_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
  11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
  12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
  13
  14 use crate::chain;
  15 use crate::chain::{ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Confirm, Listen, Watch};
  16 use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
  17 use crate::chain::channelmonitor;
  18 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
  19 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  20 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, EcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource};
  21 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PathFailure, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
  22 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
  23 use crate::ln::channel::{commitment_tx_base_weight, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel};
  24 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS, DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA};
  25 use crate::ln::channel::{DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS, ChannelError};
  26 use crate::ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
  27 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
  28 use crate::routing::gossip::{NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate};
  29 use crate::routing::router::{Path, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, get_route};
  30 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, NodeFeatures};
  31 use crate::ln::msgs;
  32 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
  33 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
  34 use crate::util::test_utils;
  35 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
  36 use crate::util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
  37 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
  38 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
  39
  40 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
  41 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
  42 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  43 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
  44 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
  45 use bitcoin::{PackedLockTime, Sequence, Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, Witness};
  46 use bitcoin::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
  47
  48 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
  49 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
  50
  51 use regex;
  52
  53 use crate::io;
  54 use crate::prelude::*;
  55 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
  56 use core::default::Default;
  57 use core::iter::repeat;
  58 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
  59 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
  60
  61 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
  62 use crate::ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
  63
  64 use super::channel::UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS;
  65
  66 #[test]
  67 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
  68         // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
  69         use crate::ln::channel::TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS;
  70         let mut cfg = UserConfig::default();
  71         cfg.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1;
  72         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
  73         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
  74         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(cfg)]);
  75         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
  76
  77         // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
  78         // funding satoshis
  79         let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
  80         let channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat, &cfg);
  81         let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
  82
  83         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
  84         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
  85
  86         // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
  87         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
  88
  89         // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
  90         // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
  91         let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
  92                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
  93                 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
  94                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
  95                 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
  96                 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
  97                         match action {
  98                                 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
  99                                         nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager", expected_regex, 1);
 100                                 },
 101                                 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
 102                         }
 103                 } else { assert!(false); }
 104         };
 105
 106         use crate::ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
 107
 108         // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
 109         insane_open_helper(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2; msg });
 110         insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS; msg });
 111
 112         insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
 113
 114         insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than channel amount minus reserve \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
 115
 116         insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
 117
 118         insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
 119
 120         insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
 121
 122         insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
 123
 124         insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
 125 }
 126
 127 #[test]
 128 fn test_funding_exceeds_no_wumbo_limit() {
 129         // Test that if a peer does not support wumbo channels, we'll refuse to open a wumbo channel to
 130         // them.
 131         use crate::ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO;
 132         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 133         let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 134         *node_cfgs[1].override_init_features.borrow_mut() = Some(channelmanager::provided_init_features(&test_default_channel_config()).clear_wumbo());
 135         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 136         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 137
 138         match nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1, 0, 42, None) {
 139                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
 140                         assert_eq!(format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1), err);
 141                 },
 142                 _ => panic!()
 143         }
 144 }
 145
 146 fn do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(send_from_initiator: bool) {
 147         // A peer providing a channel_reserve_satoshis of 0 (or less than our dust limit) is insecure,
 148         // but only for them. Because some LSPs do it with some level of trust of the clients (for a
 149         // substantial UX improvement), we explicitly allow it. Because it's unlikely to happen often
 150         // in normal testing, we test it explicitly here.
 151         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 152         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 153         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 154         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 155         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
 156
 157         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
 158         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
 159         let feerate_per_kw = 253;
 160         let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
 161         push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
 162         push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
 163
 164         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None).unwrap();
 165         let mut open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 166         if !send_from_initiator {
 167                 open_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 168                 open_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 169         }
 170         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
 171
 172         // Extract the channel accept message from node1 to node0
 173         let mut accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 174         if send_from_initiator {
 175                 accept_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 176                 accept_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 177         }
 178         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
 179         {
 180                 let sender_node = if send_from_initiator { &nodes[1] } else { &nodes[0] };
 181                 let counterparty_node = if send_from_initiator { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
 182                 let mut sender_node_per_peer_lock;
 183                 let mut sender_node_peer_state_lock;
 184                 if send_from_initiator {
 185                         let chan = get_inbound_v1_channel_ref!(sender_node, counterparty_node, sender_node_per_peer_lock, sender_node_peer_state_lock, temp_channel_id);
 186                         chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 187                         chan.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 188                 } else {
 189                         let chan = get_outbound_v1_channel_ref!(sender_node, counterparty_node, sender_node_per_peer_lock, sender_node_peer_state_lock, temp_channel_id);
 190                         chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 191                         chan.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 192                 }
 193         }
 194
 195         let funding_tx = sign_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100_000, temp_channel_id);
 196         let funding_msgs = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_tx);
 197         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_msgs.0);
 198
 199         // nodes[0] should now be able to send the full balance to nodes[1], violating nodes[1]'s
 200         // security model if it ever tries to send funds back to nodes[0] (but that's not our problem).
 201         if send_from_initiator {
 202                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000_000
 203                         // Note that for outbound channels we have to consider the commitment tx fee and the
 204                         // "fee spike buffer", which is currently a multiple of the total commitment tx fee as
 205                         // well as an additional HTLC.
 206                         - FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, 2, &channel_type_features));
 207         } else {
 208                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], push_amt);
 209         }
 210 }
 211
 212 #[test]
 213 fn test_counterparty_no_reserve() {
 214         do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(true);
 215         do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(false);
 216 }
 217
 218 #[test]
 219 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
 220         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 221         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 222         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 223         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 224         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 225
 226         // balancing
 227         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 228
 229         // A                                        B
 230         // update_fee                            ->
 231         // send (1) commitment_signed            -.
 232         //                                       <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
 233         // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
 234         // (1) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 235         //                                       .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
 236         // (2) RAA is delivered                  ->
 237         //                                       .- send (4) commitment_signed
 238         //                                       <- (3) RAA is delivered
 239         // send (5) commitment_signed            -.
 240         //                                       <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
 241         // send (6) RAA                          -.
 242         // (5) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 243         //                                       <- RAA
 244         // (6) RAA is delivered                  ->
 245
 246         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 247         {
 248                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 249                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 250         }
 251         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 252         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 253
 254         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 255         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 256         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 257                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 258                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 259                 },
 260                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 261         };
 262
 263         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 264
 265         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 266         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 267         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
 268                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
 269         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 270
 271         let payment_event = {
 272                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 273                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 274                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 275         };
 276         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 277         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 278
 279         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 280         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 281         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 282         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 283         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 284         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 285
 286         // deliver(1), generate (3):
 287         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 288         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 289         // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 290         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 291
 292         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
 293         let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 294         assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 295         assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 296         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 297         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 298         assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
 299         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 300
 301         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
 302         let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 303         assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 304         assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 305         assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 306         assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 307         assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
 308         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 309
 310         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
 311         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 312         // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 313         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 314
 315         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
 316         let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 317         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 318
 319         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 320         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 321
 322         let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 323         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
 324         match events_2[0] {
 325                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
 326                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 327         }
 328
 329         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
 330         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 331 }
 332
 333 #[test]
 334 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
 335         // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
 336         // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
 337         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 338         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 339         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 340         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 341         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 342
 343         // balancing
 344         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 345
 346         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 347         {
 348                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 349                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 350         }
 351         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 352         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 353
 354         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 355         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 356         let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 357                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
 358                         update_fee.as_ref()
 359                 },
 360                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 361         };
 362
 363         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 364
 365         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 366         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 367         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
 368                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
 369         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 370
 371         let payment_event = {
 372                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 373                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 374                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 375         };
 376         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 377         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 378
 379         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 380         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 381         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 382         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 383         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 384         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 385
 386         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
 387         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 388
 389         // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
 390 }
 391
 392 #[test]
 393 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
 394         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 395         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 396         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 397         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 398         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 399
 400         // A                                        B
 401         // update_fee/commitment_signed          ->
 402         //                                       .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
 403         // update_fee (never committed)          ->
 404         // (3) update_fee                        ->
 405         // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
 406         // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
 407         // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
 408         //                                       <- (1) RAA delivered
 409         // (3) is generated and send (4) CS      -.
 410         // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
 411         // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
 412         //                                       <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
 413         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 414         //                                          B should send no response here
 415         // (4) commitment_signed delivered       ->
 416         //                                       <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
 417         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 418
 419         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 420         let initial_feerate;
 421         {
 422                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 423                 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
 424                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
 425         }
 426         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 427         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 428
 429         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 430         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 431         let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 432                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 433                         (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
 434                 },
 435                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 436         };
 437
 438         // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
 439         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
 440         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
 441         let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 442         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 443
 444         // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
 445         // transaction:
 446         {
 447                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 448                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
 449         }
 450         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 451         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 452         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 453
 454         // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
 455         let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
 456                 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
 457                 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
 458         };
 459
 460         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 461
 462         update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
 463         // Deliver (3)
 464         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 465
 466         // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
 467         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
 468         let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 469         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 470         assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 471         assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 472         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 473         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 474         // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
 475         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
 476         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
 477
 478         // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
 479         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
 480         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 481         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 482         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 483
 484         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
 485         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 486         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 487
 488         // Delever (4)
 489         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
 490         let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 491         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 492
 493         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 494         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 495         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 496
 497         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
 498         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 499         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 500         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 501
 502         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
 503         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 504         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 505 }
 506
 507 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
 508         // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
 509         // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
 510         // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
 511         // Node objects.
 512
 513         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 514         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 515         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 516         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 517
 518         if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
 519                 let block = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, Vec::new());
 520                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
 521                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
 522         }
 523
 524         if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
 525         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
 526         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 527
 528         if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
 529         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
 530         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 531
 532         if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
 533         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
 534
 535         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
 536
 537         if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
 538         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
 539         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 540         let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 541
 542         if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
 543         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
 544         {
 545                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 546                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 547                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 548                 added_monitors.clear();
 549         }
 550         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 551
 552         let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 553
 554         if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
 555         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
 556         {
 557                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 558                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 559                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 560                 added_monitors.clear();
 561         }
 562
 563         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 564         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 565         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
 566
 567         if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
 568         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
 569
 570         if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
 571         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
 572         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
 573         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
 574         expect_channel_ready_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 575 }
 576
 577 #[test]
 578 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
 579         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
 580         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
 581         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
 582         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
 583         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
 584         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
 585         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
 586         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
 587         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
 588         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
 589         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
 590         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
 591         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
 592         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
 593         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
 594         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
 595         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
 596         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
 597 }
 598
 599 #[test]
 600 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
 601         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 602         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 603         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 604         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 605         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 606
 607         {
 608                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 609                 *feerate_lock += 25;
 610         }
 611         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 612         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 613
 614         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 615         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 616         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 617                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 618                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 619                 },
 620                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 621         };
 622         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 623
 624         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 625         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 626         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 627
 628         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 629         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 630         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 631
 632         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 633         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 634         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 635         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 636
 637         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 638         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 639         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 640 }
 641
 642 #[test]
 643 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
 644         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 645         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 646         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 647         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 648         let channel_value = 5000;
 649         let push_sats = 700;
 650         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000);
 651         let channel_id = chan.2;
 652         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 653         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
 654         let bs_channel_reserve_sats = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value, &default_config);
 655
 656         let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
 657
 658         // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
 659         // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
 660         // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
 661         // remote limit.
 662         let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
 663         let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features)) as u32;
 664         {
 665                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 666                 *feerate_lock = feerate;
 667         }
 668         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 669         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 670         let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 671
 672         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
 673
 674         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
 675
 676         // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
 677         {
 678                 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
 679
 680                 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
 681                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
 682                 let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0, &channel_type_features) / 1000;
 683                 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
 684                 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
 685                 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
 686         }
 687
 688         {
 689                 // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
 690                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 691                 *feerate_lock += 4;
 692         }
 693         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 694         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
 695         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 696
 697         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
 698
 699         // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
 700         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
 701         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
 702                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
 703                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
 704                 let local_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 705                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 706                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
 707                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 708                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 709         };
 710         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
 711                 let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
 712                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
 713                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 714                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
 715                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
 716                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 717                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
 718                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 719         };
 720
 721         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
 722         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
 723                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint);
 724
 725         let res = {
 726                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
 727                 let local_chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
 728                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 729                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 730                 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
 731                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
 732                         INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
 733                         push_sats,
 734                         channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0, &channel_type_features) / 1000,
 735                         local_funding, remote_funding,
 736                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
 737                         non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 738                         &mut htlcs,
 739                         &local_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
 740                 );
 741                 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
 742         };
 743
 744         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
 745                 channel_id: chan.2,
 746                 signature: res.0,
 747                 htlc_signatures: res.1,
 748                 #[cfg(taproot)]
 749                 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
 750         };
 751
 752         let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
 753                 channel_id: chan.2,
 754                 feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 755         };
 756
 757         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
 758
 759         //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
 760         //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
 761         //Should produce and error.
 762         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
 763         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
 764         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 765         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 766         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") },
 767                 [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], channel_value);
 768 }
 769
 770 #[test]
 771 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
 772         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 773         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 774         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 775         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 776         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 777
 778         // balancing
 779         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 780
 781         {
 782                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 783                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 784         }
 785         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 786         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 787
 788         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 789         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 790         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 791                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 792                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 793                 },
 794                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 795         };
 796         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 797         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 798         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 799         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 800
 801         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
 802
 803         // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
 804         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
 805                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
 806         {
 807                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 808                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
 809                 added_monitors.clear();
 810         }
 811         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 812         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 813         // node[1] has nothing to do
 814
 815         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 816         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 817         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 818
 819         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 820         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 821         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 822         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 823         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 824         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 825         // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
 826
 827         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 828         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
 829         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
 830         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
 831         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
 832         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
 833
 834         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
 835         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 836         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 837         let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 838
 839         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 840         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 841         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 842
 843         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 844         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 845         let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 846         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 847
 848         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 849         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 850         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 851
 852         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
 853
 854         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 855         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
 856         match events[0] {
 857                 Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } => { },
 858                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 859         };
 860
 861         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
 862
 863         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
 864         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
 865         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 866         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
 867         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
 868 }
 869
 870 #[test]
 871 fn test_update_fee() {
 872         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 873         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 874         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 875         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 876         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 877         let channel_id = chan.2;
 878
 879         // A                                        B
 880         // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 881         //                                       <- (2) revoke_and_ack
 882         //                                       .- send (3) commitment_signed
 883         // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 884         //                                       .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
 885         //                                       <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
 886         // send (6) revoke_and_ack               -.
 887         //                                       <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
 888         // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack            ->
 889         //                                       .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
 890         //                                       <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
 891         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 892
 893         // Create and deliver (1)...
 894         let feerate;
 895         {
 896                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 897                 feerate = *feerate_lock;
 898                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
 899         }
 900         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 901         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 902
 903         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 904         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 905         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 906                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 907                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 908                 },
 909                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 910         };
 911         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 912
 913         // Generate (2) and (3):
 914         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 915         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 916         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 917
 918         // Deliver (2):
 919         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 920         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 921         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 922
 923         // Create and deliver (4)...
 924         {
 925                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 926                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
 927         }
 928         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 929         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 930         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 931         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 932         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 933                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 934                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 935                 },
 936                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 937         };
 938
 939         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 940         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 941         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 942         // ... creating (5)
 943         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 944         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 945
 946         // Handle (3), creating (6):
 947         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
 948         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 949         let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 950         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 951
 952         // Deliver (5):
 953         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 954         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 955         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 956
 957         // Deliver (6), creating (7):
 958         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
 959         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 960         assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 961         assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 962         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 963         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 964         assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
 965         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 966
 967         // Deliver (7)
 968         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 969         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 970         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 971         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 972
 973         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 974         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 975         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 976
 977         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
 978         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
 979         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 980         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
 981         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
 982 }
 983
 984 #[test]
 985 fn fake_network_test() {
 986         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
 987         // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
 988         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
 989         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
 990         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
 991         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 992
 993         // Create some initial channels
 994         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 995         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
 996         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
 997
 998         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
 999         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1000         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1001         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1002         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1003
1004         // Send some more payments
1005         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1006         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
1007         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
1008
1009         // Test failure packets
1010         let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
1011         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
1012
1013         // Add a new channel that skips 3
1014         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
1015
1016         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1017         send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1018         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1019         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1020         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1021         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1022         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1023
1024         // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
1025         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1026         hops.push(RouteHop {
1027                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1028                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1029                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1030                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1031                 fee_msat: 0,
1032                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1033         });
1034         hops.push(RouteHop {
1035                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1036                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1037                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1038                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1039                 fee_msat: 0,
1040                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1041         });
1042         hops.push(RouteHop {
1043                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1044                 node_features: nodes[1].node.node_features(),
1045                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1046                 channel_features: nodes[1].node.channel_features(),
1047                 fee_msat: 1000000,
1048                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1049         });
1050         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1051         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1052         let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![Path { hops, blinded_tail: None }], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
1053
1054         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1055         hops.push(RouteHop {
1056                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1057                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1058                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1059                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1060                 fee_msat: 0,
1061                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1062         });
1063         hops.push(RouteHop {
1064                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1065                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1066                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1067                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1068                 fee_msat: 0,
1069                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1070         });
1071         hops.push(RouteHop {
1072                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1073                 node_features: nodes[1].node.node_features(),
1074                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1075                 channel_features: nodes[1].node.channel_features(),
1076                 fee_msat: 1000000,
1077                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1078         });
1079         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1080         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1081         let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![Path { hops, blinded_tail: None }], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1082
1083         // Claim the rebalances...
1084         fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1085         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1086
1087         // Close down the channels...
1088         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1089         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1090         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1091         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1092         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1093         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1094         close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1095         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1096         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1097         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1098         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1099         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1100 }
1101
1102 #[test]
1103 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1104         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1105         // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1106         // commitment dance rounds.
1107         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1108         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1109         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1110         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1111         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
1112         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
1113
1114         // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
1115         let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1116
1117         let mut payments = Vec::new();
1118         for _ in 0..50 {
1119                 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1120                 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
1121                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
1122                 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1123         }
1124         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1125
1126         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1127         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1128         let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1129         assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1130
1131         // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1132         // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1133         // another HTLC.
1134         {
1135                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_1,
1136                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)
1137                         ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1138                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1139         }
1140
1141         // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1142         let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1143         {
1144                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_2,
1145                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
1146                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1147         }
1148
1149         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1150         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1151         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1152         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1153
1154         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1155         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1156         // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1157         // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1158         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1159         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
1160         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1161
1162         let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1163         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1164         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1165
1166         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1167
1168         // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1169         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1170         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1171         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1172
1173         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1174         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1175         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1176         let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1177
1178         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1179         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1180         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1181
1182         for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1183                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1184         }
1185         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1186         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1187         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1188         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1189         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1190
1191         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1192         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1193         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1194         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1195         let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1196
1197         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1198         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1199
1200         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1201
1202         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1203         assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1204         for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1205                 match event {
1206                         &Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1207                                 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1208                         },
1209                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1210                 };
1211         }
1212
1213         for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1214                 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1215         }
1216
1217         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1218 }
1219
1220 #[test]
1221 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1222         // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1223         // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1224         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1225         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1226         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1227         let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1228
1229         // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1230         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
1231         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
1232         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
1233         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
1234         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
1235
1236         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1237
1238         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1239         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1240
1241         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1242         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1243
1244         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1245         fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1246         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1247 }
1248
1249 #[test]
1250 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1251         // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1252         // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1253         // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1254         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1255         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1256         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1257         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1258
1259         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
1260
1261         // balancing
1262         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1263
1264         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1265
1266         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1267         let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
1268         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1269
1270         // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1271         nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1272         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, 800_000);
1273         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1274
1275         // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1276         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1277
1278         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1279         let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1280         for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1281                 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1282                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1283                 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1284                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1285                 }
1286         }
1287         assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1288
1289         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1290         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1291         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1292         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1293
1294         let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1295         assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 3);
1296
1297         check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]); // Immediate HTLC claim with preimage
1298         check_spends!(claim_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
1299         check_spends!(claim_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
1300         let preimage_tx = &claim_txn[0];
1301         let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if claim_txn[1].input[0].previous_output == preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output {
1302                 (&claim_txn[1], &claim_txn[2])
1303         } else {
1304                 (&claim_txn[2], &claim_txn[1])
1305         };
1306
1307         assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1308         assert_eq!(preimage_bump_tx.input.len(), 1);
1309
1310         assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1311         assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1312         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1313
1314         assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input.len(), 1);
1315         assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1316         check_spends!(timeout_tx, remote_txn[0]);
1317         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1318
1319         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1320         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1321         for e in events {
1322                 match e {
1323                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1324                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
1325                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1326                                 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1327                         },
1328                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1329                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1330                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1331                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1332                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1333                                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1334                         },
1335                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1336                 }
1337         }
1338 }
1339
1340 #[test]
1341 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1342         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1343         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1344         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1345         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1346         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1347
1348         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1349         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1350
1351         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1352         let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2), 1 + 1, &get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2));
1353         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1354         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
1355                 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
1356         route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1357         let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1358                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).err().unwrap();
1359         match err {
1360                 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedResendSafe(ref fails) => {
1361                         if let &APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. } = &fails[0] {}
1362                         else { panic!("Unexpected error variant"); }
1363                 },
1364                 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1365         }
1366         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1367
1368         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1369 }
1370
1371 #[test]
1372 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1373         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1374         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1375         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1376         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1377         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1378
1379         let (mut route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) =
1380                 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460000);
1381         route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat += 1;
1382         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1383         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1384         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1385
1386         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1387
1388         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1389         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0],
1390                 3460001, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1391         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash).unwrap();
1392         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1393                 channel_id: chan.2,
1394                 htlc_id: 0,
1395                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1396                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1397                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1398                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1399                 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
1400         };
1401
1402         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1403
1404         // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1405         // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1406         // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1407
1408         let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1409
1410         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1411
1412         // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1413         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1414         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1415                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1416                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1417                 let local_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1418                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1419                 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1420                 chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1421
1422                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1423                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1424                  chan_signer.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1425                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1426                  chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1427         };
1428         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1429                 let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1430                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1431                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1432                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1433                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1434                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1435                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1436                  chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1437         };
1438
1439         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1440         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1441                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint);
1442
1443         // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1444         // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1445         let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1446
1447         let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1448                 offered: false,
1449                 amount_msat: 3460001,
1450                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1451                 payment_hash,
1452                 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1453         };
1454
1455         let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1456
1457         let res = {
1458                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1459                 let local_chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1460                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1461                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1462                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1463                         commitment_number,
1464                         95000,
1465                         local_chan_balance,
1466                         local_funding, remote_funding,
1467                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1468                         feerate_per_kw,
1469                         &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1470                         &local_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1471                 );
1472                 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1473         };
1474
1475         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1476                 channel_id: chan.2,
1477                 signature: res.0,
1478                 htlc_signatures: res.1,
1479                 #[cfg(taproot)]
1480                 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
1481         };
1482
1483         // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1484         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1485         let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1486
1487         // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1488         let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1489                 channel_id: chan.2,
1490                 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1491                 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point,
1492                 #[cfg(taproot)]
1493                 next_local_nonce: None,
1494         };
1495         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1496
1497         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1498         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1499         // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1500         match events[0] {
1501                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1502                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1503                         update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1504                 },
1505                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1506         };
1507         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1508                 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", ::hex::encode(raa_msg.channel_id)), 1);
1509
1510         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1511 }
1512
1513 #[test]
1514 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1515         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1516         // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1517         // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1518         // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1519         // this situation.
1520         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1521         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1522         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1523         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1524         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1525         let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
1526
1527         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1528         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, &channel_type_features);
1529
1530         push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1531
1532         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt);
1533
1534         // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
1535         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1536         // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1537         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1538                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1539         }
1540
1541         // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1542         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1543                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1544                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1545         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1546 }
1547
1548 #[test]
1549 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1550         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1551         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1552         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1553         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1554         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1555         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1556         let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
1557
1558         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1559         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1560         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1561         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1562         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, &channel_type_features);
1563         push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1564         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt);
1565
1566         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1567         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1568                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1569         }
1570
1571         let (mut route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) =
1572                 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1000);
1573         route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = 700_000;
1574         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1575         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1576         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1577         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1578         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1579         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0],
1580                 700_000, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1581         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash).unwrap();
1582         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1583                 channel_id: chan.2,
1584                 htlc_id: MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64,
1585                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1586                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1587                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1588                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1589                 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
1590         };
1591
1592         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1593         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1594         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1595         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1596         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1597         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1598         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1599         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() },
1600                 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1601 }
1602
1603 #[test]
1604 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1605         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1606         // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1607         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1608         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1609
1610         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1611         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1612         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1613         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1614         let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
1615
1616         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1617         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1618         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1619         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1620         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, &channel_type_features);
1621         push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1622         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt);
1623
1624         let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1625                 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1626         // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1627         // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1628         // commitment transaction fee.
1629         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1630
1631         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1632         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1633                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1634         }
1635
1636         // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1637         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
1638                 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt);
1639         route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat += 1;
1640         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1641                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1642                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1643 }
1644
1645 #[test]
1646 fn test_chan_init_feerate_unaffordability() {
1647         // Test that we will reject channel opens which do not leave enough to pay for any HTLCs due to
1648         // channel reserve and feerate requirements.
1649         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1650         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1651         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1652         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1653         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1654         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1655         let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
1656
1657         // Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
1658         // HTLC.
1659         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1660         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, &channel_type_features);
1661         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None).unwrap_err(),
1662                 APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
1663
1664         // During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
1665         // requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
1666         push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1667         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None).unwrap();
1668         let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1669         open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
1670         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
1671
1672         let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1673         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
1674         match msg_events[0] {
1675                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
1676                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve");
1677                 },
1678                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1679         }
1680 }
1681
1682 #[test]
1683 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1684         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1685         // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1686         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1687         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1688         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1689         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1690         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000);
1691
1692         let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1693         // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1694         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1695         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1696         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1697         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1698
1699         // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1700         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1701         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1702         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1703         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1704         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1705
1706         // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1707         // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1708         // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1709         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1710 }
1711
1712 #[test]
1713 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1714         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1715         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1716         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1717         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1718         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1719         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000);
1720
1721         let feemsat = 239;
1722         let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1723         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1724         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1725         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1726
1727         // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1728         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, &channel_type_features);
1729         let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1730         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1731
1732         // Add a pending HTLC.
1733         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1734         let payment_event_1 = {
1735                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1,
1736                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_1), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
1737                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1738
1739                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1740                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1741                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1742         };
1743         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1744
1745         // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1746         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2, &channel_type_features);
1747         let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1748         let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1749         let mut route_2 = route_1.clone();
1750         route_2.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat = amt_msat_2;
1751
1752         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1753         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1754         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1755         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1756         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1757         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(
1758                 &route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1759         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1).unwrap();
1760         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1761                 channel_id: chan.2,
1762                 htlc_id: 1,
1763                 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1764                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1765                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1766                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1767                 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
1768         };
1769
1770         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1771         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1772         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1773         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1774         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1775         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1776         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1777         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() },
1778                 [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1779 }
1780
1781 #[test]
1782 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1783         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1784         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1785         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1786         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1787         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1788         let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1789         let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1790         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1791         assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1792         assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1793
1794         let reserve = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config);
1795         assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1796         assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1797
1798         assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1799         assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1800 }
1801
1802 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
1803         (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1804 }
1805
1806 #[test]
1807 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1808         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1809         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1810         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1811         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1812         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1813         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1814         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1815         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1816         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001);
1817         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001);
1818
1819         let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1820         let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1821
1822         let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1823         let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1824
1825         macro_rules! expect_forward {
1826                 ($node: expr) => {{
1827                         let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1828                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1829                         check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1830                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1831                         payment_event
1832                 }}
1833         }
1834
1835         let feemsat = 239; // set above
1836         let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1837         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1838         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1839
1840         let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1841
1842         // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1843         {
1844                 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
1845                         .with_bolt11_features(nodes[2].node.invoice_features()).unwrap().with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1846                 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], payment_params, recv_value_0);
1847                 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1848                 assert!(route.paths[0].hops.iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1849
1850                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1851                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1852                         ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1853                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1854         }
1855
1856         // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1857         // nodes[0]'s wealth
1858         loop {
1859                 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1860                 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1861                 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1862                 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1863                 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, &channel_type_features);
1864                 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1865                 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1866                         break;
1867                 }
1868
1869                 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
1870                         .with_bolt11_features(nodes[2].node.invoice_features()).unwrap().with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1871                 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, recv_value_0).unwrap();
1872                 let (payment_preimage, ..) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], recv_value_0);
1873                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
1874
1875                 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1876                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1877                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1878                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1879                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1880                 );
1881
1882                 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1883                 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1884                 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1885                 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1886                 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1887         }
1888
1889         // adding pending output.
1890         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1891         // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1892         // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1893         // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1894         // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1895         // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1896         // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1897         // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1898         // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1899         // policy.
1900         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, &channel_type_features);
1901         let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1902         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1903
1904         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1905         let payment_event_1 = {
1906                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1,
1907                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_1), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
1908                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1909
1910                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1911                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1912                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1913         };
1914         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1915
1916         // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1917         let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1918         {
1919                 let mut route = route_1.clone();
1920                 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat = recv_value_2 + 1;
1921                 let (_, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[2]);
1922                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1923                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1924                         ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1925                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1926         }
1927
1928         // split the rest to test holding cell
1929         let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, &channel_type_features);
1930         let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1931         let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1932         let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1933         {
1934                 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1935                 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1936         }
1937
1938         // now see if they go through on both sides
1939         let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1940         // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1941         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21,
1942                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_21), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_21.0)).unwrap();
1943         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1944         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1945         assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1946
1947         // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1948         {
1949                 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
1950                         get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1951                 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1952                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1953                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1954                         ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1955                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1956         }
1957
1958         let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1959         // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1960         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22,
1961                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_22), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_22.0)).unwrap();
1962         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1963         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1964         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1965
1966         // flush the pending htlc
1967         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1968         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1969         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1970
1971         // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1972         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1973         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1974         let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1975
1976         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
1977         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1978         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1979         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1980
1981         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1982         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1983         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1984
1985         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1986
1987         let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1988         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
1989         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
1990
1991         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1992         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
1993
1994         // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
1995         assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
1996         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
1997         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
1998         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
1999         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2000
2001         let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
2002         assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
2003         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
2004         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
2005
2006         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
2007         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2008
2009         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2010         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2011         match events[0] {
2012                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, .. } => {
2013                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
2014                         assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amount_msat);
2015                         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), receiver_node_id.unwrap());
2016                         assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2017                         match &purpose {
2018                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
2019                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
2020                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
2021                                 },
2022                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
2023                         }
2024                 },
2025                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2026         }
2027         match events[1] {
2028                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, .. } => {
2029                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
2030                         assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amount_msat);
2031                         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), receiver_node_id.unwrap());
2032                         assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2033                         match &purpose {
2034                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
2035                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
2036                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
2037                                 },
2038                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
2039                         }
2040                 },
2041                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2042         }
2043
2044         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
2045         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
2046         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
2047
2048         let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1, &channel_type_features);
2049         let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
2050         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
2051
2052         let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, &channel_type_features);
2053         let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
2054         let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2055         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
2056         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
2057
2058         let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2);
2059         assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
2060 }
2061
2062 #[test]
2063 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
2064         // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
2065         // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
2066         // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
2067         // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
2068         // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
2069         // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
2070         // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
2071         // To test this we:
2072         //  * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
2073         //    you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
2074         //    you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
2075         //  * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
2076         //  * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
2077         //    the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
2078         //  * deliver the first fulfill from B
2079         //  * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
2080         //    claim,
2081         //  * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
2082         //    This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
2083         //    removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
2084         //  * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
2085         //    of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
2086         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2087         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2088         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2089         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2090         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2091
2092         let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2093         // Route the first two HTLCs.
2094         let payment_value_1 = b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000;
2095         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_value_1);
2096         let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20_000);
2097
2098         // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
2099         let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
2100         let send_1 = {
2101                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_3,
2102                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_3), PaymentId(payment_hash_3.0)).unwrap();
2103                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2104                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2105                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2106                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2107         };
2108
2109         // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
2110         // initial fulfill/CS.
2111         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
2112         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, payment_value_1);
2113         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2114         let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2115
2116         // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
2117         // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
2118         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
2119         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000);
2120         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2121         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2122
2123         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2124         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
2125         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2126         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2127         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage_1, None, false, false);
2128
2129         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
2130         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
2131         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2132         // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
2133         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2134
2135         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2136         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2137         let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2138
2139         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2140         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2141         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2142
2143         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2144         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2145         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2146
2147         // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
2148         // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2149         // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
2150         // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
2151         // on-chain as necessary).
2152         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2153         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
2154         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2155         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2156         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage_2, None, false, false);
2157
2158         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2159         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2160         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2161
2162         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2163         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2164
2165         // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2166         // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2167         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2168         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2169         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2170         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2171
2172         // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2173         // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2174         let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2175         let send_2 = {
2176                 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_4,
2177                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_4), PaymentId(payment_hash_4.0)).unwrap();
2178                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2179                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2180                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2181                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2182         };
2183
2184         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2185         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2186         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2187         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2188
2189         // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2190
2191         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2192         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2193         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2194
2195         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2196         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2197
2198         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2199         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2200         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2201         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2202
2203         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2204         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2205         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2206
2207         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2208         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2209
2210         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2211         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2212
2213         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2214         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2215 }
2216
2217 #[test]
2218 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2219         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2220         // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2221         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2222         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2223         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2224         let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2225
2226         // Create some initial channels
2227         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2228         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2229         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
2230         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
2231
2232         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2233         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2234         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2235         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2236         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2237         connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2238
2239         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2240         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2241         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2242         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2243         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2244
2245         // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2246         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_1.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2247         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2248         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2249         {
2250                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2251                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2252                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2253                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2254                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, Some(node_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2255         }
2256         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2257         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2258         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2259         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2260         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2261
2262         // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2263         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 3_000_000);
2264
2265         // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2266         // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2267         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_2.2, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2268         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2269         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2270         {
2271                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2272                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2273                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2274                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2275                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2276                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, Some(node_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2277         }
2278         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2279         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2280         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2281         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2282         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2283
2284         macro_rules! claim_funds {
2285                 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
2286                         {
2287                                 $node.node.claim_funds($preimage);
2288                                 expect_payment_claimed!($node, $payment_hash, 3_000_000);
2289                                 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2290
2291                                 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2292                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2293                                 match events[0] {
2294                                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2295                                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2296                                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2297                                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2298                                         },
2299                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2300                                 };
2301                         }
2302                 }
2303         }
2304
2305         // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2306         // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2307         nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_3.2, &nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2308         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2309         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2310         let node2_commitment_txid;
2311         {
2312                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2313                 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2314                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2315                 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2316
2317                 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2318                 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1);
2319                 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2320                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2321                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2322         }
2323         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2324         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2325         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2326         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2327         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2328
2329         // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2330         // confusing us in the following tests.
2331         let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2332
2333         // One pending HTLC to time out:
2334         let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[3], &[&nodes[4]], 3_000_000);
2335         // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2336         // buffer space).
2337
2338         let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2339                 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2340                 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2341                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2342                 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2343                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2344                                 msg.clone()
2345                         },
2346                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2347                 };
2348                 match events[1] {
2349                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2350                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2351                         },
2352                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2353                 }
2354                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2355
2356                 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2357                 {
2358                         let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2359                         node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2360                                 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2361                                         false
2362                                 } else { true }
2363                         });
2364                 }
2365
2366                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2367
2368                 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2369                 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2);
2370
2371                 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2372                 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2373                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2374                 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2375                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2376                                 msg.clone()
2377                         },
2378                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2379                 };
2380                 match events[1] {
2381                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2382                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2383                         },
2384                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2385                 }
2386                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2387                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2388
2389                 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2390                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2391                 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2392         };
2393         nodes[3].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2394         nodes[4].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2395         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2396         assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2397
2398         assert_eq!(nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon),
2399                 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
2400         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2401         check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2402 }
2403
2404 #[test]
2405 fn test_justice_tx_htlc_timeout() {
2406         // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Timeout tx, against both sides
2407         let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2408         alice_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2409         alice_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2410         alice_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2411         let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2412         bob_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2413         bob_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2414         bob_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2415         let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2416         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2417         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2418         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2419         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2420         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2421         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2422         // Create some new channels:
2423         let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2424
2425         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2426         let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2427         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2428         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2429         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2430         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2431         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2432         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2433         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2434         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2435         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2436         // Revoke the old state
2437         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2438
2439         {
2440                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2441                 {
2442                         let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2443                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2444                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2445                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2446                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2447                 }
2448                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2449                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2450                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2451
2452                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2453                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2454                 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2455                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2456                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2457                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2458                 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2459                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2460                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2461         }
2462         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2463         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2464         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2465 }
2466
2467 #[test]
2468 fn test_justice_tx_htlc_success() {
2469         // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2470         let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2471         alice_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2472         alice_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2473         alice_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2474         let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2475         bob_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2476         bob_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2477         bob_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2478         let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2479         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2480         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2481         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2482         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2483         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2484         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2485         // Create some new channels:
2486         let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2487
2488         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2489         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2490         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2491         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2492         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2493         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2494         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2495         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2496         // Revoke the old state
2497         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2498         {
2499                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2500                 {
2501                         let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2502                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2503                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2504
2505                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2506                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2507                 }
2508                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2509                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2510
2511                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2512                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2513                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2514                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2515                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2516                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2517                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2518         }
2519         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2520         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2521         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2522 }
2523
2524 #[test]
2525 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2526         // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2527         // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2528         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2529         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2530         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2531         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2532         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2533         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2534         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2535         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2536         // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2537         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2538         // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2539         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2540
2541         // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2542         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2543         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2544         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2545         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2546         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output
2547
2548         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2549
2550         // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2551         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2552         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2553         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2554         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2555 }
2556
2557 #[test]
2558 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2559         // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2560         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2561         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2562         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2563         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2564         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2565
2566         // Create some new channel:
2567         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2568
2569         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2570         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2571         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2572         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2573         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2574
2575         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2576         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2577         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2578         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2579         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2580         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2581         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2582         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2583         check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2584
2585         //Revoke the old state
2586         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2587
2588         {
2589                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2590                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2591                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2592                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2593                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2594                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2595                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2596                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2597
2598                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2599                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2600
2601                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2602                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2603
2604                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2605                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2606                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2607                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2608                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2609                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2610                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2611                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2612
2613                 // Finally, mine the penalty transaction and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2614                 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2615                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
2616                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2617                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2618         }
2619         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2620         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2621         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2622 }
2623
2624 #[test]
2625 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2626         // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2627         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2628         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2629         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2630         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2631         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2632
2633         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2634
2635         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2636         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2637         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2638         // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2639         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2640         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2641
2642         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2643         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2644
2645         //Revoke the old state
2646         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2647
2648         {
2649                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2650                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2651                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2652                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2653                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2654                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2655                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2656                 match events.last().unwrap() {
2657                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2658                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2659                 }
2660
2661                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2662                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2663
2664                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2665
2666                 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2667                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2668                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2669                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2670                 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2671                 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2672                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2673
2674                 // Filter out any non justice transactions.
2675                 node_txn.retain(|tx| tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2676                 assert!(node_txn.len() > 3);
2677
2678                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2679                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2680                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2681
2682                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2683                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2684                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2685
2686                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2687                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2688                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2689                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2690                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2691                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2692                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2693                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2694
2695                 // Finally, mine the penalty transactions and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2696                 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2697                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
2698                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2699                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[2]);
2700                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2701                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2702         }
2703         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2704         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2705         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2706 }
2707
2708 #[test]
2709 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2710         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2711         // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2712         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2713         // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2714         // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2715         // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2716         // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2717         // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2718         // towards B.
2719         // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2720         // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2721         // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2722         // PaymentSent event).
2723
2724         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2725         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2726         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2727         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2728
2729         // Create some initial channels
2730         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2731         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2732
2733         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2734         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2735         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2736         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2737         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2738
2739         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2740         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2741         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2742
2743         let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2744         let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2745
2746         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2747         // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2748         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2749         assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2750         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2751         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2752         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_1, 3_000_000);
2753         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2754         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, 3_000_000);
2755         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2756         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2757         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2758         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2759         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2760         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2761
2762         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2763         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2764         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2765         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2766         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2767         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2768         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2769         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2770         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2771         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2772         assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2773         assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2774         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0);
2775         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0);
2776
2777         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2778         connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]));
2779         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2780         {
2781                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2782                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2783                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2784                 added_monitors.clear();
2785         }
2786         let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2787         assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2788         match forwarded_events[0] {
2789                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2790                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2791         }
2792         let chan_id = Some(chan_1.2);
2793         match forwarded_events[1] {
2794                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat } => {
2795                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2796                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2797                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2798                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2799                         assert_eq!(outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, Some(3000000));
2800                 },
2801                 _ => panic!()
2802         }
2803         match forwarded_events[2] {
2804                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat } => {
2805                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2806                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2807                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2808                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2809                         assert_eq!(outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, Some(3000000));
2810                 },
2811                 _ => panic!()
2812         }
2813         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2814         {
2815                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2816                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2817                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2818                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2819                 added_monitors.clear();
2820         }
2821         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2822
2823         let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
2824         let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
2825
2826         match nodes_2_event {
2827                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2828                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2829         }
2830
2831         match nodes_0_event {
2832                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2833                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2834                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2835                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2836                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2837                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2838                 },
2839                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2840         };
2841
2842         // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
2843         match events[0] {
2844                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2845                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2846         }
2847
2848         macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2849                 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => { {
2850                         let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2851                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2852                         // Node[1]: 2 * HTLC-timeout tx
2853                         // Node[0]: 2 * HTLC-timeout tx
2854                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], $commitment_tx);
2855                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2856                         assert_ne!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0);
2857                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0);
2858                         if $htlc_offered {
2859                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2860                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2861                                 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2862                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2863                         } else {
2864                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2865                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2866                                 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2867                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2868                         }
2869                         node_txn.clear();
2870                 } }
2871         }
2872         // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2873         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0]);
2874
2875         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2876         // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx  on A's chain
2877         let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2878         check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2879         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2880         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2881         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2882         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2883         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2884         assert!(node_txn.len() == 1 || node_txn.len() == 3); // HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn
2885         let commitment_spend =
2886                 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
2887                         &node_txn[0]
2888                 } else {
2889                         // Certain `ConnectStyle`s will cause RBF bumps of the previous HTLC transaction to be broadcast.
2890                         // FullBlockViaListen
2891                         if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2892                                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2893                                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2894                                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2895                                 &node_txn[0]
2896                         } else {
2897                                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2898                                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2899                                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2900                                 &node_txn[2]
2901                         }
2902                 };
2903
2904         check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2905         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2906         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2907         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2908         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time.0, nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2909         assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2910         // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
2911         // we already checked the same situation with A.
2912
2913         // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
2914         connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()]));
2915         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2916         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2917         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2918         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2919         assert_eq!(events.len(), 5);
2920         let mut first_claimed = false;
2921         for event in events {
2922                 match event {
2923                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
2924                                 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
2925                                         assert!(!first_claimed);
2926                                         first_claimed = true;
2927                                 } else {
2928                                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
2929                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
2930                                 }
2931                         },
2932                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
2933                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
2934                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2935                 }
2936         }
2937         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2938 }
2939
2940 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
2941         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
2942         // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2943         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2944         // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
2945         //    B's commitment tx                 C's commitment tx
2946         //            \                                  \
2947         //         B's HTLC timeout tx               B's timeout tx
2948
2949         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2950         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2951         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2952         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2953         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2954         *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2955         *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2956
2957         // Create some intial channels
2958         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2959         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2960
2961         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
2962         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2963         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2964
2965         let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2966
2967         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2968         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2969         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2970         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
2971         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
2972         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }]);
2973         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2974
2975         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2976         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2977         match events[0] {
2978                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2979                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2980                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2981                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2982                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2983                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2984                 },
2985                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2986         };
2987         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2988         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2989         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2990         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2991         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2992         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
2993
2994         // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2995         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
2996         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
2997         check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false
2998                 , [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2999         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
3000         let timeout_tx = {
3001                 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
3002                 if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().skips_blocks() {
3003                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
3004                 } else {
3005                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 3); // Two extra fee bumps for timeout transaction
3006                 }
3007                 txn.iter().for_each(|tx| check_spends!(tx, commitment_tx[0]));
3008                 assert_eq!(txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3009                 txn.remove(0)
3010         };
3011
3012         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
3013         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3014         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3015
3016         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3017
3018         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
3019         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3020         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3021         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3022         match events[0] {
3023                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3024                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3025                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3026                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3027                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3028                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3029                 },
3030                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3031         };
3032
3033         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
3034         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
3035         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
3036
3037         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
3038         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
3039
3040         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3041         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3042         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3043         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // 1 timeout tx
3044         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3045         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
3046         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3047 }
3048
3049 #[test]
3050 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
3051         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
3052         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
3053         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
3054 }
3055
3056 #[test]
3057 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
3058         // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
3059         // and fail backward accordingly.
3060
3061         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3062         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3063         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3064         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3065
3066         // Create some initial channels
3067         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3068         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3069
3070         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3071         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3072         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3073         // Revoke the old state
3074         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3075
3076         let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3077
3078         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3079         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3080         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3081         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3082         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3083
3084         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
3085         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3086         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3087         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3088         match events[0] {
3089                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3090                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3091                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3092                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3093                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3094                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3095
3096                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3097                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3098                         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
3099                 },
3100                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3101         }
3102 }
3103
3104 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
3105         // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
3106         // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
3107         // commitment transaction anymore.
3108         // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
3109         // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
3110         // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
3111         // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
3112         // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
3113         // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
3114         // transactions:
3115         // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
3116         //   commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
3117         // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
3118         //   and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
3119         //   commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
3120         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3121         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3122         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3123         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3124
3125         // Create some initial channels
3126         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3127         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3128
3129         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
3130         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3131         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3132         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
3133         // Revoke the old state
3134         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3135
3136         let value = if use_dust {
3137                 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
3138                 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
3139                 nodes[2].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
3140                         .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
3141         } else { 3000000 };
3142
3143         let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3144         let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3145         let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3146
3147         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash);
3148         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: first_payment_hash }]);
3149         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3150         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3151         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3152         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3153         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3154         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3155         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3156         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3157         let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
3158         // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
3159
3160         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash);
3161         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: second_payment_hash }]);
3162         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3163         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3164         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3165         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3166         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3167         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3168         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3169         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3170         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3171         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3172         // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3173         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3174         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3175         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3176
3177         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash);
3178         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: third_payment_hash }]);
3179         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3180         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3181         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3182         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3183         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3184         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3185         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3186         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3187         // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3188         // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3189         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3190         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3191         // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3192         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3193         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3194         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3195
3196         // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3197         // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3198         let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3199         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, fourth_payment_hash,
3200                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(fourth_payment_secret), PaymentId(fourth_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3201         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3202         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3203         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3204
3205         if deliver_bs_raa {
3206                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3207                 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3208                 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3209                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3210                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3211                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3212                 match events[0] {
3213                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3214                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3215                 };
3216                 match events[1] {
3217                         Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { .. } => { },
3218                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3219                 }
3220                 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3221                 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3222         }
3223
3224         let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
3225         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3226
3227         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3228         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3229         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3230
3231         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3232         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 3 + nodes.len() - 1 } else { 4 + nodes.len() });
3233         match events[0] {
3234                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
3235                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
3236         }
3237         match events[1] {
3238                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3239                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3240                 },
3241                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3242         }
3243         match events[2] {
3244                 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3245                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3246                 },
3247                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3248         }
3249
3250         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3251         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3252
3253         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3254         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3255
3256         if deliver_bs_raa {
3257                 let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3258                 match nodes_2_event {
3259                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3260                                 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3261                                 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3262                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3263                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3264                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3265                         },
3266                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3267                 }
3268         }
3269
3270         let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3271         match nodes_2_event {
3272                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
3273                         assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3274                         assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3275                 },
3276                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3277         }
3278
3279         let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3280         match nodes_0_event {
3281                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3282                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3283                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3284                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3285                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3286                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3287
3288                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3289                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3290                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3291
3292                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3293
3294                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3295                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 6);
3296                         match events[0] {
3297                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref failure, .. } => {
3298                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3299                                         // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3300                                         // that we should update our routing table for.
3301                                         if !deliver_bs_raa {
3302                                                 if let PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) } = failure { } else { panic!("Unexpected path failure") }
3303                                         }
3304                                 },
3305                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3306                         }
3307                         match events[1] {
3308                                 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3309                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, first_payment_hash);
3310                                 },
3311                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3312                         }
3313                         match events[2] {
3314                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) }, .. } => {
3315                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3316                                 },
3317                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3318                         }
3319                         match events[3] {
3320                                 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3321                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
3322                                 },
3323                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3324                         }
3325                         match events[4] {
3326                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) }, .. } => {
3327                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3328                                 },
3329                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3330                         }
3331                         match events[5] {
3332                                 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3333                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, third_payment_hash);
3334                                 },
3335                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3336                         }
3337                 },
3338                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3339         }
3340
3341         // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
3342         match events[0] {
3343                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3344                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3345         }
3346
3347         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3348         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3349         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3350 }
3351
3352 #[test]
3353 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3354         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3355         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3356         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3357         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3358 }
3359
3360 #[test]
3361 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3362         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3363         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3364         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3365         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3366 }
3367
3368 #[test]
3369 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3370         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3371         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3372         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3373         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3374         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
3375
3376         // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3377         {
3378                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3379                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
3380                         PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3381                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3382
3383                 let payment_event = {
3384                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3385                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3386                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3387                 };
3388                 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3389                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3390         }
3391
3392         // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3393         let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3394         {
3395                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, failed_payment_hash,
3396                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(failed_payment_secret), PaymentId(failed_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3397                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3398
3399                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3400         }
3401
3402         // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3403         {
3404                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3405
3406                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3407                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3408                 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3409                 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(
3410                         &route.paths[0], 50_000, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3411                 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3412                 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash).unwrap();
3413
3414                 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3415                 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3416                         channel_id: chan.2,
3417                         htlc_id: 0,
3418                         amount_msat: 0,
3419                         payment_hash,
3420                         cltv_expiry,
3421                         onion_routing_packet,
3422                         skimmed_fee_msat: None,
3423                 };
3424                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3425         }
3426         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3427         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3428         // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3429         match events[0] {
3430                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3431                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3432                 },
3433                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3434         }
3435         match events[1] {
3436                 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3437                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3438                 },
3439                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3440         }
3441         match events[2] {
3442                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3443                         assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3444                 },
3445                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3446         }
3447         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3448         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3449 }
3450
3451 #[test]
3452 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3453         // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3454         // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3455         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3456         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3457         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3458         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3459         if *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow() == ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen {
3460                 // We rely on the ability to connect a block redundantly, which isn't allowed via
3461                 // `chain::Listen`, so we never run the test if we randomly get assigned that
3462                 // connect_style.
3463                 return;
3464         }
3465         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3466
3467         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3468         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3469         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3470         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3471         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3472         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3473
3474         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
3475         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3476         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].txid(), node_txn[1].txid());
3477
3478         let block = create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]);
3479         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
3480         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3481         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3482         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3483
3484         // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3485         // registering new transactions
3486         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
3487 }
3488
3489 #[test]
3490 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3491         // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3492         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3493         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3494         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3495         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3496         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3497         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3498
3499         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3500
3501         let mut payment_event = {
3502                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
3503                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3504                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3505
3506                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3507                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3508                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3509         };
3510
3511         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3512         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3513
3514         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3515
3516         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3517         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3518         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3519         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3520
3521         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3522         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3523         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3524         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3525         let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3526
3527         // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3528         // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3529         // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3530
3531         nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3532         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3533         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3534         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3535         let tx = {
3536                 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3537                 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3538                 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3539                 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3540                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3541                 node_txn.remove(0)
3542         };
3543
3544         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3545
3546         // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3547         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3548         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3549         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3550
3551         // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3552         {
3553                 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3554                         .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator), &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3555         }
3556         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3557         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3558         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3559         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3560         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3561         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3562         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3563
3564         check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3565 }
3566
3567 #[test]
3568 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3569         // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3570         // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3571         // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3572         // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3573
3574         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3575         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3576         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3577         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3578         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3579
3580         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
3581
3582         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
3583         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_000_000);
3584         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3585         let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3586         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3587         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
3588
3589         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3590         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3591
3592         let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3593         reconnect_args.pending_htlc_claims.0 = 1;
3594         reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3595         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3596 }
3597
3598 #[test]
3599 fn test_peer_disconnected_before_funding_broadcasted() {
3600         // Test that channels are closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` if the peer disconnects
3601         // before the funding transaction has been broadcasted.
3602         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3603         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3604         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3605         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3606
3607         // Open a channel between `nodes[0]` and `nodes[1]`, for which the funding transaction is never
3608         // broadcasted, even though it's created by `nodes[0]`.
3609         let expected_temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
3610         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3611         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
3612         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3613         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
3614
3615         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
3616         assert_eq!(temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3617
3618         assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
3619
3620         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3621         assert_eq!(funding_created_msg.temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3622
3623         // Even though the funding transaction is created by `nodes[0]`, the `FundingCreated` msg is
3624         // never sent to `nodes[1]`, and therefore the tx is never signed by either party nor
3625         // broadcasted.
3626         {
3627                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3628         }
3629
3630         // Ensure that the channel is closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` when the peers are
3631         // disconnected before the funding transaction was broadcasted.
3632         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3633         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3634
3635         check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer, false
3636                 , [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
3637         check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer, false
3638                 , [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
3639 }
3640
3641 #[test]
3642 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3643         // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3644         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3645         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3646         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3647         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3648         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3649         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3650
3651         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3652         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3653         let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3654         reconnect_args.send_channel_ready = (true, true);
3655         reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3656
3657         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3658         let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3659         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3660         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3661
3662         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3663         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3664         reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
3665
3666         let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3667         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3668         let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3669         let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3670
3671         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3672         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3673
3674         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3675         fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3676
3677         let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3678         reconnect_args.pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 = 1;
3679         reconnect_args.pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 = 1;
3680         reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3681         {
3682                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3683                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
3684                 match events[0] {
3685                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3686                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3687                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3688                         },
3689                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3690                 }
3691                 match events[1] {
3692                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3693                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3694                 }
3695                 match events[2] {
3696                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, payment_failed_permanently, .. } => {
3697                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3698                                 assert!(payment_failed_permanently);
3699                         },
3700                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3701                 }
3702                 match events[3] {
3703                         Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3704                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3705                         },
3706                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3707                 }
3708         }
3709         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
3710
3711         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3712         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3713 }
3714
3715 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3716         // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3717         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3718         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3719         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3720         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3721
3722         let mut as_channel_ready = None;
3723         let channel_id = if messages_delivered == 0 {
3724                 let (channel_ready, chan_id, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
3725                 as_channel_ready = Some(channel_ready);
3726                 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the channel_ready message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3727                 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3728                 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3729                 chan_id
3730         } else {
3731                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).2
3732         };
3733
3734         let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1_000_000);
3735
3736         let payment_event = {
3737                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_1,
3738                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
3739                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3740
3741                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3742                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3743                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3744         };
3745         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3746
3747         if messages_delivered < 2 {
3748                 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3749         } else {
3750                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3751                 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3752                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3753                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3754                         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3755
3756                         if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3757                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3758                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3759                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3760
3761                                 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3762                                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3763                                         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3764                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3765                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3766
3767                                         if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3768                                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3769                                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3770                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3771                                         }
3772                                 }
3773                         }
3774                 }
3775         }
3776
3777         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3778         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3779         if messages_delivered < 3 {
3780                 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3781                         // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a channel_ready prior to a
3782                         // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to channel_ready time.
3783                         //
3784                         // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a channel_ready immediately on
3785                         // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate channel_ready sent
3786                         // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3787                         //
3788                         // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3789                         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3790                 }
3791                 // Even if the channel_ready messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3792                 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3793                 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3794                 reconnect_args.send_channel_ready = (true, true);
3795                 reconnect_args.pending_htlc_adds.1 = 1;
3796                 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3797         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3798                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3799                 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3800                 reconnect_args.pending_htlc_adds.0 = -1;
3801                 reconnect_args.pending_raa.0 = true;
3802                 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3803         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3804                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3805                 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3806                 reconnect_args.pending_htlc_adds.0 = -1;
3807                 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3808         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3809                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3810                 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3811                 reconnect_args.pending_raa.1 = true;
3812                 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3813         } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3814                 // Everything was delivered...
3815                 reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
3816         }
3817
3818         let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3819         if messages_delivered == 0 {
3820                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 2);
3821                 match events_1[0] {
3822                         Event::ChannelReady { .. } => { },
3823                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3824                 };
3825                 match events_1[1] {
3826                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3827                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3828                 };
3829         } else {
3830                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3831                 match events_1[0] {
3832                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3833                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3834                 };
3835         }
3836
3837         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3838         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3839         reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
3840
3841         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3842
3843         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3844         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3845         match events_2[0] {
3846                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, .. } => {
3847                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3848                         assert_eq!(amount_msat, 1_000_000);
3849                         assert_eq!(receiver_node_id.unwrap(), nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3850                         assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(channel_id));
3851                         match &purpose {
3852                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3853                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3854                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3855                                 },
3856                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3857                         }
3858                 },
3859                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3860         }
3861
3862         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3863         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3864         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
3865
3866         let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3867         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3868         let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3869                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3870                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3871                         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3872                         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3873                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3874                         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3875                         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3876                         (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3877                 },
3878                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3879         };
3880
3881         if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3882                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3883
3884                 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3885                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3886                 match events_4[0] {
3887                         Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3888                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3889                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3890                         },
3891                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3892                 }
3893
3894                 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3895                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3896                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3897                         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3898
3899                         if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3900                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3901                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3902                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3903
3904                                 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3905                                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3906                                         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3907                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3908                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3909
3910                                         if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3911                                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3912                                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3913                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3914                                         }
3915                                 }
3916                         }
3917                 }
3918         }
3919
3920         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3921         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3922         if messages_delivered < 2 {
3923                 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3924                 reconnect_args.pending_htlc_claims.0 = 1;
3925                 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3926                 if messages_delivered < 1 {
3927                         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
3928                 } else {
3929                         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3930                 }
3931         } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
3932                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3933                 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3934                 reconnect_args.pending_htlc_adds.1 = -1;
3935                 reconnect_args.pending_raa.1 = true;
3936                 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3937         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3938                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3939                 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3940                 reconnect_args.pending_htlc_adds.1 = -1;
3941                 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3942         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3943                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3944                 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3945                 reconnect_args.pending_raa.0 = true;
3946                 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3947         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3948                 // Everything was delivered...
3949                 reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
3950         }
3951
3952         if messages_delivered == 1 || messages_delivered == 2 {
3953                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3954         }
3955         if messages_delivered <= 5 {
3956                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3957                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3958         }
3959         reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
3960
3961         if messages_delivered > 2 {
3962                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3963         }
3964
3965         // Channel should still work fine...
3966         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3967         let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3968         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3969 }
3970
3971 #[test]
3972 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
3973         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
3974         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
3975         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
3976         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
3977 }
3978
3979 #[test]
3980 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
3981         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
3982         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
3983         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
3984         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
3985 }
3986
3987 #[test]
3988 fn test_channel_ready_without_best_block_updated() {
3989         // Previously, if we were offline when a funding transaction was locked in, and then we came
3990         // back online, calling best_block_updated once followed by transactions_confirmed, we'd not
3991         // generate a channel_ready until a later best_block_updated. This tests that we generate the
3992         // channel_ready immediately instead.
3993         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3994         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3995         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3996         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3997         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
3998
3999         let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
4000
4001         let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
4002         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
4003         let block_txn = [funding_tx];
4004         let conf_txn: Vec<_> = block_txn.iter().enumerate().collect();
4005         let conf_block_header = nodes[0].get_block_header(conf_height);
4006         nodes[0].node.transactions_confirmed(&conf_block_header, &conf_txn[..], conf_height);
4007
4008         // Ensure nodes[0] generates a channel_ready after the transactions_confirmed
4009         let as_channel_ready = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4010         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
4011 }
4012
4013 #[test]
4014 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
4015         // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
4016         // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
4017         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4018         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4019         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4020         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4021         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4022
4023         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
4024
4025         // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
4026         let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
4027         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_2,
4028                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
4029         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4030
4031         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4032         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4033         match events_1[0] {
4034                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4035                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4036         }
4037
4038         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
4039         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
4040         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4041
4042         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4043         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4044         match events_2[0] {
4045                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4046                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4047                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4048                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4049                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4050                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4051                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4052
4053                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4054                         let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4055                         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
4056                         match events_3[0] {
4057                                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
4058                                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
4059                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
4060                                 },
4061                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4062                         }
4063
4064                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
4065                         let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4066                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4067                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4068                 },
4069                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4070         }
4071
4072         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4073         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4074
4075         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
4076                 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
4077         }, true).unwrap();
4078         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4079         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
4080         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
4081                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
4082         }, false).unwrap();
4083         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4084         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
4085
4086         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4087         let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4088         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4089         let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4090
4091         assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
4092         assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
4093
4094         assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
4095         assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
4096
4097         assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
4098
4099         assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4100         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4101         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4102         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4103         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
4104         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
4105         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
4106         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4107         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4108         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4109
4110         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
4111         let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4112         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4113         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4114         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4115         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4116         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4117         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4118
4119         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
4120         let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4121         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4122         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4123         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4124         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4125         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4126         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4127
4128         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4129         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4130         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4131         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4132
4133         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4134         let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4135         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4136         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4137
4138         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
4139         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4140         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4141
4142         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4143
4144         let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4145         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
4146         match events_5[0] {
4147                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
4148                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
4149                         match &purpose {
4150                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
4151                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
4152                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
4153                                 },
4154                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
4155                         }
4156                 },
4157                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4158         }
4159
4160         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
4161         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4162         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4163
4164         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4165         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4166 }
4167
4168 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
4169         // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
4170         // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
4171         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4172         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4173         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4174         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4175
4176         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4177
4178         let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
4179                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
4180                 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
4181                 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
4182                 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
4183                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
4184                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
4185                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
4186                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
4187                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id,
4188                         &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
4189                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4190                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4191                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4192                 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
4193                 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentClaimable event(s).
4194                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
4195                 our_payment_hash
4196         } else {
4197                 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
4198         };
4199
4200         let mut block = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, Vec::new());
4201         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4202         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4203         let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4204         for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
4205                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
4206                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4207                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4208         }
4209
4210         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
4211
4212         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4213         let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4214         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4215         assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4216         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4217         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4218
4219         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4220         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4221         // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4222         let mut expected_failure_data = (100_000 as u64).to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4223         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&(block_count - 1).to_be_bytes());
4224         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4225 }
4226
4227 #[test]
4228 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4229         do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4230         do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4231 }
4232
4233 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4234         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4235         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4236         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4237         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4238         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4239         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4240         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4241
4242         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4243         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4244         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4245         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4246
4247         // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4248         let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4249         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, first_payment_hash,
4250                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(first_payment_secret), PaymentId(first_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
4251         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4252         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4253
4254         // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4255         let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4256         let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4257         sending_node.node.send_payment_with_route(&route, second_payment_hash,
4258                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(second_payment_secret), PaymentId(second_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
4259         if forwarded_htlc {
4260                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4261                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4262                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4263                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4264                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4265         }
4266         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4267
4268         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4269         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4270         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4271         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4272
4273         if forwarded_htlc {
4274                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
4275                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4276                 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4277                 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4278                 match fail_commit[0] {
4279                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4280                                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4281                                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4282                         },
4283                         _ => unreachable!(),
4284                 }
4285                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4286         } else {
4287                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], second_payment_hash, false);
4288         }
4289 }
4290
4291 #[test]
4292 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4293         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4294         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4295 }
4296
4297 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4298         ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4299                 {
4300                         let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4301                         let mut txn = Vec::new();
4302                         let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4303                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4304                         for event in events.drain(..) {
4305                                 match event {
4306                                         Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs } => {
4307                                                 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4308                                                         txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, None, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4309                                                         all_outputs.push(outp);
4310                                                 }
4311                                         },
4312                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4313                                 };
4314                         }
4315                         if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4316                                 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, None, &secp_ctx) {
4317                                         txn.push(tx);
4318                                 }
4319                         }
4320                         txn
4321                 }
4322         }
4323 }
4324
4325 #[test]
4326 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4327         // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4328         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4329         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4330         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4331         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4332
4333         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000);
4334         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4335         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4336         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4337         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4338         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4339         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4340         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4341         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4342
4343         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4344         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4345
4346         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4347         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4348         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4349         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4350         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4351 }
4352
4353 #[test]
4354 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4355         // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4356         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4357         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4358         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4359         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4360         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4361
4362         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000);
4363         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4364         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4365         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4366         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4367
4368         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4369         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4370         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4371         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4372
4373         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4374         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4375         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4376         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4377         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4378
4379         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4380         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4381         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4382 }
4383
4384 #[test]
4385 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4386         // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4387         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4388
4389         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4390         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4391         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4392         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4393
4394         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000);
4395         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4396         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4397         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4398         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4399
4400         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4401         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4402         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4403         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4404         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4405
4406         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4407         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4408         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4409
4410         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4411         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4412         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4413         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4414         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4415 }
4416
4417 #[test]
4418 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4419         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4420         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4421         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4422         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4423
4424         // Create some initial channels
4425         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4426
4427         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
4428
4429         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4430         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4431         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4432
4433         // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4434         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4435         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4436         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4437         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4438         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4439         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4440         match events[0] {
4441                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4442                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4443         }
4444         match events[1] {
4445                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4446                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4447         }
4448
4449         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4450         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4451         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4452         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4453         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4454
4455         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4456         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4457         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4458
4459         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4460         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4461         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4462 }
4463
4464 #[test]
4465 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4466         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4467         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4468         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4469         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4470
4471         // Create some initial channels
4472         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4473
4474         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4475         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4476
4477         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4478
4479         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4480         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4481         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4482
4483         // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4484         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4485         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4486         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4487         match events[0] {
4488                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4489                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4490         }
4491         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4492
4493         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4494         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4495         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4496         check_spends!(node_txn[0],  commitment_tx[0].clone());
4497         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4498
4499         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4500         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4501         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4502         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, false);
4503
4504         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4505         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4506         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4507         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4508         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4509 }
4510
4511 #[test]
4512 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4513         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4514         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4515         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4516         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4517
4518         // Create some initial channels
4519         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4520
4521         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4522         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4523         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4524         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4525
4526         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4527
4528         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4529         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4530         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4531         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4532
4533         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4534         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4535         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4536         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4537
4538         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4539         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4540
4541         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4542         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4543         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4544 }
4545
4546 #[test]
4547 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4548         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4549         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4550         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4551         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4552         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4553
4554         // Create some initial channels
4555         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4556
4557         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4558         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4559         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4560         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4561
4562         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4563
4564         // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
4565         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4566         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4567         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4568         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4569         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4570
4571         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4572         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 1);
4573         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4574         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4575         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4576         assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
4577
4578         // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4579         connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()]));
4580         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4581         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4582         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4583
4584         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4585         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs
4586         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4587         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4588         // transactions next...
4589         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
4590         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4591
4592         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
4593         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4594         if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4595                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4596         } else {
4597                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4598                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4599         }
4600
4601         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4602         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4603
4604         // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4605         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4606         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4607         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4608         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
4609 }
4610
4611 #[test]
4612 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
4613         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4614         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4615         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4616         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4617         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4618
4619         // Create some initial channels
4620         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4621
4622         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4623         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4624         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4625         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4626
4627         // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
4628         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
4629
4630         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4631
4632         // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
4633         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4634         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4635         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4636         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4637         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4638
4639         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 1);
4640         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4641         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4642         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4643
4644         // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
4645         let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
4646         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
4647
4648         // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4649         connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()]));
4650         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4651         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4652         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4653
4654         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4655         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success
4656
4657         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4658         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4659         // transactions next...
4660         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4661         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4662         if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4663                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4664         } else {
4665                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4666                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4667         }
4668
4669         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4670         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4671
4672         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
4673         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4674
4675         // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
4676         // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
4677
4678         // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4679         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
4680         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4681         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4682         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
4683         assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4684         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
4685         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
4686 }
4687
4688 #[test]
4689 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
4690         // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
4691         // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
4692         // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
4693         // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
4694         // channel.
4695         // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
4696         // gets broadcast.
4697
4698         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4699         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4700         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4701         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4702
4703         // Create some initial channels
4704         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4705         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4706
4707         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
4708         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4709         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4710         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4711         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4712
4713         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4714         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4715         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4716
4717         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
4718         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4719         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
4720         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4721         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4722         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4723         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4724         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4725         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4726         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4727         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4728
4729         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
4730         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
4731         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4732         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4733
4734         let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
4735         assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 1);
4736         check_spends!(c_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4737         assert_eq!(c_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4738         assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
4739         assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Success tx
4740
4741         // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
4742         connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), c_txn[0].clone()]));
4743         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4744         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4745         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4746         match events[0] {
4747                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
4748                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4749         }
4750         match events[1] {
4751                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat } => {
4752                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
4753                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, Some(chan_1.2));
4754                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
4755                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
4756                         assert_eq!(outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, Some(3000000));
4757                 },
4758                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4759         }
4760         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4761         let mut msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4762         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
4763         let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut msg_events);
4764         let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut msg_events);
4765
4766         match nodes_2_event {
4767                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
4768                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4769         }
4770
4771         match nodes_0_event {
4772                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
4773                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4774                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4775                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4776                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4777                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
4778                 },
4779                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4780         };
4781
4782         // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
4783         match msg_events[0] {
4784                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4785                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4786         }
4787
4788         // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
4789         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4790         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4791         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4792         let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4793         // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx
4794         assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
4795         check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4796         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4797         assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
4798         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time.0, nodes[1].best_block_info().1); // Success tx
4799
4800         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4801         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4802 }
4803
4804 #[test]
4805 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
4806         // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
4807         // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
4808         // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
4809         // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
4810         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4811         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4812         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
4813         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
4814         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
4815         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
4816         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
4817                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
4818         let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4819
4820         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4821         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4822         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4823
4824         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4825         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4826         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4827         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4828         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
4829
4830         let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 900_000);
4831
4832         let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
4833         // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
4834         // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
4835         // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
4836         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40)
4837                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[3].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
4838         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], payment_params, 800_000);
4839         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 800_000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
4840
4841         let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4842         assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4843         check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
4844
4845         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
4846         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4847         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4848         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4849         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4850
4851         let htlc_timeout_tx;
4852         { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
4853                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4854                 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 2-or-3
4855                 assert!(node_txn.len() == 2 || node_txn.len() == 3);
4856
4857                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
4858                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4859                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
4860
4861                 if node_txn.len() > 2 {
4862                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
4863                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4864                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].output.len(), 1);
4865                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4866
4867                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
4868                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4869                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
4870                         assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
4871                 } else {
4872                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
4873                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4874                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].output.len(), 1);
4875                         assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4876                 }
4877
4878                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4879                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4880                 // Assign htlc_timeout_tx to the forwarded HTLC (with value ~800 sats). The received HTLC
4881                 // (with value 900 sats) will be claimed in the below `claim_funds` call.
4882                 if node_txn.len() > 2 {
4883                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4884                         htlc_timeout_tx = if node_txn[2].output[0].value < 900 { node_txn[2].clone() } else { node_txn[0].clone() };
4885                 } else {
4886                         htlc_timeout_tx = if node_txn[0].output[0].value < 900 { node_txn[1].clone() } else { node_txn[0].clone() };
4887                 }
4888         }
4889
4890         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
4891         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], duplicate_payment_hash, 900_000);
4892
4893         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
4894         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
4895         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4896         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4897         match events[0] {
4898                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4899                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4900         }
4901         match events[1] {
4902                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4903                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4904         }
4905         let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4906         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
4907         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
4908         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
4909         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4910         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4911         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4912         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4913         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4914         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
4915
4916         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
4917         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4918         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
4919         let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4920         assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4921         assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4922         let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
4923         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4924         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4925         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4926
4927         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4928         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4929         {
4930                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
4931         }
4932         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
4933
4934         // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
4935         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[1]);
4936         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], Some(196), true, true);
4937         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4938         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4939         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4940         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4941         assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
4942         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4943         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4944
4945         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4946         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
4947         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], our_payment_preimage, None, true, true);
4948 }
4949
4950 #[test]
4951 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
4952         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4953         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4954         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4955         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4956
4957         // Create some initial channels
4958         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4959
4960         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
4961         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4962         assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
4963         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4964         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
4965
4966         // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
4967         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4968         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
4969         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4970
4971         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
4972         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4973         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4974         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4975         match events[0] {
4976                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4977                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4978         }
4979         match events[1] {
4980                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4981                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4982         }
4983         let node_tx = {
4984                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4985                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4986                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4987                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4988                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
4989                 node_txn[0].clone()
4990         };
4991
4992         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
4993         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4994
4995         // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
4996         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4997         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4998         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4999         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
5000         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5001 }
5002
5003 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
5004         // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
5005         // unrevoked commitment transaction.
5006         // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
5007         // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
5008         // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
5009         // use the same payment hashes.
5010         // Thus, we use a six-node network:
5011         //
5012         // A \         / E
5013         //    - C - D -
5014         // B /         \ F
5015         // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
5016         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
5017         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
5018         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5019         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5020         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5021         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5022         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
5023                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5024         let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5025
5026         let _chan_0_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2);
5027         let _chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5028         let chan_2_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
5029         let chan_3_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
5030         let chan_3_5  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
5031
5032         // Rebalance and check output sanity...
5033         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
5034         send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
5035         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
5036
5037         let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id())
5038                 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan_2_3.2).unwrap().context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5039         // 0th HTLC:
5040         let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5041         // 1st HTLC:
5042         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5043         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5044         // 2nd HTLC:
5045         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5046         // 3rd HTLC:
5047         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5048         // 4th HTLC:
5049         let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5050         // 5th HTLC:
5051         let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5052         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5053         // 6th HTLC:
5054         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
5055         // 7th HTLC:
5056         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
5057
5058         // 8th HTLC:
5059         let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5060         // 9th HTLC:
5061         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5062         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5063
5064         // 10th HTLC:
5065         let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5066         // 11th HTLC:
5067         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5068         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
5069
5070         // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
5071         // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
5072         // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
5073         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2).len(), 1);
5074         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
5075
5076         // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
5077         // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5078         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1);
5079         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3);
5080         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5);
5081         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6);
5082         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
5083
5084         let failed_destinations = vec![
5085                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_1 },
5086                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_3 },
5087                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_5 },
5088                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_6 },
5089         ];
5090         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[4], failed_destinations);
5091         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
5092
5093         let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5094         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5095         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5096         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5097         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5098         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5099
5100         // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5101         nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
5102         nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4);
5103         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5104
5105         let failed_destinations_2 = vec![
5106                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 },
5107                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_4 },
5108         ];
5109         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[5], failed_destinations_2);
5110         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5111
5112         let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5113         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5114         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5115         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5116
5117         let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5118
5119         // After 4 and 2 removes respectively above in nodes[4] and nodes[5], nodes[3] should receive 6 PaymentForwardedFailed events
5120         let failed_destinations_3 = vec![
5121                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5122                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5123                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5124                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5125                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5126                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5127         ];
5128         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations_3);
5129         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5130         let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5131         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5132         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5133         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5134         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5135         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5136         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5137         if deliver_last_raa {
5138                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5139         } else {
5140                 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5141         }
5142
5143         // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5144         // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5145         // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5146         // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5147         //
5148         // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5149         // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5150         // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5151         //
5152         // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5153         // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5154         let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5155
5156         if announce_latest {
5157                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5158         } else {
5159                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5160         }
5161         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5162         let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5163                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2 + 6);
5164                 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5165         } else {
5166                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5167                 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5168         };
5169         match close_event {
5170                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5171                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5172         }
5173
5174         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5175         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5176         if deliver_last_raa {
5177                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5178
5179                 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(3).collect();
5180                 expect_htlc_handling_failed_destinations!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(), expected_destinations);
5181         } else {
5182                 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = if announce_latest {
5183                         repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(9).collect()
5184                 } else {
5185                         repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(6).collect()
5186                 };
5187
5188                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], expected_destinations);
5189         }
5190         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5191
5192         let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5193         assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5194         let mut a_done = false;
5195         for msg in cs_msgs {
5196                 match msg {
5197                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5198                                 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5199                                 // should be failed-backwards here.
5200                                 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5201                                         // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5202                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5203                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5204                                         }
5205                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5206                                         assert!(!a_done);
5207                                         a_done = true;
5208                                         &nodes[0]
5209                                 } else {
5210                                         // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5211                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5212                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5213                                         }
5214                                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5215                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5216                                         &nodes[1]
5217                                 };
5218                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5219                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5220                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5221                                 if announce_latest {
5222                                         target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5223                                         if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5224                                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5225                                         }
5226                                 }
5227                                 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5228                         },
5229                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5230                 }
5231         }
5232
5233         let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5234         assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 10 } else { 6 });
5235         let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5236         let mut as_updates = 0;
5237         for event in as_events.iter() {
5238                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref failure, .. } = event {
5239                         assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5240                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5241                                 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5242                         } else {
5243                                 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5244                         }
5245                         if let PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) } = failure {
5246                                 as_updates += 1;
5247                         }
5248                 } else if let &Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = event {
5249                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5250         }
5251         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5252         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5253         if announce_latest {
5254                 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5255                 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5256         }
5257         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5258
5259         let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5260         assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 8 } else { 6 });
5261         let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5262         let mut bs_updates = 0;
5263         for event in bs_events.iter() {
5264                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref failure, .. } = event {
5265                         assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5266                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5267                                 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5268                         } else {
5269                                 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5270                         }
5271                         if let PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) } = failure {
5272                                 bs_updates += 1;
5273                         }
5274                 } else if let &Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = event {
5275                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5276         }
5277         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5278         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5279         if announce_latest {
5280                 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5281         }
5282         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5283
5284         // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5285         // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5286         // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5287         // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5288         assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5289         assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5290 }
5291
5292 #[test]
5293 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5294         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5295 }
5296
5297 #[test]
5298 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5299         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5300 }
5301
5302 #[test]
5303 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5304         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5305         // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5306         // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5307 }
5308
5309 #[test]
5310 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5311         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5312         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5313         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5314         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5315
5316         // Create some initial channels
5317         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5318
5319         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5320         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5321         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5322         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5323
5324         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5325         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5326         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5327         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5328         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5329         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5330
5331         let htlc_timeout = {
5332                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5333                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5334                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5335                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5336                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5337                 node_txn[0].clone()
5338         };
5339
5340         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5341         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5342         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5343
5344         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5345         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5346         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5347         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5348         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5349         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5350         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5351         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5352         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5353         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5354                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5355 }
5356
5357 #[test]
5358 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5359         // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with a key
5360         // manager rotation to test that `channel_keys_id` returned in
5361         // [`SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput`] let us re-derive the channel key set to
5362         // then derive a `delayed_payment_key`.
5363
5364         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5365
5366         // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5367         let seed = [42; 32];
5368         let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5369         let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5370         let network_graph = Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger));
5371         let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
5372         let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(network_graph.clone(), &scorer);
5373         let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, router, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph, node_seed: seed, override_init_features: alloc::rc::Rc::new(core::cell::RefCell::new(None)) };
5374         let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5375         node_cfgs.remove(0);
5376         node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5377
5378         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5379         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5380
5381         // Create some initial channels
5382         // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5383         // for node 0
5384         let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2);
5385         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5386         assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5387
5388         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5389         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5390         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5391         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5392         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5393
5394         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5395         let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5396         let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5397         assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5398         check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5399
5400         // We check funding pubkey are unique
5401         let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5402         let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5403         if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5404             || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5405             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5406             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5407                 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5408         }
5409
5410         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5411         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5412         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5413         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5414         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5415         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5416
5417         let htlc_timeout = {
5418                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5419                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5420                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5421                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5422                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5423                 node_txn[0].clone()
5424         };
5425
5426         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5427         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5428         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5429
5430         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5431         let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5432         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5433         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5434         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5435         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5436         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5437         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5438         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5439         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5440         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5441                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5442 }
5443
5444 #[test]
5445 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5446         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5447         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5448         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5449         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5450
5451         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5452
5453         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5454         let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5455
5456         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5457         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5458         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5459
5460         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5461         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5462         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5463
5464         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5465         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5466         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5467
5468         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5469         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5470         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5471 }
5472
5473 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5474         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5475         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5476         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5477         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5478         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5479
5480         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5481
5482         // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5483         // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5484         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5485         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5486         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5487
5488         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5489         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5490         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
5491
5492         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5493         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5494         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5495         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5496         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5497
5498         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5499         let mut block = create_dummy_block(starting_block.0, 42, Vec::new());
5500         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5501                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5502                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5503         }
5504         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5505         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5506         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5507         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5508 }
5509
5510 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5511         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5512         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5513         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5514         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5515         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5516
5517         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5518         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
5519                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5520         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5521
5522         let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5523
5524         // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5525         // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5526         // to "time out" the HTLC.
5527
5528         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5529         let mut block = create_dummy_block(starting_block.0, 42, Vec::new());
5530
5531         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5532                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5533                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5534         }
5535         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5536         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5537         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5538         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5539 }
5540
5541 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5542         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5543         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5544         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5545         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5546         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5547
5548         // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
5549         // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5550         // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
5551         // actually revoked.
5552         let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
5553         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
5554         nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
5555         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
5556         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5557
5558         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5559         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5560         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5561         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5562         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5563         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5564         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5565         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
5566         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5567         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5568
5569         if check_revoke_no_close {
5570                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
5571                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5572         }
5573
5574         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5575         let mut block = create_dummy_block(starting_block.0, 42, Vec::new());
5576         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
5577                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5578                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5579         }
5580         if !check_revoke_no_close {
5581                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5582                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5583                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5584                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5585         } else {
5586                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5587         }
5588 }
5589
5590 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
5591 // There are only a few cases to test here:
5592 //  * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
5593 //    broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
5594 //  * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
5595 //  * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
5596 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
5597 // non-dust HTLCs.
5598 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
5599 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
5600 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
5601 #[test]
5602 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
5603         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
5604         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
5605
5606         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
5607         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
5608 }
5609
5610 #[test]
5611 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
5612         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
5613         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
5614         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
5615         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
5616 }
5617
5618 #[test]
5619 #[should_panic]
5620 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
5621         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5622         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5623         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5624         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5625         // Force duplicate randomness for every get-random call
5626         for node in nodes.iter() {
5627                 *node.keys_manager.override_random_bytes.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
5628         }
5629
5630         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
5631         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5632         let push_msat=10001;
5633         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5634         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5635         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5636         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5637
5638         // Create a second channel with the same random values. This used to panic due to a colliding
5639         // channel_id, but now panics due to a colliding outbound SCID alias.
5640         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5641 }
5642
5643 #[test]
5644 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
5645         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5646         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5647         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5648         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5649
5650         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
5651         let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
5652         let push_msat=10001;
5653         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5654
5655         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
5656         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5657         // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
5658         let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
5659         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5660
5661         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
5662         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5663         let push_msat=10001;
5664         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
5665         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5666         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
5667
5668         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
5669         // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
5670         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
5671
5672         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
5673         assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
5674         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5675
5676         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
5677         let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
5678         assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
5679
5680         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
5681         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
5682         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5683         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5684         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
5685         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5686 }
5687
5688 #[test]
5689 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
5690         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5691         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5692         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5693         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5694
5695         let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
5696         let push_msat=10001;
5697         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5698         let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5699         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
5700         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
5701
5702         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5703         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5704         let err_msg = match events[0] {
5705                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
5706                         msg.clone()
5707                 },
5708                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5709         };
5710         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
5711 }
5712
5713 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
5714 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
5715 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
5716 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
5717 #[test]
5718 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
5719         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5720         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5721         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5722         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5723         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
5724
5725         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5726         // pending_update_fee.
5727         {
5728                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5729                 *feerate_lock += 20;
5730         }
5731         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5732         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5733
5734         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5735         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5736         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5737                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5738                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5739                 },
5740                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5741         };
5742
5743         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5744
5745         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5746         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5747         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5748         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5749
5750         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5751         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, &channel_type_features);
5752         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
5753
5754         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
5755         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
5756                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5757         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5758         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
5759
5760         // Flush the pending fee update.
5761         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5762         let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5763         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5764         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
5765         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5766
5767         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
5768         // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
5769         // us to surface its failure to the user.
5770         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5771         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5772         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
5773
5774         // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
5775         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5776         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5777         match &events[0] {
5778                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: None }, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
5779                         assert_eq!(PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0), *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
5780                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
5781                         assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
5782                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id));
5783                 },
5784                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5785         }
5786         match &events[1] {
5787                 &Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5788                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
5789                 },
5790                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5791         }
5792 }
5793
5794 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
5795 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
5796 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
5797 #[test]
5798 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
5799         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5800         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5801         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5802         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5803         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
5804
5805         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5806         // pending_update_fee.
5807         {
5808                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5809                 *feerate_lock += 200;
5810         }
5811         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5812         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5813
5814         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5815         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5816         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5817                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5818                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5819                 },
5820                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5821         };
5822
5823         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5824
5825         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5826         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5827         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5828         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5829
5830         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5831         let amt_1 = 20000;
5832         let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, &channel_type_features) - amt_1;
5833         let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
5834         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
5835
5836         // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
5837         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_1, payment_hash_1,
5838                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
5839         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5840         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
5841         let payment_id_2 = PaymentId(nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5842         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_2, payment_hash_2,
5843                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), payment_id_2).unwrap();
5844         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5845         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
5846
5847         // Flush the pending fee update.
5848         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5849         let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5850         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5851         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
5852         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5853         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
5854
5855         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
5856         // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
5857         // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
5858         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5859         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5860         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
5861
5862         // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
5863         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5864         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5865         match &events[0] {
5866                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: None }, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
5867                         assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
5868                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
5869                         assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
5870                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route_2.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id));
5871                 },
5872                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5873         }
5874         match &events[1] {
5875                 &Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5876                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
5877                 },
5878                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5879         }
5880
5881         // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
5882         let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
5883                 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5884                 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
5885                 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
5886         };
5887         let raa = match send_raa_event {
5888                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
5889                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5890         };
5891         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5892         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5893         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5894         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5895         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5896         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5897         match events[0] {
5898                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
5899                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5900         }
5901         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5902         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5903         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5904         match events[0] {
5905                 Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } => {},
5906                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5907         }
5908         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
5909         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5910         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, amt_1);
5911
5912         let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5913         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5914         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
5915         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
5916 }
5917
5918 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
5919 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
5920 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
5921 // once it's freed.
5922 #[test]
5923 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
5924         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5925         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5926         // Avoid having to include routing fees in calculations
5927         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5928         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 0;
5929         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = 0;
5930         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5931         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5932         let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
5933         let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000);
5934
5935         // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5936         // pending_update_fee.
5937         {
5938                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5939                 *feerate_lock += 20;
5940         }
5941         nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5942         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5943
5944         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5945         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5946         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5947                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5948                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5949                 },
5950                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5951         };
5952
5953         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5954
5955         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
5956         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5957         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
5958         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
5959
5960         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
5961         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, &channel_type_features);
5962         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
5963         let payment_event = {
5964                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
5965                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5966                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5967
5968                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5969                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5970
5971                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
5972         };
5973         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5974         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5975         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5976         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5977
5978         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_1_2.2);
5979         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
5980
5981         // Flush the pending fee update.
5982         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5983         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5984         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5985         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5986         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5987         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
5988
5989         // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
5990         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5991         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5992
5993         let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
5994                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
5995                         msg.clone()
5996                 },
5997                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5998         };
5999
6000         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
6001         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6002         assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6003
6004         // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
6005         let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6006         assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 2);
6007         match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
6008                 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6009                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6010         }
6011
6012         // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
6013         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6014         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6015
6016         // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
6017         let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6018         assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
6019         let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
6020                 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6021                         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
6022                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
6023                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
6024                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6025                         (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6026                 },
6027                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6028         };
6029
6030         // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
6031         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
6032         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6033
6034         // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
6035         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6036         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6037         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6038         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6039         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6040         let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6041         assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
6042         let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
6043                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
6044                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6045         };
6046         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6047         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
6048         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6049 }
6050
6051 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
6052 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
6053 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
6054
6055 #[test]
6056 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
6057         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
6058         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6059         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6060         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6061         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6062         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6063
6064         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6065         route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = 100;
6066
6067         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6068                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6069                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
6070         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6071 }
6072
6073 #[test]
6074 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
6075         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6076         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6077         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6078         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6079         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6080         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6081
6082         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6083         route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = 0;
6084         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6085                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)),
6086                 true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6087                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
6088
6089         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6090         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC", 1);
6091 }
6092
6093 #[test]
6094 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
6095         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6096         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6097         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6098         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6099         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6100         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6101
6102         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6103         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6104                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6105         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6106         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6107         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6108
6109         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6110         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6111         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6112         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6113         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() },
6114                 [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6115 }
6116
6117 #[test]
6118 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6119         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6120         //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6121         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6122         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6123         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6124         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6125         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0);
6126
6127         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0)
6128                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
6129         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], payment_params, 100000000);
6130         route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = 500000001;
6131         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6132                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6133                 ), true, APIError::InvalidRoute { ref err },
6134                 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6135 }
6136
6137 #[test]
6138 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6139         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6140         //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6141         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6142         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6143         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6144         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6145         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6146         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0);
6147         let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
6148                 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6149
6150         // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
6151         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6152         for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6153                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6154                 let payment_event = {
6155                         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6156                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6157                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6158
6159                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6160                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6161                         if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6162                                 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6163                         } else {
6164                                 assert!(false);
6165                         }
6166                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6167                 };
6168                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6169                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6170                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6171
6172                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6173                 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6174         }
6175         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6176                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6177                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
6178
6179         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6180 }
6181
6182 #[test]
6183 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6184         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6185         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6186         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6187         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6188         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6189         let channel_value = 100000;
6190         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0);
6191         let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6192
6193         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6194
6195         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6196         // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6197         // limits us to.
6198         route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat =  max_in_flight + 1;
6199         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6200                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6201                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
6202         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6203
6204         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6205 }
6206
6207 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6208 #[test]
6209 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6210         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6211         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6212         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6213         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6214         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6215         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6216         let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6217         {
6218                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6219                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6220                 let channel = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6221                 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6222         }
6223
6224         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6225         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6226                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6227         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6228         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6229         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6230         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6231         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6232         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6233         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6234         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6235         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6236 }
6237
6238 #[test]
6239 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6240         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6241         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6242         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6243         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6244         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6245         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6246
6247         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6248         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6249         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6250         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6251         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6252         let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, &channel_type_features);
6253
6254         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6255         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6256         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6257                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6258         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6259         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6260
6261         // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6262         // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6263         // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6264         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6265         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6266
6267         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6268         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6269         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6270         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6271         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6272 }
6273
6274 #[test]
6275 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6276         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6277         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6278         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6279         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6280         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6281         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6282         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6283
6284         let send_amt = 3999999;
6285         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
6286                 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000);
6287         route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = send_amt;
6288         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6289         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6290         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6291         let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(
6292                 &route.paths[0], send_amt, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6293         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash).unwrap();
6294
6295         let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6296                 channel_id: chan.2,
6297                 htlc_id: 0,
6298                 amount_msat: 1000,
6299                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6300                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6301                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6302                 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
6303         };
6304
6305         for i in 0..50 {
6306                 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6307                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6308         }
6309         msg.htlc_id = (50) as u64;
6310         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6311
6312         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6313         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6314         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6315         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6316         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6317 }
6318
6319 #[test]
6320 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6321         //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6322         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6323         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6324         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6325         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6326         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6327
6328         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6329         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6330                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6331         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6332         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6333         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6334         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6335
6336         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6337         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6338         assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6339         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6340         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
6341 }
6342
6343 #[test]
6344 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6345         //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6346         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6347         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6348         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6349         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6350
6351         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6352         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6353         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6354                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6355         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6356         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6357         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6358         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6359
6360         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6361         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6362         assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6363         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6364         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6365 }
6366
6367 #[test]
6368 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6369         //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6370         // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6371         // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6372         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6373         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6374         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6375         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6376
6377         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6378         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6379         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6380                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6381         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6382         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6383         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6384
6385         //Disconnect and Reconnect
6386         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6387         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6388         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
6389                 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
6390         }, true).unwrap();
6391         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6392         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6393         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
6394                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
6395         }, false).unwrap();
6396         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6397         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6398         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6399         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6400         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6401         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6402
6403         //Resend HTLC
6404         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6405         assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6406         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6407         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6408         let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6409
6410         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6411
6412         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6413         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6414         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6415         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6416         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6417 }
6418
6419 #[test]
6420 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6421         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6422
6423         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6424         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6425         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6426         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6427         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6428         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6429         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6430                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6431
6432         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6433         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6434         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6435
6436         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6437                 channel_id: chan.2,
6438                 htlc_id: 0,
6439                 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6440         };
6441
6442         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6443
6444         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6445         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6446         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6447         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6448         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6449 }
6450
6451 #[test]
6452 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6453         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6454
6455         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6456         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6457         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6458         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6459         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6460
6461         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6462         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6463                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6464         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6465         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6466         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6467
6468         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6469                 channel_id: chan.2,
6470                 htlc_id: 0,
6471                 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6472         };
6473
6474         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6475
6476         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6477         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6478         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6479         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6480         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6481 }
6482
6483 #[test]
6484 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6485         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6486
6487         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6488         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6489         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6490         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6491         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6492
6493         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6494         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6495                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6496         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6497         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6498         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6499         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6500                 channel_id: chan.2,
6501                 htlc_id: 0,
6502                 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6503                 failure_code: 0x8000,
6504         };
6505
6506         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6507
6508         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6509         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6510         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6511         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6512         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6513 }
6514
6515 #[test]
6516 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6517         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6518
6519         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6520         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6521         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6522         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6523         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6524
6525         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6526
6527         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6528         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6529         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6530
6531         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6532         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6533         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6534                 match events[0] {
6535                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6536                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6537                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6538                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6539                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6540                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6541                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6542                         },
6543                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6544                 }
6545         };
6546
6547         update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6548
6549         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6550
6551         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6552         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6553         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6554         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6555         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6556 }
6557
6558 #[test]
6559 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6560         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6561
6562         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6563         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6564         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6565         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6566         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6567
6568         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6569
6570         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6571         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6572         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6573
6574         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6575         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6576         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6577                 match events[0] {
6578                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6579                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6580                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6581                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6582                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6583                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6584                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6585                         },
6586                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6587                 }
6588         };
6589
6590         update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
6591
6592         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6593
6594         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6595         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6596         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6597         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6598         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6599 }
6600
6601 #[test]
6602 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
6603         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
6604
6605         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6606         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6607         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6608         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6609         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6610
6611         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6612         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6613                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6614         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6615
6616         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6617         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6618
6619         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6620         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6621         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6622
6623         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6624
6625         let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
6626                 match events[0] {
6627                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6628                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6629                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6630                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6631                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6632                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6633                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
6634                         },
6635                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6636                 }
6637         };
6638         update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
6639         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6640
6641         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6642         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6643         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
6644         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6645         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
6646 }
6647
6648 #[test]
6649 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
6650         //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
6651         //    * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
6652
6653         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6654         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6655         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6656         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6657         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6658         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000);
6659
6660         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
6661
6662         //First hop
6663         let mut payment_event = {
6664                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6665                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6666                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6667                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6668                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6669                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6670         };
6671         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6672         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6673         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6674         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6675         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6676         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6677         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6678         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6679         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6680
6681         //Second Hop
6682         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6683         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6684         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6685         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6686
6687         let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6688         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6689         let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
6690                 match events_3[0] {
6691                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6692                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6693                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6694                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6695                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6696                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6697                                 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
6698                         },
6699                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6700                 }
6701         };
6702
6703         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
6704
6705         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6706         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
6707         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
6708         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6709         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6710
6711         //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
6712         match events_4[0] {
6713                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6714                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6715                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6716                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6717                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6718                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6719                 },
6720                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6721         };
6722
6723         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6724 }
6725
6726 #[test]
6727 fn test_channel_failed_after_message_with_badonion_node_perm_bits_set() {
6728         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6729         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6730         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6731         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6732         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6733         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6734
6735         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100_000);
6736
6737         // First hop
6738         let mut payment_event = {
6739                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6740                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6741                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6742                 SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[0])
6743         };
6744
6745         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6746         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6747         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6748         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6749         payment_event = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[1]);
6750         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6751
6752         // Second Hop
6753         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; // Trigger an invalid_onion_version error
6754         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6755         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6756         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6757
6758         let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6759         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6760         match events_3[0] {
6761                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6762                         let mut update_msg = updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone();
6763                         // Set the NODE bit (BADONION and PERM already set in invalid_onion_version error)
6764                         update_msg.failure_code |= 0x2000;
6765
6766                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6767                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6768                 },
6769                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6770         }
6771
6772         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1],
6773                 vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel {
6774                         node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
6775         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6776         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6777         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6778
6779         match events_4[0] {
6780                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6781                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6782                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6783                 },
6784                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6785         }
6786
6787         let events_5 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6788         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 2);
6789
6790         // Expect a PaymentPathFailed event with a ChannelFailure network update for the channel between
6791         // the node originating the error to its next hop.
6792         match events_5[0] {
6793                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { error_code, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure { short_channel_id, is_permanent }) }, ..
6794                 } => {
6795                         assert_eq!(short_channel_id, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id);
6796                         assert!(is_permanent);
6797                         assert_eq!(error_code, Some(0x8000|0x4000|0x2000|4));
6798                 },
6799                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6800         }
6801         match events_5[1] {
6802                 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6803                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
6804                 },
6805                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6806         }
6807
6808         // TODO: Test actual removal of channel from NetworkGraph when it's implemented.
6809 }
6810
6811 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
6812         // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
6813         // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
6814         // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
6815
6816         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6817         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
6818         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6819         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6820         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6821         let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6822
6823         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
6824                 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6825
6826         // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
6827         let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6828         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6829         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6830
6831         // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
6832         let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6833
6834         // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
6835         nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
6836         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6837         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
6838         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6839
6840         let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6841         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6842         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
6843         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6844
6845         // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
6846         let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6847
6848         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6849         match events[0] {
6850                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
6851                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6852                 },
6853                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6854         }
6855         match events[1] {
6856                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
6857                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6858                 },
6859                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6860         }
6861
6862         assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
6863         // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
6864         if announce_latest {
6865                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
6866         } else {
6867                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
6868         }
6869
6870         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6871         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6872         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6873
6874         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6875         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6876         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6877         // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
6878         assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
6879         let mut first_failed = false;
6880         for event in events {
6881                 match event {
6882                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6883                                 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
6884                                         assert!(!first_failed);
6885                                         first_failed = true;
6886                                 } else {
6887                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
6888                                 }
6889                         },
6890                         Event::PaymentFailed { .. } => {}
6891                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6892                 }
6893         }
6894 }
6895
6896 #[test]
6897 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
6898         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
6899         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
6900 }
6901
6902 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
6903         // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
6904         // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
6905         // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6906         // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
6907         // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6908         // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
6909
6910         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6911         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6912         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6913         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6914         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6915
6916         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
6917                 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6918
6919         let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6920         let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6921
6922         let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6923         let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
6924
6925         // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
6926         if revoked {
6927                 let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6928                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
6929         }
6930
6931         let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
6932         if local {
6933                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
6934                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
6935                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6936                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6937                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
6938
6939                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
6940                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6941                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6942                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6943                 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].clone());
6944                 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6945                 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
6946                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6947                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
6948                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6949                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
6950         } else {
6951                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
6952                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
6953                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6954                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6955                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6956                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6957
6958                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
6959                 timeout_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..)
6960                         .filter(|tx| tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == bs_commitment_tx[0].txid()).collect();
6961                 check_spends!(timeout_tx[0], bs_commitment_tx[0]);
6962                 // For both a revoked or non-revoked commitment transaction, after ANTI_REORG_DELAY the
6963                 // dust HTLC should have been failed.
6964                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
6965
6966                 if !revoked {
6967                         assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6968                 } else {
6969                         assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].lock_time.0, 11);
6970                 }
6971                 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout/revocation-claim tx
6972                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
6973                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6974                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6975                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
6976         }
6977 }
6978
6979 #[test]
6980 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
6981         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
6982         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
6983         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
6984 }
6985
6986 #[test]
6987 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
6988         // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
6989
6990         let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
6991         low_our_to_self_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
6992         let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
6993         high_their_to_self_config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
6994         let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
6995         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6996         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6997         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
6998         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6999
7000         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in OutboundV1Channel::new()
7001         if let Err(error) = OutboundV1Channel::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7002                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), 1000000, 1000000, 0,
7003                 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, 42)
7004         {
7005                 match error {
7006                         APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7007                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7008                 }
7009         } else { assert!(false) }
7010
7011         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in InboundV1Channel::new()
7012         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7013         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7014         open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7015         if let Err(error) = InboundV1Channel::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7016                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].node.channel_type_features(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
7017                 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
7018         {
7019                 match error {
7020                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str()));  },
7021                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7022                 }
7023         } else { assert!(false); }
7024
7025         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
7026         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7027         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7028         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7029         accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7030         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
7031         let reason_msg;
7032         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
7033                 match action {
7034                         &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7035                                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
7036                                 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
7037                         },
7038                         _ => { panic!(); }
7039                 }
7040         } else { panic!(); }
7041         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
7042
7043         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in InboundV1Channel::new()
7044         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7045         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7046         open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7047         if let Err(error) = InboundV1Channel::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7048                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].node.channel_type_features(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
7049                 &high_their_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
7050         {
7051                 match error {
7052                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7053                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7054                 }
7055         } else { assert!(false); }
7056 }
7057
7058 #[test]
7059 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
7060         // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
7061         // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
7062         // to B, B should refuse payment.
7063
7064         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7065         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7066         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7067         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7068
7069         // Create some initial channels
7070         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7071
7072         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
7073         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7074         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV).with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
7075         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None, 10_000, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7076         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7077         let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200, None).unwrap();
7078         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
7079                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
7080         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7081
7082         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7083         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7084         let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7085         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7086         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7087
7088         // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
7089         // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
7090         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7091         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
7092
7093         // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
7094         // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
7095         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7096
7097         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7098         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7099         let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
7100                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7101                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7102                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7103                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7104                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7105                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7106                         (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
7107                 },
7108                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7109         };
7110         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7111
7112         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
7113         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
7114
7115         // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
7116         let mut expected_failure_data = (10_000 as u64).to_be_bytes().to_vec();
7117         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH.to_be_bytes());
7118         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
7119 }
7120
7121 #[test]
7122 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
7123         // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
7124         // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
7125
7126         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7127         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7128         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7129         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7130
7131         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7132         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0);
7133         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7134
7135         // Disconnect peers
7136         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7137         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7138
7139         for _ in 0..DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS + 1 {
7140                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7141         }
7142         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7143         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7144         let mut chans_disabled = HashMap::new();
7145         for e in msg_events {
7146                 match e {
7147                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7148                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7149                                 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7150                                 if chans_disabled.insert(msg.contents.short_channel_id, msg.contents.timestamp).is_some() {
7151                                         panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7152                                 }
7153                         },
7154                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7155                 }
7156         }
7157         // Reconnect peers
7158         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
7159                 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
7160         }, true).unwrap();
7161         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7162         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7163         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
7164                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
7165         }, false).unwrap();
7166         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7167         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7168
7169         // Reestablish chan_1
7170         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7171         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7172         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7173         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7174         // Reestablish chan_2
7175         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7176         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7177         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7178         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7179         // Reestablish chan_3
7180         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7181         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7182         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7183         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7184
7185         for _ in 0..ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
7186                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7187         }
7188         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7189         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7190         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7191         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7192         for e in msg_events {
7193                 match e {
7194                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7195                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7196                                 match chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7197                                         // Each update should have a higher timestamp than the previous one, replacing
7198                                         // the old one.
7199                                         Some(prev_timestamp) => assert!(msg.contents.timestamp > prev_timestamp),
7200                                         None => panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!"),
7201                                 }
7202                         },
7203                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7204                 }
7205         }
7206         // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7207         assert!(chans_disabled.is_empty());
7208 }
7209
7210 #[test]
7211 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7212         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7213         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7214
7215         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7216         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7217         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7218         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7219
7220         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7221
7222         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7223         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 30)
7224                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[0].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
7225         let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_params, 3000000);
7226         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7227
7228         let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7229         // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7230         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7231         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7232         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7233         let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7234
7235         let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7236         for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7237                 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7238                         penalty_sum += outp.value;
7239                 }
7240         }
7241
7242         // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7243         let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7244
7245         // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7246         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7247         connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(header_114, 42, vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()]));
7248         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7249
7250         // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7251         let penalty_1;
7252         let feerate_1;
7253         {
7254                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7255                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor)
7256                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7257                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7258                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7259                 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7260                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7261                 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7262                 node_txn.clear();
7263         };
7264
7265         // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7266         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7267         let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7268         let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7269         {
7270                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7271                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7272                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7273                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7274                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7275                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7276                         penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7277                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7278                         assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7279                         let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7280                         feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7281                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7282                         assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7283                         node_txn.clear();
7284                 }
7285         }
7286         assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7287
7288         // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7289         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7290         let penalty_3;
7291         let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7292         {
7293                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7294                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7295                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7296                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7297                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7298                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7299                         penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7300                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7301                         assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7302                         let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7303                         feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7304                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7305                         assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7306                         node_txn.clear();
7307                 }
7308         }
7309         assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7310
7311         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7312         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7313 }
7314
7315 #[test]
7316 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7317         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7318         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7319
7320         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7321         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7322         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7323         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7324         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7325
7326         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7327         // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7328         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 50).with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
7329         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
7330         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7331         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7332                 3_000_000, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7333         let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7334         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 50).with_bolt11_features(nodes[0].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
7335         let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[1].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7336                 3_000_000, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7337         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7338
7339         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7340         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7341         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7342
7343         // Revoke local commitment tx
7344         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7345
7346         // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7347         connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()]));
7348         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7349         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7350         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
7351         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 50); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7352
7353         let revoked_htlc_txn = {
7354                 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
7355                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
7356
7357                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7358                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7359                 check_spends!(txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7360
7361                 assert_eq!(txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7362                 assert_eq!(txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7363                 assert_eq!(txn[1].output.len(), 1);
7364                 check_spends!(txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7365
7366                 txn
7367         };
7368
7369         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7370         let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7371         let block_11 = create_dummy_block(hash_128, 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()]);
7372         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block_11);
7373         let block_129 = create_dummy_block(block_11.block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()]);
7374         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block_129);
7375         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7376         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7377         match events.last().unwrap() {
7378                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7379                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7380         }
7381         let first;
7382         let feerate_1;
7383         let penalty_txn;
7384         {
7385                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7386                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7387                 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7388
7389                 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7390                 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7391                 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7392                 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7393                 // future).
7394                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7395                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7396                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7397                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7398                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7399                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7400
7401                 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7402                 // available, which we check here:
7403                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7404                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7405                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7406
7407                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7408                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7409
7410                 // node_txn[3] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7411                 // output, checked above).
7412                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 2);
7413                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].output.len(), 1);
7414                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
7415
7416                 first = node_txn[3].txid();
7417                 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7418                 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[1].output[0].value - node_txn[3].output[0].value;
7419                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[3].weight() as u64;
7420                 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7421                 node_txn.clear();
7422         }
7423
7424         // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7425         let block_130 = create_dummy_block(block_129.block_hash(), 42, penalty_txn);
7426         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block_130);
7427         let block_131 = create_dummy_block(block_130.block_hash(), 42, Vec::new());
7428         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block_131);
7429
7430         // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7431         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7432         assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7433         let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7434         let node_txn = {
7435                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7436                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7437
7438                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7439                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
7440                 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7441                 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7442                 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[1].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7443                 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7444                 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7445                 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7446                 node_txn.clear();
7447                 txn
7448         };
7449         // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7450         connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(header_144, 42, node_txn));
7451         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7452         {
7453                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7454                 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7455                 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7456                 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7457                 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7458                 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7459                 // up bumped justice generation.
7460                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7461                 node_txn.clear();
7462         }
7463         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7464         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7465 }
7466
7467 #[test]
7468 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
7469         // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7470         // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7471
7472         // Create 2 HTLCs
7473         // Provide preimage for one
7474         // Check aggregation
7475
7476         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7477         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7478         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7479         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7480
7481         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7482         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
7483         route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
7484
7485         // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7486         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7487         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7488         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7489         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7490
7491         // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
7492         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7493         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
7494         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
7495         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7496         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7497
7498         // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
7499         let timeout;
7500         let preimage;
7501         let preimage_bump;
7502         let feerate_timeout;
7503         let feerate_preimage;
7504         {
7505                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7506                 // 3 transactions including:
7507                 //   preimage and timeout sweeps from remote commitment + preimage sweep bump
7508                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
7509                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7510                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7511                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7512                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7513                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
7514                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
7515
7516                 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
7517                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7518                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7519                 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7520
7521                 let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output == node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output {
7522                         (node_txn[2].clone(), node_txn[1].clone())
7523                 } else {
7524                         (node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone())
7525                 };
7526
7527                 preimage_bump = preimage_bump_tx;
7528                 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7529                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output);
7530
7531                 timeout = timeout_tx.txid();
7532                 let index = timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7533                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - timeout_tx.output[0].value;
7534                 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / timeout_tx.weight() as u64;
7535
7536                 node_txn.clear();
7537         };
7538         assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
7539         assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
7540
7541         // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
7542         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7543         {
7544                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7545                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7546                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7547                 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
7548                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7549                 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7550
7551                 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7552                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
7553                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.weight() as u64;
7554                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
7555                 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
7556
7557                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7558                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7559                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7560                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
7561                 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
7562
7563                 node_txn.clear();
7564         }
7565
7566         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7567         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7568 }
7569
7570 #[test]
7571 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
7572         // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
7573         // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
7574         // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
7575         // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
7576         // EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
7577         // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
7578         // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
7579         // implement that).
7580         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7581         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7582         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7583         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7584         let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).2;
7585
7586         let per_commitment_secret;
7587         let next_per_commitment_point;
7588         {
7589                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7590                 let mut guard = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7591                 let keys = guard.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
7592
7593                 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
7594
7595                 // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
7596                 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7597                 per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
7598
7599                 // Must revoke without gaps
7600                 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7601                 keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
7602
7603                 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7604                 next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
7605                         &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
7606         }
7607
7608         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
7609                 &msgs::RevokeAndACK {
7610                         channel_id,
7611                         per_commitment_secret,
7612                         next_per_commitment_point,
7613                         #[cfg(taproot)]
7614                         next_local_nonce: None,
7615                 });
7616         assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
7617         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7618         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() }
7619                 , [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
7620 }
7621
7622 #[test]
7623 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
7624         // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
7625         // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7626
7627         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7628         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7629         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7630         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7631
7632         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7633         // Lock HTLC in both directions
7634         let (payment_preimage_1, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000);
7635         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000);
7636
7637         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7638         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7639         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7640
7641         // Revoke local commitment tx
7642         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
7643
7644         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7645         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
7646         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[0], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
7647         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7648
7649         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
7650         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7651         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7652         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
7653         let penalty_txn = {
7654                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7655                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3
7656                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7657                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7658                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7659                 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
7660                 node_txn.clear();
7661                 penalty_txn
7662         };
7663         connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, penalty_txn));
7664         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7665         {
7666                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
7667                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
7668                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
7669         }
7670 }
7671
7672 #[test]
7673 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
7674         // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
7675         // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
7676         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7677         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7678         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7679         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7680
7681         let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000);
7682
7683         // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
7684         // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
7685         // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
7686         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
7687         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7688
7689         // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
7690         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
7691         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7692         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7693
7694         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7695         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7696         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
7697         let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7698         assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
7699         match close_ev[0] {
7700                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
7701                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7702                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
7703                 },
7704                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7705         }
7706 }
7707
7708 #[test]
7709 fn test_override_channel_config() {
7710         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7711         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7712         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7713         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7714
7715         // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
7716         let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
7717         override_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
7718
7719         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
7720
7721         // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
7722         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7723         assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
7724         assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
7725 }
7726
7727 #[test]
7728 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
7729         let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
7730         zero_config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
7731         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7732         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7733         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
7734         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7735
7736         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
7737         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7738         assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7739
7740         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7741         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7742         assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7743 }
7744
7745 #[test]
7746 fn test_channel_update_has_correct_htlc_maximum_msat() {
7747         // Tests that the `ChannelUpdate` message has the correct values for `htlc_maximum_msat` set.
7748         // Bolt 7 specifies that if present `htlc_maximum_msat`:
7749         // 1. MUST be set to less than or equal to the channel capacity. In LDK, this is capped to
7750         // 90% of the `channel_value`.
7751         // 2. MUST be set to less than or equal to the `max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` received from the peer.
7752
7753         let mut config_30_percent = UserConfig::default();
7754         config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7755         config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 30;
7756         let mut config_50_percent = UserConfig::default();
7757         config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7758         config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 50;
7759         let mut config_95_percent = UserConfig::default();
7760         config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7761         config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 95;
7762         let mut config_100_percent = UserConfig::default();
7763         config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7764         config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 100;
7765
7766         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7767         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7768         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config_30_percent), Some(config_50_percent), Some(config_95_percent), Some(config_100_percent)]);
7769         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7770
7771         let channel_value_satoshis = 100000;
7772         let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7773         let channel_value_30_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.3) as u64;
7774         let channel_value_50_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.5) as u64;
7775         let channel_value_90_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.9) as u64;
7776
7777         let (node_0_chan_update, node_1_chan_update, _, _)  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value_satoshis, 10001);
7778         let (node_2_chan_update, node_3_chan_update, _, _)  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, channel_value_satoshis, 10001);
7779
7780         // Assert that `node[0]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 50 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7781         // that's the value of `node[1]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
7782         assert_eq!(node_0_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_50_percent_msat);
7783         // Assert that `node[1]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 30 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7784         // that's the value of `node[0]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
7785         assert_eq!(node_1_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_30_percent_msat);
7786
7787         // Assert that `node[2]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7788         // the value of `node[3]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (100%), exceeds 90% of the
7789         // `channel_value`.
7790         assert_eq!(node_2_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
7791         // Assert that `node[3]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7792         // the value of `node[2]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (95%), exceeds 90% of the
7793         // `channel_value`.
7794         assert_eq!(node_3_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
7795 }
7796
7797 #[test]
7798 fn test_manually_accept_inbound_channel_request() {
7799         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7800         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7801         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7802         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7803         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7804         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7805
7806         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7807         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7808
7809         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7810
7811         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
7812         // accepting the inbound channel request.
7813         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7814
7815         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7816         match events[0] {
7817                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
7818                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap();
7819                 }
7820                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7821         }
7822
7823         let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7824         assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7825
7826         match accept_msg_ev[0] {
7827                 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
7828                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7829                 }
7830                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7831         }
7832
7833         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
7834
7835         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7836         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7837
7838         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7839         match events[0] {
7840                 Event::ChannelClosed { user_channel_id, .. } => {
7841                         assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 23);
7842                 }
7843                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7844         }
7845 }
7846
7847 #[test]
7848 fn test_manually_reject_inbound_channel_request() {
7849         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7850         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7851         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7852         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7853         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7854         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7855
7856         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7857         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7858
7859         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7860
7861         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
7862         // rejecting the inbound channel request.
7863         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7864
7865         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7866         match events[0] {
7867                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
7868                         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
7869                 }
7870                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7871         }
7872
7873         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7874         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7875
7876         match close_msg_ev[0] {
7877                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => {
7878                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7879                 }
7880                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7881         }
7882
7883         // There should be no more events to process, as the channel was never opened.
7884         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
7885 }
7886
7887 #[test]
7888 fn test_can_not_accept_inbound_channel_twice() {
7889         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7890         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7891         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7892         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7893         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7894         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7895
7896         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7897         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7898
7899         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7900
7901         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
7902         // accepting the inbound channel request.
7903         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7904
7905         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7906         match events[0] {
7907                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
7908                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0).unwrap();
7909                         let api_res = nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
7910                         match api_res {
7911                                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
7912                                         assert_eq!(err, "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.");
7913                                 },
7914                                 Ok(_) => panic!("Channel shouldn't be possible to be accepted twice"),
7915                                 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected Error {:?}", e),
7916                         }
7917                 }
7918                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7919         }
7920
7921         // Ensure that the channel wasn't closed after attempting to accept it twice.
7922         let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7923         assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7924
7925         match accept_msg_ev[0] {
7926                 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
7927                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7928                 }
7929                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7930         }
7931 }
7932
7933 #[test]
7934 fn test_can_not_accept_unknown_inbound_channel() {
7935         let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7936         let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
7937         let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
7938         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
7939
7940         let unknown_channel_id = [0; 32];
7941         let api_res = nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&unknown_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
7942         match api_res {
7943                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
7944                         assert_eq!(err, "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.");
7945                 },
7946                 Ok(_) => panic!("It shouldn't be possible to accept an unkown channel"),
7947                 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected Error: {:?}", e),
7948         }
7949 }
7950
7951 #[test]
7952 fn test_onion_value_mpp_set_calculation() {
7953         // Test that we use the onion value `amt_to_forward` when
7954         // calculating whether we've reached the `total_msat` of an MPP
7955         // by having a routing node forward more than `amt_to_forward`
7956         // and checking that the receiving node doesn't generate
7957         // a PaymentClaimable event too early
7958         let node_count = 4;
7959         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(node_count);
7960         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(node_count, &chanmon_cfgs);
7961         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(node_count, &node_cfgs, &vec![None; node_count]);
7962         let mut nodes = create_network(node_count, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7963
7964         let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7965         let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7966         let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7967         let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7968
7969         let total_msat = 100_000;
7970         let expected_paths: &[&[&Node]] = &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]];
7971         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], total_msat);
7972         let sample_path = route.paths.pop().unwrap();
7973
7974         let mut path_1 = sample_path.clone();
7975         path_1.hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7976         path_1.hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
7977         path_1.hops[1].pubkey = nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id();
7978         path_1.hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
7979         path_1.hops[1].fee_msat = 100_000;
7980         route.paths.push(path_1);
7981
7982         let mut path_2 = sample_path.clone();
7983         path_2.hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
7984         path_2.hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
7985         path_2.hops[1].pubkey = nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id();
7986         path_2.hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
7987         path_2.hops[1].fee_msat = 1_000;
7988         route.paths.push(path_2);
7989
7990         // Send payment
7991         let payment_id = PaymentId(nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.get_secure_random_bytes());
7992         let onion_session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
7993                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
7994         nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, our_payment_hash,
7995                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), None, payment_id, Some(total_msat), onion_session_privs).unwrap();
7996         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], expected_paths.len());
7997
7998         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7999         assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_paths.len());
8000
8001         // First path
8002         let ev = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&expected_paths[0][0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
8003         let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8004         let mut prev_node = &nodes[0];
8005
8006         for (idx, &node) in expected_paths[0].iter().enumerate() {
8007                 assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
8008
8009                 if idx == 0 { // routing node
8010                         let session_priv = [3; 32];
8011                         let height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
8012                         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv).unwrap();
8013                         let mut onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
8014                         let (mut onion_payloads, _, _) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 100_000,
8015                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), height + 1, &None).unwrap();
8016                         // Edit amt_to_forward to simulate the sender having set
8017                         // the final amount and the routing node taking less fee
8018                         if let msgs::OutboundOnionPayload::Receive { ref mut amt_msat, .. } = onion_payloads[1] {
8019                                 *amt_msat = 99_000;
8020                         } else { panic!() }
8021                         let new_onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash).unwrap();
8022                         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet = new_onion_packet;
8023                 }
8024
8025                 node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8026                 check_added_monitors!(node, 0);
8027                 commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8028                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(node);
8029
8030                 if idx == 0 {
8031                         let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8032                         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
8033                         check_added_monitors!(node, 1);
8034                         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
8035                         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
8036                 } else {
8037                         let events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8038                         assert!(events_2.is_empty());
8039                 }
8040
8041                 prev_node = node;
8042         }
8043
8044         // Second path
8045         let ev = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&expected_paths[1][0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
8046         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], expected_paths[1], 101_000, our_payment_hash.clone(), Some(our_payment_secret), ev, true, None);
8047
8048         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], expected_paths, false, our_payment_preimage);
8049 }
8050
8051 fn do_test_overshoot_mpp(msat_amounts: &[u64], total_msat: u64) {
8052
8053         let routing_node_count = msat_amounts.len();
8054         let node_count = routing_node_count + 2;
8055
8056         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(node_count);
8057         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(node_count, &chanmon_cfgs);
8058         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(node_count, &node_cfgs, &vec![None; node_count]);
8059         let nodes = create_network(node_count, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8060
8061         let src_idx = 0;
8062         let dst_idx = 1;
8063
8064         // Create channels for each amount
8065         let mut expected_paths = Vec::with_capacity(routing_node_count);
8066         let mut src_chan_ids = Vec::with_capacity(routing_node_count);
8067         let mut dst_chan_ids = Vec::with_capacity(routing_node_count);
8068         for i in 0..routing_node_count {
8069                 let routing_node = 2 + i;
8070                 let src_chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, src_idx, routing_node).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8071                 src_chan_ids.push(src_chan_id);
8072                 let dst_chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, routing_node, dst_idx).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8073                 dst_chan_ids.push(dst_chan_id);
8074                 let path = vec![&nodes[routing_node], &nodes[dst_idx]];
8075                 expected_paths.push(path);
8076         }
8077         let expected_paths: Vec<&[&Node]> = expected_paths.iter().map(|route| route.as_slice()).collect();
8078
8079         // Create a route for each amount
8080         let example_amount = 100000;
8081         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[src_idx], nodes[dst_idx], example_amount);
8082         let sample_path = route.paths.pop().unwrap();
8083         for i in 0..routing_node_count {
8084                 let routing_node = 2 + i;
8085                 let mut path = sample_path.clone();
8086                 path.hops[0].pubkey = nodes[routing_node].node.get_our_node_id();
8087                 path.hops[0].short_channel_id = src_chan_ids[i];
8088                 path.hops[1].pubkey = nodes[dst_idx].node.get_our_node_id();
8089                 path.hops[1].short_channel_id = dst_chan_ids[i];
8090                 path.hops[1].fee_msat = msat_amounts[i];
8091                 route.paths.push(path);
8092         }
8093
8094         // Send payment with manually set total_msat
8095         let payment_id = PaymentId(nodes[src_idx].keys_manager.backing.get_secure_random_bytes());
8096         let onion_session_privs = nodes[src_idx].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
8097                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
8098         nodes[src_idx].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, our_payment_hash,
8099                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), None, payment_id, Some(total_msat), onion_session_privs).unwrap();
8100         check_added_monitors!(nodes[src_idx], expected_paths.len());
8101
8102         let mut events = nodes[src_idx].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8103         assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_paths.len());
8104         let mut amount_received = 0;
8105         for (path_idx, expected_path) in expected_paths.iter().enumerate() {
8106                 let ev = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&expected_path[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
8107
8108                 let current_path_amount = msat_amounts[path_idx];
8109                 amount_received += current_path_amount;
8110                 let became_claimable_now = amount_received >= total_msat && amount_received - current_path_amount < total_msat;
8111                 pass_along_path(&nodes[src_idx], expected_path, amount_received, our_payment_hash.clone(), Some(our_payment_secret), ev, became_claimable_now, None);
8112         }
8113
8114         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[src_idx], &expected_paths, false, our_payment_preimage);
8115 }
8116
8117 #[test]
8118 fn test_overshoot_mpp() {
8119         do_test_overshoot_mpp(&[100_000, 101_000], 200_000);
8120         do_test_overshoot_mpp(&[100_000, 10_000, 100_000], 200_000);
8121 }
8122
8123 #[test]
8124 fn test_simple_mpp() {
8125         // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
8126         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8127         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8128         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8129         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8130
8131         let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8132         let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8133         let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8134         let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8135
8136         let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8137         let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8138         route.paths.push(path);
8139         route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8140         route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8141         route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8142         route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8143         route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8144         route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8145         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
8146         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
8147 }
8148
8149 #[test]
8150 fn test_preimage_storage() {
8151         // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
8152         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8153         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8154         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8155         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8156
8157         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8158
8159         {
8160                 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200, None).unwrap();
8161                 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8162                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8163                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8164                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8165                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8166                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8167                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8168                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8169         }
8170         // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8171         // values from previous calls.
8172         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8173         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8174         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8175         match events[0] {
8176                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref purpose, .. } => {
8177                         match &purpose {
8178                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
8179                                         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
8180                                 },
8181                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
8182                         }
8183                 },
8184                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8185         }
8186 }
8187
8188 #[test]
8189 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8190         // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8191         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8192         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8193         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8194         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8195
8196         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8197
8198         let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8199         let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8200         let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2, None).unwrap();
8201         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8202
8203         // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8204         // resulting events.
8205         macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8206                 ($payment_hash: expr) => {
8207                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8208                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8209                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8210                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8211                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8212
8213                         // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8214                         // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8215                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8216                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash: $payment_hash }]);
8217                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8218
8219                         // We should fail the payment back
8220                         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8221                         match events.pop().unwrap() {
8222                                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8223                                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8224                                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8225                                 },
8226                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8227                         }
8228                 }
8229         }
8230
8231         let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8232         // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8233         let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8234
8235         // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8236         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
8237                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(random_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8238         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(our_payment_hash);
8239         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8240
8241         // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8242         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, random_payment_hash,
8243                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(random_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8244         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8245         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8246
8247         // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8248         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, random_payment_hash,
8249                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(random_payment_secret), PaymentId(random_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8250         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8251         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8252 }
8253
8254 #[test]
8255 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8256         // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8257         // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8258         // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus
8259         // error.
8260         //
8261         // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8262         // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8263         // commitment at same time.
8264
8265         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8266         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8267         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8268         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8269
8270         // Create some initial channel
8271         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8272         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8273
8274         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8275         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8276
8277         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8278         let (preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
8279
8280         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8281         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8282         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8283         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8284         let watchtower = {
8285                 let new_monitor = {
8286                         let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8287                         let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8288                                         &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8289                         assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8290                         new_monitor
8291                 };
8292                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8293                 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8294                 watchtower
8295         };
8296         let block = create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new());
8297         // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8298         // transaction lock time requirements here.
8299         chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (block.clone(), 200));
8300         watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, 200);
8301
8302         // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8303         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage);
8304         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8305         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
8306
8307         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8308         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8309         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8310         {
8311                 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
8312                 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
8313                 let mut channel = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, chan_1.2);
8314                 if let Ok(Some(update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8315                         assert_eq!(watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure);
8316                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8317                 } else { assert!(false); }
8318         }
8319         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8320         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8321         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8322         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8323 }
8324
8325 #[test]
8326 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8327         // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8328         // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8329         // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8330         // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8331
8332         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8333         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8334         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8335         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8336
8337         // Create some initial channel
8338         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8339         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8340
8341         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8342         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8343
8344         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8345         route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8346
8347         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8348         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8349         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8350         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8351         let alice_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::with_blocks(
8352                 Arc::new(Mutex::new(nodes[0].blocks.lock().unwrap().clone())),
8353         );
8354         let watchtower_alice = {
8355                 let new_monitor = {
8356                         let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8357                         let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8358                                         &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8359                         assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8360                         new_monitor
8361                 };
8362                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &alice_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8363                 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8364                 watchtower
8365         };
8366         let block = create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new());
8367         // Make Alice aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating transaction lock time
8368         // requirements here.
8369         const HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST: u32 = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
8370         alice_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST) as usize, (block.clone(), HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST));
8371         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST);
8372
8373         // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8374         let alice_state = {
8375                 let mut txn = alice_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
8376                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8377                 txn.remove(0)
8378         };
8379
8380         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8381         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8382         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8383         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8384         let bob_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::with_blocks(Arc::clone(&alice_broadcaster.blocks));
8385         let watchtower_bob = {
8386                 let new_monitor = {
8387                         let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8388                         let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8389                                         &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8390                         assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8391                         new_monitor
8392                 };
8393                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &bob_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8394                 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8395                 watchtower
8396         };
8397         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new()), HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST - 1);
8398
8399         // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8400         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8401         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8402                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8403         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8404
8405         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8406         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8407         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8408         {
8409                 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
8410                 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
8411                 let mut channel = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, chan_1.2);
8412                 if let Ok(Some(update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8413                         // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8414                         assert_eq!(watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure);
8415                         assert_eq!(watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8416                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8417                 } else { assert!(false); }
8418         }
8419         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8420         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8421
8422         //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8423         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new()), HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST);
8424
8425         // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8426         let bob_state_y;
8427         {
8428                 let mut txn = bob_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
8429                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8430                 bob_state_y = txn.remove(0);
8431         };
8432
8433         // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8434         let height = HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST + 1;
8435         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
8436         check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
8437         check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false,
8438                 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
8439         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, vec![bob_state_y.clone()]), height);
8440         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
8441         {
8442                 let htlc_txn = alice_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
8443                 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
8444                 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8445                 // Alice doesn't clean up the old HTLC claim since it hasn't seen a conflicting spend for
8446                 // it. However, she should, because it now has an invalid parent.
8447                 check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], alice_state);
8448         }
8449 }
8450
8451 #[test]
8452 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8453         // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8454         // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8455         // message).
8456         //
8457         // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8458         // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8459         //
8460         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8461         // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8462         // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8463         // before receiving funding_signed.
8464         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8465         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8466         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8467         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8468
8469         // Create an initial channel
8470         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8471         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8472         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8473         let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8474         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan_msg);
8475
8476         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8477         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8478
8479         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8480         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8481
8482         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8483         let channel_id = crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
8484         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8485         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8486         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString("Hi".to_string()) }, true,
8487                 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(); 2], 100000);
8488 }
8489
8490 #[test]
8491 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8492         // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8493         // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8494         // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8495         // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
8496         // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
8497         // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
8498
8499         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8500         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8501         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8502         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8503
8504         // Create some initial channels
8505         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8506
8507         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
8508         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
8509         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
8510         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8511         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
8512         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
8513
8514         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8515         let block = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![local_txn[0].clone()]);
8516         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
8517         // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
8518         // this test before #653 fix.
8519         chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &block, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
8520         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8521         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8522         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
8523         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
8524
8525         let htlc_timeout = {
8526                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8527                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8528                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8529                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8530                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
8531                 node_txn[0].clone()
8532         };
8533
8534         connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![htlc_timeout.clone()]));
8535         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8536         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
8537 }
8538
8539 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
8540         // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
8541         // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
8542         // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
8543         //
8544         // Steps of the test:
8545         // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
8546         // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
8547         // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
8548         // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
8549         // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
8550         //    but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
8551         // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
8552         // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
8553         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8554         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8555         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8556         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8557
8558         // Create some initial channels
8559         let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8560         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001);
8561
8562         // Steps (1) and (2):
8563         // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
8564         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
8565
8566         // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
8567         let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
8568         check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8569         assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
8570         check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
8571         assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8572         assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
8573
8574         // Steps (3) and (4):
8575         // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
8576         // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
8577         let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
8578         let mut counterparty_node = 1; // Bob if Alice force-closes
8579
8580         // Bob force-closes
8581         if !broadcast_alice {
8582                 force_closing_node = 1;
8583                 counterparty_node = 0;
8584         }
8585         nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_ab.2, &nodes[counterparty_node].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8586         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
8587         check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
8588         check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[counterparty_node].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
8589         if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8590                 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
8591                         true => alice_txn.clone(),
8592                         false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
8593                 };
8594                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]));
8595                 if broadcast_alice {
8596                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8597                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8598                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
8599                 }
8600         }
8601
8602         // Step (5):
8603         // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
8604         // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
8605         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8606         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8607         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
8608
8609         let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8610         assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8611         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8612         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8613         assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
8614         assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8615
8616         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8617         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false, false);
8618         // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
8619         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
8620                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8621                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8622                 match events[0] {
8623                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
8624                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8625                         },
8626                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8627                 };
8628         }
8629         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
8630         // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
8631         // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
8632         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8633
8634         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8635         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8636         let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
8637                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8638                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8639                         (*msg).clone()
8640                 },
8641                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8642         };
8643         let bob_updates = match events[1] {
8644                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
8645                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8646                         (*updates).clone()
8647                 },
8648                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8649         };
8650
8651         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
8652         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8653         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
8654         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8655
8656         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8657         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8658         let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
8659                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8660                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8661                         (*msg).clone()
8662                 },
8663                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8664         };
8665         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
8666         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8667
8668         // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
8669         // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
8670         let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
8671         if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
8672         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8673                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]));
8674                 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
8675                 if broadcast_alice {
8676                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8677                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8678                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
8679                 }
8680                 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8681                 if broadcast_alice {
8682                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8683                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8684                 } else {
8685                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8686                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8687                 }
8688         }
8689
8690         // Step (6):
8691         // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
8692         // broadcasted commitment transaction.
8693         {
8694                 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
8695                         true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
8696                         false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
8697                 };
8698                 // If Alice force-closed, Bob only broadcasts a HTLC-output-claiming transaction. Otherwise,
8699                 // Bob force-closed and broadcasts the commitment transaction along with a
8700                 // HTLC-output-claiming transaction.
8701                 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8702                 if broadcast_alice {
8703                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8704                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8705                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8706                 } else {
8707                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8708                         check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8709                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8710                 }
8711         }
8712 }
8713
8714 #[test]
8715 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
8716         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
8717         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
8718         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
8719         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
8720 }
8721
8722 #[test]
8723 fn test_duplicate_temporary_channel_id_from_different_peers() {
8724         // Tests that we can accept two different `OpenChannel` requests with the same
8725         // `temporary_channel_id`, as long as they are from different peers.
8726         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8727         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8728         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8729         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8730
8731         // Create an first channel channel
8732         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8733         let mut open_chan_msg_chan_1_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8734
8735         // Create an second channel
8736         nodes[2].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 43, None).unwrap();
8737         let mut open_chan_msg_chan_2_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8738
8739         // Modify the `OpenChannel` from `nodes[2]` to `nodes[0]` to ensure that it uses the same
8740         // `temporary_channel_id` as the `OpenChannel` from nodes[1] to nodes[0].
8741         open_chan_msg_chan_2_0.temporary_channel_id = open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.temporary_channel_id;
8742
8743         // Assert that `nodes[0]` can accept both `OpenChannel` requests, even though they use the same
8744         // `temporary_channel_id` as they are from different peers.
8745         nodes[0].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg_chan_1_0);
8746         {
8747                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8748                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8749                 match &events[0] {
8750                         MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { node_id, msg } => {
8751                                 assert_eq!(node_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8752                                 assert_eq!(msg.temporary_channel_id, open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.temporary_channel_id);
8753                         },
8754                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8755                 }
8756         }
8757
8758         nodes[0].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg_chan_2_0);
8759         {
8760                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8761                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8762                 match &events[0] {
8763                         MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { node_id, msg } => {
8764                                 assert_eq!(node_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8765                                 assert_eq!(msg.temporary_channel_id, open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.temporary_channel_id);
8766                         },
8767                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8768                 }
8769         }
8770 }
8771
8772 #[test]
8773 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
8774         // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
8775         // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
8776         //
8777         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
8778         // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
8779         // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
8780         // updating logic for the existing channel.
8781         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8782         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8783         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8784         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8785
8786         // Create an initial channel
8787         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8788         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8789         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8790         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8791
8792         // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
8793         // that it is rejected.
8794         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8795         {
8796                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8797                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8798                 match events[0] {
8799                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8800                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
8801                                 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
8802                                 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
8803                                 // move forward with it.
8804                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8805                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8806                         },
8807                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8808                 }
8809         }
8810
8811         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8812         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8813
8814         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8815         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8816
8817         let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8818         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8819         {
8820                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8821                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8822                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8823                 added_monitors.clear();
8824         }
8825         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8826
8827         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8828
8829         let funding_outpoint = crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
8830         let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
8831
8832         // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
8833         // temporary one).
8834
8835         // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
8836         // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
8837         // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
8838         open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
8839         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8840         {
8841                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8842                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8843                 match events[0] {
8844                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8845                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8846                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8847                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8848                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8849                         },
8850                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8851                 }
8852         }
8853
8854         // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
8855         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8856         let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8857         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_2_msg);
8858         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8859         create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
8860
8861         let (_, funding_created) = {
8862                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8863                 let mut a_peer_state = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8864                 // Once we call `get_funding_created` the channel has a duplicate channel_id as
8865                 // another channel in the ChannelManager - an invalid state. Thus, we'd panic later when we
8866                 // try to create another channel. Instead, we drop the channel entirely here (leaving the
8867                 // channelmanager in a possibly nonsense state instead).
8868                 let mut as_chan = a_peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.remove(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
8869                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8870                 as_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap()
8871         };
8872         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8873         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
8874         // At this point we'll look up if the channel_id is present and immediately fail the channel
8875         // without trying to persist the `ChannelMonitor`.
8876         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8877
8878         // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
8879         {
8880                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8881                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8882                 match events[0] {
8883                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8884                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8885                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8886                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
8887                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8888                         },
8889                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8890                 }
8891         }
8892
8893         // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
8894         // everything is functional.
8895         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
8896         {
8897                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8898                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8899                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8900                 added_monitors.clear();
8901         }
8902         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8903
8904         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8905         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
8906         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
8907         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
8908
8909         let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8910         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8911         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
8912
8913         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
8914 }
8915
8916 #[test]
8917 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
8918         // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
8919         //
8920         // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
8921         // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
8922         // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
8923         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8924         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8925         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8926         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8927
8928         // Create some initial channels
8929         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8930         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8931         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001);
8932
8933         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8934         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8935         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8936
8937         // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
8938         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8939         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8940
8941         // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
8942         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8943         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8944         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
8945         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString("ERR".to_string()) },
8946                 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
8947         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
8948         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8949         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
8950         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8951
8952         // A null channel ID should close all channels
8953         let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8954         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8955         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
8956         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString("ERR".to_string()) },
8957                 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(); 2], 100000);
8958         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8959         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8960         match events[0] {
8961                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
8962                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
8963                 },
8964                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8965         }
8966         match events[1] {
8967                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
8968                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
8969                 },
8970                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8971         }
8972         // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
8973         // peer_disconnected.
8974         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8975         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8976
8977         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8978         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8979         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8980 }
8981
8982 #[test]
8983 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
8984         // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
8985         //
8986         // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
8987         // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
8988         // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
8989         // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
8990         //
8991         // Further, if the funding transaction is consensus-valid, confirms, and is later spent, we'd
8992         // previously have crashed in `ChannelMonitor` even though we closed the channel as bogus and
8993         // gave up on it. We test this here by generating such a transaction.
8994         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8995         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8996         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8997         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8998
8999         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9000         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9001         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9002
9003         let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
9004
9005         // Create a witness program which can be spent by a 4-empty-stack-elements witness and which is
9006         // 136 bytes long. This matches our "accepted HTLC preimage spend" matching, previously causing
9007         // a panic as we'd try to extract a 32 byte preimage from a witness element without checking
9008         // its length.
9009         let mut wit_program: Vec<u8> = channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program();
9010         let wit_program_script: Script = wit_program.into();
9011         for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
9012                 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
9013                 output.script_pubkey = Script::new_v0_p2wsh(&wit_program_script.wscript_hash());
9014         }
9015
9016         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
9017         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9018         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9019         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9020
9021         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9022         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9023         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9024
9025         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9026         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
9027
9028         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9029         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9030         nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
9031
9032         let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
9033         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
9034         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() },
9035                 [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
9036         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9037         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9038         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
9039         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
9040                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9041                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
9042                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
9043                 } else { panic!(); }
9044         } else { panic!(); }
9045         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
9046
9047         // Now confirm a spend of the (bogus) funding transaction. As long as the witness is 5 elements
9048         // long the ChannelMonitor will try to read 32 bytes from the second-to-last element, panicing
9049         // as its not 32 bytes long.
9050         let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
9051                 version: 2i32, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
9052                 input: tx.output.iter().enumerate().map(|(idx, _)| TxIn {
9053                         previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
9054                                 txid: tx.txid(),
9055                                 vout: idx as u32,
9056                         },
9057                         script_sig: Script::new(),
9058                         sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
9059                         witness: Witness::from_vec(channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness())
9060                 }).collect(),
9061                 output: vec![TxOut {
9062                         value: 1000,
9063                         script_pubkey: Script::new(),
9064                 }]
9065         };
9066         check_spends!(spend_tx, tx);
9067         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &spend_tx);
9068 }
9069
9070 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
9071         // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
9072         // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
9073         // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
9074         // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
9075         // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
9076         // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
9077         // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
9078         // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
9079         // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
9080         // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
9081         // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
9082         // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
9083         // until we learned about an additional block.
9084         //
9085         // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
9086         // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
9087         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9088         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9089         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9090         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9091         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
9092
9093         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9094         let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
9095         let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
9096         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9097         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9098
9099         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9100         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9101         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
9102         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9103         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9104         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
9105
9106         let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
9107         if !test_height_before_timelock {
9108                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
9109         }
9110         nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9111                 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
9112         if test_height_before_timelock {
9113                 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
9114                 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
9115                 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
9116                 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9117         } else {
9118                 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
9119                 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9120                 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
9121                 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0].txid(), node_txn[0].txid());
9122                 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
9123                 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
9124                 // timelock is up).
9125                 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
9126                 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
9127
9128                 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
9129                 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
9130                 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
9131                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9132                         &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
9133                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: channel_id }]);
9134                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9135
9136                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9137                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9138                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9139                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9140                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9141                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9142                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9143                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9144                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
9145         }
9146 }
9147
9148 #[test]
9149 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
9150         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
9151         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
9152 }
9153
9154 fn do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(test_for_second_fail_panic: bool) {
9155         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9156         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9157         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9158         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9159
9160         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9161
9162         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9163                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
9164         let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 10_000).unwrap();
9165
9166         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
9167
9168         {
9169                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
9170                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9171                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9172                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9173                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9174                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9175                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9176                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9177         }
9178         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9179         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 10_000);
9180
9181         {
9182                 // Note that we use a different PaymentId here to allow us to duplicativly pay
9183                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
9184                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_secret.0)).unwrap();
9185                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9186                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9187                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9188                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9189                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9190                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9191                 // At this point, nodes[1] would notice it has too much value for the payment. It will
9192                 // assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9193                 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC. Previously, it'd also have failed back
9194                 // the first HTLC delivered above.
9195         }
9196
9197         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9198         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9199
9200         if test_for_second_fail_panic {
9201                 // Now we go fail back the first HTLC from the user end.
9202                 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
9203
9204                 let expected_destinations = vec![
9205                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
9206                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
9207                 ];
9208                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1],  expected_destinations);
9209                 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9210
9211                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9212                 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9213                 assert_eq!(fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 2);
9214
9215                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9216                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
9217                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9218
9219                 let failure_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9220                 assert_eq!(failure_events.len(), 4);
9221                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
9222                 if let Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = failure_events[1] {} else { panic!(); }
9223                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[2] {} else { panic!(); }
9224                 if let Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = failure_events[3] {} else { panic!(); }
9225         } else {
9226                 // Let the second HTLC fail and claim the first
9227                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9228                 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9229
9230                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9231                 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9232                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9233                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9234
9235                 expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
9236
9237                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
9238         }
9239 }
9240
9241 #[test]
9242 fn test_dup_htlc_second_fail_panic() {
9243         // Previously, if we received two HTLCs back-to-back, where the second overran the expected
9244         // value for the payment, we'd fail back both HTLCs after generating a `PaymentClaimable` event.
9245         // Then, if the user failed the second payment, they'd hit a "tried to fail an already failed
9246         // HTLC" debug panic. This tests for this behavior, checking that only one HTLC is auto-failed.
9247         do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(true);
9248 }
9249
9250 #[test]
9251 fn test_dup_htlc_second_rejected() {
9252         // Test that if we receive a second HTLC for an MPP payment that overruns the payment amount we
9253         // simply reject the second HTLC but are still able to claim the first HTLC.
9254         do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(false);
9255 }
9256
9257 #[test]
9258 fn test_inconsistent_mpp_params() {
9259         // Test that if we recieve two HTLCs with different payment parameters we fail back the first
9260         // such HTLC and allow the second to stay.
9261         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9262         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9263         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9264         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9265
9266         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0);
9267         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0);
9268         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0);
9269         let chan_2_3 =create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0);
9270
9271         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9272                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[3].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
9273         let mut route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 15_000_000).unwrap();
9274         assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9275         route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9276                 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9277                 if path_a.hops[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9278                         core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9279         });
9280
9281         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[3]);
9282
9283         let cur_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
9284         let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
9285
9286         let session_privs = {
9287                 // We create a fake route here so that we start with three pending HTLCs, which we'll
9288                 // ultimately have, just not right away.
9289                 let mut dup_route = route.clone();
9290                 dup_route.paths.push(route.paths[1].clone());
9291                 nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
9292                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &dup_route).unwrap()
9293         };
9294         nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
9295                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id,
9296                 &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
9297         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9298
9299         {
9300                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9301                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9302                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), false, None);
9303         }
9304         assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9305
9306         nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
9307                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), 14_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
9308         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9309
9310         {
9311                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9312                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9313                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9314
9315                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9316                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9317
9318                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9319                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9320
9321                 let mut events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9322                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9323                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9324
9325                 nodes[3].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9326                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9327                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg, true, true);
9328
9329                 // At this point, nodes[3] should notice the two HTLCs don't contain the same total payment
9330                 // amount. It will assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9331                 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC.
9332         }
9333         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[3]);
9334         nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9335         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[3], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9336         nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9337
9338         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
9339
9340         let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9341         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9342         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9343
9344         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }]);
9345         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9346
9347         let fail_updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9348         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9349         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], fail_updates_2.commitment_signed, false);
9350
9351         expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9352
9353         nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
9354                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id,
9355                 &None, session_privs[2]).unwrap();
9356         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9357
9358         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9359         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9360         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), true, None);
9361
9362         do_claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, our_payment_preimage);
9363         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], our_payment_preimage, Some(None), true, true);
9364 }
9365
9366 #[test]
9367 fn test_double_partial_claim() {
9368         // Test what happens if a node receives a payment, generates a PaymentClaimable event, the HTLCs
9369         // time out, the sender resends only some of the MPP parts, then the user processes the
9370         // PaymentClaimable event, ensuring they don't inadvertently claim only part of the full payment
9371         // amount.
9372         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9373         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9374         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9375         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9376
9377         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0);
9378         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0);
9379         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0);
9380         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0);
9381
9382         let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], 15_000_000);
9383         assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9384         route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9385                 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9386                 if path_a.hops[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9387                         core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9388         });
9389
9390         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
9391         // nodes[3] has now received a PaymentClaimable event...which it will take some (exorbitant)
9392         // amount of time to respond to.
9393
9394         // Connect some blocks to time out the payment
9395         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
9396         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // To get the same height for sending later
9397
9398         let failed_destinations = vec![
9399                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
9400                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
9401         ];
9402         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations);
9403
9404         pass_failed_payment_back(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_hash, PaymentFailureReason::RecipientRejected);
9405
9406         // nodes[1] now retries one of the two paths...
9407         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9408                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9409         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9410
9411         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9412         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9413         let node_1_msgs = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
9414         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), node_1_msgs, false, None);
9415
9416         // At this point nodes[3] has received one half of the payment, and the user goes to handle
9417         // that PaymentClaimable event they got hours ago and never handled...we should refuse to claim.
9418         nodes[3].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9419         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9420         assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9421 }
9422
9423 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
9424 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
9425 enum ExposureEvent {
9426         /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
9427         AtHTLCForward,
9428         /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
9429         AtHTLCReception,
9430         /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
9431         AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
9432 }
9433
9434 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool, multiplier_dust_limit: bool) {
9435         // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
9436         // policy.
9437         //
9438         // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
9439         // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
9440         // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
9441         // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
9442         // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
9443         // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
9444         // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
9445         // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
9446
9447         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9448         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
9449         config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = if multiplier_dust_limit {
9450                 // Default test fee estimator rate is 253 sat/kw, so we set the multiplier to 5_000_000 / 253
9451                 // to get roughly the same initial value as the default setting when this test was
9452                 // originally written.
9453                 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253)
9454         } else { MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(5_000_000) }; // initial default setting value
9455         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9456         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
9457         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9458
9459         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9460         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9461         open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
9462         open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
9463         if on_holder_tx {
9464                 open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9465         }
9466         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
9467         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9468         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9469
9470         let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
9471
9472         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9473
9474         if on_holder_tx {
9475                 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
9476                 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
9477                 let mut chan = get_outbound_v1_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, temporary_channel_id);
9478                 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9479         }
9480
9481         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9482         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9483         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9484         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9485
9486         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9487         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9488         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9489
9490         let (channel_ready, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9491         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9492         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9493
9494         // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
9495         let (mut route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) =
9496                 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000);
9497
9498         let (dust_buffer_feerate, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat) = {
9499                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9500                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9501                 let chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
9502                 (chan.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64,
9503                 chan.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator(nodes[0].fee_estimator)))
9504         };
9505         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9506         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9507
9508         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9509         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9510
9511         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 4;
9512         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
9513
9514         if on_holder_tx {
9515                 if dust_outbound_balance {
9516                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9517                         // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9518                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
9519                         for _ in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9520                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9521                                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9522                                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9523                         }
9524                 } else {
9525                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9526                         // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9527                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
9528                         for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9529                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9530                         }
9531                 }
9532         } else {
9533                 if dust_outbound_balance {
9534                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9535                         // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9536                         for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx - 1 {
9537                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9538                                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9539                                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9540                         }
9541                 } else {
9542                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9543                         // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9544                         for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx - 1 {
9545                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9546                         }
9547                 }
9548         }
9549
9550         if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
9551                 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat =
9552                         if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat + 1 };
9553                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9554                 if on_holder_tx {
9555                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9556                                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)
9557                                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
9558                 } else {
9559                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9560                                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)
9561                                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
9562                 }
9563         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
9564                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat + 4 });
9565                 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9566                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9567                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9568                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9569                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9570                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
9571                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9572                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9573                 if on_holder_tx {
9574                         // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
9575                         let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9576                         let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9577                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9578                 } else {
9579                         // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
9580                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
9581                                 format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
9582                                         dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx - 1) + dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat + 4,
9583                                         max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9584                 }
9585         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
9586                 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat = 2_500_000;
9587                 // For the multiplier dust exposure limit, since it scales with feerate,
9588                 // we need to add a lot of HTLCs that will become dust at the new feerate
9589                 // to cross the threshold.
9590                 for _ in 0..20 {
9591                         let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash(&nodes[1], Some(1_000), None);
9592                         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9593                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9594                 }
9595                 {
9596                         let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9597                         *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
9598                 }
9599                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9600                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9601                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel", "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure", 1);
9602         }
9603
9604         let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9605         let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9606         added_monitors.clear();
9607 }
9608
9609 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure_by_threshold_type(multiplier_dust_limit: bool) {
9610         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
9611         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
9612         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
9613         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
9614         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
9615         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
9616         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
9617         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
9618         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
9619         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
9620         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
9621         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
9622 }
9623
9624 #[test]
9625 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
9626         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure_by_threshold_type(false);
9627         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure_by_threshold_type(true);
9628 }
9629
9630 #[test]
9631 fn test_non_final_funding_tx() {
9632         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9633         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9634         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9635         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9636
9637         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9638         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9639         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
9640         let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9641         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
9642
9643         let best_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
9644
9645         let chan_id = *nodes[0].network_chan_count.borrow();
9646         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9647         let input = TxIn { previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint::null(), script_sig: bitcoin::Script::new(), sequence: Sequence(1), witness: Witness::from_vec(vec!(vec!(1))) };
9648         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9649         let mut tx = match events[0] {
9650                 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } => {
9651                         // Timelock the transaction _beyond_ the best client height + 1.
9652                         Transaction { version: chan_id as i32, lock_time: PackedLockTime(best_height + 2), input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut {
9653                                 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9654                         }]}
9655                 },
9656                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9657         };
9658         // Transaction should fail as it's evaluated as non-final for propagation.
9659         match nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()) {
9660                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
9661                         assert_eq!(format!("Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final"), err);
9662                 },
9663                 _ => panic!()
9664         }
9665
9666         // However, transaction should be accepted if it's in a +1 headroom from best block.
9667         tx.lock_time = PackedLockTime(tx.lock_time.0 - 1);
9668         assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
9669         get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9670 }
9671
9672 #[test]
9673 fn accept_busted_but_better_fee() {
9674         // If a peer sends us a fee update that is too low, but higher than our previous channel
9675         // feerate, we should accept it. In the future we may want to consider closing the channel
9676         // later, but for now we only accept the update.
9677         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9678         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9679         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9680         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9681
9682         create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9683
9684         // Set nodes[1] to expect 5,000 sat/kW.
9685         {
9686                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9687                 *feerate_lock = 5000;
9688         }
9689
9690         // If nodes[0] increases their feerate, even if its not enough, nodes[1] should accept it.
9691         {
9692                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9693                 *feerate_lock = 1000;
9694         }
9695         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9696         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9697
9698         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9699         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9700         match events[0] {
9701                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
9702                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
9703                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], commitment_signed, false);
9704                 },
9705                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9706         };
9707
9708         // If nodes[0] increases their feerate further, even if its not enough, nodes[1] should accept
9709         // it.
9710         {
9711                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9712                 *feerate_lock = 2000;
9713         }
9714         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9715         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9716
9717         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9718         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9719         match events[0] {
9720                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
9721                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
9722                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], commitment_signed, false);
9723                 },
9724                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9725         };
9726
9727         // However, if nodes[0] decreases their feerate, nodes[1] should reject it and close the
9728         // channel.
9729         {
9730                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9731                 *feerate_lock = 1000;
9732         }
9733         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9734         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9735
9736         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9737         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9738         match events[0] {
9739                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
9740                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
9741                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
9742                                 err: "Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: 1000. Our expected lower limit: 5000 (- 250)".to_owned() },
9743                                 [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
9744                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9745                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9746                 },
9747                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9748         };
9749 }
9750
9751 fn do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(valid_delta: bool, use_user_hash: bool) {
9752         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9753         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9754         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9755         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9756         let min_final_cltv_expiry_delta = 120;
9757         let final_cltv_expiry_delta = if valid_delta { min_final_cltv_expiry_delta + 2 } else {
9758                 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta - 2 };
9759         let recv_value = 100_000;
9760
9761         create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9762
9763         let payment_parameters = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32);
9764         let (payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = if use_user_hash {
9765                 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1],
9766                         Some(recv_value), Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta));
9767                 (payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret)
9768         } else {
9769                 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(recv_value), 7200, Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)).unwrap();
9770                 (payment_hash, nodes[1].node.get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret).unwrap(), payment_secret)
9771         };
9772         let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_parameters, recv_value).unwrap();
9773         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9774                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9775         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9776         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9777         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9778         let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9779         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9780         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9781         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9782
9783         if valid_delta {
9784                 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, recv_value, if use_user_hash {
9785                         None } else { Some(payment_preimage) }, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9786
9787                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
9788         } else {
9789                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9790
9791                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9792
9793                 let fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9794                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9795                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
9796
9797                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9798         }
9799 }
9800
9801 #[test]
9802 fn test_payment_with_custom_min_cltv_expiry_delta() {
9803         do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(false, false);
9804         do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(false, true);
9805         do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(true, false);
9806         do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(true, true);
9807 }
9808
9809 #[test]
9810 fn test_disconnects_peer_awaiting_response_ticks() {
9811         // Tests that nodes which are awaiting on a response critical for channel responsiveness
9812         // disconnect their counterparty after `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
9813         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9814         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9815         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9816         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9817
9818         // Asserts a disconnect event is queued to the user.
9819         let check_disconnect_event = |node: &Node, should_disconnect: bool| {
9820                 let disconnect_event = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().iter().find_map(|event|
9821                         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action, .. } = event {
9822                                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning { .. } = action {
9823                                         Some(())
9824                                 } else {
9825                                         None
9826                                 }
9827                         } else {
9828                                 None
9829                         }
9830                 );
9831                 assert_eq!(disconnect_event.is_some(), should_disconnect);
9832         };
9833
9834         // Fires timer ticks ensuring we only attempt to disconnect peers after reaching
9835         // `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
9836         let check_disconnect = |node: &Node| {
9837                 // No disconnect without any timer ticks.
9838                 check_disconnect_event(node, false);
9839
9840                 // No disconnect with 1 timer tick less than required.
9841                 for _ in 0..DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS - 1 {
9842                         node.node.timer_tick_occurred();
9843                         check_disconnect_event(node, false);
9844                 }
9845
9846                 // Disconnect after reaching the required ticks.
9847                 node.node.timer_tick_occurred();
9848                 check_disconnect_event(node, true);
9849
9850                 // Disconnect again on the next tick if the peer hasn't been disconnected yet.
9851                 node.node.timer_tick_occurred();
9852                 check_disconnect_event(node, true);
9853         };
9854
9855         create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9856
9857         // We'll start by performing a fee update with Alice (nodes[0]) on the channel.
9858         *nodes[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
9859         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9860         check_added_monitors!(&nodes[0], 1);
9861         let alice_fee_update = get_htlc_update_msgs(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9862         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), alice_fee_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
9863         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &alice_fee_update.commitment_signed);
9864         check_added_monitors!(&nodes[1], 1);
9865
9866         // This will prompt Bob (nodes[1]) to respond with his `CommitmentSigned` and `RevokeAndACK`.
9867         let (bob_revoke_and_ack, bob_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9868         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revoke_and_ack);
9869         check_added_monitors!(&nodes[0], 1);
9870         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_commitment_signed);
9871         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
9872
9873         // Alice then needs to send her final `RevokeAndACK` to complete the commitment dance. We
9874         // pretend Bob hasn't received the message and check whether he'll disconnect Alice after
9875         // reaching `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
9876         let alice_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9877         check_disconnect(&nodes[1]);
9878
9879         // Now, we'll reconnect them to test awaiting a `ChannelReestablish` message.
9880         //
9881         // Note that since the commitment dance didn't complete above, Alice is expected to resend her
9882         // final `RevokeAndACK` to Bob to complete it.
9883         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9884         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9885         let bob_init = msgs::Init {
9886                 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9887         };
9888         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_init, true).unwrap();
9889         let alice_init = msgs::Init {
9890                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9891         };
9892         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &alice_init, true).unwrap();
9893
9894         // Upon reconnection, Alice sends her `ChannelReestablish` to Bob. Alice, however, hasn't
9895         // received Bob's yet, so she should disconnect him after reaching
9896         // `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
9897         let alice_channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
9898                 nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()
9899         );
9900         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &alice_channel_reestablish);
9901         check_disconnect(&nodes[0]);
9902
9903         // Bob now sends his `ChannelReestablish` to Alice to resume the channel and consider it "live".
9904         let bob_channel_reestablish = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().iter().find_map(|event|
9905                 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = event {
9906                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9907                         Some(msg.clone())
9908                 } else {
9909                         None
9910                 }
9911         ).unwrap();
9912         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_channel_reestablish);
9913
9914         // Sanity check that Alice won't disconnect Bob since she's no longer waiting for any messages.
9915         for _ in 0..DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS {
9916                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9917                 check_disconnect_event(&nodes[0], false);
9918         }
9919
9920         // However, Bob is still waiting on Alice's `RevokeAndACK`, so he should disconnect her after
9921         // reaching `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
9922         check_disconnect(&nodes[1]);
9923
9924         // Finally, have Bob process the last message.
9925         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &alice_revoke_and_ack);
9926         check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
9927
9928         // At this point, neither node should attempt to disconnect each other, since they aren't
9929         // waiting on any messages.
9930         for node in &nodes {
9931                 for _ in 0..DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS {
9932                         node.node.timer_tick_occurred();
9933                         check_disconnect_event(node, false);
9934                 }
9935         }
9936 }
9937
9938 #[test]
9939 fn test_remove_expired_outbound_unfunded_channels() {
9940         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9941         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9942         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9943         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9944
9945         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9946         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9947         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
9948         let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9949         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
9950
9951         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9952         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9953         match events[0] {
9954                 Event::FundingGenerationReady { .. } => (),
9955                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9956         };
9957
9958         // Asserts the outbound channel has been removed from a nodes[0]'s peer state map.
9959         let check_outbound_channel_existence = |should_exist: bool| {
9960                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9961                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9962                 assert_eq!(chan_lock.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.contains_key(&temp_channel_id), should_exist);
9963         };
9964
9965         // Channel should exist without any timer ticks.
9966         check_outbound_channel_existence(true);
9967
9968         // Channel should exist with 1 timer tick less than required.
9969         for _ in 0..UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS - 1 {
9970                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9971                 check_outbound_channel_existence(true)
9972         }
9973
9974         // Remove channel after reaching the required ticks.
9975         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9976         check_outbound_channel_existence(false);
9977
9978         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9979         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
9980         match msg_events[0] {
9981                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
9982                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake");
9983                 },
9984                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9985         }
9986         check_closed_event(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false, &[nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
9987 }
9988
9989 #[test]
9990 fn test_remove_expired_inbound_unfunded_channels() {
9991         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9992         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9993         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9994         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9995
9996         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9997         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9998         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
9999         let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10000         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
10001
10002         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10003         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10004         match events[0] {
10005                 Event::FundingGenerationReady { .. } => (),
10006                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10007         };
10008
10009         // Asserts the inbound channel has been removed from a nodes[1]'s peer state map.
10010         let check_inbound_channel_existence = |should_exist: bool| {
10011                 let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10012                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
10013                 assert_eq!(chan_lock.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.contains_key(&temp_channel_id), should_exist);
10014         };
10015
10016         // Channel should exist without any timer ticks.
10017         check_inbound_channel_existence(true);
10018
10019         // Channel should exist with 1 timer tick less than required.
10020         for _ in 0..UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS - 1 {
10021                 nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10022                 check_inbound_channel_existence(true)
10023         }
10024
10025         // Remove channel after reaching the required ticks.
10026         nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10027         check_inbound_channel_existence(false);
10028
10029         let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10030         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
10031         match msg_events[0] {
10032                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
10033                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake");
10034                 },
10035                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10036         }
10037         check_closed_event(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false, &[nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
10038 }
10039
10040 fn do_test_multi_post_event_actions(do_reload: bool) {
10041         // Tests handling multiple post-Event actions at once.
10042         // There is specific code in ChannelManager to handle channels where multiple post-Event
10043         // `ChannelMonitorUpdates` are pending at once. This test exercises that code.
10044         //
10045         // Specifically, we test calling `get_and_clear_pending_events` while there are two
10046         // PaymentSents from different channels and one channel has two pending `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s
10047         // - one from an RAA and one from an inbound commitment_signed.
10048         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10049         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10050         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
10051         let (persister, chain_monitor, nodes_0_deserialized);
10052         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10053
10054         let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).2;
10055         let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).2;
10056
10057         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
10058         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
10059
10060         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
10061         let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
10062
10063         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
10064         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10065         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 1_000_000);
10066
10067         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
10068         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
10069         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, 1_000_000);
10070
10071         for dest in &[1, 2] {
10072                 let htlc_fulfill_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[*dest], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10073                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[*dest].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_fulfill_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10074                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[*dest], htlc_fulfill_updates.commitment_signed, false);
10075                 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 0);
10076         }
10077
10078         let (route, payment_hash_3, _, payment_secret_3) =
10079                 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 100_000);
10080         let payment_id = PaymentId(payment_hash_3.0);
10081         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_3,
10082                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_3), payment_id).unwrap();
10083         check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
10084
10085         let send_event = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[1]);
10086         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]);
10087         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.commitment_msg);
10088         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
10089
10090         if do_reload {
10091                 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
10092                 let chan_0_monitor_serialized = get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).encode();
10093                 let chan_1_monitor_serialized = get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_2).encode();
10094                 reload_node!(nodes[0], test_default_channel_config(), &nodes_0_serialized, &[&chan_0_monitor_serialized, &chan_1_monitor_serialized], persister, chain_monitor, nodes_0_deserialized);
10095
10096                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10097                 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10098
10099                 reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
10100                 reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[2]));
10101         }
10102
10103         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10104         assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
10105         if let Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, .. } = events[0] {
10106                 assert!(payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage || payment_preimage == payment_preimage_2);
10107         } else { panic!(); }
10108         if let Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, .. } = events[1] {
10109                 assert!(payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage || payment_preimage == payment_preimage_2);
10110         } else { panic!(); }
10111         if let Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } = events[2] {} else { panic!(); }
10112         if let Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } = events[3] {} else { panic!(); }
10113
10114         // After the events are processed, the ChannelMonitorUpdates will be released and, upon their
10115         // completion, we'll respond to nodes[1] with an RAA + CS.
10116         get_revoke_commit_msgs(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10117         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 3);
10118 }
10119
10120 #[test]
10121 fn test_multi_post_event_actions() {
10122         do_test_multi_post_event_actions(true);
10123         do_test_multi_post_event_actions(false);
10124 }