_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
  11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
  12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
  13
  14 use chain;
  15 use chain::{Confirm, Listen, Watch};
  16 use chain::channelmonitor;
  17 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
  18 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  19 use chain::keysinterface::{BaseSign, KeysInterface};
  20 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
  21 use ln::channel::{commitment_tx_base_weight, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT};
  22 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS };
  23 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
  24 use ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
  25 use ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
  26 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, find_route, get_route};
  27 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures, NodeFeatures};
  28 use ln::msgs;
  29 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, OptionalField, ErrorAction};
  30 use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
  31 use util::{byte_utils, test_utils};
  32 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason};
  33 use util::errors::APIError;
  34 use util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
  35 use util::config::UserConfig;
  36
  37 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
  38 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
  39 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
  40 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  41 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
  42 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
  43
  44 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
  45 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
  46
  47 use regex;
  48
  49 use io;
  50 use prelude::*;
  51 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
  52 use core::default::Default;
  53 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
  54
  55 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
  56 use ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
  57
  58 #[test]
  59 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
  60         // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
  61         use ln::channel::TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS;
  62         let mut cfg = UserConfig::default();
  63         cfg.peer_channel_config_limits.max_funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1;
  64         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
  65         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
  66         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(cfg)]);
  67         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
  68
  69         // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
  70         // funding satoshis
  71         let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
  72         let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat);
  73         let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
  74
  75         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
  76         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
  77
  78         // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
  79         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
  80
  81         // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
  82         // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
  83         let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
  84                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
  85                 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
  86                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
  87                 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
  88                 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
  89                         match action {
  90                                 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
  91                                         nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), expected_regex, 1);
  92                                 },
  93                                 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
  94                         }
  95                 } else { assert!(false); }
  96         };
  97
  98         use ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
  99
 100         // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
 101         insane_open_helper(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2; msg });
 102         insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS; msg });
 103
 104         insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
 105
 106         insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than channel amount minus reserve \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
 107
 108         insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
 109
 110         insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
 111
 112         insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
 113
 114         insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
 115
 116         insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
 117 }
 118
 119 #[test]
 120 fn test_funding_exceeds_no_wumbo_limit() {
 121         // Test that if a peer does not support wumbo channels, we'll refuse to open a wumbo channel to
 122         // them.
 123         use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO;
 124         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 125         let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 126         node_cfgs[1].features = InitFeatures::known().clear_wumbo();
 127         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 128         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 129
 130         match nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1, 0, 42, None) {
 131                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
 132                         assert_eq!(format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1), err);
 133                 },
 134                 _ => panic!()
 135         }
 136 }
 137
 138 fn do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(send_from_initiator: bool) {
 139         // A peer providing a channel_reserve_satoshis of 0 (or less than our dust limit) is insecure,
 140         // but only for them. Because some LSPs do it with some level of trust of the clients (for a
 141         // substantial UX improvement), we explicitly allow it. Because it's unlikely to happen often
 142         // in normal testing, we test it explicitly here.
 143         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 144         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 145         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 146         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 147
 148         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
 149         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
 150         let feerate_per_kw = 253;
 151         let opt_anchors = false;
 152         push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
 153         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
 154
 155         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None).unwrap();
 156         let mut open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 157         if !send_from_initiator {
 158                 open_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 159                 open_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 160         }
 161         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_message);
 162
 163         // Extract the channel accept message from node1 to node0
 164         let mut accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 165         if send_from_initiator {
 166                 accept_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 167                 accept_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 168         }
 169         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel_message);
 170         {
 171                 let mut lock;
 172                 let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(if send_from_initiator { &nodes[1] } else { &nodes[0] }, lock, temp_channel_id);
 173                 chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 174                 chan.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 175         }
 176
 177         let funding_tx = sign_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100_000, temp_channel_id);
 178         let funding_msgs = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_tx);
 179         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_msgs.0);
 180
 181         // nodes[0] should now be able to send the full balance to nodes[1], violating nodes[1]'s
 182         // security model if it ever tries to send funds back to nodes[0] (but that's not our problem).
 183         if send_from_initiator {
 184                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000_000
 185                         // Note that for outbound channels we have to consider the commitment tx fee and the
 186                         // "fee spike buffer", which is currently a multiple of the total commitment tx fee as
 187                         // well as an additional HTLC.
 188                         - FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, 2, opt_anchors));
 189         } else {
 190                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], push_amt);
 191         }
 192 }
 193
 194 #[test]
 195 fn test_counterparty_no_reserve() {
 196         do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(true);
 197         do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(false);
 198 }
 199
 200 #[test]
 201 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
 202         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 203         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 204         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 205         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 206         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 207
 208         // balancing
 209         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 210
 211         // A                                        B
 212         // update_fee                            ->
 213         // send (1) commitment_signed            -.
 214         //                                       <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
 215         // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
 216         // (1) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 217         //                                       .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
 218         // (2) RAA is delivered                  ->
 219         //                                       .- send (4) commitment_signed
 220         //                                       <- (3) RAA is delivered
 221         // send (5) commitment_signed            -.
 222         //                                       <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
 223         // send (6) RAA                          -.
 224         // (5) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 225         //                                       <- RAA
 226         // (6) RAA is delivered                  ->
 227
 228         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 229         {
 230                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 231                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 232         }
 233         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 234         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 235
 236         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 237         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 238         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 239                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 240                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 241                 },
 242                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 243         };
 244
 245         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 246
 247         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 248         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 249         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
 250         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 251
 252         let payment_event = {
 253                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 254                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 255                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 256         };
 257         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 258         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 259
 260         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 261         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 262         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 263         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 264         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 265         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 266
 267         // deliver(1), generate (3):
 268         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 269         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 270         // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 271         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 272
 273         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
 274         let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 275         assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 276         assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 277         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 278         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 279         assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
 280         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 281
 282         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
 283         let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 284         assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 285         assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 286         assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 287         assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 288         assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
 289         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 290
 291         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
 292         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 293         // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 294         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 295
 296         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
 297         let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 298         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 299
 300         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 301         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 302
 303         let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 304         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
 305         match events_2[0] {
 306                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
 307                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 308         }
 309
 310         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
 311         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 312 }
 313
 314 #[test]
 315 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
 316         // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
 317         // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
 318         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 319         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 320         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 321         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 322         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 323
 324         // balancing
 325         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 326
 327         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 328         {
 329                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 330                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 331         }
 332         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 333         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 334
 335         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 336         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 337         let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 338                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
 339                         update_fee.as_ref()
 340                 },
 341                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 342         };
 343
 344         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 345
 346         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 347         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 348         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
 349         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 350
 351         let payment_event = {
 352                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 353                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 354                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 355         };
 356         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 357         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 358
 359         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 360         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 361         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 362         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 363         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 364         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 365
 366         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
 367         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 368
 369         // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
 370 }
 371
 372 #[test]
 373 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
 374         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 375         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 376         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 377         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 378         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 379
 380         // A                                        B
 381         // update_fee/commitment_signed          ->
 382         //                                       .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
 383         // update_fee (never committed)          ->
 384         // (3) update_fee                        ->
 385         // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
 386         // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
 387         // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
 388         //                                       <- (1) RAA delivered
 389         // (3) is generated and send (4) CS      -.
 390         // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
 391         // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
 392         //                                       <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
 393         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 394         //                                          B should send no response here
 395         // (4) commitment_signed delivered       ->
 396         //                                       <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
 397         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 398
 399         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 400         let initial_feerate;
 401         {
 402                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 403                 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
 404                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
 405         }
 406         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 407         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 408
 409         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 410         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 411         let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 412                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 413                         (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
 414                 },
 415                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 416         };
 417
 418         // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
 419         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
 420         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
 421         let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 422         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 423
 424         // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
 425         // transaction:
 426         {
 427                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 428                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
 429         }
 430         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 431         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 432         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 433
 434         // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
 435         let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
 436                 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
 437                 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
 438         };
 439
 440         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 441
 442         update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
 443         // Deliver (3)
 444         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 445
 446         // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
 447         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
 448         let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 449         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 450         assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 451         assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 452         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 453         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 454         // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
 455         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
 456         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
 457
 458         // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
 459         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
 460         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 461         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 462         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 463
 464         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
 465         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 466         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 467
 468         // Delever (4)
 469         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
 470         let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 471         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 472
 473         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 474         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 475         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 476
 477         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
 478         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 479         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 480         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 481
 482         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
 483         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 484         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 485 }
 486
 487 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
 488         // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
 489         // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
 490         // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
 491         // Node objects.
 492
 493         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 494         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 495         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 496         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 497
 498         if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
 499                 let block = Block {
 500                         header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
 501                         txdata: vec![],
 502                 };
 503                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
 504                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
 505         }
 506
 507         if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
 508         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
 509         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 510
 511         if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
 512         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
 513         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 514
 515         if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
 516         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
 517
 518         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
 519
 520         if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
 521         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
 522         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 523         let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 524
 525         if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
 526         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
 527         {
 528                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 529                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 530                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 531                 added_monitors.clear();
 532         }
 533         let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 534
 535         if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
 536         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
 537         {
 538                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 539                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 540                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 541                 added_monitors.clear();
 542         }
 543
 544         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 545         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
 546
 547         if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
 548         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
 549
 550         if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
 551         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
 552         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
 553         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
 554 }
 555
 556 #[test]
 557 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
 558         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
 559         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
 560         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
 561         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
 562         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
 563         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
 564         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
 565         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
 566         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
 567         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
 568         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
 569         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
 570         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
 571         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
 572         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
 573         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
 574         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
 575         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
 576 }
 577
 578 #[test]
 579 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
 580         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 581         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 582         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 583         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 584         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 585
 586         {
 587                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 588                 *feerate_lock += 25;
 589         }
 590         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 591         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 592
 593         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 594         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 595         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 596                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 597                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 598                 },
 599                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 600         };
 601         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 602
 603         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 604         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 605         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 606
 607         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 608         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 609         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 610
 611         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 612         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 613         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 614         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 615
 616         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 617         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 618         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 619 }
 620
 621 #[test]
 622 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
 623         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 624         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 625         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 626         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 627         let channel_value = 5000;
 628         let push_sats = 700;
 629         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 630         let channel_id = chan.2;
 631         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 632         let bs_channel_reserve_sats = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value);
 633
 634         let opt_anchors = false;
 635
 636         // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
 637         // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
 638         // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
 639         // remote limit.
 640         let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
 641         let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors)) as u32;
 642         {
 643                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 644                 *feerate_lock = feerate;
 645         }
 646         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 647         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 648         let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 649
 650         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
 651
 652         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
 653
 654         // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
 655         {
 656                 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
 657
 658                 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
 659                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
 660                 let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000;
 661                 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
 662                 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
 663                 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
 664         }
 665
 666         {
 667                 // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
 668                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 669                 *feerate_lock += 4;
 670         }
 671         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 672         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
 673         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 674
 675         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
 676
 677         // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
 678         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
 679         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
 680                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 681                 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 682                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 683                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
 684                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 685                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 686         };
 687         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
 688                 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 689                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 690                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
 691                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
 692                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 693                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
 694                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 695         };
 696
 697         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
 698         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
 699                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
 700
 701         let res = {
 702                 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 703                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 704                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 705                 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
 706                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
 707                         INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
 708                         push_sats,
 709                         channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000,
 710                         opt_anchors, local_funding, remote_funding,
 711                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
 712                         non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 713                         &mut htlcs,
 714                         &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
 715                 );
 716                 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
 717         };
 718
 719         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
 720                 channel_id: chan.2,
 721                 signature: res.0,
 722                 htlc_signatures: res.1
 723         };
 724
 725         let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
 726                 channel_id: chan.2,
 727                 feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 728         };
 729
 730         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
 731
 732         //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
 733         //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
 734         //Should produce and error.
 735         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
 736         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
 737         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 738         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 739         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") });
 740 }
 741
 742 #[test]
 743 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
 744         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 745         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 746         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 747         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 748         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 749
 750         // balancing
 751         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 752
 753         {
 754                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 755                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 756         }
 757         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 758         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 759
 760         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 761         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 762         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 763                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 764                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 765                 },
 766                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 767         };
 768         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 769         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 770         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 771         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 772
 773         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
 774
 775         // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
 776         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
 777         {
 778                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 779                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
 780                 added_monitors.clear();
 781         }
 782         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 783         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 784         // node[1] has nothing to do
 785
 786         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 787         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 788         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 789
 790         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 791         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 792         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 793         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 794         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 795         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 796         // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
 797
 798         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 799         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
 800         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
 801         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
 802         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
 803         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
 804
 805         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
 806         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 807         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 808         let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 809
 810         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 811         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 812         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 813
 814         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 815         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 816         let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 817         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 818
 819         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 820         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 821         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 822
 823         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
 824
 825         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 826         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
 827         match events[0] {
 828                 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
 829                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 830         };
 831
 832         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
 833
 834         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
 835         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
 836         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 837         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 838         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 839 }
 840
 841 #[test]
 842 fn test_update_fee() {
 843         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 844         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 845         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 846         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 847         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 848         let channel_id = chan.2;
 849
 850         // A                                        B
 851         // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 852         //                                       <- (2) revoke_and_ack
 853         //                                       .- send (3) commitment_signed
 854         // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 855         //                                       .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
 856         //                                       <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
 857         // send (6) revoke_and_ack               -.
 858         //                                       <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
 859         // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack            ->
 860         //                                       .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
 861         //                                       <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
 862         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 863
 864         // Create and deliver (1)...
 865         let feerate;
 866         {
 867                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 868                 feerate = *feerate_lock;
 869                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
 870         }
 871         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 872         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 873
 874         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 875         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 876         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 877                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 878                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 879                 },
 880                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 881         };
 882         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 883
 884         // Generate (2) and (3):
 885         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 886         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 887         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 888
 889         // Deliver (2):
 890         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 891         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 892         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 893
 894         // Create and deliver (4)...
 895         {
 896                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 897                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
 898         }
 899         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 900         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 901         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 902         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 903         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 904                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 905                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 906                 },
 907                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 908         };
 909
 910         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 911         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 912         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 913         // ... creating (5)
 914         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 915         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 916
 917         // Handle (3), creating (6):
 918         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
 919         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 920         let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 921         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 922
 923         // Deliver (5):
 924         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 925         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 926         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 927
 928         // Deliver (6), creating (7):
 929         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
 930         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 931         assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 932         assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 933         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 934         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 935         assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
 936         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 937
 938         // Deliver (7)
 939         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 940         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 941         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 942         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 943
 944         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 945         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 946         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 947
 948         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
 949         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
 950         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 951         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 952         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 953 }
 954
 955 #[test]
 956 fn fake_network_test() {
 957         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
 958         // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
 959         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
 960         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
 961         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
 962         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 963
 964         // Create some initial channels
 965         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 966         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 967         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 968
 969         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
 970         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 971         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 972         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 973         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 974
 975         // Send some more payments
 976         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
 977         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
 978         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
 979
 980         // Test failure packets
 981         let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
 982         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
 983
 984         // Add a new channel that skips 3
 985         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 986
 987         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
 988         send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
 989         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 990         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 991         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 992         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 993         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 994
 995         // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
 996         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
 997         hops.push(RouteHop {
 998                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
 999                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1000                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1001                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1002                 fee_msat: 0,
1003                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1004         });
1005         hops.push(RouteHop {
1006                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1007                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1008                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1009                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1010                 fee_msat: 0,
1011                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1012         });
1013         hops.push(RouteHop {
1014                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1015                 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1016                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1017                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1018                 fee_msat: 1000000,
1019                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1020         });
1021         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1022         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1023         let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
1024
1025         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1026         hops.push(RouteHop {
1027                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1028                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1029                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1030                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1031                 fee_msat: 0,
1032                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1033         });
1034         hops.push(RouteHop {
1035                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1036                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1037                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1038                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1039                 fee_msat: 0,
1040                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1041         });
1042         hops.push(RouteHop {
1043                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1044                 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1045                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1046                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1047                 fee_msat: 1000000,
1048                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1049         });
1050         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1051         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1052         let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1053
1054         // Claim the rebalances...
1055         fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1056         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1057
1058         // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
1059         let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1060
1061         // Send some payments across both channels
1062         let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1063         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1064         let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1065
1066
1067         route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
1068         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1069         assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1070         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap(), 1);
1071
1072         //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
1073
1074         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
1075         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
1076         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
1077
1078         // Close down the channels...
1079         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1080         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1081         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1082         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1083         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1084         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1085         close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1086         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1087         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1088         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1089         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1090         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1091         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
1092         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1093         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1094 }
1095
1096 #[test]
1097 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1098         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1099         // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1100         // commitment dance rounds.
1101         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1102         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1103         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1104         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1105         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1106         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1107
1108         let mut payments = Vec::new();
1109         for _ in 0..::ln::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
1110                 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1111                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
1112                 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1113         }
1114         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1115
1116         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1117         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1118         let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1119         assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1120
1121         // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1122         // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1123         // another HTLC.
1124         let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1125         {
1126                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1127                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1128                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1129                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
1130         }
1131
1132         // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1133         let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1134         {
1135                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
1136                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1137         }
1138
1139         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1140         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1141         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1142         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1143
1144         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1145         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1146         // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1147         // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1148         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1149         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1150         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1151
1152         let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1153         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1154         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1155
1156         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1157
1158         // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1159         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1160         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1161         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1162
1163         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1164         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1165         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1166         let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1167
1168         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1169         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1170         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1171
1172         for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1173                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1174         }
1175         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1176         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1177         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1178         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1179         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1180
1181         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1182         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1183         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1184         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1185         let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1186
1187         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1188         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1189
1190         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1191
1192         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1193         assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1194         for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1195                 match event {
1196                         &Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1197                                 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1198                         },
1199                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1200                 };
1201         }
1202
1203         for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1204                 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1205         }
1206
1207         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1208 }
1209
1210 #[test]
1211 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1212         // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1213         // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1214         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1215         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1216         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1217         let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1218
1219         // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1220         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1221         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1222         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1223         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1224         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1225
1226         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1227
1228         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1229         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1230
1231         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1232         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1233
1234         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1235         fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1236         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1237 }
1238
1239 #[test]
1240 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1241         // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1242         // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1243         // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1244         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1245         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1246         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1247         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1248
1249         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1250
1251         // balancing
1252         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1253
1254         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1255
1256         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1257         let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
1258         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1259
1260         // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1261         nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1262         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, 800_000);
1263         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1264
1265         // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1266         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1267
1268         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1269         let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1270         for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1271                 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1272                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1273                 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1274                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1275                 }
1276         }
1277         assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1278
1279         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1280         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1281         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1282         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1283
1284         // Check we only broadcast 1 timeout tx
1285         let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1286         assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 8);
1287         assert_eq!(claim_txn[1], claim_txn[4]);
1288         assert_eq!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[5]);
1289         check_spends!(claim_txn[1], chan_1.3);
1290         check_spends!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[1]);
1291         check_spends!(claim_txn[7], claim_txn[1]);
1292
1293         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1294         assert_eq!(claim_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
1295         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, claim_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
1296
1297         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1298         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1299         check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
1300         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1301         assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
1302         assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1303         check_spends!(claim_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
1304         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1305
1306         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1307         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1308         for e in events {
1309                 match e {
1310                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1311                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
1312                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1313                                 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1314                         },
1315                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1316                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1317                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1318                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1319                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1320                                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1321                         },
1322                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1323                 }
1324         }
1325 }
1326
1327 #[test]
1328 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1329         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1330         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1331         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1332         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1333         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1334
1335         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1336         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1337
1338         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1339         let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2), 1 + 1, get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2));
1340         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1341         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send + 1);
1342         let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).err().unwrap();
1343         match err {
1344                 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(ref fails) => {
1345                         match &fails[0] {
1346                                 &APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ref err} =>
1347                                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)),
1348                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1349                         }
1350                 },
1351                 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1352         }
1353         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1354         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1355
1356         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1357 }
1358
1359 #[test]
1360 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1361         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1362         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1363         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1364         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1365         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1366
1367         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460001);
1368         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1369         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1370         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1371
1372         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1373
1374         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1375         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3460001, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1376         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1377         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1378                 channel_id: chan.2,
1379                 htlc_id: 0,
1380                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1381                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1382                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1383                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1384         };
1385
1386         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1387
1388         // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1389         // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1390         // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1391
1392         let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1393
1394         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1395
1396         // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1397         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1398         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1399                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1400                 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1401                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1402                 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1403                 chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1404
1405                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1406                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1407                  chan_signer.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1408                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1409                  chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1410         };
1411         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1412                 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1413                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1414                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1415                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1416                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1417                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1418                  chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1419         };
1420
1421         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1422         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1423                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
1424
1425         // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1426         // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1427         let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1428
1429         let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1430                 offered: false,
1431                 amount_msat: 3460001,
1432                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1433                 payment_hash,
1434                 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1435         };
1436
1437         let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1438
1439         let res = {
1440                 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1441                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1442                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1443                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1444                         commitment_number,
1445                         95000,
1446                         local_chan_balance,
1447                         local_chan.opt_anchors(), local_funding, remote_funding,
1448                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1449                         feerate_per_kw,
1450                         &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1451                         &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1452                 );
1453                 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1454         };
1455
1456         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1457                 channel_id: chan.2,
1458                 signature: res.0,
1459                 htlc_signatures: res.1
1460         };
1461
1462         // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1463         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1464         let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1465
1466         // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1467         let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1468                 channel_id: chan.2,
1469                 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1470                 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point
1471         };
1472         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1473
1474         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1475         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1476         // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1477         match events[0] {
1478                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1479                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1480                         update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1481                 },
1482                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1483         };
1484         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1485                 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", ::hex::encode(raa_msg.channel_id)), 1);
1486
1487         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1488 }
1489
1490 #[test]
1491 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1492         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1493         // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1494         // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1495         // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1496         // this situation.
1497         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1498         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1499         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1500         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1501
1502         let opt_anchors = false;
1503
1504         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1505         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1506         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1507
1508         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1509
1510         // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1511         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1512                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1513         }
1514
1515         // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1516         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1517         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1518                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1519         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1520         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1521 }
1522
1523 #[test]
1524 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1525         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1526         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1527         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1528         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1529         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1530
1531         let opt_anchors = false;
1532
1533         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1534         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1535         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1536         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1537         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1538         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1539         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1540
1541         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1542         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1543                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1544         }
1545
1546         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 700_000);
1547         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1548         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1549         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1550         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1551         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1552         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 700_000, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1553         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1554         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1555                 channel_id: chan.2,
1556                 htlc_id: MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64,
1557                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1558                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1559                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1560                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1561         };
1562
1563         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1564         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1565         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1566         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1567         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1568         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1569         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1570         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() });
1571 }
1572
1573 #[test]
1574 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1575         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1576         // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1577         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1578         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1579
1580         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1581         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1582         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1583
1584         let opt_anchors = false;
1585
1586         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1587         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1588         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1589         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1590         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1591         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1592         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1593
1594         let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1595                 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1596         // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1597         // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1598         // commitment transaction fee.
1599         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1600
1601         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1602         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1603                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1604         }
1605
1606         // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1607         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt + 1);
1608         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1609                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1610 }
1611
1612 #[test]
1613 fn test_chan_init_feerate_unaffordability() {
1614         // Test that we will reject channel opens which do not leave enough to pay for any HTLCs due to
1615         // channel reserve and feerate requirements.
1616         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1617         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1618         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1619         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1620         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1621
1622         let opt_anchors = false;
1623
1624         // Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
1625         // HTLC.
1626         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1627         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1628         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None).unwrap_err(),
1629                 APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
1630
1631         // During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
1632         // requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
1633         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1634         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None).unwrap();
1635         let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1636         open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
1637         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg);
1638
1639         let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1640         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
1641         match msg_events[0] {
1642                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
1643                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve");
1644                 },
1645                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1646         }
1647 }
1648
1649 #[test]
1650 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1651         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1652         // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1653         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1654         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1655         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1656         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1657         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1658
1659         let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1660         // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1661         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1662         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1663         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1664         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1665
1666         // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1667         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1668         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1669         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1670         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1671         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1672
1673         // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1674         // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1675         // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1676         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1677 }
1678
1679 #[test]
1680 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1681         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1682         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1683         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1684         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1685         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1686         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1687
1688         let feemsat = 239;
1689         let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1690         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1691         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1692         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1693
1694         // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1695         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1696         let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1697         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1698
1699         // Add a pending HTLC.
1700         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1701         let payment_event_1 = {
1702                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1703                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1704
1705                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1706                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1707                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1708         };
1709         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1710
1711         // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1712         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2, opt_anchors);
1713         let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1714         let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1715         let (route_2, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_2);
1716
1717         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1718         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1719         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1720         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1721         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1722         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, &None, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1723         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1);
1724         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1725                 channel_id: chan.2,
1726                 htlc_id: 1,
1727                 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1728                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1729                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1730                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1731         };
1732
1733         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1734         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1735         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1736         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1737         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1738         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1739         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1740         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() });
1741 }
1742
1743 #[test]
1744 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1745         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1746         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1747         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1748         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1749         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1750         let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1751         let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1752         assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1753         assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1754
1755         let reserve = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100000);
1756         assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1757         assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1758
1759         assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1760         assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1761 }
1762
1763 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
1764         (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1765 }
1766
1767 #[test]
1768 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1769         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1770         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1771         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1772         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1773         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1774         config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1775         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1776         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1777         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1778         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1779
1780         let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1781         let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1782
1783         let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1784         let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1785
1786         macro_rules! expect_forward {
1787                 ($node: expr) => {{
1788                         let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1789                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1790                         check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1791                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1792                         payment_event
1793                 }}
1794         }
1795
1796         let feemsat = 239; // set above
1797         let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1798         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1799         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1800
1801         let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1802
1803         // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1804         {
1805                 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_0);
1806                 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1807                 assert!(route.paths[0].iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1808                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1809                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1810                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1811                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
1812         }
1813
1814         // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1815         // nodes[0]'s wealth
1816         loop {
1817                 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1818                 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1819                 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1820                 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1821                 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1822                 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1823                 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1824                         break;
1825                 }
1826                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
1827
1828                 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1829                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1830                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1831                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1832                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1833                 );
1834
1835                 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1836                 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1837                 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1838                 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1839                 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1840         }
1841
1842         // adding pending output.
1843         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1844         // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1845         // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1846         // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1847         // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1848         // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1849         // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1850         // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1851         // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1852         // policy.
1853         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1854         let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1855         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1856
1857         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1858         let payment_event_1 = {
1859                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1860                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1861
1862                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1863                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1864                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1865         };
1866         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1867
1868         // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1869         let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1870         {
1871                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_2 + 1);
1872                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1873                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1874                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1875         }
1876
1877         // split the rest to test holding cell
1878         let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1879         let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1880         let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1881         let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1882         {
1883                 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1884                 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1885         }
1886
1887         // now see if they go through on both sides
1888         let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1889         // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1890         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21, &Some(our_payment_secret_21)).unwrap();
1891         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1892         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1893         assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1894
1895         // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1896         {
1897                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22+1);
1898                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1899                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1900                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1901                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 2);
1902         }
1903
1904         let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1905         // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1906         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22, &Some(our_payment_secret_22)).unwrap();
1907         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1908         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1909         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1910
1911         // flush the pending htlc
1912         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1913         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1914         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1915
1916         // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1917         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1918         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1919         let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1920
1921         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
1922         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1923         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1924         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1925
1926         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1927         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1928         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1929
1930         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1931
1932         let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1933         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
1934         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
1935
1936         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1937         expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
1938
1939         // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
1940         assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
1941         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
1942         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
1943         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
1944         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1945
1946         let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1947         assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
1948         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
1949         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
1950
1951         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
1952         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1953
1954         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1955         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1956         match events[0] {
1957                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
1958                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
1959                         assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
1960                         match &purpose {
1961                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1962                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1963                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
1964                                 },
1965                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1966                         }
1967                 },
1968                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1969         }
1970         match events[1] {
1971                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
1972                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
1973                         assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
1974                         match &purpose {
1975                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1976                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1977                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
1978                                 },
1979                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1980                         }
1981                 },
1982                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1983         }
1984
1985         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
1986         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
1987         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
1988
1989         let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1, opt_anchors);
1990         let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
1991         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
1992
1993         let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
1994         let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
1995         let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1996         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
1997         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
1998
1999         let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2000         assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
2001 }
2002
2003 #[test]
2004 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
2005         // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
2006         // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
2007         // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
2008         // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
2009         // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
2010         // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
2011         // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
2012         // To test this we:
2013         //  * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
2014         //    you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
2015         //    you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
2016         //  * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
2017         //  * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
2018         //    the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
2019         //  * deliver the first fulfill from B
2020         //  * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
2021         //    claim,
2022         //  * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
2023         //    This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
2024         //    removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
2025         //  * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
2026         //    of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
2027         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2028         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2029         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2030         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2031         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2032
2033         let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2034         // Route the first two HTLCs.
2035         let payment_value_1 = b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000;
2036         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_value_1);
2037         let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20_000);
2038
2039         // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
2040         let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
2041         let send_1 = {
2042                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_3, &Some(payment_secret_3)).unwrap();
2043                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2044                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2045                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2046                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2047         };
2048
2049         // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
2050         // initial fulfill/CS.
2051         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
2052         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, payment_value_1);
2053         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2054         let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2055
2056         // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
2057         // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
2058         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
2059         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000);
2060         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2061         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2062
2063         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2064         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
2065         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2066         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2067         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
2068
2069         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
2070         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
2071         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2072         // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
2073         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2074
2075         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2076         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2077         let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2078
2079         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2080         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2081         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2082
2083         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2084         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2085         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2086
2087         // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
2088         // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2089         // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
2090         // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
2091         // on-chain as necessary).
2092         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2093         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
2094         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2095         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2096         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
2097
2098         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2099         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2100         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2101
2102         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2103         expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2104
2105         // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2106         // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2107         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2108         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2109         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2110         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2111
2112         // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2113         // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2114         let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2115         let send_2 = {
2116                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_4, &Some(payment_secret_4)).unwrap();
2117                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2118                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2119                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2120                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2121         };
2122
2123         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2124         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2125         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2126         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2127
2128         // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2129
2130         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2131         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2132         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2133
2134         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2135         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2136
2137         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2138         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2139         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2140         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2141
2142         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2143         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2144         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2145
2146         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2147         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2148
2149         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2150         expect_payment_received!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2151
2152         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2153         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2154 }
2155
2156 #[test]
2157 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2158         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2159         // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2160         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2161         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2162         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2163         let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2164
2165         // Create some initial channels
2166         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2167         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2168         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2169         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2170
2171         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2172         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2173         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2174         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2175         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2176         connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2177
2178         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2179         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2180         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2181         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2182         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2183
2184         // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2185         nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan_1.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2186         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2187         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2188         {
2189                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2190                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2191                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2192                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2193                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2194         }
2195         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2196         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2197         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2198         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2199         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2200
2201         // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2202         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 3_000_000);
2203
2204         // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2205         // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2206         nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan_2.2, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2207         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2208         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2209         {
2210                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2211                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2212                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2213                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2214                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2215                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2216         }
2217         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2218         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2219         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2220         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2221         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2222
2223         macro_rules! claim_funds {
2224                 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
2225                         {
2226                                 $node.node.claim_funds($preimage);
2227                                 expect_payment_claimed!($node, $payment_hash, 3_000_000);
2228                                 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2229
2230                                 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2231                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2232                                 match events[0] {
2233                                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2234                                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2235                                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2236                                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2237                                         },
2238                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2239                                 };
2240                         }
2241                 }
2242         }
2243
2244         // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2245         // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2246         nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&chan_3.2, &nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2247         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2248         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2249         let node2_commitment_txid;
2250         {
2251                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2252                 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2253                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2254                 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2255
2256                 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2257                 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1);
2258                 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2259                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2260                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2261         }
2262         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2263         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2264         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2265         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2266         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2267
2268         // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2269         // confusing us in the following tests.
2270         let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2271
2272         // One pending HTLC to time out:
2273         let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[3], &[&nodes[4]], 3_000_000);
2274         // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2275         // buffer space).
2276
2277         let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2278                 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2279                 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2280                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2281                 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2282                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2283                                 msg.clone()
2284                         },
2285                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2286                 };
2287                 match events[1] {
2288                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2289                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2290                         },
2291                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2292                 }
2293                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2294
2295                 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2296                 {
2297                         let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2298                         node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2299                                 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2300                                         false
2301                                 } else { true }
2302                         });
2303                 }
2304
2305                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2306
2307                 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2308                 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2);
2309
2310                 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2311                 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2312                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2313                 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2314                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2315                                 msg.clone()
2316                         },
2317                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2318                 };
2319                 match events[1] {
2320                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2321                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2322                         },
2323                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2324                 }
2325                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2326                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2327
2328                 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2329                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2330                 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2331         };
2332         nodes[3].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2333         nodes[4].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2334         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2335         assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2336
2337         nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon).unwrap();
2338         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2339         check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2340 }
2341
2342 #[test]
2343 fn test_justice_tx() {
2344         // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2345         let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2346         alice_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
2347         alice_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2348         alice_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2349         let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2350         bob_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
2351         bob_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2352         bob_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2353         let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2354         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2355         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2356         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2357         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2358         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2359         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2360         // Create some new channels:
2361         let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2362
2363         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2364         let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2365         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2366         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2367         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2368         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2369         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2370         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2371         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2372         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2373         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2374         // Revoke the old state
2375         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2376
2377         {
2378                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2379                 {
2380                         let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2381                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2382                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2383
2384                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2385                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2386                         node_txn.truncate(1);
2387                 }
2388                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2389                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2390                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2391
2392                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2393                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2394                 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2395                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2396                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2397                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2398                 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2399                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2400                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2401         }
2402         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2403
2404         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2405         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2406
2407         // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
2408         // Create some new channels:
2409         let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2410         {
2411                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2412                 node_txn.clear();
2413         }
2414
2415         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2416         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2417         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2418         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2419         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2420         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2421         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2422         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2423         // Revoke the old state
2424         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2425         {
2426                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2427                 {
2428                         let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2429                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); //ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2430                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2431
2432                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2433                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2434                 }
2435                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2436                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2437
2438                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2439                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2440                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2441                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2442                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2443                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2444                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2445         }
2446         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2447         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2448         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2449 }
2450
2451 #[test]
2452 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2453         // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2454         // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2455         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2456         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2457         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2458         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2459         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2460         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2461         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2462         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2463         // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2464         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2465         // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2466         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2467
2468         // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2469         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2470         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2471         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2472         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2473         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2474
2475         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2476         check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
2477
2478         // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2479         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2480         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2481         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2482         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2483 }
2484
2485 #[test]
2486 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2487         // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2488         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2489         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2490         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2491         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2492         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2493
2494         // Create some new channel:
2495         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2496
2497         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2498         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2499         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2500         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2501         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2502
2503         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2504         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2505         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2506         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2507         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2508         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2509         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2510         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2511         check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2512
2513         //Revoke the old state
2514         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2515
2516         {
2517                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2518                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2519                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2520                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2521                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2522                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2523                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2524                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2525
2526                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2527                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment
2528
2529                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2530                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2531
2532                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2533                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2534                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2535                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2536                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2537                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2538                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2539                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2540
2541                 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
2542                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2543                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
2544         }
2545         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2546         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2547         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2548 }
2549
2550 #[test]
2551 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2552         // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2553         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2554         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2555         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2556         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2557         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2558
2559         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2560
2561         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2562         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2563         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2564         // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2565         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2566         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2567
2568         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2569         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2570
2571         //Revoke the old state
2572         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2573
2574         {
2575                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2576                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2577                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2578                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2579                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2580                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2581                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2582                 match events[1] {
2583                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2584                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2585                 }
2586
2587                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2588                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2589
2590                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2591                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 9);
2592                 // ChannelMonitor: justice tx revoked offered htlc, justice tx revoked received htlc, justice tx revoked to_local (3)
2593                 // ChannelManager: local commmitment + local HTLC-timeout (2)
2594                 // ChannelMonitor: bumped justice tx, after one increase, bumps on HTLC aren't generated not being substantial anymore, bump on revoked to_local isn't generated due to more room for expiration (2)
2595                 // ChannelMonitor: local commitment + local HTLC-timeout (2)
2596
2597                 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2598                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2599                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2600                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2601                 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2602                 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2603                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2604
2605                 // Justice transactions are indices 1-2-4
2606                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2607                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
2608                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
2609
2610                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2611                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2612                 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2613
2614                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2615                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2616                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2617                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2618                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2619                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2620                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2621                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2622         }
2623         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2624         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2625         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2626 }
2627
2628 #[test]
2629 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2630         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2631         // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2632         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2633         // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2634         // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2635         // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2636         // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2637         // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2638         // towards B.
2639         // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2640         // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2641         // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2642         // PaymentSent event).
2643
2644         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2645         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2646         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2647         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2648
2649         // Create some initial channels
2650         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2651         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2652
2653         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2654         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2655         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2656         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2657         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2658
2659         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2660         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2661         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2662
2663         let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2664         let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2665
2666         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2667         // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2668         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2669         assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2670         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2671         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2672         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_1, 3_000_000);
2673         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2674         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, 3_000_000);
2675         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2676         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2677         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2678         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2679         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2680         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2681
2682         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2683         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2684         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2685         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2686         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx, 2*htlc-success tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2687         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5);
2688         assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2689         assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2690         assert_eq!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2691         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2692         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2693         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2694         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2695         assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2696         assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2697         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
2698         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2699
2700         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2701         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2702         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: node_txn});
2703         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2704         {
2705                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2706                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2707                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2708                 added_monitors.clear();
2709         }
2710         let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2711         assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2712         match forwarded_events[0] {
2713                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2714                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2715         }
2716         let chan_id = Some(chan_1.2);
2717         match forwarded_events[1] {
2718                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
2719                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2720                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2721                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2722                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2723                 },
2724                 _ => panic!()
2725         }
2726         match forwarded_events[2] {
2727                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
2728                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2729                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2730                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2731                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2732                 },
2733                 _ => panic!()
2734         }
2735         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2736         {
2737                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2738                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2739                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2740                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2741                 added_monitors.clear();
2742         }
2743         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2744         match events[0] {
2745                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2746                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2747         }
2748         match events[1] {
2749                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2750                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2751         }
2752
2753         match events[2] {
2754                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2755                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2756                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2757                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2758                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2759                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2760                 },
2761                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2762         };
2763         macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2764                 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $chan_tx: expr) => { {
2765                         let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2766                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
2767                         // Node[1]: ChannelManager: 3 (commitment tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (timeout tx)
2768                         // Node[0]: ChannelManager: 3 (commtiemtn tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 HTLC-timeout
2769                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2770                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], $commitment_tx);
2771                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2772                         assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time, 0);
2773                         if $htlc_offered {
2774                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2775                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2776                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2777                                 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2778                         } else {
2779                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2780                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2781                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2782                                 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2783                         }
2784                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], $chan_tx);
2785                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2786                         node_txn.clear();
2787                 } }
2788         }
2789         // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own local state as a fallback, suggesting an alternate
2790         // commitment transaction with a corresponding HTLC-Timeout transactions, as well as a
2791         // timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2792         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2793
2794         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2795         // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx  on A's chain
2796         let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2797         check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2798         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2799         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2800         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2801         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2802         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2803         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 6); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx + HTLC-Sucess * 2), ChannelMonitor : 3 (HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn)
2804         let commitment_spend =
2805                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2806                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2807                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2808                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2809                         &node_txn[0]
2810                 } else {
2811                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2812                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2813                         assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2814                         &node_txn[2]
2815                 };
2816
2817         check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2818         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2819         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2820         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2821         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time, 0);
2822         assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2823         check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3);
2824         assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2825         check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[3]);
2826         check_spends!(node_txn[5], node_txn[3]);
2827         // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
2828         // we already checked the same situation with A.
2829
2830         // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
2831         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2832         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()] });
2833         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2834         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2835         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2836         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2837         assert_eq!(events.len(), 5);
2838         let mut first_claimed = false;
2839         for event in events {
2840                 match event {
2841                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
2842                                 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
2843                                         assert!(!first_claimed);
2844                                         first_claimed = true;
2845                                 } else {
2846                                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
2847                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
2848                                 }
2849                         },
2850                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
2851                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
2852                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2853                 }
2854         }
2855         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2856 }
2857
2858 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
2859         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
2860         // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2861         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2862         // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
2863         //    B's commitment tx                 C's commitment tx
2864         //            \                                  \
2865         //         B's HTLC timeout tx               B's timeout tx
2866
2867         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2868         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2869         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2870         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2871         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2872         *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2873         *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2874
2875         // Create some intial channels
2876         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2877         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2878
2879         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
2880         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2881         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2882
2883         let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2884
2885         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2886         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2887         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2888         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
2889         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
2890         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2891         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2892
2893         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2894         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2895         match events[0] {
2896                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2897                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2898                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2899                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2900                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2901                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2902                 },
2903                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2904         };
2905         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2906         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2907         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2908         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2909         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx)
2910         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2911         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2912         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2913
2914         // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2915         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
2916         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2917         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
2918         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2919         let timeout_tx;
2920         {
2921                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2922                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-timeout), 1 timeout tx
2923                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2924                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2925
2926                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2927                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2928
2929                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2930                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2931                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2932                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2933
2934                 timeout_tx = node_txn[2].clone();
2935                 node_txn.clear();
2936         }
2937
2938         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
2939         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2940         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2941         {
2942                 // B will rebroadcast a fee-bumped timeout transaction here.
2943                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2944                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2945                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2946         }
2947
2948         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2949         {
2950                 // B may rebroadcast its own holder commitment transaction here, as a safeguard against
2951                 // some incredibly unlikely partial-eclipse-attack scenarios. That said, because the
2952                 // original commitment_tx[0] (also spending chan_2.3) has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY B really
2953                 // shouldn't broadcast anything here, and in some connect style scenarios we do not.
2954                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2955                 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
2956                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2957                 } else {
2958                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
2959                 }
2960         }
2961
2962         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2963         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2964         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2965         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2966         match events[0] {
2967                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2968                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2969                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2970                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2971                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2972                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2973                 },
2974                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2975         };
2976
2977         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
2978         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2979         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2980
2981         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
2982         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2983
2984         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2985         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2986         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2987         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 commitment tx, ChannelMonitor : 1 timeout tx
2988         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2989         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2990         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2991         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2992         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2993 }
2994
2995 #[test]
2996 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
2997         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
2998         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
2999         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
3000 }
3001
3002 #[test]
3003 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
3004         // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
3005         // and fail backward accordingly.
3006
3007         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3008         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3009         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3010         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3011
3012         // Create some initial channels
3013         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3014         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3015
3016         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3017         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3018         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3019         // Revoke the old state
3020         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3021
3022         let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3023
3024         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3025         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3026         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3027         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3028         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3029
3030         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3031         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3032         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3033         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3034         match events[0] {
3035                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3036                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3037                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3038                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3039                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3040                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3041
3042                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3043                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3044                         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
3045                 },
3046                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3047         }
3048 }
3049
3050 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
3051         // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
3052         // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
3053         // commitment transaction anymore.
3054         // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
3055         // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
3056         // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
3057         // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
3058         // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
3059         // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
3060         // transactions:
3061         // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
3062         //   commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
3063         // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
3064         //   and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
3065         //   commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
3066         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3067         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3068         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3069         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3070
3071         // Create some initial channels
3072         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3073         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3074
3075         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
3076         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3077         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3078         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
3079         // Revoke the old state
3080         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3081
3082         let value = if use_dust {
3083                 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
3084                 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
3085                 nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
3086         } else { 3000000 };
3087
3088         let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3089         let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3090         let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3091
3092         assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash));
3093         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3094         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3095         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3096         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3097         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3098         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3099         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3100         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3101         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3102         let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
3103         // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
3104
3105         assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash));
3106         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3107         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3108         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3109         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3110         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3111         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3112         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3113         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3114         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3115         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3116         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3117         // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3118         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3119         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3120         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3121
3122         assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash));
3123         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3124         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3125         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3126         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3127         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3128         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3129         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3130         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3131         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3132         // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3133         // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3134         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3135         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3136         // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3137         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3138         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3139         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3140
3141         // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3142         // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3143         let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3144         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, fourth_payment_hash, &Some(fourth_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3145         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3146         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3147         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3148
3149         if deliver_bs_raa {
3150                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3151                 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3152                 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3153                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3154                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3155                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3156                 match events[0] {
3157                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3158                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3159                 };
3160                 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3161                 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3162         }
3163
3164         let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
3165         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3166
3167         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3168         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3169         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3170         assert!(ANTI_REORG_DELAY > PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS); // We assume payments will also expire
3171
3172         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3173         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 4 });
3174         match events[0] {
3175                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
3176                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
3177         }
3178         match events[1] {
3179                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3180                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3181                 },
3182                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3183         }
3184         if !deliver_bs_raa {
3185                 match events[2] {
3186                         Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3187                                 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3188                         },
3189                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3190                 }
3191                 match events[3] {
3192                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3193                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3194                 };
3195         }
3196         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3197         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3198
3199         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3200         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3201         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 1 } else { 0 }] {
3202                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3203                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3204         }
3205         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 1 }] {
3206                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
3207                         assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3208                         assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3209                 },
3210                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3211         }
3212         if deliver_bs_raa {
3213                 match events[0] {
3214                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3215                                 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3216                                 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3217                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3218                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3219                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3220                         },
3221                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3222                 }
3223         }
3224         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 3 } else { 2 }] {
3225                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3226                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3227                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3228                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3229                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3230                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3231
3232                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3233                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3234                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3235
3236                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3237
3238                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3239                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3240                         match events[0] {
3241                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3242                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3243                                         // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3244                                         // that we should update our routing table for.
3245                                         if !deliver_bs_raa {
3246                                                 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3247                                         }
3248                                 },
3249                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3250                         }
3251                         match events[1] {
3252                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3253                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3254                                         assert!(network_update.is_some());
3255                                 },
3256                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3257                         }
3258                         match events[2] {
3259                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3260                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3261                                         assert!(network_update.is_some());
3262                                 },
3263                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3264                         }
3265                 },
3266                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3267         }
3268
3269         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3270         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3271         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3272 }
3273
3274 #[test]
3275 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3276         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3277         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3278         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3279         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3280 }
3281
3282 #[test]
3283 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3284         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3285         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3286         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3287         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3288 }
3289
3290 #[test]
3291 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3292         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3293         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3294         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3295         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3296         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3297
3298         // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3299         {
3300                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3301                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
3302                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3303
3304                 let payment_event = {
3305                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3306                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3307                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3308                 };
3309                 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3310                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3311         }
3312
3313         // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3314         let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3315         {
3316                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, failed_payment_hash, &Some(failed_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3317                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3318
3319                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3320         }
3321
3322         // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3323         {
3324                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3325
3326                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3327                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3328                 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3329                 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 50_000, &Some(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3330                 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3331                 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
3332
3333                 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3334                 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3335                         channel_id: chan.2,
3336                         htlc_id: 0,
3337                         amount_msat: 0,
3338                         payment_hash,
3339                         cltv_expiry,
3340                         onion_routing_packet,
3341                 };
3342                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3343         }
3344         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3345         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3346         // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3347         match events[0] {
3348                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3349                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3350                 },
3351                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3352         }
3353         match events[1] {
3354                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3355                         assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3356                 },
3357                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3358         }
3359         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3360         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3361 }
3362
3363 #[test]
3364 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3365         // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3366         // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3367         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3368         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3369         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3370         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3371         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3372
3373         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3374         nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3375         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3376         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3377         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3378         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3379
3380         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3381         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3382         assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
3383
3384         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3385         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
3386         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3387         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3388         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3389
3390         // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3391         // registering new transactions
3392         header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
3393         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
3394 }
3395
3396 #[test]
3397 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3398         // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3399         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3400         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3401         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3402         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3403         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3404         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3405
3406         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3407
3408         let mut payment_event = {
3409                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3410                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3411
3412                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3413                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3414                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3415         };
3416
3417         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3418         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3419
3420         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3421
3422         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3423         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3424         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3425         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3426
3427         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3428         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3429         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3430         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3431         let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3432
3433         // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3434         // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3435         // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3436
3437         nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3438         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3439         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3440         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3441         let tx = {
3442                 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3443                 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3444                 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3445                 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3446                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3447                 node_txn.remove(0)
3448         };
3449
3450         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3451
3452         // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3453         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3454         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3455         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3456
3457         // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3458         {
3459                 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3460                         .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator, &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3461         }
3462         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3463         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3464         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3465         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3466         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3467         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3468         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3469
3470         check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3471 }
3472
3473 #[test]
3474 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3475         // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3476         // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3477         // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3478         // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3479
3480         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3481         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3482         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3483         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3484         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3485
3486         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
3487
3488         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
3489         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_000_000);
3490         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3491         let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3492         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3493         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
3494
3495         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3496         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3497
3498         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3499         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3500 }
3501
3502 #[test]
3503 fn test_peer_disconnected_before_funding_broadcasted() {
3504         // Test that channels are closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` if the peer disconnects
3505         // before the funding transaction has been broadcasted.
3506         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3507         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3508         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3509         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3510
3511         // Open a channel between `nodes[0]` and `nodes[1]`, for which the funding transaction is never
3512         // broadcasted, even though it's created by `nodes[0]`.
3513         let expected_temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
3514         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3515         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
3516         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3517         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
3518
3519         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
3520         assert_eq!(temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3521
3522         assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
3523
3524         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3525         assert_eq!(funding_created_msg.temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3526
3527         // Even though the funding transaction is created by `nodes[0]`, the `FundingCreated` msg is
3528         // never sent to `nodes[1]`, and therefore the tx is never signed by either party nor
3529         // broadcasted.
3530         {
3531                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3532         }
3533
3534         // Ensure that the channel is closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` when the peers are
3535         // disconnected before the funding transaction was broadcasted.
3536         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3537         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3538
3539         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3540         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3541 }
3542
3543 #[test]
3544 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3545         // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3546         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3547         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3548         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3549         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3550         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3551         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3552
3553         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3554         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3555         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3556
3557         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3558         let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3559         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3560         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3561
3562         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3563         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3564         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3565
3566         let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3567         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3568         let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3569         let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3570
3571         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3572         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3573
3574         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3575         fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3576
3577         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
3578         {
3579                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3580                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3581                 match events[0] {
3582                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3583                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3584                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3585                         },
3586                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3587                 }
3588                 match events[1] {
3589                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
3590                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3591                                 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
3592                         },
3593                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3594                 }
3595                 match events[2] {
3596                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3597                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3598                 }
3599         }
3600
3601         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3602         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3603 }
3604
3605 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3606         // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3607         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3608         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3609         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3610         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3611
3612         let mut as_funding_locked = None;
3613         if messages_delivered == 0 {
3614                 let (funding_locked, _, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3615                 as_funding_locked = Some(funding_locked);
3616                 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3617                 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3618                 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3619         } else {
3620                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3621         }
3622
3623         let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1_000_000);
3624
3625         let payment_event = {
3626                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
3627                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3628
3629                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3630                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3631                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3632         };
3633         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3634
3635         if messages_delivered < 2 {
3636                 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3637         } else {
3638                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3639                 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3640                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3641                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3642                         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3643
3644                         if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3645                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3646                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3647                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3648
3649                                 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3650                                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3651                                         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3652                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3653                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3654
3655                                         if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3656                                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3657                                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3658                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3659                                         }
3660                                 }
3661                         }
3662                 }
3663         }
3664
3665         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3666         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3667         if messages_delivered < 3 {
3668                 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3669                         // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a funding_locked prior to a
3670                         // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to funding_locked time.
3671                         //
3672                         // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a funding_locked immediately on
3673                         // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate funding_locked sent
3674                         // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3675                         //
3676                         // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3677                         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3678                 }
3679                 // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3680                 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3681                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3682         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3683                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3684                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3685         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3686                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3687                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3688         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3689                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3690                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3691         } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3692                 // Everything was delivered...
3693                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3694         }
3695
3696         let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3697         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3698         match events_1[0] {
3699                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3700                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3701         };
3702
3703         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3704         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3705         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3706
3707         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3708
3709         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3710         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3711         match events_2[0] {
3712                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
3713                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3714                         assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
3715                         match &purpose {
3716                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3717                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3718                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3719                                 },
3720                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3721                         }
3722                 },
3723                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3724         }
3725
3726         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3727         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3728         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
3729
3730         let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3731         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3732         let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3733                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3734                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3735                         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3736                         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3737                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3738                         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3739                         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3740                         (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3741                 },
3742                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3743         };
3744
3745         if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3746                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3747
3748                 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3749                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3750                 match events_4[0] {
3751                         Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3752                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3753                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3754                         },
3755                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3756                 }
3757
3758                 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3759                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3760                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3761                         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3762
3763                         if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3764                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3765                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3766                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3767
3768                                 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3769                                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3770                                         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3771                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3772                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3773
3774                                         if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3775                                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3776                                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3777                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3778                                         }
3779                                 }
3780                         }
3781                 }
3782         }
3783
3784         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3785         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3786         if messages_delivered < 2 {
3787                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3788                 if messages_delivered < 1 {
3789                         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
3790                 } else {
3791                         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3792                 }
3793         } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
3794                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3795                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3796         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3797                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3798                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3799         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3800                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3801                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3802         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3803                 // Everything was delivered...
3804                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3805         }
3806
3807         if messages_delivered == 1 || messages_delivered == 2 {
3808                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3809         }
3810
3811         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3812         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3813         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3814
3815         if messages_delivered > 2 {
3816                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3817         }
3818
3819         // Channel should still work fine...
3820         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3821         let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3822         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3823 }
3824
3825 #[test]
3826 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
3827         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
3828         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
3829         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
3830         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
3831 }
3832
3833 #[test]
3834 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
3835         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
3836         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
3837         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
3838         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
3839 }
3840
3841 #[test]
3842 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
3843         // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
3844         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3845         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3846         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3847         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
3848         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
3849         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
3850         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3851         let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3852
3853         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3854         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3855
3856         confirm_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
3857         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3858         assert!(events_1.is_empty());
3859
3860         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3861
3862         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3863         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3864
3865         confirm_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3866         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3867         assert!(events_2.is_empty());
3868
3869         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
3870         let as_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3871         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
3872         let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3873
3874         // nodes[0] hasn't yet received a funding_locked, so it only sends that on reconnect.
3875         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
3876         let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3877         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3878         let as_funding_locked = match events_3[0] {
3879                 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3880                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3881                         msg.clone()
3882                 },
3883                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_3[0]),
3884         };
3885
3886         // nodes[1] received nodes[0]'s funding_locked on the first reconnect above, so it should send
3887         // announcement_signatures as well as channel_update.
3888         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish);
3889         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3890         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 3);
3891         let chan_id;
3892         let bs_funding_locked = match events_4[0] {
3893                 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3894                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3895                         chan_id = msg.channel_id;
3896                         msg.clone()
3897                 },
3898                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[0]),
3899         };
3900         let bs_announcement_sigs = match events_4[1] {
3901                 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3902                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3903                         msg.clone()
3904                 },
3905                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[1]),
3906         };
3907         match events_4[2] {
3908                 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
3909                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3910                 },
3911                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[2]),
3912         }
3913
3914         // Re-deliver nodes[0]'s funding_locked, which nodes[1] can safely ignore. It currently
3915         // generates a duplicative private channel_update
3916         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked);
3917         let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3918         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
3919         match events_5[0] {
3920                 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
3921                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3922                 },
3923                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_5[0]),
3924         };
3925
3926         // When we deliver nodes[1]'s funding_locked, however, nodes[0] will generate its
3927         // announcement_signatures.
3928         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_funding_locked);
3929         let events_6 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3930         assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
3931         let as_announcement_sigs = match events_6[0] {
3932                 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3933                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3934                         msg.clone()
3935                 },
3936                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_6[0]),
3937         };
3938
3939         // When we deliver nodes[1]'s announcement_signatures to nodes[0], nodes[0] should immediately
3940         // broadcast the channel announcement globally, as well as re-send its (now-public)
3941         // channel_update.
3942         nodes[0].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs);
3943         let events_7 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3944         assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
3945         let (chan_announcement, as_update) = match events_7[0] {
3946                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3947                         (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
3948                 },
3949                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_7[0]),
3950         };
3951
3952         // Finally, deliver nodes[0]'s announcement_signatures to nodes[1] and make sure it creates the
3953         // same channel_announcement.
3954         nodes[1].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs);
3955         let events_8 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3956         assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
3957         let bs_update = match events_8[0] {
3958                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3959                         assert_eq!(*msg, chan_announcement);
3960                         update_msg.clone()
3961                 },
3962                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_8[0]),
3963         };
3964
3965         // Provide the channel announcement and public updates to the network graph
3966         nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap();
3967         nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
3968         nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
3969
3970         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3971         let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3972         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
3973
3974         // Check that after deserialization and reconnection we can still generate an identical
3975         // channel_announcement from the cached signatures.
3976         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3977
3978         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
3979         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
3980         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
3981
3982         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
3983         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
3984         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[0].logger, node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
3985         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
3986         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
3987         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
3988                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
3989         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
3990
3991         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
3992         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
3993                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
3994                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
3995                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
3996                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
3997                         keys_manager,
3998                         fee_estimator: node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator,
3999                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4000                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4001                         logger: nodes[0].logger,
4002                         channel_monitors,
4003                 }).unwrap()
4004         };
4005         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4006         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4007
4008         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4009         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4010         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4011
4012         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4013
4014         // The channel announcement should be re-generated exactly by broadcast_node_announcement.
4015         nodes[0].node.broadcast_node_announcement([0, 0, 0], [0; 32], Vec::new());
4016         let msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4017         let mut found_announcement = false;
4018         for event in msgs.iter() {
4019                 match event {
4020                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, .. } => {
4021                                 if *msg == chan_announcement { found_announcement = true; }
4022                         },
4023                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => {},
4024                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4025                 }
4026         }
4027         assert!(found_announcement);
4028 }
4029
4030 #[test]
4031 fn test_funding_locked_without_best_block_updated() {
4032         // Previously, if we were offline when a funding transaction was locked in, and then we came
4033         // back online, calling best_block_updated once followed by transactions_confirmed, we'd not
4034         // generate a funding_locked until a later best_block_updated. This tests that we generate the
4035         // funding_locked immediately instead.
4036         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4037         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4038         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4039         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4040         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
4041
4042         let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4043
4044         let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
4045         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
4046         let block_txn = [funding_tx];
4047         let conf_txn: Vec<_> = block_txn.iter().enumerate().collect();
4048         let conf_block_header = nodes[0].get_block_header(conf_height);
4049         nodes[0].node.transactions_confirmed(&conf_block_header, &conf_txn[..], conf_height);
4050
4051         // Ensure nodes[0] generates a funding_locked after the transactions_confirmed
4052         let as_funding_locked = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4053         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked);
4054 }
4055
4056 #[test]
4057 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
4058         // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
4059         // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
4060         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4061         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4062         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4063         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4064         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4065
4066         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
4067
4068         // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
4069         let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
4070         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
4071         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4072
4073         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4074         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4075         match events_1[0] {
4076                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4077                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4078         }
4079
4080         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
4081         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
4082         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4083
4084         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4085         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4086         match events_2[0] {
4087                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4088                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4089                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4090                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4091                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4092                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4093                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4094
4095                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4096                         let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4097                         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
4098                         match events_3[0] {
4099                                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
4100                                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
4101                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
4102                                 },
4103                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4104                         }
4105
4106                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
4107                         let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4108                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4109                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4110                 },
4111                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4112         }
4113
4114         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4115         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4116
4117         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4118         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4119         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
4120         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4121         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4122         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
4123
4124         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4125         let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4126         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4127         let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4128
4129         assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
4130         assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
4131
4132         assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
4133         assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
4134
4135         assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
4136
4137         assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4138         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4139         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4140         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4141         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
4142         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
4143         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
4144         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4145         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4146         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4147
4148         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
4149         let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4150         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4151         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4152         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4153         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4154         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4155         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4156
4157         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
4158         let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4159         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4160         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4161         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4162         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4163         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4164         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4165
4166         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4167         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4168         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4169         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4170
4171         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4172         let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4173         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4174         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4175
4176         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
4177         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4178         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4179
4180         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4181
4182         let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4183         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
4184         match events_5[0] {
4185                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
4186                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
4187                         match &purpose {
4188                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
4189                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
4190                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
4191                                 },
4192                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
4193                         }
4194                 },
4195                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4196         }
4197
4198         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
4199         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4200         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4201
4202         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4203         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4204 }
4205
4206 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
4207         // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
4208         // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
4209         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4210         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4211         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4212         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4213
4214         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4215
4216         let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
4217                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
4218                 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
4219                 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
4220                 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
4221                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
4222                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
4223                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4224                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4225                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4226                 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
4227                 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentReceived event(s).
4228                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
4229                 our_payment_hash
4230         } else {
4231                 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
4232         };
4233
4234         let mut block = Block {
4235                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
4236                 txdata: vec![],
4237         };
4238         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4239         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4240         let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4241         for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
4242                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
4243                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4244                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4245         }
4246
4247         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4248
4249         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4250         let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4251         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4252         assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4253         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4254         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4255
4256         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4257         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4258         // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4259         let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(100_000).to_vec();
4260         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(block_count - 1));
4261         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4262 }
4263
4264 #[test]
4265 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4266         do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4267         do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4268 }
4269
4270 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4271         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4272         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4273         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4274         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4275         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4276         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4277         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4278
4279         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4280         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4281         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4282         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4283
4284         // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4285         let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4286         {
4287                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, first_payment_hash, &Some(first_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4288         }
4289         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4290         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4291
4292         // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4293         let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4294         let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4295         sending_node.node.send_payment(&route, second_payment_hash, &Some(second_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4296         if forwarded_htlc {
4297                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4298                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4299                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4300                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4301                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4302         }
4303         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4304
4305         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4306         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4307         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4308         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4309
4310         if forwarded_htlc {
4311                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4312                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4313                 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4314                 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4315                 match fail_commit[0] {
4316                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4317                                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4318                                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4319                         },
4320                         _ => unreachable!(),
4321                 }
4322                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4323         } else {
4324                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4325                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4326                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[0] {
4327                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
4328                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
4329                 if let Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[1] {
4330                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
4331                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
4332         }
4333 }
4334
4335 #[test]
4336 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4337         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4338         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4339 }
4340
4341 #[test]
4342 fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4343         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4344         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4345         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4346         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4347         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4348         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4349         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4350         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4351         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4352
4353         let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4354
4355         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4356
4357         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4358         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4359         get_monitor!(nodes[0], OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id())
4360                 .write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4361
4362         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4363         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4364         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4365         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4366         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4367         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4368         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4369         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4370                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4371         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4372
4373         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4374         let config = UserConfig::default();
4375         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4376                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4377                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4378                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4379                         default_config: config,
4380                         keys_manager,
4381                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4382                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4383                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4384                         logger: &logger,
4385                         channel_monitors,
4386                 }).unwrap()
4387         };
4388         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4389         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4390
4391         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4392         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4393         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4394         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4395
4396         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4397         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4398         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4399         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4400
4401         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4402         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4403         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4404         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4405
4406         let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4407         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
4408         for node in nodes.iter() {
4409                 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4410                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4411                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4412         }
4413
4414         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4415 }
4416
4417 #[test]
4418 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_events() {
4419         // This test makes sure the events field in ChannelManager survives de/serialization
4420         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4421         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4422         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4423         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4424         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4425         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4426         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4427         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4428         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4429
4430         // Start creating a channel, but stop right before broadcasting the funding transaction
4431         let channel_value = 100000;
4432         let push_msat = 10001;
4433         let a_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4434         let b_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4435         let node_a = nodes.remove(0);
4436         let node_b = nodes.remove(0);
4437         node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
4438         node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), a_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4439         node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), b_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id()));
4440
4441         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&node_a, &node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, 42);
4442
4443         node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
4444         check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
4445
4446         node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4447         {
4448                 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4449                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4450                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4451                 added_monitors.clear();
4452         }
4453
4454         let bs_funding_signed = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
4455         node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_funding_signed);
4456         {
4457                 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4458                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4459                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4460                 added_monitors.clear();
4461         }
4462         // Normally, this is where node_a would broadcast the funding transaction, but the test de/serializes first instead
4463
4464         nodes.push(node_a);
4465         nodes.push(node_b);
4466
4467         // Start the de/seriailization process mid-channel creation to check that the channel manager will hold onto events that are serialized
4468         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4469         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4470         get_monitor!(nodes[0], bs_funding_signed.channel_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4471
4472         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4473         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4474         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4475         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4476         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4477         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4478         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4479         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4480                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4481         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4482
4483         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4484         let config = UserConfig::default();
4485         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4486                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4487                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4488                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4489                         default_config: config,
4490                         keys_manager,
4491                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4492                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4493                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4494                         logger: &logger,
4495                         channel_monitors,
4496                 }).unwrap()
4497         };
4498         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4499         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4500
4501         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4502
4503         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4504         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4505
4506         // After deserializing, make sure the funding_transaction is still held by the channel manager
4507         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4508         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
4509         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4510         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
4511
4512         // Make sure the channel is functioning as though the de/serialization never happened
4513         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4514         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4515
4516         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4517         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4518         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4519         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4520
4521         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4522         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4523         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4524         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4525
4526         let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4527         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
4528         for node in nodes.iter() {
4529                 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4530                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4531                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4532         }
4533
4534         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4535 }
4536
4537 #[test]
4538 fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4539         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4540         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4541         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4542         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4543         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4544         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4545         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4546         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4547         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4548         let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4549
4550         let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4551         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4552
4553         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4554
4555         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4556         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4557         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4558
4559         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4560         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4561         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4562         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4563         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4564         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4565         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4566         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4567                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4568         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4569
4570         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4571         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4572                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4573                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4574                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4575                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4576                         keys_manager,
4577                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4578                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4579                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4580                         logger: &logger,
4581                         channel_monitors,
4582                 }).unwrap()
4583         };
4584         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4585         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4586
4587         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4588         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4589         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4590
4591         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4592
4593         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
4594         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4595 }
4596
4597 #[test]
4598 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
4599         // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with an out-of-date ChannelMonitor
4600         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4601         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4602         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
4603         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4604         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4605         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4606         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4607         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4608         let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4609         let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4610         let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4611         let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4612
4613         let mut node_0_stale_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4614         for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4615                 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4616                 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4617                 node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4618         }
4619
4620         let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
4621
4622         // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
4623         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4624
4625         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
4626         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4627         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4628         nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4629
4630         // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
4631         // nodes[3])
4632         let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4633         for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4634                 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4635                 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4636                 node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4637         }
4638
4639         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4640         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4641         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4642         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4643         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4644         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4645
4646
4647         let mut node_0_stale_monitors = Vec::new();
4648         for serialized in node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4649                 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4650                 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4651                 assert!(read.is_empty());
4652                 node_0_stale_monitors.push(monitor);
4653         }
4654
4655         let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
4656         for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4657                 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4658                 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4659                 assert!(read.is_empty());
4660                 node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
4661         }
4662
4663         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4664         if let Err(msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue) =
4665                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4666                 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4667                 keys_manager,
4668                 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4669                 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4670                 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4671                 logger: &logger,
4672                 channel_monitors: node_0_stale_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4673         }) { } else {
4674                 panic!("If the monitor(s) are stale, this indicates a bug and we should get an Err return");
4675         };
4676
4677         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4678         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) =
4679                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4680                 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4681                 keys_manager,
4682                 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4683                 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4684                 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4685                 logger: &logger,
4686                 channel_monitors: node_0_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4687         }).unwrap();
4688         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4689         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4690
4691         { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx
4692                 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4693                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
4694                 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
4695                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
4696         }
4697
4698         for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
4699                 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor).is_ok());
4700                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4701         }
4702         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4703         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
4704
4705         // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
4706         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4707         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4708         //... and we can even still claim the payment!
4709         claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4710
4711         nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4712         let reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[3], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4713         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4714         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish);
4715         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4716         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
4717         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
4718                 match action {
4719                         &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
4720                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
4721                         },
4722                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
4723                 }
4724         }
4725 }
4726
4727 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4728         ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4729                 {
4730                         let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4731                         let mut txn = Vec::new();
4732                         let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4733                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4734                         for event in events.drain(..) {
4735                                 match event {
4736                                         Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs } => {
4737                                                 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4738                                                         txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4739                                                         all_outputs.push(outp);
4740                                                 }
4741                                         },
4742                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4743                                 };
4744                         }
4745                         if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4746                                 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx) {
4747                                         txn.push(tx);
4748                                 }
4749                         }
4750                         txn
4751                 }
4752         }
4753 }
4754
4755 #[test]
4756 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4757         // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4758         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4759         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4760         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4761         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4762
4763         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4764         nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4765         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4766         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4767         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4768         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4769         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4770         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4771         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4772
4773         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4774         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4775
4776         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4777         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4778         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4779         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4780         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4781 }
4782
4783 #[test]
4784 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4785         // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4786         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4787         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4788         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4789         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4790         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4791
4792         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4793         nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4794         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4795         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4796         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4797
4798         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4799         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4800         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4801         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4802
4803         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4804         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4805         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4806         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4807         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4808
4809         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4810         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4811         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4812 }
4813
4814 #[test]
4815 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4816         // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4817         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4818
4819         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4820         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4821         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4822         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4823
4824         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4825         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4826         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4827         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4828         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4829
4830         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4831         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4832         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4833         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4834         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4835
4836         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4837         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4838         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4839
4840         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4841         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4842         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4843         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4844         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4845 }
4846
4847 #[test]
4848 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4849         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4850         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4851         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4852         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4853
4854         // Create some initial channels
4855         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4856
4857         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
4858
4859         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4860         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4861         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4862
4863         // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4864         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4865         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4866         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4867         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4868         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4869         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4870         match events[0] {
4871                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4872                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4873         }
4874         match events[1] {
4875                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4876                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4877         }
4878
4879         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4880         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-Success), ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4881         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4882         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4883         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4884         check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
4885         check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
4886
4887         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4888         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4889         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4890
4891         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4892         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4893         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4894 }
4895
4896 #[test]
4897 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4898         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4899         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4900         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4901         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4902
4903         // Create some initial channels
4904         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4905
4906         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4907         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4908
4909         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4910
4911         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4912         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4913         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4914
4915         // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4916         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4917         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4918         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4919         match events[0] {
4920                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4921                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4922         }
4923         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4924
4925         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4926         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4927         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelManager : 1 local commitent tx, ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4928         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
4929         check_spends!(node_txn[1],  commitment_tx[0].clone());
4930         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4931
4932         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4933         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4934         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4935         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, true);
4936
4937         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4938         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4939         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4940         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]);
4941         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4942 }
4943
4944 #[test]
4945 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4946         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4947         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4948         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4949         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4950
4951         // Create some initial channels
4952         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4953
4954         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4955         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4956         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4957         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4958
4959         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4960
4961         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4962         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4963         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4964         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4965
4966         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4967         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
4968         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4969         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4970
4971         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4972         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4973
4974         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4975         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4976         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4977 }
4978
4979 #[test]
4980 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4981         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4982         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4983         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4984         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4985         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4986
4987         // Create some initial channels
4988         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4989
4990         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4991         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4992         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4993         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4994
4995         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4996
4997         // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
4998         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4999         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5000         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5001         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5002         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5003
5004         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5005         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
5006         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5007         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5008         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5009         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
5010         assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].lock_time, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
5011
5012         // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
5013         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5014         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()] });
5015         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5016         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5017         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5018
5019         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5020         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5021         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
5022         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
5023         // transactions next...
5024         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
5025         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
5026
5027         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
5028         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
5029         if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid() {
5030                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5031         } else {
5032                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid());
5033                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5034         }
5035
5036         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5037         check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
5038
5039         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
5040         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5041
5042         // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
5043         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5044         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5045         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5046         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
5047 }
5048
5049 #[test]
5050 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
5051         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5052         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
5053         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5054         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5055         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5056
5057         // Create some initial channels
5058         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5059
5060         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5061         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5062         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5063         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
5064
5065         // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
5066         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
5067
5068         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
5069
5070         // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
5071         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
5072         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5073         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5074         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5075         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5076
5077         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
5078         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5079         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5080         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
5081
5082         // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
5083         let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
5084         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
5085
5086         // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
5087         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5088         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
5089         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5090         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5091         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5092
5093         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5094         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5095
5096         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
5097         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
5098         // transactions next...
5099         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
5100         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
5101         if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
5102                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5103         } else {
5104                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
5105                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5106         }
5107
5108         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5109         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
5110
5111         check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
5112
5113         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
5114         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5115
5116         // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
5117         // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
5118
5119         // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
5120         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5121         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5122         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5123         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
5124         assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5125         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
5126         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
5127 }
5128
5129 #[test]
5130 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
5131         // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
5132         // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
5133         // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
5134         // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
5135         // channel.
5136         // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
5137         // gets broadcast.
5138
5139         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5140         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5141         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5142         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5143
5144         // Create some initial channels
5145         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5146         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5147
5148         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5149         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5150         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5151         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5152         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5153
5154         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
5155         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
5156         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
5157
5158         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
5159         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5160         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
5161         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5162         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
5163         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5164         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5165         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5166         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5167         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5168         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5169
5170         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
5171         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5172         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5173         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5174
5175         let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Success tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
5176         assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 3);
5177         assert_eq!(c_txn[0], c_txn[2]);
5178         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0], c_txn[1]);
5179         check_spends!(c_txn[1], chan_2.3);
5180         check_spends!(c_txn[2], c_txn[1]);
5181         assert_eq!(c_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
5182         assert_eq!(c_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5183         assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
5184         assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
5185
5186         // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
5187         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
5188         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![c_txn[1].clone(), c_txn[2].clone()]});
5189         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5190         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5191         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5192         match events[0] {
5193                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5194                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5195         }
5196         match events[1] {
5197                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
5198                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
5199                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, Some(chan_1.2));
5200                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
5201                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
5202                 },
5203                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5204         }
5205         {
5206                 let mut b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5207                 // ChannelMonitor: claim tx
5208                 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
5209                 check_spends!(b_txn[0], chan_2.3); // B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
5210                 b_txn.clear();
5211         }
5212         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5213         let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5214         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
5215         match msg_events[0] {
5216                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5217                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5218         }
5219         match msg_events[1] {
5220                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
5221                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5222         }
5223         match msg_events[2] {
5224                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
5225                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5226                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5227                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5228                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5229                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
5230                 },
5231                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5232         };
5233         // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
5234         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5235         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
5236         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5237         let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5238         // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success tx
5239         assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 3);
5240         check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_1.3);
5241         check_spends!(b_txn[2], b_txn[1]);
5242         check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
5243         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5244         assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
5245         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
5246
5247         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5248         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5249 }
5250
5251 #[test]
5252 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
5253         // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
5254         // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
5255         // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
5256         // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
5257         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
5258         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
5259         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5260         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5261         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5262         config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5263         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
5264                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5265         let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5266
5267         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5268         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5269         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5270
5271         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5272         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5273         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5274         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5275         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
5276
5277         let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 900_000);
5278
5279         let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
5280         // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
5281         // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
5282         // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
5283         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id())
5284                 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
5285         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], payment_params, 900000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40);
5286         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 900000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
5287
5288         let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5289         assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5290         check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5291
5292         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
5293         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5294         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5295         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5296         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5297
5298         let htlc_timeout_tx;
5299         { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
5300                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5301                 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5302                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
5303                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5304
5305                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5306                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5307                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5308                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5309                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
5310                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], commitment_txn[0]);
5311                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
5312
5313                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5314                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5315                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5316                 htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[1].clone();
5317         }
5318
5319         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
5320         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], duplicate_payment_hash, 900_000);
5321
5322         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
5323         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
5324         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5325         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5326         match events[0] {
5327                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5328                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5329         }
5330         match events[1] {
5331                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5332                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5333         }
5334         let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5335         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs), ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
5336         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
5337         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5338         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5339         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5340         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5341         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5342         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5343         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5344         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[3], htlc_success_txn[0]);
5345         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[4], htlc_success_txn[1]);
5346         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
5347
5348         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
5349         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5350         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5351         let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5352         assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5353         assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5354         let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
5355         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5356         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5357         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5358
5359         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5360         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5361         {
5362                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5363         }
5364         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
5365
5366         // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
5367         // Note that the fee paid is effectively double as the HTLC value (including the nodes[1] fee
5368         // and nodes[2] fee) is rounded down and then claimed in full.
5369         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[0]);
5370         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], Some(196*2), true, true);
5371         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5372         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5373         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5374         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5375         assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
5376         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5377         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5378
5379         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5380         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
5381
5382         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5383         match events[0] {
5384                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5385                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
5386                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
5387                 }
5388                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5389         }
5390 }
5391
5392 #[test]
5393 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
5394         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5395         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5396         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5397         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5398
5399         // Create some initial channels
5400         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5401
5402         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
5403         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5404         assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
5405         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5406         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5407
5408         // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
5409         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5410         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
5411         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5412
5413         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
5414         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5415         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5416         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5417         match events[0] {
5418                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5419                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5420         }
5421         match events[1] {
5422                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5423                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5424         }
5425         let node_tx = {
5426                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5427                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5428                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
5429                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5430                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5431                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5432                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5433                 node_txn[0].clone()
5434         };
5435
5436         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
5437         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5438
5439         // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5440         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5441         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5442         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5443         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
5444         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5445 }
5446
5447 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
5448         // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
5449         // unrevoked commitment transaction.
5450         // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
5451         // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
5452         // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
5453         // use the same payment hashes.
5454         // Thus, we use a six-node network:
5455         //
5456         // A \         / E
5457         //    - C - D -
5458         // B /         \ F
5459         // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
5460         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
5461         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
5462         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5463         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5464         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5465         config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5466         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
5467                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5468         let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5469
5470         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5471         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5472         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5473         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5474         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5475
5476         // Rebalance and check output sanity...
5477         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
5478         send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
5479         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
5480
5481         let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5482         // 0th HTLC:
5483         let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5484         // 1st HTLC:
5485         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5486         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5487         // 2nd HTLC:
5488         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5489         // 3rd HTLC:
5490         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5491         // 4th HTLC:
5492         let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5493         // 5th HTLC:
5494         let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5495         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5496         // 6th HTLC:
5497         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200).unwrap());
5498         // 7th HTLC:
5499         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200).unwrap());
5500
5501         // 8th HTLC:
5502         let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5503         // 9th HTLC:
5504         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5505         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5506
5507         // 10th HTLC:
5508         let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5509         // 11th HTLC:
5510         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5511         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200).unwrap());
5512
5513         // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
5514         // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
5515         // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
5516         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2).len(), 1);
5517         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
5518
5519         // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
5520         // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5521         assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1));
5522         assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3));
5523         assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5));
5524         assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6));
5525         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
5526         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[4]);
5527         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
5528
5529         let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5530         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5531         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5532         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5533         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5534         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5535
5536         // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5537         assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
5538         assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4));
5539         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5540         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[5]);
5541         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5542
5543         let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5544         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5545         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5546         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5547
5548         let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5549
5550         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[3]);
5551         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5552         let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5553         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5554         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5555         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5556         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5557         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5558         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5559         if deliver_last_raa {
5560                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5561         } else {
5562                 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5563         }
5564
5565         // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5566         // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5567         // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5568         // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5569         //
5570         // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5571         // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5572         // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5573         //
5574         // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5575         // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5576         let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5577
5578         if announce_latest {
5579                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5580         } else {
5581                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5582         }
5583         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5584         let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5585                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5586                 events[1].clone()
5587         } else {
5588                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5589                 events[0].clone()
5590         };
5591         match close_event {
5592                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5593                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5594         }
5595
5596         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5597         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5598         if deliver_last_raa {
5599                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5600         } else {
5601                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5602         }
5603         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5604
5605         let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5606         assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5607         let mut a_done = false;
5608         for msg in cs_msgs {
5609                 match msg {
5610                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5611                                 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5612                                 // should be failed-backwards here.
5613                                 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5614                                         // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5615                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5616                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5617                                         }
5618                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5619                                         assert!(!a_done);
5620                                         a_done = true;
5621                                         &nodes[0]
5622                                 } else {
5623                                         // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5624                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5625                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5626                                         }
5627                                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5628                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5629                                         &nodes[1]
5630                                 };
5631                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5632                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5633                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5634                                 if announce_latest {
5635                                         target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5636                                         if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5637                                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5638                                         }
5639                                 }
5640                                 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5641                         },
5642                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5643                 }
5644         }
5645
5646         let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5647         assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5648         let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5649         let mut as_updates = 0;
5650         for event in as_events.iter() {
5651                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5652                         assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5653                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5654                                 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5655                         } else {
5656                                 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5657                         }
5658                         if network_update.is_some() {
5659                                 as_updates += 1;
5660                         }
5661                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5662         }
5663         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5664         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5665         if announce_latest {
5666                 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5667                 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5668         }
5669         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5670
5671         let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5672         assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5673         let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5674         let mut bs_updates = 0;
5675         for event in bs_events.iter() {
5676                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5677                         assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5678                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5679                                 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5680                         } else {
5681                                 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5682                         }
5683                         if network_update.is_some() {
5684                                 bs_updates += 1;
5685                         }
5686                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5687         }
5688         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5689         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5690         if announce_latest {
5691                 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5692         }
5693         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5694
5695         // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5696         // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5697         // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5698         // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5699         assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5700         assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5701 }
5702
5703 #[test]
5704 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5705         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5706 }
5707
5708 #[test]
5709 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5710         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5711 }
5712
5713 #[test]
5714 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5715         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5716         // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5717         // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5718 }
5719
5720 #[test]
5721 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5722         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5723         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5724         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5725         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5726
5727         // Create some initial channels
5728         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5729
5730         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5731         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5732         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5733         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5734
5735         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5736         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5737         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5738         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5739         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5740         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5741
5742         let htlc_timeout = {
5743                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5744                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
5745                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5746                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5747                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5748                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5749                 node_txn[1].clone()
5750         };
5751
5752         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5753         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5754         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5755
5756         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5757         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5758         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5759         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5760         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5761         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5762         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5763         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5764         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5765         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5766                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5767 }
5768
5769 #[test]
5770 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5771         // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with
5772         // a key manager rotation to test that key_derivation_params returned in DynamicOutputP2WSH
5773         // let us re-derive the channel key set to then derive a delayed_payment_key.
5774
5775         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5776
5777         // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5778         let seed = [42; 32];
5779         let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5780         let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5781         let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph: &chanmon_cfgs[0].network_graph, node_seed: seed, features: InitFeatures::known() };
5782         let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5783         node_cfgs.remove(0);
5784         node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5785
5786         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5787         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5788
5789         // Create some initial channels
5790         // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5791         // for node 0
5792         let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5793         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5794         assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5795
5796         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5797         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5798         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5799         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5800         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5801
5802         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5803         let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5804         let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5805         assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5806         check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5807
5808         // We check funding pubkey are unique
5809         let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5810         let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5811         if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5812             || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5813             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5814             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5815                 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5816         }
5817
5818         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5819         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5820         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5821         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5822         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5823         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5824
5825         let htlc_timeout = {
5826                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5827                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5828                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5829                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn_1[0]);
5830                 node_txn[1].clone()
5831         };
5832
5833         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5834         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5835         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5836
5837         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5838         let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5839         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5840         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5841         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5842         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5843         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5844         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5845         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5846         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5847         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5848                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5849 }
5850
5851 #[test]
5852 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5853         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5854         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5855         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5856         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5857
5858         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5859
5860         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5861         let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5862
5863         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5864         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5865         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5866
5867         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5868         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5869         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5870
5871         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5872         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5873         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5874
5875         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5876         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5877         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5878 }
5879
5880 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5881         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5882         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5883         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5884         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5885         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5886
5887         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5888
5889         // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5890         // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5891         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5892         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5893         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5894
5895         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5896         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5897         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
5898
5899         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5900         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5901         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5902         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5903         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5904
5905         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5906         let mut block = Block {
5907                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5908                 txdata: vec![],
5909         };
5910         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5911                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5912                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5913         }
5914         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5915         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5916         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5917         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5918 }
5919
5920 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5921         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5922         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5923         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5924         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5925         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5926
5927         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5928         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5929         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5930
5931         let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5932
5933         // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5934         // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5935         // to "time out" the HTLC.
5936
5937         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5938         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5939
5940         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5941                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: Vec::new()});
5942                 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
5943         }
5944         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5945         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5946         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5947         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5948 }
5949
5950 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5951         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5952         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5953         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5954         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5955         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5956
5957         // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
5958         // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5959         // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
5960         // actually revoked.
5961         let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
5962         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
5963         assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
5964         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5965         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5966
5967         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5968         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5969         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5970         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5971         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5972         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5973         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5974         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
5975         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5976         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5977
5978         if check_revoke_no_close {
5979                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
5980                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5981         }
5982
5983         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5984         let mut block = Block {
5985                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5986                 txdata: vec![],
5987         };
5988         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
5989                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5990                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5991         }
5992         if !check_revoke_no_close {
5993                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5994                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5995                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5996                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5997         } else {
5998                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5999                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6000                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[0] {
6001                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
6002                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
6003                 if let Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[1] {
6004                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
6005                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
6006         }
6007 }
6008
6009 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
6010 // There are only a few cases to test here:
6011 //  * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
6012 //    broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
6013 //  * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
6014 //  * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
6015 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
6016 // non-dust HTLCs.
6017 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
6018 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
6019 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
6020 #[test]
6021 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
6022         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
6023         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
6024
6025         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
6026         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
6027 }
6028
6029 #[test]
6030 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
6031         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
6032         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
6033         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
6034         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
6035 }
6036
6037 #[test]
6038 #[should_panic]
6039 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
6040         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6041         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6042         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6043         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6044         // Force duplicate randomness for every get-random call
6045         for node in nodes.iter() {
6046                 *node.keys_manager.override_random_bytes.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
6047         }
6048
6049         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
6050         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
6051         let push_msat=10001;
6052         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
6053         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6054         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
6055         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6056
6057         // Create a second channel with the same random values. This used to panic due to a colliding
6058         // channel_id, but now panics due to a colliding outbound SCID alias.
6059         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
6060 }
6061
6062 #[test]
6063 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
6064         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6065         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6066         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6067         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6068
6069         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
6070         let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
6071         let push_msat=10001;
6072         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
6073
6074         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
6075         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
6076         // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
6077         let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
6078         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
6079
6080         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
6081         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
6082         let push_msat=10001;
6083         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
6084         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6085         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
6086
6087         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
6088         // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
6089         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
6090
6091         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
6092         assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
6093         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6094
6095         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
6096         let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
6097         assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
6098
6099         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
6100         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
6101         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6102         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6103         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
6104         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6105 }
6106
6107 #[test]
6108 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
6109         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6110         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6111         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6112         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6113
6114         let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
6115         let push_msat=10001;
6116         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
6117         let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6118         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
6119         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
6120
6121         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
6122         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6123         let err_msg = match events[0] {
6124                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
6125                         msg.clone()
6126                 },
6127                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6128         };
6129         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
6130 }
6131
6132 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
6133 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
6134 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
6135 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
6136 #[test]
6137 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
6138         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6139         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6140         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6141         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6142         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6143
6144         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6145         // pending_update_fee.
6146         {
6147                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6148                 *feerate_lock += 20;
6149         }
6150         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6151         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6152
6153         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6154         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6155         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6156                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6157                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6158                 },
6159                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6160         };
6161
6162         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6163
6164         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6165         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6166         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6167         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6168
6169         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6170         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
6171         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6172
6173         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6174         let our_payment_id = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6175         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6176         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6177
6178         // Flush the pending fee update.
6179         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6180         let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6181         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6182         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
6183         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6184
6185         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
6186         // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
6187         // us to surface its failure to the user.
6188         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6189         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6190         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6191         let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6192                 hex::encode(our_payment_hash.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6193         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6194
6195         // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
6196         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6197         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6198         match &events[0] {
6199                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data, .. } => {
6200                         assert_eq!(our_payment_id, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6201                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
6202                         assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
6203                         assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6204                         assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6205                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
6206                         assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
6207                         assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
6208                 },
6209                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6210         }
6211 }
6212
6213 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
6214 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
6215 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
6216 #[test]
6217 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
6218         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6219         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6220         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6221         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6222         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6223
6224         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6225         // pending_update_fee.
6226         {
6227                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6228                 *feerate_lock += 200;
6229         }
6230         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6231         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6232
6233         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6234         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6235         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6236                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6237                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6238                 },
6239                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6240         };
6241
6242         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6243
6244         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6245         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6246         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6247         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6248
6249         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6250         let amt_1 = 20000;
6251         let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors) - amt_1;
6252         let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
6253         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
6254
6255         // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
6256         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
6257         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6258         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
6259         let payment_id_2 = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
6260         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6261         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
6262
6263         // Flush the pending fee update.
6264         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6265         let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6266         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6267         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
6268         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6269         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
6270
6271         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
6272         // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
6273         // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
6274         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6275         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6276         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6277         let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6278                 hex::encode(payment_hash_2.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6279         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6280
6281         // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
6282         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6283         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6284         match &events[0] {
6285                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data, .. } => {
6286                         assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6287                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
6288                         assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
6289                         assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6290                         assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6291                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
6292                         assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
6293                         assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
6294                 },
6295                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6296         }
6297
6298         // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
6299         let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
6300                 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6301                 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
6302                 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
6303         };
6304         let raa = match send_raa_event {
6305                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
6306                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6307         };
6308         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6309         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6310         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6311         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6312         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6313         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6314         match events[0] {
6315                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6316                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6317         }
6318         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6319         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6320         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6321         match events[0] {
6322                 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => {},
6323                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6324         }
6325         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
6326         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6327         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, amt_1);
6328
6329         let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6330         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6331         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
6332         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
6333 }
6334
6335 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
6336 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
6337 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
6338 // once it's freed.
6339 #[test]
6340 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
6341         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6342         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6343         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
6344         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
6345         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
6346         config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
6347         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
6348         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6349         let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6350         let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6351
6352         // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6353         // pending_update_fee.
6354         {
6355                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6356                 *feerate_lock += 20;
6357         }
6358         nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6359         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6360
6361         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6362         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6363         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6364                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6365                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6366                 },
6367                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6368         };
6369
6370         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6371
6372         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6373         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6374         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6375         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6376
6377         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6378         let feemsat = 239;
6379         let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
6380         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors) - total_routing_fee_msat;
6381         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
6382         let payment_event = {
6383                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6384                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6385
6386                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6387                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6388
6389                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6390         };
6391         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6392         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6393         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6394         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6395
6396         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1_2.2);
6397         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6398
6399         // Flush the pending fee update.
6400         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6401         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6402         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6403         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6404         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6405         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6406
6407         // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
6408         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6409         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6410
6411         let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
6412                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
6413                         msg.clone()
6414                 },
6415                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6416         };
6417
6418         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
6419         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6420         assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6421
6422         // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
6423         let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6424         assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 1);
6425         match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
6426                 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6427                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6428         }
6429
6430         // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
6431         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6432         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6433
6434         // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
6435         let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6436         assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
6437         let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
6438                 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6439                         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
6440                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
6441                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
6442                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6443                         (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6444                 },
6445                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6446         };
6447
6448         // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
6449         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
6450         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6451
6452         // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
6453         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6454         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6455         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6456         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6457         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6458         let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6459         assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
6460         let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
6461                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
6462                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6463         };
6464         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6465         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
6466         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6467 }
6468
6469 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
6470 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
6471 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
6472
6473 #[test]
6474 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
6475         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
6476         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6477         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6478         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6479         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6480         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6481
6482         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6483         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 100;
6484
6485         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6486                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6487         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6488         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value".to_string(), 1);
6489 }
6490
6491 #[test]
6492 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
6493         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6494         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6495         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6496         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6497         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6498         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6499
6500         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6501         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 0;
6502         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6503                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
6504
6505         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6506         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6507 }
6508
6509 #[test]
6510 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
6511         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6512         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6513         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6514         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6515         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6516         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6517
6518         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6519         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6520         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6521         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6522         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6523
6524         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6525         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6526         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6527         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6528         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() });
6529 }
6530
6531 #[test]
6532 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6533         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6534         //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6535         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6536         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6537         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6538         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6539         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6540
6541         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
6542                 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
6543         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], payment_params, 100000000, 0);
6544         route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = 500000001;
6545         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::RouteError { ref err },
6546                 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6547 }
6548
6549 #[test]
6550 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6551         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6552         //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6553         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6554         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6555         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6556         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6557         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6558         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6559         let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6560
6561         for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6562                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6563                 let payment_event = {
6564                         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6565                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6566
6567                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6568                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6569                         if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6570                                 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6571                         } else {
6572                                 assert!(false);
6573                         }
6574                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6575                 };
6576                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6577                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6578                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6579
6580                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6581                 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6582         }
6583         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6584         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6585                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6586
6587         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6588         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
6589 }
6590
6591 #[test]
6592 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6593         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6594         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6595         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6596         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6597         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6598         let channel_value = 100000;
6599         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6600         let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6601
6602         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6603
6604         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6605         // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6606         // limits us to.
6607         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat =  max_in_flight + 1;
6608         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6609                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6610
6611         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6612         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
6613
6614         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6615 }
6616
6617 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6618 #[test]
6619 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6620         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6621         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6622         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6623         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6624         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6625         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6626         let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6627         {
6628                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6629                 let channel = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6630                 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6631         }
6632
6633         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6634         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6635         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6636         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6637         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6638         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6639         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6640         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6641         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6642         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6643         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6644 }
6645
6646 #[test]
6647 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6648         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6649         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6650         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6651         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6652         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6653         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6654
6655         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6656         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6657         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6658         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6659         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6660         let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
6661
6662         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6663         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6664         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6665         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6666         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6667
6668         // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6669         // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6670         // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6671         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6672         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6673
6674         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6675         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6676         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6677         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6678         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6679 }
6680
6681 #[test]
6682 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6683         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6684         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6685         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6686         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6687         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6688         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6689         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6690
6691         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3999999);
6692         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6693         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6694         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6695         let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3999999, &Some(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6696         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash);
6697
6698         let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6699                 channel_id: chan.2,
6700                 htlc_id: 0,
6701                 amount_msat: 1000,
6702                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6703                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6704                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6705         };
6706
6707         for i in 0..super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
6708                 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6709                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6710         }
6711         msg.htlc_id = (super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS) as u64;
6712         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6713
6714         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6715         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6716         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6717         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6718         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6719 }
6720
6721 #[test]
6722 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6723         //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6724         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6725         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6726         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6727         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6728         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6729
6730         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6731         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6732         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6733         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6734         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6735         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6736
6737         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6738         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6739         assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6740         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6741         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6742 }
6743
6744 #[test]
6745 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6746         //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6747         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6748         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6749         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6750         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6751
6752         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6753         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6754         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6755         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6756         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6757         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6758         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6759
6760         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6761         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6762         assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6763         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6764         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6765 }
6766
6767 #[test]
6768 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6769         //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6770         // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6771         // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6772         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6773         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6774         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6775         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6776
6777         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6778         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6779         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6780         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6781         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6782         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6783
6784         //Disconnect and Reconnect
6785         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6786         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6787         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
6788         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6789         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6790         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
6791         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6792         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6793         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6794         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6795         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6796         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6797
6798         //Resend HTLC
6799         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6800         assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6801         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6802         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6803         let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6804
6805         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6806
6807         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6808         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6809         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6810         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6811         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6812 }
6813
6814 #[test]
6815 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6816         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6817
6818         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6819         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6820         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6821         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6822         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6823         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6824         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6825
6826         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6827         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6828         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6829
6830         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6831                 channel_id: chan.2,
6832                 htlc_id: 0,
6833                 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6834         };
6835
6836         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6837
6838         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6839         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6840         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6841         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6842         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6843 }
6844
6845 #[test]
6846 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6847         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6848
6849         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6850         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6851         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6852         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6853         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6854
6855         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6856         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6857         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6858         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6859         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6860
6861         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6862                 channel_id: chan.2,
6863                 htlc_id: 0,
6864                 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6865         };
6866
6867         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6868
6869         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6870         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6871         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6872         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6873         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6874 }
6875
6876 #[test]
6877 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6878         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6879
6880         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6881         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6882         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6883         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6884         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6885
6886         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6887         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6888         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6889         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6890         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6891         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6892                 channel_id: chan.2,
6893                 htlc_id: 0,
6894                 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6895                 failure_code: 0x8000,
6896         };
6897
6898         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6899
6900         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6901         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6902         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6903         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6904         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6905 }
6906
6907 #[test]
6908 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6909         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6910
6911         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6912         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6913         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6914         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6915         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6916
6917         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6918
6919         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6920         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6921         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6922
6923         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6924         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6925         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6926                 match events[0] {
6927                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6928                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6929                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6930                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6931                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6932                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6933                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6934                         },
6935                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6936                 }
6937         };
6938
6939         update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6940
6941         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6942
6943         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6944         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6945         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6946         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6947         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6948 }
6949
6950 #[test]
6951 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6952         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6953
6954         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6955         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6956         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6957         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6958         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6959
6960         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6961
6962         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6963         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6964         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6965
6966         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6967         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6968         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6969                 match events[0] {
6970                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6971                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6972                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6973                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6974                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6975                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6976                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6977                         },
6978                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6979                 }
6980         };
6981
6982         update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
6983
6984         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6985
6986         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6987         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6988         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6989         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6990         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6991 }
6992
6993 #[test]
6994 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
6995         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
6996
6997         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6998         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6999         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7000         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7001         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7002
7003         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
7004         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7005         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7006
7007         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7008         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
7009
7010         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7011         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7012         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
7013
7014         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7015
7016         let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
7017                 match events[0] {
7018                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
7019                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7020                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7021                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7022                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
7023                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7024                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
7025                         },
7026                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7027                 }
7028         };
7029         update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
7030         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
7031
7032         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
7033         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
7034         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
7035         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7036         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
7037 }
7038
7039 #[test]
7040 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
7041         //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
7042         //    * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
7043
7044         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7045         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7046         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7047         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7048         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7049         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7050
7051         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
7052
7053         //First hop
7054         let mut payment_event = {
7055                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7056                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7057                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7058                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7059                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
7060         };
7061         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7062         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7063         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7064         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7065         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7066         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
7067         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7068         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
7069         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
7070
7071         //Second Hop
7072         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
7073         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7074         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
7075         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
7076
7077         let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7078         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7079         let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
7080                 match events_3[0] {
7081                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7082                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7083                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7084                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7085                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
7086                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7087                                 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
7088                         },
7089                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7090                 }
7091         };
7092
7093         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
7094
7095         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7096         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
7097         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7098         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7099         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
7100
7101         //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
7102         match events_4[0] {
7103                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
7104                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7105                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7106                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7107                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7108                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7109                 },
7110                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7111         };
7112
7113         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7114 }
7115
7116 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
7117         // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
7118         // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
7119         // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
7120
7121         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7122         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7123         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7124         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7125         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7126         let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7127
7128         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7129
7130         // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
7131         let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7132         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7133         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7134
7135         // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
7136         let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7137
7138         // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
7139         assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
7140         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7141         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7142         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7143
7144         let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7145         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7146         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
7147         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7148
7149         // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
7150         let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7151
7152         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7153         match events[0] {
7154                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
7155                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7156                 },
7157                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7158         }
7159         match events[1] {
7160                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
7161                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7162                 },
7163                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7164         }
7165
7166         assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
7167         // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
7168         if announce_latest {
7169                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
7170         } else {
7171                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
7172         }
7173
7174         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7175         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7176         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7177
7178         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7179         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7180         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7181         // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
7182         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7183         let mut first_failed = false;
7184         for event in events {
7185                 match event {
7186                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7187                                 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
7188                                         assert!(!first_failed);
7189                                         first_failed = true;
7190                                 } else {
7191                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
7192                                 }
7193                         }
7194                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7195                 }
7196         }
7197 }
7198
7199 #[test]
7200 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
7201         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
7202         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
7203 }
7204
7205 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
7206         // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7207         // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
7208         // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7209         // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
7210         // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7211         // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
7212
7213         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7214         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7215         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7216         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7217         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7218
7219         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7220
7221         let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7222         let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7223
7224         let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7225         let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7226
7227         // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
7228         if revoked {
7229                 let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7230                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
7231         }
7232
7233         let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
7234         if local {
7235                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
7236                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
7237                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7238                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7239                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
7240
7241                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
7242                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7243                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7244                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7245                 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7246                 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7247                 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
7248                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7249                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7250                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7251                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7252         } else {
7253                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
7254                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7255                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7256                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7257                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7258                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7259                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7260                 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7261                 if !revoked {
7262                         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
7263                         assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7264                         // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout tx on remote commitment tx
7265                         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7266                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7267                         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7268                         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7269                 } else {
7270                         // If revoked, both dust & non-dust HTLCs should have been failed after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confs of revoked
7271                         // commitment tx
7272                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7273                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7274                         let first;
7275                         match events[0] {
7276                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7277                                         if payment_hash == dust_hash { first = true; }
7278                                         else { first = false; }
7279                                 },
7280                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7281                         }
7282                         match events[1] {
7283                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7284                                         if first { assert_eq!(payment_hash, non_dust_hash); }
7285                                         else { assert_eq!(payment_hash, dust_hash); }
7286                                 },
7287                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7288                         }
7289                 }
7290         }
7291 }
7292
7293 #[test]
7294 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
7295         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
7296         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
7297         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
7298 }
7299
7300 #[test]
7301 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
7302         // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
7303
7304         let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7305         low_our_to_self_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
7306         let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7307         high_their_to_self_config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
7308         let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
7309         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7310         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7311         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
7312         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7313
7314         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
7315         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) },
7316                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), 1000000, 1000000, 0,
7317                 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, 42)
7318         {
7319                 match error {
7320                         APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7321                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7322                 }
7323         } else { assert!(false) }
7324
7325         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7326         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7327         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7328         open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7329         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) },
7330                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0,
7331                 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
7332         {
7333                 match error {
7334                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str()));  },
7335                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7336                 }
7337         } else { assert!(false); }
7338
7339         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
7340         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7341         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7342         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7343         accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7344         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7345         let reason_msg;
7346         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
7347                 match action {
7348                         &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7349                                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
7350                                 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
7351                         },
7352                         _ => { panic!(); }
7353                 }
7354         } else { panic!(); }
7355         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg });
7356
7357         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7358         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7359         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7360         open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7361         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) },
7362                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0,
7363                 &high_their_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
7364         {
7365                 match error {
7366                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7367                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7368                 }
7369         } else { assert!(false); }
7370 }
7371
7372 #[test]
7373 fn test_data_loss_protect() {
7374         // We want to be sure that :
7375         // * we don't broadcast our Local Commitment Tx in case of fallen behind
7376         //   (but this is not quite true - we broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr)
7377         // * we close channel in case of detecting other being fallen behind
7378         // * we are able to claim our own outputs thanks to to_remote being static
7379         // TODO: this test is incomplete and the data_loss_protect implementation is incomplete - see issue #775
7380         let persister;
7381         let logger;
7382         let fee_estimator;
7383         let tx_broadcaster;
7384         let chain_source;
7385         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7386         // We broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr, which would cause a panic
7387         // during signing due to revoked tx
7388         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7389         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
7390         let monitor;
7391         let node_state_0;
7392         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7393         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7394         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7395
7396         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7397
7398         // Cache node A state before any channel update
7399         let previous_node_state = nodes[0].node.encode();
7400         let mut previous_chain_monitor_state = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7401         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan.2).write(&mut previous_chain_monitor_state).unwrap();
7402
7403         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7404         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7405
7406         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7407         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7408
7409         // Restore node A from previous state
7410         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
7411         let mut chain_monitor = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_chain_monitor_state.0), keys_manager).unwrap().1;
7412         chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
7413         tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster { txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new())) };
7414         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7415         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7416         monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &tx_broadcaster, &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7417         node_state_0 = {
7418                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7419                 channel_monitors.insert(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, &mut chain_monitor);
7420                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_node_state), ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7421                         keys_manager: keys_manager,
7422                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
7423                         chain_monitor: &monitor,
7424                         logger: &logger,
7425                         tx_broadcaster: &tx_broadcaster,
7426                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
7427                         channel_monitors,
7428                 }).unwrap().1
7429         };
7430         nodes[0].node = &node_state_0;
7431         assert!(monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chain_monitor).is_ok());
7432         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &monitor;
7433         nodes[0].chain_source = &chain_source;
7434
7435         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7436
7437         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7438         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7439
7440         let reestablish_0 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7441
7442         // Check we don't broadcast any transactions following learning of per_commitment_point from B
7443         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_0[0]);
7444         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7445
7446         {
7447                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7448                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7449         }
7450
7451         let mut reestablish_1 = Vec::with_capacity(1);
7452         for msg in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
7453                 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } = msg {
7454                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7455                         reestablish_1.push(msg.clone());
7456                 } else if let MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } = msg {
7457                 } else if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg {
7458                         match action {
7459                                 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7460                                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting");
7461                                 },
7462                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
7463                         }
7464                 } else {
7465                         panic!("Unexpected event")
7466                 }
7467         }
7468
7469         // Check we close channel detecting A is fallen-behind
7470         // Check that we sent the warning message when we detected that A has fallen behind,
7471         // and give the possibility for A to recover from the warning.
7472         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7473         let warn_msg = "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned();
7474         assert!(check_warn_msg!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), chan.2).contains(&warn_msg));
7475
7476         // Check A is able to claim to_remote output
7477         let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7478         // The node B should not broadcast the transaction to force close the channel!
7479         assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
7480         // B should now detect that there is something wrong and should force close the channel.
7481         let exp_err = "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can\'t do any automated broadcasting";
7482         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: exp_err.to_string() });
7483
7484         // after the warning message sent by B, we should not able to
7485         // use the channel, or reconnect with success to the channel.
7486         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().is_empty());
7487         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7488         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7489         let retry_reestablish = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7490
7491         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &retry_reestablish[0]);
7492         let mut err_msgs_0 = Vec::with_capacity(1);
7493         for msg in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
7494                 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg {
7495                         match action {
7496                                 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7497                                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Failed to find corresponding channel");
7498                                         err_msgs_0.push(msg.clone());
7499                                 },
7500                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
7501                         }
7502                 } else {
7503                         panic!("Unexpected event!");
7504                 }
7505         }
7506         assert_eq!(err_msgs_0.len(), 1);
7507         nodes[1].node.handle_error(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &err_msgs_0[0]);
7508         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().is_empty());
7509         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7510         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned() });
7511         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
7512 }
7513
7514 #[test]
7515 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
7516         // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
7517         // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
7518         // to B, B should refuse payment.
7519
7520         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7521         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7522         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7523         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7524
7525         // Create some initial channels
7526         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7527
7528         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7529         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7530         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7531         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7532         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7533         let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
7534         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7535         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7536
7537         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7538         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7539         let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7540         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7541         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7542
7543         // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
7544         // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
7545         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7546         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7547
7548         // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
7549         // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
7550         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7551
7552         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7553         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7554         let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
7555                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7556                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7557                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7558                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7559                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7560                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7561                         (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
7562                 },
7563                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7564         };
7565         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7566
7567         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
7568         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
7569
7570         // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
7571         let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(10_000).to_vec();
7572         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH));
7573         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
7574 }
7575
7576 #[test]
7577 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
7578         // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
7579         // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
7580
7581         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7582         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7583         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7584         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7585
7586         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7587         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7588         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7589
7590         // Disconnect peers
7591         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7592         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7593
7594         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // Enabled -> DisabledStaged
7595         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // DisabledStaged -> Disabled
7596         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7597         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7598         let mut chans_disabled = HashMap::new();
7599         for e in msg_events {
7600                 match e {
7601                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7602                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7603                                 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7604                                 if chans_disabled.insert(msg.contents.short_channel_id, msg.contents.timestamp).is_some() {
7605                                         panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7606                                 }
7607                         },
7608                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7609                 }
7610         }
7611         // Reconnect peers
7612         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7613         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7614         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7615         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7616         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7617         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7618
7619         // Reestablish chan_1
7620         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7621         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7622         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7623         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7624         // Reestablish chan_2
7625         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7626         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7627         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7628         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7629         // Reestablish chan_3
7630         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7631         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7632         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7633         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7634
7635         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7636         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7637         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7638         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7639         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7640         for e in msg_events {
7641                 match e {
7642                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7643                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7644                                 match chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7645                                         // Each update should have a higher timestamp than the previous one, replacing
7646                                         // the old one.
7647                                         Some(prev_timestamp) => assert!(msg.contents.timestamp > prev_timestamp),
7648                                         None => panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!"),
7649                                 }
7650                         },
7651                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7652                 }
7653         }
7654         // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7655         assert!(chans_disabled.is_empty());
7656 }
7657
7658 #[test]
7659 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7660         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7661         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7662
7663         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7664         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7665         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7666         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7667
7668         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7669
7670         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7671         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
7672                 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7673         let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_params, 3000000, 30);
7674         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7675
7676         let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7677         // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7678         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7679         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7680         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7681         let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7682
7683         let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7684         for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7685                 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7686                         penalty_sum += outp.value;
7687                 }
7688         }
7689
7690         // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7691         let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7692
7693         // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7694         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7695         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_114, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7696         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()] });
7697         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7698
7699         // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7700         let penalty_1;
7701         let feerate_1;
7702         {
7703                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7704                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor) + local commitment tx
7705                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7706                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7707                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7708                 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7709                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7710                 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7711                 node_txn.clear();
7712         };
7713
7714         // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7715         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7716         let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7717         let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7718         {
7719                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7720                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7721                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7722                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7723                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7724                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7725                         penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7726                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7727                         assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7728                         let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7729                         feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7730                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7731                         assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7732                         node_txn.clear();
7733                 }
7734         }
7735         assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7736
7737         // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7738         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7739         let penalty_3;
7740         let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7741         {
7742                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7743                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7744                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7745                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7746                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7747                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7748                         penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7749                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7750                         assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7751                         let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7752                         feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7753                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7754                         assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7755                         node_txn.clear();
7756                 }
7757         }
7758         assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7759
7760         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7761         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7762 }
7763
7764 #[test]
7765 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7766         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7767         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7768
7769         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7770         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7771         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7772         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7773         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7774
7775         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7776         // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7777         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7778         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7779         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7780         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7781                 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7782         let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7783         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7784         let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[1].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7785                 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7786         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7787
7788         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7789         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7790         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7791
7792         // Revoke local commitment tx
7793         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7794
7795         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7796         // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7797         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7798         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7799         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7800         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7801         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 49); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7802
7803         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7804         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
7805         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], chan.3);
7806
7807         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7808         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7809         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7810
7811         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7812         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7813         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
7814         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7815
7816         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7817         let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7818         let header_11 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: hash_128, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7819         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_11, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7820         let header_129 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_11.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7821         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_129, txdata: vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[2].clone()] });
7822         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7823         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7824         match events[1] {
7825                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7826                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7827         }
7828         let first;
7829         let feerate_1;
7830         let penalty_txn;
7831         {
7832                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7833                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + A commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7834                 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7835
7836                 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7837                 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7838                 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7839                 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7840                 // future).
7841                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7842                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7843                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7844                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7845                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7846                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7847
7848                 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7849                 // available, which we check here:
7850                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7851                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7852                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7853
7854                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7855                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7856
7857                 // node_txn[3] is the local commitment tx broadcast just because (and somewhat in case of
7858                 // reorgs, though its not clear its ever worth broadcasting conflicting txn like this when
7859                 // a remote commitment tx has already been confirmed).
7860                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan.3);
7861
7862                 // node_txn[4] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7863                 // output, checked above).
7864                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 2);
7865                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].output.len(), 1);
7866                 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7867
7868                 first = node_txn[4].txid();
7869                 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7870                 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[4].output[0].value;
7871                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[4].weight() as u64;
7872                 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7873                 node_txn.clear();
7874         }
7875
7876         // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7877         let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_129.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7878         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7879         let header_131 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_130.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7880         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_131, txdata: Vec::new() });
7881         {
7882                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7883                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // 2 bumped penalty txn on revoked commitment tx
7884
7885                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7886                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7887                 // Note that these are both bogus - they spend outputs already claimed in block 129:
7888                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output  {
7889                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7890                 } else {
7891                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7892                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7893                 }
7894
7895                 node_txn.clear();
7896         };
7897
7898         // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7899         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7900         assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7901         let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7902         let node_txn = {
7903                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7904                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7905
7906                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7907                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7908                 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7909                 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7910                 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7911                 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7912                 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7913                 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7914                 node_txn.clear();
7915                 txn
7916         };
7917         // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7918         let header_145 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_144, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7919         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_145, txdata: node_txn });
7920         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7921         {
7922                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7923                 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7924                 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7925                 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7926                 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7927                 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7928                 // up bumped justice generation.
7929                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7930                 node_txn.clear();
7931         }
7932         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7933         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7934 }
7935
7936 #[test]
7937 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
7938         // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7939         // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7940
7941         // Create 2 HTLCs
7942         // Provide preimage for one
7943         // Check aggregation
7944
7945         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7946         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7947         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7948         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7949
7950         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7951         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
7952         route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
7953
7954         // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7955         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7956         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7957         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7958         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7959
7960         // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
7961         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7962         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
7963         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
7964         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7965         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7966
7967         // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
7968         let timeout;
7969         let preimage;
7970         let preimage_bump;
7971         let feerate_timeout;
7972         let feerate_preimage;
7973         {
7974                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7975                 // 9 transactions including:
7976                 // 1*2 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success
7977                 // 1*3 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success + HTLC-Timeout
7978                 // 2 * HTLC-Success (one RBF bump we'll check later)
7979                 // 1 * HTLC-Timeout
7980                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 8);
7981                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7982                 assert_eq!(node_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
7983                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7984                 check_spends!(node_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
7985                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
7986                 preimage_bump = node_txn[3].clone();
7987
7988                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan.3);
7989                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
7990                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
7991                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[5]);
7992
7993                 timeout = node_txn[6].txid();
7994                 let index = node_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7995                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[6].output[0].value;
7996                 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / node_txn[6].weight() as u64;
7997
7998                 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
7999                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
8000                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
8001                 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
8002
8003                 node_txn.clear();
8004         };
8005         assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
8006         assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
8007
8008         // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
8009         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
8010         {
8011                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8012                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8013                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8014                 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
8015                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
8016                 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
8017
8018                 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
8019                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
8020                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.weight() as u64;
8021                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
8022                 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
8023
8024                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
8025                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
8026                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
8027                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
8028                 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
8029
8030                 node_txn.clear();
8031         }
8032
8033         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8034         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8035 }
8036
8037 #[test]
8038 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
8039         // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
8040         // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
8041         // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
8042         // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
8043         // EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
8044         // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
8045         // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
8046         // implement that).
8047         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8048         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8049         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8050         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8051         let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
8052
8053         let mut guard = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
8054         let keys = guard.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
8055
8056         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
8057
8058         // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
8059         keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8060         let per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
8061
8062         // Must revoke without gaps
8063         keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8064         keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
8065
8066         keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8067         let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
8068                 &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
8069
8070         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
8071                 &msgs::RevokeAndACK { channel_id, per_commitment_secret, next_per_commitment_point });
8072         assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
8073         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8074         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() });
8075 }
8076
8077 #[test]
8078 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
8079         // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
8080         // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
8081
8082         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8083         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8084         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8085         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8086
8087         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8088         // Lock HTLC in both directions
8089         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8090         route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8091
8092         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
8093         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8094         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
8095
8096         // Revoke local commitment tx
8097         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
8098
8099         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
8100         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
8101         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[0]);
8102         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8103
8104         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
8105         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8106         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8107         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8108         let penalty_txn = {
8109                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8110                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
8111                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8112                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8113                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8114                 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
8115                 node_txn.clear();
8116                 penalty_txn
8117         };
8118         let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8119         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
8120         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8121         {
8122                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
8123                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
8124                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
8125         }
8126 }
8127
8128 #[test]
8129 fn test_pending_claimed_htlc_no_balance_underflow() {
8130         // Tests that if we have a pending outbound HTLC as well as a claimed-but-not-fully-removed
8131         // HTLC we will not underflow when we call `Channel::get_balance_msat()`.
8132         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8133         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8134         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8135         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8136         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8137
8138         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_010_000);
8139         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8140         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_010_000);
8141         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8142         let fulfill_ev = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8143
8144         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8145         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
8146         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.commitment_signed);
8147         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8148         let (_raa, _cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8149
8150         // At this point nodes[1] has received 1,010k msat (10k msat more than their reserve) and can
8151         // send an HTLC back (though it will go in the holding cell). Send an HTLC back and check we
8152         // can get our balance.
8153
8154         // Get a route from nodes[1] to nodes[0] by getting a route going the other way and then flip
8155         // the public key of the only hop. This works around ChannelDetails not showing the
8156         // almost-claimed HTLC as available balance.
8157         let (mut route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000);
8158         route.payment_params = None; // This is all wrong, but unnecessary
8159         route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8160         let (_, payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
8161         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
8162
8163         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].balance_msat, 1_000_000);
8164 }
8165
8166 #[test]
8167 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
8168         // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
8169         // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
8170         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8171         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8172         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8173         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8174
8175         let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8176
8177         // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
8178         // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
8179         // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
8180         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
8181         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8182
8183         // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
8184         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
8185         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8186         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8187
8188         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
8189         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8190         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
8191         let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8192         assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
8193         match close_ev[0] {
8194                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
8195                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8196                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
8197                 },
8198                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8199         }
8200 }
8201
8202 #[test]
8203 fn test_override_channel_config() {
8204         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8205         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8206         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8207         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8208
8209         // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
8210         let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
8211         override_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
8212
8213         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
8214
8215         // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
8216         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8217         assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
8218         assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
8219 }
8220
8221 #[test]
8222 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
8223         let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
8224         zero_config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
8225         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8226         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8227         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
8228         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8229
8230         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
8231         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8232         assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8233
8234         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8235         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8236         assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8237 }
8238
8239 #[test]
8240 fn test_channel_update_has_correct_htlc_maximum_msat() {
8241         // Tests that the `ChannelUpdate` message has the correct values for `htlc_maximum_msat` set.
8242         // Bolt 7 specifies that if present `htlc_maximum_msat`:
8243         // 1. MUST be set to less than or equal to the channel capacity. In LDK, this is capped to
8244         // 90% of the `channel_value`.
8245         // 2. MUST be set to less than or equal to the `max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` received from the peer.
8246
8247         let mut config_30_percent = UserConfig::default();
8248         config_30_percent.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
8249         config_30_percent.own_channel_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 30;
8250         let mut config_50_percent = UserConfig::default();
8251         config_50_percent.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
8252         config_50_percent.own_channel_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 50;
8253         let mut config_95_percent = UserConfig::default();
8254         config_95_percent.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
8255         config_95_percent.own_channel_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 95;
8256         let mut config_100_percent = UserConfig::default();
8257         config_100_percent.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
8258         config_100_percent.own_channel_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 100;
8259
8260         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8261         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8262         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config_30_percent), Some(config_50_percent), Some(config_95_percent), Some(config_100_percent)]);
8263         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8264
8265         let channel_value_satoshis = 100000;
8266         let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8267         let channel_value_30_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.3) as u64;
8268         let channel_value_50_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.5) as u64;
8269         let channel_value_90_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.9) as u64;
8270
8271         let (node_0_chan_update, node_1_chan_update, _, _)  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value_satoshis, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8272         let (node_2_chan_update, node_3_chan_update, _, _)  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, channel_value_satoshis, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8273
8274         // Assert that `node[0]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 50 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8275         // that's the value of `node[1]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
8276         assert_eq!(node_0_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, OptionalField::Present(channel_value_50_percent_msat));
8277         // Assert that `node[1]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 30 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8278         // that's the value of `node[0]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
8279         assert_eq!(node_1_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, OptionalField::Present(channel_value_30_percent_msat));
8280
8281         // Assert that `node[2]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8282         // the value of `node[3]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (100%), exceeds 90% of the
8283         // `channel_value`.
8284         assert_eq!(node_2_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, OptionalField::Present(channel_value_90_percent_msat));
8285         // Assert that `node[3]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8286         // the value of `node[2]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (95%), exceeds 90% of the
8287         // `channel_value`.
8288         assert_eq!(node_3_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, OptionalField::Present(channel_value_90_percent_msat));
8289 }
8290
8291 #[test]
8292 fn test_manually_accept_inbound_channel_request() {
8293         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8294         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8295         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8296         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8297         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8298         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8299
8300         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8301         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8302
8303         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8304
8305         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8306         // accepting the inbound channel request.
8307         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8308
8309         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8310         match events[0] {
8311                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8312                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap();
8313                 }
8314                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8315         }
8316
8317         let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8318         assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8319
8320         match accept_msg_ev[0] {
8321                 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
8322                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8323                 }
8324                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8325         }
8326
8327         nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8328
8329         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8330         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8331
8332         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8333         match events[0] {
8334                 Event::ChannelClosed { user_channel_id, .. } => {
8335                         assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 23);
8336                 }
8337                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8338         }
8339 }
8340
8341 #[test]
8342 fn test_manually_reject_inbound_channel_request() {
8343         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8344         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8345         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8346         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8347         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8348         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8349
8350         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8351         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8352
8353         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8354
8355         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8356         // rejecting the inbound channel request.
8357         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8358
8359         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8360         match events[0] {
8361                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8362                         nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8363                 }
8364                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8365         }
8366
8367         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8368         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8369
8370         match close_msg_ev[0] {
8371                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => {
8372                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8373                 }
8374                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8375         }
8376         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8377 }
8378
8379 #[test]
8380 fn test_reject_funding_before_inbound_channel_accepted() {
8381         // This tests that when `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` is set to true, inbound
8382         // channels must to be manually accepted through `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel` by
8383         // the node operator before the counterparty sends a `FundingCreated` message. If a
8384         // `FundingCreated` message is received before the channel is accepted, it should be rejected
8385         // and the channel should be closed.
8386         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8387         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8388         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8389         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8390         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8391         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8392
8393         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8394         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8395         let temp_channel_id = res.temporary_channel_id;
8396
8397         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8398
8399         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in the `msg_events`.
8400         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8401
8402         // Clear the `Event::OpenChannelRequest` event without responding to the request.
8403         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8404
8405         // Get the `AcceptChannel` message of `nodes[1]` without calling
8406         // `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`, which generates a
8407         // `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` event. The message is passed to `nodes[0]`
8408         // `handle_accept_channel`, which is required in order for `create_funding_transaction` to
8409         // succeed when `nodes[0]` is passed to it.
8410         {
8411                 let mut lock;
8412                 let channel = get_channel_ref!(&nodes[1], lock, temp_channel_id);
8413                 let accept_chan_msg = channel.get_accept_channel_message();
8414                 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_chan_msg);
8415         }
8416
8417         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8418
8419         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8420         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8421
8422         // The `funding_created_msg` should be rejected by `nodes[1]` as it hasn't accepted the channel
8423         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8424
8425         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8426         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8427
8428         let expected_err = "FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted";
8429         match close_msg_ev[0] {
8430                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id, } => {
8431                         assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, temp_channel_id);
8432                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8433                         assert_eq!(msg.data, expected_err);
8434                 }
8435                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8436         }
8437
8438         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
8439 }
8440
8441 #[test]
8442 fn test_can_not_accept_inbound_channel_twice() {
8443         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8444         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8445         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8446         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8447         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8448         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8449
8450         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8451         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8452
8453         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8454
8455         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8456         // accepting the inbound channel request.
8457         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8458
8459         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8460         match events[0] {
8461                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8462                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0).unwrap();
8463                         let api_res = nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
8464                         match api_res {
8465                                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8466                                         assert_eq!(err, "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.");
8467                                 },
8468                                 Ok(_) => panic!("Channel shouldn't be possible to be accepted twice"),
8469                                 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8470                         }
8471                 }
8472                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8473         }
8474
8475         // Ensure that the channel wasn't closed after attempting to accept it twice.
8476         let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8477         assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8478
8479         match accept_msg_ev[0] {
8480                 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
8481                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8482                 }
8483                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8484         }
8485 }
8486
8487 #[test]
8488 fn test_can_not_accept_unknown_inbound_channel() {
8489         let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8490         let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
8491         let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
8492         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
8493
8494         let unknown_channel_id = [0; 32];
8495         let api_res = nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&unknown_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
8496         match api_res {
8497                 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
8498                         assert_eq!(err, "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist");
8499                 },
8500                 Ok(_) => panic!("It shouldn't be possible to accept an unkown channel"),
8501                 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8502         }
8503 }
8504
8505 #[test]
8506 fn test_simple_mpp() {
8507         // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
8508         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8509         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8510         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8511         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8512
8513         let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8514         let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8515         let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8516         let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8517
8518         let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8519         let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8520         route.paths.push(path);
8521         route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8522         route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8523         route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8524         route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8525         route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8526         route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8527         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
8528         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
8529 }
8530
8531 #[test]
8532 fn test_preimage_storage() {
8533         // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
8534         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8535         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8536         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8537         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8538
8539         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8540
8541         {
8542                 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
8543                 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8544                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8545                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8546                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8547                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8548                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8549                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8550         }
8551         // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8552         // values from previous calls.
8553         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8554         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8555         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8556         match events[0] {
8557                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref purpose, .. } => {
8558                         match &purpose {
8559                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
8560                                         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
8561                                 },
8562                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
8563                         }
8564                 },
8565                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8566         }
8567 }
8568
8569 #[test]
8570 #[allow(deprecated)]
8571 fn test_secret_timeout() {
8572         // Simple test of payment secret storage time outs. After
8573         // `create_inbound_payment(_for_hash)_legacy` is removed, this test will be removed as well.
8574         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8575         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8576         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8577         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8578
8579         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8580
8581         let (payment_hash, payment_secret_1) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_legacy(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8582
8583         // We should fail to register the same payment hash twice, at least until we've connected a
8584         // block with time 7200 + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1.
8585         if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8586                 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8587         } else { panic!(); }
8588         let mut block = {
8589                 let node_1_blocks = nodes[1].blocks.lock().unwrap();
8590                 Block {
8591                         header: BlockHeader {
8592                                 version: 0x2000000,
8593                                 prev_blockhash: node_1_blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(),
8594                                 merkle_root: Default::default(),
8595                                 time: node_1_blocks.len() as u32 + 7200, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8596                         txdata: vec![],
8597                 }
8598         };
8599         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8600         if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8601                 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8602         } else { panic!(); }
8603
8604         // If we then connect the second block, we should be able to register the same payment hash
8605         // again (this time getting a new payment secret).
8606         block.header.prev_blockhash = block.header.block_hash();
8607         block.header.time += 1;
8608         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8609         let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8610         assert_ne!(payment_secret_1, our_payment_secret);
8611
8612         {
8613                 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8614                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8615                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8616                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8617                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8618                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8619                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8620         }
8621         // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8622         // values from previous calls.
8623         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8624         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8625         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8626         match events[0] {
8627                 Event::PaymentReceived { purpose: PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret }, .. } => {
8628                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
8629                         assert_eq!(payment_secret, our_payment_secret);
8630                         // We don't actually have the payment preimage with which to claim this payment!
8631                 },
8632                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8633         }
8634 }
8635
8636 #[test]
8637 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8638         // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8639         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8640         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8641         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8642         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8643
8644         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8645
8646         let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8647         let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8648         let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8649         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8650
8651         // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8652         // resulting events.
8653         macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8654                 () => {
8655                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8656                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8657                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8658                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8659                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8660
8661                         // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8662                         // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8663                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8664                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8665                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8666
8667                         // We should fail the payment back
8668                         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8669                         match events.pop().unwrap() {
8670                                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8671                                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8672                                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8673                                 },
8674                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8675                         }
8676                 }
8677         }
8678
8679         let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8680         // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8681         let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8682
8683         // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8684         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8685         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8686         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8687
8688         // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8689         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8690         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8691         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8692
8693         // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8694         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8695         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8696         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8697 }
8698
8699 #[test]
8700 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8701         // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8702         // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8703         // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateErr.
8704         //
8705         // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8706         // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8707         // commitment at same time.
8708
8709         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8710         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8711         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8712         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8713
8714         // Create some initial channel
8715         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8716         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8717
8718         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8719         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8720
8721         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8722         let (preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
8723
8724         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8725         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8726         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8727         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8728         let watchtower = {
8729                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8730                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8731                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8732                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8733                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8734                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8735                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8736                 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8737                 watchtower
8738         };
8739         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8740         // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8741         // transaction lock time requirements here.
8742         chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (header, 0));
8743         watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 200);
8744
8745         // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8746         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage);
8747         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8748         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
8749
8750         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8751         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8752         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8753         if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8754                 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8755                         if let Err(_) =  watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8756                         if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8757                 } else { assert!(false); }
8758         } else { assert!(false); };
8759         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8760         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8761         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8762         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8763 }
8764
8765 #[test]
8766 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8767         // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8768         // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8769         // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8770         // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8771
8772         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8773         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8774         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8775         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8776
8777         // Create some initial channel
8778         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8779         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8780
8781         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8782         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8783
8784         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8785         route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8786
8787         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8788         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8789         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8790         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8791         let watchtower_alice = {
8792                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8793                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8794                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8795                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8796                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8797                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8798                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8799                 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8800                 watchtower
8801         };
8802         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8803         // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8804         // transaction lock time requirements here.
8805         chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as usize, (header, 0));
8806         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8807
8808         // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8809         {
8810                 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8811                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8812                 txn.clear();
8813         }
8814
8815         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8816         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8817         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8818         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8819         let watchtower_bob = {
8820                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8821                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8822                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8823                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8824                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8825                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8826                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8827                 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8828                 watchtower
8829         };
8830         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8831         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8832
8833         // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8834         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8835         {
8836                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8837         }
8838         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8839
8840         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8841         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8842         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8843         if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8844                 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8845                         // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8846                         if let Err(_) =  watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8847                         if let Ok(_) = watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8848                         if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8849                 } else { assert!(false); }
8850         } else { assert!(false); };
8851         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8852         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8853
8854         //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8855         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8856         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8857
8858         // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8859         let bob_state_y;
8860         {
8861                 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8862                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8863                 bob_state_y = txn[0].clone();
8864                 txn.clear();
8865         };
8866
8867         // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8868         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8869         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![bob_state_y.clone()] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8870         {
8871                 let htlc_txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8872                 // We broadcast twice the transaction, once due to the HTLC-timeout, once due
8873                 // the onchain detection of the HTLC output
8874                 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
8875                 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8876                 check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], bob_state_y);
8877         }
8878 }
8879
8880 #[test]
8881 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8882         // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8883         // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8884         // message).
8885         //
8886         // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8887         // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8888         //
8889         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8890         // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8891         // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8892         // before receiving funding_signed.
8893         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8894         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8895         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8896         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8897
8898         // Create an initial channel
8899         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8900         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8901         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8902         let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8903         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_chan_msg);
8904
8905         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8906         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8907
8908         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8909         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8910
8911         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8912         let channel_id = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
8913         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8914         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8915         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Hi".to_string() }, true);
8916 }
8917
8918 #[test]
8919 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8920         // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8921         // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8922         // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8923         // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
8924         // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
8925         // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
8926
8927         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8928         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8929         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8930         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8931
8932         // Create some initial channels
8933         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8934
8935         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
8936         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
8937         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
8938         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8939         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
8940         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
8941
8942         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8943         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8944         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] });
8945         // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
8946         // this test before #653 fix.
8947         chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
8948         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8949         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8950         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8951         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
8952
8953         let htlc_timeout = {
8954                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8955                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
8956                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8957                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
8958                 node_txn[1].clone()
8959         };
8960
8961         let header_201 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8962         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_201, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout.clone()] });
8963         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8964         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8965 }
8966
8967 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
8968         // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
8969         // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
8970         // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
8971         //
8972         // Steps of the test:
8973         // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
8974         // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
8975         // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
8976         // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
8977         // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
8978         //    but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
8979         // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
8980         // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
8981         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8982         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8983         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8984         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8985
8986         // Create some initial channels
8987         let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8988         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8989
8990         // Steps (1) and (2):
8991         // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
8992         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
8993
8994         // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
8995         let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
8996         check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8997         assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
8998         check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
8999         assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9000         assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
9001
9002         // Steps (3) and (4):
9003         // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
9004         // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
9005         let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
9006         let mut counterparty_node = 1; // Bob if Alice force-closes
9007
9008         // Bob force-closes
9009         if !broadcast_alice {
9010                 force_closing_node = 1;
9011                 counterparty_node = 0;
9012         }
9013         nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_channel(&chan_ab.2, &nodes[counterparty_node].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9014         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
9015         check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
9016         check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9017         if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9018                 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
9019                         true => alice_txn.clone(),
9020                         false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
9021                 };
9022                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
9023                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
9024                 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
9025                 if broadcast_alice {
9026                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9027                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9028                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
9029                 }
9030                 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
9031                 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
9032         }
9033
9034         // Step (5):
9035         // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
9036         // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
9037         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9038         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9039         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
9040
9041         let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9042         assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9043         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9044         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9045         assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
9046         assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
9047
9048         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9049         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false, false);
9050         // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
9051         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
9052                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9053                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9054                 match events[0] {
9055                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
9056                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9057                         },
9058                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9059                 };
9060         }
9061         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
9062         // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
9063         // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
9064         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9065
9066         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9067         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9068         let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
9069                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
9070                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9071                         (*msg).clone()
9072                 },
9073                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9074         };
9075         let bob_updates = match events[1] {
9076                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
9077                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9078                         (*updates).clone()
9079                 },
9080                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9081         };
9082
9083         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
9084         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9085         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
9086         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9087
9088         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9089         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9090         let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
9091                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
9092                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9093                         (*msg).clone()
9094                 },
9095                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9096         };
9097         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
9098         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9099
9100         // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
9101         // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
9102         let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
9103         if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
9104         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9105                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
9106                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
9107                 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
9108                 if broadcast_alice {
9109                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9110                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9111                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
9112                 }
9113                 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9114                 if broadcast_alice {
9115                         // In `connect_block()`, the ChainMonitor and ChannelManager are separately notified about a
9116                         // new block being connected. The ChannelManager being notified triggers a monitor update,
9117                         // which triggers broadcasting our commitment tx and an HTLC-claiming tx. The ChainMonitor
9118                         // being notified triggers the HTLC-claiming tx redundantly, resulting in 3 total txs being
9119                         // broadcasted.
9120                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 3);
9121                         check_spends!(bob_txn[1], chan_ab.3);
9122                 } else {
9123                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
9124                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
9125                 }
9126         }
9127
9128         // Step (6):
9129         // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
9130         // broadcasted commitment transaction.
9131         {
9132                 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
9133                 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9134                         // Bob should now have an extra broadcasted tx, for the preimage-claiming transaction.
9135                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
9136                 }
9137                 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
9138                         true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
9139                         false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
9140                 };
9141                 // If Alice force-closed and Bob didn't receive her commitment transaction until after he
9142                 // received Carol's fulfill, he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction first. Else if
9143                 // Bob force closed or if he found out about Alice's commitment tx before receiving Carol's
9144                 // fulfill, then he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction second.
9145                 if broadcast_alice && !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9146                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
9147                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
9148                 } else {
9149                         check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
9150                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
9151                 }
9152         }
9153 }
9154
9155 #[test]
9156 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
9157         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
9158         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
9159         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
9160         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
9161 }
9162
9163 #[test]
9164 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
9165         // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
9166         // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
9167         //
9168         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
9169         // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
9170         // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
9171         // updating logic for the existing channel.
9172         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9173         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9174         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9175         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9176
9177         // Create an initial channel
9178         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
9179         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9180         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
9181         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9182
9183         // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
9184         // that it is rejected.
9185         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
9186         {
9187                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9188                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9189                 match events[0] {
9190                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9191                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
9192                                 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
9193                                 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
9194                                 // move forward with it.
9195                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9196                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9197                         },
9198                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9199                 }
9200         }
9201
9202         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
9203         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
9204
9205         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9206         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9207
9208         let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9209         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9210         {
9211                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9212                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
9213                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
9214                 added_monitors.clear();
9215         }
9216         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9217
9218         let funding_outpoint = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
9219         let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
9220
9221         // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
9222         // temporary one).
9223
9224         // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
9225         // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
9226         // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
9227         open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
9228         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
9229         {
9230                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9231                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9232                 match events[0] {
9233                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9234                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
9235                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
9236                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9237                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9238                         },
9239                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9240                 }
9241         }
9242
9243         // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
9244         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
9245         let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9246         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_2_msg);
9247         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9248         create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
9249
9250         let funding_created = {
9251                 let mut a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
9252                 let mut as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get_mut(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
9253                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9254                 as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
9255         };
9256         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9257         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
9258         // At this point we'll try to add a duplicate channel monitor, which will be rejected, but
9259         // still needs to be cleared here.
9260         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9261
9262         // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
9263         {
9264                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9265                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9266                 match events[0] {
9267                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9268                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
9269                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
9270                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
9271                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9272                         },
9273                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9274                 }
9275         }
9276
9277         // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
9278         // everything is functional.
9279         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
9280         {
9281                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9282                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
9283                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
9284                 added_monitors.clear();
9285         }
9286
9287         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9288         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
9289         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9290         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
9291
9292         let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9293         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
9294         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9295         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
9296 }
9297
9298 #[test]
9299 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
9300         // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
9301         //
9302         // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
9303         // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
9304         // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
9305         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9306         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9307         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9308         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9309
9310         // Create some initial channels
9311         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9312         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9313         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9314
9315         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9316         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9317         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9318
9319         // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
9320         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9321         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9322
9323         // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
9324         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9325         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9326         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
9327         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
9328         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
9329         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9330         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
9331         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9332
9333         // A null channel ID should close all channels
9334         let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9335         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9336         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9337         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
9338         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9339         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9340         match events[0] {
9341                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9342                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9343                 },
9344                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9345         }
9346         match events[1] {
9347                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9348                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9349                 },
9350                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9351         }
9352         // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
9353         // peer_disconnected with no_connection_possible set to false, duplicating the
9354         // close-all-channels logic. That's OK, we don't want to end up not force-closing channels for
9355         // users with their own peer handling logic. We duplicate the call here, however.
9356         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9357         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9358
9359         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
9360         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9361         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9362 }
9363
9364 #[test]
9365 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
9366         // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
9367         //
9368         // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
9369         // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
9370         // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
9371         // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
9372         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9373         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9374         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9375         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9376
9377         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9378         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9379         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9380
9381         let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
9382         for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
9383                 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
9384                 output.script_pubkey = bitcoin::Script::new();
9385         }
9386
9387         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
9388         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9389         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9390
9391         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9392         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9393
9394         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9395         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
9396
9397         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9398         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9399         nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
9400
9401         let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
9402         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
9403         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
9404         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9405         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9406         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
9407         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
9408                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9409                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
9410                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
9411                 } else { panic!(); }
9412         } else { panic!(); }
9413         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
9414 }
9415
9416 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
9417         // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
9418         // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
9419         // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
9420         // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
9421         // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
9422         // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
9423         // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
9424         // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
9425         // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
9426         // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
9427         // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
9428         // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
9429         // until we learned about an additional block.
9430         //
9431         // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
9432         // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
9433         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9434         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9435         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9436         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9437         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
9438
9439         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9440         let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9441         let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
9442         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9443         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9444
9445         nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9446         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9447         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9448         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9449         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9450         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
9451
9452         let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
9453         if !test_height_before_timelock {
9454                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
9455         }
9456         nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9457                 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
9458         if test_height_before_timelock {
9459                 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
9460                 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
9461                 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
9462                 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9463         } else {
9464                 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
9465                 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9466                 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
9467                 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
9468                 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
9469                 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
9470                 // timelock is up).
9471                 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
9472                 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
9473
9474                 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
9475                 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
9476                 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
9477                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9478                         &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
9479                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9480                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9481
9482                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9483                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9484                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9485                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9486                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9487                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9488                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9489                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9490                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
9491         }
9492 }
9493
9494 #[test]
9495 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
9496         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
9497         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
9498 }
9499
9500 #[test]
9501 fn test_forwardable_regen() {
9502         // Tests that if we reload a ChannelManager while forwards are pending we will regenerate the
9503         // PendingHTLCsForwardable event automatically, ensuring we don't forget to forward/receive
9504         // HTLCs.
9505         // We test it for both payment receipt and payment forwarding.
9506
9507         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9508         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9509         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9510         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
9511         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
9512         let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
9513         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9514         let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9515         let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9516
9517         // First send a payment to nodes[1]
9518         let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
9519         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9520         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9521
9522         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9523         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9524         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9525         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9526         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9527
9528         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9529
9530         // Next send a payment which is forwarded by nodes[1]
9531         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 200_000);
9532         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
9533         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9534
9535         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9536         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9537         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9538         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9539         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9540
9541         // There is already a PendingHTLCsForwardable event "pending" so another one will not be
9542         // generated
9543         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9544
9545         // Now restart nodes[1] and make sure it regenerates a single PendingHTLCsForwardable
9546         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9547         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9548
9549         let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
9550         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9551         let mut chan_1_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9552         get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_1).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9553         get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_2).write(&mut chan_1_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9554
9555         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
9556         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
9557         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
9558         nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
9559
9560         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9561         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9562                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9563         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
9564         let mut chan_1_monitor_read = &chan_1_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9565         let (_, mut chan_1_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9566                 &mut chan_1_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9567         assert!(chan_1_monitor_read.is_empty());
9568
9569         let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
9570         let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
9571                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
9572                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
9573                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_1_monitor);
9574                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
9575                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
9576                         keys_manager,
9577                         fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
9578                         chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
9579                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
9580                         logger: nodes[1].logger,
9581                         channel_monitors,
9582                 }).unwrap()
9583         };
9584         nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
9585         assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
9586
9587         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
9588         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_1_monitor).is_ok());
9589         nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
9590         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9591
9592         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9593         // Note that nodes[1] and nodes[2] resend their funding_locked here since they haven't updated
9594         // the commitment state.
9595         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9596
9597         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9598
9599         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9600         expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 100_000);
9601         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9602
9603         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9604         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9605         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9606         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9607         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9608         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9609         expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 200_000);
9610
9611         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
9612         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage_2);
9613 }
9614
9615 fn do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(test_for_second_fail_panic: bool) {
9616         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9617         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9618         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9619         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9620
9621         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9622
9623         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
9624                 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
9625         let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
9626
9627         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
9628
9629         {
9630                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
9631                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9632                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9633                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9634                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9635                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9636                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9637         }
9638         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9639         expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 10_000);
9640
9641         {
9642                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
9643                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9644                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9645                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9646                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9647                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9648                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9649                 // At this point, nodes[1] would notice it has too much value for the payment. It will
9650                 // assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9651                 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC. Previously, it'd also have failed back
9652                 // the first HTLC delivered above.
9653         }
9654
9655         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9656         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9657
9658         if test_for_second_fail_panic {
9659                 // Now we go fail back the first HTLC from the user end.
9660                 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
9661
9662                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9663                 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9664
9665                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9666                 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9667                 assert_eq!(fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 2);
9668
9669                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9670                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
9671                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9672
9673                 let failure_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9674                 assert_eq!(failure_events.len(), 2);
9675                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
9676                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[1] {} else { panic!(); }
9677         } else {
9678                 // Let the second HTLC fail and claim the first
9679                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9680                 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9681
9682                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9683                 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9684                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9685                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9686
9687                 expect_payment_failed_conditions!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9688
9689                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
9690         }
9691 }
9692
9693 #[test]
9694 fn test_dup_htlc_second_fail_panic() {
9695         // Previously, if we received two HTLCs back-to-back, where the second overran the expected
9696         // value for the payment, we'd fail back both HTLCs after generating a `PaymentReceived` event.
9697         // Then, if the user failed the second payment, they'd hit a "tried to fail an already failed
9698         // HTLC" debug panic. This tests for this behavior, checking that only one HTLC is auto-failed.
9699         do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(true);
9700 }
9701
9702 #[test]
9703 fn test_dup_htlc_second_rejected() {
9704         // Test that if we receive a second HTLC for an MPP payment that overruns the payment amount we
9705         // simply reject the second HTLC but are still able to claim the first HTLC.
9706         do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(false);
9707 }
9708
9709 #[test]
9710 fn test_inconsistent_mpp_params() {
9711         // Test that if we recieve two HTLCs with different payment parameters we fail back the first
9712         // such HTLC and allow the second to stay.
9713         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9714         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9715         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9716         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9717
9718         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9719         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9720         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9721         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9722
9723         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id())
9724                 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
9725         let mut route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 15_000_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
9726         assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9727         route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9728                 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9729                 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9730                         core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9731         });
9732         let payment_params_opt = Some(payment_params);
9733
9734         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[3]);
9735
9736         let cur_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
9737         let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
9738         {
9739                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
9740                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9741
9742                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9743                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9744                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), false, None);
9745         }
9746         assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9747
9748         {
9749                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 14_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
9750                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9751
9752                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9753                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9754                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9755
9756                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9757                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9758
9759                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9760                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9761
9762                 let mut events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9763                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9764                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9765
9766                 nodes[3].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9767                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9768                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg, true, true);
9769
9770                 // At this point, nodes[3] should notice the two HTLCs don't contain the same total payment
9771                 // amount. It will assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9772                 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC.
9773         }
9774         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[3]);
9775         nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9776         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[3]);
9777         nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9778
9779         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
9780
9781         let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9782         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9783         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9784
9785         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9786         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9787
9788         let fail_updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9789         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9790         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], fail_updates_2.commitment_signed, false);
9791
9792         expect_payment_failed_conditions!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9793
9794         nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
9795         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9796
9797         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9798         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9799         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), true, None);
9800
9801         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, our_payment_preimage);
9802 }
9803
9804 #[test]
9805 fn test_keysend_payments_to_public_node() {
9806         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9807         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9808         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9809         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9810
9811         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9812         let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9813         let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9814         let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9815         let route_params = RouteParameters {
9816                 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9817                 final_value_msat: 10000,
9818                 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9819         };
9820         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
9821         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9822         let route = find_route(&payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
9823
9824         let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9825         let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9826         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9827         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9828         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9829         let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9830         let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9831         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9832         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9833 }
9834
9835 #[test]
9836 fn test_keysend_payments_to_private_node() {
9837         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9838         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9839         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9840         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9841
9842         let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9843         let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9844         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
9845         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
9846
9847         let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9848         let route_params = RouteParameters {
9849                 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9850                 final_value_msat: 10000,
9851                 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9852         };
9853         let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9854         let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9855         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
9856         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9857         let route = find_route(
9858                 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9859                 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
9860         ).unwrap();
9861
9862         let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9863         let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9864         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9865         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9866         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9867         let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9868         let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9869         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9870         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9871 }
9872
9873 fn do_test_partial_claim_before_restart(persist_both_monitors: bool) {
9874         // Test what happens if a node receives an MPP payment, claims it, but crashes before
9875         // persisting the ChannelManager. If `persist_both_monitors` is false, also crash after only
9876         // updating one of the two channels' ChannelMonitors. As a result, on startup, we'll (a) still
9877         // have the PaymentReceived event, (b) have one (or two) channel(s) that goes on chain with the
9878         // HTLC preimage in them, and (c) optionally have one channel that is live off-chain but does
9879         // not have the preimage tied to the still-pending HTLC.
9880         //
9881         // To get to the correct state, on startup we should propagate the preimage to the
9882         // still-off-chain channel, claiming the HTLC as soon as the peer connects, with the monitor
9883         // receiving the preimage without a state update.
9884         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9885         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9886         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9887
9888         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
9889         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
9890         let nodes_3_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
9891
9892         let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9893
9894         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9895         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9896         let chan_id_persisted = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9897         let chan_id_not_persisted = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9898
9899         // Create an MPP route for 15k sats, more than the default htlc-max of 10%
9900         let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], 15_000_000);
9901         assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9902         route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9903                 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9904                 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9905                         core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9906         });
9907
9908         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9909         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9910
9911         // Send the payment through to nodes[3] *without* clearing the PaymentReceived event
9912         let mut send_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9913         assert_eq!(send_events.len(), 2);
9914         do_pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), send_events[0].clone(), true, false, None);
9915         do_pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), send_events[1].clone(), true, false, None);
9916
9917         // Now that we have an MPP payment pending, get the latest encoded copies of nodes[3]'s
9918         // monitors and ChannelManager, for use later, if we don't want to persist both monitors.
9919         let mut original_monitor = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9920         if !persist_both_monitors {
9921                 for outpoint in nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.list_monitors() {
9922                         if outpoint.to_channel_id() == chan_id_not_persisted {
9923                                 assert!(original_monitor.0.is_empty());
9924                                 nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap().write(&mut original_monitor).unwrap();
9925                         }
9926                 }
9927         }
9928
9929         let mut original_manager = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9930         nodes[3].node.write(&mut original_manager).unwrap();
9931
9932         expect_payment_received!(nodes[3], payment_hash, payment_secret, 15_000_000);
9933
9934         nodes[3].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9935         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 2);
9936         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[3], payment_hash, 15_000_000);
9937
9938         // Now fetch one of the two updated ChannelMonitors from nodes[3], and restart pretending we
9939         // crashed in between the two persistence calls - using one old ChannelMonitor and one new one,
9940         // with the old ChannelManager.
9941         let mut updated_monitor = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9942         for outpoint in nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.list_monitors() {
9943                 if outpoint.to_channel_id() == chan_id_persisted {
9944                         assert!(updated_monitor.0.is_empty());
9945                         nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap().write(&mut updated_monitor).unwrap();
9946                 }
9947         }
9948         // If `persist_both_monitors` is set, get the second monitor here as well
9949         if persist_both_monitors {
9950                 for outpoint in nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.list_monitors() {
9951                         if outpoint.to_channel_id() == chan_id_not_persisted {
9952                                 assert!(original_monitor.0.is_empty());
9953                                 nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap().write(&mut original_monitor).unwrap();
9954                         }
9955                 }
9956         }
9957
9958         // Now restart nodes[3].
9959         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
9960         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[3].keys_manager;
9961         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[3].chain_source), nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[3].logger, node_cfgs[3].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
9962         nodes[3].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
9963         let mut monitors = Vec::new();
9964         for mut monitor_data in [original_monitor, updated_monitor].iter() {
9965                 let (_, mut deserialized_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut &monitor_data.0[..], keys_manager).unwrap();
9966                 monitors.push(deserialized_monitor);
9967         }
9968
9969         let config = UserConfig::default();
9970         nodes_3_deserialized = {
9971                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
9972                 for monitor in monitors.iter_mut() {
9973                         channel_monitors.insert(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
9974                 }
9975                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut &original_manager.0[..], ChannelManagerReadArgs {
9976                         default_config: config,
9977                         keys_manager,
9978                         fee_estimator: node_cfgs[3].fee_estimator,
9979                         chain_monitor: nodes[3].chain_monitor,
9980                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
9981                         logger: nodes[3].logger,
9982                         channel_monitors,
9983                 }).unwrap().1
9984         };
9985         nodes[3].node = &nodes_3_deserialized;
9986
9987         for monitor in monitors {
9988                 // On startup the preimage should have been copied into the non-persisted monitor:
9989                 assert!(monitor.get_stored_preimages().contains_key(&payment_hash));
9990                 nodes[3].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.clone(), monitor).unwrap();
9991         }
9992         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 2);
9993
9994         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9995         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9996
9997         // During deserialization, we should have closed one channel and broadcast its latest
9998         // commitment transaction. We should also still have the original PaymentReceived event we
9999         // never finished processing.
10000         let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10001         assert_eq!(events.len(), if persist_both_monitors { 3 } else { 2 });
10002         if let Event::PaymentReceived { amt: 15_000_000, .. } = events[0] { } else { panic!(); }
10003         if let Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager, .. } = events[1] { } else { panic!(); }
10004         if persist_both_monitors {
10005                 if let Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager, .. } = events[2] { } else { panic!(); }
10006         }
10007
10008         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), if persist_both_monitors { 0 } else { 1 });
10009         if !persist_both_monitors {
10010                 // If one of the two channels is still live, reveal the payment preimage over it.
10011
10012                 nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
10013                 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2]);
10014                 nodes[2].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
10015                 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[3]);
10016
10017                 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
10018                 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
10019                 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
10020
10021                 nodes[3].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
10022
10023                 // Once we call `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` the holding cell is cleared and the HTLC
10024                 // claim should fly.
10025                 let ds_msgs = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10026                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
10027                 assert_eq!(ds_msgs.len(), 2);
10028                 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } = ds_msgs[1] {} else { panic!(); }
10029
10030                 let cs_updates = match ds_msgs[0] {
10031                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
10032                                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10033                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
10034                                 let cs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10035                                 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[2], nodes[0], nodes[3], Some(1000), false, false);
10036                                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
10037                                 cs_updates
10038                         }
10039                         _ => panic!(),
10040                 };
10041
10042                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10043                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], cs_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
10044                 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
10045         }
10046 }
10047
10048 #[test]
10049 fn test_partial_claim_before_restart() {
10050         do_test_partial_claim_before_restart(false);
10051         do_test_partial_claim_before_restart(true);
10052 }
10053
10054 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
10055 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
10056 enum ExposureEvent {
10057         /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
10058         AtHTLCForward,
10059         /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
10060         AtHTLCReception,
10061         /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
10062         AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
10063 }
10064
10065 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool) {
10066         // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
10067         // policy.
10068         //
10069         // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
10070         // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
10071         // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
10072         // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
10073         // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
10074         // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
10075         // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
10076         // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
10077
10078         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10079         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
10080         config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = 5_000_000; // default setting value
10081         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10082         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
10083         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10084
10085         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
10086         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10087         open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
10088         open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
10089         if on_holder_tx {
10090                 open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10091         }
10092         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
10093         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10094         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
10095
10096         let opt_anchors = false;
10097
10098         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
10099
10100         if on_holder_tx {
10101                 if let Some(mut chan) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&temporary_channel_id) {
10102                         chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10103                 }
10104         }
10105
10106         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
10107         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
10108         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10109
10110         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
10111         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10112
10113         let (funding_locked, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
10114         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
10115         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
10116
10117         let dust_buffer_feerate = {
10118                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
10119                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
10120                 chan.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64
10121         };
10122         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
10123         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
10124
10125         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
10126         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
10127
10128         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 25;
10129         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
10130
10131         if on_holder_tx {
10132                 if dust_outbound_balance {
10133                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
10134                         // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
10135                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
10136                         for i in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
10137                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
10138                                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
10139                         }
10140                 } else {
10141                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
10142                         // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
10143                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
10144                         for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
10145                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
10146                         }
10147                 }
10148         } else {
10149                 if dust_outbound_balance {
10150                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
10151                         // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
10152                         for i in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
10153                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
10154                                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
10155                         }
10156                 } else {
10157                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
10158                         // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
10159                         for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
10160                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
10161                         }
10162                 }
10163         }
10164
10165         let dust_overflow = dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx + 1);
10166         if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
10167                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
10168                 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
10169                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
10170                 if on_holder_tx {
10171                         let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
10172                         let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
10173                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
10174                 } else {
10175                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
10176                 }
10177         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
10178                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
10179                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
10180                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10181                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10182                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10183                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
10184                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10185                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
10186                 if on_holder_tx {
10187                         // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
10188                         let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
10189                         let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
10190                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
10191                 } else {
10192                         // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
10193                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
10194                 }
10195         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
10196                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 2_500_000);
10197                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at update_fee-swallowed HTLC", ); }
10198                 {
10199                         let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
10200                         *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
10201                 }
10202                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10203                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10204                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure".to_string(), 1);
10205         }
10206
10207         let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10208         let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
10209         added_monitors.clear();
10210 }
10211
10212 #[test]
10213 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
10214         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
10215         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
10216         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
10217         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
10218         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
10219         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
10220         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
10221         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
10222         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
10223         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
10224         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
10225         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
10226 }