                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2581
2582                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2583                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment
2584
2585                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2586                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2587
2588                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2589                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2590                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2591                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2592                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2593                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2594                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2595                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2596
2597                 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
2598                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2599                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
2600         }
2601         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2602         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2603         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2604 }
2605
2606 #[test]
2607 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2608         // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2609         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2610         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2611         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2612         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2613         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2614
2615         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2616
2617         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2618         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2619         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2620         // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2621         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2622         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2623
2624         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2625         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2626
2627         //Revoke the old state
2628         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2629
2630         {
2631                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2632                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2633                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2634                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2635                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2636                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2637                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2638                 match events[1] {
2639                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2640                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2641                 }
2642
2643                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2644                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2645
2646                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2647                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 9);
2648                 // ChannelMonitor: justice tx revoked offered htlc, justice tx revoked received htlc, justice tx revoked to_local (3)
2649                 // ChannelManager: local commmitment + local HTLC-timeout (2)
2650                 // ChannelMonitor: bumped justice tx, after one increase, bumps on HTLC aren't generated not being substantial anymore, bump on revoked to_local isn't generated due to more room for expiration (2)
2651                 // ChannelMonitor: local commitment + local HTLC-timeout (2)
2652
2653                 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2654                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2655                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2656                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2657                 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2658                 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2659                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2660
2661                 // Justice transactions are indices 1-2-4
2662                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2663                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
2664                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
2665
2666                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2667                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2668                 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2669
2670                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2671                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2672                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2673                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2674                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2675                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2676                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2677                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2678         }
2679         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2680         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2681         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2682 }
2683
2684 #[test]
2685 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2686         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2687         // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2688         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2689         // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2690         // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2691         // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2692         // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2693         // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2694         // towards B.
2695         // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2696         // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2697         // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2698         // PaymentSent event).
2699
2700         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2701         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2702         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2703         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2704
2705         // Create some initial channels
2706         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2707         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2708
2709         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2710         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2711         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2712         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2713         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2714
2715         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2716         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2717         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2718
2719         let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2720         let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2721
2722         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2723         // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2724         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2725         assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2726         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2727         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2728         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2729         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2730         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2731         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2732         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2733         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2734         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2735
2736         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2737         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2738         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2739         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2740         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx, 2*htlc-success tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2741         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5);
2742         assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2743         assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2744         assert_eq!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2745         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2746         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2747         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2748         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2749         assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2750         assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2751         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
2752         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2753
2754         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2755         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2756         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: node_txn});
2757         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2758         {
2759                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2760                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2761                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2762                 added_monitors.clear();
2763         }
2764         let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2765         assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2766         match forwarded_events[0] {
2767                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2768                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2769         }
2770         if let Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat: Some(1000), claim_from_onchain_tx: true } = forwarded_events[1] {
2771                 } else { panic!(); }
2772         if let Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat: Some(1000), claim_from_onchain_tx: true } = forwarded_events[2] {
2773                 } else { panic!(); }
2774         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2775         {
2776                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2777                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2778                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2779                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2780                 added_monitors.clear();
2781         }
2782         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2783         match events[0] {
2784                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2785                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2786         }
2787         match events[1] {
2788                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2789                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2790         }
2791
2792         match events[2] {
2793                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2794                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2795                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2796                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2797                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2798                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2799                 },
2800                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2801         };
2802         macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2803                 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $chan_tx: expr) => { {
2804                         let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2805                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
2806                         // Node[1]: ChannelManager: 3 (commitment tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (timeout tx)
2807                         // Node[0]: ChannelManager: 3 (commtiemtn tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 HTLC-timeout
2808                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2809                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], $commitment_tx);
2810                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2811                         assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time, 0);
2812                         if $htlc_offered {
2813                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2814                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2815                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2816                                 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2817                         } else {
2818                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2819                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2820                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2821                                 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2822                         }
2823                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], $chan_tx);
2824                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2825                         node_txn.clear();
2826                 } }
2827         }
2828         // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own local state as a fallback, suggesting an alternate
2829         // commitment transaction with a corresponding HTLC-Timeout transactions, as well as a
2830         // timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2831         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2832
2833         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2834         // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx  on A's chain
2835         let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2836         check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2837         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2838         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2839         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2840         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2841         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2842         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 6); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx + HTLC-Sucess * 2), ChannelMonitor : 3 (HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn)
2843         let commitment_spend =
2844                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2845                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2846                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2847                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2848                         &node_txn[0]
2849                 } else {
2850                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2851                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2852                         assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2853                         &node_txn[2]
2854                 };
2855
2856         check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2857         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2858         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2859         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2860         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time, 0);
2861         assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2862         check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3);
2863         assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2864         check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[3]);
2865         check_spends!(node_txn[5], node_txn[3]);
2866         // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
2867         // we already checked the same situation with A.
2868
2869         // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
2870         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2871         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()] });
2872         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2873         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2874         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2875         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2876         assert_eq!(events.len(), 5);
2877         let mut first_claimed = false;
2878         for event in events {
2879                 match event {
2880                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
2881                                 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
2882                                         assert!(!first_claimed);
2883                                         first_claimed = true;
2884                                 } else {
2885                                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
2886                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
2887                                 }
2888                         },
2889                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
2890                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
2891                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2892                 }
2893         }
2894         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2895 }
2896
2897 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
2898         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
2899         // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2900         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2901         // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
2902         //    B's commitment tx                 C's commitment tx
2903         //            \                                  \
2904         //         B's HTLC timeout tx               B's timeout tx
2905
2906         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2907         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2908         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2909         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2910         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2911         *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2912         *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2913
2914         // Create some intial channels
2915         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2916         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2917
2918         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
2919         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2920         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2921
2922         let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2923
2924         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2925         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2926         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2927         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
2928         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
2929         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2930         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2931
2932         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2933         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2934         match events[0] {
2935                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2936                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2937                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2938                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2939                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2940                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2941                 },
2942                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2943         };
2944         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2945         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2946         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2947         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2948         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx)
2949         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2950         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2951         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2952
2953         // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2954         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
2955         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2956         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
2957         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2958         let timeout_tx;
2959         {
2960                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2961                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-timeout), 1 timeout tx
2962                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2963                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2964
2965                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2966                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2967
2968                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2969                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2970                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2971                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2972
2973                 timeout_tx = node_txn[2].clone();
2974                 node_txn.clear();
2975         }
2976
2977         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
2978         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2979         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2980         {
2981                 // B will rebroadcast a fee-bumped timeout transaction here.
2982                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2983                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2984                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2985         }
2986
2987         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2988         {
2989                 // B may rebroadcast its own holder commitment transaction here, as a safeguard against
2990                 // some incredibly unlikely partial-eclipse-attack scenarios. That said, because the
2991                 // original commitment_tx[0] (also spending chan_2.3) has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY B really
2992                 // shouldn't broadcast anything here, and in some connect style scenarios we do not.
2993                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2994                 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
2995                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2996                 } else {
2997                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
2998                 }
2999         }
3000
3001         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3002         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3003         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3004         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3005         match events[0] {
3006                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3007                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3008                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3009                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3010                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3011                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3012                 },
3013                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3014         };
3015
3016         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
3017         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
3018         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
3019
3020         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
3021         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
3022
3023         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3024         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3025         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3026         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 commitment tx, ChannelMonitor : 1 timeout tx
3027         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
3028         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
3029         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
3030         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
3031         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3032 }
3033
3034 #[test]
3035 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
3036         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
3037         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
3038         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
3039 }
3040
3041 #[test]
3042 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
3043         // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
3044         // and fail backward accordingly.
3045
3046         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3047         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3048         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3049         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3050
3051         // Create some initial channels
3052         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3053         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3054
3055         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3056         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3057         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3058         // Revoke the old state
3059         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3060
3061         let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3062
3063         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3064         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3065         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3066         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3067         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3068
3069         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3070         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3071         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3072         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3073         match events[0] {
3074                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3075                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3076                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3077                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3078                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3079                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3080
3081                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3082                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3083                         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
3084                 },
3085                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3086         }
3087 }
3088
3089 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
3090         // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
3091         // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
3092         // commitment transaction anymore.
3093         // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
3094         // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
3095         // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
3096         // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
3097         // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
3098         // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
3099         // transactions:
3100         // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
3101         //   commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
3102         // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
3103         //   and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
3104         //   commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
3105         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3106         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3107         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3108         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3109
3110         // Create some initial channels
3111         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3112         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3113
3114         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
3115         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3116         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3117         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
3118         // Revoke the old state
3119         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3120
3121         let value = if use_dust {
3122                 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
3123                 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
3124                 nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
3125         } else { 3000000 };
3126
3127         let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3128         let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3129         let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3130
3131         assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash));
3132         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3133         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3134         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3135         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3136         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3137         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3138         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3139         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3140         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3141         let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
3142         // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
3143
3144         assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash));
3145         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3146         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3147         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3148         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3149         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3150         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3151         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3152         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3153         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3154         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3155         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3156         // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3157         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3158         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3159         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3160
3161         assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash));
3162         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3163         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3164         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3165         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3166         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3167         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3168         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3169         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3170         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3171         // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3172         // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3173         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3174         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3175         // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3176         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3177         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3178         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3179
3180         // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3181         // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3182         let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3183         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, fourth_payment_hash, &Some(fourth_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3184         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3185         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3186         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3187
3188         if deliver_bs_raa {
3189                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3190                 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3191                 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3192                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3193                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3194                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3195                 match events[0] {
3196                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3197                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3198                 };
3199                 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3200                 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3201         }
3202
3203         let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
3204         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3205
3206         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3207         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3208         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3209         assert!(ANTI_REORG_DELAY > PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS); // We assume payments will also expire
3210
3211         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3212         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 4 });
3213         match events[0] {
3214                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
3215                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
3216         }
3217         match events[1] {
3218                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3219                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3220                 },
3221                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3222         }
3223         if !deliver_bs_raa {
3224                 match events[2] {
3225                         Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3226                                 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3227                         },
3228                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3229                 }
3230                 match events[3] {
3231                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3232                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3233                 };
3234         }
3235         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3236         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3237
3238         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3239         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3240         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 1 } else { 0 }] {
3241                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3242                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3243         }
3244         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 1 }] {
3245                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
3246                         assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3247                         assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3248                 },
3249                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3250         }
3251         if deliver_bs_raa {
3252                 match events[0] {
3253                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3254                                 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3255                                 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3256                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3257                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3258                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3259                         },
3260                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3261                 }
3262         }
3263         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 3 } else { 2 }] {
3264                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3265                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3266                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3267                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3268                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3269                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3270
3271                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3272                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3273                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3274
3275                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3276
3277                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3278                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3279                         match events[0] {
3280                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3281                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3282                                         // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3283                                         // that we should update our routing table for.
3284                                         if !deliver_bs_raa {
3285                                                 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3286                                         }
3287                                 },
3288                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3289                         }
3290                         match events[1] {
3291                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3292                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3293                                         assert!(network_update.is_some());
3294                                 },
3295                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3296                         }
3297                         match events[2] {
3298                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3299                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3300                                         assert!(network_update.is_some());
3301                                 },
3302                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3303                         }
3304                 },
3305                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3306         }
3307
3308         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3309         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3310         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3311 }
3312
3313 #[test]
3314 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3315         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3316         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3317         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3318         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3319 }
3320
3321 #[test]
3322 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3323         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3324         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3325         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3326         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3327 }
3328
3329 #[test]
3330 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3331         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3332         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3333         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3334         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3335         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3336
3337         // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3338         {
3339                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3340                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
3341                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3342
3343                 let payment_event = {
3344                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3345                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3346                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3347                 };
3348                 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3349                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3350         }
3351
3352         // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3353         let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3354         {
3355                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, failed_payment_hash, &Some(failed_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3356                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3357
3358                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3359         }
3360
3361         // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3362         {
3363                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3364
3365                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3366                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3367                 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3368                 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 50_000, &Some(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3369                 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3370                 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
3371
3372                 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3373                 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3374                         channel_id: chan.2,
3375                         htlc_id: 0,
3376                         amount_msat: 0,
3377                         payment_hash,
3378                         cltv_expiry,
3379                         onion_routing_packet,
3380                 };
3381                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3382         }
3383         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3384         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3385         // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3386         match events[0] {
3387                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3388                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3389                 },
3390                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3391         }
3392         match events[1] {
3393                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3394                         assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3395                 },
3396                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3397         }
3398         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3399         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3400 }
3401
3402 #[test]
3403 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3404         // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3405         // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3406         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3407         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3408         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3409         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3410         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3411
3412         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3413         nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id).unwrap();
3414         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3415         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3416         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3417         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3418
3419         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3420         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3421         assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
3422
3423         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3424         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
3425         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3426         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3427         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3428
3429         // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3430         // registering new transactions
3431         header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
3432         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
3433 }
3434
3435 #[test]
3436 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3437         // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3438         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3439         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3440         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3441         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3442         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3443         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3444
3445         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3446
3447         let mut payment_event = {
3448                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3449                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3450
3451                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3452                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3453                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3454         };
3455
3456         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3457         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3458
3459         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3460
3461         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3462         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3463         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3464         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3465
3466         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3467         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3468         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3469         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3470         let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3471
3472         // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3473         // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3474         // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3475
3476         nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id).unwrap();
3477         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3478         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3479         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3480         let tx = {
3481                 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3482                 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3483                 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3484                 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3485                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3486                 node_txn.remove(0)
3487         };
3488
3489         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3490
3491         // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3492         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3493         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3494         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3495
3496         // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3497         {
3498                 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3499                         .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator, &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3500         }
3501         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3502         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3503         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3504         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3505         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3506         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3507         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3508
3509         check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3510 }
3511
3512 #[test]
3513 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3514         // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3515         // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3516         // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3517         // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3518
3519         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3520         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3521         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3522         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3523         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3524
3525         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3526
3527         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
3528         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3529         let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3530         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3531         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
3532
3533         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3534         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3535
3536         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3537         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3538 }
3539
3540 #[test]
3541 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3542         // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3543         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3544         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3545         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3546         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3547         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3548         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3549
3550         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3551         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3552         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3553
3554         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3555         let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3556         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3557         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3558
3559         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3560         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3561         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3562
3563         let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3564         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3565         let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3566         let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3567
3568         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3569         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3570
3571         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3572         fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3573
3574         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
3575         {
3576                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3577                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3578                 match events[0] {
3579                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3580                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3581                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3582                         },
3583                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3584                 }
3585                 match events[1] {
3586                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
3587                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3588                                 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
3589                         },
3590                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3591                 }
3592                 match events[2] {
3593                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3594                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3595                 }
3596         }
3597
3598         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3599         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3600 }
3601
3602 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3603         // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3604         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3605         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3606         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3607         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3608
3609         let mut as_funding_locked = None;
3610         if messages_delivered == 0 {
3611                 let (funding_locked, _, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3612                 as_funding_locked = Some(funding_locked);
3613                 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3614                 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3615                 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3616         } else {
3617                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3618         }
3619
3620         let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3621
3622         let payment_event = {
3623                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
3624                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3625
3626                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3627                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3628                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3629         };
3630         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3631
3632         if messages_delivered < 2 {
3633                 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3634         } else {
3635                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3636                 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3637                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3638                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3639                         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3640
3641                         if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3642                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3643                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3644                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3645
3646                                 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3647                                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3648                                         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3649                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3650                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3651
3652                                         if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3653                                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3654                                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3655                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3656                                         }
3657                                 }
3658                         }
3659                 }
3660         }
3661
3662         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3663         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3664         if messages_delivered < 3 {
3665                 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3666                         // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a funding_locked prior to a
3667                         // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to funding_locked time.
3668                         //
3669                         // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a funding_locked immediately on
3670                         // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate funding_locked sent
3671                         // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3672                         //
3673                         // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3674                         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3675                 }
3676                 // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3677                 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3678                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3679         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3680                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3681                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3682         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3683                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3684                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3685         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3686                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3687                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3688         } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3689                 // Everything was delivered...
3690                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3691         }
3692
3693         let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3694         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3695         match events_1[0] {
3696                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3697                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3698         };
3699
3700         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3701         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3702         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3703
3704         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3705
3706         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3707         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3708         match events_2[0] {
3709                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
3710                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3711                         assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
3712                         match &purpose {
3713                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3714                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3715                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3716                                 },
3717                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3718                         }
3719                 },
3720                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3721         }
3722
3723         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3724         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3725
3726         let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3727         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3728         let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3729                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3730                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3731                         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3732                         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3733                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3734                         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3735                         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3736                         (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3737                 },
3738                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3739         };
3740
3741         if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3742                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3743
3744                 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3745                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3746                 match events_4[0] {
3747                         Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3748                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3749                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3750                         },
3751                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3752                 }
3753
3754                 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3755                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3756                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3757                         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3758
3759                         if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3760                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3761                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3762                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3763
3764                                 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3765                                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3766                                         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3767                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3768                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3769
3770                                         if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3771                                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3772                                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3773                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3774                                         }
3775                                 }
3776                         }
3777                 }
3778         }
3779
3780         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3781         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3782         if messages_delivered < 2 {
3783                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3784                 if messages_delivered < 1 {
3785                         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
3786                 } else {
3787                         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3788                 }
3789         } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
3790                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3791                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3792         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3793                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3794                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3795         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3796                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3797                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3798         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3799                 // Everything was delivered...
3800                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3801         }
3802
3803         if messages_delivered == 1 || messages_delivered == 2 {
3804                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3805         }
3806
3807         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3808         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3809         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3810
3811         if messages_delivered > 2 {
3812                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3813         }
3814
3815         // Channel should still work fine...
3816         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3817         let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3818         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3819 }
3820
3821 #[test]
3822 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
3823         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
3824         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
3825         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
3826         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
3827 }
3828
3829 #[test]
3830 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
3831         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
3832         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
3833         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
3834         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
3835 }
3836
3837 #[test]
3838 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
3839         // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
3840         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3841         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3842         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3843         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
3844         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
3845         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
3846         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3847         let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3848
3849         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3850         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3851
3852         confirm_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
3853         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3854         assert!(events_1.is_empty());
3855
3856         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3857
3858         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3859         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3860
3861         confirm_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3862         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3863         assert!(events_2.is_empty());
3864
3865         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
3866         let as_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3867         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
3868         let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3869
3870         // nodes[0] hasn't yet received a funding_locked, so it only sends that on reconnect.
3871         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
3872         let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3873         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3874         let as_funding_locked = match events_3[0] {
3875                 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3876                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3877                         msg.clone()
3878                 },
3879                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_3[0]),
3880         };
3881
3882         // nodes[1] received nodes[0]'s funding_locked on the first reconnect above, so it should send
3883         // announcement_signatures as well as channel_update.
3884         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish);
3885         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3886         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 3);
3887         let chan_id;
3888         let bs_funding_locked = match events_4[0] {
3889                 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3890                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3891                         chan_id = msg.channel_id;
3892                         msg.clone()
3893                 },
3894                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[0]),
3895         };
3896         let bs_announcement_sigs = match events_4[1] {
3897                 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3898                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3899                         msg.clone()
3900                 },
3901                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[1]),
3902         };
3903         match events_4[2] {
3904                 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
3905                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3906                 },
3907                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[2]),
3908         }
3909
3910         // Re-deliver nodes[0]'s funding_locked, which nodes[1] can safely ignore. It currently
3911         // generates a duplicative private channel_update
3912         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked);
3913         let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3914         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
3915         match events_5[0] {
3916                 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
3917                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3918                 },
3919                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_5[0]),
3920         };
3921
3922         // When we deliver nodes[1]'s funding_locked, however, nodes[0] will generate its
3923         // announcement_signatures.
3924         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_funding_locked);
3925         let events_6 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3926         assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
3927         let as_announcement_sigs = match events_6[0] {
3928                 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3929                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3930                         msg.clone()
3931                 },
3932                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_6[0]),
3933         };
3934
3935         // When we deliver nodes[1]'s announcement_signatures to nodes[0], nodes[0] should immediately
3936         // broadcast the channel announcement globally, as well as re-send its (now-public)
3937         // channel_update.
3938         nodes[0].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs);
3939         let events_7 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3940         assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
3941         let (chan_announcement, as_update) = match events_7[0] {
3942                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3943                         (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
3944                 },
3945                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_7[0]),
3946         };
3947
3948         // Finally, deliver nodes[0]'s announcement_signatures to nodes[1] and make sure it creates the
3949         // same channel_announcement.
3950         nodes[1].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs);
3951         let events_8 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3952         assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
3953         let bs_update = match events_8[0] {
3954                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3955                         assert_eq!(*msg, chan_announcement);
3956                         update_msg.clone()
3957                 },
3958                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_8[0]),
3959         };
3960
3961         // Provide the channel announcement and public updates to the network graph
3962         nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap();
3963         nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
3964         nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
3965
3966         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3967         let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3968         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
3969
3970         // Check that after deserialization and reconnection we can still generate an identical
3971         // channel_announcement from the cached signatures.
3972         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3973
3974         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
3975         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
3976         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
3977
3978         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
3979         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
3980         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[0].logger, node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
3981         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
3982         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
3983         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
3984                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
3985         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
3986
3987         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
3988         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
3989                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
3990                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
3991                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
3992                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
3993                         keys_manager,
3994                         fee_estimator: node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator,
3995                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
3996                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
3997                         logger: nodes[0].logger,
3998                         channel_monitors,
3999                 }).unwrap()
4000         };
4001         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4002         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4003
4004         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4005         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4006         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4007
4008         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4009
4010         // The channel announcement should be re-generated exactly by broadcast_node_announcement.
4011         nodes[0].node.broadcast_node_announcement([0, 0, 0], [0; 32], Vec::new());
4012         let msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4013         let mut found_announcement = false;
4014         for event in msgs.iter() {
4015                 match event {
4016                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, .. } => {
4017                                 if *msg == chan_announcement { found_announcement = true; }
4018                         },
4019                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => {},
4020                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4021                 }
4022         }
4023         assert!(found_announcement);
4024 }
4025
4026 #[test]
4027 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
4028         // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
4029         // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
4030         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4031         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4032         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4033         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4034         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4035
4036         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4037
4038         // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
4039         let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
4040         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
4041         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4042
4043         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4044         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4045         match events_1[0] {
4046                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4047                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4048         }
4049
4050         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
4051         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4052
4053         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4054         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4055         match events_2[0] {
4056                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4057                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4058                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4059                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4060                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4061                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4062                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4063
4064                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4065                         let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4066                         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
4067                         match events_3[0] {
4068                                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
4069                                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
4070                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
4071                                 },
4072                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4073                         }
4074
4075                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
4076                         let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4077                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4078                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4079                 },
4080                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4081         }
4082
4083         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4084         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4085
4086         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4087         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4088         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
4089         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4090         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4091         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
4092
4093         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4094         let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4095         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4096         let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4097
4098         assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
4099         assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
4100
4101         assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
4102         assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
4103
4104         assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
4105
4106         assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4107         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4108         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4109         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4110         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
4111         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
4112         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
4113         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4114         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4115         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4116
4117         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
4118         let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4119         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4120         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4121         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4122         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4123         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4124         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4125
4126         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
4127         let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4128         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4129         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4130         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4131         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4132         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4133         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4134
4135         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4136         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4137         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4138         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4139
4140         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4141         let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4142         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4143         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4144
4145         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
4146         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4147         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4148
4149         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4150
4151         let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4152         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
4153         match events_5[0] {
4154                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
4155                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
4156                         match &purpose {
4157                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
4158                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
4159                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
4160                                 },
4161                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
4162                         }
4163                 },
4164                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4165         }
4166
4167         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
4168         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4169         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4170
4171         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4172         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4173 }
4174
4175 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
4176         // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
4177         // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
4178         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4179         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4180         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4181         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4182
4183         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4184
4185         let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
4186                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
4187                 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
4188                 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
4189                 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
4190                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
4191                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
4192                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4193                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4194                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4195                 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
4196                 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentReceived event(s).
4197                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
4198                 our_payment_hash
4199         } else {
4200                 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
4201         };
4202
4203         let mut block = Block {
4204                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
4205                 txdata: vec![],
4206         };
4207         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4208         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4209         let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4210         for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
4211                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
4212                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4213                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4214         }
4215
4216         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4217
4218         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4219         let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4220         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4221         assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4222         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4223         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4224
4225         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4226         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4227         // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4228         let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(100_000).to_vec();
4229         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(block_count - 1));
4230         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4231 }
4232
4233 #[test]
4234 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4235         do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4236         do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4237 }
4238
4239 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4240         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4241         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4242         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4243         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4244         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4245         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4246         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4247
4248         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4249         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4250         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4251         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4252
4253         // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4254         let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4255         {
4256                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, first_payment_hash, &Some(first_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4257         }
4258         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4259         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4260
4261         // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4262         let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4263         let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4264         sending_node.node.send_payment(&route, second_payment_hash, &Some(second_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4265         if forwarded_htlc {
4266                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4267                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4268                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4269                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4270                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4271         }
4272         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4273
4274         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4275         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4276         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4277         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4278
4279         if forwarded_htlc {
4280                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4281                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4282                 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4283                 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4284                 match fail_commit[0] {
4285                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4286                                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4287                                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4288                         },
4289                         _ => unreachable!(),
4290                 }
4291                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4292         } else {
4293                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4294                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4295                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[0] {
4296                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
4297                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
4298                 if let Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[1] {
4299                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
4300                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
4301         }
4302 }
4303
4304 #[test]
4305 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4306         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4307         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4308 }
4309
4310 #[test]
4311 fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4312         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4313         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4314         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4315         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4316         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4317         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4318         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4319         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4320         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4321
4322         let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4323
4324         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4325
4326         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4327         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4328         get_monitor!(nodes[0], OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id())
4329                 .write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4330
4331         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4332         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4333         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4334         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4335         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4336         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4337         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4338         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4339                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4340         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4341
4342         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4343         let config = UserConfig::default();
4344         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4345                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4346                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4347                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4348                         default_config: config,
4349                         keys_manager,
4350                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4351                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4352                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4353                         logger: &logger,
4354                         channel_monitors,
4355                 }).unwrap()
4356         };
4357         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4358         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4359
4360         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4361         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4362         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4363         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4364
4365         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4366         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4367         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4368         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4369
4370         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4371         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4372         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4373         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4374
4375         let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4376         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
4377         for node in nodes.iter() {
4378                 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4379                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4380                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4381         }
4382
4383         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4384 }
4385
4386 #[test]
4387 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_events() {
4388         // This test makes sure the events field in ChannelManager survives de/serialization
4389         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4390         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4391         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4392         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4393         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4394         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4395         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4396         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4397         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4398
4399         // Start creating a channel, but stop right before broadcasting the funding transaction
4400         let channel_value = 100000;
4401         let push_msat = 10001;
4402         let a_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4403         let b_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4404         let node_a = nodes.remove(0);
4405         let node_b = nodes.remove(0);
4406         node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
4407         node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), a_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4408         node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), b_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id()));
4409
4410         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&node_a, channel_value, 42);
4411
4412         node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
4413         check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
4414
4415         node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4416         {
4417                 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4418                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4419                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4420                 added_monitors.clear();
4421         }
4422
4423         let bs_funding_signed = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
4424         node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_funding_signed);
4425         {
4426                 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4427                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4428                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4429                 added_monitors.clear();
4430         }
4431         // Normally, this is where node_a would broadcast the funding transaction, but the test de/serializes first instead
4432
4433         nodes.push(node_a);
4434         nodes.push(node_b);
4435
4436         // Start the de/seriailization process mid-channel creation to check that the channel manager will hold onto events that are serialized
4437         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4438         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4439         get_monitor!(nodes[0], bs_funding_signed.channel_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4440
4441         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4442         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4443         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4444         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4445         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4446         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4447         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4448         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4449                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4450         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4451
4452         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4453         let config = UserConfig::default();
4454         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4455                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4456                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4457                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4458                         default_config: config,
4459                         keys_manager,
4460                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4461                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4462                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4463                         logger: &logger,
4464                         channel_monitors,
4465                 }).unwrap()
4466         };
4467         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4468         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4469
4470         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4471
4472         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4473         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4474
4475         // After deserializing, make sure the funding_transaction is still held by the channel manager
4476         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4477         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
4478         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4479         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
4480
4481         // Make sure the channel is functioning as though the de/serialization never happened
4482         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4483         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4484
4485         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4486         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4487         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4488         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4489
4490         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4491         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4492         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4493         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4494
4495         let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4496         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
4497         for node in nodes.iter() {
4498                 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4499                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4500                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4501         }
4502
4503         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4504 }
4505
4506 #[test]
4507 fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4508         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4509         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4510         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4511         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4512         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4513         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4514         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4515         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4516         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4517         let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4518
4519         let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4520         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4521
4522         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4523
4524         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4525         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4526         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4527
4528         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4529         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4530         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4531         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4532         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4533         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4534         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4535         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4536                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4537         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4538
4539         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4540         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4541                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4542                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4543                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4544                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4545                         keys_manager,
4546                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4547                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4548                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4549                         logger: &logger,
4550                         channel_monitors,
4551                 }).unwrap()
4552         };
4553         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4554         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4555
4556         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4557         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4558         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4559
4560         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4561
4562         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
4563         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4564 }
4565
4566 #[test]
4567 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
4568         // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with an out-of-date ChannelMonitor
4569         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4570         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4571         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
4572         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4573         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4574         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4575         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4576         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4577         let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4578         let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4579         let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4580         let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4581
4582         let mut node_0_stale_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4583         for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4584                 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4585                 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4586                 node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4587         }
4588
4589         let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
4590
4591         // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
4592         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4593
4594         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
4595         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4596         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4597         nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4598
4599         // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
4600         // nodes[3])
4601         let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4602         for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4603                 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4604                 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4605                 node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4606         }
4607
4608         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4609         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4610         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4611         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4612         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4613         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4614
4615
4616         let mut node_0_stale_monitors = Vec::new();
4617         for serialized in node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4618                 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4619                 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4620                 assert!(read.is_empty());
4621                 node_0_stale_monitors.push(monitor);
4622         }
4623
4624         let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
4625         for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4626                 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4627                 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4628                 assert!(read.is_empty());
4629                 node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
4630         }
4631
4632         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4633         if let Err(msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue) =
4634                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4635                 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4636                 keys_manager,
4637                 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4638                 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4639                 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4640                 logger: &logger,
4641                 channel_monitors: node_0_stale_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4642         }) { } else {
4643                 panic!("If the monitor(s) are stale, this indicates a bug and we should get an Err return");
4644         };
4645
4646         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4647         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) =
4648                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4649                 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4650                 keys_manager,
4651                 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4652                 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4653                 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4654                 logger: &logger,
4655                 channel_monitors: node_0_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4656         }).unwrap();
4657         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4658         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4659
4660         { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx
4661                 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4662                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
4663                 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
4664                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
4665         }
4666
4667         for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
4668                 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor).is_ok());
4669                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4670         }
4671         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4672         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
4673
4674         // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
4675         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4676         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4677         //... and we can even still claim the payment!
4678         claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4679
4680         nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4681         let reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[3], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4682         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4683         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish);
4684         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4685         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
4686         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
4687                 match action {
4688                         &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
4689                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
4690                         },
4691                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
4692                 }
4693         }
4694 }
4695
4696 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4697         ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4698                 {
4699                         let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4700                         let mut txn = Vec::new();
4701                         let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4702                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4703                         for event in events.drain(..) {
4704                                 match event {
4705                                         Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs } => {
4706                                                 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4707                                                         txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4708                                                         all_outputs.push(outp);
4709                                                 }
4710                                         },
4711                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4712                                 };
4713                         }
4714                         if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4715                                 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx) {
4716                                         txn.push(tx);
4717                                 }
4718                         }
4719                         txn
4720                 }
4721         }
4722 }
4723
4724 #[test]
4725 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4726         // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4727         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4728         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4729         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4730         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4731
4732         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4733         nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2).unwrap();
4734         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4735         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4736         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4737         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4738         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4739         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4740         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4741
4742         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4743         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4744
4745         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4746         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4747         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4748         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4749         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4750 }
4751
4752 #[test]
4753 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4754         // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4755         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4756         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4757         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4758         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4759         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4760
4761         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4762         nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2).unwrap();
4763         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4764         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4765         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4766
4767         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4768         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4769         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4770         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4771
4772         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4773         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4774         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4775         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4776         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4777
4778         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4779         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4780         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4781 }
4782
4783 #[test]
4784 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4785         // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4786         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4787
4788         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4789         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4790         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4791         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4792
4793         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4794         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4795         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4796         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4797         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4798
4799         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4800         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4801         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4802         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4803         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4804
4805         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4806         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4807         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4808
4809         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4810         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4811         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4812         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4813         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4814 }
4815
4816 #[test]
4817 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4818         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4819         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4820         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4821         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4822
4823         // Create some initial channels
4824         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4825
4826         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4827
4828         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4829         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4830         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4831
4832         // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4833         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
4834         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4835         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4836         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4837         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4838         match events[0] {
4839                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4840                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4841         }
4842         match events[1] {
4843                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4844                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4845         }
4846
4847         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4848         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-Success), ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4849         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4850         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4851         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4852         check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
4853         check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
4854
4855         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4856         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4857         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4858
4859         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4860         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4861         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4862 }
4863
4864 #[test]
4865 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4866         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4867         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4868         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4869         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4870
4871         // Create some initial channels
4872         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4873
4874         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4875         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4876
4877         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4878
4879         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4880         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4881         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4882
4883         // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4884         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4885         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4886         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4887         match events[0] {
4888                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4889                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4890         }
4891         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4892
4893         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4894         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4895         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelManager : 1 local commitent tx, ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4896         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
4897         check_spends!(node_txn[1],  commitment_tx[0].clone());
4898         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4899
4900         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4901         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4902         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4903         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, true);
4904
4905         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4906         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4907         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4908         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]);
4909         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4910 }
4911
4912 #[test]
4913 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4914         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4915         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4916         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4917         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4918
4919         // Create some initial channels
4920         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4921
4922         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4923         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4924         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4925         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4926
4927         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4928
4929         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4930         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4931         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4932         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4933
4934         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4935         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
4936         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4937         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4938
4939         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4940         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4941
4942         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4943         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4944         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4945 }
4946
4947 #[test]
4948 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4949         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4950         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4951         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4952         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4953         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4954
4955         // Create some initial channels
4956         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4957
4958         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4959         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4960         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4961         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4962
4963         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4964
4965         // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
4966         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4967         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4968         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4969         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4970         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4971
4972         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4973         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4974         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], chan_1.3);
4975         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4976         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4977         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4978         assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].lock_time, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
4979
4980         // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4981         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4982         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()] });
4983         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4984         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4985         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4986
4987         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4988         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
4989         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4990         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4991         // transactions next...
4992         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
4993         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
4994
4995         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
4996         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
4997         if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid() {
4998                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4999         } else {
5000                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid());
5001                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5002         }
5003
5004         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5005         check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
5006
5007         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
5008         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5009
5010         // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
5011         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5012         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5013         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5014         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
5015 }
5016
5017 #[test]
5018 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
5019         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5020         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
5021         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5022         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5023         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5024
5025         // Create some initial channels
5026         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5027
5028         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5029         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5030         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5031         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
5032
5033         // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
5034         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
5035
5036         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
5037
5038         // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
5039         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
5040         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5041         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5042         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5043         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5044
5045         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
5046         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5047         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5048         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
5049
5050         // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
5051         let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
5052         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
5053
5054         // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
5055         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5056         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
5057         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5058         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5059         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5060
5061         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5062         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5063
5064         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
5065         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
5066         // transactions next...
5067         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
5068         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
5069         if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
5070                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5071         } else {
5072                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
5073                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5074         }
5075
5076         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5077         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
5078
5079         check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
5080
5081         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
5082         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5083
5084         // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
5085         // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
5086
5087         // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
5088         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5089         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5090         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5091         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
5092         assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5093         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
5094         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
5095 }
5096
5097 #[test]
5098 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
5099         // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
5100         // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
5101         // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
5102         // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
5103         // channel.
5104         // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
5105         // gets broadcast.
5106
5107         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5108         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5109         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5110         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5111
5112         // Create some initial channels
5113         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5114         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5115
5116         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5117         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5118         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5119         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5120         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5121
5122         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
5123         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
5124         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
5125
5126         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
5127         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5128         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
5129         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5130         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5131         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5132         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5133         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5134         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5135         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5136
5137         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
5138         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5139         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5140         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5141
5142         let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Success tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
5143         assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 3);
5144         assert_eq!(c_txn[0], c_txn[2]);
5145         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0], c_txn[1]);
5146         check_spends!(c_txn[1], chan_2.3);
5147         check_spends!(c_txn[2], c_txn[1]);
5148         assert_eq!(c_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
5149         assert_eq!(c_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5150         assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
5151         assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
5152
5153         // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
5154         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
5155         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![c_txn[1].clone(), c_txn[2].clone()]});
5156         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5157         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5158         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5159         match events[0] {
5160                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5161                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5162         }
5163         match events[1] {
5164                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, claim_from_onchain_tx } => {
5165                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
5166                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
5167                 },
5168                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5169         }
5170         {
5171                 let mut b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5172                 // ChannelMonitor: claim tx
5173                 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
5174                 check_spends!(b_txn[0], chan_2.3); // B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
5175                 b_txn.clear();
5176         }
5177         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5178         let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5179         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
5180         match msg_events[0] {
5181                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5182                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5183         }
5184         match msg_events[1] {
5185                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
5186                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5187         }
5188         match msg_events[2] {
5189                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
5190                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5191                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5192                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5193                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5194                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
5195                 },
5196                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5197         };
5198         // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
5199         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5200         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
5201         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5202         let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5203         // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success tx
5204         assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 3);
5205         check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_1.3);
5206         check_spends!(b_txn[2], b_txn[1]);
5207         check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
5208         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5209         assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
5210         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
5211
5212         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5213         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5214 }
5215
5216 #[test]
5217 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
5218         // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
5219         // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
5220         // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
5221         // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
5222         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
5223         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
5224         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5225         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5226         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5227         config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5228         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
5229                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5230         let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5231
5232         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5233         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5234         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5235
5236         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5237         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5238         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5239         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5240         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
5241
5242         let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 900000);
5243
5244         let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
5245         // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
5246         // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
5247         // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
5248         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], vec![], 900000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40);
5249         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 900000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
5250
5251         let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5252         assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5253         check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5254
5255         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
5256         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5257         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5258         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5259         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5260
5261         let htlc_timeout_tx;
5262         { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
5263                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5264                 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5265                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
5266                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5267
5268                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5269                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5270                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5271                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5272                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
5273                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], commitment_txn[0]);
5274                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
5275
5276                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5277                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5278                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5279                 htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[1].clone();
5280         }
5281
5282         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
5283         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
5284         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
5285         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5286         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5287         match events[0] {
5288                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5289                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5290         }
5291         match events[1] {
5292                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5293                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5294         }
5295         let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5296         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs), ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
5297         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
5298         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5299         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5300         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5301         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5302         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5303         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5304         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5305         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[3], htlc_success_txn[0]);
5306         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[4], htlc_success_txn[1]);
5307         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
5308
5309         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
5310         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5311         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5312         let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5313         assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5314         assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5315         let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
5316         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5317         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5318         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5319
5320         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5321         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5322         {
5323                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5324         }
5325         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
5326
5327         // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
5328         // Note that the fee paid is effectively double as the HTLC value (including the nodes[1] fee
5329         // and nodes[2] fee) is rounded down and then claimed in full.
5330         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[0]);
5331         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], Some(196*2), true);
5332         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5333         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5334         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5335         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5336         assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
5337         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5338         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5339
5340         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5341         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
5342
5343         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5344         match events[0] {
5345                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5346                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
5347                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
5348                 }
5349                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5350         }
5351 }
5352
5353 #[test]
5354 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
5355         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5356         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5357         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5358         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5359
5360         // Create some initial channels
5361         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5362
5363         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
5364         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5365         assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
5366         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5367         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5368
5369         // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
5370         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5371         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5372         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
5373         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5374         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5375         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5376         match events[0] {
5377                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5378                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5379         }
5380         match events[1] {
5381                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5382                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5383         }
5384         let node_tx = {
5385                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5386                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5387                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
5388                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5389                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5390                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5391                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5392                 node_txn[0].clone()
5393         };
5394
5395         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
5396         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5397
5398         // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5399         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5400         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5401         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5402         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
5403         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5404 }
5405
5406 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
5407         // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
5408         // unrevoked commitment transaction.
5409         // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
5410         // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
5411         // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
5412         // use the same payment hashes.
5413         // Thus, we use a six-node network:
5414         //
5415         // A \         / E
5416         //    - C - D -
5417         // B /         \ F
5418         // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
5419         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
5420         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
5421         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5422         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5423         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5424         config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5425         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
5426                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5427         let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5428
5429         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5430         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5431         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5432         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5433         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5434
5435         // Rebalance and check output sanity...
5436         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
5437         send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
5438         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
5439
5440         let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5441         // 0th HTLC:
5442         let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5443         // 1st HTLC:
5444         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5445         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5446         // 2nd HTLC:
5447         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5448         // 3rd HTLC:
5449         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5450         // 4th HTLC:
5451         let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5452         // 5th HTLC:
5453         let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5454         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5455         // 6th HTLC:
5456         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200).unwrap());
5457         // 7th HTLC:
5458         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200).unwrap());
5459
5460         // 8th HTLC:
5461         let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5462         // 9th HTLC:
5463         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5464         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5465
5466         // 10th HTLC:
5467         let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5468         // 11th HTLC:
5469         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5470         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200).unwrap());
5471
5472         // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
5473         // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
5474         // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
5475         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2).len(), 1);
5476         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
5477
5478         // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
5479         // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5480         assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1));
5481         assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3));
5482         assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5));
5483         assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6));
5484         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
5485         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[4]);
5486         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
5487
5488         let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5489         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5490         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5491         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5492         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5493         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5494
5495         // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5496         assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
5497         assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4));
5498         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5499         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[5]);
5500         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5501
5502         let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5503         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5504         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5505         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5506
5507         let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5508
5509         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[3]);
5510         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5511         let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5512         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5513         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5514         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5515         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5516         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5517         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5518         if deliver_last_raa {
5519                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5520         } else {
5521                 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5522         }
5523
5524         // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5525         // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5526         // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5527         // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5528         //
5529         // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5530         // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5531         // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5532         //
5533         // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5534         // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5535         let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5536
5537         if announce_latest {
5538                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5539         } else {
5540                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5541         }
5542         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5543         let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5544                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5545                 events[1].clone()
5546         } else {
5547                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5548                 events[0].clone()
5549         };
5550         match close_event {
5551                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5552                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5553         }
5554
5555         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5556         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5557         if deliver_last_raa {
5558                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5559         } else {
5560                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5561         }
5562         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5563
5564         let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5565         assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5566         let mut a_done = false;
5567         for msg in cs_msgs {
5568                 match msg {
5569                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5570                                 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5571                                 // should be failed-backwards here.
5572                                 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5573                                         // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5574                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5575                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5576                                         }
5577                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5578                                         assert!(!a_done);
5579                                         a_done = true;
5580                                         &nodes[0]
5581                                 } else {
5582                                         // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5583                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5584                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5585                                         }
5586                                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5587                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5588                                         &nodes[1]
5589                                 };
5590                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5591                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5592                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5593                                 if announce_latest {
5594                                         target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5595                                         if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5596                                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5597                                         }
5598                                 }
5599                                 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5600                         },
5601                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5602                 }
5603         }
5604
5605         let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5606         assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5607         let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5608         let mut as_updates = 0;
5609         for event in as_events.iter() {
5610                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5611                         assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5612                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5613                                 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5614                         } else {
5615                                 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5616                         }
5617                         if network_update.is_some() {
5618                                 as_updates += 1;
5619                         }
5620                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5621         }
5622         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5623         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5624         if announce_latest {
5625                 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5626                 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5627         }
5628         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5629
5630         let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5631         assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5632         let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5633         let mut bs_updates = 0;
5634         for event in bs_events.iter() {
5635                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5636                         assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5637                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5638                                 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5639                         } else {
5640                                 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5641                         }
5642                         if network_update.is_some() {
5643                                 bs_updates += 1;
5644                         }
5645                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5646         }
5647         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5648         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5649         if announce_latest {
5650                 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5651         }
5652         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5653
5654         // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5655         // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5656         // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5657         // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5658         assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5659         assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5660 }
5661
5662 #[test]
5663 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5664         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5665 }
5666
5667 #[test]
5668 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5669         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5670 }
5671
5672 #[test]
5673 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5674         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5675         // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5676         // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5677 }
5678
5679 #[test]
5680 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5681         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5682         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5683         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5684         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5685
5686         // Create some initial channels
5687         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5688
5689         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5690         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5691         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5692         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5693
5694         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5695         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5696         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5697         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5698         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5699         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5700
5701         let htlc_timeout = {
5702                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5703                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
5704                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5705                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5706                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5707                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5708                 node_txn[1].clone()
5709         };
5710
5711         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5712         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5713         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5714
5715         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5716         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5717         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5718         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5719         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5720         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5721         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5722         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5723         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5724         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5725                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5726 }
5727
5728 #[test]
5729 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5730         // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with
5731         // a key manager rotation to test that key_derivation_params returned in DynamicOutputP2WSH
5732         // let us re-derive the channel key set to then derive a delayed_payment_key.
5733
5734         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5735
5736         // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5737         let seed = [42; 32];
5738         let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5739         let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5740         let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph: &chanmon_cfgs[0].network_graph, node_seed: seed, features: InitFeatures::known() };
5741         let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5742         node_cfgs.remove(0);
5743         node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5744
5745         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5746         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5747
5748         // Create some initial channels
5749         // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5750         // for node 0
5751         let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5752         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5753         assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5754
5755         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5756         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5757         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5758         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5759         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5760
5761         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5762         let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5763         let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5764         assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5765         check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5766
5767         // We check funding pubkey are unique
5768         let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness[3][36..69]));
5769         let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness[3][36..69]));
5770         if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5771             || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5772             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5773             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5774                 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5775         }
5776
5777         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5778         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5779         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5780         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5781         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5782         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5783
5784         let htlc_timeout = {
5785                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5786                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5787                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5788                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn_1[0]);
5789                 node_txn[1].clone()
5790         };
5791
5792         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5793         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5794         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5795
5796         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5797         let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5798         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5799         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5800         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5801         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5802         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5803         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5804         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5805         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5806         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5807                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5808 }
5809
5810 #[test]
5811 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5812         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5813         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5814         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5815         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5816
5817         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5818
5819         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5820         let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5821
5822         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5823         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5824         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5825
5826         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5827         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5828         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5829
5830         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5831         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5832         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5833
5834         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5835         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5836         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5837 }
5838
5839 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5840         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5841         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5842         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5843         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5844         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5845
5846         let (payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5847
5848         // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5849         // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5850         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
5851         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5852
5853         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5854         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5855         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
5856
5857         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5858         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5859         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5860         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5861         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5862
5863         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5864         let mut block = Block {
5865                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5866                 txdata: vec![],
5867         };
5868         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5869                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5870                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5871         }
5872         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5873         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5874         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5875         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5876 }
5877
5878 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5879         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5880         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5881         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5882         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5883         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5884
5885         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5886         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5887         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5888
5889         let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5890
5891         // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5892         // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5893         // to "time out" the HTLC.
5894
5895         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5896         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5897
5898         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5899                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: Vec::new()});
5900                 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
5901         }
5902         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5903         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5904         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5905         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5906 }
5907
5908 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5909         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5910         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5911         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5912         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5913         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5914
5915         // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
5916         // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5917         // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
5918         // actually revoked.
5919         let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
5920         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
5921         assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
5922         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5923         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5924
5925         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5926         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5927         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5928         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5929         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5930         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5931         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5932         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
5933         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5934         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5935
5936         if check_revoke_no_close {
5937                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
5938                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5939         }
5940
5941         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5942         let mut block = Block {
5943                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5944                 txdata: vec![],
5945         };
5946         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
5947                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5948                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5949         }
5950         if !check_revoke_no_close {
5951                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5952                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5953                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5954                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5955         } else {
5956                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5957                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5958                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[0] {
5959                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
5960                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5961                 if let Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[1] {
5962                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
5963                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5964         }
5965 }
5966
5967 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
5968 // There are only a few cases to test here:
5969 //  * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
5970 //    broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
5971 //  * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
5972 //  * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
5973 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
5974 // non-dust HTLCs.
5975 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
5976 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
5977 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
5978 #[test]
5979 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
5980         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
5981         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
5982
5983         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
5984         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
5985 }
5986
5987 #[test]
5988 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
5989         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
5990         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
5991         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
5992         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
5993 }
5994
5995 #[test]
5996 #[should_panic]
5997 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
5998         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5999         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6000         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6001         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6002         //Force duplicate channel ids
6003         for node in nodes.iter() {
6004                 *node.keys_manager.override_random_bytes.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
6005         }
6006
6007         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
6008         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
6009         let push_msat=10001;
6010         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
6011         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6012         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
6013         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6014
6015         //Create a second channel with a channel_id collision
6016         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
6017 }
6018
6019 #[test]
6020 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
6021         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6022         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6023         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6024         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6025
6026         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
6027         let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
6028         let push_msat=10001;
6029         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
6030
6031         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
6032         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
6033         // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
6034         let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
6035         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
6036
6037         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
6038         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
6039         let push_msat=10001;
6040         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
6041         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6042         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
6043
6044         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
6045         // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
6046         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
6047
6048         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
6049         assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
6050         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6051
6052         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
6053         let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
6054         assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
6055
6056         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
6057         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
6058         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6059         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6060         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
6061         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6062 }
6063
6064 #[test]
6065 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
6066         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6067         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6068         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6069         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6070
6071         let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
6072         let push_msat=10001;
6073         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
6074         let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6075         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
6076         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
6077
6078         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
6079         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6080         let err_msg = match events[0] {
6081                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
6082                         msg.clone()
6083                 },
6084                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6085         };
6086         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
6087 }
6088
6089 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
6090 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
6091 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
6092 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
6093 #[test]
6094 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
6095         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6096         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6097         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6098         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6099         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6100
6101         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6102         // pending_update_fee.
6103         {
6104                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6105                 *feerate_lock += 20;
6106         }
6107         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6108         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6109
6110         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6111         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6112         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6113                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6114                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6115                 },
6116                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6117         };
6118
6119         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6120
6121         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6122         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6123         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6124         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6125
6126         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6127         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
6128         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6129
6130         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6131         let our_payment_id = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6132         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6133         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6134
6135         // Flush the pending fee update.
6136         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6137         let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6138         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6139         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
6140         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6141
6142         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
6143         // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
6144         // us to surface its failure to the user.
6145         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6146         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6147         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6148         let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6149                 hex::encode(our_payment_hash.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6150         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6151
6152         // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
6153         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6154         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6155         match &events[0] {
6156                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data, .. } => {
6157                         assert_eq!(our_payment_id, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6158                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
6159                         assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
6160                         assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6161                         assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6162                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
6163                         assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
6164                         assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
6165                 },
6166                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6167         }
6168 }
6169
6170 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
6171 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
6172 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
6173 #[test]
6174 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
6175         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6176         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6177         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6178         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6179         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6180
6181         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6182         // pending_update_fee.
6183         {
6184                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6185                 *feerate_lock += 200;
6186         }
6187         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6188         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6189
6190         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6191         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6192         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6193                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6194                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6195                 },
6196                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6197         };
6198
6199         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6200
6201         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6202         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6203         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6204         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6205
6206         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6207         let amt_1 = 20000;
6208         let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors) - amt_1;
6209         let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
6210         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
6211
6212         // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
6213         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
6214         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6215         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
6216         let payment_id_2 = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
6217         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6218         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
6219
6220         // Flush the pending fee update.
6221         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6222         let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6223         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6224         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
6225         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6226         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
6227
6228         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
6229         // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
6230         // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
6231         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6232         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6233         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6234         let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6235                 hex::encode(payment_hash_2.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6236         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6237
6238         // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
6239         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6240         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6241         match &events[0] {
6242                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data, .. } => {
6243                         assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6244                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
6245                         assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
6246                         assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6247                         assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6248                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
6249                         assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
6250                         assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
6251                 },
6252                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6253         }
6254
6255         // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
6256         let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
6257                 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6258                 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
6259                 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
6260         };
6261         let raa = match send_raa_event {
6262                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
6263                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6264         };
6265         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6266         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6267         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6268         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6269         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6270         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6271         match events[0] {
6272                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6273                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6274         }
6275         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6276         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6277         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6278         match events[0] {
6279                 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => {},
6280                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6281         }
6282         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
6283         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6284         let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6285         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6286         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
6287         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
6288 }
6289
6290 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
6291 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
6292 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
6293 // once it's freed.
6294 #[test]
6295 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
6296         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6297         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6298         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
6299         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
6300         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
6301         config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
6302         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
6303         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6304         let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6305         let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6306
6307         // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6308         // pending_update_fee.
6309         {
6310                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6311                 *feerate_lock += 20;
6312         }
6313         nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6314         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6315
6316         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6317         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6318         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6319                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6320                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6321                 },
6322                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6323         };
6324
6325         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6326
6327         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6328         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6329         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6330         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6331
6332         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6333         let feemsat = 239;
6334         let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
6335         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors) - total_routing_fee_msat;
6336         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
6337         let payment_event = {
6338                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6339                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6340
6341                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6342                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6343
6344                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6345         };
6346         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6347         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6348         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6349         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6350
6351         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1_2.2);
6352         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6353
6354         // Flush the pending fee update.
6355         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6356         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6357         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6358         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6359         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6360         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6361
6362         // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
6363         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6364         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6365
6366         let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
6367                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
6368                         msg.clone()
6369                 },
6370                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6371         };
6372
6373         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
6374         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6375         assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6376
6377         // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
6378         let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6379         assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 1);
6380         match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
6381                 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6382                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6383         }
6384
6385         // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
6386         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6387         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6388
6389         // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
6390         let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6391         assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
6392         let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
6393                 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6394                         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
6395                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
6396                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
6397                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6398                         (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6399                 },
6400                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6401         };
6402
6403         // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
6404         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
6405         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6406
6407         // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
6408         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6409         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6410         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6411         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6412         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6413         let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6414         assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
6415         let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
6416                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
6417                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6418         };
6419         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6420         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
6421         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6422 }
6423
6424 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
6425 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
6426 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
6427
6428 #[test]
6429 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
6430         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
6431         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6432         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6433         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6434         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6435         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6436
6437         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6438         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 100;
6439
6440         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6441                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6442         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6443         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value".to_string(), 1);
6444 }
6445
6446 #[test]
6447 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
6448         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6449         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6450         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6451         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6452         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6453         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6454
6455         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6456         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 0;
6457         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6458                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
6459
6460         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6461         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6462 }
6463
6464 #[test]
6465 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
6466         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6467         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6468         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6469         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6470         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6471         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6472
6473         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6474         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6475         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6476         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6477         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6478
6479         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6480         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6481         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6482         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6483         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() });
6484 }
6485
6486 #[test]
6487 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6488         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6489         //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6490         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6491         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6492         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6493         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6494         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6495
6496         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], vec![], 100000000, 500000001);
6497         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::RouteError { ref err },
6498                 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6499 }
6500
6501 #[test]
6502 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6503         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6504         //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6505         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6506         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6507         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6508         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6509         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6510         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6511         let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6512
6513         for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6514                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6515                 let payment_event = {
6516                         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6517                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6518
6519                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6520                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6521                         if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6522                                 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6523                         } else {
6524                                 assert!(false);
6525                         }
6526                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6527                 };
6528                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6529                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6530                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6531
6532                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6533                 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6534         }
6535         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6536         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6537                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6538
6539         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6540         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
6541 }
6542
6543 #[test]
6544 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6545         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6546         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6547         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6548         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6549         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6550         let channel_value = 100000;
6551         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6552         let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6553
6554         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6555
6556         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6557         // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6558         // limits us to.
6559         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat =  max_in_flight + 1;
6560         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6561                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6562
6563         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6564         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
6565
6566         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6567 }
6568
6569 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6570 #[test]
6571 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6572         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6573         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6574         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6575         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6576         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6577         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6578         let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6579         {
6580                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6581                 let channel = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6582                 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6583         }
6584
6585         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6586         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6587         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6588         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6589         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6590         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6591         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6592         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6593         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6594         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6595         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6596 }
6597
6598 #[test]
6599 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6600         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6601         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6602         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6603         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6604         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6605         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6606
6607         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6608         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6609         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6610         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6611         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6612         let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
6613
6614         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6615         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6616         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6617         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6618         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6619
6620         // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6621         // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6622         // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6623         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6624         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6625
6626         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6627         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6628         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6629         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6630         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6631 }
6632
6633 #[test]
6634 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6635         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6636         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6637         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6638         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6639         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6640         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6641         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6642
6643         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3999999);
6644         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6645         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6646         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6647         let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3999999, &Some(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6648         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash);
6649
6650         let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6651                 channel_id: chan.2,
6652                 htlc_id: 0,
6653                 amount_msat: 1000,
6654                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6655                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6656                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6657         };
6658
6659         for i in 0..super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
6660                 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6661                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6662         }
6663         msg.htlc_id = (super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS) as u64;
6664         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6665
6666         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6667         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6668         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6669         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6670         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6671 }
6672
6673 #[test]
6674 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6675         //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6676         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6677         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6678         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6679         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6680         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6681
6682         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6683         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6684         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6685         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6686         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6687         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6688
6689         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6690         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6691         assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6692         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6693         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6694 }
6695
6696 #[test]
6697 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6698         //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6699         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6700         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6701         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6702         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6703
6704         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6705         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6706         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6707         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6708         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6709         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6710         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6711
6712         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6713         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6714         assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6715         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6716         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6717 }
6718
6719 #[test]
6720 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6721         //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6722         // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6723         // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6724         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6725         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6726         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6727         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6728
6729         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6730         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6731         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6732         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6733         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6734         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6735
6736         //Disconnect and Reconnect
6737         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6738         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6739         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
6740         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6741         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6742         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
6743         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6744         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6745         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6746         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6747         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6748         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6749
6750         //Resend HTLC
6751         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6752         assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6753         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6754         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6755         let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6756
6757         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6758
6759         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6760         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6761         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6762         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6763         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6764 }
6765
6766 #[test]
6767 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6768         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6769
6770         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6771         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6772         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6773         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6774         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6775         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6776         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6777
6778         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6779         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6780         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6781
6782         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6783                 channel_id: chan.2,
6784                 htlc_id: 0,
6785                 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6786         };
6787
6788         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6789
6790         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6791         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6792         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6793         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6794         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6795 }
6796
6797 #[test]
6798 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6799         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6800
6801         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6802         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6803         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6804         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6805         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6806
6807         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6808         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6809         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6810         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6811         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6812
6813         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6814                 channel_id: chan.2,
6815                 htlc_id: 0,
6816                 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6817         };
6818
6819         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6820
6821         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6822         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6823         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6824         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6825         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6826 }
6827
6828 #[test]
6829 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6830         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6831
6832         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6833         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6834         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6835         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6836         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6837
6838         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6839         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6840         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6841         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6842         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6843         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6844                 channel_id: chan.2,
6845                 htlc_id: 0,
6846                 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6847                 failure_code: 0x8000,
6848         };
6849
6850         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6851
6852         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6853         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6854         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6855         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6856         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6857 }
6858
6859 #[test]
6860 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6861         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6862
6863         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6864         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6865         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6866         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6867         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6868
6869         let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
6870
6871         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6872         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6873
6874         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6875         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6876         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6877                 match events[0] {
6878                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6879                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6880                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6881                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6882                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6883                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6884                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6885                         },
6886                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6887                 }
6888         };
6889
6890         update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6891
6892         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6893
6894         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6895         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6896         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6897         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6898         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6899 }
6900
6901 #[test]
6902 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6903         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6904
6905         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6906         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6907         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6908         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6909         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6910
6911         let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
6912
6913         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6914         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6915
6916         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6917         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6918         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6919                 match events[0] {
6920                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6921                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6922                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6923                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6924                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6925                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6926                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6927                         },
6928                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6929                 }
6930         };
6931
6932         update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
6933
6934         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6935
6936         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6937         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6938         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6939         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6940         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6941 }
6942
6943 #[test]
6944 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
6945         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
6946
6947         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6948         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6949         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6950         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6951         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6952
6953         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6954         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6955         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6956
6957         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6958         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6959
6960         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6961         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6962         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6963
6964         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6965
6966         let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
6967                 match events[0] {
6968                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6969                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6970                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6971                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6972                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6973                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6974                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
6975                         },
6976                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6977                 }
6978         };
6979         update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
6980         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6981
6982         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6983         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6984         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
6985         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6986         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6987 }
6988
6989 #[test]
6990 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
6991         //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
6992         //    * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
6993
6994         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6995         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6996         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6997         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6998         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6999         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7000
7001         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
7002
7003         //First hop
7004         let mut payment_event = {
7005                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7006                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7007                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7008                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7009                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
7010         };
7011         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7012         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7013         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7014         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7015         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7016         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
7017         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7018         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
7019         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
7020
7021         //Second Hop
7022         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
7023         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7024         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
7025         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
7026
7027         let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7028         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7029         let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
7030                 match events_3[0] {
7031                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7032                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7033                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7034                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7035                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
7036                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7037                                 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
7038                         },
7039                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7040                 }
7041         };
7042
7043         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
7044
7045         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7046         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
7047         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7048         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7049         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
7050
7051         //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
7052         match events_4[0] {
7053                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
7054                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7055                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7056                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7057                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7058                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7059                 },
7060                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7061         };
7062
7063         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7064 }
7065
7066 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
7067         // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
7068         // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
7069         // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
7070
7071         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7072         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7073         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7074         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7075         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7076         let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7077
7078         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7079
7080         // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
7081         let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7082         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7083         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7084
7085         // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
7086         let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7087
7088         // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
7089         assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
7090         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7091         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7092         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7093
7094         let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7095         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7096         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
7097         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7098
7099         // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
7100         let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7101
7102         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7103         match events[0] {
7104                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
7105                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7106                 },
7107                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7108         }
7109         match events[1] {
7110                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
7111                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7112                 },
7113                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7114         }
7115
7116         assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
7117         // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
7118         if announce_latest {
7119                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
7120         } else {
7121                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
7122         }
7123
7124         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7125         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7126         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7127
7128         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7129         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7130         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7131         // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
7132         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7133         let mut first_failed = false;
7134         for event in events {
7135                 match event {
7136                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7137                                 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
7138                                         assert!(!first_failed);
7139                                         first_failed = true;
7140                                 } else {
7141                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
7142                                 }
7143                         }
7144                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7145                 }
7146         }
7147 }
7148
7149 #[test]
7150 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
7151         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
7152         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
7153 }
7154
7155 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
7156         // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7157         // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
7158         // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7159         // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
7160         // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7161         // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
7162
7163         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7164         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7165         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7166         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7167         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7168
7169         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7170
7171         let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7172         let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7173
7174         let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7175         let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7176
7177         // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
7178         if revoked {
7179                 let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7180                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
7181         }
7182
7183         let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
7184         if local {
7185                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
7186                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
7187                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7188                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7189                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
7190
7191                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
7192                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7193                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7194                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7195                 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7196                 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7197                 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
7198                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7199                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7200                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7201                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7202         } else {
7203                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
7204                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7205                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7206                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7207                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7208                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7209                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7210                 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7211                 if !revoked {
7212                         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
7213                         assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7214                         // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout tx on remote commitment tx
7215                         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7216                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7217                         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7218                         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7219                 } else {
7220                         // If revoked, both dust & non-dust HTLCs should have been failed after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confs of revoked
7221                         // commitment tx
7222                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7223                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7224                         let first;
7225                         match events[0] {
7226                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7227                                         if payment_hash == dust_hash { first = true; }
7228                                         else { first = false; }
7229                                 },
7230                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7231                         }
7232                         match events[1] {
7233                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7234                                         if first { assert_eq!(payment_hash, non_dust_hash); }
7235                                         else { assert_eq!(payment_hash, dust_hash); }
7236                                 },
7237                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7238                         }
7239                 }
7240         }
7241 }
7242
7243 #[test]
7244 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
7245         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
7246         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
7247         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
7248 }
7249
7250 #[test]
7251 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
7252         // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
7253
7254         let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7255         low_our_to_self_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
7256         let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7257         high_their_to_self_config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
7258         let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
7259         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7260         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7261         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
7262         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7263
7264         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
7265         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), 1000000, 1000000, 0, &low_our_to_self_config, 0) {
7266                 match error {
7267                         APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7268                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7269                 }
7270         } else { assert!(false) }
7271
7272         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7273         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7274         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7275         open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7276         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0, &low_our_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger) {
7277                 match error {
7278                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str()));  },
7279                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7280                 }
7281         } else { assert!(false); }
7282
7283         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
7284         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7285         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7286         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7287         accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7288         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7289         let reason_msg;
7290         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
7291                 match action {
7292                         &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7293                                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
7294                                 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
7295                         },
7296                         _ => { panic!(); }
7297                 }
7298         } else { panic!(); }
7299         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg });
7300
7301         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7302         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7303         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7304         open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7305         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0, &high_their_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger) {
7306                 match error {
7307                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7308                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7309                 }
7310         } else { assert!(false); }
7311 }
7312
7313 #[test]
7314 fn test_data_loss_protect() {
7315         // We want to be sure that :
7316         // * we don't broadcast our Local Commitment Tx in case of fallen behind
7317         //   (but this is not quite true - we broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr)
7318         // * we close channel in case of detecting other being fallen behind
7319         // * we are able to claim our own outputs thanks to to_remote being static
7320         // TODO: this test is incomplete and the data_loss_protect implementation is incomplete - see issue #775
7321         let persister;
7322         let logger;
7323         let fee_estimator;
7324         let tx_broadcaster;
7325         let chain_source;
7326         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7327         // We broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr, which would cause a panic
7328         // during signing due to revoked tx
7329         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7330         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
7331         let monitor;
7332         let node_state_0;
7333         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7334         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7335         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7336
7337         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7338
7339         // Cache node A state before any channel update
7340         let previous_node_state = nodes[0].node.encode();
7341         let mut previous_chain_monitor_state = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7342         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan.2).write(&mut previous_chain_monitor_state).unwrap();
7343
7344         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7345         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7346
7347         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7348         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7349
7350         // Restore node A from previous state
7351         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
7352         let mut chain_monitor = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_chain_monitor_state.0), keys_manager).unwrap().1;
7353         chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
7354         tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
7355         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7356         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7357         monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &tx_broadcaster, &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7358         node_state_0 = {
7359                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7360                 channel_monitors.insert(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, &mut chain_monitor);
7361                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_node_state), ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7362                         keys_manager: keys_manager,
7363                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
7364                         chain_monitor: &monitor,
7365                         logger: &logger,
7366                         tx_broadcaster: &tx_broadcaster,
7367                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
7368                         channel_monitors,
7369                 }).unwrap().1
7370         };
7371         nodes[0].node = &node_state_0;
7372         assert!(monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chain_monitor).is_ok());
7373         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &monitor;
7374         nodes[0].chain_source = &chain_source;
7375
7376         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7377
7378         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7379         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7380
7381         let reestablish_0 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7382
7383         // Check we don't broadcast any transactions following learning of per_commitment_point from B
7384         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_0[0]);
7385         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7386
7387         {
7388                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7389                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7390         }
7391
7392         let mut reestablish_1 = Vec::with_capacity(1);
7393         for msg in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
7394                 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } = msg {
7395                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7396                         reestablish_1.push(msg.clone());
7397                 } else if let MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } = msg {
7398                 } else if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg {
7399                         match action {
7400                                 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7401                                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting");
7402                                 },
7403                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
7404                         }
7405                 } else {
7406                         panic!("Unexpected event")
7407                 }
7408         }
7409
7410         // Check we close channel detecting A is fallen-behind
7411         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7412         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_string() });
7413         assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction");
7414         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7415
7416         // Check A is able to claim to_remote output
7417         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7418         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7419         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
7420         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
7421         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
7422         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7423         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can\'t do any automated broadcasting".to_string() });
7424         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
7425         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
7426         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
7427 }
7428
7429 #[test]
7430 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
7431         // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
7432         // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
7433         // to B, B should refuse payment.
7434
7435         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7436         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7437         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7438         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7439
7440         // Create some initial channels
7441         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7442
7443         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7444         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7445         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7446         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7447         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7448         let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
7449         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7450         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7451
7452         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7453         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7454         let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7455         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7456         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7457
7458         // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
7459         // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
7460         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7461         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7462
7463         // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
7464         // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
7465         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7466
7467         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7468         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7469         let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
7470                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7471                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7472                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7473                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7474                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7475                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7476                         (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
7477                 },
7478                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7479         };
7480         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7481
7482         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
7483         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
7484
7485         // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
7486         let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(10_000).to_vec();
7487         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH));
7488         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
7489 }
7490
7491 #[test]
7492 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
7493         // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
7494         // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
7495
7496         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7497         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7498         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7499         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7500
7501         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7502         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7503         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7504
7505         // Disconnect peers
7506         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7507         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7508
7509         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // Enabled -> DisabledStaged
7510         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // DisabledStaged -> Disabled
7511         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7512         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7513         let mut chans_disabled = HashMap::new();
7514         for e in msg_events {
7515                 match e {
7516                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7517                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7518                                 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7519                                 if chans_disabled.insert(msg.contents.short_channel_id, msg.contents.timestamp).is_some() {
7520                                         panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7521                                 }
7522                         },
7523                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7524                 }
7525         }
7526         // Reconnect peers
7527         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7528         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7529         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7530         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7531         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7532         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7533
7534         // Reestablish chan_1
7535         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7536         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7537         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7538         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7539         // Reestablish chan_2
7540         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7541         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7542         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7543         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7544         // Reestablish chan_3
7545         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7546         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7547         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7548         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7549
7550         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7551         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7552         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7553         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7554         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7555         for e in msg_events {
7556                 match e {
7557                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7558                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7559                                 match chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7560                                         // Each update should have a higher timestamp than the previous one, replacing
7561                                         // the old one.
7562                                         Some(prev_timestamp) => assert!(msg.contents.timestamp > prev_timestamp),
7563                                         None => panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!"),
7564                                 }
7565                         },
7566                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7567                 }
7568         }
7569         // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7570         assert!(chans_disabled.is_empty());
7571 }
7572
7573 #[test]
7574 fn test_priv_forwarding_rejection() {
7575         // If we have a private channel with outbound liquidity, and
7576         // UserConfig::accept_forwards_to_priv_channels is set to false, we should reject any attempts
7577         // to forward through that channel.
7578         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7579         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7580         let mut no_announce_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
7581         no_announce_cfg.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
7582         no_announce_cfg.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels = false;
7583         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(no_announce_cfg), None]);
7584         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
7585         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
7586         let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
7587         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7588
7589         let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
7590
7591         // Note that the create_*_chan functions in utils requires announcement_signatures, which we do
7592         // not send for private channels.
7593         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7594         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7595         nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
7596         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7597         nodes[1].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7598
7599         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[1], 1_000_000, 42);
7600         nodes[1].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
7601         nodes[2].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()));
7602         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
7603
7604         let cs_funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7605         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_funding_signed);
7606         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7607
7608         let conf_height = core::cmp::max(nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1, nodes[2].best_block_info().1 + 1);
7609         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, conf_height);
7610         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH - 1);
7611         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[2], &tx, conf_height);
7612         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH - 1);
7613         let as_funding_locked = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7614         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7615         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7616         nodes[2].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked);
7617         get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7618
7619         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].is_public);
7620         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
7621         assert!(!nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels()[0].is_public);
7622
7623         // We should always be able to forward through nodes[1] as long as its out through a public
7624         // channel:
7625         send_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[0]], 10_000);
7626
7627         // ... however, if we send to nodes[2], we will have to pass the private channel from nodes[1]
7628         // to nodes[2], which should be rejected:
7629         let route_hint = RouteHint(vec![RouteHintHop {
7630                 src_node_id: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
7631                 short_channel_id: nodes[2].node.list_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap(),
7632                 fees: RoutingFees { base_msat: 1000, proportional_millionths: 0 },
7633                 cltv_expiry_delta: MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
7634                 htlc_minimum_msat: None,
7635                 htlc_maximum_msat: None,
7636         }]);
7637         let last_hops = vec![route_hint];
7638         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], last_hops, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
7639
7640         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7641         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7642         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
7643         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7644         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
7645
7646         let htlc_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7647         assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7648         assert_eq!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7649         assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7650         assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fee.is_none());
7651
7652         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7653         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_fail_updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7654         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, nodes[2].node.list_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap(), true);
7655
7656         // Now disconnect nodes[1] from its peers and restart with accept_forwards_to_priv_channels set
7657         // to true. Sadly there is currently no way to change it at runtime.
7658
7659         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7660         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7661
7662         let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
7663         let mut monitor_a_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7664         let mut monitor_b_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7665         get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_1).write(&mut monitor_a_serialized).unwrap();
7666         get_monitor!(nodes[1], cs_funding_signed.channel_id).write(&mut monitor_b_serialized).unwrap();
7667
7668         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7669         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
7670         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7671         nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
7672
7673         let mut monitor_a_read = &monitor_a_serialized.0[..];
7674         let mut monitor_b_read = &monitor_b_serialized.0[..];
7675         let (_, mut monitor_a) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut monitor_a_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
7676         let (_, mut monitor_b) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut monitor_b_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
7677         assert!(monitor_a_read.is_empty());
7678         assert!(monitor_b_read.is_empty());
7679
7680         no_announce_cfg.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels = true;
7681
7682         let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
7683         let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
7684                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7685                 channel_monitors.insert(monitor_a.get_funding_txo().0, &mut monitor_a);
7686                 channel_monitors.insert(monitor_b.get_funding_txo().0, &mut monitor_b);
7687                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7688                         default_config: no_announce_cfg,
7689                         keys_manager,
7690                         fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
7691                         chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
7692                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
7693                         logger: nodes[1].logger,
7694                         channel_monitors,
7695                 }).unwrap()
7696         };
7697         assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
7698         nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
7699
7700         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor_a.get_funding_txo().0, monitor_a).is_ok());
7701         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor_b.get_funding_txo().0, monitor_b).is_ok());
7702         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7703         nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
7704
7705         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7706         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7707         let as_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7708         let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7709         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish);
7710         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
7711         get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7712         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7713
7714         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7715         nodes[2].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7716         let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7717         let cs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7718         nodes[2].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
7719         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_reestablish);
7720         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7721         get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7722
7723         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7724         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7725         pass_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], 10_000, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret);
7726         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], our_payment_preimage);
7727 }
7728
7729 #[test]
7730 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7731         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7732         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7733
7734         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7735         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7736         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7737         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7738
7739         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7740
7741         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7742         let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], vec![], 3000000, 30);
7743         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7744
7745         let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7746         // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7747         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7748         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7749         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7750         let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7751
7752         let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7753         for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7754                 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7755                         penalty_sum += outp.value;
7756                 }
7757         }
7758
7759         // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7760         let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7761
7762         // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7763         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7764         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_114, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7765         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()] });
7766         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7767
7768         // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7769         let penalty_1;
7770         let feerate_1;
7771         {
7772                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7773                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor) + local commitment tx
7774                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7775                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7776                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7777                 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7778                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7779                 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7780                 node_txn.clear();
7781         };
7782
7783         // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7784         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7785         let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7786         let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7787         {
7788                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7789                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7790                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7791                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7792                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7793                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7794                         penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7795                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7796                         assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7797                         let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7798                         feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7799                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7800                         assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7801                         node_txn.clear();
7802                 }
7803         }
7804         assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7805
7806         // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7807         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7808         let penalty_3;
7809         let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7810         {
7811                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7812                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7813                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7814                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7815                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7816                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7817                         penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7818                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7819                         assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7820                         let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7821                         feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7822                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7823                         assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7824                         node_txn.clear();
7825                 }
7826         }
7827         assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7828
7829         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7830         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7831 }
7832
7833 #[test]
7834 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7835         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7836         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7837
7838         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7839         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7840         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7841         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7842         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7843
7844         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7845         // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7846         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7847         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7848         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7849         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7850                 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7851         let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7852         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7853         let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[1].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7854                 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7855         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7856
7857         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7858         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7859         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7860
7861         // Revoke local commitment tx
7862         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7863
7864         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7865         // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7866         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7867         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7868         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7869         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7870         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 49); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7871
7872         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7873         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
7874         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], chan.3);
7875
7876         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7877         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7878         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7879
7880         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7881         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7882         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
7883         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7884
7885         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7886         let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7887         let header_11 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: hash_128, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7888         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_11, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7889         let header_129 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_11.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7890         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_129, txdata: vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[2].clone()] });
7891         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7892         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7893         match events[1] {
7894                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7895                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7896         }
7897         let first;
7898         let feerate_1;
7899         let penalty_txn;
7900         {
7901                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7902                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + A commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7903                 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7904
7905                 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7906                 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7907                 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7908                 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7909                 // future).
7910                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7911                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7912                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7913                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7914                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7915                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7916
7917                 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7918                 // available, which we check here:
7919                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7920                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7921                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7922
7923                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7924                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7925
7926                 // node_txn[3] is the local commitment tx broadcast just because (and somewhat in case of
7927                 // reorgs, though its not clear its ever worth broadcasting conflicting txn like this when
7928                 // a remote commitment tx has already been confirmed).
7929                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan.3);
7930
7931                 // node_txn[4] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7932                 // output, checked above).
7933                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 2);
7934                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].output.len(), 1);
7935                 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7936
7937                 first = node_txn[4].txid();
7938                 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7939                 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[4].output[0].value;
7940                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[4].get_weight() as u64;
7941                 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7942                 node_txn.clear();
7943         }
7944
7945         // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7946         let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_129.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7947         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7948         let header_131 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_130.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7949         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_131, txdata: Vec::new() });
7950         {
7951                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7952                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // 2 bumped penalty txn on revoked commitment tx
7953
7954                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7955                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7956                 // Note that these are both bogus - they spend outputs already claimed in block 129:
7957                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output  {
7958                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7959                 } else {
7960                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7961                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7962                 }
7963
7964                 node_txn.clear();
7965         };
7966
7967         // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7968         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7969         assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7970         let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7971         let node_txn = {
7972                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7973                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7974
7975                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7976                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7977                 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7978                 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7979                 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7980                 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7981                 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7982                 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7983                 node_txn.clear();
7984                 txn
7985         };
7986         // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7987         let header_145 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_144, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7988         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_145, txdata: node_txn });
7989         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7990         {
7991                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7992                 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7993                 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7994                 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7995                 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7996                 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7997                 // up bumped justice generation.
7998                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7999                 node_txn.clear();
8000         }
8001         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8002         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8003 }
8004
8005 #[test]
8006 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
8007         // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
8008         // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
8009
8010         // Create 2 HTLCs
8011         // Provide preimage for one
8012         // Check aggregation
8013
8014         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8015         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8016         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8017         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8018
8019         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8020         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
8021         route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
8022
8023         // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
8024         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
8025         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
8026         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8027         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
8028
8029         // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
8030         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8031         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
8032         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8033         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
8034
8035         // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
8036         let timeout;
8037         let preimage;
8038         let preimage_bump;
8039         let feerate_timeout;
8040         let feerate_preimage;
8041         {
8042                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8043                 // 9 transactions including:
8044                 // 1*2 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success
8045                 // 1*3 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success + HTLC-Timeout
8046                 // 2 * HTLC-Success (one RBF bump we'll check later)
8047                 // 1 * HTLC-Timeout
8048                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 8);
8049                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8050                 assert_eq!(node_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
8051                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
8052                 check_spends!(node_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
8053                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
8054                 preimage_bump = node_txn[3].clone();
8055
8056                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan.3);
8057                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
8058                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
8059                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[5]);
8060
8061                 timeout = node_txn[6].txid();
8062                 let index = node_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout;
8063                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[6].output[0].value;
8064                 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / node_txn[6].get_weight() as u64;
8065
8066                 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
8067                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
8068                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
8069                 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
8070
8071                 node_txn.clear();
8072         };
8073         assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
8074         assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
8075
8076         // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
8077         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
8078         {
8079                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8080                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8081                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8082                 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
8083                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
8084                 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
8085
8086                 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
8087                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
8088                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.get_weight() as u64;
8089                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
8090                 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
8091
8092                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
8093                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
8094                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
8095                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
8096                 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
8097
8098                 node_txn.clear();
8099         }
8100
8101         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8102         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8103 }
8104
8105 #[test]
8106 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
8107         // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
8108         // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
8109         // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
8110         // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
8111         // EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
8112         // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
8113         // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
8114         // implement that).
8115         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8116         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8117         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8118         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8119         let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
8120
8121         let mut guard = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
8122         let keys = guard.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
8123
8124         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
8125
8126         // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
8127         keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8128         let per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
8129
8130         // Must revoke without gaps
8131         keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8132         keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
8133
8134         keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8135         let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
8136                 &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
8137
8138         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
8139                 &msgs::RevokeAndACK { channel_id, per_commitment_secret, next_per_commitment_point });
8140         assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
8141         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8142         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() });
8143 }
8144
8145 #[test]
8146 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
8147         // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
8148         // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
8149
8150         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8151         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8152         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8153         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8154
8155         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8156         // Lock HTLC in both directions
8157         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8158         route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8159
8160         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
8161         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8162         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
8163
8164         // Revoke local commitment tx
8165         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
8166
8167         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
8168         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
8169         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[0]);
8170         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8171
8172         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
8173         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8174         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8175         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8176         let penalty_txn = {
8177                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8178                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
8179                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8180                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8181                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8182                 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
8183                 node_txn.clear();
8184                 penalty_txn
8185         };
8186         let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8187         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
8188         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8189         {
8190                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
8191                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
8192                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
8193         }
8194 }
8195
8196 #[test]
8197 fn test_pending_claimed_htlc_no_balance_underflow() {
8198         // Tests that if we have a pending outbound HTLC as well as a claimed-but-not-fully-removed
8199         // HTLC we will not underflow when we call `Channel::get_balance_msat()`.
8200         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8201         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8202         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8203         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8204         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8205
8206         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_010_000).0;
8207         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8208         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8209         let fulfill_ev = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8210
8211         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8212         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
8213         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.commitment_signed);
8214         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8215         let (_raa, _cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8216
8217         // At this point nodes[1] has received 1,010k msat (10k msat more than their reserve) and can
8218         // send an HTLC back (though it will go in the holding cell). Send an HTLC back and check we
8219         // can get our balance.
8220
8221         // Get a route from nodes[1] to nodes[0] by getting a route going the other way and then flip
8222         // the public key of the only hop. This works around ChannelDetails not showing the
8223         // almost-claimed HTLC as available balance.
8224         let (mut route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000);
8225         route.payment_params = None; // This is all wrong, but unnecessary
8226         route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8227         let (_, payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
8228         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
8229
8230         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].balance_msat, 1_000_000);
8231 }
8232
8233 #[test]
8234 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
8235         // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
8236         // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
8237         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8238         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8239         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8240         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8241
8242         let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8243
8244         // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
8245         // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
8246         // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
8247         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
8248         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8249
8250         // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
8251         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
8252         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8253         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8254
8255         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
8256         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8257         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
8258         let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8259         assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
8260         match close_ev[0] {
8261                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
8262                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8263                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
8264                 },
8265                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8266         }
8267 }
8268
8269 #[test]
8270 fn test_override_channel_config() {
8271         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8272         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8273         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8274         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8275
8276         // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
8277         let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
8278         override_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
8279
8280         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
8281
8282         // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
8283         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8284         assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
8285         assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
8286 }
8287
8288 #[test]
8289 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
8290         let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
8291         zero_config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
8292         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8293         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8294         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
8295         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8296
8297         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
8298         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8299         assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8300
8301         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8302         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8303         assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8304 }
8305
8306 #[test]
8307 fn test_manually_accept_inbound_channel_request() {
8308         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8309         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8310         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8311         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8312         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8313         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8314
8315         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8316         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8317
8318         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8319
8320         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8321         // accepting the inbound channel request.
8322         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8323
8324         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8325         match events[0] {
8326                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8327                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
8328                 }
8329                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8330         }
8331
8332         let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8333         assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8334
8335         match accept_msg_ev[0] {
8336                 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
8337                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8338                 }
8339                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8340         }
8341 }
8342
8343 #[test]
8344 fn test_manually_reject_inbound_channel_request() {
8345         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8346         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8347         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8348         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8349         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8350         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8351
8352         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8353         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8354
8355         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8356
8357         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8358         // rejecting the inbound channel request.
8359         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8360
8361         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8362         match events[0] {
8363                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8364                         nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
8365                 }
8366                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8367         }
8368
8369         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8370         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8371
8372         match close_msg_ev[0] {
8373                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => {
8374                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8375                 }
8376                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8377         }
8378         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8379 }
8380
8381 #[test]
8382 fn test_reject_funding_before_inbound_channel_accepted() {
8383         // This tests that when `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` is set to true, inbound
8384         // channels must to be manually accepted through `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel` by
8385         // the node operator before the counterparty sends a `FundingCreated` message. If a
8386         // `FundingCreated` message is received before the channel is accepted, it should be rejected
8387         // and the channel should be closed.
8388         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8389         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8390         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8391         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8392         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8393         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8394
8395         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8396         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8397         let temp_channel_id = res.temporary_channel_id;
8398
8399         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8400
8401         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in the `msg_events`.
8402         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8403
8404         // Clear the `Event::OpenChannelRequest` event without responding to the request.
8405         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8406
8407         // Get the `AcceptChannel` message of `nodes[1]` without calling
8408         // `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`, which generates a
8409         // `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` event. The message is passed to `nodes[0]`
8410         // `handle_accept_channel`, which is required in order for `create_funding_transaction` to
8411         // succeed when `nodes[0]` is passed to it.
8412         {
8413                 let mut lock;
8414                 let channel = get_channel_ref!(&nodes[1], lock, temp_channel_id);
8415                 let accept_chan_msg = channel.get_accept_channel_message();
8416                 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_chan_msg);
8417         }
8418
8419         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
8420
8421         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
8422         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8423
8424         // The `funding_created_msg` should be rejected by `nodes[1]` as it hasn't accepted the channel
8425         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8426
8427         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8428         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8429
8430         let expected_err = "FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted";
8431         match close_msg_ev[0] {
8432                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id, } => {
8433                         assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, temp_channel_id);
8434                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8435                         assert_eq!(msg.data, expected_err);
8436                 }
8437                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8438         }
8439
8440         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
8441 }
8442
8443 #[test]
8444 fn test_can_not_accept_inbound_channel_twice() {
8445         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8446         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8447         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8448         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8449         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8450         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8451
8452         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8453         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8454
8455         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8456
8457         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8458         // accepting the inbound channel request.
8459         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8460
8461         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8462         match events[0] {
8463                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8464                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
8465                         let api_res = nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id);
8466                         match api_res {
8467                                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8468                                         assert_eq!(err, "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.");
8469                                 },
8470                                 Ok(_) => panic!("Channel shouldn't be possible to be accepted twice"),
8471                                 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8472                         }
8473                 }
8474                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8475         }
8476
8477         // Ensure that the channel wasn't closed after attempting to accept it twice.
8478         let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8479         assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8480
8481         match accept_msg_ev[0] {
8482                 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
8483                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8484                 }
8485                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8486         }
8487 }
8488
8489 #[test]
8490 fn test_can_not_accept_unknown_inbound_channel() {
8491         let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
8492         let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
8493         let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
8494         let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr)[0].node;
8495
8496         let unknown_channel_id = [0; 32];
8497         let api_res = node.accept_inbound_channel(&unknown_channel_id);
8498         match api_res {
8499                 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
8500                         assert_eq!(err, "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist");
8501                 },
8502                 Ok(_) => panic!("It shouldn't be possible to accept an unkown channel"),
8503                 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8504         }
8505 }
8506
8507 #[test]
8508 fn test_simple_mpp() {
8509         // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
8510         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8511         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8512         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8513         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8514
8515         let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8516         let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8517         let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8518         let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8519
8520         let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8521         let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8522         route.paths.push(path);
8523         route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8524         route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8525         route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8526         route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8527         route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8528         route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8529         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
8530         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
8531 }
8532
8533 #[test]
8534 fn test_preimage_storage() {
8535         // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
8536         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8537         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8538         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8539         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8540
8541         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8542
8543         {
8544                 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
8545                 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8546                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8547                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8548                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8549                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8550                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8551                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8552         }
8553         // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8554         // values from previous calls.
8555         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8556         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8557         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8558         match events[0] {
8559                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref purpose, .. } => {
8560                         match &purpose {
8561                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
8562                                         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
8563                                 },
8564                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
8565                         }
8566                 },
8567                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8568         }
8569 }
8570
8571 #[test]
8572 #[allow(deprecated)]
8573 fn test_secret_timeout() {
8574         // Simple test of payment secret storage time outs. After
8575         // `create_inbound_payment(_for_hash)_legacy` is removed, this test will be removed as well.
8576         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8577         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8578         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8579         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8580
8581         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8582
8583         let (payment_hash, payment_secret_1) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_legacy(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8584
8585         // We should fail to register the same payment hash twice, at least until we've connected a
8586         // block with time 7200 + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1.
8587         if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8588                 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8589         } else { panic!(); }
8590         let mut block = {
8591                 let node_1_blocks = nodes[1].blocks.lock().unwrap();
8592                 Block {
8593                         header: BlockHeader {
8594                                 version: 0x2000000,
8595                                 prev_blockhash: node_1_blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(),
8596                                 merkle_root: Default::default(),
8597                                 time: node_1_blocks.len() as u32 + 7200, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8598                         txdata: vec![],
8599                 }
8600         };
8601         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8602         if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8603                 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8604         } else { panic!(); }
8605
8606         // If we then connect the second block, we should be able to register the same payment hash
8607         // again (this time getting a new payment secret).
8608         block.header.prev_blockhash = block.header.block_hash();
8609         block.header.time += 1;
8610         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8611         let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8612         assert_ne!(payment_secret_1, our_payment_secret);
8613
8614         {
8615                 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8616                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8617                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8618                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8619                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8620                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8621                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8622         }
8623         // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8624         // values from previous calls.
8625         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8626         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8627         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8628         match events[0] {
8629                 Event::PaymentReceived { purpose: PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret }, .. } => {
8630                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
8631                         assert_eq!(payment_secret, our_payment_secret);
8632                         // We don't actually have the payment preimage with which to claim this payment!
8633                 },
8634                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8635         }
8636 }
8637
8638 #[test]
8639 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8640         // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8641         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8642         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8643         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8644         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8645
8646         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8647
8648         let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8649         let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8650         let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8651         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8652
8653         // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8654         // resulting events.
8655         macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8656                 () => {
8657                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8658                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8659                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8660                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8661                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8662
8663                         // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8664                         // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8665                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8666                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8667                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8668
8669                         // We should fail the payment back
8670                         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8671                         match events.pop().unwrap() {
8672                                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8673                                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8674                                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8675                                 },
8676                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8677                         }
8678                 }
8679         }
8680
8681         let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8682         // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8683         let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8684
8685         // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8686         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8687         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8688         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8689
8690         // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8691         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8692         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8693         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8694
8695         // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8696         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8697         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8698         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8699 }
8700
8701 #[test]
8702 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8703         // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8704         // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8705         // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateErr.
8706         //
8707         // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8708         // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8709         // commitment at same time.
8710
8711         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8712         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8713         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8714         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8715
8716         // Create some initial channel
8717         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8718         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8719
8720         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8721         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8722
8723         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8724         let preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8725
8726         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8727         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8728         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8729         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8730         let watchtower = {
8731                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8732                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8733                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8734                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8735                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8736                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8737                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8738                 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8739                 watchtower
8740         };
8741         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8742         // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8743         // transaction lock time requirements here.
8744         chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (header, 0));
8745         watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 200);
8746
8747         // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8748         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage));
8749         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8750         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8751         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8752         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8753         if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8754                 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8755                         if let Err(_) =  watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8756                         if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8757                 } else { assert!(false); }
8758         } else { assert!(false); };
8759         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8760         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8761         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8762         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8763 }
8764
8765 #[test]
8766 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8767         // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8768         // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8769         // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8770         // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8771
8772         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8773         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8774         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8775         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8776
8777         // Create some initial channel
8778         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8779         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8780
8781         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8782         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8783
8784         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8785         route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8786
8787         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8788         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8789         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8790         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8791         let watchtower_alice = {
8792                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8793                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8794                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8795                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8796                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8797                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8798                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8799                 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8800                 watchtower
8801         };
8802         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8803         // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8804         // transaction lock time requirements here.
8805         chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as usize, (header, 0));
8806         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8807
8808         // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8809         {
8810                 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8811                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8812                 txn.clear();
8813         }
8814
8815         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8816         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8817         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8818         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8819         let watchtower_bob = {
8820                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8821                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8822                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8823                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8824                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8825                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8826                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8827                 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8828                 watchtower
8829         };
8830         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8831         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8832
8833         // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8834         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8835         {
8836                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8837         }
8838         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8839
8840         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8841         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8842         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8843         if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8844                 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8845                         // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8846                         if let Err(_) =  watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8847                         if let Ok(_) = watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8848                         if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8849                 } else { assert!(false); }
8850         } else { assert!(false); };
8851         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8852         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8853
8854         //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8855         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8856         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8857
8858         // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8859         let bob_state_y;
8860         {
8861                 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8862                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8863                 bob_state_y = txn[0].clone();
8864                 txn.clear();
8865         };
8866
8867         // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8868         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8869         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![bob_state_y.clone()] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8870         {
8871                 let htlc_txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8872                 // We broadcast twice the transaction, once due to the HTLC-timeout, once due
8873                 // the onchain detection of the HTLC output
8874                 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
8875                 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8876                 check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], bob_state_y);
8877         }
8878 }
8879
8880 #[test]
8881 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8882         // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8883         // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8884         // message).
8885         //
8886         // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8887         // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8888         //
8889         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8890         // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8891         // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8892         // before receiving funding_signed.
8893         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8894         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8895         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8896         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8897
8898         // Create an initial channel
8899         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8900         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8901         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8902         let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8903         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_chan_msg);
8904
8905         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8906         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
8907
8908         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
8909         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8910
8911         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8912         let channel_id = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
8913         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8914         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8915         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Hi".to_string() }, true);
8916 }
8917
8918 #[test]
8919 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8920         // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8921         // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8922         // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8923         // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
8924         // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
8925         // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
8926
8927         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8928         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8929         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8930         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8931
8932         // Create some initial channels
8933         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8934
8935         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
8936         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
8937         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
8938         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8939         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
8940         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
8941
8942         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8943         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8944         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] });
8945         // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
8946         // this test before #653 fix.
8947         chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
8948         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8949         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8950         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8951         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
8952
8953         let htlc_timeout = {
8954                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8955                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
8956                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8957                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
8958                 node_txn[1].clone()
8959         };
8960
8961         let header_201 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8962         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_201, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout.clone()] });
8963         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8964         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8965 }
8966
8967 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
8968         // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
8969         // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
8970         // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
8971         //
8972         // Steps of the test:
8973         // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
8974         // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
8975         // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
8976         // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
8977         // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
8978         //    but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
8979         // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
8980         // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
8981         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8982         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8983         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8984         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8985
8986         // Create some initial channels
8987         let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8988         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8989
8990         // Steps (1) and (2):
8991         // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
8992         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3_000_000);
8993
8994         // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
8995         let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
8996         check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8997         assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
8998         check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
8999         assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9000         assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
9001
9002         // Steps (3) and (4):
9003         // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
9004         // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
9005         let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
9006         if !broadcast_alice { force_closing_node = 1; } // Bob force-closes
9007         nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_channel(&chan_ab.2).unwrap();
9008         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
9009         check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
9010         check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9011         if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9012                 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
9013                         true => alice_txn.clone(),
9014                         false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
9015                 };
9016                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
9017                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
9018                 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
9019                 if broadcast_alice {
9020                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9021                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9022                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
9023                 }
9024                 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
9025                 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
9026         }
9027
9028         // Step (5):
9029         // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
9030         // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
9031         assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
9032         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9033         let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9034         assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9035         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9036         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9037         assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
9038         assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
9039
9040         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9041         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false);
9042         // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
9043         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
9044                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9045                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9046                 match events[0] {
9047                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
9048                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9049                         },
9050                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9051                 };
9052         }
9053         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
9054         // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
9055         // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
9056         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9057
9058         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9059         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9060         let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
9061                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
9062                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9063                         (*msg).clone()
9064                 },
9065                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9066         };
9067         let bob_updates = match events[1] {
9068                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
9069                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9070                         (*updates).clone()
9071                 },
9072                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9073         };
9074
9075         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
9076         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9077         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
9078         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9079
9080         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9081         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9082         let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
9083                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
9084                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9085                         (*msg).clone()
9086                 },
9087                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9088         };
9089         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
9090         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9091
9092         // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
9093         // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
9094         let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
9095         if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
9096         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9097                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
9098                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
9099                 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
9100                 if broadcast_alice {
9101                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9102                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9103                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
9104                 }
9105                 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9106                 if broadcast_alice {
9107                         // In `connect_block()`, the ChainMonitor and ChannelManager are separately notified about a
9108                         // new block being connected. The ChannelManager being notified triggers a monitor update,
9109                         // which triggers broadcasting our commitment tx and an HTLC-claiming tx. The ChainMonitor
9110                         // being notified triggers the HTLC-claiming tx redundantly, resulting in 3 total txs being
9111                         // broadcasted.
9112                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 3);
9113                         check_spends!(bob_txn[1], chan_ab.3);
9114                 } else {
9115                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
9116                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
9117                 }
9118         }
9119
9120         // Step (6):
9121         // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
9122         // broadcasted commitment transaction.
9123         {
9124                 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
9125                 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9126                         // Bob should now have an extra broadcasted tx, for the preimage-claiming transaction.
9127                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
9128                 }
9129                 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
9130                         true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
9131                         false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
9132                 };
9133                 // If Alice force-closed and Bob didn't receive her commitment transaction until after he
9134                 // received Carol's fulfill, he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction first. Else if
9135                 // Bob force closed or if he found out about Alice's commitment tx before receiving Carol's
9136                 // fulfill, then he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction second.
9137                 if broadcast_alice && !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9138                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
9139                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
9140                 } else {
9141                         check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
9142                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
9143                 }
9144         }
9145 }
9146
9147 #[test]
9148 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
9149         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
9150         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
9151         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
9152         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
9153 }
9154
9155 #[test]
9156 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
9157         // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
9158         // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
9159         //
9160         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
9161         // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
9162         // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
9163         // updating logic for the existing channel.
9164         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9165         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9166         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9167         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9168
9169         // Create an initial channel
9170         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
9171         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9172         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
9173         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9174
9175         // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
9176         // that it is rejected.
9177         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
9178         {
9179                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9180                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9181                 match events[0] {
9182                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9183                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
9184                                 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
9185                                 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
9186                                 // move forward with it.
9187                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9188                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9189                         },
9190                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9191                 }
9192         }
9193
9194         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
9195         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
9196
9197         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
9198         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9199
9200         let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9201         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9202         {
9203                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9204                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
9205                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
9206                 added_monitors.clear();
9207         }
9208         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9209
9210         let funding_outpoint = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
9211         let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
9212
9213         // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
9214         // temporary one).
9215
9216         // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
9217         // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
9218         // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
9219         open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
9220         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
9221         {
9222                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9223                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9224                 match events[0] {
9225                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9226                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
9227                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
9228                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9229                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9230                         },
9231                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9232                 }
9233         }
9234
9235         // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
9236         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
9237         let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9238         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_2_msg);
9239         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9240         create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
9241
9242         let funding_created = {
9243                 let mut a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
9244                 let mut as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get_mut(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
9245                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9246                 as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
9247         };
9248         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9249         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
9250         // At this point we'll try to add a duplicate channel monitor, which will be rejected, but
9251         // still needs to be cleared here.
9252         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9253
9254         // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
9255         {
9256                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9257                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9258                 match events[0] {
9259                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9260                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
9261                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
9262                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
9263                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9264                         },
9265                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9266                 }
9267         }
9268
9269         // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
9270         // everything is functional.
9271         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
9272         {
9273                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9274                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
9275                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
9276                 added_monitors.clear();
9277         }
9278
9279         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9280         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
9281         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9282         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
9283
9284         let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9285         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
9286         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9287         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
9288 }
9289
9290 #[test]
9291 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
9292         // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
9293         //
9294         // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
9295         // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
9296         // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
9297         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9298         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9299         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9300         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9301
9302         // Create some initial channels
9303         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9304         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9305         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9306
9307         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9308         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9309         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9310
9311         // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
9312         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9313         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9314
9315         // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
9316         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9317         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9318         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
9319         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
9320         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
9321         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9322         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
9323         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9324
9325         // A null channel ID should close all channels
9326         let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9327         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9328         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9329         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
9330         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9331         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9332         match events[0] {
9333                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9334                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9335                 },
9336                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9337         }
9338         match events[1] {
9339                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9340                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9341                 },
9342                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9343         }
9344         // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
9345         // peer_disconnected with no_connection_possible set to false, duplicating the
9346         // close-all-channels logic. That's OK, we don't want to end up not force-closing channels for
9347         // users with their own peer handling logic. We duplicate the call here, however.
9348         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9349         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9350
9351         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
9352         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9353         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9354 }
9355
9356 #[test]
9357 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
9358         // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
9359         //
9360         // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
9361         // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
9362         // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
9363         // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
9364         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9365         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9366         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9367         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9368
9369         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9370         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9371         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9372
9373         let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100_000, 42);
9374         for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
9375                 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
9376                 output.script_pubkey = bitcoin::Script::new();
9377         }
9378
9379         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
9380         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9381         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9382
9383         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9384         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9385
9386         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9387         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
9388
9389         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9390         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9391         nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
9392
9393         let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
9394         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
9395         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
9396         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9397         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9398         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
9399         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
9400                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9401                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
9402                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
9403                 } else { panic!(); }
9404         } else { panic!(); }
9405         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
9406 }
9407
9408 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
9409         // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
9410         // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
9411         // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
9412         // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
9413         // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
9414         // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
9415         // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
9416         // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
9417         // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
9418         // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
9419         // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
9420         // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
9421         // until we learned about an additional block.
9422         //
9423         // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
9424         // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
9425         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9426         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9427         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9428         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9429         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
9430
9431         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9432         let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9433         let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
9434         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9435         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9436
9437         nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&channel_id).unwrap();
9438         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9439         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9440         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9441         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9442         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
9443
9444         let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
9445         if !test_height_before_timelock {
9446                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
9447         }
9448         nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9449                 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
9450         if test_height_before_timelock {
9451                 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
9452                 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
9453                 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
9454                 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9455         } else {
9456                 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
9457                 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9458                 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
9459                 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
9460                 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
9461                 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
9462                 // timelock is up).
9463                 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
9464                 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
9465
9466                 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
9467                 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
9468                 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
9469                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9470                         &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
9471                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9472                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9473
9474                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9475                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9476                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9477                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9478                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9479                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9480                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9481                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9482                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
9483         }
9484 }
9485
9486 #[test]
9487 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
9488         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
9489         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
9490 }
9491
9492 #[test]
9493 fn test_forwardable_regen() {
9494         // Tests that if we reload a ChannelManager while forwards are pending we will regenerate the
9495         // PendingHTLCsForwardable event automatically, ensuring we don't forget to forward/receive
9496         // HTLCs.
9497         // We test it for both payment receipt and payment forwarding.
9498
9499         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9500         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9501         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9502         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
9503         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
9504         let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
9505         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9506         let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9507         let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9508
9509         // First send a payment to nodes[1]
9510         let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
9511         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9512         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9513
9514         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9515         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9516         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9517         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9518         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9519
9520         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9521
9522         // Next send a payment which is forwarded by nodes[1]
9523         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 200_000);
9524         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
9525         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9526
9527         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9528         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9529         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9530         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9531         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9532
9533         // There is already a PendingHTLCsForwardable event "pending" so another one will not be
9534         // generated
9535         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9536
9537         // Now restart nodes[1] and make sure it regenerates a single PendingHTLCsForwardable
9538         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9539         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9540
9541         let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
9542         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9543         let mut chan_1_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9544         get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_1).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9545         get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_2).write(&mut chan_1_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9546
9547         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
9548         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
9549         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
9550         nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
9551
9552         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9553         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9554                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9555         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
9556         let mut chan_1_monitor_read = &chan_1_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9557         let (_, mut chan_1_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9558                 &mut chan_1_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9559         assert!(chan_1_monitor_read.is_empty());
9560
9561         let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
9562         let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
9563                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
9564                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
9565                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_1_monitor);
9566                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
9567                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
9568                         keys_manager,
9569                         fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
9570                         chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
9571                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
9572                         logger: nodes[1].logger,
9573                         channel_monitors,
9574                 }).unwrap()
9575         };
9576         nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
9577         assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
9578
9579         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
9580         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_1_monitor).is_ok());
9581         nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
9582         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9583
9584         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9585         // Note that nodes[1] and nodes[2] resend their funding_locked here since they haven't updated
9586         // the commitment state.
9587         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9588
9589         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9590
9591         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9592         expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 100_000);
9593         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9594
9595         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9596         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9597         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9598         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9599         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9600         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9601         expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 200_000);
9602
9603         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
9604         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage_2);
9605 }
9606
9607 #[test]
9608 fn test_dup_htlc_second_fail_panic() {
9609         // Previously, if we received two HTLCs back-to-back, where the second overran the expected
9610         // value for the payment, we'd fail back both HTLCs after generating a `PaymentReceived` event.
9611         // Then, if the user failed the second payment, they'd hit a "tried to fail an already failed
9612         // HTLC" debug panic. This tests for this behavior, checking that only one HTLC is auto-failed.
9613         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9614         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9615         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9616         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9617
9618         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9619
9620         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
9621                 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
9622         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
9623         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9624         let route = get_route(
9625                 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(),
9626                 Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9627                 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
9628
9629         let (_, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
9630
9631         {
9632                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
9633                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9634                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9635                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9636                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9637                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9638                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9639         }
9640         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9641         expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 10_000);
9642
9643         {
9644                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
9645                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9646                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9647                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9648                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9649                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9650                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9651                 // At this point, nodes[1] would notice it has too much value for the payment. It will
9652                 // assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9653                 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC. Previously, it'd also have failed back
9654                 // the first HTLC delivered above.
9655         }
9656
9657         // Now we go fail back the first HTLC from the user end.
9658         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9659         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9660         nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
9661
9662         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9663         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9664
9665         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9666         let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9667         assert_eq!(fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 2);
9668
9669         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9670         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
9671         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9672
9673         let failure_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9674         assert_eq!(failure_events.len(), 2);
9675         if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
9676         if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[1] {} else { panic!(); }
9677 }
9678
9679 #[test]
9680 fn test_keysend_payments_to_public_node() {
9681         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9682         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9683         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9684         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9685
9686         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9687         let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9688         let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9689         let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9690         let route_params = RouteParameters {
9691                 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9692                 final_value_msat: 10000,
9693                 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9694         };
9695         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
9696         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9697         let route = find_route(&payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
9698
9699         let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9700         let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9701         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9702         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9703         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9704         let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9705         let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9706         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9707         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9708 }
9709
9710 #[test]
9711 fn test_keysend_payments_to_private_node() {
9712         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9713         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9714         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9715         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9716
9717         let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9718         let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9719         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
9720         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
9721
9722         let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9723         let route_params = RouteParameters {
9724                 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9725                 final_value_msat: 10000,
9726                 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9727         };
9728         let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9729         let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9730         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
9731         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9732         let route = find_route(
9733                 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9734                 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
9735         ).unwrap();
9736
9737         let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9738         let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9739         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9740         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9741         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9742         let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9743         let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9744         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9745         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9746 }
9747
9748 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
9749 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
9750 enum ExposureEvent {
9751         /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
9752         AtHTLCForward,
9753         /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
9754         AtHTLCReception,
9755         /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
9756         AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
9757 }
9758
9759 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool) {
9760         // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
9761         // policy.
9762         //
9763         // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
9764         // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
9765         // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
9766         // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
9767         // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
9768         // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
9769         // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
9770         // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
9771
9772         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9773         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
9774         config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = 5_000_000; // default setting value
9775         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9776         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
9777         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9778
9779         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9780         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9781         open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
9782         open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
9783         if on_holder_tx {
9784                 open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9785         }
9786         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
9787         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9788         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
9789
9790         let opt_anchors = false;
9791
9792         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 1_000_000, 42);
9793
9794         if on_holder_tx {
9795                 if let Some(mut chan) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&temporary_channel_id) {
9796                         chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9797                 }
9798         }
9799
9800         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
9801         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9802         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9803
9804         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9805         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9806
9807         let (funding_locked, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9808         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
9809         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9810
9811         let dust_buffer_feerate = {
9812                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
9813                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
9814                 chan.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64
9815         };
9816         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9817         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9818
9819         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9820         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9821
9822         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 25;
9823         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
9824
9825         if on_holder_tx {
9826                 if dust_outbound_balance {
9827                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9828                         // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9829                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
9830                         for i in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9831                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9832                                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9833                         }
9834                 } else {
9835                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9836                         // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9837                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
9838                         for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9839                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9840                         }
9841                 }
9842         } else {
9843                 if dust_outbound_balance {
9844                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9845                         // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9846                         for i in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9847                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9848                                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9849                         }
9850                 } else {
9851                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9852                         // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9853                         for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9854                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9855                         }
9856                 }
9857         }
9858
9859         let dust_overflow = dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx + 1);
9860         if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
9861                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9862                 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9863                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9864                 if on_holder_tx {
9865                         let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9866                         let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9867                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9868                 } else {
9869                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9870                 }
9871         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
9872                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9873                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9874                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9875                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9876                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9877                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
9878                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9879                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9880                 if on_holder_tx {
9881                         // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
9882                         let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9883                         let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9884                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9885                 } else {
9886                         // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
9887                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9888                 }
9889         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
9890                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 2_500_000);
9891                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at update_fee-swallowed HTLC", ); }
9892                 {
9893                         let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9894                         *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
9895                 }
9896                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9897                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9898                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure".to_string(), 1);
9899         }
9900
9901         let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9902         let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9903         added_monitors.clear();
9904 }
9905
9906 #[test]
9907 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
9908         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9909         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9910         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9911         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9912         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9913         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9914         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9915         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9916         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9917         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9918         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9919         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9920 }