1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
15 use crate::chain::{ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Confirm, Listen, Watch};
16 use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
17 use crate::chain::channelmonitor;
18 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
19 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
20 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{ChannelSigner, EcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource};
21 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
22 use crate::ln::channel::{commitment_tx_base_weight, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT};
23 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA};
24 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
25 use crate::ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
26 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
27 use crate::routing::gossip::{NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate};
28 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, find_route, get_route};
29 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures};
31 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
32 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
33 use crate::util::test_utils;
34 use crate::util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
35 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
36 use crate::util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
37 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
39 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
40 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
41 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
42 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
43 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
44 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
45 use bitcoin::{PackedLockTime, Sequence, Transaction, TxIn, TxMerkleNode, TxOut, Witness};
46 use bitcoin::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
48 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
49 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
54 use crate::prelude::*;
55 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
56 use core::default::Default;
57 use core::iter::repeat;
58 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
59 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
61 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
62 use crate::ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
65 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
66 // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
67 use crate::ln::channel::TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS;
68 let mut cfg = UserConfig::default();
69 cfg.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1;
70 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
71 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
72 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(cfg)]);
73 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
75 // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
77 let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
78 let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat, &cfg);
79 let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
81 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
82 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
84 // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
85 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
87 // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
88 // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
89 let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
90 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
91 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
92 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
93 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
94 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
96 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
97 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), expected_regex, 1);
99 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
101 } else { assert!(false); }
104 use crate::ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
106 // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
107 insane_open_helper(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2; msg });
108 insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS; msg });
110 insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
112 insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than channel amount minus reserve \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
114 insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
116 insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
118 insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
120 insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
122 insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
126 fn test_funding_exceeds_no_wumbo_limit() {
127 // Test that if a peer does not support wumbo channels, we'll refuse to open a wumbo channel to
129 use crate::ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO;
130 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
131 let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
132 *node_cfgs[1].override_init_features.borrow_mut() = Some(channelmanager::provided_init_features(&test_default_channel_config()).clear_wumbo());
133 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
134 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
136 match nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1, 0, 42, None) {
137 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
138 assert_eq!(format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1), err);
144 fn do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(send_from_initiator: bool) {
145 // A peer providing a channel_reserve_satoshis of 0 (or less than our dust limit) is insecure,
146 // but only for them. Because some LSPs do it with some level of trust of the clients (for a
147 // substantial UX improvement), we explicitly allow it. Because it's unlikely to happen often
148 // in normal testing, we test it explicitly here.
149 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
150 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
151 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
152 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
153 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
155 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
156 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
157 let feerate_per_kw = 253;
158 let opt_anchors = false;
159 push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
160 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
162 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None).unwrap();
163 let mut open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
164 if !send_from_initiator {
165 open_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
166 open_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
168 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
170 // Extract the channel accept message from node1 to node0
171 let mut accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
172 if send_from_initiator {
173 accept_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
174 accept_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
176 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
178 let sender_node = if send_from_initiator { &nodes[1] } else { &nodes[0] };
179 let counterparty_node = if send_from_initiator { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
180 let mut sender_node_per_peer_lock;
181 let mut sender_node_peer_state_lock;
182 let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(sender_node, counterparty_node, sender_node_per_peer_lock, sender_node_peer_state_lock, temp_channel_id);
183 chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
184 chan.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
187 let funding_tx = sign_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100_000, temp_channel_id);
188 let funding_msgs = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_tx);
189 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_msgs.0);
191 // nodes[0] should now be able to send the full balance to nodes[1], violating nodes[1]'s
192 // security model if it ever tries to send funds back to nodes[0] (but that's not our problem).
193 if send_from_initiator {
194 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000_000
195 // Note that for outbound channels we have to consider the commitment tx fee and the
196 // "fee spike buffer", which is currently a multiple of the total commitment tx fee as
197 // well as an additional HTLC.
198 - FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, 2, opt_anchors));
200 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], push_amt);
205 fn test_counterparty_no_reserve() {
206 do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(true);
207 do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(false);
211 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
212 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
213 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
214 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
215 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
216 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
219 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
223 // send (1) commitment_signed -.
224 // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
225 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
226 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
227 // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
228 // (2) RAA is delivered ->
229 // .- send (4) commitment_signed
230 // <- (3) RAA is delivered
231 // send (5) commitment_signed -.
232 // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
234 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
236 // (6) RAA is delivered ->
238 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
240 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
243 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
244 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
246 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
247 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
248 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
249 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
250 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
252 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
255 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
257 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
258 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
259 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
260 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
262 let payment_event = {
263 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
264 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
265 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
267 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
268 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
270 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
271 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
272 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
273 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
274 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
275 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
277 // deliver(1), generate (3):
278 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
279 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
280 // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
281 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
283 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
284 let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
285 assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
286 assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
287 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
288 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
289 assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
290 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
292 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
293 let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
294 assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
295 assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
296 assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
297 assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
298 assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
299 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
301 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
302 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
303 // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
304 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
306 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
307 let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
308 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
310 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
311 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
313 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
314 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
316 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
317 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
320 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
321 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
325 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
326 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
327 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
328 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
329 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
330 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
331 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
332 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
335 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
337 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
339 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
342 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
343 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
345 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
346 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
347 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
348 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
351 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
354 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
356 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
357 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
358 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
359 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
361 let payment_event = {
362 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
363 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
364 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
366 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
367 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
369 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
370 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
371 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
372 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
373 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
374 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
376 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
377 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
379 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
383 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
384 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
385 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
386 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
387 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
388 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
391 // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
392 // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
393 // update_fee (never committed) ->
395 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
396 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
397 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
398 // <- (1) RAA delivered
399 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
400 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
401 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
402 // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
404 // B should send no response here
405 // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
406 // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
409 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
412 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
413 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
414 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
416 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
417 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
419 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
420 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
421 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
422 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
423 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
425 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
428 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
429 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
430 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
431 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
432 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
434 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
437 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
438 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
440 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
441 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
442 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
444 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
445 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
446 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
447 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
450 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
452 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
454 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
456 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
457 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
458 let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
459 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
460 assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
461 assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
462 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
463 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
464 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
465 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
466 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
468 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
469 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
470 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
471 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
472 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
474 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
475 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
476 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
479 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
480 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
481 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
483 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
484 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
485 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
487 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
488 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
489 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
490 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
492 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
493 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
494 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
497 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
498 // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
499 // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
500 // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
503 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
504 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
505 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
506 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
508 if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
510 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
513 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
514 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
517 if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
518 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
519 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
521 if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
522 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
523 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
525 if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
526 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
528 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
530 if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
531 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
532 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
533 let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
535 if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
536 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
538 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
539 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
540 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
541 added_monitors.clear();
543 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
545 if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
546 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
548 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
549 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
550 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
551 added_monitors.clear();
554 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
555 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
557 if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
558 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
560 if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
561 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
562 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
563 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
564 expect_channel_ready_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
568 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
569 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
570 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
571 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
572 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
573 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
574 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
575 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
576 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
577 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
578 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
579 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
580 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
581 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
582 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
583 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
584 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
585 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
586 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
590 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
591 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
592 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
593 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
594 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
595 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
598 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
601 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
602 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
604 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
605 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
606 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
607 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
608 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
610 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
612 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
614 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
615 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
616 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
618 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
619 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
620 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
622 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
623 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
624 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
625 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
627 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
628 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
629 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
633 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
634 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
635 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
636 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
637 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
638 let channel_value = 5000;
640 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000);
641 let channel_id = chan.2;
642 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
643 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
644 let bs_channel_reserve_sats = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value, &default_config);
646 let opt_anchors = false;
648 // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
649 // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
650 // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
652 let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
653 let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors)) as u32;
655 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
656 *feerate_lock = feerate;
658 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
659 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
660 let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
662 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
664 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
666 // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
668 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
670 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
671 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
672 let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000;
673 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
674 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
675 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
679 // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
680 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
683 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
684 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
685 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
687 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
689 // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
690 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
691 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
692 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
693 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
694 let local_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
695 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
696 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
697 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
698 pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
700 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
701 let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
702 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
703 let remote_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
704 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
705 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
706 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
707 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
708 pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
711 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
712 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
713 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint);
716 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
717 let local_chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
718 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
719 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
720 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
721 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
722 INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
724 channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000,
725 opt_anchors, local_funding, remote_funding,
726 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
727 non_buffer_feerate + 4,
729 &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
731 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
734 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
737 htlc_signatures: res.1
740 let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
742 feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
745 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
747 //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
748 //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
749 //Should produce and error.
750 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
751 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
752 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
753 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
754 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") });
758 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
759 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
760 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
761 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
762 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
763 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
766 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
769 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
772 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
773 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
775 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
776 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
777 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
778 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
779 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
781 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
783 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
784 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
785 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
786 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
788 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
790 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
791 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
793 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
794 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
795 added_monitors.clear();
797 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
798 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
799 // node[1] has nothing to do
801 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
802 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
803 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
805 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
806 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
807 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
808 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
809 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
810 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
811 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
813 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
814 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
815 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
816 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
817 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
818 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
820 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
821 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
822 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
823 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
825 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
826 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
827 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
829 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
830 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
831 let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
832 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
834 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
835 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
836 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
838 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
840 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
841 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
843 Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } => { },
844 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
847 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
849 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
850 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
851 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
852 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
853 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
857 fn test_update_fee() {
858 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
859 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
860 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
861 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
862 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
863 let channel_id = chan.2;
866 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
867 // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
868 // .- send (3) commitment_signed
869 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
870 // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
871 // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
872 // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
873 // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
874 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
875 // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
876 // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
879 // Create and deliver (1)...
882 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
883 feerate = *feerate_lock;
884 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
886 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
887 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
889 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
890 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
891 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
892 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
893 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
895 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
897 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
899 // Generate (2) and (3):
900 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
901 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
902 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
905 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
906 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
907 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
909 // Create and deliver (4)...
911 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
912 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
914 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
915 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
916 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
917 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
918 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
919 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
920 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
922 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
925 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
926 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
927 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
929 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
930 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
932 // Handle (3), creating (6):
933 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
934 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
935 let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
936 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
939 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
940 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
941 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
943 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
944 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
945 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
946 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
947 assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
948 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
949 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
950 assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
951 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
954 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
955 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
956 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
957 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
959 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
960 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
961 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
963 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
964 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
965 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
966 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
967 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
971 fn fake_network_test() {
972 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
973 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
974 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
975 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
976 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
977 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
979 // Create some initial channels
980 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
981 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
982 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
984 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
985 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
986 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
987 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
988 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
990 // Send some more payments
991 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
992 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
993 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
995 // Test failure packets
996 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
997 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
999 // Add a new channel that skips 3
1000 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
1002 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1003 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1004 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1005 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1006 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1007 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1008 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1010 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
1011 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1012 hops.push(RouteHop {
1013 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1014 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1015 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1016 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1018 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1020 hops.push(RouteHop {
1021 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1022 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1023 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1024 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1026 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1028 hops.push(RouteHop {
1029 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1030 node_features: nodes[1].node.node_features(),
1031 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1032 channel_features: nodes[1].node.channel_features(),
1034 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1036 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1037 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1038 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
1040 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1041 hops.push(RouteHop {
1042 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1043 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1044 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1045 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1047 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1049 hops.push(RouteHop {
1050 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1051 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1052 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1053 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1055 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1057 hops.push(RouteHop {
1058 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1059 node_features: nodes[1].node.node_features(),
1060 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1061 channel_features: nodes[1].node.channel_features(),
1063 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1065 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1066 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1067 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1069 // Claim the rebalances...
1070 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1071 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1073 // Close down the channels...
1074 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1075 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1076 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1077 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1078 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1079 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1080 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1081 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1082 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1083 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1084 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1085 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1089 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1090 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1091 // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1092 // commitment dance rounds.
1093 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1094 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1095 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1096 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1097 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
1098 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
1100 let mut payments = Vec::new();
1101 for _ in 0..crate::ln::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
1102 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1103 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
1104 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1106 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1108 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1109 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1110 let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1111 assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1113 // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1114 // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1116 let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1118 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1119 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1120 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1121 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
1124 // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1125 let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1127 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
1128 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1131 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1132 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1133 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1134 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1136 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1137 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1138 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1139 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1140 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1141 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
1142 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1144 let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1145 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1146 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1148 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1150 // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1151 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1152 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1153 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1155 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1156 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1157 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1158 let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1160 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1161 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1162 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1164 for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1165 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1167 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1168 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1169 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1170 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1171 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1173 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1174 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1175 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1176 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1177 let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1179 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1180 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1182 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1184 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1185 assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1186 for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1188 &Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1189 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1191 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1195 for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1196 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1199 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1203 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1204 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1205 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1206 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1207 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1208 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1209 let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1211 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1212 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
1213 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
1214 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
1215 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
1216 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
1218 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1220 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1221 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1223 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1224 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1226 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1227 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1228 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1232 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1233 // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1234 // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1235 // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1236 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1237 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1238 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1239 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1241 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
1244 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1246 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1248 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1249 let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
1250 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1252 // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1253 nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1254 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, 800_000);
1255 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1257 // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1258 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1260 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1261 let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1262 for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1263 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1264 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1265 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1266 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1269 assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1271 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1272 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1273 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1274 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1276 let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1277 assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 3);
1279 check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]); // Immediate HTLC claim with preimage
1280 check_spends!(claim_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
1281 check_spends!(claim_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
1282 let preimage_tx = &claim_txn[0];
1283 let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if claim_txn[1].input[0].previous_output == preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output {
1284 (&claim_txn[1], &claim_txn[2])
1286 (&claim_txn[2], &claim_txn[1])
1289 assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1290 assert_eq!(preimage_bump_tx.input.len(), 1);
1292 assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1293 assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1294 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1296 assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input.len(), 1);
1297 assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1298 check_spends!(timeout_tx, remote_txn[0]);
1299 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1301 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1302 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1305 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1306 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
1307 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1308 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1310 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1311 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1312 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1313 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1314 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1315 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1317 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1323 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1324 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1325 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1326 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1327 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1328 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1330 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1331 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1333 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1334 let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2), 1 + 1, get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2));
1335 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1336 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send + 1);
1337 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).err().unwrap();
1339 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedResendSafe(ref fails) => {
1341 &APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ref err} =>
1342 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)),
1343 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1346 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1348 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1349 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1351 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1355 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1356 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1357 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1358 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1359 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1360 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1362 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460001);
1363 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1364 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1365 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1367 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1369 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1370 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3460001, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1371 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1372 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1375 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1376 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1377 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1378 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1381 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1383 // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1384 // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1385 // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1387 let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1389 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1391 // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1392 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1393 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1394 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1395 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1396 let local_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1397 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1398 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1399 chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1401 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1402 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1403 chan_signer.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1404 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1405 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1407 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1408 let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1409 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1410 let remote_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1411 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1412 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1413 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1414 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1415 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1418 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1419 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1420 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint);
1422 // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1423 // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1424 let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1426 let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1428 amount_msat: 3460001,
1429 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1431 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1434 let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1437 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1438 let local_chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1439 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1440 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1441 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1445 local_chan.opt_anchors(), local_funding, remote_funding,
1446 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1448 &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1449 &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1451 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1454 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1457 htlc_signatures: res.1
1460 // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1461 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1462 let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1464 // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1465 let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1467 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1468 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point
1470 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1472 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1473 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1474 // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1476 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1477 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1478 update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1480 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1482 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1483 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", ::hex::encode(raa_msg.channel_id)), 1);
1485 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1489 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1490 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1491 // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1492 // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1493 // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1495 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1496 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1497 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1498 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1499 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1500 let opt_anchors = false;
1502 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1503 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1505 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1507 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt);
1509 // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1510 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1511 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1514 // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1515 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1516 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1517 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1518 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1519 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1523 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1524 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1525 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1526 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1527 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1528 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1529 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1530 let opt_anchors = false;
1532 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1533 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1534 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1535 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1536 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1537 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1538 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt);
1540 // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1541 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1542 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1545 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 700_000);
1546 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1547 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1548 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1549 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1550 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1551 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 700_000, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1552 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1553 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1555 htlc_id: MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64,
1556 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1557 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1558 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1559 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1562 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1563 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1564 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1565 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1566 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1567 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1568 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1569 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() });
1573 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1574 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1575 // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1576 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1577 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1579 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1580 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1581 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1582 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1583 let opt_anchors = false;
1585 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1586 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1587 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1588 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1589 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1590 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1591 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt);
1593 let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1594 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1595 // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1596 // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1597 // commitment transaction fee.
1598 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1600 // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1601 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1602 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1605 // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1606 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt + 1);
1607 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1608 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1612 fn test_chan_init_feerate_unaffordability() {
1613 // Test that we will reject channel opens which do not leave enough to pay for any HTLCs due to
1614 // channel reserve and feerate requirements.
1615 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1616 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1617 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1618 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1619 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1620 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1621 let opt_anchors = false;
1623 // Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
1625 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1626 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1627 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None).unwrap_err(),
1628 APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
1630 // During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
1631 // requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
1632 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1633 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None).unwrap();
1634 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1635 open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
1636 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
1638 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1639 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
1640 match msg_events[0] {
1641 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
1642 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve");
1644 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1649 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1650 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1651 // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1652 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1653 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1654 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1655 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1656 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000);
1658 let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1659 // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1660 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1661 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1662 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1663 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1665 // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1666 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1667 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1668 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1669 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1670 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1672 // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1673 // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1674 // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1675 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1679 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1680 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1681 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1682 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1683 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1684 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1685 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000);
1688 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1689 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1690 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1691 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1693 // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1694 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1695 let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1696 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1698 // Add a pending HTLC.
1699 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1700 let payment_event_1 = {
1701 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
1702 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1704 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1705 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1706 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1708 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1710 // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1711 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2, opt_anchors);
1712 let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1713 let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1714 let (route_2, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_2);
1716 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1717 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1718 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1719 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1720 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1721 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, &None, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1722 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1);
1723 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1726 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1727 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1728 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1729 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1732 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1733 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1734 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1735 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1736 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1737 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1738 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1739 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() });
1743 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1744 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1745 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1746 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1747 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1748 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1749 let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1750 let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1751 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1752 assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1753 assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1755 let reserve = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config);
1756 assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1757 assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1759 assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1760 assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1763 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
1764 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1768 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1769 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1770 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1771 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1772 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1773 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1774 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1775 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1776 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1777 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001);
1778 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001);
1780 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1781 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1783 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1784 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1786 macro_rules! expect_forward {
1788 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1789 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1790 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1791 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1796 let feemsat = 239; // set above
1797 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1798 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1799 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1801 let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1803 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1805 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
1806 .with_features(nodes[2].node.invoice_features()).with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1807 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], payment_params, recv_value_0, TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
1808 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1809 assert!(route.paths[0].iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1811 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1812 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1813 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1814 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
1817 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1818 // nodes[0]'s wealth
1820 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1821 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1822 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1823 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1824 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1825 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1826 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1830 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
1831 .with_features(nodes[2].node.invoice_features()).with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1832 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, recv_value_0, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
1833 let (payment_preimage, ..) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], recv_value_0);
1834 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
1836 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1837 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1838 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1839 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1840 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1843 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1844 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1845 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1846 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1847 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1850 // adding pending output.
1851 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1852 // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1853 // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1854 // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1855 // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1856 // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1857 // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1858 // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1859 // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1861 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1862 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1863 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1865 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1866 let payment_event_1 = {
1867 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
1868 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1870 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1871 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1872 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1874 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1876 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1877 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1879 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_2 + 1);
1880 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1881 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1882 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1885 // split the rest to test holding cell
1886 let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1887 let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1888 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1889 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1891 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1892 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1895 // now see if they go through on both sides
1896 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1897 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1898 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21, &Some(our_payment_secret_21), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_21.0)).unwrap();
1899 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1900 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1901 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1903 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1905 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22+1);
1906 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1907 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1908 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1909 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 2);
1912 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1913 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1914 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22, &Some(our_payment_secret_22), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_22.0)).unwrap();
1915 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1916 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1917 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1919 // flush the pending htlc
1920 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1921 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1922 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1924 // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1925 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1926 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1927 let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1929 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
1930 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1931 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1932 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1934 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1935 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1936 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1938 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1940 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1941 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
1942 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
1944 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1945 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
1947 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
1948 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
1949 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
1950 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
1951 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
1952 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1954 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1955 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
1956 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
1957 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
1959 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
1960 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1962 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1963 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1965 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, via_user_channel_id: _ } => {
1966 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
1967 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amount_msat);
1968 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), receiver_node_id.unwrap());
1969 assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
1971 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1972 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1973 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
1975 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1978 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1981 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, via_user_channel_id: _ } => {
1982 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
1983 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amount_msat);
1984 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), receiver_node_id.unwrap());
1985 assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
1987 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1988 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1989 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
1991 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1994 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1997 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
1998 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
1999 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
2001 let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1, opt_anchors);
2002 let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
2003 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
2005 let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
2006 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
2007 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2008 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
2009 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
2011 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2);
2012 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
2016 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
2017 // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
2018 // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
2019 // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
2020 // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
2021 // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
2022 // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
2023 // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
2025 // * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
2026 // you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
2027 // you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
2028 // * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
2029 // * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
2030 // the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
2031 // * deliver the first fulfill from B
2032 // * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
2034 // * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
2035 // This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
2036 // removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
2037 // * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
2038 // of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
2039 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2040 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2041 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2042 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2043 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2045 let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2046 // Route the first two HTLCs.
2047 let payment_value_1 = b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000;
2048 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_value_1);
2049 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20_000);
2051 // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
2052 let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
2054 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_3, &Some(payment_secret_3), PaymentId(payment_hash_3.0)).unwrap();
2055 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2056 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2057 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2058 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2061 // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
2062 // initial fulfill/CS.
2063 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
2064 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, payment_value_1);
2065 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2066 let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2068 // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
2069 // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
2070 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
2071 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000);
2072 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2073 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2075 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2076 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
2077 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2078 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2079 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
2081 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
2082 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
2083 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2084 // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
2085 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2087 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2088 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2089 let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2091 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2092 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2093 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2095 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2096 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2097 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2099 // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
2100 // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2101 // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
2102 // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
2103 // on-chain as necessary).
2104 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2105 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
2106 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2107 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2108 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
2110 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2111 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2112 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2114 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2115 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2117 // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2118 // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2119 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2120 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2121 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2122 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2124 // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2125 // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2126 let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2128 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_4, &Some(payment_secret_4), PaymentId(payment_hash_4.0)).unwrap();
2129 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2130 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2131 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2132 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2135 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2136 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2137 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2138 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2140 // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2142 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2143 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2144 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2146 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2147 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2149 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2150 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2151 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2152 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2154 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2155 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2156 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2158 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2159 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2161 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2162 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2164 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2165 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2169 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2170 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2171 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2172 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2173 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2174 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2175 let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2177 // Create some initial channels
2178 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2179 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2180 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
2181 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
2183 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2184 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2185 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2186 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2187 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2188 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2190 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2191 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2192 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2193 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2194 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2196 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2197 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_1.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2198 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2199 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2201 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2202 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2203 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2204 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2205 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, Some(node_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2207 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2208 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2209 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2210 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2211 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2213 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2214 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 3_000_000);
2216 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2217 // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2218 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_2.2, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2219 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2220 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2222 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2223 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2224 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2225 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2226 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2227 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, Some(node_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2229 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2230 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2231 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2232 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2233 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2235 macro_rules! claim_funds {
2236 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
2238 $node.node.claim_funds($preimage);
2239 expect_payment_claimed!($node, $payment_hash, 3_000_000);
2240 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2242 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2243 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2245 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2246 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2247 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2248 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2250 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2256 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2257 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2258 nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_3.2, &nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2259 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2260 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2261 let node2_commitment_txid;
2263 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2264 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2265 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2266 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2268 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2269 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1);
2270 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2271 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2272 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2274 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2275 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2276 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2277 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2278 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2280 // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2281 // confusing us in the following tests.
2282 let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2284 // One pending HTLC to time out:
2285 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[3], &[&nodes[4]], 3_000_000);
2286 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2289 let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2290 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2291 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2292 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2293 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2294 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2297 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2300 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2301 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2303 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2305 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2307 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2309 let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2310 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2311 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2317 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2319 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2320 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2);
2322 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2323 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2324 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2325 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2326 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2329 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2332 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2333 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2335 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2337 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2338 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2340 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2341 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2342 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2344 nodes[3].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2345 nodes[4].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2346 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2347 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2349 assert_eq!(nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon),
2350 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
2351 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2352 check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2356 fn test_justice_tx() {
2357 // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2358 let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2359 alice_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2360 alice_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2361 alice_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2362 let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2363 bob_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2364 bob_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2365 bob_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2366 let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2367 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2368 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2369 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2370 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2371 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2372 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2373 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen;
2374 // Create some new channels:
2375 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2377 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2378 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2379 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2380 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2381 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2382 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2383 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2384 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2385 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2386 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2387 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2388 // Revoke the old state
2389 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2392 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2394 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2395 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2396 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2398 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2399 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2401 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2402 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2403 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2405 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2406 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2407 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2408 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2409 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2410 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2411 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2412 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2413 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2415 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2417 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2418 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2420 // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
2421 // Create some new channels:
2422 let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2424 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2428 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2429 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2430 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2431 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2432 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2433 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2434 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2435 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2436 // Revoke the old state
2437 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2439 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2441 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2442 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2443 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2445 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2446 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2448 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2449 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2451 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2452 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2453 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2454 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2455 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2456 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2457 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2459 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2460 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2461 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2465 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2466 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2467 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2468 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2469 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2470 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2471 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2472 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2473 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2474 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2475 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2476 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2477 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2478 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2479 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2481 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2482 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2483 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2484 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2485 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2486 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output
2488 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2490 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2491 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2492 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2493 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2494 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2498 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2499 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2500 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2501 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2502 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2503 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2504 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2506 // Create some new channel:
2507 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2509 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2510 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2511 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2512 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2513 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2515 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2516 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2517 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2518 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2519 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2520 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2521 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2522 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2523 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2525 //Revoke the old state
2526 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2529 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2530 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2531 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2532 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2533 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2534 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2535 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2536 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2538 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2539 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2541 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2542 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2544 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2545 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2546 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2547 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2548 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2549 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2550 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2551 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2553 // Finally, mine the penalty transaction and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2554 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2555 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
2556 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2557 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2559 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2560 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2561 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2565 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2566 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2567 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2568 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2569 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2570 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2571 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2573 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2575 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2576 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2577 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2578 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2579 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2580 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2582 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2583 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2585 //Revoke the old state
2586 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2589 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2590 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2591 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2592 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2593 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2594 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2595 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2596 match events.last().unwrap() {
2597 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2598 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2601 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2602 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2604 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2605 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 7);
2607 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2608 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2609 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2610 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2611 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2612 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2613 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2615 // Justice transactions are indices 2-3-4
2616 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2617 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
2618 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
2620 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2621 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2622 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2624 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2625 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2626 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2627 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2628 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2629 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2630 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2631 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2633 // Finally, mine the penalty transactions and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2634 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2635 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[2]);
2636 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[3]);
2637 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[4]);
2638 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2639 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2641 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2642 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2643 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2647 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2648 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2649 // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2650 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2651 // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2652 // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2653 // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2654 // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2655 // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2657 // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2658 // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2659 // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2660 // PaymentSent event).
2662 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2663 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2664 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2665 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2667 // Create some initial channels
2668 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2669 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2671 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2672 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2673 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2674 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2675 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2677 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2678 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2679 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2681 let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2682 let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2684 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2685 // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2686 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2687 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2688 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2689 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2690 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_1, 3_000_000);
2691 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2692 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, 3_000_000);
2693 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2694 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2695 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2696 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2697 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2698 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2700 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2701 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2702 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2703 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2704 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2705 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2706 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2707 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2708 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2709 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2710 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2711 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2712 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0);
2713 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0);
2715 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2716 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2717 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
2718 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2720 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2721 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2722 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2723 added_monitors.clear();
2725 let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2726 assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2727 match forwarded_events[0] {
2728 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2729 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2731 let chan_id = Some(chan_1.2);
2732 match forwarded_events[1] {
2733 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
2734 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2735 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2736 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2737 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2741 match forwarded_events[2] {
2742 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
2743 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2744 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2745 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2746 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2750 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2752 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2753 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2754 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2755 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2756 added_monitors.clear();
2758 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2760 let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
2761 let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
2763 match nodes_2_event {
2764 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2765 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2768 match nodes_0_event {
2769 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2770 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2771 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2772 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2773 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2774 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2776 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2779 // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
2781 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2782 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2785 macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2786 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => { {
2787 let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2788 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2789 // Node[1]: 2 * HTLC-timeout tx
2790 // Node[0]: 2 * HTLC-timeout tx
2791 check_spends!(node_txn[0], $commitment_tx);
2792 check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2793 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0);
2794 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0);
2796 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2797 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2798 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2799 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2801 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2802 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2803 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2804 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2809 // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2810 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0]);
2812 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2813 // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx on A's chain
2814 let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2815 check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2816 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2817 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2818 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2819 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2820 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2821 assert!(node_txn.len() == 1 || node_txn.len() == 3); // HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn
2822 let commitment_spend =
2823 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
2826 // Certain `ConnectStyle`s will cause RBF bumps of the previous HTLC transaction to be broadcast.
2827 // FullBlockViaListen
2828 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2829 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2830 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2831 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2834 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2835 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2836 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2841 check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2842 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2843 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2844 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2845 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time.0, 0);
2846 assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2847 // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
2848 // we already checked the same situation with A.
2850 // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
2851 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2852 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()] });
2853 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2854 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2855 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2856 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2857 assert_eq!(events.len(), 5);
2858 let mut first_claimed = false;
2859 for event in events {
2861 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
2862 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
2863 assert!(!first_claimed);
2864 first_claimed = true;
2866 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
2867 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
2870 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
2871 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
2872 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2875 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2878 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
2879 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
2880 // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2881 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2882 // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
2883 // B's commitment tx C's commitment tx
2885 // B's HTLC timeout tx B's timeout tx
2887 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2888 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2889 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2890 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2891 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2892 *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2893 *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2895 // Create some intial channels
2896 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2897 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2899 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
2900 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2901 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2903 let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2905 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2906 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2907 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2908 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
2909 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
2910 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }]);
2911 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2913 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2914 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2916 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2917 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2918 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2919 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2920 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2921 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2923 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2925 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2926 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2927 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2928 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2929 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2930 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
2932 // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2933 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
2934 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2935 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
2936 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2939 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2940 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-timeout), 1 timeout tx
2942 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2943 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2945 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2946 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2947 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2948 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2950 timeout_tx = node_txn[2].clone();
2954 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
2955 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2956 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2958 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2960 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
2961 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2962 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2963 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2965 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2966 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2967 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2968 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2969 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2970 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2972 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2975 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
2976 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2977 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2979 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
2980 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2982 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2983 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2984 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2985 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // 1 timeout tx
2986 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2987 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2988 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2992 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
2993 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
2994 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
2995 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
2999 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
3000 // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
3001 // and fail backward accordingly.
3003 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3004 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3005 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3006 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3008 // Create some initial channels
3009 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3010 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3012 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3013 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3014 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3015 // Revoke the old state
3016 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3018 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3020 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3021 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3022 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3023 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3024 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3026 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
3027 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3028 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3029 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3031 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3032 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3033 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3034 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3035 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3036 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3038 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3039 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3040 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
3042 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3046 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
3047 // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
3048 // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
3049 // commitment transaction anymore.
3050 // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
3051 // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
3052 // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
3053 // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
3054 // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
3055 // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
3057 // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
3058 // commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
3059 // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
3060 // and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
3061 // commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
3062 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3063 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3064 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3065 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3067 // Create some initial channels
3068 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3069 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3071 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
3072 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3073 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3074 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
3075 // Revoke the old state
3076 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3078 let value = if use_dust {
3079 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
3080 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
3081 nodes[2].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
3082 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
3085 let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3086 let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3087 let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3089 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash);
3090 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: first_payment_hash }]);
3091 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3092 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3093 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3094 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3095 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3096 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3097 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3098 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3099 let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
3100 // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
3102 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash);
3103 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: second_payment_hash }]);
3104 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3105 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3106 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3107 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3108 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3109 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3110 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3111 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3112 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3113 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3114 // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3115 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3116 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3117 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3119 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash);
3120 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: third_payment_hash }]);
3121 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3122 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3123 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3124 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3125 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3126 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3127 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3128 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3129 // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3130 // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3131 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3132 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3133 // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3134 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3135 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3136 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3138 // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3139 // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3140 let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3141 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, fourth_payment_hash, &Some(fourth_payment_secret), PaymentId(fourth_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3142 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3143 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3144 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3147 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3148 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3149 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3150 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3151 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3152 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3154 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3155 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3158 Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { .. } => { },
3159 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3161 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3162 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3165 let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
3166 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3168 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3169 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3170 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3172 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3173 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 2 + nodes.len() - 1 } else { 3 + nodes.len() });
3175 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
3176 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
3179 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3180 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3182 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3184 if !deliver_bs_raa {
3186 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3187 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3189 nodes[1].node.abandon_payment(PaymentId(fourth_payment_hash.0));
3190 let payment_failed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3191 assert_eq!(payment_failed_events.len(), 1);
3192 match payment_failed_events[0] {
3193 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3194 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3196 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3200 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3201 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3203 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3204 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3207 let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3208 match nodes_2_event {
3209 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3210 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3211 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3212 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3213 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3214 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3216 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3220 let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3221 match nodes_2_event {
3222 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
3223 assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3224 assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3226 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3229 let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3230 match nodes_0_event {
3231 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3232 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3233 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3234 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3235 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3236 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3238 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3239 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3240 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3242 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3244 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3245 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3247 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref network_update, .. } => {
3248 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3249 // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3250 // that we should update our routing table for.
3251 if !deliver_bs_raa {
3252 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3255 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3258 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref network_update, .. } => {
3259 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3260 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3262 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3265 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref network_update, .. } => {
3266 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3267 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3269 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3272 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3275 // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
3277 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3278 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3281 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3282 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3283 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3287 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3288 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3289 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3290 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3291 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3295 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3296 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3297 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3298 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3299 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3303 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3304 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3305 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3306 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3307 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3308 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
3310 // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3312 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3313 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3314 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3316 let payment_event = {
3317 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3318 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3319 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3321 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3322 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3325 // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3326 let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3328 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, failed_payment_hash, &Some(failed_payment_secret), PaymentId(failed_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3329 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3331 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3334 // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3336 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3338 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3339 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3340 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3341 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 50_000, &Some(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3342 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3343 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
3345 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3346 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3352 onion_routing_packet,
3354 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3356 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3357 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3358 // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3360 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3361 assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3363 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3366 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3367 assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3369 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3371 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3372 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3376 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3377 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3378 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3379 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3380 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3381 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3382 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3383 if *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow() == ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen {
3384 // We rely on the ability to connect a block redundantly, which isn't allowed via
3385 // `chain::Listen`, so we never run the test if we randomly get assigned that
3389 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3391 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3392 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3393 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3394 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3395 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3396 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3398 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
3399 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3400 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
3402 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3403 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
3404 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3405 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3406 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3408 // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3409 // registering new transactions
3410 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
3414 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3415 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3416 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3417 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3418 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3419 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3420 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3421 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3423 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3425 let mut payment_event = {
3426 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3427 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3429 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3430 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3431 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3434 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3435 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3437 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3439 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3440 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3441 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3442 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3444 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3445 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3446 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3447 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3448 let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3450 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3451 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3452 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3454 nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3455 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3456 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3457 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3459 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3460 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3461 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3462 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3463 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3467 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3469 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3470 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3471 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3472 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3474 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3476 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3477 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator), &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3479 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3480 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3481 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3482 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3483 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3484 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3485 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3487 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3491 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3492 // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3493 // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3494 // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3495 // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3497 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3498 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3499 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3500 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3501 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3503 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
3505 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
3506 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_000_000);
3507 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3508 let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3509 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3510 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
3512 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3513 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3515 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3516 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3520 fn test_peer_disconnected_before_funding_broadcasted() {
3521 // Test that channels are closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` if the peer disconnects
3522 // before the funding transaction has been broadcasted.
3523 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3524 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3525 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3526 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3528 // Open a channel between `nodes[0]` and `nodes[1]`, for which the funding transaction is never
3529 // broadcasted, even though it's created by `nodes[0]`.
3530 let expected_temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
3531 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3532 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
3533 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3534 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
3536 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
3537 assert_eq!(temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3539 assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
3541 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3542 assert_eq!(funding_created_msg.temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3544 // Even though the funding transaction is created by `nodes[0]`, the `FundingCreated` msg is
3545 // never sent to `nodes[1]`, and therefore the tx is never signed by either party nor
3548 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3551 // Ensure that the channel is closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` when the peers are
3552 // disconnected before the funding transaction was broadcasted.
3553 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3554 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3556 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3557 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3561 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3562 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3563 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3564 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3565 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3566 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3567 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3568 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3570 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3571 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3572 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3574 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3575 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3576 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3577 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3579 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3580 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3581 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3583 let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3584 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3585 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3586 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3588 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3589 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3591 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3592 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3594 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
3596 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3597 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3599 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3600 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3601 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3603 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3606 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, payment_failed_permanently, .. } => {
3607 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3608 assert!(payment_failed_permanently);
3610 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3613 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3614 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3618 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3619 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3622 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3623 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3624 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3625 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3626 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3627 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3629 let mut as_channel_ready = None;
3630 let channel_id = if messages_delivered == 0 {
3631 let (channel_ready, chan_id, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
3632 as_channel_ready = Some(channel_ready);
3633 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the channel_ready message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3634 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3635 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3638 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).2
3641 let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1_000_000);
3643 let payment_event = {
3644 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
3645 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3647 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3648 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3649 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3651 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3653 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3654 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3656 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3657 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3658 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3659 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3660 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3662 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3663 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3664 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3665 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3667 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3668 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3669 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3670 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3671 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3673 if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3674 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3675 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3676 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3683 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3684 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3685 if messages_delivered < 3 {
3686 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3687 // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a channel_ready prior to a
3688 // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to channel_ready time.
3690 // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a channel_ready immediately on
3691 // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate channel_ready sent
3692 // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3694 // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3695 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3697 // Even if the channel_ready messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3698 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3699 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3700 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3701 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3702 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3703 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3704 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3705 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3706 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3707 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3708 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3709 } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3710 // Everything was delivered...
3711 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3714 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3715 if messages_delivered == 0 {
3716 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 2);
3718 Event::ChannelReady { .. } => { },
3719 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3722 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3723 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3726 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3728 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3729 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3733 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3734 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3735 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3737 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3739 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3740 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3742 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, via_user_channel_id: _ } => {
3743 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3744 assert_eq!(amount_msat, 1_000_000);
3745 assert_eq!(receiver_node_id.unwrap(), nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3746 assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(channel_id));
3748 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3749 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3750 assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3752 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3755 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3758 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3759 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3760 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
3762 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3763 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3764 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3765 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3766 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3767 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3768 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3769 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3770 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3771 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3772 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3774 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3777 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3778 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3780 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3781 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3783 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3784 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3785 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3787 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3790 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3791 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3792 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3793 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3795 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3796 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3797 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3798 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3800 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3801 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3802 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3803 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3804 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3806 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3807 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3808 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3809 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3816 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3817 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3818 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3819 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3820 if messages_delivered < 1 {
3821 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
3823 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3825 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
3826 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3827 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3828 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3829 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3830 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3831 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3832 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3833 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3834 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3835 // Everything was delivered...
3836 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3839 if messages_delivered == 1 || messages_delivered == 2 {
3840 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3842 if messages_delivered <= 5 {
3843 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3844 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3846 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3848 if messages_delivered > 2 {
3849 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3852 // Channel should still work fine...
3853 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3854 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3855 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3859 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
3860 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
3861 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
3862 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
3863 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
3867 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
3868 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
3869 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
3870 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
3871 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
3875 fn test_channel_ready_without_best_block_updated() {
3876 // Previously, if we were offline when a funding transaction was locked in, and then we came
3877 // back online, calling best_block_updated once followed by transactions_confirmed, we'd not
3878 // generate a channel_ready until a later best_block_updated. This tests that we generate the
3879 // channel_ready immediately instead.
3880 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3881 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3882 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3883 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3884 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
3886 let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
3888 let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
3889 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
3890 let block_txn = [funding_tx];
3891 let conf_txn: Vec<_> = block_txn.iter().enumerate().collect();
3892 let conf_block_header = nodes[0].get_block_header(conf_height);
3893 nodes[0].node.transactions_confirmed(&conf_block_header, &conf_txn[..], conf_height);
3895 // Ensure nodes[0] generates a channel_ready after the transactions_confirmed
3896 let as_channel_ready = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3897 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
3901 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
3902 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
3903 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
3904 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3905 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3906 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3907 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3908 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3910 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
3912 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
3913 let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3914 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
3915 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3917 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3918 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3920 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
3921 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3924 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3925 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
3926 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3928 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3929 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3931 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3932 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3933 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3934 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3935 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3936 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3937 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3939 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3940 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3941 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3943 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3944 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
3945 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
3947 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3950 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
3951 let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3952 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3953 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3955 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3958 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3959 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3961 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
3962 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
3963 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
3964 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
3965 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
3966 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
3968 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
3969 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
3970 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
3971 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
3973 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
3974 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
3976 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
3977 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
3979 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
3981 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3982 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3983 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3984 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3985 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
3986 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
3987 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
3988 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3989 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3990 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3992 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
3993 let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3994 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3995 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3996 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3997 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3998 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
3999 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4001 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
4002 let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4003 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4004 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4005 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4006 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4007 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4008 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4010 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4011 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4012 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4013 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4015 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4016 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4017 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4018 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4020 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
4021 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4022 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4024 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4026 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4027 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
4029 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
4030 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
4032 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
4033 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
4034 assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
4036 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
4039 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4042 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
4043 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4044 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4046 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4047 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4050 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
4051 // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
4052 // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
4053 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4054 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4055 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4056 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4058 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4060 let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
4061 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
4062 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
4063 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
4064 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
4065 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
4066 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
4067 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
4068 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4069 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4070 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4071 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
4072 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentClaimable event(s).
4073 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
4076 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
4079 let mut block = Block {
4080 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
4083 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4084 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4085 let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4086 for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
4087 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
4088 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4089 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4092 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
4094 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4095 let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4096 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4097 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4098 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4099 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4101 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4102 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4103 // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4104 let mut expected_failure_data = (100_000 as u64).to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4105 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&(block_count - 1).to_be_bytes());
4106 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4110 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4111 do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4112 do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4115 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4116 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4117 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4118 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4119 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4120 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4121 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4122 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4124 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4125 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4126 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4127 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4129 // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4130 let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4132 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, first_payment_hash, &Some(first_payment_secret), PaymentId(first_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
4134 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4135 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4137 // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4138 let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4139 let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4140 sending_node.node.send_payment(&route, second_payment_hash, &Some(second_payment_secret), PaymentId(second_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
4142 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4143 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4144 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4145 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4146 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4148 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4150 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4151 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4152 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4153 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4156 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
4157 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4158 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4159 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4160 match fail_commit[0] {
4161 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4162 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4163 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4165 _ => unreachable!(),
4167 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4169 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], second_payment_hash, false);
4174 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4175 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4176 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4179 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4180 ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4182 let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4183 let mut txn = Vec::new();
4184 let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4185 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4186 for event in events.drain(..) {
4188 Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs } => {
4189 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4190 txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4191 all_outputs.push(outp);
4194 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4197 if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4198 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx) {
4208 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4209 // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4210 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4211 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4212 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4213 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4215 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000);
4216 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4217 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4218 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4219 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4220 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4221 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4222 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4223 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4225 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4226 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4228 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4229 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4230 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4231 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4232 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4236 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4237 // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4238 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4239 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4240 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4241 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4242 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4244 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000);
4245 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4246 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4247 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4248 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4250 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4251 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4252 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4253 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4255 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4256 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4257 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4258 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4259 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4261 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4262 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4263 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4267 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4268 // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4269 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4271 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4272 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4273 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4274 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4276 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000);
4277 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4278 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4279 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4280 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4282 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4283 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4284 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4285 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4286 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4288 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4289 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4290 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4292 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4293 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4294 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4295 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4296 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4300 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4301 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4302 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4303 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4304 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4306 // Create some initial channels
4307 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4309 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
4311 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4312 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4313 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4315 // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4316 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4317 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4318 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4319 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4320 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4321 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4323 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4324 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4327 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4328 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4331 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4332 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4333 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4334 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4335 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4337 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4338 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4339 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4341 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4342 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4343 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4347 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4348 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4349 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4350 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4351 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4353 // Create some initial channels
4354 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4356 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4357 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4359 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4361 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4362 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4363 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4365 // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4366 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4367 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4368 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4370 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4371 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4373 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4375 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4376 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4377 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4378 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
4379 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4381 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4382 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4383 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4384 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, false);
4386 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4387 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4388 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4389 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4390 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4394 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4395 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4396 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4397 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4398 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4400 // Create some initial channels
4401 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4403 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4404 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4405 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4406 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4408 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4410 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4411 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4412 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4413 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4415 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4416 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4417 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4418 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4420 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4421 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4423 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4424 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4425 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4429 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4430 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4431 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4432 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4433 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4434 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4436 // Create some initial channels
4437 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4439 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4440 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4441 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4442 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4444 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4446 // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
4447 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4448 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4449 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4450 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4451 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4453 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4454 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 1);
4455 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4456 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4457 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4458 assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
4460 // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4461 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4462 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
4463 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4464 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4465 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4467 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4468 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs
4469 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4470 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4471 // transactions next...
4472 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
4473 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4475 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
4476 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4477 if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4478 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4480 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4481 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4484 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4485 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4487 // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4488 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4489 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4490 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4491 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
4495 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
4496 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4497 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4498 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4499 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4500 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4502 // Create some initial channels
4503 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4505 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4506 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4507 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4508 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4510 // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
4511 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
4513 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4515 // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
4516 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4517 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4518 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4519 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4520 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4522 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 1);
4523 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4524 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4525 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4527 // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
4528 let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
4529 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
4531 // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4532 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4533 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
4534 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4535 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4536 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4538 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4539 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success
4541 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4542 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4543 // transactions next...
4544 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4545 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4546 if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4547 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4549 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4550 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4553 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4554 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4556 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
4557 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4559 // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
4560 // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
4562 // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4563 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
4564 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4565 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4566 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
4567 assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4568 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
4569 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
4573 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
4574 // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
4575 // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
4576 // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
4577 // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
4579 // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
4582 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4583 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4584 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4585 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4587 // Create some initial channels
4588 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4589 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4591 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
4592 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4593 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4594 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4595 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4597 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4598 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4599 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4601 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
4602 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4603 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
4604 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4605 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4606 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4607 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4608 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4609 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4610 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4611 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4613 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
4614 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
4615 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4616 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4618 let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
4619 assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 1);
4620 check_spends!(c_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4621 assert_eq!(c_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4622 assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
4623 assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Success tx
4625 // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
4626 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
4627 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), c_txn[0].clone()]});
4628 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4629 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4630 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4632 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
4633 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4636 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
4637 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
4638 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, Some(chan_1.2));
4639 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
4640 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
4642 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4644 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4645 let mut msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4646 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
4647 let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut msg_events);
4648 let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut msg_events);
4650 match nodes_2_event {
4651 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
4652 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4655 match nodes_0_event {
4656 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
4657 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4658 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4659 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4660 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4661 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
4663 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4666 // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
4667 match msg_events[0] {
4668 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4669 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4672 // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
4673 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4674 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4675 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4676 let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4677 // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx
4678 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
4679 check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4680 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4681 assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
4682 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Success tx
4684 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4685 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4689 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
4690 // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
4691 // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
4692 // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
4693 // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
4694 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4695 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4696 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
4697 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
4698 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
4699 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
4700 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
4701 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
4702 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4704 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4705 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4706 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4708 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4709 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4710 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4711 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4712 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
4714 let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 900_000);
4716 let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
4717 // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
4718 // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
4719 // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
4720 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40)
4721 .with_features(nodes[3].node.invoice_features());
4722 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], payment_params, 800_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40);
4723 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 800_000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
4725 let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4726 assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4727 check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
4729 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
4730 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4731 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4732 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4733 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4735 let htlc_timeout_tx;
4736 { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
4737 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4738 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 2-or-3
4739 assert!(node_txn.len() == 2 || node_txn.len() == 3);
4741 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
4742 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4743 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
4745 if node_txn.len() > 2 {
4746 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
4747 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4748 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].output.len(), 1);
4749 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4751 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
4752 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4753 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
4754 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
4756 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
4757 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4758 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].output.len(), 1);
4759 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4762 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4763 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4764 // Assign htlc_timeout_tx to the forwarded HTLC (with value ~800 sats). The received HTLC
4765 // (with value 900 sats) will be claimed in the below `claim_funds` call.
4766 if node_txn.len() > 2 {
4767 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4768 htlc_timeout_tx = if node_txn[2].output[0].value < 900 { node_txn[2].clone() } else { node_txn[0].clone() };
4770 htlc_timeout_tx = if node_txn[0].output[0].value < 900 { node_txn[1].clone() } else { node_txn[0].clone() };
4774 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
4775 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], duplicate_payment_hash, 900_000);
4777 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
4778 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
4779 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4780 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4782 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4783 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4786 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4787 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4789 let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4790 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
4791 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
4792 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
4793 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4794 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4795 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4796 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4797 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4798 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
4800 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
4801 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4802 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
4803 let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4804 assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4805 assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4806 let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
4807 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4808 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4809 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4811 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4812 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4814 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
4816 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
4818 // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
4819 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[1]);
4820 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], Some(196), true, true);
4821 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4822 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4823 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4824 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4825 assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
4826 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4827 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4829 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4830 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
4832 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4834 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
4835 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
4836 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
4838 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4843 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
4844 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4845 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4846 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4847 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4849 // Create some initial channels
4850 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4852 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
4853 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4854 assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
4855 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4856 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
4858 // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
4859 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4860 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
4861 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4863 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
4864 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4865 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4866 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4868 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4869 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4872 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4873 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4876 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4877 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4878 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4879 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4880 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
4884 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
4885 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4887 // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
4888 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4889 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4890 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4891 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
4892 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4895 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
4896 // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
4897 // unrevoked commitment transaction.
4898 // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
4899 // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
4900 // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
4901 // use the same payment hashes.
4902 // Thus, we use a six-node network:
4907 // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
4908 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
4909 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
4910 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
4911 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
4912 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
4913 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
4914 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
4915 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
4916 let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4918 let _chan_0_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2);
4919 let _chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4920 let chan_2_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4921 let chan_3_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
4922 let chan_3_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
4924 // Rebalance and check output sanity...
4925 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
4926 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
4927 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
4929 let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id())
4930 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan_2_3.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
4932 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4934 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4935 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
4937 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4939 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4941 let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
4943 let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
4944 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
4946 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
4948 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
4951 let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
4953 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
4954 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4957 let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4959 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
4960 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
4962 // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
4963 // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
4964 // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
4965 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2).len(), 1);
4966 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
4968 // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
4969 // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
4970 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1);
4971 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3);
4972 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5);
4973 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6);
4974 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
4976 let failed_destinations = vec![
4977 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_1 },
4978 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_3 },
4979 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_5 },
4980 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_6 },
4982 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[4], failed_destinations);
4983 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
4985 let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
4986 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4987 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
4988 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
4989 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
4990 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
4992 // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
4993 nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
4994 nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4);
4995 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
4997 let failed_destinations_2 = vec![
4998 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 },
4999 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_4 },
5001 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[5], failed_destinations_2);
5002 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5004 let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5005 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5006 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5007 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5009 let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5011 // After 4 and 2 removes respectively above in nodes[4] and nodes[5], nodes[3] should receive 6 PaymentForwardedFailed events
5012 let failed_destinations_3 = vec![
5013 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5014 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5015 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5016 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5017 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5018 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5020 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations_3);
5021 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5022 let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5023 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5024 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5025 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5026 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5027 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5028 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5029 if deliver_last_raa {
5030 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5032 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5035 // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5036 // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5037 // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5038 // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5040 // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5041 // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5042 // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5044 // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5045 // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5046 let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5048 if announce_latest {
5049 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5051 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5053 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5054 let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5055 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2 + 6);
5056 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5058 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5059 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5062 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5063 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5066 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5067 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5068 if deliver_last_raa {
5069 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5071 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(3).collect();
5072 expect_htlc_handling_failed_destinations!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(), expected_destinations);
5074 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = if announce_latest {
5075 repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(9).collect()
5077 repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(6).collect()
5080 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], expected_destinations);
5082 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5084 let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5085 assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5086 let mut a_done = false;
5087 for msg in cs_msgs {
5089 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5090 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5091 // should be failed-backwards here.
5092 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5093 // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5094 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5095 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5097 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5102 // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5103 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5104 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5106 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5107 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5110 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5111 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5112 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5113 if announce_latest {
5114 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5115 if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5116 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5119 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5121 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5125 let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5126 assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5127 let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5128 let mut as_updates = 0;
5129 for event in as_events.iter() {
5130 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5131 assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5132 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5133 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5135 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5137 if network_update.is_some() {
5140 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5142 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5143 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5144 if announce_latest {
5145 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5146 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5148 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5150 let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5151 assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5152 let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5153 let mut bs_updates = 0;
5154 for event in bs_events.iter() {
5155 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5156 assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5157 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5158 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5160 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5162 if network_update.is_some() {
5165 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5167 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5168 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5169 if announce_latest {
5170 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5172 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5174 // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5175 // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5176 // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5177 // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5178 assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5179 assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5183 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5184 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5188 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5189 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5193 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5194 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5195 // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5196 // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5200 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5201 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5202 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5203 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5204 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5206 // Create some initial channels
5207 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5209 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5210 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5211 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5212 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5214 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5215 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5216 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5217 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5218 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5219 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5221 let htlc_timeout = {
5222 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5223 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5224 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5225 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5226 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5230 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5231 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5232 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5234 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5235 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5236 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5237 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5238 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5239 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5240 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5241 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5242 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5243 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5244 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5248 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5249 // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with a key
5250 // manager rotation to test that `channel_keys_id` returned in
5251 // [`SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput`] let us re-derive the channel key set to
5252 // then derive a `delayed_payment_key`.
5254 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5256 // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5257 let seed = [42; 32];
5258 let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5259 let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5260 let network_graph = Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source.genesis_hash, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger));
5261 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(network_graph.clone());
5262 let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, router, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph, node_seed: seed, override_init_features: alloc::rc::Rc::new(core::cell::RefCell::new(None)) };
5263 let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5264 node_cfgs.remove(0);
5265 node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5267 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5268 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5270 // Create some initial channels
5271 // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5273 let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2);
5274 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5275 assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5277 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5278 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5279 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5280 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5281 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5283 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5284 let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5285 let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5286 assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5287 check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5289 // We check funding pubkey are unique
5290 let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5291 let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5292 if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5293 || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5294 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5295 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5296 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5299 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5300 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5301 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5302 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5303 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5304 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5306 let htlc_timeout = {
5307 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5308 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5309 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5310 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5311 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5315 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5316 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5317 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5319 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5320 let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5321 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5322 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5323 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5324 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5325 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5326 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5327 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5328 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5329 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5330 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5334 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5335 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5336 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5337 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5338 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5340 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5342 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5343 let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5345 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5346 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5347 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5349 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5350 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5351 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5353 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5354 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5355 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5357 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5358 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5359 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5362 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5363 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5364 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5365 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5366 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5367 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5369 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5371 // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5372 // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5373 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5374 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5375 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5377 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5378 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5379 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
5381 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5382 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5383 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5384 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5385 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5387 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5388 let mut block = Block {
5389 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5392 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5393 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5394 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5396 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5397 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5398 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5399 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5402 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5403 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5404 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5405 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5406 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5407 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5409 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5410 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5411 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5413 let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5415 // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5416 // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5417 // to "time out" the HTLC.
5419 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5420 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5422 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5423 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: Vec::new()});
5424 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
5426 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5427 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5428 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5429 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5432 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5433 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5434 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5435 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5436 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5437 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5439 // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
5440 // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5441 // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
5442 // actually revoked.
5443 let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
5444 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
5445 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
5446 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
5447 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5449 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5450 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5451 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5452 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5453 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5454 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5455 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5456 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
5457 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5458 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5460 if check_revoke_no_close {
5461 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
5462 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5465 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5466 let mut block = Block {
5467 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5470 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
5471 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5472 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5474 if !check_revoke_no_close {
5475 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5476 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5477 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5478 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5480 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5484 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
5485 // There are only a few cases to test here:
5486 // * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
5487 // broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
5488 // * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
5489 // * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
5490 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
5492 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
5493 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
5494 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
5496 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
5497 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
5498 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
5500 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
5501 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
5505 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
5506 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
5507 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
5508 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
5509 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
5514 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
5515 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5516 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5517 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5518 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5519 // Force duplicate randomness for every get-random call
5520 for node in nodes.iter() {
5521 *node.keys_manager.override_random_bytes.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
5524 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
5525 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5526 let push_msat=10001;
5527 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5528 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5529 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5530 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5532 // Create a second channel with the same random values. This used to panic due to a colliding
5533 // channel_id, but now panics due to a colliding outbound SCID alias.
5534 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5538 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
5539 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5540 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5541 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5542 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5544 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
5545 let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
5546 let push_msat=10001;
5547 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5549 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
5550 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5551 // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
5552 let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
5553 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5555 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
5556 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5557 let push_msat=10001;
5558 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
5559 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5560 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
5562 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
5563 // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
5564 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
5566 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
5567 assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
5568 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5570 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
5571 let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
5572 assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
5574 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
5575 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
5576 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5577 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5578 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
5579 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5583 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
5584 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5585 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5586 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5587 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5589 let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
5590 let push_msat=10001;
5591 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5592 let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5593 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
5594 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
5596 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5597 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5598 let err_msg = match events[0] {
5599 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
5602 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5604 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
5607 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
5608 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
5609 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
5610 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
5612 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
5613 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5614 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5615 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5616 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5617 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
5619 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5620 // pending_update_fee.
5622 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5623 *feerate_lock += 20;
5625 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5626 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5628 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5629 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5630 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5631 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5632 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5634 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5637 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5639 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5640 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5641 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5642 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5644 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5645 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
5646 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
5648 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
5649 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5650 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5651 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
5653 // Flush the pending fee update.
5654 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5655 let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5656 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5657 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
5658 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5660 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
5661 // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
5662 // us to surface its failure to the user.
5663 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5664 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5665 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
5666 let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
5667 hex::encode(our_payment_hash.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
5668 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
5670 // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
5671 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5672 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5674 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
5675 assert_eq!(PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0), *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
5676 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
5677 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
5678 assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
5679 assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
5680 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id));
5682 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5686 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
5687 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
5688 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
5690 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
5691 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5692 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5693 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5694 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5695 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
5697 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5698 // pending_update_fee.
5700 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5701 *feerate_lock += 200;
5703 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5704 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5706 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5707 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5708 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5709 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5710 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5712 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5715 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5717 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5718 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5719 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5720 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5722 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5724 let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors) - amt_1;
5725 let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
5726 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
5728 // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
5729 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
5730 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5731 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
5732 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId(nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5733 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2), payment_id_2).unwrap();
5734 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5735 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
5737 // Flush the pending fee update.
5738 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5739 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5740 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5741 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
5742 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5743 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
5745 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
5746 // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
5747 // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
5748 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5749 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5750 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
5751 let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
5752 hex::encode(payment_hash_2.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
5753 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
5755 // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
5756 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5757 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5759 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
5760 assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
5761 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
5762 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
5763 assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
5764 assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
5765 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route_2.paths[0][0].short_channel_id));
5767 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5770 // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
5771 let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
5772 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5773 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
5774 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
5776 let raa = match send_raa_event {
5777 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
5778 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5780 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5781 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5782 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5783 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5784 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5785 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5787 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
5788 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5790 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5791 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5792 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5794 Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } => {},
5795 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5797 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
5798 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5799 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, amt_1);
5801 let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5802 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5803 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
5804 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
5807 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
5808 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
5809 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
5812 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
5813 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5814 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5815 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5816 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5817 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5818 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5819 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5820 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5821 let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
5822 let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000);
5824 // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5825 // pending_update_fee.
5827 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5828 *feerate_lock += 20;
5830 nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5831 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5833 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5834 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5835 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5836 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5837 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5839 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5842 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5844 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
5845 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5846 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
5847 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
5849 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
5851 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
5852 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors) - total_routing_fee_msat;
5853 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
5854 let payment_event = {
5855 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5856 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5858 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5859 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5861 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
5863 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5864 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5865 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5866 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5868 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_1_2.2);
5869 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
5871 // Flush the pending fee update.
5872 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5873 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5874 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5875 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5876 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5877 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
5879 // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
5880 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5881 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5883 let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
5884 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
5887 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5890 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
5891 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5892 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5894 // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
5895 let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5896 assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 2);
5897 match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
5898 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
5899 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5902 // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
5903 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5904 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5906 // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
5907 let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5908 assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
5909 let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
5910 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
5911 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
5912 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
5913 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
5914 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5915 (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
5917 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5920 // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
5921 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
5922 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5924 // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
5925 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5926 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5927 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5928 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5929 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
5930 let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5931 assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
5932 let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
5933 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
5934 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5936 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5937 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
5938 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5941 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
5942 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
5943 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
5946 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
5947 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
5948 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5949 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5950 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5951 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5952 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
5954 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
5955 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 100;
5957 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
5958 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
5959 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5960 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value".to_string(), 1);
5964 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
5965 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
5966 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5967 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5968 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5969 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5970 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
5972 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
5973 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 0;
5974 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
5975 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
5977 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5978 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
5982 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
5983 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
5984 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5985 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5986 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5987 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5988 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
5990 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
5991 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5992 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5993 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5994 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
5996 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
5997 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
5998 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
5999 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6000 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() });
6004 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6005 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6006 //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6007 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6008 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6009 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6010 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6011 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0);
6013 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0)
6014 .with_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features());
6015 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], payment_params, 100000000, 0);
6016 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = 500000001;
6017 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::InvalidRoute { ref err },
6018 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6022 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6023 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6024 //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6025 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6026 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6027 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6028 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6029 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6030 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0);
6031 let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
6032 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6034 for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6035 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6036 let payment_event = {
6037 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6038 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6040 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6041 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6042 if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6043 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6047 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6049 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6050 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6051 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6053 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6054 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6056 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6057 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6058 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6060 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6061 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
6065 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6066 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6067 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6068 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6069 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6070 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6071 let channel_value = 100000;
6072 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0);
6073 let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6075 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6077 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6078 // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6080 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = max_in_flight + 1;
6081 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6082 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6084 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6085 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
6087 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6090 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6092 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6093 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6094 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6095 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6096 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6097 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6098 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6099 let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6101 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6102 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6103 let channel = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6104 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6107 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6108 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6109 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6110 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6111 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6112 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6113 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6114 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6115 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6116 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6117 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6121 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6122 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6123 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6124 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6125 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6126 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6127 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6129 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6130 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6131 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6132 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6133 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6134 let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
6136 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6137 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6138 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6139 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6140 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6142 // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6143 // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6144 // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6145 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6146 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6148 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6149 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6150 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6151 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6152 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6156 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6157 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6158 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6159 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6160 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6161 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6162 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6163 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6165 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3999999);
6166 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6167 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6168 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6169 let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3999999, &Some(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6170 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash);
6172 let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6176 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6177 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6178 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6181 for i in 0..super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
6182 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6183 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6185 msg.htlc_id = (super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS) as u64;
6186 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6188 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6189 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6190 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6191 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6192 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6196 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6197 //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6198 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6199 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6200 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6201 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6202 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6204 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6205 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6206 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6207 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6208 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6209 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6211 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6212 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6213 assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6214 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6215 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6219 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6220 //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6221 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6222 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6223 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6224 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6226 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6227 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6228 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6229 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6230 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6231 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6232 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6234 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6235 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6236 assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6237 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6238 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6242 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6243 //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6244 // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6245 // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6246 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6247 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6248 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6249 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6251 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6252 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6253 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6254 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6255 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6256 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6258 //Disconnect and Reconnect
6259 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6260 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6261 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
6262 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6263 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6264 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
6265 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6266 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6267 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6268 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6269 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6270 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6273 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6274 assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6275 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6276 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6277 let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6279 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6281 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6282 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6283 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6284 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6285 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6289 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6290 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6292 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6293 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6294 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6295 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6296 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6297 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6298 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6300 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6301 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6302 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6304 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6307 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6310 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6312 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6313 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6314 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6315 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6316 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6320 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6321 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6323 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6324 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6325 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6326 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6327 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6329 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6330 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6331 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6332 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6333 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6335 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6338 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6341 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6343 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6344 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6345 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6346 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6347 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6351 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6352 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6354 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6355 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6356 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6357 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6358 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6360 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6361 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6362 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6363 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6364 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6365 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6368 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6369 failure_code: 0x8000,
6372 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6374 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6375 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6376 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6377 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6378 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6382 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6383 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6385 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6386 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6387 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6388 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6389 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6391 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6393 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6394 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6395 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6397 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6398 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6399 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6401 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6402 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6403 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6404 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6405 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6406 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6407 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6409 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6413 update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6415 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6417 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6418 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6419 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6420 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6421 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6425 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6426 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6428 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6429 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6430 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6431 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6432 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6434 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6436 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6437 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6438 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6440 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6441 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6442 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6444 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6445 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6446 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6447 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6448 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6449 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6450 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6452 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6456 update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
6458 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6460 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6461 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6462 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6463 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6464 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6468 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
6469 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
6471 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6472 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6473 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6474 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6475 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6477 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6478 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6479 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6481 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6482 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6484 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6485 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6486 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6488 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6490 let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
6492 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6493 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6494 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6495 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6496 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6497 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6498 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
6500 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6503 update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
6504 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6506 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6507 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6508 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
6509 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6510 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6514 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
6515 //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
6516 // * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
6518 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6519 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6520 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6521 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6522 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6523 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000);
6525 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
6528 let mut payment_event = {
6529 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6530 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6531 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6532 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6533 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6535 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6536 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6537 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6538 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6539 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6540 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6541 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6542 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6543 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6546 payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6547 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6548 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6549 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6551 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6552 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6553 let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
6555 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6556 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6557 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6558 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6559 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6560 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6561 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
6563 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6567 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
6569 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6570 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
6571 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
6572 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6573 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6575 //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
6577 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6578 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6579 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6580 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6581 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6582 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6584 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6587 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6591 fn test_channel_failed_after_message_with_badonion_node_perm_bits_set() {
6592 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6593 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6594 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6595 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6596 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6597 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6599 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100_000);
6602 let mut payment_event = {
6603 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6604 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6605 SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[0])
6608 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6609 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6610 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6611 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6612 payment_event = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[1]);
6613 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6616 payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; // Trigger an invalid_onion_version error
6617 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6618 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6619 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6621 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6622 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6624 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6625 let mut update_msg = updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone();
6626 // Set the NODE bit (BADONION and PERM already set in invalid_onion_version error)
6627 update_msg.failure_code |= 0x2000;
6629 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6630 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6632 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6635 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1],
6636 vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel {
6637 node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
6638 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6639 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6640 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6643 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6644 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6645 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6647 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6650 let events_5 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6651 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
6653 // Expect a PaymentPathFailed event with a ChannelFailure network update for the channel between
6654 // the node originating the error to its next hop.
6656 Event::PaymentPathFailed { network_update:
6657 Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure { short_channel_id, is_permanent }), error_code, ..
6659 assert_eq!(short_channel_id, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id);
6660 assert!(is_permanent);
6661 assert_eq!(error_code, Some(0x8000|0x4000|0x2000|4));
6663 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6666 // TODO: Test actual removal of channel from NetworkGraph when it's implemented.
6669 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
6670 // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
6671 // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
6672 // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
6674 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6675 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
6676 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6677 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6678 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6679 let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6681 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
6682 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6684 // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
6685 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6686 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6687 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6689 // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
6690 let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6692 // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
6693 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
6694 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6695 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
6696 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6698 let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6699 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6700 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
6701 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6703 // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
6704 let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6706 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6708 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
6709 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6711 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6714 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
6715 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6717 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6720 assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
6721 // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
6722 if announce_latest {
6723 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
6725 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
6728 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6729 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6730 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6732 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6733 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6734 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6735 // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
6736 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6737 let mut first_failed = false;
6738 for event in events {
6740 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6741 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
6742 assert!(!first_failed);
6743 first_failed = true;
6745 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
6748 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6754 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
6755 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
6756 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
6759 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
6760 // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
6761 // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
6762 // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6763 // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
6764 // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6765 // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
6767 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6768 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6769 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6770 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6771 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6773 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
6774 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6776 let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6777 let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6779 let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6780 let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
6782 // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
6784 let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6785 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
6788 let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
6790 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
6791 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
6792 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6793 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6794 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
6796 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
6797 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6798 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6799 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6800 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].clone());
6801 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6802 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
6803 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6804 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
6805 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6806 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
6808 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
6809 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
6810 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6811 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6812 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6813 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6815 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
6816 timeout_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..)
6817 .filter(|tx| tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == bs_commitment_tx[0].txid()).collect();
6818 check_spends!(timeout_tx[0], bs_commitment_tx[0]);
6819 // For both a revoked or non-revoked commitment transaction, after ANTI_REORG_DELAY the
6820 // dust HTLC should have been failed.
6821 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
6824 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6826 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].lock_time.0, 0);
6828 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout/revocation-claim tx
6829 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
6830 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6831 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6832 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
6837 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
6838 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
6839 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
6840 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
6844 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
6845 // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
6847 let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
6848 low_our_to_self_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
6849 let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
6850 high_their_to_self_config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
6851 let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
6852 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6853 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6854 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
6855 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6857 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
6858 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
6859 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), 1000000, 1000000, 0,
6860 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, 42)
6863 APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
6864 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6866 } else { assert!(false) }
6868 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
6869 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
6870 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6871 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
6872 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
6873 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].node.channel_type_features(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
6874 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
6877 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
6878 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6880 } else { assert!(false); }
6882 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
6883 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
6884 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
6885 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6886 accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
6887 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
6889 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
6891 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
6892 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
6893 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
6897 } else { panic!(); }
6898 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg });
6900 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
6901 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
6902 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6903 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
6904 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
6905 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].node.channel_type_features(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
6906 &high_their_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
6909 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
6910 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6912 } else { assert!(false); }
6916 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
6917 // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
6918 // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
6919 // to B, B should refuse payment.
6921 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6922 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6923 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6924 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6926 // Create some initial channels
6927 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6929 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
6930 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
6931 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV).with_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features());
6932 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
6933 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6934 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200, None).unwrap();
6935 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6936 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6938 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6939 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6940 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
6941 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6942 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6944 // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
6945 // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
6946 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6947 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
6949 // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
6950 // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
6951 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6953 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6954 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6955 let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6956 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6957 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6958 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6959 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6960 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6961 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6962 (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
6964 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6966 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6968 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
6969 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
6971 // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
6972 let mut expected_failure_data = (10_000 as u64).to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6973 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH.to_be_bytes());
6974 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
6978 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
6979 // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
6980 // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
6982 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6983 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6984 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6985 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6987 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6988 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0);
6989 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6992 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6993 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6995 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // Enabled -> DisabledStaged
6996 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // DisabledStaged -> Disabled
6997 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6998 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
6999 let mut chans_disabled = HashMap::new();
7000 for e in msg_events {
7002 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7003 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7004 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7005 if chans_disabled.insert(msg.contents.short_channel_id, msg.contents.timestamp).is_some() {
7006 panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7009 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7013 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7014 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7015 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7016 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7017 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7018 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7020 // Reestablish chan_1
7021 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7022 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7023 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7024 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7025 // Reestablish chan_2
7026 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7027 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7028 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7029 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7030 // Reestablish chan_3
7031 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7032 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7033 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7034 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7036 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7037 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7038 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7039 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7040 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7041 for e in msg_events {
7043 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7044 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7045 match chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7046 // Each update should have a higher timestamp than the previous one, replacing
7048 Some(prev_timestamp) => assert!(msg.contents.timestamp > prev_timestamp),
7049 None => panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!"),
7052 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7055 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7056 assert!(chans_disabled.is_empty());
7060 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7061 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7062 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7064 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7065 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7066 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7067 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7069 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7071 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7072 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 30)
7073 .with_features(nodes[0].node.invoice_features());
7074 let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_params, 3000000, 30);
7075 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7077 let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7078 // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7079 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7080 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7081 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7082 let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7084 let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7085 for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7086 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7087 penalty_sum += outp.value;
7091 // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7092 let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7094 // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7095 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7096 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_114, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7097 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()] });
7098 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7100 // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7104 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7105 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor)
7106 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7107 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7108 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7109 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7110 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7111 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7115 // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7116 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7117 let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7118 let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7120 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7121 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7122 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7123 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7124 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7125 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7126 penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7127 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7128 assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7129 let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7130 feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7131 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7132 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7136 assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7138 // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7139 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7141 let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7143 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7144 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7145 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7146 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7147 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7148 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7149 penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7150 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7151 assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7152 let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7153 feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7154 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7155 assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7159 assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7161 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7162 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7166 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7167 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7168 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7170 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7171 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7172 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7173 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7174 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7176 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7177 // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7178 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 50).with_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features());
7179 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7180 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7181 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7182 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7183 let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7184 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 50).with_features(nodes[0].node.invoice_features());
7185 let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[1].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7186 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7187 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7189 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7190 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7191 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7193 // Revoke local commitment tx
7194 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7196 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7197 // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7198 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7199 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7200 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7201 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7202 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 49); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7204 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
7205 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
7207 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7208 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7209 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7211 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7212 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7213 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].output.len(), 1);
7214 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7216 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7217 let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7218 let header_11 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: hash_128, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7219 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_11, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7220 let header_129 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_11.block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7221 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_129, txdata: vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()] });
7222 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7223 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7224 match events.last().unwrap() {
7225 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7226 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7232 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7233 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7234 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7236 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7237 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7238 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7239 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7241 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7242 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7243 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7244 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7245 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7246 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7248 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7249 // available, which we check here:
7250 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7251 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7252 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7254 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7255 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7257 // node_txn[3] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7258 // output, checked above).
7259 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 2);
7260 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].output.len(), 1);
7261 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
7263 first = node_txn[3].txid();
7264 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7265 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[1].output[0].value - node_txn[3].output[0].value;
7266 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[3].weight() as u64;
7267 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7271 // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7272 let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_129.block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7273 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7274 let header_131 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_130.block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7275 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_131, txdata: Vec::new() });
7277 // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7278 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7279 assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7280 let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7282 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7283 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7285 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7286 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
7287 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7288 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7289 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[1].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7290 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7291 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7292 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7296 // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7297 let header_145 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_144, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7298 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_145, txdata: node_txn });
7299 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7301 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7302 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7303 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7304 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7305 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7306 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7307 // up bumped justice generation.
7308 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7311 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7312 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7316 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
7317 // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7318 // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7321 // Provide preimage for one
7322 // Check aggregation
7324 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7325 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7326 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7327 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7329 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7330 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
7331 route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
7333 // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7334 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7335 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7336 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7337 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7339 // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
7340 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7341 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
7342 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
7343 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7344 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7346 // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
7350 let feerate_timeout;
7351 let feerate_preimage;
7353 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7354 // 3 transactions including:
7355 // preimage and timeout sweeps from remote commitment + preimage sweep bump
7356 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
7357 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7358 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7359 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7360 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7361 check_spends!(node_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
7362 check_spends!(node_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
7364 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
7365 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7366 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7367 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7369 let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output == node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output {
7370 (node_txn[2].clone(), node_txn[1].clone())
7372 (node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone())
7375 preimage_bump = preimage_bump_tx;
7376 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7377 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output);
7379 timeout = timeout_tx.txid();
7380 let index = timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7381 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - timeout_tx.output[0].value;
7382 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / timeout_tx.weight() as u64;
7386 assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
7387 assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
7389 // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
7390 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7392 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7393 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7394 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7395 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
7396 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7397 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7399 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7400 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
7401 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.weight() as u64;
7402 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
7403 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
7405 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7406 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7407 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7408 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
7409 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
7414 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7415 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7419 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
7420 // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
7421 // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
7422 // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
7423 // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
7424 // EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
7425 // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
7426 // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
7428 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7429 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7430 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7431 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7432 let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).2;
7434 let per_commitment_secret;
7435 let next_per_commitment_point;
7437 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7438 let mut guard = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7439 let keys = guard.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
7441 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
7443 // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
7444 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7445 per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
7447 // Must revoke without gaps
7448 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7449 keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
7451 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7452 next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
7453 &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
7456 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
7457 &msgs::RevokeAndACK { channel_id, per_commitment_secret, next_per_commitment_point });
7458 assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
7459 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7460 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() });
7464 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
7465 // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
7466 // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7468 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7469 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7470 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7471 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7473 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7474 // Lock HTLC in both directions
7475 let (payment_preimage_1, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000);
7476 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000);
7478 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7479 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7480 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7482 // Revoke local commitment tx
7483 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
7485 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7486 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
7487 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[0], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
7488 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7490 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
7491 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7492 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7493 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7495 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7496 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3
7497 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7498 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7499 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7500 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
7504 let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7505 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7506 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7508 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
7509 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
7510 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
7515 fn test_pending_claimed_htlc_no_balance_underflow() {
7516 // Tests that if we have a pending outbound HTLC as well as a claimed-but-not-fully-removed
7517 // HTLC we will not underflow when we call `Channel::get_balance_msat()`.
7518 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7519 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7520 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7521 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7522 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0);
7524 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_010_000);
7525 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7526 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_010_000);
7527 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7528 let fulfill_ev = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7530 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7531 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
7532 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.commitment_signed);
7533 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7534 let (_raa, _cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7536 // At this point nodes[1] has received 1,010k msat (10k msat more than their reserve) and can
7537 // send an HTLC back (though it will go in the holding cell). Send an HTLC back and check we
7538 // can get our balance.
7540 // Get a route from nodes[1] to nodes[0] by getting a route going the other way and then flip
7541 // the public key of the only hop. This works around ChannelDetails not showing the
7542 // almost-claimed HTLC as available balance.
7543 let (mut route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000);
7544 route.payment_params = None; // This is all wrong, but unnecessary
7545 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7546 let (_, payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7547 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
7549 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].balance_msat, 1_000_000);
7553 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
7554 // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
7555 // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
7556 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7557 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7558 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7559 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7561 let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000);
7563 // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
7564 // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
7565 // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
7566 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
7567 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7569 // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
7570 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
7571 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7572 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7574 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7575 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7576 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
7577 let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7578 assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
7580 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
7581 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7582 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
7584 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7589 fn test_override_channel_config() {
7590 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7591 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7592 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7593 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7595 // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
7596 let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
7597 override_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
7599 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
7601 // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
7602 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7603 assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
7604 assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
7608 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
7609 let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
7610 zero_config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
7611 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7612 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7613 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
7614 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7616 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
7617 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7618 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7620 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7621 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7622 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7626 fn test_channel_update_has_correct_htlc_maximum_msat() {
7627 // Tests that the `ChannelUpdate` message has the correct values for `htlc_maximum_msat` set.
7628 // Bolt 7 specifies that if present `htlc_maximum_msat`:
7629 // 1. MUST be set to less than or equal to the channel capacity. In LDK, this is capped to
7630 // 90% of the `channel_value`.
7631 // 2. MUST be set to less than or equal to the `max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` received from the peer.
7633 let mut config_30_percent = UserConfig::default();
7634 config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7635 config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 30;
7636 let mut config_50_percent = UserConfig::default();
7637 config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7638 config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 50;
7639 let mut config_95_percent = UserConfig::default();
7640 config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7641 config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 95;
7642 let mut config_100_percent = UserConfig::default();
7643 config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7644 config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 100;
7646 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7647 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7648 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config_30_percent), Some(config_50_percent), Some(config_95_percent), Some(config_100_percent)]);
7649 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7651 let channel_value_satoshis = 100000;
7652 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7653 let channel_value_30_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.3) as u64;
7654 let channel_value_50_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.5) as u64;
7655 let channel_value_90_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.9) as u64;
7657 let (node_0_chan_update, node_1_chan_update, _, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value_satoshis, 10001);
7658 let (node_2_chan_update, node_3_chan_update, _, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, channel_value_satoshis, 10001);
7660 // Assert that `node[0]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 50 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7661 // that's the value of `node[1]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
7662 assert_eq!(node_0_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_50_percent_msat);
7663 // Assert that `node[1]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 30 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7664 // that's the value of `node[0]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
7665 assert_eq!(node_1_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_30_percent_msat);
7667 // Assert that `node[2]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7668 // the value of `node[3]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (100%), exceeds 90% of the
7670 assert_eq!(node_2_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
7671 // Assert that `node[3]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7672 // the value of `node[2]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (95%), exceeds 90% of the
7674 assert_eq!(node_3_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
7678 fn test_manually_accept_inbound_channel_request() {
7679 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7680 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7681 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7682 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7683 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7684 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7686 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7687 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7689 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7691 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
7692 // accepting the inbound channel request.
7693 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7695 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7697 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
7698 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap();
7700 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7703 let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7704 assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7706 match accept_msg_ev[0] {
7707 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
7708 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7710 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7713 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
7715 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7716 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7718 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7720 Event::ChannelClosed { user_channel_id, .. } => {
7721 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 23);
7723 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7728 fn test_manually_reject_inbound_channel_request() {
7729 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7730 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7731 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7732 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7733 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7734 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7736 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7737 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7739 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7741 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
7742 // rejecting the inbound channel request.
7743 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7745 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7747 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
7748 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
7750 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7753 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7754 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7756 match close_msg_ev[0] {
7757 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => {
7758 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7760 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7762 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
7766 fn test_reject_funding_before_inbound_channel_accepted() {
7767 // This tests that when `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` is set to true, inbound
7768 // channels must to be manually accepted through `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel` by
7769 // the node operator before the counterparty sends a `FundingCreated` message. If a
7770 // `FundingCreated` message is received before the channel is accepted, it should be rejected
7771 // and the channel should be closed.
7772 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7773 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7774 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7775 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7776 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7777 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7779 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7780 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7781 let temp_channel_id = res.temporary_channel_id;
7783 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7785 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in the `msg_events`.
7786 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7788 // Clear the `Event::OpenChannelRequest` event without responding to the request.
7789 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7791 // Get the `AcceptChannel` message of `nodes[1]` without calling
7792 // `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`, which generates a
7793 // `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` event. The message is passed to `nodes[0]`
7794 // `handle_accept_channel`, which is required in order for `create_funding_transaction` to
7795 // succeed when `nodes[0]` is passed to it.
7796 let accept_chan_msg = {
7797 let mut node_1_per_peer_lock;
7798 let mut node_1_peer_state_lock;
7799 let channel = get_channel_ref!(&nodes[1], nodes[0], node_1_per_peer_lock, node_1_peer_state_lock, temp_channel_id);
7800 channel.get_accept_channel_message()
7802 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan_msg);
7804 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
7806 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
7807 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7809 // The `funding_created_msg` should be rejected by `nodes[1]` as it hasn't accepted the channel
7810 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
7812 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7813 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7815 let expected_err = "FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted";
7816 match close_msg_ev[0] {
7817 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id, } => {
7818 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, temp_channel_id);
7819 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7820 assert_eq!(msg.data, expected_err);
7822 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7825 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
7829 fn test_can_not_accept_inbound_channel_twice() {
7830 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7831 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7832 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7833 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7834 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7835 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7837 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7838 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7840 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7842 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
7843 // accepting the inbound channel request.
7844 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7846 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7848 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
7849 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0).unwrap();
7850 let api_res = nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
7852 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
7853 assert_eq!(err, "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.");
7855 Ok(_) => panic!("Channel shouldn't be possible to be accepted twice"),
7856 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
7859 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7862 // Ensure that the channel wasn't closed after attempting to accept it twice.
7863 let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7864 assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7866 match accept_msg_ev[0] {
7867 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
7868 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7870 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7875 fn test_can_not_accept_unknown_inbound_channel() {
7876 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7877 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
7878 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
7879 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
7881 let unknown_channel_id = [0; 32];
7882 let api_res = nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&unknown_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
7884 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
7885 assert_eq!(err, format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(unknown_channel_id), nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7887 Ok(_) => panic!("It shouldn't be possible to accept an unkown channel"),
7888 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
7893 fn test_simple_mpp() {
7894 // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
7895 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7896 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7897 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
7898 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7900 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7901 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7902 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7903 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7905 let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
7906 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
7907 route.paths.push(path);
7908 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7909 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
7910 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
7911 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
7912 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
7913 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
7914 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
7915 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
7919 fn test_preimage_storage() {
7920 // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
7921 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7922 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7923 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7924 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7926 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7929 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200, None).unwrap();
7930 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7931 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
7932 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7933 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7934 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7935 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7936 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7938 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
7939 // values from previous calls.
7940 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7941 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7942 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7944 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref purpose, .. } => {
7946 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
7947 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
7949 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
7952 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7957 #[allow(deprecated)]
7958 fn test_secret_timeout() {
7959 // Simple test of payment secret storage time outs. After
7960 // `create_inbound_payment(_for_hash)_legacy` is removed, this test will be removed as well.
7961 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7962 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7963 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7964 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7966 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7968 let (payment_hash, payment_secret_1) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_legacy(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
7970 // We should fail to register the same payment hash twice, at least until we've connected a
7971 // block with time 7200 + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1.
7972 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
7973 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
7974 } else { panic!(); }
7976 let node_1_blocks = nodes[1].blocks.lock().unwrap();
7978 header: BlockHeader {
7980 prev_blockhash: node_1_blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(),
7981 merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(),
7982 time: node_1_blocks.len() as u32 + 7200, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
7986 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
7987 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
7988 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
7989 } else { panic!(); }
7991 // If we then connect the second block, we should be able to register the same payment hash
7992 // again (this time getting a new payment secret).
7993 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.header.block_hash();
7994 block.header.time += 1;
7995 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
7996 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
7997 assert_ne!(payment_secret_1, our_payment_secret);
8000 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8001 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8002 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8003 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8004 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8005 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8006 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8008 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8009 // values from previous calls.
8010 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8011 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8012 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8014 Event::PaymentClaimable { purpose: PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret }, .. } => {
8015 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
8016 assert_eq!(payment_secret, our_payment_secret);
8017 // We don't actually have the payment preimage with which to claim this payment!
8019 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8024 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8025 // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8026 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8027 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8028 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8029 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8031 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8033 let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8034 let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8035 let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2, None).unwrap();
8036 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8038 // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8039 // resulting events.
8040 macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8041 ($payment_hash: expr) => {
8042 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8043 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8044 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8045 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8046 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8048 // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8049 // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8050 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8051 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash: $payment_hash }]);
8052 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8054 // We should fail the payment back
8055 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8056 match events.pop().unwrap() {
8057 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8058 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8059 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8061 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8066 let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8067 // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8068 let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8070 // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8071 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8072 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(our_payment_hash);
8073 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8075 // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8076 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(random_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8077 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8078 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8080 // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8081 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret), PaymentId(random_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8082 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8083 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8087 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8088 // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8089 // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8090 // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus
8093 // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8094 // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8095 // commitment at same time.
8097 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8098 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8099 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8100 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8102 // Create some initial channel
8103 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8104 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8106 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8107 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8109 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8110 let (preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
8112 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8113 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8114 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8115 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8117 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8118 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8119 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8120 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8121 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8122 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8123 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8124 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8127 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8128 let block = Block { header, txdata: vec![] };
8129 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8130 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8131 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (block.clone(), 0));
8132 watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, 200);
8134 // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8135 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage);
8136 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8137 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
8139 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8140 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8141 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8143 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
8144 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
8145 let mut channel = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, chan_1.2);
8146 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8147 assert_eq!(watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure);
8148 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8149 } else { assert!(false); }
8151 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8152 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8153 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8154 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8158 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8159 // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8160 // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8161 // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8162 // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8164 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8165 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8166 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8167 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8169 // Create some initial channel
8170 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8171 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8173 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8174 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8176 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8177 route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8179 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8180 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8181 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8182 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8183 let watchtower_alice = {
8184 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8185 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8186 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8187 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8188 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8189 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8190 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8191 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8194 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8195 let block = Block { header, txdata: vec![] };
8196 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8197 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8198 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as usize, (block.clone(), 0));
8199 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8201 // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8203 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8204 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8208 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8209 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8210 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8211 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8212 let watchtower_bob = {
8213 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8214 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8215 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8216 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8217 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8218 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8219 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8220 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8223 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8224 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8226 // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8227 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8229 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8231 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8233 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8234 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8235 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8237 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
8238 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
8239 let mut channel = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, chan_1.2);
8240 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8241 // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8242 assert_eq!(watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure);
8243 assert_eq!(watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8244 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8245 } else { assert!(false); }
8247 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8248 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8250 //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8251 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8252 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8254 // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8257 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8258 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8259 bob_state_y = txn[0].clone();
8263 // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8264 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8265 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![bob_state_y.clone()] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8267 let htlc_txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8268 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 1);
8269 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8274 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8275 // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8276 // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8279 // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8280 // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8282 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8283 // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8284 // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8285 // before receiving funding_signed.
8286 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8287 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8288 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8289 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8291 // Create an initial channel
8292 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8293 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8294 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8295 let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8296 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan_msg);
8298 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8299 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8301 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8302 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8304 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8305 let channel_id = crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
8306 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8307 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8308 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Hi".to_string() }, true);
8312 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8313 // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8314 // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8315 // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8316 // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
8317 // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
8318 // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
8320 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8321 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8322 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8323 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8325 // Create some initial channels
8326 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8328 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
8329 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
8330 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
8331 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8332 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
8333 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
8335 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8336 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8337 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] });
8338 // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
8339 // this test before #653 fix.
8340 chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
8341 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8342 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8343 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8344 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
8346 let htlc_timeout = {
8347 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8348 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8349 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8350 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8351 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
8355 let header_201 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8356 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_201, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout.clone()] });
8357 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8358 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
8361 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
8362 // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
8363 // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
8364 // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
8366 // Steps of the test:
8367 // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
8368 // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
8369 // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
8370 // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
8371 // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
8372 // but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
8373 // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
8374 // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
8375 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8376 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8377 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8378 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8380 // Create some initial channels
8381 let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8382 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001);
8384 // Steps (1) and (2):
8385 // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
8386 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
8388 // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
8389 let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
8390 check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8391 assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
8392 check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
8393 assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8394 assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
8396 // Steps (3) and (4):
8397 // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
8398 // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
8399 let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
8400 let mut counterparty_node = 1; // Bob if Alice force-closes
8403 if !broadcast_alice {
8404 force_closing_node = 1;
8405 counterparty_node = 0;
8407 nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_ab.2, &nodes[counterparty_node].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8408 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
8409 check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
8410 check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8411 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8412 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
8413 true => alice_txn.clone(),
8414 false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
8416 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8417 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8418 if broadcast_alice {
8419 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8420 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8421 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8426 // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
8427 // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
8428 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8429 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8430 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
8432 let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8433 assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8434 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8435 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8436 assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
8437 assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8439 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8440 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false, false);
8441 // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
8442 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
8443 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8444 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8446 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
8447 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8449 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8452 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
8453 // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
8454 // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
8455 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8457 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8458 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8459 let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
8460 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8461 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8464 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8466 let bob_updates = match events[1] {
8467 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
8468 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8471 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8474 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
8475 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8476 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
8477 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8479 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8480 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8481 let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
8482 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8483 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8486 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8488 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
8489 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8491 // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
8492 // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
8493 let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
8494 if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
8495 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8496 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8497 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8498 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
8499 if broadcast_alice {
8500 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8501 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8502 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8504 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8505 if broadcast_alice {
8506 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8507 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8509 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8510 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8515 // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
8516 // broadcasted commitment transaction.
8518 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
8519 true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
8520 false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
8522 // If Alice force-closed, Bob only broadcasts a HTLC-output-claiming transaction. Otherwise,
8523 // Bob force-closed and broadcasts the commitment transaction along with a
8524 // HTLC-output-claiming transaction.
8525 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8526 if broadcast_alice {
8527 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8528 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8529 assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8531 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8532 check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8533 assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8539 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
8540 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
8541 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
8542 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
8543 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
8547 fn test_duplicate_temporary_channel_id_from_different_peers() {
8548 // Tests that we can accept two different `OpenChannel` requests with the same
8549 // `temporary_channel_id`, as long as they are from different peers.
8550 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8551 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8552 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8553 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8555 // Create an first channel channel
8556 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8557 let mut open_chan_msg_chan_1_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8559 // Create an second channel
8560 nodes[2].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 43, None).unwrap();
8561 let mut open_chan_msg_chan_2_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8563 // Modify the `OpenChannel` from `nodes[2]` to `nodes[0]` to ensure that it uses the same
8564 // `temporary_channel_id` as the `OpenChannel` from nodes[1] to nodes[0].
8565 open_chan_msg_chan_2_0.temporary_channel_id = open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.temporary_channel_id;
8567 // Assert that `nodes[0]` can accept both `OpenChannel` requests, even though they use the same
8568 // `temporary_channel_id` as they are from different peers.
8569 nodes[0].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg_chan_1_0);
8571 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8572 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8574 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { node_id, msg } => {
8575 assert_eq!(node_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8576 assert_eq!(msg.temporary_channel_id, open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.temporary_channel_id);
8578 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8582 nodes[0].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg_chan_2_0);
8584 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8585 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8587 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { node_id, msg } => {
8588 assert_eq!(node_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8589 assert_eq!(msg.temporary_channel_id, open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.temporary_channel_id);
8591 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8597 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
8598 // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
8599 // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
8601 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
8602 // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
8603 // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
8604 // updating logic for the existing channel.
8605 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8606 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8607 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8608 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8610 // Create an initial channel
8611 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8612 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8613 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8614 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8616 // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
8617 // that it is rejected.
8618 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8620 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8621 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8623 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8624 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
8625 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
8626 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
8627 // move forward with it.
8628 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8629 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8631 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8635 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8636 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8638 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8639 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8641 let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8642 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8644 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8645 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8646 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8647 added_monitors.clear();
8649 let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8651 let funding_outpoint = crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
8652 let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
8654 // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
8657 // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
8658 // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
8659 // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
8660 open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
8661 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8663 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8664 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8666 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8667 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8668 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8669 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8670 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8672 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8676 // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
8677 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8678 let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8679 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_2_msg);
8680 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8681 create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
8683 let funding_created = {
8684 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8685 let mut a_peer_state = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8686 // Once we call `get_outbound_funding_created` the channel has a duplicate channel_id as
8687 // another channel in the ChannelManager - an invalid state. Thus, we'd panic later when we
8688 // try to create another channel. Instead, we drop the channel entirely here (leaving the
8689 // channelmanager in a possibly nonsense state instead).
8690 let mut as_chan = a_peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
8691 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8692 as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
8694 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8695 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
8696 // At this point we'll try to add a duplicate channel monitor, which will be rejected, but
8697 // still needs to be cleared here.
8698 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8700 // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
8702 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8703 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8705 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8706 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8707 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8708 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
8709 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8711 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8715 // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
8716 // everything is functional.
8717 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
8719 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8720 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8721 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8722 added_monitors.clear();
8725 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8726 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
8727 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
8728 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
8730 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8731 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8732 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
8734 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
8738 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
8739 // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
8741 // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
8742 // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
8743 // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
8744 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8745 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8746 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8747 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8749 // Create some initial channels
8750 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8751 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8752 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001);
8754 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8755 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8756 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8758 // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
8759 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8760 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8762 // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
8763 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8764 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8765 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
8766 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
8767 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
8768 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8769 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
8770 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8772 // A null channel ID should close all channels
8773 let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8774 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8775 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
8776 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
8777 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8778 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8780 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
8781 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
8783 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8786 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
8787 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
8789 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8791 // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
8792 // peer_disconnected with no_connection_possible set to false, duplicating the
8793 // close-all-channels logic. That's OK, we don't want to end up not force-closing channels for
8794 // users with their own peer handling logic. We duplicate the call here, however.
8795 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8796 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8798 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
8799 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8800 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8804 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
8805 // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
8807 // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
8808 // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
8809 // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
8810 // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
8812 // Further, if the funding transaction is consensus-valid, confirms, and is later spent, we'd
8813 // previously have crashed in `ChannelMonitor` even though we closed the channel as bogus and
8814 // gave up on it. We test this here by generating such a transaction.
8815 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8816 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8817 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8818 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8820 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8821 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8822 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8824 let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
8826 // Create a witness program which can be spent by a 4-empty-stack-elements witness and which is
8827 // 136 bytes long. This matches our "accepted HTLC preimage spend" matching, previously causing
8828 // a panic as we'd try to extract a 32 byte preimage from a witness element without checking
8830 let mut wit_program: Vec<u8> = channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program();
8831 let wit_program_script: Script = wit_program.into();
8832 for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
8833 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
8834 output.script_pubkey = Script::new_v0_p2wsh(&wit_program_script.wscript_hash());
8837 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
8838 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8839 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8841 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8842 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8844 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8845 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
8847 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
8848 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
8849 nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
8851 let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
8852 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
8853 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
8854 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8855 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8856 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
8857 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
8858 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8859 if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
8860 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
8861 } else { panic!(); }
8862 } else { panic!(); }
8863 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
8865 // Now confirm a spend of the (bogus) funding transaction. As long as the witness is 5 elements
8866 // long the ChannelMonitor will try to read 32 bytes from the second-to-last element, panicing
8867 // as its not 32 bytes long.
8868 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
8869 version: 2i32, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
8870 input: tx.output.iter().enumerate().map(|(idx, _)| TxIn {
8871 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
8875 script_sig: Script::new(),
8876 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
8877 witness: Witness::from_vec(channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness())
8879 output: vec![TxOut {
8881 script_pubkey: Script::new(),
8884 check_spends!(spend_tx, tx);
8885 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &spend_tx);
8888 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
8889 // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
8890 // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
8891 // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
8892 // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
8893 // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
8894 // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
8895 // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
8896 // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
8897 // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
8898 // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
8899 // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
8900 // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
8901 // until we learned about an additional block.
8903 // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
8904 // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
8905 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8906 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8907 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8908 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8909 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
8911 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8912 let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
8913 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
8914 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8915 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8917 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8918 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8919 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8920 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8921 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
8922 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8924 let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
8925 if !test_height_before_timelock {
8926 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
8928 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
8929 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
8930 if test_height_before_timelock {
8931 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
8932 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
8933 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8934 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
8936 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
8937 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
8938 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
8939 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
8940 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
8941 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
8943 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
8944 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
8946 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
8947 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
8948 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
8949 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
8950 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
8951 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: channel_id }]);
8952 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8954 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8955 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8956 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8957 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8958 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8959 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8960 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8961 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8962 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
8967 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
8968 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
8969 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
8972 fn do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(test_for_second_fail_panic: bool) {
8973 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8974 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8975 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8976 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8978 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8980 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
8981 .with_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features());
8982 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
8984 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
8987 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8988 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8989 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8990 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8991 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8992 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8993 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8995 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8996 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 10_000);
8999 // Note that we use a different PaymentId here to allow us to duplicativly pay
9000 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_secret.0)).unwrap();
9001 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9002 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9003 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9004 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9005 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9006 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9007 // At this point, nodes[1] would notice it has too much value for the payment. It will
9008 // assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9009 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC. Previously, it'd also have failed back
9010 // the first HTLC delivered above.
9013 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9014 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9016 if test_for_second_fail_panic {
9017 // Now we go fail back the first HTLC from the user end.
9018 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
9020 let expected_destinations = vec![
9021 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
9022 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
9024 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1], expected_destinations);
9025 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9027 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9028 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9029 assert_eq!(fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 2);
9031 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9032 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
9033 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9035 let failure_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9036 assert_eq!(failure_events.len(), 2);
9037 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
9038 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[1] {} else { panic!(); }
9040 // Let the second HTLC fail and claim the first
9041 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9042 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9044 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9045 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9046 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9047 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9049 expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9051 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
9056 fn test_dup_htlc_second_fail_panic() {
9057 // Previously, if we received two HTLCs back-to-back, where the second overran the expected
9058 // value for the payment, we'd fail back both HTLCs after generating a `PaymentClaimable` event.
9059 // Then, if the user failed the second payment, they'd hit a "tried to fail an already failed
9060 // HTLC" debug panic. This tests for this behavior, checking that only one HTLC is auto-failed.
9061 do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(true);
9065 fn test_dup_htlc_second_rejected() {
9066 // Test that if we receive a second HTLC for an MPP payment that overruns the payment amount we
9067 // simply reject the second HTLC but are still able to claim the first HTLC.
9068 do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(false);
9072 fn test_inconsistent_mpp_params() {
9073 // Test that if we recieve two HTLCs with different payment parameters we fail back the first
9074 // such HTLC and allow the second to stay.
9075 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9076 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9077 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9078 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9080 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0);
9081 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0);
9082 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0);
9083 let chan_2_3 =create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0);
9085 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9086 .with_features(nodes[3].node.invoice_features());
9087 let mut route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 15_000_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
9088 assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9089 route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9090 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9091 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9092 core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9094 let payment_params_opt = Some(payment_params);
9096 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[3]);
9098 let cur_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
9099 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
9101 let session_privs = {
9102 // We create a fake route here so that we start with three pending HTLCs, which we'll
9103 // ultimately have, just not right away.
9104 let mut dup_route = route.clone();
9105 dup_route.paths.push(route.paths[1].clone());
9106 nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &dup_route).unwrap()
9109 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
9110 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9112 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9113 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9114 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), false, None);
9116 assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9119 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 14_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
9120 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9122 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9123 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9124 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9126 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9127 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9129 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9130 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9132 let mut events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9133 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9134 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9136 nodes[3].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9137 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9138 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg, true, true);
9140 // At this point, nodes[3] should notice the two HTLCs don't contain the same total payment
9141 // amount. It will assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9142 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC.
9144 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[3]);
9145 nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9146 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[3], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9147 nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9149 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
9151 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9152 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9153 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9155 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }]);
9156 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9158 let fail_updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9159 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9160 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], fail_updates_2.commitment_signed, false);
9162 expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9164 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[2]).unwrap();
9165 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9167 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9168 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9169 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), true, None);
9171 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, our_payment_preimage);
9175 fn test_keysend_payments_to_public_node() {
9176 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9177 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9178 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9179 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9181 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9182 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9183 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9184 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9185 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9186 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
9187 final_value_msat: 10000,
9188 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9190 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
9191 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9192 let route = find_route(&payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
9194 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9195 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(test_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9196 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9197 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9198 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9199 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9200 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9201 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9202 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9206 fn test_keysend_payments_to_private_node() {
9207 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9208 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9209 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9210 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9212 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9213 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9215 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9216 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9217 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
9218 final_value_msat: 10000,
9219 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9221 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9222 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9223 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
9224 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9225 let route = find_route(
9226 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9227 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
9230 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9231 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(test_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9232 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9233 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9234 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9235 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9236 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9237 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9238 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9242 fn test_double_partial_claim() {
9243 // Test what happens if a node receives a payment, generates a PaymentClaimable event, the HTLCs
9244 // time out, the sender resends only some of the MPP parts, then the user processes the
9245 // PaymentClaimable event, ensuring they don't inadvertently claim only part of the full payment
9247 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9248 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9249 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9250 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9252 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0);
9253 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0);
9254 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0);
9255 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0);
9257 let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], 15_000_000);
9258 assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9259 route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9260 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9261 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9262 core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9265 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
9266 // nodes[3] has now received a PaymentClaimable event...which it will take some (exorbitant)
9267 // amount of time to respond to.
9269 // Connect some blocks to time out the payment
9270 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
9271 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // To get the same height for sending later
9273 let failed_destinations = vec![
9274 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
9275 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
9277 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations);
9279 pass_failed_payment_back(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_hash);
9281 // nodes[1] now retries one of the two paths...
9282 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9283 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9285 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9286 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9287 let node_1_msgs = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
9288 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), node_1_msgs, false, None);
9290 // At this point nodes[3] has received one half of the payment, and the user goes to handle
9291 // that PaymentClaimable event they got hours ago and never handled...we should refuse to claim.
9292 nodes[3].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9293 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9294 assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9297 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
9298 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
9299 enum ExposureEvent {
9300 /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
9302 /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
9304 /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
9305 AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
9308 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool) {
9309 // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
9312 // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
9313 // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
9314 // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
9315 // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
9316 // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
9317 // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
9318 // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
9319 // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
9321 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9322 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
9323 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = 5_000_000; // default setting value
9324 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9325 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
9326 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9328 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9329 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9330 open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
9331 open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
9333 open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9335 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
9336 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9337 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9339 let opt_anchors = false;
9341 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9344 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
9345 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
9346 let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, temporary_channel_id);
9347 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9350 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9351 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9352 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9354 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9355 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9357 let (channel_ready, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9358 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9359 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9361 let dust_buffer_feerate = {
9362 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9363 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9364 let chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
9365 chan.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64
9367 let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9368 let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9370 let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9371 let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9373 let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 25;
9374 let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
9377 if dust_outbound_balance {
9378 // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9379 // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9380 // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
9381 for i in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9382 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9383 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9386 // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9387 // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9388 // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
9389 for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9390 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9394 if dust_outbound_balance {
9395 // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9396 // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9397 for i in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9398 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9399 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9402 // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9403 // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9404 for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9405 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9410 let dust_overflow = dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx + 1);
9411 if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
9412 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9413 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9414 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9416 let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9417 let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9418 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9420 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9422 } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
9423 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9424 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9425 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9426 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9427 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9428 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
9429 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9430 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9432 // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
9433 let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9434 let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9435 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9437 // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
9438 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9440 } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
9441 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 2_500_000);
9442 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)) { panic!("Unexpected event at update_fee-swallowed HTLC", ); }
9444 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9445 *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
9447 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9448 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9449 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure".to_string(), 1);
9452 let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9453 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9454 added_monitors.clear();
9458 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
9459 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9460 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9461 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9462 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9463 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9464 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9465 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9466 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9467 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9468 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9469 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9470 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9474 fn test_non_final_funding_tx() {
9475 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9476 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9477 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9478 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9480 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9481 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9482 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
9483 let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9484 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
9486 let best_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
9488 let chan_id = *nodes[0].network_chan_count.borrow();
9489 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9490 let input = TxIn { previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint::null(), script_sig: bitcoin::Script::new(), sequence: Sequence(1), witness: Witness::from_vec(vec!(vec!(1))) };
9491 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9492 let mut tx = match events[0] {
9493 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } => {
9494 // Timelock the transaction _beyond_ the best client height + 2.
9495 Transaction { version: chan_id as i32, lock_time: PackedLockTime(best_height + 3), input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut {
9496 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9499 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9501 // Transaction should fail as it's evaluated as non-final for propagation.
9502 match nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()) {
9503 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
9504 assert_eq!(format!("Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final"), err);
9509 // However, transaction should be accepted if it's in a +2 headroom from best block.
9510 tx.lock_time = PackedLockTime(tx.lock_time.0 - 1);
9511 assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
9512 get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9516 fn accept_busted_but_better_fee() {
9517 // If a peer sends us a fee update that is too low, but higher than our previous channel
9518 // feerate, we should accept it. In the future we may want to consider closing the channel
9519 // later, but for now we only accept the update.
9520 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9521 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9522 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9523 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9525 create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9527 // Set nodes[1] to expect 5,000 sat/kW.
9529 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9530 *feerate_lock = 5000;
9533 // If nodes[0] increases their feerate, even if its not enough, nodes[1] should accept it.
9535 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9536 *feerate_lock = 1000;
9538 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9539 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9541 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9542 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9544 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
9545 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
9546 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], commitment_signed, false);
9548 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9551 // If nodes[0] increases their feerate further, even if its not enough, nodes[1] should accept
9554 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9555 *feerate_lock = 2000;
9557 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9558 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9560 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9561 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9563 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
9564 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
9565 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], commitment_signed, false);
9567 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9570 // However, if nodes[0] decreases their feerate, nodes[1] should reject it and close the
9573 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9574 *feerate_lock = 1000;
9576 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9577 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9579 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9580 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9582 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
9583 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
9584 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
9585 err: "Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: 1000. Our expected lower limit: 5000 (- 250)".to_owned() });
9586 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9587 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9589 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9593 fn do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(valid_delta: bool, use_user_hash: bool) {
9594 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9595 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9596 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9597 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9598 let min_final_cltv_expiry_delta = 120;
9599 let final_cltv_expiry_delta = if valid_delta { min_final_cltv_expiry_delta + 2 } else {
9600 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta - 2 };
9601 let recv_value = 100_000;
9603 create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9605 let payment_parameters = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32);
9606 let (payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = if use_user_hash {
9607 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1],
9608 Some(recv_value), Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta));
9609 (payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret)
9611 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(recv_value), 7200, Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)).unwrap();
9612 (payment_hash, nodes[1].node.get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret).unwrap(), payment_secret)
9614 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_parameters, recv_value, final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32).unwrap();
9615 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9616 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9617 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9618 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9619 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9620 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9621 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9622 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9625 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, recv_value, if use_user_hash {
9626 None } else { Some(payment_preimage) }, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9628 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
9630 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9632 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9634 let fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9635 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9636 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
9638 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9643 fn test_payment_with_custom_min_cltv_expiry_delta() {
9644 do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(false, false);
9645 do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(false, true);
9646 do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(true, false);
9647 do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(true, true);