1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
15 use crate::chain::{ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Confirm, Listen, Watch};
16 use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
17 use crate::chain::channelmonitor;
18 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
19 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
20 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, EcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource};
21 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PathFailure, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
22 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
23 use crate::ln::channel::{commitment_tx_base_weight, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel};
24 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS, DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA};
25 use crate::ln::channel::{DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS, ChannelError};
26 use crate::ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
27 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
28 use crate::routing::gossip::{NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate};
29 use crate::routing::router::{Path, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, find_route, get_route};
30 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures};
32 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
33 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
34 use crate::util::test_utils;
35 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
36 use crate::util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
37 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
38 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
40 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
41 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
42 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
43 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
44 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
45 use bitcoin::{PackedLockTime, Sequence, Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, Witness};
46 use bitcoin::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
48 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
49 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
54 use crate::prelude::*;
55 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
56 use core::default::Default;
57 use core::iter::repeat;
58 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
59 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
61 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
62 use crate::ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
65 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
66 // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
67 use crate::ln::channel::TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS;
68 let mut cfg = UserConfig::default();
69 cfg.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1;
70 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
71 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
72 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(cfg)]);
73 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
75 // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
77 let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
78 let channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat, &cfg);
79 let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
81 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
82 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
84 // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
85 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
87 // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
88 // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
89 let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
90 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
91 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
92 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
93 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
94 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
96 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
97 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager", expected_regex, 1);
99 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
101 } else { assert!(false); }
104 use crate::ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
106 // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
107 insane_open_helper(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2; msg });
108 insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS; msg });
110 insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
112 insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than channel amount minus reserve \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
114 insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
116 insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
118 insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
120 insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
122 insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
126 fn test_funding_exceeds_no_wumbo_limit() {
127 // Test that if a peer does not support wumbo channels, we'll refuse to open a wumbo channel to
129 use crate::ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO;
130 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
131 let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
132 *node_cfgs[1].override_init_features.borrow_mut() = Some(channelmanager::provided_init_features(&test_default_channel_config()).clear_wumbo());
133 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
134 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
136 match nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1, 0, 42, None) {
137 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
138 assert_eq!(format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1), err);
144 fn do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(send_from_initiator: bool) {
145 // A peer providing a channel_reserve_satoshis of 0 (or less than our dust limit) is insecure,
146 // but only for them. Because some LSPs do it with some level of trust of the clients (for a
147 // substantial UX improvement), we explicitly allow it. Because it's unlikely to happen often
148 // in normal testing, we test it explicitly here.
149 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
150 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
151 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
152 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
153 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
155 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
156 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
157 let feerate_per_kw = 253;
158 let opt_anchors = false;
159 push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
160 push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
162 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None).unwrap();
163 let mut open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
164 if !send_from_initiator {
165 open_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
166 open_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
168 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
170 // Extract the channel accept message from node1 to node0
171 let mut accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
172 if send_from_initiator {
173 accept_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
174 accept_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
176 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
178 let sender_node = if send_from_initiator { &nodes[1] } else { &nodes[0] };
179 let counterparty_node = if send_from_initiator { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
180 let mut sender_node_per_peer_lock;
181 let mut sender_node_peer_state_lock;
182 if send_from_initiator {
183 let chan = get_inbound_v1_channel_ref!(sender_node, counterparty_node, sender_node_per_peer_lock, sender_node_peer_state_lock, temp_channel_id);
184 chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
185 chan.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
187 let chan = get_outbound_v1_channel_ref!(sender_node, counterparty_node, sender_node_per_peer_lock, sender_node_peer_state_lock, temp_channel_id);
188 chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
189 chan.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
193 let funding_tx = sign_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100_000, temp_channel_id);
194 let funding_msgs = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_tx);
195 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_msgs.0);
197 // nodes[0] should now be able to send the full balance to nodes[1], violating nodes[1]'s
198 // security model if it ever tries to send funds back to nodes[0] (but that's not our problem).
199 if send_from_initiator {
200 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000_000
201 // Note that for outbound channels we have to consider the commitment tx fee and the
202 // "fee spike buffer", which is currently a multiple of the total commitment tx fee as
203 // well as an additional HTLC.
204 - FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, 2, opt_anchors));
206 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], push_amt);
211 fn test_counterparty_no_reserve() {
212 do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(true);
213 do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(false);
217 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
218 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
219 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
220 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
221 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
222 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
225 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
229 // send (1) commitment_signed -.
230 // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
231 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
232 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
233 // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
234 // (2) RAA is delivered ->
235 // .- send (4) commitment_signed
236 // <- (3) RAA is delivered
237 // send (5) commitment_signed -.
238 // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
240 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
242 // (6) RAA is delivered ->
244 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
246 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
249 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
250 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
252 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
253 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
254 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
255 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
256 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
258 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
261 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
263 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
264 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
265 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
266 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
267 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
269 let payment_event = {
270 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
271 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
272 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
274 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
275 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
277 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
278 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
279 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
280 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
281 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
282 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
284 // deliver(1), generate (3):
285 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
286 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
287 // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
288 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
290 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
291 let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
292 assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
293 assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
294 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
295 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
296 assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
297 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
299 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
300 let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
301 assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
302 assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
303 assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
304 assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
305 assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
306 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
308 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
309 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
310 // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
311 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
313 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
314 let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
315 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
317 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
318 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
320 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
321 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
323 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
324 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
327 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
328 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
332 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
333 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
334 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
335 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
336 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
337 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
338 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
339 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
342 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
344 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
346 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
349 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
350 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
352 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
353 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
354 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
355 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
358 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
361 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
363 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
364 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
365 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
366 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
367 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
369 let payment_event = {
370 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
371 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
372 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
374 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
375 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
377 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
378 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
379 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
380 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
381 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
382 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
384 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
385 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
387 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
391 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
392 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
393 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
394 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
395 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
396 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
399 // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
400 // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
401 // update_fee (never committed) ->
403 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
404 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
405 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
406 // <- (1) RAA delivered
407 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
408 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
409 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
410 // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
412 // B should send no response here
413 // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
414 // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
417 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
420 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
421 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
422 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
424 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
425 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
427 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
428 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
429 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
430 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
431 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
433 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
436 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
437 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
438 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
439 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
440 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
442 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
445 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
446 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
448 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
449 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
450 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
452 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
453 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
454 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
455 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
458 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
460 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
462 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
464 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
465 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
466 let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
467 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
468 assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
469 assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
470 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
471 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
472 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
473 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
474 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
476 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
477 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
478 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
479 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
480 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
482 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
483 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
484 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
487 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
488 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
489 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
491 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
492 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
493 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
495 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
496 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
497 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
498 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
500 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
501 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
502 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
505 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
506 // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
507 // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
508 // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
511 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
512 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
513 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
514 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
516 if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
517 let block = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, Vec::new());
518 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
519 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
522 if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
523 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
524 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
526 if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
527 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
528 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
530 if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
531 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
533 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
535 if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
536 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
537 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
538 let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
540 if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
541 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
543 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
544 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
545 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
546 added_monitors.clear();
548 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
550 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
552 if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
553 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
555 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
556 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
557 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
558 added_monitors.clear();
561 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
562 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
563 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
565 if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
566 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
568 if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
569 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
570 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
571 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
572 expect_channel_ready_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
576 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
577 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
578 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
579 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
580 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
581 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
582 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
583 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
584 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
585 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
586 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
587 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
588 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
589 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
590 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
591 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
592 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
593 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
594 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
598 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
599 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
600 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
601 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
602 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
603 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
606 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
609 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
610 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
612 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
613 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
614 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
615 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
616 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
618 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
620 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
622 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
623 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
624 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
626 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
627 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
628 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
630 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
631 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
632 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
633 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
635 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
636 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
637 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
641 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
642 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
643 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
644 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
645 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
646 let channel_value = 5000;
648 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000);
649 let channel_id = chan.2;
650 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
651 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
652 let bs_channel_reserve_sats = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value, &default_config);
654 let opt_anchors = false;
656 // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
657 // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
658 // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
660 let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
661 let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors)) as u32;
663 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
664 *feerate_lock = feerate;
666 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
667 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
668 let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
670 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
672 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
674 // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
676 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
678 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
679 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
680 let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000;
681 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
682 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
683 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
687 // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
688 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
691 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
692 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
693 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
695 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
697 // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
698 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
699 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
700 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
701 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
702 let local_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
703 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
704 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
705 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
706 pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
708 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
709 let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
710 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
711 let remote_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
712 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
713 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
714 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
715 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
716 pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
719 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
720 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
721 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint);
724 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
725 let local_chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
726 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
727 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
728 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
729 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
730 INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
732 channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000,
733 opt_anchors, local_funding, remote_funding,
734 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
735 non_buffer_feerate + 4,
737 &local_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
739 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
742 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
745 htlc_signatures: res.1,
747 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
750 let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
752 feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
755 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
757 //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
758 //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
759 //Should produce and error.
760 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
761 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
762 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
763 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
764 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") });
768 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
769 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
770 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
771 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
772 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
773 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
776 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
779 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
782 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
783 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
785 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
786 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
787 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
788 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
789 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
791 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
793 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
794 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
795 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
796 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
798 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
800 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
801 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
802 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
804 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
805 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
806 added_monitors.clear();
808 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
809 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
810 // node[1] has nothing to do
812 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
813 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
814 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
816 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
817 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
818 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
819 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
820 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
821 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
822 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
824 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
825 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
826 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
827 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
828 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
829 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
831 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
832 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
833 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
834 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
836 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
837 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
838 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
840 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
841 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
842 let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
843 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
845 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
846 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
847 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
849 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
851 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
852 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
854 Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } => { },
855 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
858 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
860 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
861 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
862 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
863 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
864 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
868 fn test_update_fee() {
869 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
870 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
871 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
872 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
873 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
874 let channel_id = chan.2;
877 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
878 // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
879 // .- send (3) commitment_signed
880 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
881 // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
882 // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
883 // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
884 // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
885 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
886 // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
887 // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
890 // Create and deliver (1)...
893 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
894 feerate = *feerate_lock;
895 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
897 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
898 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
900 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
901 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
902 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
903 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
904 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
906 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
908 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
910 // Generate (2) and (3):
911 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
912 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
913 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
916 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
917 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
918 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
920 // Create and deliver (4)...
922 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
923 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
925 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
926 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
927 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
928 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
929 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
930 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
931 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
933 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
936 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
937 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
938 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
940 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
941 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
943 // Handle (3), creating (6):
944 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
945 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
946 let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
947 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
950 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
951 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
952 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
954 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
955 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
956 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
957 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
958 assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
959 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
960 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
961 assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
962 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
965 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
966 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
967 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
968 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
970 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
971 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
972 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
974 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
975 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
976 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
977 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
978 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
982 fn fake_network_test() {
983 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
984 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
985 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
986 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
987 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
988 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
990 // Create some initial channels
991 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
992 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
993 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
995 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
996 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
997 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
998 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
999 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1001 // Send some more payments
1002 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1003 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
1004 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
1006 // Test failure packets
1007 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
1008 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
1010 // Add a new channel that skips 3
1011 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
1013 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1014 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1015 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1016 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1017 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1018 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1019 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1021 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
1022 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1023 hops.push(RouteHop {
1024 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1025 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1026 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1027 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1029 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1031 hops.push(RouteHop {
1032 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1033 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1034 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1035 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1037 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1039 hops.push(RouteHop {
1040 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1041 node_features: nodes[1].node.node_features(),
1042 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1043 channel_features: nodes[1].node.channel_features(),
1045 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1047 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1048 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1049 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![Path { hops, blinded_tail: None }], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
1051 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1052 hops.push(RouteHop {
1053 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1054 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1055 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1056 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1058 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1060 hops.push(RouteHop {
1061 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1062 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1063 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1064 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1066 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1068 hops.push(RouteHop {
1069 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1070 node_features: nodes[1].node.node_features(),
1071 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1072 channel_features: nodes[1].node.channel_features(),
1074 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1076 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1077 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1078 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![Path { hops, blinded_tail: None }], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1080 // Claim the rebalances...
1081 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1082 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1084 // Close down the channels...
1085 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1086 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1087 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1088 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1089 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1090 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1091 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1092 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1093 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1094 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1095 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1096 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1100 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1101 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1102 // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1103 // commitment dance rounds.
1104 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1105 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1106 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1107 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1108 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
1109 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
1111 // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
1112 let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1114 let mut payments = Vec::new();
1116 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1117 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
1118 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
1119 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1121 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1123 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1124 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1125 let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1126 assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1128 // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1129 // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1132 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_1,
1133 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)
1134 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1135 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1138 // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1139 let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1141 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_2,
1142 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
1143 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1146 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1147 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1148 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1149 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1151 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1152 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1153 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1154 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1155 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1156 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
1157 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1159 let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1160 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1161 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1163 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1165 // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1166 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1167 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1168 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1170 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1171 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1172 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1173 let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1175 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1176 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1177 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1179 for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1180 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1182 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1183 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1184 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1185 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1186 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1188 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1189 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1190 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1191 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1192 let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1194 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1195 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1197 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1199 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1200 assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1201 for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1203 &Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1204 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1206 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1210 for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1211 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1214 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1218 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1219 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1220 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1221 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1222 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1223 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1224 let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1226 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1227 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
1228 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
1229 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
1230 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
1231 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
1233 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1235 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1236 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1238 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1239 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1241 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1242 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1243 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1247 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1248 // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1249 // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1250 // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1251 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1252 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1253 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1254 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1256 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
1259 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1261 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1263 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1264 let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
1265 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1267 // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1268 nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1269 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, 800_000);
1270 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1272 // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1273 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1275 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1276 let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1277 for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1278 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1279 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1280 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1281 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1284 assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1286 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1287 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1288 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1289 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1291 let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1292 assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 3);
1294 check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]); // Immediate HTLC claim with preimage
1295 check_spends!(claim_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
1296 check_spends!(claim_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
1297 let preimage_tx = &claim_txn[0];
1298 let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if claim_txn[1].input[0].previous_output == preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output {
1299 (&claim_txn[1], &claim_txn[2])
1301 (&claim_txn[2], &claim_txn[1])
1304 assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1305 assert_eq!(preimage_bump_tx.input.len(), 1);
1307 assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1308 assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1309 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1311 assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input.len(), 1);
1312 assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1313 check_spends!(timeout_tx, remote_txn[0]);
1314 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1316 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1317 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1320 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1321 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
1322 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1323 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1325 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1326 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1327 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1328 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1329 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1330 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1332 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1338 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1339 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1340 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1341 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1342 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1343 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1345 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1346 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1348 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1349 let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2), 1 + 1, get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2));
1350 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1351 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
1352 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
1353 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1354 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1355 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).err().unwrap();
1357 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedResendSafe(ref fails) => {
1358 if let &APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. } = &fails[0] {}
1359 else { panic!("Unexpected error variant"); }
1361 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1363 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1365 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1369 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1370 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1371 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1372 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1373 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1374 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1376 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) =
1377 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460000);
1378 route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat += 1;
1379 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1380 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1381 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1383 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1385 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1386 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0],
1387 3460001, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1388 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash).unwrap();
1389 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1392 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1393 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1394 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1395 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1398 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1400 // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1401 // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1402 // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1404 let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1406 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1408 // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1409 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1410 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1411 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1412 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1413 let local_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1414 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1415 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1416 chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1418 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1419 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1420 chan_signer.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1421 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1422 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1424 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1425 let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1426 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1427 let remote_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1428 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1429 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1430 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1431 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1432 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1435 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1436 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1437 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint);
1439 // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1440 // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1441 let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1443 let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1445 amount_msat: 3460001,
1446 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1448 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1451 let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1454 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1455 let local_chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1456 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1457 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1458 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1462 local_chan.context.opt_anchors(), local_funding, remote_funding,
1463 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1465 &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1466 &local_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1468 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1471 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1474 htlc_signatures: res.1,
1476 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
1479 // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1480 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1481 let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1483 // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1484 let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1486 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1487 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point,
1489 next_local_nonce: None,
1491 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1493 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1494 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1495 // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1497 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1498 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1499 update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1501 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1503 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1504 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", ::hex::encode(raa_msg.channel_id)), 1);
1506 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1510 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1511 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1512 // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1513 // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1514 // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1516 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1517 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1518 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1519 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1520 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1521 let opt_anchors = false;
1523 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1524 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1526 push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1528 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt);
1530 // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
1531 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1532 // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1533 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1534 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1537 // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1538 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1539 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1540 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1541 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1545 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1546 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1547 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1548 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1549 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1550 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1551 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1552 let opt_anchors = false;
1554 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1555 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1556 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1557 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1558 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1559 push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1560 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt);
1562 // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1563 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1564 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1567 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) =
1568 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1000);
1569 route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = 700_000;
1570 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1571 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1572 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1573 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1574 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1575 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0],
1576 700_000, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1577 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash).unwrap();
1578 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1580 htlc_id: MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64,
1581 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1582 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1583 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1584 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1587 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1588 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1589 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1590 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1591 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1592 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1593 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1594 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() });
1598 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1599 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1600 // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1601 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1602 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1604 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1605 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1606 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1607 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1608 let opt_anchors = false;
1610 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1611 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1612 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1613 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1614 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1615 push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1616 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt);
1618 let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1619 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1620 // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1621 // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1622 // commitment transaction fee.
1623 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1625 // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1626 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1627 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1630 // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1631 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
1632 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt);
1633 route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat += 1;
1634 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1635 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1636 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1640 fn test_chan_init_feerate_unaffordability() {
1641 // Test that we will reject channel opens which do not leave enough to pay for any HTLCs due to
1642 // channel reserve and feerate requirements.
1643 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1644 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1645 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1646 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1647 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1648 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1649 let opt_anchors = false;
1651 // Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
1653 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1654 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1655 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None).unwrap_err(),
1656 APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
1658 // During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
1659 // requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
1660 push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1661 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None).unwrap();
1662 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1663 open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
1664 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
1666 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1667 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
1668 match msg_events[0] {
1669 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
1670 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve");
1672 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1677 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1678 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1679 // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1680 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1681 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1682 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1683 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1684 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000);
1686 let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1687 // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1688 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1689 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1690 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1691 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1693 // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1694 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1695 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1696 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1697 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1698 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1700 // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1701 // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1702 // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1703 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1707 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1708 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1709 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1710 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1711 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1712 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1713 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000);
1716 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1717 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1718 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1719 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1721 // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1722 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1723 let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1724 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1726 // Add a pending HTLC.
1727 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1728 let payment_event_1 = {
1729 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1,
1730 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_1), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
1731 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1733 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1734 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1735 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1737 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1739 // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1740 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2, opt_anchors);
1741 let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1742 let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1743 let mut route_2 = route_1.clone();
1744 route_2.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat = amt_msat_2;
1746 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1747 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1748 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1749 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1750 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1751 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(
1752 &route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1753 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1).unwrap();
1754 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1757 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1758 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1759 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1760 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1763 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1764 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1765 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1766 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1767 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1768 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1769 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1770 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() });
1774 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1775 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1776 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1777 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1778 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1779 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1780 let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1781 let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1782 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1783 assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1784 assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1786 let reserve = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config);
1787 assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1788 assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1790 assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1791 assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1794 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
1795 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1799 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1800 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1801 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1802 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1803 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1804 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1805 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1806 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1807 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1808 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001);
1809 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001);
1811 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1812 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1814 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1815 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1817 macro_rules! expect_forward {
1819 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1820 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1821 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1822 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1827 let feemsat = 239; // set above
1828 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1829 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1830 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1832 let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1834 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1836 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
1837 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[2].node.invoice_features()).unwrap().with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1838 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], payment_params, recv_value_0);
1839 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1840 assert!(route.paths[0].hops.iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1842 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1843 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1844 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1845 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1848 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1849 // nodes[0]'s wealth
1851 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1852 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1853 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1854 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1855 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1856 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1857 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1861 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
1862 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[2].node.invoice_features()).unwrap().with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1863 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, recv_value_0).unwrap();
1864 let (payment_preimage, ..) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], recv_value_0);
1865 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
1867 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1868 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1869 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1870 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1871 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1874 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1875 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1876 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1877 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1878 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1881 // adding pending output.
1882 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1883 // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1884 // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1885 // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1886 // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1887 // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1888 // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1889 // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1890 // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1892 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1893 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1894 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1896 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1897 let payment_event_1 = {
1898 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1,
1899 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_1), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
1900 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1902 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1903 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1904 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1906 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1908 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1909 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1911 let mut route = route_1.clone();
1912 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat = recv_value_2 + 1;
1913 let (_, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[2]);
1914 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1915 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1916 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1917 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1920 // split the rest to test holding cell
1921 let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1922 let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1923 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1924 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1926 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1927 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1930 // now see if they go through on both sides
1931 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1932 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1933 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21,
1934 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_21), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_21.0)).unwrap();
1935 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1936 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1937 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1939 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1941 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
1942 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1943 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1944 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1945 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1946 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1947 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1950 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1951 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1952 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22,
1953 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_22), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_22.0)).unwrap();
1954 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1955 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1956 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1958 // flush the pending htlc
1959 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1960 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1961 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1963 // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1964 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1965 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1966 let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1968 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
1969 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1970 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1971 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1973 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1974 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1975 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1977 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1979 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1980 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
1981 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
1983 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1984 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
1986 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
1987 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
1988 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
1989 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
1990 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
1991 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1993 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1994 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
1995 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
1996 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
1998 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
1999 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2001 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2002 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2004 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, .. } => {
2005 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
2006 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amount_msat);
2007 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), receiver_node_id.unwrap());
2008 assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2010 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
2011 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
2012 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
2014 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
2017 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2020 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, .. } => {
2021 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
2022 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amount_msat);
2023 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), receiver_node_id.unwrap());
2024 assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2026 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
2027 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
2028 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
2030 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
2033 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2036 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
2037 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
2038 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
2040 let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1, opt_anchors);
2041 let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
2042 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
2044 let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
2045 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
2046 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2047 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
2048 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
2050 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2);
2051 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
2055 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
2056 // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
2057 // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
2058 // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
2059 // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
2060 // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
2061 // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
2062 // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
2064 // * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
2065 // you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
2066 // you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
2067 // * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
2068 // * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
2069 // the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
2070 // * deliver the first fulfill from B
2071 // * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
2073 // * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
2074 // This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
2075 // removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
2076 // * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
2077 // of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
2078 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2079 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2080 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2081 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2082 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2084 let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2085 // Route the first two HTLCs.
2086 let payment_value_1 = b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000;
2087 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_value_1);
2088 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20_000);
2090 // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
2091 let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
2093 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_3,
2094 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_3), PaymentId(payment_hash_3.0)).unwrap();
2095 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2096 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2097 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2098 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2101 // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
2102 // initial fulfill/CS.
2103 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
2104 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, payment_value_1);
2105 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2106 let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2108 // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
2109 // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
2110 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
2111 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000);
2112 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2113 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2115 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2116 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
2117 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2118 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2119 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
2121 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
2122 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
2123 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2124 // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
2125 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2127 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2128 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2129 let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2131 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2132 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2133 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2135 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2136 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2137 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2139 // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
2140 // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2141 // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
2142 // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
2143 // on-chain as necessary).
2144 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2145 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
2146 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2147 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2148 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
2150 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2151 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2152 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2154 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2155 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2157 // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2158 // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2159 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2160 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2161 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2162 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2164 // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2165 // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2166 let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2168 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_4,
2169 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_4), PaymentId(payment_hash_4.0)).unwrap();
2170 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2171 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2172 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2173 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2176 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2177 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2178 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2179 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2181 // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2183 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2184 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2185 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2187 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2188 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2190 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2191 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2192 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2193 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2195 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2196 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2197 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2199 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2200 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2202 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2203 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2205 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2206 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2210 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2211 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2212 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2213 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2214 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2215 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2216 let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2218 // Create some initial channels
2219 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2220 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2221 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
2222 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
2224 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2225 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2226 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2227 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2228 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2229 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2231 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2232 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2233 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2234 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2235 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2237 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2238 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_1.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2239 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2240 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2242 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2243 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2244 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2245 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2246 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, Some(node_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2248 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2249 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2250 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2251 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2252 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2254 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2255 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 3_000_000);
2257 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2258 // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2259 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_2.2, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2260 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2261 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2263 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2264 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2265 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2266 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2267 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2268 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, Some(node_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2270 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2271 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2272 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2273 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2274 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2276 macro_rules! claim_funds {
2277 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
2279 $node.node.claim_funds($preimage);
2280 expect_payment_claimed!($node, $payment_hash, 3_000_000);
2281 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2283 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2284 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2286 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2287 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2288 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2289 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2291 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2297 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2298 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2299 nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_3.2, &nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2300 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2301 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2302 let node2_commitment_txid;
2304 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2305 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2306 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2307 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2309 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2310 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1);
2311 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2312 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2313 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2315 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2316 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2317 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2318 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2319 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2321 // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2322 // confusing us in the following tests.
2323 let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2325 // One pending HTLC to time out:
2326 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[3], &[&nodes[4]], 3_000_000);
2327 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2330 let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2331 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2332 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2333 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2334 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2335 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2338 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2341 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2342 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2344 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2346 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2348 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2350 let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2351 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2352 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2358 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2360 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2361 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2);
2363 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2364 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2365 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2366 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2367 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2370 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2373 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2374 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2376 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2378 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2379 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2381 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2382 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2383 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2385 nodes[3].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2386 nodes[4].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2387 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2388 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2390 assert_eq!(nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon),
2391 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
2392 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2393 check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2397 fn test_justice_tx_htlc_timeout() {
2398 // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Timeout tx, against both sides
2399 let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2400 alice_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2401 alice_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2402 alice_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2403 let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2404 bob_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2405 bob_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2406 bob_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2407 let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2408 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2409 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2410 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2411 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2412 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2413 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2414 // Create some new channels:
2415 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2417 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2418 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2419 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2420 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2421 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2422 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2423 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2424 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2425 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2426 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2427 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2428 // Revoke the old state
2429 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2432 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2434 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2435 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2436 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2437 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2438 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2440 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2441 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2442 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2444 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2445 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2446 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2447 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2448 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2449 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2450 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2451 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2452 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2454 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2455 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2456 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2460 fn test_justice_tx_htlc_success() {
2461 // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2462 let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2463 alice_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2464 alice_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2465 alice_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2466 let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2467 bob_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2468 bob_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2469 bob_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2470 let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2471 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2472 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2473 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2474 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2475 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2476 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2477 // Create some new channels:
2478 let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2480 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2481 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2482 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2483 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2484 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2485 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2486 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2487 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2488 // Revoke the old state
2489 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2491 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2493 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2494 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2495 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2497 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2498 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2500 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2501 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2503 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2504 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2505 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2506 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2507 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2508 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2509 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2511 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2512 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2513 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2517 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2518 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2519 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2520 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2521 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2522 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2523 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2524 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2525 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2526 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2527 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2528 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2529 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2530 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2531 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2533 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2534 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2535 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2536 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2537 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2538 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output
2540 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2542 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2543 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2544 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2545 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2546 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2550 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2551 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2552 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2553 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2554 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2555 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2556 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2558 // Create some new channel:
2559 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2561 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2562 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2563 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2564 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2565 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2567 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2568 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2569 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2570 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2571 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2572 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2573 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2574 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2575 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2577 //Revoke the old state
2578 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2581 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2582 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2583 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2584 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2585 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2586 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2587 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2588 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2590 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2591 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2593 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2594 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2596 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2597 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2598 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2599 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2600 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2601 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2602 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2603 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2605 // Finally, mine the penalty transaction and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2606 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2607 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
2608 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2609 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2611 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2612 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2613 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2617 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2618 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2619 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2620 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2621 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2622 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2623 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2625 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2627 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2628 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2629 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2630 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2631 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2632 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2634 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2635 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2637 //Revoke the old state
2638 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2641 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2642 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2643 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2644 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2645 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2646 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2647 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2648 match events.last().unwrap() {
2649 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2650 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2653 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2654 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2656 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2658 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2659 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2660 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2661 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2662 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2663 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2664 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2666 // Filter out any non justice transactions.
2667 node_txn.retain(|tx| tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2668 assert!(node_txn.len() > 3);
2670 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2671 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2672 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2674 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2675 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2676 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2678 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2679 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2680 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2681 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2682 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2683 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2684 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2685 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2687 // Finally, mine the penalty transactions and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2688 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2689 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
2690 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2691 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[2]);
2692 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2693 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2695 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2696 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2697 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2701 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2702 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2703 // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2704 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2705 // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2706 // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2707 // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2708 // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2709 // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2711 // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2712 // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2713 // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2714 // PaymentSent event).
2716 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2717 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2718 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2719 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2721 // Create some initial channels
2722 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2723 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2725 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2726 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2727 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2728 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2729 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2731 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2732 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2733 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2735 let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2736 let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2738 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2739 // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2740 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2741 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2742 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2743 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2744 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_1, 3_000_000);
2745 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2746 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, 3_000_000);
2747 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2748 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2749 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2750 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2751 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2752 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2754 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2755 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2756 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2757 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2758 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2759 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2760 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2761 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2762 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2763 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2764 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2765 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2766 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0);
2767 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0);
2769 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2770 connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]));
2771 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2773 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2774 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2775 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2776 added_monitors.clear();
2778 let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2779 assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2780 match forwarded_events[0] {
2781 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2782 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2784 let chan_id = Some(chan_1.2);
2785 match forwarded_events[1] {
2786 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat } => {
2787 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2788 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2789 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2790 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2791 assert_eq!(outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, Some(3000000));
2795 match forwarded_events[2] {
2796 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat } => {
2797 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2798 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2799 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2800 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2801 assert_eq!(outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, Some(3000000));
2805 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2807 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2808 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2809 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2810 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2811 added_monitors.clear();
2813 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2815 let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
2816 let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
2818 match nodes_2_event {
2819 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2820 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2823 match nodes_0_event {
2824 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2825 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2826 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2827 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2828 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2829 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2831 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2834 // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
2836 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2837 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2840 macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2841 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => { {
2842 let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2843 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2844 // Node[1]: 2 * HTLC-timeout tx
2845 // Node[0]: 2 * HTLC-timeout tx
2846 check_spends!(node_txn[0], $commitment_tx);
2847 check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2848 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0);
2849 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0);
2851 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2852 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2853 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2854 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2856 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2857 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2858 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2859 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2864 // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2865 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0]);
2867 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2868 // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx on A's chain
2869 let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2870 check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2871 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2872 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2873 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2874 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2875 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2876 assert!(node_txn.len() == 1 || node_txn.len() == 3); // HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn
2877 let commitment_spend =
2878 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
2881 // Certain `ConnectStyle`s will cause RBF bumps of the previous HTLC transaction to be broadcast.
2882 // FullBlockViaListen
2883 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2884 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2885 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2886 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2889 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2890 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2891 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2896 check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2897 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2898 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2899 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2900 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time.0, nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2901 assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2902 // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
2903 // we already checked the same situation with A.
2905 // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
2906 connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()]));
2907 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2908 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2909 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2910 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2911 assert_eq!(events.len(), 5);
2912 let mut first_claimed = false;
2913 for event in events {
2915 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
2916 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
2917 assert!(!first_claimed);
2918 first_claimed = true;
2920 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
2921 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
2924 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
2925 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
2926 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2929 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2932 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
2933 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
2934 // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2935 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2936 // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
2937 // B's commitment tx C's commitment tx
2939 // B's HTLC timeout tx B's timeout tx
2941 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2942 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2943 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2944 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2945 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2946 *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2947 *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2949 // Create some intial channels
2950 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2951 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2953 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
2954 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2955 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2957 let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2959 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2960 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2961 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2962 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
2963 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
2964 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }]);
2965 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2967 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2968 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2970 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2971 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2972 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2973 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2974 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2975 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2977 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2979 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2980 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2981 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2982 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2983 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2984 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
2986 // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2987 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
2988 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
2989 check_closed_event(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false);
2990 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2992 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2993 if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().skips_blocks() {
2994 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2996 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 3); // Two extra fee bumps for timeout transaction
2998 txn.iter().for_each(|tx| check_spends!(tx, commitment_tx[0]));
2999 assert_eq!(txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3003 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
3004 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3005 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3007 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3009 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
3010 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3011 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3012 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3014 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3015 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3016 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3017 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3018 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3019 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3021 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3024 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
3025 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
3026 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
3028 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
3029 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
3031 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3032 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3033 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3034 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // 1 timeout tx
3035 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3036 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
3037 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3041 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
3042 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
3043 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
3044 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
3048 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
3049 // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
3050 // and fail backward accordingly.
3052 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3053 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3054 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3055 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3057 // Create some initial channels
3058 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3059 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3061 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3062 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3063 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3064 // Revoke the old state
3065 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3067 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3069 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3070 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3071 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3072 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3073 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3075 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
3076 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3077 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3078 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3080 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3081 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3082 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3083 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3084 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3085 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3087 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3088 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3089 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
3091 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3095 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
3096 // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
3097 // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
3098 // commitment transaction anymore.
3099 // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
3100 // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
3101 // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
3102 // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
3103 // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
3104 // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
3106 // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
3107 // commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
3108 // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
3109 // and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
3110 // commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
3111 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3112 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3113 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3114 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3116 // Create some initial channels
3117 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3118 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3120 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
3121 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3122 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3123 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
3124 // Revoke the old state
3125 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3127 let value = if use_dust {
3128 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
3129 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
3130 nodes[2].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
3131 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
3134 let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3135 let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3136 let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3138 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash);
3139 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: first_payment_hash }]);
3140 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3141 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3142 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3143 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3144 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3145 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3146 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3147 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3148 let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
3149 // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
3151 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash);
3152 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: second_payment_hash }]);
3153 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3154 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3155 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3156 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3157 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3158 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3159 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3160 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3161 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3162 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3163 // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3164 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3165 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3166 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3168 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash);
3169 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: third_payment_hash }]);
3170 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3171 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3172 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3173 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3174 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3175 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3176 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3177 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3178 // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3179 // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3180 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3181 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3182 // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3183 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3184 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3185 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3187 // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3188 // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3189 let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3190 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, fourth_payment_hash,
3191 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(fourth_payment_secret), PaymentId(fourth_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3192 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3193 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3194 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3197 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3198 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3199 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3200 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3201 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3202 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3204 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3205 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3208 Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { .. } => { },
3209 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3211 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3212 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3215 let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
3216 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3218 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3219 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3220 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3222 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3223 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 3 + nodes.len() - 1 } else { 4 + nodes.len() });
3225 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
3226 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
3229 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3230 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3232 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3235 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3236 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3238 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3241 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3242 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3244 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3245 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3248 let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3249 match nodes_2_event {
3250 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3251 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3252 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3253 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3254 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3255 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3257 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3261 let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3262 match nodes_2_event {
3263 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
3264 assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3265 assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3267 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3270 let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3271 match nodes_0_event {
3272 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3273 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3274 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3275 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3276 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3277 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3279 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3280 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3281 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3283 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3285 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3286 assert_eq!(events.len(), 6);
3288 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref failure, .. } => {
3289 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3290 // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3291 // that we should update our routing table for.
3292 if !deliver_bs_raa {
3293 if let PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) } = failure { } else { panic!("Unexpected path failure") }
3296 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3299 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3300 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, first_payment_hash);
3302 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3305 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) }, .. } => {
3306 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3308 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3311 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3312 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
3314 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3317 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) }, .. } => {
3318 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3320 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3323 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3324 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, third_payment_hash);
3326 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3329 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3332 // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
3334 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3335 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3338 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3339 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3340 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3344 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3345 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3346 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3347 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3348 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3352 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3353 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3354 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3355 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3356 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3360 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3361 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3362 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3363 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3364 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3365 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
3367 // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3369 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3370 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
3371 PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3372 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3374 let payment_event = {
3375 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3376 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3377 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3379 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3380 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3383 // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3384 let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3386 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, failed_payment_hash,
3387 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(failed_payment_secret), PaymentId(failed_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3388 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3390 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3393 // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3395 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3397 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3398 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3399 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3400 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(
3401 &route.paths[0], 50_000, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3402 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3403 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash).unwrap();
3405 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3406 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3412 onion_routing_packet,
3414 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3416 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3417 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3418 // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3420 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3421 assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3423 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3426 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3427 assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3429 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3432 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3433 assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3435 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3437 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3438 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3442 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3443 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3444 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3445 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3446 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3447 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3448 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3449 if *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow() == ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen {
3450 // We rely on the ability to connect a block redundantly, which isn't allowed via
3451 // `chain::Listen`, so we never run the test if we randomly get assigned that
3455 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3457 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3458 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3459 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3460 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3461 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3462 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3464 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
3465 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3466 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].txid(), node_txn[1].txid());
3468 let block = create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]);
3469 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
3470 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3471 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3472 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3474 // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3475 // registering new transactions
3476 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
3480 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3481 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3482 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3483 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3484 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3485 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3486 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3487 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3489 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3491 let mut payment_event = {
3492 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
3493 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3494 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3496 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3497 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3498 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3501 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3502 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3504 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3506 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3507 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3508 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3509 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3511 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3512 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3513 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3514 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3515 let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3517 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3518 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3519 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3521 nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3522 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3523 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3524 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3526 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3527 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3528 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3529 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3530 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3534 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3536 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3537 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3538 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3539 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3541 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3543 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3544 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator), &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3546 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3547 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3548 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3549 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3550 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3551 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3552 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3554 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3558 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3559 // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3560 // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3561 // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3562 // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3564 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3565 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3566 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3567 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3568 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3570 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
3572 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
3573 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_000_000);
3574 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3575 let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3576 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3577 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
3579 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3580 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3582 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3583 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3587 fn test_peer_disconnected_before_funding_broadcasted() {
3588 // Test that channels are closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` if the peer disconnects
3589 // before the funding transaction has been broadcasted.
3590 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3591 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3592 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3593 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3595 // Open a channel between `nodes[0]` and `nodes[1]`, for which the funding transaction is never
3596 // broadcasted, even though it's created by `nodes[0]`.
3597 let expected_temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
3598 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3599 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
3600 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3601 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
3603 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
3604 assert_eq!(temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3606 assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
3608 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3609 assert_eq!(funding_created_msg.temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3611 // Even though the funding transaction is created by `nodes[0]`, the `FundingCreated` msg is
3612 // never sent to `nodes[1]`, and therefore the tx is never signed by either party nor
3615 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3618 // Ensure that the channel is closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` when the peers are
3619 // disconnected before the funding transaction was broadcasted.
3620 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3621 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3623 check_closed_event(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer, false);
3624 check_closed_event(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer, false);
3628 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3629 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3630 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3631 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3632 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3633 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3634 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3635 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3637 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3638 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3639 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3641 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3642 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3643 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3644 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3646 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3647 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3648 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3650 let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3651 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3652 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3653 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3655 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3656 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3658 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3659 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3661 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
3663 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3664 assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
3666 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3667 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3668 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3670 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3673 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3674 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3677 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, payment_failed_permanently, .. } => {
3678 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3679 assert!(payment_failed_permanently);
3681 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3684 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3685 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3687 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3691 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3692 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3695 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3696 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3697 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3698 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3699 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3700 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3702 let mut as_channel_ready = None;
3703 let channel_id = if messages_delivered == 0 {
3704 let (channel_ready, chan_id, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
3705 as_channel_ready = Some(channel_ready);
3706 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the channel_ready message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3707 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3708 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3711 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).2
3714 let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1_000_000);
3716 let payment_event = {
3717 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_1,
3718 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
3719 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3721 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3722 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3723 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3725 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3727 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3728 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3730 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3731 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3732 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3733 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3734 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3736 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3737 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3738 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3739 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3741 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3742 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3743 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3744 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3745 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3747 if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3748 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3749 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3750 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3757 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3758 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3759 if messages_delivered < 3 {
3760 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3761 // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a channel_ready prior to a
3762 // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to channel_ready time.
3764 // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a channel_ready immediately on
3765 // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate channel_ready sent
3766 // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3768 // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3769 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3771 // Even if the channel_ready messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3772 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3773 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3774 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3775 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3776 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3777 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3778 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3779 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3780 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3781 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3782 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3783 } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3784 // Everything was delivered...
3785 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3788 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3789 if messages_delivered == 0 {
3790 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 2);
3792 Event::ChannelReady { .. } => { },
3793 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3796 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3797 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3800 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3802 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3803 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3807 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3808 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3809 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3811 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3813 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3814 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3816 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, .. } => {
3817 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3818 assert_eq!(amount_msat, 1_000_000);
3819 assert_eq!(receiver_node_id.unwrap(), nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3820 assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(channel_id));
3822 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3823 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3824 assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3826 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3829 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3832 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3833 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3834 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
3836 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3837 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3838 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3839 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3840 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3841 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3842 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3843 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3844 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3845 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3846 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3848 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3851 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3852 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3854 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3855 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3857 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3858 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3859 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3861 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3864 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3865 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3866 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3867 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3869 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3870 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3871 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3872 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3874 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3875 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3876 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3877 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3878 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3880 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3881 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3882 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3883 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3890 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3891 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3892 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3893 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3894 if messages_delivered < 1 {
3895 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
3897 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3899 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
3900 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3901 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3902 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3903 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3904 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3905 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3906 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3907 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3908 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3909 // Everything was delivered...
3910 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3913 if messages_delivered == 1 || messages_delivered == 2 {
3914 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3916 if messages_delivered <= 5 {
3917 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3918 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3920 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3922 if messages_delivered > 2 {
3923 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3926 // Channel should still work fine...
3927 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3928 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3929 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3933 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
3934 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
3935 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
3936 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
3937 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
3941 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
3942 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
3943 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
3944 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
3945 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
3949 fn test_channel_ready_without_best_block_updated() {
3950 // Previously, if we were offline when a funding transaction was locked in, and then we came
3951 // back online, calling best_block_updated once followed by transactions_confirmed, we'd not
3952 // generate a channel_ready until a later best_block_updated. This tests that we generate the
3953 // channel_ready immediately instead.
3954 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3955 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3956 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3957 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3958 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
3960 let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
3962 let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
3963 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
3964 let block_txn = [funding_tx];
3965 let conf_txn: Vec<_> = block_txn.iter().enumerate().collect();
3966 let conf_block_header = nodes[0].get_block_header(conf_height);
3967 nodes[0].node.transactions_confirmed(&conf_block_header, &conf_txn[..], conf_height);
3969 // Ensure nodes[0] generates a channel_ready after the transactions_confirmed
3970 let as_channel_ready = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3971 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
3975 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
3976 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
3977 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
3978 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3979 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3980 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3981 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3982 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3984 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
3986 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
3987 let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3988 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_2,
3989 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
3990 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3992 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3993 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3995 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
3996 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3999 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
4000 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
4001 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4003 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4004 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4006 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4007 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4008 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4009 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4010 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4011 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4012 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4014 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4015 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4016 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
4018 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
4019 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
4020 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
4022 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4025 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
4026 let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4027 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4028 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4030 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4033 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4034 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4036 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
4037 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
4039 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4040 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
4041 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
4042 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
4044 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4045 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
4047 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4048 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4049 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4050 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4052 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
4053 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
4055 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
4056 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
4058 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
4060 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4061 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4062 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4063 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4064 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
4065 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
4066 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
4067 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4068 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4069 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4071 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
4072 let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4073 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4074 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4075 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4076 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4077 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4078 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4080 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
4081 let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4082 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4083 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4084 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4085 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4086 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4087 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4089 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4090 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4091 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4092 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4094 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4095 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4096 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4097 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4099 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
4100 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4101 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4103 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4105 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4106 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
4108 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
4109 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
4111 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
4112 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
4113 assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
4115 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
4118 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4121 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
4122 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4123 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4125 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4126 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4129 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
4130 // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
4131 // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
4132 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4133 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4134 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4135 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4137 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4139 let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
4140 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
4141 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
4142 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
4143 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
4144 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
4145 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
4146 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
4147 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
4148 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id,
4149 &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
4150 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4151 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4152 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4153 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
4154 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentClaimable event(s).
4155 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
4158 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
4161 let mut block = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, Vec::new());
4162 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4163 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4164 let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4165 for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
4166 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
4167 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4168 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4171 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
4173 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4174 let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4175 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4176 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4177 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4178 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4180 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4181 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4182 // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4183 let mut expected_failure_data = (100_000 as u64).to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4184 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&(block_count - 1).to_be_bytes());
4185 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4189 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4190 do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4191 do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4194 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4195 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4196 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4197 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4198 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4199 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4200 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4201 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4203 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4204 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4205 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4206 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4208 // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4209 let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4210 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, first_payment_hash,
4211 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(first_payment_secret), PaymentId(first_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
4212 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4213 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4215 // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4216 let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4217 let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4218 sending_node.node.send_payment_with_route(&route, second_payment_hash,
4219 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(second_payment_secret), PaymentId(second_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
4221 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4222 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4223 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4224 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4225 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4227 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4229 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4230 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4231 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4232 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4235 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
4236 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4237 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4238 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4239 match fail_commit[0] {
4240 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4241 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4242 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4244 _ => unreachable!(),
4246 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4248 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], second_payment_hash, false);
4253 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4254 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4255 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4258 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4259 ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4261 let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4262 let mut txn = Vec::new();
4263 let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4264 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4265 for event in events.drain(..) {
4267 Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs } => {
4268 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4269 txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, None, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4270 all_outputs.push(outp);
4273 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4276 if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4277 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, None, &secp_ctx) {
4287 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4288 // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4289 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4290 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4291 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4292 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4294 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000);
4295 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4296 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4297 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4298 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4299 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4300 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4301 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4302 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4304 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4305 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4307 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4308 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4309 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4310 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4311 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4315 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4316 // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4317 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4318 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4319 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4320 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4321 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4323 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000);
4324 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4325 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4326 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4327 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4329 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4330 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4331 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4332 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4334 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4335 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4336 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4337 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4338 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4340 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4341 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4342 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4346 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4347 // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4348 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4350 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4351 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4352 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4353 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4355 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000);
4356 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4357 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4358 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4359 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4361 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4362 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4363 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4364 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4365 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4367 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4368 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4369 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4371 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4372 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4373 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4374 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4375 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4379 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4380 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4381 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4382 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4383 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4385 // Create some initial channels
4386 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4388 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
4390 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4391 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4392 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4394 // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4395 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4396 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4397 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4398 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4399 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4400 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4402 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4403 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4406 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4407 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4410 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4411 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4412 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4413 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4414 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4416 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4417 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4418 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4420 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4421 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4422 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4426 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4427 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4428 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4429 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4430 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4432 // Create some initial channels
4433 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4435 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4436 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4438 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4440 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4441 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4442 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4444 // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4445 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4446 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4447 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4449 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4450 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4452 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4454 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4455 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4456 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4457 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
4458 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4460 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4461 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4462 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4463 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, false);
4465 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4466 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4467 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4468 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4469 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4473 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4474 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4475 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4476 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4477 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4479 // Create some initial channels
4480 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4482 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4483 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4484 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4485 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4487 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4489 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4490 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4491 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4492 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4494 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4495 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4496 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4497 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4499 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4500 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4502 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4503 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4504 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4508 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4509 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4510 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4511 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4512 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4513 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4515 // Create some initial channels
4516 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4518 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4519 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4520 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4521 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4523 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4525 // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
4526 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4527 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4528 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4529 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4530 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4532 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4533 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 1);
4534 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4535 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4536 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4537 assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
4539 // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4540 connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()]));
4541 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4542 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4543 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4545 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4546 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs
4547 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4548 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4549 // transactions next...
4550 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
4551 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4553 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
4554 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4555 if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4556 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4558 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4559 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4562 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4563 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4565 // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4566 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4567 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4568 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4569 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
4573 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
4574 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4575 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4576 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4577 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4578 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4580 // Create some initial channels
4581 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4583 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4584 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4585 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4586 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4588 // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
4589 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
4591 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4593 // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
4594 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4595 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4596 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4597 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4598 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4600 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 1);
4601 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4602 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4603 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4605 // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
4606 let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
4607 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
4609 // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4610 connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()]));
4611 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4612 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4613 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4615 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4616 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success
4618 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4619 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4620 // transactions next...
4621 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4622 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4623 if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4624 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4626 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4627 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4630 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4631 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4633 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
4634 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4636 // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
4637 // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
4639 // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4640 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
4641 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4642 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4643 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
4644 assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4645 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
4646 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
4650 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
4651 // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
4652 // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
4653 // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
4654 // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
4656 // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
4659 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4660 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4661 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4662 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4664 // Create some initial channels
4665 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4666 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4668 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
4669 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4670 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4671 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4672 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4674 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4675 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4676 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4678 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
4679 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4680 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
4681 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4682 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4683 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4684 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4685 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4686 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4687 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4688 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4690 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
4691 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
4692 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4693 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4695 let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
4696 assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 1);
4697 check_spends!(c_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4698 assert_eq!(c_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4699 assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
4700 assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Success tx
4702 // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
4703 connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), c_txn[0].clone()]));
4704 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4705 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4706 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4708 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
4709 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4712 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat } => {
4713 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
4714 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, Some(chan_1.2));
4715 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
4716 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
4717 assert_eq!(outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, Some(3000000));
4719 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4721 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4722 let mut msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4723 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
4724 let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut msg_events);
4725 let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut msg_events);
4727 match nodes_2_event {
4728 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
4729 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4732 match nodes_0_event {
4733 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
4734 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4735 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4736 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4737 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4738 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
4740 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4743 // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
4744 match msg_events[0] {
4745 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4746 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4749 // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
4750 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4751 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4752 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4753 let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4754 // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx
4755 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
4756 check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4757 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4758 assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
4759 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time.0, nodes[1].best_block_info().1); // Success tx
4761 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4762 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4766 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
4767 // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
4768 // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
4769 // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
4770 // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
4771 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4772 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4773 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
4774 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
4775 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
4776 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
4777 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
4778 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
4779 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4781 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4782 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4783 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4785 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4786 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4787 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4788 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4789 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
4791 let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 900_000);
4793 let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
4794 // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
4795 // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
4796 // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
4797 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40)
4798 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[3].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
4799 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], payment_params, 800_000);
4800 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 800_000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
4802 let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4803 assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4804 check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
4806 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
4807 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4808 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4809 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4810 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4812 let htlc_timeout_tx;
4813 { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
4814 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4815 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 2-or-3
4816 assert!(node_txn.len() == 2 || node_txn.len() == 3);
4818 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
4819 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4820 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
4822 if node_txn.len() > 2 {
4823 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
4824 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4825 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].output.len(), 1);
4826 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4828 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
4829 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4830 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
4831 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
4833 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
4834 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4835 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].output.len(), 1);
4836 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4839 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4840 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4841 // Assign htlc_timeout_tx to the forwarded HTLC (with value ~800 sats). The received HTLC
4842 // (with value 900 sats) will be claimed in the below `claim_funds` call.
4843 if node_txn.len() > 2 {
4844 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4845 htlc_timeout_tx = if node_txn[2].output[0].value < 900 { node_txn[2].clone() } else { node_txn[0].clone() };
4847 htlc_timeout_tx = if node_txn[0].output[0].value < 900 { node_txn[1].clone() } else { node_txn[0].clone() };
4851 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
4852 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], duplicate_payment_hash, 900_000);
4854 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
4855 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
4856 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4857 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4859 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4860 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4863 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4864 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4866 let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4867 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
4868 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
4869 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
4870 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4871 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4872 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4873 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4874 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4875 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
4877 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
4878 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4879 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
4880 let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4881 assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4882 assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4883 let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
4884 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4885 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4886 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4888 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4889 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4891 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
4893 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
4895 // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
4896 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[1]);
4897 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], Some(196), true, true);
4898 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4899 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4900 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4901 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4902 assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
4903 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4904 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4906 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4907 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
4908 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], our_payment_preimage, None, true);
4912 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
4913 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4914 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4915 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4916 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4918 // Create some initial channels
4919 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4921 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
4922 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4923 assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
4924 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4925 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
4927 // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
4928 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4929 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
4930 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4932 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
4933 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4934 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4935 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4937 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4938 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4941 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4942 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4945 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4946 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4947 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4948 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4949 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
4953 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
4954 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4956 // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
4957 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4958 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4959 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4960 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
4961 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4964 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
4965 // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
4966 // unrevoked commitment transaction.
4967 // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
4968 // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
4969 // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
4970 // use the same payment hashes.
4971 // Thus, we use a six-node network:
4976 // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
4977 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
4978 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
4979 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
4980 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
4981 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
4982 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
4983 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
4984 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
4985 let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4987 let _chan_0_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2);
4988 let _chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4989 let chan_2_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4990 let chan_3_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
4991 let chan_3_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
4993 // Rebalance and check output sanity...
4994 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
4995 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
4996 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
4998 let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id())
4999 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan_2_3.2).unwrap().context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5001 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5003 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5004 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5006 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5008 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5010 let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5012 let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5013 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5015 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
5017 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
5020 let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5022 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5023 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5026 let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5028 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5029 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
5031 // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
5032 // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
5033 // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
5034 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2).len(), 1);
5035 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
5037 // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
5038 // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5039 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1);
5040 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3);
5041 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5);
5042 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6);
5043 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
5045 let failed_destinations = vec![
5046 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_1 },
5047 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_3 },
5048 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_5 },
5049 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_6 },
5051 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[4], failed_destinations);
5052 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
5054 let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5055 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5056 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5057 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5058 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5059 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5061 // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5062 nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
5063 nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4);
5064 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5066 let failed_destinations_2 = vec![
5067 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 },
5068 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_4 },
5070 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[5], failed_destinations_2);
5071 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5073 let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5074 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5075 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5076 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5078 let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5080 // After 4 and 2 removes respectively above in nodes[4] and nodes[5], nodes[3] should receive 6 PaymentForwardedFailed events
5081 let failed_destinations_3 = vec![
5082 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5083 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5084 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5085 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5086 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5087 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5089 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations_3);
5090 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5091 let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5092 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5093 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5094 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5095 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5096 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5097 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5098 if deliver_last_raa {
5099 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5101 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5104 // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5105 // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5106 // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5107 // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5109 // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5110 // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5111 // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5113 // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5114 // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5115 let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5117 if announce_latest {
5118 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5120 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5122 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5123 let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5124 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2 + 6);
5125 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5127 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5128 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5131 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5132 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5135 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5136 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5137 if deliver_last_raa {
5138 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5140 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(3).collect();
5141 expect_htlc_handling_failed_destinations!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(), expected_destinations);
5143 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = if announce_latest {
5144 repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(9).collect()
5146 repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(6).collect()
5149 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], expected_destinations);
5151 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5153 let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5154 assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5155 let mut a_done = false;
5156 for msg in cs_msgs {
5158 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5159 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5160 // should be failed-backwards here.
5161 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5162 // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5163 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5164 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5166 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5171 // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5172 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5173 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5175 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5176 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5179 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5180 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5181 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5182 if announce_latest {
5183 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5184 if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5185 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5188 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5190 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5194 let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5195 assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 10 } else { 6 });
5196 let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5197 let mut as_updates = 0;
5198 for event in as_events.iter() {
5199 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref failure, .. } = event {
5200 assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5201 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5202 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5204 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5206 if let PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) } = failure {
5209 } else if let &Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = event {
5210 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5212 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5213 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5214 if announce_latest {
5215 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5216 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5218 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5220 let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5221 assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 8 } else { 6 });
5222 let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5223 let mut bs_updates = 0;
5224 for event in bs_events.iter() {
5225 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref failure, .. } = event {
5226 assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5227 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5228 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5230 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5232 if let PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) } = failure {
5235 } else if let &Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = event {
5236 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5238 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5239 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5240 if announce_latest {
5241 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5243 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5245 // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5246 // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5247 // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5248 // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5249 assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5250 assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5254 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5255 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5259 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5260 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5264 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5265 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5266 // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5267 // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5271 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5272 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5273 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5274 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5275 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5277 // Create some initial channels
5278 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5280 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5281 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5282 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5283 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5285 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5286 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5287 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5288 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5289 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5290 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5292 let htlc_timeout = {
5293 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5294 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5295 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5296 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5297 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5301 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5302 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5303 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5305 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5306 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5307 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5308 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5309 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5310 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5311 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5312 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5313 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5314 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5315 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5319 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5320 // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with a key
5321 // manager rotation to test that `channel_keys_id` returned in
5322 // [`SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput`] let us re-derive the channel key set to
5323 // then derive a `delayed_payment_key`.
5325 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5327 // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5328 let seed = [42; 32];
5329 let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5330 let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5331 let network_graph = Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger));
5332 let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
5333 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(network_graph.clone(), &scorer);
5334 let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, router, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph, node_seed: seed, override_init_features: alloc::rc::Rc::new(core::cell::RefCell::new(None)) };
5335 let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5336 node_cfgs.remove(0);
5337 node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5339 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5340 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5342 // Create some initial channels
5343 // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5345 let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2);
5346 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5347 assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5349 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5350 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5351 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5352 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5353 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5355 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5356 let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5357 let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5358 assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5359 check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5361 // We check funding pubkey are unique
5362 let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5363 let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5364 if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5365 || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5366 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5367 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5368 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5371 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5372 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5373 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5374 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5375 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5376 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5378 let htlc_timeout = {
5379 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5380 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5381 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5382 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5383 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5387 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5388 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5389 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5391 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5392 let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5393 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5394 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5395 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5396 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5397 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5398 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5399 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5400 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5401 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5402 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5406 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5407 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5408 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5409 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5410 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5412 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5414 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5415 let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5417 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5418 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5419 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5421 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5422 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5423 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5425 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5426 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5427 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5429 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5430 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5431 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5434 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5435 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5436 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5437 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5438 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5439 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5441 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5443 // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5444 // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5445 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5446 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5447 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5449 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5450 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5451 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
5453 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5454 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5455 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5456 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5457 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5459 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5460 let mut block = create_dummy_block(starting_block.0, 42, Vec::new());
5461 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5462 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5463 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5465 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5466 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5467 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5468 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5471 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5472 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5473 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5474 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5475 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5476 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5478 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5479 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
5480 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5481 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5483 let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5485 // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5486 // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5487 // to "time out" the HTLC.
5489 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5490 let mut block = create_dummy_block(starting_block.0, 42, Vec::new());
5492 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5493 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5494 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5496 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5497 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5498 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5499 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5502 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5503 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5504 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5505 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5506 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5507 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5509 // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
5510 // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5511 // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
5512 // actually revoked.
5513 let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
5514 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
5515 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
5516 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
5517 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5519 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5520 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5521 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5522 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5523 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5524 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5525 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5526 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
5527 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5528 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5530 if check_revoke_no_close {
5531 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
5532 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5535 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5536 let mut block = create_dummy_block(starting_block.0, 42, Vec::new());
5537 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
5538 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5539 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5541 if !check_revoke_no_close {
5542 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5543 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5544 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5545 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5547 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5551 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
5552 // There are only a few cases to test here:
5553 // * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
5554 // broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
5555 // * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
5556 // * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
5557 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
5559 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
5560 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
5561 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
5563 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
5564 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
5565 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
5567 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
5568 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
5572 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
5573 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
5574 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
5575 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
5576 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
5581 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
5582 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5583 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5584 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5585 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5586 // Force duplicate randomness for every get-random call
5587 for node in nodes.iter() {
5588 *node.keys_manager.override_random_bytes.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
5591 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
5592 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5593 let push_msat=10001;
5594 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5595 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5596 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5597 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5599 // Create a second channel with the same random values. This used to panic due to a colliding
5600 // channel_id, but now panics due to a colliding outbound SCID alias.
5601 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5605 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
5606 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5607 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5608 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5609 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5611 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
5612 let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
5613 let push_msat=10001;
5614 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5616 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
5617 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5618 // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
5619 let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
5620 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5622 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
5623 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5624 let push_msat=10001;
5625 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
5626 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5627 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
5629 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
5630 // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
5631 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
5633 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
5634 assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
5635 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5637 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
5638 let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
5639 assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
5641 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
5642 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
5643 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5644 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5645 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
5646 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5650 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
5651 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5652 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5653 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5654 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5656 let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
5657 let push_msat=10001;
5658 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5659 let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5660 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
5661 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
5663 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5664 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5665 let err_msg = match events[0] {
5666 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
5669 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5671 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
5674 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
5675 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
5676 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
5677 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
5679 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
5680 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5681 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5682 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5683 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5684 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
5686 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5687 // pending_update_fee.
5689 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5690 *feerate_lock += 20;
5692 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5693 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5695 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5696 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5697 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5698 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5699 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5701 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5704 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5706 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5707 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5708 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5709 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5711 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5712 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
5713 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
5715 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
5716 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
5717 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5718 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5719 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
5721 // Flush the pending fee update.
5722 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5723 let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5724 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5725 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
5726 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5728 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
5729 // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
5730 // us to surface its failure to the user.
5731 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5732 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5733 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
5735 // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
5736 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5737 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5739 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: None }, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
5740 assert_eq!(PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0), *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
5741 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
5742 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
5743 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id));
5745 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5748 &Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5749 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
5751 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5755 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
5756 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
5757 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
5759 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
5760 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5761 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5762 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5763 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5764 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
5766 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5767 // pending_update_fee.
5769 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5770 *feerate_lock += 200;
5772 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5773 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5775 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5776 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5777 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5778 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5779 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5781 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5784 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5786 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5787 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5788 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5789 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5791 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5793 let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors) - amt_1;
5794 let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
5795 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
5797 // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
5798 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_1, payment_hash_1,
5799 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
5800 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5801 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
5802 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId(nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5803 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_2, payment_hash_2,
5804 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), payment_id_2).unwrap();
5805 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5806 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
5808 // Flush the pending fee update.
5809 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5810 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5811 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5812 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
5813 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5814 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
5816 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
5817 // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
5818 // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
5819 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5820 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5821 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
5823 // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
5824 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5825 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5827 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: None }, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
5828 assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
5829 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
5830 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
5831 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route_2.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id));
5833 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5836 &Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5837 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
5839 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5842 // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
5843 let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
5844 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5845 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
5846 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
5848 let raa = match send_raa_event {
5849 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
5850 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5852 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5853 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5854 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5855 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5856 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5857 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5859 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
5860 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5862 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5863 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5864 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5866 Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } => {},
5867 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5869 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
5870 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5871 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, amt_1);
5873 let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5874 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5875 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
5876 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
5879 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
5880 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
5881 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
5884 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
5885 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5886 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5887 // Avoid having to include routing fees in calculations
5888 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5889 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 0;
5890 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = 0;
5891 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5892 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5893 let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
5894 let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000);
5896 // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5897 // pending_update_fee.
5899 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5900 *feerate_lock += 20;
5902 nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5903 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5905 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5906 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5907 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5908 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5909 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5911 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5914 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5916 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
5917 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5918 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
5919 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
5921 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
5922 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
5923 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
5924 let payment_event = {
5925 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
5926 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5927 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5929 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5930 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5932 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
5934 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5935 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5936 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5937 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5939 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_1_2.2);
5940 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
5942 // Flush the pending fee update.
5943 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5944 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5945 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5946 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5947 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5948 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
5950 // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
5951 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5952 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5954 let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
5955 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
5958 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5961 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
5962 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5963 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5965 // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
5966 let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5967 assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 2);
5968 match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
5969 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
5970 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5973 // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
5974 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5975 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5977 // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
5978 let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5979 assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
5980 let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
5981 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
5982 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
5983 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
5984 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
5985 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5986 (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
5988 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5991 // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
5992 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
5993 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5995 // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
5996 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5997 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5998 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5999 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6000 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6001 let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6002 assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
6003 let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
6004 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
6005 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6007 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6008 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
6009 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6012 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
6013 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
6014 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
6017 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
6018 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
6019 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6020 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6021 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6022 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6023 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6025 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6026 route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = 100;
6028 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6029 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6030 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
6031 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6035 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
6036 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6037 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6038 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6039 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6040 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6041 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6043 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6044 route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = 0;
6045 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6046 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)),
6047 true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6048 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
6050 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6051 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC", 1);
6055 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
6056 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6057 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6058 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6059 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6060 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6061 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6063 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6064 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6065 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6066 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6067 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6068 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6070 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6071 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6072 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6073 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6074 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() });
6078 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6079 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6080 //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6081 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6082 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6083 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6084 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6085 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0);
6087 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0)
6088 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
6089 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], payment_params, 100000000);
6090 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = 500000001;
6091 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6092 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6093 ), true, APIError::InvalidRoute { ref err },
6094 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6098 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6099 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6100 //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6101 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6102 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6103 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6104 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6105 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6106 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0);
6107 let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
6108 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6110 // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
6111 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6112 for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6113 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6114 let payment_event = {
6115 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6116 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6117 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6119 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6120 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6121 if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6122 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6126 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6128 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6129 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6130 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6132 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6133 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6135 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6136 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6137 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
6139 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6143 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6144 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6145 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6146 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6147 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6148 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6149 let channel_value = 100000;
6150 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0);
6151 let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6153 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6155 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6156 // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6158 route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = max_in_flight + 1;
6159 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6160 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6161 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
6162 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6164 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6167 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6169 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6170 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6171 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6172 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6173 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6174 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6175 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6176 let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6178 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6179 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6180 let channel = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6181 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6184 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6185 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6186 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6187 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6188 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6189 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6190 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6191 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6192 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6193 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6194 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6195 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6199 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6200 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6201 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6202 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6203 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6204 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6205 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6207 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6208 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6209 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6210 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6211 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6212 let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
6214 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6215 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6216 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6217 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6218 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6219 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6221 // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6222 // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6223 // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6224 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6225 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6227 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6228 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6229 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6230 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6231 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6235 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6236 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6237 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6238 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6239 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6240 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6241 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6242 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6244 let send_amt = 3999999;
6245 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
6246 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000);
6247 route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = send_amt;
6248 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6249 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6250 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6251 let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(
6252 &route.paths[0], send_amt, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6253 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash).unwrap();
6255 let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6259 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6260 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6261 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6265 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6266 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6268 msg.htlc_id = (50) as u64;
6269 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6271 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6272 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6273 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6274 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6275 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6279 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6280 //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6281 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6282 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6283 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6284 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6285 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6287 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6288 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6289 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6290 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6291 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6292 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6293 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6295 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6296 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6297 assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6298 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6299 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6303 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6304 //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6305 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6306 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6307 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6308 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6310 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6311 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6312 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6313 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6314 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6315 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6316 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6317 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6319 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6320 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6321 assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6322 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6323 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6327 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6328 //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6329 // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6330 // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6331 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6332 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6333 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6334 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6336 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6337 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6338 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6339 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6340 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6341 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6342 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6344 //Disconnect and Reconnect
6345 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6346 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6347 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
6348 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
6350 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6351 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6352 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
6353 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
6355 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6356 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6357 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6358 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6359 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6360 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6363 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6364 assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6365 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6366 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6367 let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6369 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6371 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6372 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6373 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6374 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6375 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6379 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6380 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6382 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6383 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6384 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6385 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6386 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6387 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6388 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6389 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6391 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6392 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6393 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6395 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6398 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6401 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6403 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6404 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6405 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6406 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6407 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6411 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6412 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6414 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6415 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6416 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6417 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6418 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6420 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6421 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6422 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6423 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6424 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6425 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6427 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6430 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6433 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6435 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6436 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6437 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6438 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6439 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6443 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6444 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6446 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6447 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6448 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6449 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6450 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6452 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6453 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6454 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6455 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6456 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6457 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6458 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6461 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6462 failure_code: 0x8000,
6465 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6467 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6468 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6469 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6470 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6471 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6475 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6476 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6478 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6479 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6480 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6481 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6482 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6484 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6486 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6487 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6488 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6490 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6491 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6492 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6494 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6495 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6496 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6497 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6498 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6499 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6500 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6502 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6506 update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6508 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6510 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6511 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6512 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6513 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6514 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6518 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6519 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6521 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6522 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6523 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6524 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6525 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6527 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6529 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6530 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6531 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6533 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6534 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6535 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6537 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6538 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6539 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6540 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6541 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6542 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6543 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6545 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6549 update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
6551 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6553 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6554 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6555 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6556 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6557 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6561 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
6562 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
6564 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6565 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6566 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6567 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6568 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6570 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6571 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6572 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6573 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6575 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6576 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6578 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6579 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6580 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6582 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6584 let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
6586 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6587 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6588 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6589 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6590 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6591 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6592 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
6594 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6597 update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
6598 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6600 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6601 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6602 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
6603 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6604 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6608 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
6609 //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
6610 // * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
6612 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6613 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6614 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6615 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6616 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6617 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000);
6619 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
6622 let mut payment_event = {
6623 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6624 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6625 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6626 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6627 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6628 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6630 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6631 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6632 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6633 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6634 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6635 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6636 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6637 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6638 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6641 payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6642 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6643 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6644 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6646 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6647 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6648 let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
6650 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6651 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6652 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6653 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6654 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6655 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6656 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
6658 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6662 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
6664 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6665 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
6666 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
6667 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6668 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6670 //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
6672 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6673 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6674 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6675 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6676 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6677 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6679 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6682 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6686 fn test_channel_failed_after_message_with_badonion_node_perm_bits_set() {
6687 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6688 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6689 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6690 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6691 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6692 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6694 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100_000);
6697 let mut payment_event = {
6698 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6699 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6700 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6701 SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[0])
6704 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6705 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6706 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6707 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6708 payment_event = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[1]);
6709 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6712 payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; // Trigger an invalid_onion_version error
6713 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6714 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6715 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6717 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6718 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6720 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6721 let mut update_msg = updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone();
6722 // Set the NODE bit (BADONION and PERM already set in invalid_onion_version error)
6723 update_msg.failure_code |= 0x2000;
6725 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6726 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6728 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6731 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1],
6732 vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel {
6733 node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
6734 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6735 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6736 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6739 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6740 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6741 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6743 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6746 let events_5 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6747 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 2);
6749 // Expect a PaymentPathFailed event with a ChannelFailure network update for the channel between
6750 // the node originating the error to its next hop.
6752 Event::PaymentPathFailed { error_code, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure { short_channel_id, is_permanent }) }, ..
6754 assert_eq!(short_channel_id, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id);
6755 assert!(is_permanent);
6756 assert_eq!(error_code, Some(0x8000|0x4000|0x2000|4));
6758 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6761 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6762 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
6764 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6767 // TODO: Test actual removal of channel from NetworkGraph when it's implemented.
6770 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
6771 // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
6772 // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
6773 // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
6775 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6776 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
6777 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6778 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6779 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6780 let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6782 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
6783 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6785 // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
6786 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6787 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6788 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6790 // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
6791 let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6793 // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
6794 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
6795 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6796 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
6797 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6799 let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6800 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6801 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
6802 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6804 // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
6805 let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6807 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6809 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
6810 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6812 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6815 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
6816 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6818 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6821 assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
6822 // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
6823 if announce_latest {
6824 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
6826 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
6829 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6830 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6831 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6833 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6834 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6835 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6836 // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
6837 assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
6838 let mut first_failed = false;
6839 for event in events {
6841 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6842 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
6843 assert!(!first_failed);
6844 first_failed = true;
6846 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
6849 Event::PaymentFailed { .. } => {}
6850 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6856 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
6857 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
6858 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
6861 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
6862 // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
6863 // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
6864 // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6865 // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
6866 // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6867 // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
6869 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6870 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6871 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6872 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6873 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6875 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
6876 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6878 let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6879 let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6881 let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6882 let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
6884 // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
6886 let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6887 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
6890 let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
6892 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
6893 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
6894 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6895 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6896 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
6898 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
6899 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6900 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6901 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6902 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].clone());
6903 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6904 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
6905 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6906 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
6907 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6908 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
6910 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
6911 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
6912 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6913 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6914 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6915 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6917 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
6918 timeout_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..)
6919 .filter(|tx| tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == bs_commitment_tx[0].txid()).collect();
6920 check_spends!(timeout_tx[0], bs_commitment_tx[0]);
6921 // For both a revoked or non-revoked commitment transaction, after ANTI_REORG_DELAY the
6922 // dust HTLC should have been failed.
6923 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
6926 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6928 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].lock_time.0, 11);
6930 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout/revocation-claim tx
6931 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
6932 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6933 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6934 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
6939 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
6940 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
6941 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
6942 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
6946 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
6947 // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
6949 let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
6950 low_our_to_self_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
6951 let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
6952 high_their_to_self_config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
6953 let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
6954 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6955 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6956 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
6957 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6959 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in OutboundV1Channel::new()
6960 if let Err(error) = OutboundV1Channel::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
6961 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), 1000000, 1000000, 0,
6962 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, 42)
6965 APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
6966 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6968 } else { assert!(false) }
6970 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in InboundV1Channel::new()
6971 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
6972 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6973 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
6974 if let Err(error) = InboundV1Channel::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
6975 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].node.channel_type_features(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
6976 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
6979 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
6980 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6982 } else { assert!(false); }
6984 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
6985 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
6986 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
6987 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6988 accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
6989 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
6991 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
6993 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
6994 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
6995 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
6999 } else { panic!(); }
7000 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg });
7002 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in InboundV1Channel::new()
7003 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7004 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7005 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7006 if let Err(error) = InboundV1Channel::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7007 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].node.channel_type_features(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
7008 &high_their_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
7011 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7012 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7014 } else { assert!(false); }
7018 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
7019 // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
7020 // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
7021 // to B, B should refuse payment.
7023 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7024 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7025 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7026 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7028 // Create some initial channels
7029 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7031 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
7032 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7033 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV).with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
7034 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None, 10_000, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7035 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7036 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200, None).unwrap();
7037 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
7038 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
7039 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7041 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7042 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7043 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7044 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7045 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7047 // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
7048 // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
7049 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7050 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
7052 // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
7053 // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
7054 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7056 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7057 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7058 let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
7059 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7060 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7061 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7062 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7063 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7064 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7065 (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
7067 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7069 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7071 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
7072 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
7074 // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
7075 let mut expected_failure_data = (10_000 as u64).to_be_bytes().to_vec();
7076 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH.to_be_bytes());
7077 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
7081 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
7082 // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
7083 // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
7085 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7086 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7087 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7088 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7090 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7091 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0);
7092 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7095 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7096 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7098 for _ in 0..DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS + 1 {
7099 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7101 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7102 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7103 let mut chans_disabled = HashMap::new();
7104 for e in msg_events {
7106 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7107 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7108 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7109 if chans_disabled.insert(msg.contents.short_channel_id, msg.contents.timestamp).is_some() {
7110 panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7113 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7117 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
7118 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
7120 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7121 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7122 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
7123 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
7125 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7126 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7128 // Reestablish chan_1
7129 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7130 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7131 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7132 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7133 // Reestablish chan_2
7134 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7135 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7136 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7137 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7138 // Reestablish chan_3
7139 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7140 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7141 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7142 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7144 for _ in 0..ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
7145 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7147 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7148 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7149 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7150 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7151 for e in msg_events {
7153 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7154 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7155 match chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7156 // Each update should have a higher timestamp than the previous one, replacing
7158 Some(prev_timestamp) => assert!(msg.contents.timestamp > prev_timestamp),
7159 None => panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!"),
7162 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7165 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7166 assert!(chans_disabled.is_empty());
7170 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7171 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7172 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7174 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7175 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7176 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7177 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7179 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7181 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7182 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 30)
7183 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[0].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
7184 let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_params, 3000000);
7185 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7187 let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7188 // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7189 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7190 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7191 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7192 let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7194 let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7195 for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7196 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7197 penalty_sum += outp.value;
7201 // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7202 let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7204 // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7205 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7206 connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(header_114, 42, vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()]));
7207 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7209 // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7213 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7214 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor)
7215 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7216 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7217 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7218 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7219 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7220 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7224 // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7225 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7226 let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7227 let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7229 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7230 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7231 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7232 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7233 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7234 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7235 penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7236 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7237 assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7238 let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7239 feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7240 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7241 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7245 assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7247 // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7248 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7250 let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7252 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7253 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7254 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7255 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7256 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7257 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7258 penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7259 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7260 assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7261 let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7262 feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7263 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7264 assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7268 assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7270 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7271 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7275 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7276 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7277 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7279 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7280 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7281 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7282 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7283 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7285 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7286 // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7287 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 50).with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
7288 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
7289 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7290 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7291 3_000_000, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7292 let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7293 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 50).with_bolt11_features(nodes[0].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
7294 let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[1].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7295 3_000_000, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7296 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7298 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7299 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7300 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7302 // Revoke local commitment tx
7303 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7305 // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7306 connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()]));
7307 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7308 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7309 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7310 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 50); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7312 let revoked_htlc_txn = {
7313 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
7314 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
7316 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7317 assert_eq!(txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7318 check_spends!(txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7320 assert_eq!(txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7321 assert_eq!(txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7322 assert_eq!(txn[1].output.len(), 1);
7323 check_spends!(txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7328 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7329 let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7330 let block_11 = create_dummy_block(hash_128, 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()]);
7331 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block_11);
7332 let block_129 = create_dummy_block(block_11.block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()]);
7333 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block_129);
7334 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7335 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7336 match events.last().unwrap() {
7337 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7338 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7344 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7345 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7346 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7348 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7349 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7350 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7351 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7353 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7354 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7355 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7356 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7357 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7358 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7360 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7361 // available, which we check here:
7362 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7363 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7364 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7366 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7367 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7369 // node_txn[3] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7370 // output, checked above).
7371 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 2);
7372 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].output.len(), 1);
7373 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
7375 first = node_txn[3].txid();
7376 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7377 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[1].output[0].value - node_txn[3].output[0].value;
7378 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[3].weight() as u64;
7379 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7383 // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7384 let block_130 = create_dummy_block(block_129.block_hash(), 42, penalty_txn);
7385 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block_130);
7386 let block_131 = create_dummy_block(block_130.block_hash(), 42, Vec::new());
7387 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block_131);
7389 // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7390 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7391 assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7392 let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7394 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7395 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7397 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7398 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
7399 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7400 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7401 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[1].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7402 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7403 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7404 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7408 // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7409 connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(header_144, 42, node_txn));
7410 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7412 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7413 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7414 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7415 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7416 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7417 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7418 // up bumped justice generation.
7419 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7422 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7423 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7427 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
7428 // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7429 // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7432 // Provide preimage for one
7433 // Check aggregation
7435 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7436 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7437 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7438 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7440 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7441 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
7442 route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
7444 // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7445 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7446 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7447 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7448 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7450 // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
7451 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7452 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
7453 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
7454 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7455 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7457 // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
7461 let feerate_timeout;
7462 let feerate_preimage;
7464 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7465 // 3 transactions including:
7466 // preimage and timeout sweeps from remote commitment + preimage sweep bump
7467 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
7468 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7469 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7470 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7471 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7472 check_spends!(node_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
7473 check_spends!(node_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
7475 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
7476 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7477 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7478 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7480 let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output == node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output {
7481 (node_txn[2].clone(), node_txn[1].clone())
7483 (node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone())
7486 preimage_bump = preimage_bump_tx;
7487 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7488 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output);
7490 timeout = timeout_tx.txid();
7491 let index = timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7492 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - timeout_tx.output[0].value;
7493 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / timeout_tx.weight() as u64;
7497 assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
7498 assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
7500 // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
7501 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7503 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7504 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7505 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7506 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
7507 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7508 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7510 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7511 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
7512 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.weight() as u64;
7513 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
7514 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
7516 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7517 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7518 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7519 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
7520 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
7525 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7526 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7530 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
7531 // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
7532 // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
7533 // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
7534 // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
7535 // EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
7536 // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
7537 // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
7539 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7540 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7541 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7542 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7543 let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).2;
7545 let per_commitment_secret;
7546 let next_per_commitment_point;
7548 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7549 let mut guard = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7550 let keys = guard.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
7552 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
7554 // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
7555 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7556 per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
7558 // Must revoke without gaps
7559 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7560 keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
7562 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7563 next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
7564 &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
7567 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
7568 &msgs::RevokeAndACK {
7570 per_commitment_secret,
7571 next_per_commitment_point,
7573 next_local_nonce: None,
7575 assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
7576 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7577 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() });
7581 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
7582 // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
7583 // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7585 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7586 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7587 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7588 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7590 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7591 // Lock HTLC in both directions
7592 let (payment_preimage_1, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000);
7593 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000);
7595 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7596 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7597 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7599 // Revoke local commitment tx
7600 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
7602 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7603 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
7604 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[0], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
7605 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7607 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
7608 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7609 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7610 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7612 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7613 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3
7614 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7615 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7616 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7617 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
7621 connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, penalty_txn));
7622 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7624 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
7625 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
7626 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
7631 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
7632 // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
7633 // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
7634 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7635 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7636 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7637 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7639 let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000);
7641 // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
7642 // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
7643 // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
7644 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
7645 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7647 // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
7648 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
7649 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7650 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7652 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7653 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7654 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
7655 let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7656 assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
7658 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
7659 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7660 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
7662 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7667 fn test_override_channel_config() {
7668 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7669 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7670 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7671 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7673 // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
7674 let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
7675 override_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
7677 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
7679 // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
7680 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7681 assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
7682 assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
7686 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
7687 let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
7688 zero_config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
7689 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7690 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7691 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
7692 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7694 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
7695 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7696 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7698 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7699 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7700 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7704 fn test_channel_update_has_correct_htlc_maximum_msat() {
7705 // Tests that the `ChannelUpdate` message has the correct values for `htlc_maximum_msat` set.
7706 // Bolt 7 specifies that if present `htlc_maximum_msat`:
7707 // 1. MUST be set to less than or equal to the channel capacity. In LDK, this is capped to
7708 // 90% of the `channel_value`.
7709 // 2. MUST be set to less than or equal to the `max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` received from the peer.
7711 let mut config_30_percent = UserConfig::default();
7712 config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7713 config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 30;
7714 let mut config_50_percent = UserConfig::default();
7715 config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7716 config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 50;
7717 let mut config_95_percent = UserConfig::default();
7718 config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7719 config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 95;
7720 let mut config_100_percent = UserConfig::default();
7721 config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7722 config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 100;
7724 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7725 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7726 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config_30_percent), Some(config_50_percent), Some(config_95_percent), Some(config_100_percent)]);
7727 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7729 let channel_value_satoshis = 100000;
7730 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7731 let channel_value_30_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.3) as u64;
7732 let channel_value_50_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.5) as u64;
7733 let channel_value_90_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.9) as u64;
7735 let (node_0_chan_update, node_1_chan_update, _, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value_satoshis, 10001);
7736 let (node_2_chan_update, node_3_chan_update, _, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, channel_value_satoshis, 10001);
7738 // Assert that `node[0]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 50 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7739 // that's the value of `node[1]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
7740 assert_eq!(node_0_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_50_percent_msat);
7741 // Assert that `node[1]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 30 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7742 // that's the value of `node[0]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
7743 assert_eq!(node_1_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_30_percent_msat);
7745 // Assert that `node[2]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7746 // the value of `node[3]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (100%), exceeds 90% of the
7748 assert_eq!(node_2_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
7749 // Assert that `node[3]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7750 // the value of `node[2]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (95%), exceeds 90% of the
7752 assert_eq!(node_3_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
7756 fn test_manually_accept_inbound_channel_request() {
7757 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7758 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7759 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7760 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7761 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7762 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7764 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7765 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7767 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7769 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
7770 // accepting the inbound channel request.
7771 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7773 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7775 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
7776 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap();
7778 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7781 let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7782 assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7784 match accept_msg_ev[0] {
7785 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
7786 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7788 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7791 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
7793 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7794 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7796 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7798 Event::ChannelClosed { user_channel_id, .. } => {
7799 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 23);
7801 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7806 fn test_manually_reject_inbound_channel_request() {
7807 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7808 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7809 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7810 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7811 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7812 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7814 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7815 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7817 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7819 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
7820 // rejecting the inbound channel request.
7821 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7823 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7825 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
7826 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
7828 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7831 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7832 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7834 match close_msg_ev[0] {
7835 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => {
7836 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7838 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7840 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
7844 fn test_reject_funding_before_inbound_channel_accepted() {
7845 // This tests that when `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` is set to true, inbound
7846 // channels must to be manually accepted through `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel` by
7847 // the node operator before the counterparty sends a `FundingCreated` message. If a
7848 // `FundingCreated` message is received before the channel is accepted, it should be rejected
7849 // and the channel should be closed.
7850 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7851 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7852 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7853 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7854 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7855 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7857 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7858 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7859 let temp_channel_id = res.temporary_channel_id;
7861 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7863 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in the `msg_events`.
7864 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7866 // Clear the `Event::OpenChannelRequest` event without responding to the request.
7867 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7869 // Get the `AcceptChannel` message of `nodes[1]` without calling
7870 // `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`, which generates a
7871 // `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` event. The message is passed to `nodes[0]`
7872 // `handle_accept_channel`, which is required in order for `create_funding_transaction` to
7873 // succeed when `nodes[0]` is passed to it.
7874 let accept_chan_msg = {
7875 let mut node_1_per_peer_lock;
7876 let mut node_1_peer_state_lock;
7877 let channel = get_inbound_v1_channel_ref!(&nodes[1], nodes[0], node_1_per_peer_lock, node_1_peer_state_lock, temp_channel_id);
7878 channel.get_accept_channel_message()
7880 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan_msg);
7882 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
7884 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
7885 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7887 // The `funding_created_msg` should be rejected by `nodes[1]` as it hasn't accepted the channel
7888 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
7890 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7891 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7893 let expected_err = "FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted";
7894 match close_msg_ev[0] {
7895 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id, } => {
7896 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, temp_channel_id);
7897 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7898 assert_eq!(msg.data, expected_err);
7900 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7903 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
7907 fn test_can_not_accept_inbound_channel_twice() {
7908 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7909 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7910 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7911 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7912 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7913 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7915 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7916 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7918 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7920 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
7921 // accepting the inbound channel request.
7922 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7924 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7926 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
7927 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0).unwrap();
7928 let api_res = nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
7930 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
7931 assert_eq!(err, "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.");
7933 Ok(_) => panic!("Channel shouldn't be possible to be accepted twice"),
7934 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
7937 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7940 // Ensure that the channel wasn't closed after attempting to accept it twice.
7941 let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7942 assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7944 match accept_msg_ev[0] {
7945 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
7946 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7948 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7953 fn test_can_not_accept_unknown_inbound_channel() {
7954 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7955 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
7956 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
7957 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
7959 let unknown_channel_id = [0; 32];
7960 let api_res = nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&unknown_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
7962 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
7963 assert_eq!(err, format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(unknown_channel_id), nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7965 Ok(_) => panic!("It shouldn't be possible to accept an unkown channel"),
7966 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
7971 fn test_onion_value_mpp_set_calculation() {
7972 // Test that we use the onion value `amt_to_forward` when
7973 // calculating whether we've reached the `total_msat` of an MPP
7974 // by having a routing node forward more than `amt_to_forward`
7975 // and checking that the receiving node doesn't generate
7976 // a PaymentClaimable event too early
7978 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(node_count);
7979 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(node_count, &chanmon_cfgs);
7980 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(node_count, &node_cfgs, &vec![None; node_count]);
7981 let mut nodes = create_network(node_count, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7983 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7984 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7985 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7986 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7988 let total_msat = 100_000;
7989 let expected_paths: &[&[&Node]] = &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]];
7990 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], total_msat);
7991 let sample_path = route.paths.pop().unwrap();
7993 let mut path_1 = sample_path.clone();
7994 path_1.hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7995 path_1.hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
7996 path_1.hops[1].pubkey = nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id();
7997 path_1.hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
7998 path_1.hops[1].fee_msat = 100_000;
7999 route.paths.push(path_1);
8001 let mut path_2 = sample_path.clone();
8002 path_2.hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8003 path_2.hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8004 path_2.hops[1].pubkey = nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id();
8005 path_2.hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8006 path_2.hops[1].fee_msat = 1_000;
8007 route.paths.push(path_2);
8010 let payment_id = PaymentId(nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.get_secure_random_bytes());
8011 let onion_session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
8012 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
8013 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, our_payment_hash,
8014 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), None, payment_id, Some(total_msat), onion_session_privs).unwrap();
8015 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], expected_paths.len());
8017 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8018 assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_paths.len());
8021 let ev = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&expected_paths[0][0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
8022 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8023 let mut prev_node = &nodes[0];
8025 for (idx, &node) in expected_paths[0].iter().enumerate() {
8026 assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
8028 if idx == 0 { // routing node
8029 let session_priv = [3; 32];
8030 let height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
8031 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv).unwrap();
8032 let mut onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
8033 let (mut onion_payloads, _, _) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 100_000,
8034 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), height + 1, &None).unwrap();
8035 // Edit amt_to_forward to simulate the sender having set
8036 // the final amount and the routing node taking less fee
8037 onion_payloads[1].amt_to_forward = 99_000;
8038 let new_onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash).unwrap();
8039 payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet = new_onion_packet;
8042 node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8043 check_added_monitors!(node, 0);
8044 commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8045 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(node);
8048 let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8049 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
8050 check_added_monitors!(node, 1);
8051 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
8052 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
8054 let events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8055 assert!(events_2.is_empty());
8062 let ev = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&expected_paths[1][0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
8063 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], expected_paths[1], 101_000, our_payment_hash.clone(), Some(our_payment_secret), ev, true, None);
8065 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], expected_paths, false, our_payment_preimage);
8068 fn do_test_overshoot_mpp(msat_amounts: &[u64], total_msat: u64) {
8070 let routing_node_count = msat_amounts.len();
8071 let node_count = routing_node_count + 2;
8073 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(node_count);
8074 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(node_count, &chanmon_cfgs);
8075 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(node_count, &node_cfgs, &vec![None; node_count]);
8076 let nodes = create_network(node_count, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8081 // Create channels for each amount
8082 let mut expected_paths = Vec::with_capacity(routing_node_count);
8083 let mut src_chan_ids = Vec::with_capacity(routing_node_count);
8084 let mut dst_chan_ids = Vec::with_capacity(routing_node_count);
8085 for i in 0..routing_node_count {
8086 let routing_node = 2 + i;
8087 let src_chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, src_idx, routing_node).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8088 src_chan_ids.push(src_chan_id);
8089 let dst_chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, routing_node, dst_idx).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8090 dst_chan_ids.push(dst_chan_id);
8091 let path = vec![&nodes[routing_node], &nodes[dst_idx]];
8092 expected_paths.push(path);
8094 let expected_paths: Vec<&[&Node]> = expected_paths.iter().map(|route| route.as_slice()).collect();
8096 // Create a route for each amount
8097 let example_amount = 100000;
8098 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[src_idx], nodes[dst_idx], example_amount);
8099 let sample_path = route.paths.pop().unwrap();
8100 for i in 0..routing_node_count {
8101 let routing_node = 2 + i;
8102 let mut path = sample_path.clone();
8103 path.hops[0].pubkey = nodes[routing_node].node.get_our_node_id();
8104 path.hops[0].short_channel_id = src_chan_ids[i];
8105 path.hops[1].pubkey = nodes[dst_idx].node.get_our_node_id();
8106 path.hops[1].short_channel_id = dst_chan_ids[i];
8107 path.hops[1].fee_msat = msat_amounts[i];
8108 route.paths.push(path);
8111 // Send payment with manually set total_msat
8112 let payment_id = PaymentId(nodes[src_idx].keys_manager.backing.get_secure_random_bytes());
8113 let onion_session_privs = nodes[src_idx].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
8114 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
8115 nodes[src_idx].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, our_payment_hash,
8116 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), None, payment_id, Some(total_msat), onion_session_privs).unwrap();
8117 check_added_monitors!(nodes[src_idx], expected_paths.len());
8119 let mut events = nodes[src_idx].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8120 assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_paths.len());
8121 let mut amount_received = 0;
8122 for (path_idx, expected_path) in expected_paths.iter().enumerate() {
8123 let ev = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&expected_path[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
8125 let current_path_amount = msat_amounts[path_idx];
8126 amount_received += current_path_amount;
8127 let became_claimable_now = amount_received >= total_msat && amount_received - current_path_amount < total_msat;
8128 pass_along_path(&nodes[src_idx], expected_path, amount_received, our_payment_hash.clone(), Some(our_payment_secret), ev, became_claimable_now, None);
8131 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[src_idx], &expected_paths, false, our_payment_preimage);
8135 fn test_overshoot_mpp() {
8136 do_test_overshoot_mpp(&[100_000, 101_000], 200_000);
8137 do_test_overshoot_mpp(&[100_000, 10_000, 100_000], 200_000);
8141 fn test_simple_mpp() {
8142 // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
8143 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8144 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8145 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8146 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8148 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8149 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8150 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8151 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8153 let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8154 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8155 route.paths.push(path);
8156 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8157 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8158 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8159 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8160 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8161 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8162 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
8163 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
8167 fn test_preimage_storage() {
8168 // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
8169 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8170 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8171 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8172 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8174 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8177 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200, None).unwrap();
8178 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8179 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8180 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8181 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8182 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8183 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8184 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8185 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8187 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8188 // values from previous calls.
8189 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8190 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8191 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8193 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref purpose, .. } => {
8195 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
8196 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
8198 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
8201 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8206 #[allow(deprecated)]
8207 fn test_secret_timeout() {
8208 // Simple test of payment secret storage time outs. After
8209 // `create_inbound_payment(_for_hash)_legacy` is removed, this test will be removed as well.
8210 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8211 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8212 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8213 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8215 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8217 let (payment_hash, payment_secret_1) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_legacy(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8219 // We should fail to register the same payment hash twice, at least until we've connected a
8220 // block with time 7200 + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1.
8221 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8222 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8223 } else { panic!(); }
8225 let node_1_blocks = nodes[1].blocks.lock().unwrap();
8226 create_dummy_block(node_1_blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(), node_1_blocks.len() as u32 + 7200, Vec::new())
8228 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8229 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8230 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8231 } else { panic!(); }
8233 // If we then connect the second block, we should be able to register the same payment hash
8234 // again (this time getting a new payment secret).
8235 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.header.block_hash();
8236 block.header.time += 1;
8237 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8238 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8239 assert_ne!(payment_secret_1, our_payment_secret);
8242 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8243 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8244 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8245 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8246 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8247 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8248 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8249 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8251 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8252 // values from previous calls.
8253 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8254 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8255 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8257 Event::PaymentClaimable { purpose: PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret }, .. } => {
8258 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
8259 assert_eq!(payment_secret, our_payment_secret);
8260 // We don't actually have the payment preimage with which to claim this payment!
8262 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8267 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8268 // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8269 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8270 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8271 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8272 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8274 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8276 let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8277 let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8278 let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2, None).unwrap();
8279 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8281 // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8282 // resulting events.
8283 macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8284 ($payment_hash: expr) => {
8285 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8286 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8287 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8288 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8289 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8291 // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8292 // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8293 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8294 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash: $payment_hash }]);
8295 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8297 // We should fail the payment back
8298 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8299 match events.pop().unwrap() {
8300 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8301 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8302 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8304 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8309 let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8310 // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8311 let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8313 // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8314 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
8315 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(random_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8316 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(our_payment_hash);
8317 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8319 // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8320 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, random_payment_hash,
8321 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(random_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8322 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8323 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8325 // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8326 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, random_payment_hash,
8327 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(random_payment_secret), PaymentId(random_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8328 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8329 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8333 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8334 // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8335 // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8336 // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus
8339 // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8340 // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8341 // commitment at same time.
8343 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8344 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8345 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8346 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8348 // Create some initial channel
8349 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8350 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8352 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8353 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8355 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8356 let (preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
8358 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8359 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8360 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8361 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8364 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8365 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8366 &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8367 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8370 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8371 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8374 let block = create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new());
8375 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8376 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8377 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (block.clone(), 200));
8378 watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, 200);
8380 // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8381 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage);
8382 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8383 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
8385 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8386 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8387 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8389 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
8390 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
8391 let mut channel = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, chan_1.2);
8392 if let Ok(Some(update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8393 assert_eq!(watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure);
8394 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8395 } else { assert!(false); }
8397 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8398 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8399 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8400 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8404 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8405 // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8406 // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8407 // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8408 // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8410 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8411 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8412 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8413 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8415 // Create some initial channel
8416 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8417 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8419 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8420 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8422 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8423 route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8425 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8426 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8427 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8428 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8429 let alice_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::with_blocks(
8430 Arc::new(Mutex::new(nodes[0].blocks.lock().unwrap().clone())),
8432 let watchtower_alice = {
8434 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8435 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8436 &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8437 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8440 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &alice_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8441 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8444 let block = create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new());
8445 // Make Alice aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating transaction lock time
8446 // requirements here.
8447 const HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST: u32 = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
8448 alice_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST) as usize, (block.clone(), HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST));
8449 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST);
8451 // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8453 let mut txn = alice_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
8454 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8458 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8459 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8460 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8461 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8462 let bob_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::with_blocks(Arc::clone(&alice_broadcaster.blocks));
8463 let watchtower_bob = {
8465 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8466 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8467 &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8468 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8471 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &bob_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8472 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8475 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new()), HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST - 1);
8477 // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8478 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8479 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8480 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8481 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8483 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8484 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8485 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8487 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
8488 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
8489 let mut channel = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, chan_1.2);
8490 if let Ok(Some(update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8491 // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8492 assert_eq!(watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure);
8493 assert_eq!(watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8494 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8495 } else { assert!(false); }
8497 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8498 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8500 //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8501 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new()), HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST);
8503 // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8506 let mut txn = bob_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
8507 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8508 bob_state_y = txn.remove(0);
8511 // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8512 let height = HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST + 1;
8513 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
8514 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
8515 check_closed_event(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false);
8516 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, vec![bob_state_y.clone()]), height);
8517 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
8519 let htlc_txn = alice_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
8520 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
8521 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8522 // Alice doesn't clean up the old HTLC claim since it hasn't seen a conflicting spend for
8523 // it. However, she should, because it now has an invalid parent.
8524 check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], alice_state);
8529 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8530 // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8531 // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8534 // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8535 // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8537 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8538 // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8539 // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8540 // before receiving funding_signed.
8541 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8542 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8543 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8544 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8546 // Create an initial channel
8547 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8548 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8549 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8550 let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8551 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan_msg);
8553 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8554 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8556 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8557 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8559 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8560 let channel_id = crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
8561 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8562 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8563 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString("Hi".to_string()) }, true);
8567 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8568 // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8569 // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8570 // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8571 // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
8572 // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
8573 // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
8575 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8576 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8577 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8578 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8580 // Create some initial channels
8581 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8583 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
8584 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
8585 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
8586 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8587 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
8588 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
8590 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8591 let block = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![local_txn[0].clone()]);
8592 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
8593 // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
8594 // this test before #653 fix.
8595 chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &block, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
8596 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8597 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8598 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8599 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
8601 let htlc_timeout = {
8602 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8603 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8604 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8605 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8606 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
8610 connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![htlc_timeout.clone()]));
8611 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8612 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
8615 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
8616 // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
8617 // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
8618 // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
8620 // Steps of the test:
8621 // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
8622 // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
8623 // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
8624 // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
8625 // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
8626 // but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
8627 // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
8628 // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
8629 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8630 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8631 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8632 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8634 // Create some initial channels
8635 let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8636 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001);
8638 // Steps (1) and (2):
8639 // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
8640 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
8642 // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
8643 let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
8644 check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8645 assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
8646 check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
8647 assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8648 assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
8650 // Steps (3) and (4):
8651 // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
8652 // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
8653 let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
8654 let mut counterparty_node = 1; // Bob if Alice force-closes
8657 if !broadcast_alice {
8658 force_closing_node = 1;
8659 counterparty_node = 0;
8661 nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_ab.2, &nodes[counterparty_node].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8662 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
8663 check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
8664 check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8665 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8666 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
8667 true => alice_txn.clone(),
8668 false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
8670 connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]));
8671 if broadcast_alice {
8672 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8673 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8674 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8679 // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
8680 // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
8681 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8682 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8683 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
8685 let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8686 assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8687 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8688 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8689 assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
8690 assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8692 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8693 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false, false);
8694 // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
8695 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
8696 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8697 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8699 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
8700 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8702 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8705 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
8706 // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
8707 // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
8708 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8710 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8711 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8712 let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
8713 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8714 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8717 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8719 let bob_updates = match events[1] {
8720 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
8721 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8724 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8727 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
8728 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8729 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
8730 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8732 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8733 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8734 let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
8735 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8736 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8739 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8741 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
8742 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8744 // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
8745 // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
8746 let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
8747 if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
8748 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8749 connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]));
8750 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
8751 if broadcast_alice {
8752 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8753 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8754 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8756 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8757 if broadcast_alice {
8758 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8759 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8761 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8762 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8767 // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
8768 // broadcasted commitment transaction.
8770 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
8771 true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
8772 false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
8774 // If Alice force-closed, Bob only broadcasts a HTLC-output-claiming transaction. Otherwise,
8775 // Bob force-closed and broadcasts the commitment transaction along with a
8776 // HTLC-output-claiming transaction.
8777 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8778 if broadcast_alice {
8779 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8780 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8781 assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8783 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8784 check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8785 assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8791 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
8792 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
8793 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
8794 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
8795 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
8799 fn test_duplicate_temporary_channel_id_from_different_peers() {
8800 // Tests that we can accept two different `OpenChannel` requests with the same
8801 // `temporary_channel_id`, as long as they are from different peers.
8802 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8803 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8804 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8805 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8807 // Create an first channel channel
8808 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8809 let mut open_chan_msg_chan_1_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8811 // Create an second channel
8812 nodes[2].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 43, None).unwrap();
8813 let mut open_chan_msg_chan_2_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8815 // Modify the `OpenChannel` from `nodes[2]` to `nodes[0]` to ensure that it uses the same
8816 // `temporary_channel_id` as the `OpenChannel` from nodes[1] to nodes[0].
8817 open_chan_msg_chan_2_0.temporary_channel_id = open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.temporary_channel_id;
8819 // Assert that `nodes[0]` can accept both `OpenChannel` requests, even though they use the same
8820 // `temporary_channel_id` as they are from different peers.
8821 nodes[0].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg_chan_1_0);
8823 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8824 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8826 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { node_id, msg } => {
8827 assert_eq!(node_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8828 assert_eq!(msg.temporary_channel_id, open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.temporary_channel_id);
8830 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8834 nodes[0].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg_chan_2_0);
8836 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8837 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8839 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { node_id, msg } => {
8840 assert_eq!(node_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8841 assert_eq!(msg.temporary_channel_id, open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.temporary_channel_id);
8843 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8849 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
8850 // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
8851 // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
8853 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
8854 // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
8855 // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
8856 // updating logic for the existing channel.
8857 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8858 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8859 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8860 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8862 // Create an initial channel
8863 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8864 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8865 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8866 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8868 // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
8869 // that it is rejected.
8870 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8872 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8873 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8875 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8876 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
8877 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
8878 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
8879 // move forward with it.
8880 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8881 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8883 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8887 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8888 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8890 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8891 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8893 let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8894 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8896 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8897 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8898 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8899 added_monitors.clear();
8901 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8903 let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8905 let funding_outpoint = crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
8906 let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
8908 // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
8911 // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
8912 // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
8913 // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
8914 open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
8915 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8917 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8918 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8920 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8921 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8922 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8923 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8924 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8926 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8930 // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
8931 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8932 let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8933 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_2_msg);
8934 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8935 create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
8937 let (_, funding_created) = {
8938 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8939 let mut a_peer_state = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8940 // Once we call `get_outbound_funding_created` the channel has a duplicate channel_id as
8941 // another channel in the ChannelManager - an invalid state. Thus, we'd panic later when we
8942 // try to create another channel. Instead, we drop the channel entirely here (leaving the
8943 // channelmanager in a possibly nonsense state instead).
8944 let mut as_chan = a_peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.remove(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
8945 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8946 as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap()
8948 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8949 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
8950 // At this point we'll look up if the channel_id is present and immediately fail the channel
8951 // without trying to persist the `ChannelMonitor`.
8952 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8954 // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
8956 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8957 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8959 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8960 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8961 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8962 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
8963 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8965 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8969 // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
8970 // everything is functional.
8971 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
8973 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8974 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8975 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8976 added_monitors.clear();
8978 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8980 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8981 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
8982 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
8983 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
8985 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8986 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8987 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
8989 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
8993 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
8994 // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
8996 // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
8997 // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
8998 // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
8999 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9000 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9001 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9002 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9004 // Create some initial channels
9005 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9006 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9007 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001);
9009 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9010 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9011 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9013 // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
9014 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9015 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9017 // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
9018 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9019 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9020 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
9021 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString("ERR".to_string()) });
9022 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
9023 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9024 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
9025 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9027 // A null channel ID should close all channels
9028 let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9029 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9030 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9031 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString("ERR".to_string()) });
9032 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9033 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9035 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9036 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9038 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9041 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9042 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9044 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9046 // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
9047 // peer_disconnected.
9048 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9049 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9051 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9052 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9053 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9057 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
9058 // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
9060 // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
9061 // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
9062 // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
9063 // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
9065 // Further, if the funding transaction is consensus-valid, confirms, and is later spent, we'd
9066 // previously have crashed in `ChannelMonitor` even though we closed the channel as bogus and
9067 // gave up on it. We test this here by generating such a transaction.
9068 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9069 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9070 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9071 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9073 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9074 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9075 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9077 let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
9079 // Create a witness program which can be spent by a 4-empty-stack-elements witness and which is
9080 // 136 bytes long. This matches our "accepted HTLC preimage spend" matching, previously causing
9081 // a panic as we'd try to extract a 32 byte preimage from a witness element without checking
9083 let mut wit_program: Vec<u8> = channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program();
9084 let wit_program_script: Script = wit_program.into();
9085 for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
9086 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
9087 output.script_pubkey = Script::new_v0_p2wsh(&wit_program_script.wscript_hash());
9090 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
9091 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9092 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9093 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9095 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9096 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9097 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9099 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9100 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
9102 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9103 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9104 nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
9106 let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
9107 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
9108 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
9109 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9110 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9111 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
9112 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
9113 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9114 if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
9115 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
9116 } else { panic!(); }
9117 } else { panic!(); }
9118 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
9120 // Now confirm a spend of the (bogus) funding transaction. As long as the witness is 5 elements
9121 // long the ChannelMonitor will try to read 32 bytes from the second-to-last element, panicing
9122 // as its not 32 bytes long.
9123 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
9124 version: 2i32, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
9125 input: tx.output.iter().enumerate().map(|(idx, _)| TxIn {
9126 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
9130 script_sig: Script::new(),
9131 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
9132 witness: Witness::from_vec(channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness())
9134 output: vec![TxOut {
9136 script_pubkey: Script::new(),
9139 check_spends!(spend_tx, tx);
9140 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &spend_tx);
9143 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
9144 // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
9145 // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
9146 // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
9147 // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
9148 // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
9149 // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
9150 // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
9151 // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
9152 // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
9153 // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
9154 // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
9155 // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
9156 // until we learned about an additional block.
9158 // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
9159 // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
9160 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9161 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9162 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9163 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9164 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
9166 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9167 let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
9168 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
9169 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9170 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9172 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9173 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9174 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9175 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9176 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9177 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
9179 let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
9180 if !test_height_before_timelock {
9181 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
9183 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9184 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
9185 if test_height_before_timelock {
9186 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
9187 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
9188 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
9189 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9191 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
9192 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9193 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
9194 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0].txid(), node_txn[0].txid());
9195 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
9196 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
9198 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
9199 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
9201 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
9202 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
9203 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
9204 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9205 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
9206 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: channel_id }]);
9207 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9209 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9210 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9211 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9212 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9213 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9214 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9215 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9216 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9217 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
9222 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
9223 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
9224 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
9227 fn do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(test_for_second_fail_panic: bool) {
9228 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9229 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9230 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9231 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9233 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9235 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9236 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
9237 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 10_000).unwrap();
9239 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
9242 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
9243 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9244 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9245 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9246 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9247 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9248 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9249 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9251 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9252 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 10_000);
9255 // Note that we use a different PaymentId here to allow us to duplicativly pay
9256 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
9257 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_secret.0)).unwrap();
9258 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9259 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9260 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9261 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9262 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9263 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9264 // At this point, nodes[1] would notice it has too much value for the payment. It will
9265 // assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9266 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC. Previously, it'd also have failed back
9267 // the first HTLC delivered above.
9270 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9271 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9273 if test_for_second_fail_panic {
9274 // Now we go fail back the first HTLC from the user end.
9275 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
9277 let expected_destinations = vec![
9278 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
9279 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
9281 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1], expected_destinations);
9282 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9284 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9285 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9286 assert_eq!(fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 2);
9288 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9289 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
9290 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9292 let failure_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9293 assert_eq!(failure_events.len(), 4);
9294 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
9295 if let Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = failure_events[1] {} else { panic!(); }
9296 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[2] {} else { panic!(); }
9297 if let Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = failure_events[3] {} else { panic!(); }
9299 // Let the second HTLC fail and claim the first
9300 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9301 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9303 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9304 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9305 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9306 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9308 expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
9310 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
9315 fn test_dup_htlc_second_fail_panic() {
9316 // Previously, if we received two HTLCs back-to-back, where the second overran the expected
9317 // value for the payment, we'd fail back both HTLCs after generating a `PaymentClaimable` event.
9318 // Then, if the user failed the second payment, they'd hit a "tried to fail an already failed
9319 // HTLC" debug panic. This tests for this behavior, checking that only one HTLC is auto-failed.
9320 do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(true);
9324 fn test_dup_htlc_second_rejected() {
9325 // Test that if we receive a second HTLC for an MPP payment that overruns the payment amount we
9326 // simply reject the second HTLC but are still able to claim the first HTLC.
9327 do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(false);
9331 fn test_inconsistent_mpp_params() {
9332 // Test that if we recieve two HTLCs with different payment parameters we fail back the first
9333 // such HTLC and allow the second to stay.
9334 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9335 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9336 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9337 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9339 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0);
9340 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0);
9341 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0);
9342 let chan_2_3 =create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0);
9344 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9345 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[3].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
9346 let mut route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 15_000_000).unwrap();
9347 assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9348 route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9349 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9350 if path_a.hops[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9351 core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9354 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[3]);
9356 let cur_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
9357 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
9359 let session_privs = {
9360 // We create a fake route here so that we start with three pending HTLCs, which we'll
9361 // ultimately have, just not right away.
9362 let mut dup_route = route.clone();
9363 dup_route.paths.push(route.paths[1].clone());
9364 nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
9365 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &dup_route).unwrap()
9367 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
9368 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id,
9369 &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
9370 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9373 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9374 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9375 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), false, None);
9377 assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9379 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
9380 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), 14_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
9381 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9384 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9385 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9386 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9388 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9389 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9391 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9392 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9394 let mut events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9395 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9396 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9398 nodes[3].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9399 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9400 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg, true, true);
9402 // At this point, nodes[3] should notice the two HTLCs don't contain the same total payment
9403 // amount. It will assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9404 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC.
9406 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[3]);
9407 nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9408 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[3], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9409 nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9411 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
9413 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9414 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9415 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9417 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }]);
9418 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9420 let fail_updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9421 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9422 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], fail_updates_2.commitment_signed, false);
9424 expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9426 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
9427 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id,
9428 &None, session_privs[2]).unwrap();
9429 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9431 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9432 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9433 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), true, None);
9435 do_claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, our_payment_preimage);
9436 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], our_payment_preimage, Some(None), true);
9440 fn test_keysend_payments_to_public_node() {
9441 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9442 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9443 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9444 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9446 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9447 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9448 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9449 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9450 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9451 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false),
9452 final_value_msat: 10000,
9454 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9455 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9456 let route = find_route(&payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
9458 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9459 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage),
9460 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(test_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9461 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9462 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9463 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9464 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9465 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9466 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9467 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9471 fn test_keysend_payments_to_private_node() {
9472 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9473 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9474 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9475 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9477 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9478 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9480 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9481 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9482 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false),
9483 final_value_msat: 10000,
9485 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9486 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9487 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9488 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9489 let route = find_route(
9490 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9491 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9494 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9495 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage),
9496 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(test_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9497 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9498 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9499 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9500 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9501 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9502 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9503 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9507 fn test_double_partial_claim() {
9508 // Test what happens if a node receives a payment, generates a PaymentClaimable event, the HTLCs
9509 // time out, the sender resends only some of the MPP parts, then the user processes the
9510 // PaymentClaimable event, ensuring they don't inadvertently claim only part of the full payment
9512 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9513 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9514 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9515 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9517 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0);
9518 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0);
9519 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0);
9520 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0);
9522 let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], 15_000_000);
9523 assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9524 route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9525 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9526 if path_a.hops[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9527 core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9530 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
9531 // nodes[3] has now received a PaymentClaimable event...which it will take some (exorbitant)
9532 // amount of time to respond to.
9534 // Connect some blocks to time out the payment
9535 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
9536 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // To get the same height for sending later
9538 let failed_destinations = vec![
9539 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
9540 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
9542 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations);
9544 pass_failed_payment_back(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_hash, PaymentFailureReason::RecipientRejected);
9546 // nodes[1] now retries one of the two paths...
9547 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9548 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9549 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9551 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9552 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9553 let node_1_msgs = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
9554 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), node_1_msgs, false, None);
9556 // At this point nodes[3] has received one half of the payment, and the user goes to handle
9557 // that PaymentClaimable event they got hours ago and never handled...we should refuse to claim.
9558 nodes[3].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9559 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9560 assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9563 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
9564 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
9565 enum ExposureEvent {
9566 /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
9568 /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
9570 /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
9571 AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
9574 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool) {
9575 // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
9578 // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
9579 // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
9580 // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
9581 // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
9582 // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
9583 // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
9584 // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
9585 // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
9587 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9588 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
9589 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = 5_000_000; // default setting value
9590 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9591 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
9592 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9594 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9595 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9596 open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
9597 open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
9599 open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9601 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
9602 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9603 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9605 let opt_anchors = false;
9607 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9610 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
9611 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
9612 let mut chan = get_outbound_v1_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, temporary_channel_id);
9613 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9616 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9617 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9618 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9619 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9621 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9622 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9623 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9625 let (channel_ready, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9626 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9627 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9629 // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
9630 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) =
9631 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000);
9633 let dust_buffer_feerate = {
9634 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9635 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9636 let chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
9637 chan.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64
9639 let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9640 let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9642 let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9643 let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9645 let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 4;
9646 let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
9649 if dust_outbound_balance {
9650 // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9651 // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9652 // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
9653 for _ in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9654 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9655 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9656 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9659 // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9660 // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9661 // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
9662 for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9663 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9667 if dust_outbound_balance {
9668 // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9669 // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9670 for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx - 1 {
9671 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9672 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9673 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9676 // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9677 // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9678 for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx - 1 {
9679 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9684 if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
9685 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat =
9686 if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat + 1 };
9687 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9689 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9690 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)
9691 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
9693 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9694 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)
9695 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
9697 } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
9698 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat + 1 });
9699 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9700 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9701 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9702 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9703 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9704 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
9705 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9706 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9708 // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
9709 let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9710 let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9711 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9713 // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
9714 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
9715 format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
9716 dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx - 1) + dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat + 1,
9717 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9719 } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
9720 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat = 2_500_000;
9721 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9722 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9724 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9725 *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
9727 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9728 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9729 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel", "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure", 1);
9732 let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9733 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9734 added_monitors.clear();
9738 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
9739 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9740 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9741 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9742 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9743 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9744 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9745 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9746 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9747 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9748 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9749 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9750 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9754 fn test_non_final_funding_tx() {
9755 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9756 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9757 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9758 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9760 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9761 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9762 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
9763 let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9764 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
9766 let best_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
9768 let chan_id = *nodes[0].network_chan_count.borrow();
9769 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9770 let input = TxIn { previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint::null(), script_sig: bitcoin::Script::new(), sequence: Sequence(1), witness: Witness::from_vec(vec!(vec!(1))) };
9771 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9772 let mut tx = match events[0] {
9773 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } => {
9774 // Timelock the transaction _beyond_ the best client height + 1.
9775 Transaction { version: chan_id as i32, lock_time: PackedLockTime(best_height + 2), input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut {
9776 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9779 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9781 // Transaction should fail as it's evaluated as non-final for propagation.
9782 match nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()) {
9783 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
9784 assert_eq!(format!("Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final"), err);
9789 // However, transaction should be accepted if it's in a +1 headroom from best block.
9790 tx.lock_time = PackedLockTime(tx.lock_time.0 - 1);
9791 assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
9792 get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9796 fn accept_busted_but_better_fee() {
9797 // If a peer sends us a fee update that is too low, but higher than our previous channel
9798 // feerate, we should accept it. In the future we may want to consider closing the channel
9799 // later, but for now we only accept the update.
9800 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9801 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9802 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9803 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9805 create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9807 // Set nodes[1] to expect 5,000 sat/kW.
9809 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9810 *feerate_lock = 5000;
9813 // If nodes[0] increases their feerate, even if its not enough, nodes[1] should accept it.
9815 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9816 *feerate_lock = 1000;
9818 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9819 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9821 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9822 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9824 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
9825 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
9826 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], commitment_signed, false);
9828 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9831 // If nodes[0] increases their feerate further, even if its not enough, nodes[1] should accept
9834 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9835 *feerate_lock = 2000;
9837 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9838 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9840 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9841 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9843 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
9844 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
9845 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], commitment_signed, false);
9847 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9850 // However, if nodes[0] decreases their feerate, nodes[1] should reject it and close the
9853 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9854 *feerate_lock = 1000;
9856 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9857 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9859 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9860 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9862 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
9863 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
9864 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
9865 err: "Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: 1000. Our expected lower limit: 5000 (- 250)".to_owned() });
9866 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9867 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9869 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9873 fn do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(valid_delta: bool, use_user_hash: bool) {
9874 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9875 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9876 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9877 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9878 let min_final_cltv_expiry_delta = 120;
9879 let final_cltv_expiry_delta = if valid_delta { min_final_cltv_expiry_delta + 2 } else {
9880 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta - 2 };
9881 let recv_value = 100_000;
9883 create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9885 let payment_parameters = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32);
9886 let (payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = if use_user_hash {
9887 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1],
9888 Some(recv_value), Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta));
9889 (payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret)
9891 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(recv_value), 7200, Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)).unwrap();
9892 (payment_hash, nodes[1].node.get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret).unwrap(), payment_secret)
9894 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_parameters, recv_value).unwrap();
9895 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9896 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9897 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9898 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9899 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9900 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9901 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9902 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9903 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9906 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, recv_value, if use_user_hash {
9907 None } else { Some(payment_preimage) }, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9909 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
9911 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9913 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9915 let fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9916 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9917 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
9919 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9924 fn test_payment_with_custom_min_cltv_expiry_delta() {
9925 do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(false, false);
9926 do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(false, true);
9927 do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(true, false);
9928 do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(true, true);
9932 fn test_disconnects_peer_awaiting_response_ticks() {
9933 // Tests that nodes which are awaiting on a response critical for channel responsiveness
9934 // disconnect their counterparty after `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
9935 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9936 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9937 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9938 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9940 // Asserts a disconnect event is queued to the user.
9941 let check_disconnect_event = |node: &Node, should_disconnect: bool| {
9942 let disconnect_event = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().iter().find_map(|event|
9943 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action, .. } = event {
9944 if let msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning { .. } = action {
9953 assert_eq!(disconnect_event.is_some(), should_disconnect);
9956 // Fires timer ticks ensuring we only attempt to disconnect peers after reaching
9957 // `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
9958 let check_disconnect = |node: &Node| {
9959 // No disconnect without any timer ticks.
9960 check_disconnect_event(node, false);
9962 // No disconnect with 1 timer tick less than required.
9963 for _ in 0..DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS - 1 {
9964 node.node.timer_tick_occurred();
9965 check_disconnect_event(node, false);
9968 // Disconnect after reaching the required ticks.
9969 node.node.timer_tick_occurred();
9970 check_disconnect_event(node, true);
9972 // Disconnect again on the next tick if the peer hasn't been disconnected yet.
9973 node.node.timer_tick_occurred();
9974 check_disconnect_event(node, true);
9977 create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9979 // We'll start by performing a fee update with Alice (nodes[0]) on the channel.
9980 *nodes[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
9981 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9982 check_added_monitors!(&nodes[0], 1);
9983 let alice_fee_update = get_htlc_update_msgs(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9984 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), alice_fee_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
9985 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &alice_fee_update.commitment_signed);
9986 check_added_monitors!(&nodes[1], 1);
9988 // This will prompt Bob (nodes[1]) to respond with his `CommitmentSigned` and `RevokeAndACK`.
9989 let (bob_revoke_and_ack, bob_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9990 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revoke_and_ack);
9991 check_added_monitors!(&nodes[0], 1);
9992 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_commitment_signed);
9993 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
9995 // Alice then needs to send her final `RevokeAndACK` to complete the commitment dance. We
9996 // pretend Bob hasn't received the message and check whether he'll disconnect Alice after
9997 // reaching `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
9998 let alice_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9999 check_disconnect(&nodes[1]);
10001 // Now, we'll reconnect them to test awaiting a `ChannelReestablish` message.
10003 // Note that since the commitment dance didn't complete above, Alice is expected to resend her
10004 // final `RevokeAndACK` to Bob to complete it.
10005 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10006 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10007 let bob_init = msgs::Init {
10008 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10010 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_init, true).unwrap();
10011 let alice_init = msgs::Init {
10012 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10014 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &alice_init, true).unwrap();
10016 // Upon reconnection, Alice sends her `ChannelReestablish` to Bob. Alice, however, hasn't
10017 // received Bob's yet, so she should disconnect him after reaching
10018 // `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
10019 let alice_channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
10020 nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()
10022 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &alice_channel_reestablish);
10023 check_disconnect(&nodes[0]);
10025 // Bob now sends his `ChannelReestablish` to Alice to resume the channel and consider it "live".
10026 let bob_channel_reestablish = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().iter().find_map(|event|
10027 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = event {
10028 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10034 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_channel_reestablish);
10036 // Sanity check that Alice won't disconnect Bob since she's no longer waiting for any messages.
10037 for _ in 0..DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS {
10038 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10039 check_disconnect_event(&nodes[0], false);
10042 // However, Bob is still waiting on Alice's `RevokeAndACK`, so he should disconnect her after
10043 // reaching `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
10044 check_disconnect(&nodes[1]);
10046 // Finally, have Bob process the last message.
10047 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &alice_revoke_and_ack);
10048 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
10050 // At this point, neither node should attempt to disconnect each other, since they aren't
10051 // waiting on any messages.
10052 for node in &nodes {
10053 for _ in 0..DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS {
10054 node.node.timer_tick_occurred();
10055 check_disconnect_event(node, false);